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Abstract: A large number of world's political leaders have at one time or other were baptised through the fires of militancy. Others, who opposed the militants have also appeared in the political battlements. Comparing the leadership strategies, tactics and styles employed by these leaders to conventional leadership thoughts gives us patterns to learn and emulate. In a course covering 300 slides, this presentation goes through the gamut of militancy, terrorism, counter-terrorism, communication, leadership and lessons we can learn from the past to meet today's global challenges.JEL Classifications: A10, D20, D40, D70, D90, E20, L10, L80, M10, M31, P13 L00, M1, M12, M14, D70, D74, D78, D79, L14, M1
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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism
Dichotomy or Congruence
A course prepared for the Institute of Defense Studies (IDSS),
Nanyang University, Singapore, 1st Q. 2008
By
Aruna Kulatunga, MBA, MHRM (Monash University)
Senior Consultant - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.Eu
1Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Course Outline
2
9:00 - 10:45 10:45-11:0011:00 - 12:30 12:30-13:30 13:30-15:15 15:15-15:30 15:30-17:00 17:00-17:15
Day 1
Course Introduction
/ Setting Outcomes,
expectations
Coffee Break
Lessons from the
past
Lunch Break
Lessons from the
past. Cont.
Coffee Break
Concepts of
leadership
Day's Discussion
Benchmarking
Leadership Styles / Negotiation and
Communication
profiling
Day 2
Change Management
/ Communicat
ion & Negotiation
Coffee Break
Applying the
lessons
Lunch Break
Breakout Activity
Coffee Break
Bringing it together - Reinforcing
the outcomes
Day's Discussion
2Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Introduction
The threat level: its directed at you!
The why’s of gathering knowledge
Concepts of COIN, CT & linking with leadership
Lessons from the past - lessons for the future
What we take back - practical tool sets for achieving self-efficacy in leadership
3
Country
Principles
Ideas
Beliefs
Religion
Family
You
Beliefs BeliefsThe Threat Signal
World
3Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
IntroductionSetting the outcomes &
expectationsBenchmarking best practices in CT
How to relate the BM’s to leadership traits, theories and knowledge
Difference between tactics & strategy
The leader & manager - a necessary dichotomy
The essence of leadership - Managing Change
44Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
IntroductionSetting the outcomes &
expectations con-td.
55Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Unit delivery
From 11:00 - 12:30
Looking at history, learning from the past
People, incidents, tactics & strategies
Malaya, Kenya & Vietnam, Successes and failures
Eating Soup with a Knife...
66Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Leadership profiles
Lawrence of Arabia
Chairman Mao
Ernesto Guevara
Gerald Templer
David Galula
77Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Unit delivery
From 13:30 - 15:15 - Breakout Activity
Strategies and personalities - Lessons from the past continued...
88Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Unit delivery
From 15:30 - 17:00
Concepts of Leadership
Theories and Styles
The Unexpected Leader
The Johari window
The three lenses of leadership
Who moved my cheese?
The Flight of the Buffalo 99Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Unit deliveryDay 2 - 09:00-10:45
The difference between management and leadership: legitimate power and control vs. empowerment and change - Jooste.K (2004)
What is Change?
Theories of Change Management
The two legs of Change -Communication & Negotiation
More on empowerment... 1010Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Unit deliveryDay 2 - 11:00 - 12:30
Taking a look back at Day One’s lessons from the past
Can we apply what we know in Day Two, from concepts of leadership, change management, communication and negotiations, to these “incidents from the past”?
What toolkits do we need to apply our theories into practical realities?
Can we benchmark and identify best practices in contextual leadership? 11
11Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Unit deliveryDay 2 - 13:30 - 15-15
Realigning ourselves - lets take some quizzes - what’s my leadership style & how well do I communicate
Lessons on feedback
Double loop learning
A short introduction to knowledge management and its importance to leaders
Group activity - !to be decided! 1212Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
Unit delivery
Day 2 - 15:30 - 17:00
Reinforcing the outcomes from group activities
Bringing it together -
Organizations must rely on the knowledge, skills, experience and judgement of all its people..not a select handful...
Leadership is an enabler - not a barrier
1313Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
IntroductionSetting the outcomes &
expectations con-td.
Take away a Toolkit for Leaders
Change Management
Communication
Negotiation
Concepts of permeability
Access, Trust, Confidentiality, Consistency, Continuity
1414Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Aruna Kulatunga ([email protected]) @ www.comunicamos.eu
IntroductionSetting the outcomes &
expectations con-td.
Participation..Participation...Participation
Respect to all
No disturbances - mobile phones must be off!
Questions and queries at any time
Enlightened debate & contribution15
15Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Lessons from the past
Session II (11:00 - 12:30)
16Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga
17BBC Documentary 10 minutes
17Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
History of Guerilla warfare
Diminutive form of the Spanish word for war “Guerra”
Derived from Spanish partidas actions against French in 1808-14
First documented guerilla activity in a Hittite parchment, 15 Century B.C.
Mao Tse Tung’s writings not much different to Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” first written in 400 BC
Continuous evidence of guerilla warfare through out history
Terrorism - a form of guerilla warfare with actions targeting civilian life and property
18Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.1
18Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
History of Guerilla warfare...
All guerilla actions, insurgency, terrorism, small wars, urban revolutions, have one constant, a single thread, through out history
A degree of support from some sections of the population who was willing to provide the combatant refuge in time of need, provisions and succor information
Johannes Most
Considered a pioneer of both modern urban revolution and international terrorism - Published a work on the systematic use of terror by small groups of activists utilizing the most modern technology available in 1884 (Beckett.p.15)
19Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.1
19Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Thomas Edward Lawrence
Lawrence’s Six Fundamental Principles Of Insurgency
First, a successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base.
Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy.
Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts.
Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement.
Fifth, the irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence and logistical independence.
Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike at the enemy’s logistics and signals vulnerabilities.
20
Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind of the Insurgent." Army July.
Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind of the Insurgent." Army July: p 34.
20Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
T.E. Lawrence...
Personal credibility and role remains controversial
Does not desist from original guerilla theory espoused by Lawrence
Perceived the importance of popular support with 2% active support could achieve victory given the remaining 98% acquiesced or sympathized
Defined command as a function of - Algebraic - biological - psychological (motivation, morale) impetus
Followers include
Mao
Wingate
21
Propaganda “the greatest weapon in the armory of a modern commander”
Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.19-20
21Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Orde Wingate...
Helped to train the Haganah
Enlisted Haganah help to run clandestine attack groups to protect oil pipeline from Iraq to Port of Haifa
The Gideon Force
Chindits
22Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.47
22Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Mao Tse Tung...
Born in Hunan Province
Son of a farmer who provided the son with a high school education
After a series of defeats relating to attacks on Nationalists held cities, Mao changes direction from an urban proletariat led revolution to rural peasant led insurgency in 1930.
Shift in emphasis termed the “single most vital decision” in the history of the CCP.
23NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.20
“The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of people”
23Tuesday, 24 June 2008Mao developed Clausewitz theory and utilised it on the ground. The same theory applies in CT. As much as the Terrorist uses the masses or his/her own purposes, by acknowledging and identifying the power of the people, turn it against the Terrorist
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Mao’s 3 Rules and 8 Remarks
RulesAll actions are subject to commandDo not steal from the peopleBe neither selfish or unjust
RemarksReplace the door when you leave the houseRoll up the bedding on which you have sleptBe courteousBe honest in your transactionsReturn what you borrowReplace what you breakDo not bathe in the presence of womenDo not without authority search those you arrest
24
“The Unity of Spirit” between the troops and the people
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.22
24Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
The fish swimming in the water...
Mao description of a revolutionary as relying on the people for support - “Like a fish swimming in the water”
While the fish can be killed by polluting the water, this is not a desirable course of action -Frank Kitson
Trading space for time, first enumerated by Lawrence, leaving the Turks in Medina
“Politics is war without bloodshed. War is politics with bloodshed” (Becket, 2005, p.73)
25
“To gain territory is no cause for joy and to lose territory is no cause for sorrow. To lose territory or cities is of no importance. The important thing is to think up ways of destroying the enemy” (Becket, 2005, p.73)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.28
25Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Ho Chi Minh...
Nguyen Tat Thanh - (Ho Chi Minh)
Wrote a chapter on guerilla warfare in a 1928 soviet guide to insurrection. (It was the only chapter on guerilla warfare)
Controversial...but no dispute of his influence over the 20th century world events
26Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. , p.60
http://encarta.msn.com/media_461526436_761558397_-1_1/Ho_Chi_Minh.html
26Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Viet Minh vs the French...
Widespread and systematic use of terror by VM
Elimination of old administrative structures
killing village elders and officials in guerilla zones
LTTE in Sri Lanka eliminated nearly 70% of elders, some of whom nurtured the LTTE in its early days
Repeated indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets
27Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.50
27Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
COIN in early USSR...
Mikhail Tukhachevsky
Executed later by Stalin, considered by some to be a father of modern COIN
Stressed the need to take account local values and culture
Emphasized on single point of control over all aspects of the COIN response
Suggested pseudo-gangs
BUT, also was in favor of gulags, large scale evictions, assumption of collective guilt and collective punishments
28Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.50
28Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Mistaken identities..
Antoine Henry Jomini
Prescribed annihilation of the enemy force as best route to achieve victory
Destruction of the enemy force on the field
Carl Von Clausewitz
Victory is when the political objectives on which the war is being fought are accomplished
29
“True power of the armies rest in the people and their government”
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.18
29Tuesday, 24 June 2008In most small wars and insurgencies, the Clausewitz principle has stood in favour of the insurgents, a point to remember.
Mau Mau is a classic example. Kenyatta - Kenya
Nagl states one person who leveraged Clausewitz was Mao Tse - Tung
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Tache d'huile - Stain of oil
Concept developed first by Thomas Bugeaud in French Algeria in 1840Refined further by other Frenchmen in 1890 and in 1912
Extending French control more effectively through a dual military - political strategySolider - administrators with a dual roleSystematically spreading influenceConquest not by mighty blows, but as patch of oil spreadsReassuring local leaders France will uphold traditional authoritySoldiers acting as administrators, farmers, teachers, workshop managers... Aim of assimilation rather than subjugation
30Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.40-41
30Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga
3131Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
David Galula - a personal war...
Commanded troops for two years in Kabliya, East of Algiers
First hand experience serving as military attaché in China at the beginning of Mao’s government and subsequently in Hong Kong, observing Huk insurgency in the Philippines, the Malayan emergency and French efforts to maintain its empire in Indochina
Need for doctrine - (disputed by Kitson and Nagl)
Recognition of FNL’s urban terrorist strategy as driven by force multiplication efforts of propaganda - more effect in the cities
32
“ Outwardly treat every civlian as a friend; inwardly consider him a rebel till you have proof to the contrary”
Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., (From Bruce Hoffmanʼs foreward to the new edition (2006) p v-vii)
32Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
David Galula - a personal war...
Imperative of not alienating the local population
Emphasis on policing rather than military tactics to defeat insurrection
Fallacy of a decapitation strategy
Propaganda, propaganda, propaganda
33Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., (From Bruce Hoffmanʼs foreward to the new edition (2006) p v-vii)
33Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
The Philippines - 1898 Spanish American War
USA’s most successful instance of counterinsurgency theory and practiceIn addition to military measures
PropagandaCash Bounties for surrendered weaponsComprehensive public works program
Military measures included the imprisonment, deportation and “defeating” insurgents who maintained antagonism against the
34NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.46
34Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
British in Malaya...
Background...
3535Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Lt. Gen. Harold Briggs
Unusual grasp of the political nature of insurgency and of measures required to defeat it.
“In the early days we didn't grasp how important the support of the local people was. It wasn’t until Briggs that we understood that the CTs got all of their support - food, supplies, intelligence - from the local people” - a veteran of the Malaya emergency.
36
Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis.P.56
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.71
36Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Harold Briggs...
Promoted cooperation between military, police and civil arms of the government
Cooperation extended from the top to the bottom, pervading across all hierarchies through a system of integrated committees - Solving the problem of pulling in opposite directions
Emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering
Used intelligence in targeted, intensive, but small-scale operations
Concentrated full attention on fringe Chinese villages, improving, consolidating and isolating the villages from the CTs. - The draining the water process
37Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.56
37Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Harold Briggs...
Flexibility of operations in the jungle - key note
Battalion commanders being reconciled to devolve leadership to where it matters, NCO’s taking responsibility to make decisions on the spot
“New Villages” stopped the fish from moving in the water and when the CT came into replenish his supplies, he ran the risk of being caught in the shallows!
38NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.74
38Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Lt. Col. Walter Walker..Malaya
Traveling light and knowing the land; the coming of the Ferrets
The Jungle war fare school in the old asylum...Determined personal leadership...pushing the boundaries of hierachy
“For training only” Flame throwing cartridges - using available resources
39NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.68-70
39Tuesday, 24 June 2008 Lawrence, Wingate, Calvert - unorthodox, eccentric?Walker, Kitson, De La Billiere, - exceptional leaders
Paul, James, and Martin Spirit. "General Sir Peter De La Billiere". 2005. www.britains-smallwars.com. 16 Mar. 2007. <http://www.britains-smallwars.com/gulf/Billiere.html>.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Walter Walker...
Bypassing command hierarchies, going direct to the top appealing for change(Other officers also similarly oriented towards positive change - Walker not an isolated case)
Walker’s superiors were generally available but not quite open to analytical thinking: - the case of the open top transport lorries
Different cultures in the field and at the HQ - Field wants innovative techniques implemented - HQ keeping records, looking for patterns and puzzling over the results
40NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.79-80
40Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Walter Walker...
Inviting feedback and implementing suggestions - Surrendered CTs used to evaluate units in operationsOperational innovations through learning from the CTs - crossing streams walking backwards - Purposefully leaving footprints
(Practices later abandoned in COIN operations in Vietnam, VCs learnt quickly to identify false trails by weight patterns)
Introduction of ATOM (The Conduct of Anti-terrorist operations in Malaya) to codify and indoctrinate COIN practices learnt through Jungle School
41
“It is ..(because) of this handbook...we got militant communism in Malaya by the throat” - Templer (Nagl. p.98)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.97
41Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Oliver Lyttelton - Colonial Secretary
“Emergency is in essence a Police rather than a military task”
Creating and arming a Chinese home guard- propaganda starting from the school- “Children coming back $om school convert the parents to our way of thinking in the long term war of ideas, which we must win if we are to see a peaceful country and one which can some day be entrusted with self- government within the British commonwealth”
Sets the end-game clearly in instructions to Templer: - “Malaya should in due course become a fu'y self-governing nation” (p. 88)
42
“You cannot win the war without the help of the population and you cannot get the support of the population without at least beginning to win the war”
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.76-77
42Tuesday, 24 June 2008Converting Prabhakaranʼs children
UNP government in 2003 issues Passport to Charles Anthony,
http://origin.island.lk/2003/02/26/news09.html
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Gerald Templer...
Suborned the fight against CTs to achieving nationhood, merging the British objective with that of the local population.Uses symbolic language in the discourse of war Shows resilience and personal courage- Travels to residence in the bullet-ridden car in which his predecessor was assassinated just days before on arrival in MalayaCuts across hierarchies and involves younger civil servants in the decision making processStarts at the bottom - first things first - make political progress at local levelInvolves local leadership in taking responsibility for directing the war effortListens to and incorporates suggestions from Junior officers - a secret ballot to collect information on CTs.Physical Stamina- Tours the country unceasingly
43
“The Malayan people can count on the powerful and continuing assistance of His Majesty’s government not only in the immediate task of defeating the terrorists, but in the longer term objective of forging a United Malayan nation”
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.88-89
Corbet, 1986, p57-59
43Tuesday, 24 June 2008discourse of warsymbols, legends, repetitive messages, the just war, futile war etc.Secret Ballot - remedied the situation where householders were scared of giving information. Given the secret ballot was enforced, i.e., balloting was compulsory, there was no indication who provided the information
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Templer’s six laws...
Get the priorities rightGet the instructions rightGet the organization rightGet the right people into the organizationGet the right spirit into the peopleLeave them to get on with it
Dividing the intelligence functions - Director of Intelligence to analyze and report - Special Branch to collect and collateDividing responsibility efficientlyEnergized the situation
44NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.90-91
44Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Incident of Templer’s boots (with Templar in them) suddenly standing on he paperwork on top of a policeman’s desk.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Gerald Templer...
Entrusting responsibility to junior officers and backing them up with personal authority
Unconventional behavior - Issuing orders from the bathtub (Orde Wingate was also known for his eccentric bath routines...)
45NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.95-96
45Tuesday, 24 June 2008Wingate rarely bathed..prefered to scrub himself with a rubber brush...jungle warfare teaches soldiers to disguise body smell with mud and leaves, never to use soap, enemy trackers use smell to identify spoor
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Gerald Templer...
Expanding “oil spots” of security - Standardized and carried out throughout in an identical pattern
Use of pseudo Gangs- Mainly to trick CTs into surrendering- CTs eliminated only if there were no other options
Focussing on priorities - “To hell with drill, we want them to handle weapons and lay ambushes”-
(Negative impact in today’s warfare - untrained and undisciplined units - operational nightmares)
Ability to coordinate all of the efforts - Social, political, economical, civilian - police and military
46
“Military Force cannot change opinion, it can only create a framework in which economic reform and good government can take effect”
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.98 -100
46Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Gerald Templer...
Effective Feedback Loops in place..
Giving time to “Belly ache”
Subordinates offered substantiated criticism
Suggestions incorporated
The final version is owned by all, but had the personal authority of Templer
Never being afraid of bad news
47NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.104
47Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Hugh Green...
Providing a credible alternative -
Cash rewards and rehabilitation for surrenders
Persuading the people that the government is capable of providing essential services and defeating the CTs.
Using ex-CTs in the PsyWar effort
48NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.93
48Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Propaganda head.. (later DG/BBC)
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
British in Malaya...
No single doctrine - Freedom, and the necessity to create own answers
Recognition that situations differ and are dynamic
There is no right answer to all the questions
Recognition that there is little assistance from the center
Therefore, the need to adopt, make do
49
Spirit of Innovation
Wingate - Gideon Force, ChingitsCalvert -Malayan ScoutsWalker-Ferrets
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.194-195
49Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
British in Malaya...
Feedback Loops
Open to suggestions from below
Getting the decision making authority to allow innovation, monitor effectiveness, transmit new ideas with requirements that it be followed throughout the organization
Organization is not global
Can be divisional
Rarely more than country
No risks to social standing of superior officer to accept suggestion from junior
British organization culture, club, old school, etc, helps
50
Innovate
Transmit globally
Change if necessary
Monitor effectiveness
Implement locally
Monitor continously
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.195
50Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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51
Innovate
Transmit globally
Change if necessary
Monitor effectiveness
Implement locally
Monitor continously
51Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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British in Malaya...
Strategic and shared vision
Briggs
Putting the campaign in proper perspective
Military component vis-à-vis political and economic components
Templer / Lytellton
Continued to put into effect the Briggs plan
Shared vision
Templer insisting all subordinates share the vision
52
“The solution (to the Malaya Emergency) ...is in the hands of all of us, the peoples of Malaya and the governments which serve them” - Templer (Nagl p.197)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.195-196
52Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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British in Malaya...
Use of strict doctrine discouragedEach theater is different and needs its own policyShaping the respond to local and immediate needExperience teaches what works and what does notDoctrine is only as basis for training and equippingTraining to be up to date, effective and extremely flexible- Troops informed immediately of changes in training
53NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.204
53Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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British in Malaya...
Difference between Westmoreland and Templer
Templer makes Walter Walker write a field manual based on local experiences and tactics used
Westmoreland requests doctrine from Washington
54NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.210
54Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Thompson’s Five principles of counterinsurgency
The government must have a clear political aim; to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.
The government must function in accordance with the law
The government must have an overall plan
The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerilla
In the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first
55NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.29
55Tuesday, 24 June 2008Nagl states that what will determine the final outcome of COIN theory and practice is whether or not the national objective has been attained. Taking Thompsonʼs first principle as the ultimate national objective, how many governments has been successful in applying COIN theory?Thompson served in Malaya and Kenya, and is senior to Kitson
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Fighting for the right reasons?
Clausewitz - War must always be subordinate to the political goals for which it is being fought
Analyze current conflicts based on this percept
56NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.31
56Tuesday, 24 June 2008Iraq -AfghanistanIndonesiaEastern Timor
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Intellectual Soldiers...
“The Defence of Duffer’s Drift” by Maj. Gen. Ernest Swinton
An intellectual soldier in an un-intellectual organization
The importance of thinking, reading, writing and learning based on your own experiences and passing it down to the future generations.
57NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.37
57Tuesday, 24 June 2008Link it with learning organisation
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Did the British fail in Ireland...
Lack of good police intelligence
- which is at the heart of counterinsurgency and;
The nonexistence, from the government side, of an “hearts & minds” exercise, which the IRA was abundantly involved in
58NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.40
58Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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250 Years of Learning...
John Adams (c.1818) - The Revolution was in the Hearts and Minds of the people
Gerald Templar (c.1950) - The answer lies not in pouring more troops to the jungle, but in hearts and minds of the people
Marqués de Santa Cruz (Spain c. 1724-30) - Cautioned against trying to alter the traditions and customs of people under occupation, recommending amnesties granted soon after ceasing hostilities (Becket, 2005, p.26)
59Clutterbuck, Richard L.(1967)The Long Long War : The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960. London: Cassell., p.3
59Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Situation in Vietnam from a US perspective
End goal never clear - Were the French genuine in devolving power back to the Vietnamese post WWII?
60NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.118
60Tuesday, 24 June 2008Nagl talks of French making empty promises
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Vietnam from...
Questions of credibility from the beginning - General Paul Harkins - 1st Commander of the Military Assistance Command (MAC-V) - Known to be liberal with the truthAdmiral Harry Felt - CINC-PAC - Overly optimistic
Killing the messenger - Lt. Col. John Paul VannCol. Daniel PorterBrig. Gen. Robert York
Honest review of Ap Bac battlefield debacle dismissed by HarkinYork was not inside the chain of command at MAC-V. Lack of authority may have led to York’s inability to create an institutional consensus that change was needed
61
“I consider it a victory, we took the objective” - Gen. Harkin in Ap Bac debacle
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.134
61Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Vietnam from ...
Westmoreland vs Lew Walt - Marine Corps Combined action platoons (CAPS) program focussed on village-based pacification
“The only successful American project of any kind whatsoever in Vietnam” - Journalist William Lederer
Utilized the “oil spot” concept
Too little CAPS, too late!
62NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.156-157
62Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Vietnam from...
A change in perspective
“Strategy begins where politics ends”
1936 Staff Manual
“In this era, a soldier fights alongside the statesman to maintain the peace”
1985 Staff Manual
63NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.201
63Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Vietnam from..
If you only have a hammer to use, all problems will begin to look like nails....
Using firepower -
seeing all wars as military problems
No use for a political - military - economic screw driver
64NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.203
64Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Robert Comer...
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) - 1967-71
Vigorous Interventions ( The Blow Torch)Creative Bureaucratic infightingHad access to the President - by passing commandKey to the war was local security
Pulling together all military and civilian pacification programs under one command - shades of Briggs and TemplerEncouraged innovation from its personnel - Phoenix programme (p.166) to destroy VC infrastructure Inflexible, Compartmentalized, not permeableWestmoreland screened by his his staff, bad news prevented from reaching the top (Nagl p.180)
65
“It wasn’t tried seriously until too late...” Komer on CORDS“Everything ran its own compartment. ...Vietnam was a tragedy of bureaucratic inability to adapt to unconventional situations” Komer, (Nagl p.180)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.164-166
65Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Nagl’s main conclusion
It is the organizational culture of the military institution that determines whether innovation succeeds or fails
Holds true for any organization
66
“Building learning organizations entails profound cultural shifts” - Peter M. Senge
66Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Mau Mau in Kenya...
Major disparities in land distribution and income between white settlers and indigenous Africans
Kenya African Union
Jomo Kenyata’s National Front
Mau Mau
Made up of Kikuyu tribesmen, majority in KAU
Command structure not effective - But bound by secret oath and superstition
Estimated one million tribesmen taken oath
Brains of the movement in Nairobi, not in rural areas
67Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.59
Corbet, 1986, p.59
67Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Mau Mau in Kenya...
Use of “turned” informers and systematic cordon and search (Operation Anvil) breaks urban and rural links and MM cell structuresSuperior intelligence as a result of AnvilProgram of “Villagisation” , but not as successful as in MalayaExtensive use of pseudo gangs result in arrest of Dedan Kimathi, Execution of Kimathi signals end of emergencyKenya gains independence and Jomo Kenyatta becomes first leader of independent KenyaBronze statue of Kimathi erected by Kenyan government in Nairobi in December 2006 (Mwai, 2006)
68Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.59
Mwai, Elizabeth. "Headlines | Government to put up Kimathi statue." TheStandard online 12Dec2006. 27 Mar. 2007 <http://eastandard.net/hm_news/news.php?articleid=1143962407>.
68Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Mau Mau in Kenya
Pseudo gangs comes in for criticism
Use of indiscriminate force
Final resolution came through strengthening hands of local leaders and accelerating political, economic and social reform
As in Malaya, where CTs did not receive outside help, Mau Mau insurrection limited to Kenya, making the British job easier
69Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.65
McGhie, John. "British brutality in Mau Mau conflict | The Guardian | Guardian Unlimited." British Brutality in Mau Mau conflict Internet 9NOV2002. 27 Mar. 2007 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,836653,00.html>.
69Tuesday, 24 June 2008Smith, Graham. "Blind Eye to the Butcher (Torture in Bahrain) - Google Video." Carlton ITV 1, Special Report on the Butcher of Bahrain 2002. 27 Mar. 2007 <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=8207296200885546643>.
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Pseudo Gangs...
Desertion of Algeria’s Force Z to FNL 200 pseudo gang members cross over with weapons
Freds in Ireland
Operating under Military Reconnaissance Force (Hoffman & Taw, 1992, P.98)
70Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Morrison Taw. A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency. Santa Monica: Rand, 1992.
Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., p.97
70Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Pseudo Gangs...
Using turned terrorists
Turning through carrot and stick approach
Not as successful as the hooded informants in Kenya
Some became double agents, while others executed by IRA
Kitson’s laundry, set up to spot telltale signs of blood or explosives, blown by a Fred, killing the soldier-driver of the laundry delivery van and nearly costing the lives of the other “laundry” workers (Hoffman & Taw, 1992, p.108)
71Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Morrison Taw. A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency. Santa Monica: Rand, 1992.
71Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Revolution in warfare
Napolean’s Nation in Arms
Mao’s Armed Nation
AQ - 1.2 Billion Strong Muslim Ummah (Nation) that transcends state and ethnic boundaries (See Ramakrishna, Kumar.
"Countering the New Terrorism of Al Qaeda without Generating Civilizational Conflict: The Need for an Indirect Strategy." The New Terrorism - Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies. Eds. Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002. 254.)
72NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.27
72Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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New Lessons from Iraq - Separating the fish from the water
73
Enemy can be defeated only if his name and address, and of his extended family, is known
Dynamically adjusting to changing situations - Intelligence staff analyzing HumInt, trained for artillery range
Creating Link Diagrams - depicting who talks with whom - Shades of the Algerian war
Localized intelligence - collected and processed on-the-spot, not relying on Washington as in Vietnam war
Developing Long term relationships and cultural awareness
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.XIII
73Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Why you need a mustache to win a war
Capt. Travis Patriquin's powerpoint presentation
Provide lucid, easy to understand, basis for action
74Raddatz, Martha. "Army Captain's Simple Demonstration: How to Win in Iraq". 2006. ABC News International. (15 Dec. 2006). 20 March 2007. <http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2729584>.
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Dedicated and reliable local partnerships
The ultimate objective in achieving the final goal in Iraq.
Achieved in Malaysia
Not in Vietnam other than isolated Marine Corps operations that were called off by high command
76NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.xiv
76Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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A Day When Mahdi Army Showed Its Other Side -
Militia Seen as Heroic in Aiding Bomb Victims
Terror Fighters or the local government?
Take the initiative out of the established government
Provide essential services and a sense of immediate security to the people
77Raghavan, Sudarsan. "A Day When Mahdi Army Showed Its Other Side - Militia Seen as Heroic in Aiding Bomb Victims". 2006. (27 Nov. 2006): Washington Post. 20 Mar. 2007 2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/26/AR2006112601242.html?nav=hcmodule>
77Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Wars of attrition
Has poor record of success
Pouring in Men, Money and Material is an escalating and indiscriminate use of firepower - results in upward spiral of civilian alienation
78
Playing chess while enemy is playing poker...
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.27
78Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Hoffman and Taw...
Examined COIN/CT operations in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Rhodesia, N.Ireland, W.Germany and Italy
Uses Julian Paget’s taxonomy
Paget examined 32 campaigns in colonial countries - Paget, Julian. Counterinsurgency Campaigning. London: Faber and Faber, 1967
Four elements that augment COIN/CT operations
Effective overall command and coordination structure
Confidence building measures and anti-terro legislation to weaken support for Terrorists and strengthening public support for the government
Coordination within and between intelligence services
Foreign collaboration amongst governments and security forces
7979Tuesday, 24 June 2008
Hoffman, Bruce. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica: Rand, 2004 June. - Netwar - changing constituencies in COIN/CT - Nebulous organisation, no identifiable leadership or unifying ideology (except for anti-western sentiment?) - Represents new form of warfare “for a new, networked century” - Imperative to be a learning organization, agile, flexible and change oriented to proactively and dynamically engage the “new enemy”
©Aruna KulatungaHoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Morrison Taw. A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency. Santa Monica: Rand, 1992 p.11980
80Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Hoffman and Taw...
Netwar - changing constituencies in COIN/CT
Nebulous organization, no identifiable leadership or unifying ideology (except for anti-western sentiment?)
Represents new form of warfare “for a new, networked century”
Imperative to be a learning organization, agile, flexible and change oriented to proactively and dynamically engage the “new enemy”
8181Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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The importance of being a learning organisation
8282Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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A succession of small wars...
Second Anglo-Boer War (United Kingdom [U.K.]vs. Boer separatists, 1899-1902).Philippine Insurrection (United States [U.S.] vs. Filipino nationalists, 1899-1902 [1916])Arab Revolt (Ottoman Turkey vs. Arab rebels, 1916-1918). Iraq 1920 (U.K. vs. Iraqi rebels, 1920) China (Nationalist Party [KMT] vs. Communists, 1922-1949). Nicaraguan Intervention (U.S. and Government of Nicaragua [GoN] vs. Sandinistas, 1925-1932). France, World War II (Germany vs. French resistance and Special Operations Executive [SOE]/Office of Strategic Services [OSS], 1940-1945).Balkans, World War II (Germany vs. Tito’s partisans and SOE/OSS, 1940-1945). Greek Civil War (U.K., then U.S. and Government of Greece [GoG], vs. National Liberation Army [ELAS],1944-1949). Indonesian Revolt (Netherlands vs. Indonesian rebels, 1945-1949). French Indochina (France vs. Viet Minh, 1945-1954). Palestine (U.K. vs. Jewish separatists, 1945-1948). Hukbalahap Rebellion (Philippine Islands [P.I.] vs. Hukbalahap, 1946-1954). Malayan Emergency (U.K. vs. Malayan Communist Party [MPC]/Malayan Races Liberation Army [MRLA],1948-1960). Kenyan Emergency (U.K. vs. Mau Mau, 1952-1956). Algerian Revolt (France vs. National Liberation Front[FLN], 1954-1962). Cyprus (U.K. vs. Ethniki Organosis Kyprios Agoniston[EOKA] (a Greek terrorist organization), 1954-1959). Aden (U.K. and Aden vs. Yemeni insurgents, 1955-1967). Cuban Revolution (Cuba’s Batista regime vs. Castro,1956-1959). France (France vs. Secret Army Organization [OAS],1958-1962). Venezuela (Venezuela vs. urban-based Armed Forces for National Liberation [FALN], 1958-1963). Vietnam War (U.S. and Government of Vietnam[GoVN] vs. National Liberation Front [NLF] and Democratic People’s Republic of Vietnam [DPRVN],1958-1975). Guatemalan Civil War (Guatemala vs. Marxist rebels,1961-1996). Angola (Portugal vs. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA], 1961-1974). Guinea-Bissau (Portugal vs. Marxist rebels, 1963-1974). Uruguay (Uruguay vs. Tupamaros, 1963-1972). Mozambique (Portugal vs. Front for the Liberation of Mozambique [FRELIMO], 1964-1974).Colombian Civil War (U.S. and Government of Colombia [GoC] vs. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] and National Liberation Army[ELN], 1964-present). Northern Ireland (U.K. vs. Irish Republican Army [IRA],1968-present). Weather Underground (WU) (U.S. vs. Students for a Democratic Society [SDS]/WU, Black Panthers, Symbionese Liberation Army [SLA] et al., 1968-1980). Spain (Spain vs. Basque Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna [ETA](Basque fatherland and liberty), 1968-present). Oman (U.K. and Oman vs. Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf [PFLOAG],1969-1976). Germany (Germany vs. Baader-Meinhof Red Army Faction [RAF], 1970-1992). Philippines (P.I. vs. New People’s Army [NPA] and Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF]/Moro Islamic Liberation Front [MILF], 1970-present). Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka vs. Tamil New Tigers [TNT],1972-present). Palestine (Israel vs. Palestine Liberation Front [PLF]et al., 1973-present). Rhodesia (Rhodesia vs. Zimbabwe African People’s Union [ZAPU] and Zimbabwe African National Union[ZANU], 1974-1980). Western Sahara (Morocco vs. Western Sahara Freedom Movement [POLISARIO], 1975-1991). Soviet- Afghan War (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics[USSR] and Government of Afghanistan [GoA] vs. Mujahideen, 1979-1988). Salvadoran Civil War (U.S. and Government of El Salvador [GoES] vs. Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN], 1979-1991). Senderista Insurgency (Peru vs. Sendero Luminoso, 1980-1995; vs. Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement [MRTA], 1996-1997). Nicaragua (Frente Sandinista Deliberacion Nacional[FSLN] vs. National Guard [GN]/Contras, 1980-1990). Kashmir (India vs. Kashmiri Muslim separatists,1988-present). Algeria (Algeria/National Liberation Front [FLN] vs. Islamic Salvation Front [FIS]/Armed Islamic Group[GIA], 1992-present). Somalia Humanitarian Relief Mission (U.S. and UNvs. armed factions, 1992-1994). Chechnya (Russia vs. Chechen separatists, 1994-present). Nepal (Nepal vs. Maoists, 1996-present). Afghanistan (U.S. and GoA vs. Taliban, 2001-present). Iraq (Government of Iraq [GoI] and U.S.-led coalition vs. jihadists and insurgents, 2003-present).
83Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." Military Review May-June (2005): 5., p.8
83Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Sepp - Best practices in CT...
Successful Operational PracticesAdherence to Human Rights
Law enforcementHonest, trained police able to gather first-rate intelligence supported by uncorrupted Judiciary
Population Control Political process to engage root causesCounterinsurgent warfare Securing Borders
84Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." Military Review May-June (2005): 5.
84Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Sepp - Best practices in CT...
Emphasis on intelligence.
Focus on population, their needs, and security.
Secure areas established, expanded.
Insurgents isolated from population (population control).
Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader).
Effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns.
Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents.
Police in lead; military supporting.
Police force expanded, diversified.
Conventional military forces reoriented for counterinsurgency.
Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces.
Insurgent sanctuaries denied
85Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." Military Review May-June (2005): 5., p.10
85Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Sepp - Best Practices in CT...
Unsuccessful CT PracticesPrimacy of military direction of counterinsurgency.Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, not on engaging population.Battalion-size operations as the norm.Military units concentrated on large bases for protection.Special Forces focused on raiding.Adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment.Building, training indigenous army in image of U.S. Army.Peacetime government processes. Open borders, airspace, coastlines.
86Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." Military Review May-June (2005): 5., p.10
86Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Leadership Traits:Extraversion
ConscientiousnessOpenness Emotional
Intelligence (qualified)
Traits Theories of Leadership consider personality, social, physical, or intellectual traits to differentiate leaders from non-leaders.
87
Trait Theories
87Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Limitations:No universal traits found that predict leadership in all situations.Unclear evidence of the cause and effect of relationship of leadership and traits.Better predictor of the appearance of leadership than distinguishing effective and ineffective leaders.
88
Trait Theories
88Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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89
Behavioral Theories
Behavioral Theories of Leadership
Theories proposing that specific behaviors differentiate leaders from non-leaders.
Behavioral theory:
Leadership behaviors can be taught.
Vs.
Trait theory:
Leaders are born, not made.
89Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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90
Behavioral Approach
Ohio State Studies/U. of Michigan
Initiating Structure/Production Orientation
Consideration/Employee Orientation
Assumption: Leaders can be trained
Goal: Develop leaders
Problem: Effective behaviors do not generalize across situations
90Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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91
University of Michigan Studies
Employee-Oriented Leader
Emphasizing interpersonal relations; taking a personal interest in the needs of employees and accepting individual differences among members.
Production-Oriented Leader
One who emphasizes technical or task aspects of the job.
91Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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92
Path-Goal Theory
Premise
Leader must help followers attaining goals and reduce roadblocks to success
Leaders must change behaviors to fit the situation (environmental contingencies & subordinate contingencies)
92Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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93
The Path-Goal Theory
93Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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94
Leader-Participation Model
Premise:
Rule based decision tree to guide leaders about when and when not to include subordinate participation in decision making
Considers 12 contingency variables to consider whether or not to include subordinates in decision making
94Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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95
Leader-Participation Model
Importance of the decision
Importance of obtaining follower commitment to the decision
Whether the leader has sufficient information to make a good decision
How well structured the problem is
Whether an autocratic decision would receive follower commitment
Whether followers “buy into” the organization’s goals
Whether there is likely to be conflict
95Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Transformational and Transactional Leadership (Bass and Avolio, 1990,
Transformational Leadership:
Idealized attributes - encourages follower trust
Idealized behaviors - sharing a common vision
Inspirational motivation - inspiring a vision
Intellectual stimulation - questions status quo
Individualized consideration - coaching, mentoring
9696Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Transformational and Transactional Leadership
Transactional Leadership:
Contingent Reward - reward for meeting expectations
Management by Exception (Active) - focuses on mistakes and exceptions
Management by Exception (Passive) - only takes action when things go wrong
Non-Leadership:
Laissez-faire - avoidance of responsibility
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What is the best leadership style?
The one which works for the individual leader in a specific time and in a specific environment
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Leadership
Some are born great,
some achieve greatness, and
some have greatness thrust upon them.
Malvolio, Twelfth Night, Act 11, Scene V
William Shakespeare
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Leadership
Lead, follow, or get out of the wayPlaque on Ted Turner’s desk
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Leadership
Primus inter pares
(First among equals)
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Management
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Creates consistent and orderly results.
Helps an organization run efficiently, on-time and on-budget Planning and Budgeting
Establish detailed steps and timetables for achieving specific results
Organizing and Staffing
Creating the structure of jobs needed to implement the plan
Controlling
Monitoring results, spotting deviations and making corrections
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Leadership
Creates change, often dramatic change & helps the organization adapt to the changing environment.
Direction Setting
Creates a vision of the future for a product, activity or organization
Aligns People & Systems
Communicates the vision and strategies through words & deeds so that relevant people understand and accept direction
Motivates and Inspires
Energizing individuals so that they achieve the vision despite bureaucratic constraints
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10 Commandments for Successful Leaders
A sound ethical compass
Ability to make unpleasant decision
Clarity and focus
Ambition
Effective communication skills
Ability to identify the right work role for people
A knack for developing talent
Emotional self-confidence
Adaptability
Charm
104The Economist. (2003). Higher Education Special Report, The Australian, 12 November, 6-7.
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Who is a leader...
MANAGERS: Plan and ControlLEADERS: Inspire and Motivate“The very essence of leadership is that you have to have a vision.” Theodore Hesburgh“..is the art of getting someone else to do what you want done because he (or she) wants to do it.” Dwight Eisenhower“Effective leadership is putting first things first. Effective management is discipline, carrying it out.” Stephen Covey“Leadership, like swimming, cannot be learned by reading about it.” Henry Mintzberg“.. effective leadership is not about making speeches or being liked; leadership is defined by results not attributes.” Peter Drucker“.. The function of leadership is to produce more leaders not followers.” Ralph Nader
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Influences on leadership
mythology
culture
religion
family of origin
readings
media
education
observations
role models
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Reflections
Tao
a paradox:by being selfless, the leader enhances self
leads from behind
mentors & develops others
focuses on the benefit of all
role is to become redundant
wise leader (spiritual )
Tao means how
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Reflections
Machiavelli
focus on self-interest
the end justifies the means
the goal is everything
appearance is useful
dishonesty is acceptable
the ultimate pragmatist
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Reflections
Aristotle
focus on equity and justice
all citizens should take their turn in governing & being governed
how - the old & the young
values being “honourable”
disturbed by the lack of virtue from those who want to be leaders
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Reflections
Plato
the ideal leader of the ideal State - the philosopher king
values intellect and wisdom
leaders should be selected & educated
anti-democratic, authoritarian philosopher
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Reflections
Thomas Carlyle
the Ablest Man
true-hearted, justest
the Noblest man
one supreme person to lead
the “hero”
don’t need a ballot box - have the perfect state
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What is leadership...
In the context of the study of Organizational Behavior (OB), Leadership is about change.
“An empowered organization is one in which individuals have the knowledge, skill, desire and opportunity to personally succeed in a way that leads to collective organizational success.” Stephen Covey
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Is leadership innate or can it be learnt?
113Tuesday, 24 June 2008In answering this question we will present a number of different theories that argue that there are core traits necessary for effective leadership.
We will ask you to identify those traits you feel are most important to effective leadership and to consider whether you regard them as innate or learnt.
When we went through this exercise we found that the answer is more complex than first envisaged.
Anne to hand out work sheets???
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Is leadership innate or can it be learnt?
113Tuesday, 24 June 2008In answering this question we will present a number of different theories that argue that there are core traits necessary for effective leadership.
We will ask you to identify those traits you feel are most important to effective leadership and to consider whether you regard them as innate or learnt.
When we went through this exercise we found that the answer is more complex than first envisaged.
Anne to hand out work sheets???
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
The “Great Man Theory”Cawthorn, D.L. (1996)
Prior to 1950’s the ‘Great Man Theory’ was generally accepted
1950-90 Behavioural Scientists suggested that the born leader is a myth
Only ingredient necessary is a desire to learn
Cawthorn suggests that the desire to learn is one of many required traits
114Tuesday, 24 June 2008In our readings we find that Cawthorn revisits the Great Man Theory which up until the 1950’s was the popular theory on leadership. •Revolved around the Hero Leader concept where the leader was out in front leading the charge (John Wayne concept)•For the past 50 years concept of leadership dominated by behavioural scientists. In 1986 Warren Bennis & Burt Nanus suggest that:
•born leader is a myth•only ingredient required is a desire to learn
•Cawthorn refutes this view, •it is more probable that the desire and ability to learn are some of a number of traits required for effective leadership.
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The “Right Stuff ”
Not equally present in all people (Kirpatrick & Locke)
Some are marked for subjection, others for rule (Aristotle)
Natural aristocracy (Jefferson)
Linked to one’s personality (Zaleznik)
Intimately connected to biological characteristics
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So what are these traits and how do they distinguish some people for the general masses?•Kirpatrick & Locke describe these characteristics as the “Right Stuff”and see them as some special ingredient that seperates leaders from followers (Fleur will expand on this later)•Aristotle identified a unique distinction between leaders and followers, stating that ………•In his 1813 leter to John Adams, Thomas Jefferson described it as a natural aristocracy …..
•Define aristocracy•Distinguish between hereditary & natural • Incl genius & virtue
•Zaleznik links these differences to ones personality (charisma)•Life sciences link it to a special brain chemistry between leaders & followers.
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Serotonin
116Tuesday, 24 June 2008Suggest that high levels of the brain chemical Serotonin promotes leadership.WOW! Could this be a magic elixir for leadership?I searched the WEB to find out more (Advance Slide)People using smart drugs to enhance study or memory.What’s in Serotonin?(Read WEB page) So what produces Serotonin? SugarSo if we pump ourself full of sugar we could all be better leaders. The down-side is that we will put on weight. So we can be Fat Leaders or Thin Followers. The choice is yours. (Name a few Fat Leaders) Here is your opportunity to leave tonight a better leader. Hand out marshmallows (one now or two later)Important point. Before you pump yourself full of sugar it is possible that Serotonin is produced in the brain as a result of doing leadership rather than promoting leadership.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Liquid Serotonin (Homoeopathic)
When the serotonin level in the brain is depleted from stress, anxiety, depression, hyperactivity or
A.D.D, communication in the brain through neurotransmitters is decreased. Neurotransmitters is the chemical language of the brain. For a quick
boost, use Liquid Serotonin. 1 oz. bottle $15 OR 3 for $40 +P&H
Serotonin
116Tuesday, 24 June 2008Suggest that high levels of the brain chemical Serotonin promotes leadership.WOW! Could this be a magic elixir for leadership?I searched the WEB to find out more (Advance Slide)People using smart drugs to enhance study or memory.What’s in Serotonin?(Read WEB page) So what produces Serotonin? SugarSo if we pump ourself full of sugar we could all be better leaders. The down-side is that we will put on weight. So we can be Fat Leaders or Thin Followers. The choice is yours. (Name a few Fat Leaders) Here is your opportunity to leave tonight a better leader. Hand out marshmallows (one now or two later)Important point. Before you pump yourself full of sugar it is possible that Serotonin is produced in the brain as a result of doing leadership rather than promoting leadership.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Situational Forces
Linkage between leadership and the situation in which leaders find themselves.
Churchill
Martin Luther King
Princess Diana
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In addition to those traits already identified Cawthorn recognises that the situation in which leaders find themselves may draw out their leadership traits.Go through list: (acknowledge James’citation of Weary Dunlop)
Although their situation may have drawn out these people’s leadership traits a further traits they possessed was the vision, purpose and determination to do something about the situation that would make a difference.
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Leadership Traits (Cawthorn)
Learning
Knowledge
Wisdom
Competence
Talent
Ability
Genius
Virtue
Chemical make up
Personality
Vision/purpose
118Tuesday, 24 June 2008So what are the traits identified by CawthornLearning (Cawthorn)Knowledge (Aristotle)Wisdom (Aristotle)Competence (Aristotle)Talent (Aristotle)Ability (Aristotle)Genius (Jefferson)Virtue (Jefferson)Chemical make upPersonality (Zaleznik) (linked to charisma)Vision/purpose (Cawthorn)
So Do Traits Really Matter? To answer this I’ll now handover to Fleur.
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Leadership: do traits matter?
Early 20th century, evolution of Trait Theory
Trait defined as: People’s general characteristics, including capacities, motives or patterns of behaviour (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991).
Did not make assumptions about whether leadership traits were inherited or acquired
Leaders’ characteristics are different from non-leaders
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Early 20th century, evolution of Trait Theory.Trait Defined as: People’s general characteristics, including capacities, motives or patterns of behaviour. (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991).Trait theories did not make assumptions about whether leadership traits were inherited or acquired.Simply asserted that leaders’ characteristics are different from non-leaders.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Core traits do matter!
Drive :
Reflecting a high level of effort
Achievement, motivation, ambition, energy, tenacity & initiative
Achievement:
Better ways of doing things
Ambition:
‘Dogged determination to succeed’ (Walt Disney)
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Drive : Trait reflecting a high level of effort.Achievement, motivation, ambition, energy, tenacity & initiative.
Achievement:Developing better ways of doing things.
Ambition:Walt Disney calls it ‘dogged determination to succeed’
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Core Traits (cont)
Energy:
Active, lively and often restless
Tenacity:
Overcoming obstacles, will & perseverance
Initiative:
Pro-active, make choices, & take action!
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Energy:Active, lively and often restless.
Tenacity:Overcoming obstacles, will & perseverance.
Initiative:Pro-active, make choices, & take action!
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Core Traits (cont)
Leaders must be achievement orientated, ambitious, energetic, tenacious and proactive
Effective leaders must not only be full of drive & ambition, they must want to lead others!
Leadership Motivation:
Equated with the need for power
Influencing others, assuming responsibility
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Trait theory is suggesting that leaders must be achievement orientated, ambitious, energetic, tenacious and proactive.But, effective leaders must not only be full of drive & ambition, they must want to lead others!Leadership Motivation:
Often equated with the need for power.Influencing others, assuming responsibility.
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Core Traits (cont)
Honesty & Integrity
Self-confidence
Emotional Stability
Cognitive Ability
Knowledge of the business
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Honesty & IntegritySelf-confidence.Emotional Stability.Cognitive Ability.Knowledge of the business
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Is leadership innate or learnt?
Certain traits are less changeable or trainable:
Cognitive Ability: the least trainable of all traits
Knowledge of industry: can be developed through experience and training
Honesty: Does not require skill building A virtue one achieves or rejects by choice
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Certain traits are less changeable or trainable.Cognitive Ability: the least trainable of all traits.(As Anne will discuss)Knowledge of industry: can be developed through experience and training.Honesty: Does not require skill building. It is a virtue one achieves or rejects by choice.
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Evidence: Traits do matter!(Kirkpatrick & Locke)
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Drive
Achievement
Ambition
Energy
Tenacity
Initiative
Leadership Motivation
Honesty & Integrity
Self Confidence
Emotional Stability
Cognitive Ability
Knowledge of Business
125Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Asian Leadership
12 Principles of Asian Leadership Importance of strategies Transforming adversary’s strength to weakness Deception to gain advantage Understanding contradiction Compromise Striving for total victory Taking advantage of adversary’s misfortune
Flexibility Gathering information Seeing interdependence of relationships Patience Avoiding strong emotions
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References
Cawthorn, D.L. (1996). Leadership: The great man theory revisited. Business Horizons. 39 (3), 1-4.
Conger, J.A. (1991) Inspiring others: the lanaguage of leadership. Academy of Management Executive, 5(1), 31-45.
Goleman,D (1998).What makes a leader? Harvard Business Review,76(6),November -December,92-102
Kirkpatrick, S.A. and Locke, E.A. (1991) Leadership: do traits matter? Acadamey of Management Executive, 5(2), 48-60.
Sarros, James C. and Oleh Butchatsky. (1996). Leadership: Australias Top CEOs - Finding out what makes them the best.Sydney: Harper Collins.
Goleman,D. (2000).Leadership that gets results. Harvard Business Review,78(2), March -April,78-93
Senge,P.M., (1990)The leader’s new work Sloan Mangement Review 30(1) fall1-7
Zohar, D.& Marshall, I. (2001) Spiritual Intelligence The Ultimate Intelligence. Bloomsbury Publishing London
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COMMUNICATION
"The motto of communication theory
ought to be: Dialogue with the self, dissemination with
the other. ~John Durham Peters (1999, p. 57)
Peters, John Durham. Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of Communication. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.128
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129 Documentary clip on Dr Martin Luther King129Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Jihad
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Jihad means struggle - for example the struggle for self-improvement - and
only occasionally in Muslim history has it meant doing battle with non-believers.
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Fatwa
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Many in the West think “Fatwa” means a death sentence. It does not. It is simply a religious ruling - and in order to be binding, a fatwa must be issued by a Muslim who is qualified to do so.
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Culture
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Artifacts, Legends,
Myths, Wise persons
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Communications = Language?
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Written Expressions
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Verbal Instructions
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Verbal intonation- emphasis someone gives to words or phrases that convey meaning
Body language- gestures, facial expressions and other body movements that convey meaning
7
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Nonverbal communication
Transmission without words
Every oral communication is accompanied by a nonverbal message
Nonverbal component usually carries the greatest impact
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SenderMeaning
ReceiverInterpretation
EncodingTransmission
Decoding
Feedback
141
Communication Process
141Tuesday, 24 June 2008THE EARLIEST MODELS OF COMMUNICATION IN ORGANSIATIONS EMPHASISED COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOURS AND ADOPTED A PIPELINE VIEW OF COMMUNICATIONS. IN THIS VIEW COMMUNICATIONS FLOWED BETWEEN THE SENDER AND THE RECEIVER. THIS IS A VALID PROCESS, DRAWS ATTENTION TO CERTAIN ASPECTS, BUT OBSCURING OTHERS.YET THE PROCESS OF HOW MEANING IS CONSTRUCTED IN COMMUNICATIONS IS MORE PROBLEMATIC. IT EXPLAINS THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMWHICH ARISES WHEN DESPITE EVERYONE RECEIVING THE SAME MESSAGE, THEY UNDERSTAND IT IN DIFFERENT WAYS.PEOPLE COMMUNICATE FROM A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD.CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES EMPHASISE COMMUNICATIONS IS: - AN EVER CHANGING DYNAMIC PROCESS- INVOLVES THE CREATION/RECREATION OF MEANING WHICH RESIDES IN PEOPLE AS WELL AS THE MESSAGE, AND- A SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY THAT SERVES MANY FNCTIONS, AND ONE SHOULD EXAMINE THE RELATIONSHIPS B/W INDIVIDUALS
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Human characteristicsProfessional characteristics
A Balanced Voice
ConfidenceAuthorityFirmness
Power
TrustWarmthSincerity
Believability
Your Voice - An asset or Liability?
142Tuesday, 24 June 2008Hi or Low Pitch: Out of Balance
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Hearing and Listening
Hearing is not listening. The former is a physical process, while the latter is a mental process.
Listening involves comprehending and retaining what was heard. Failure to listen is a common barrier to successful oral communication.
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Hearing and Listening
One reason that listening is challenging is that most people speak @ 100-200 words a minute, but we are capable of listening to material of average difficulty @ 500 or more words a minute (Krizan et al., 2002).
This difference allows a listener's mind to wander to topics other than the message.
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Exhibit affirmation
Avoid distracting actions
Ask questions
Paraphrase
Avoid interrupting
Don’t over talk
Smooth transitions
Make eye contact
All help developeffective
activelistening
skills
Active listening
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Results
Conversation(lack of understanding,
diverging views, evaluate others)
Dialogue
Discussion
Reveal feelings, explore assumptions, suspend
opinion, build common ground
State positions, advocate views, convince others, and build oppositions
Long-term, innovative solutions, shared
meaning, transformed mindset
Short-term resolutions, agreement by logic, mindsets held onto
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Dialogue and Discussion
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Developingeffective feedback skills
Well-timed
Specific
Control
Goal-oriented
Impersonal
Understanding147
Feedback skills
147Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Making Feedback Effective
Give immediate feedback
don’t delay feedback
discuss performance while the memory is vivid
Make feedback specific
focus on definite behavior and time-frame
make sure behavior was controllable
Make feedback problem-oriented
focus on behavior not personality
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In order for feedback to be constructive rather than destructive, it must be immediate, focused on specific behaviors, and problem oriented. Because the mistake or incident can be recalled more accurately and discussed in detail by the manager and the worker, immediate feedback is much more effective than delayed feedback. Specific feedback focuses on particular acts or incidents that are clearly under the control of the employee. Furthermore, specific feedback isn't very helpful unless employees have control over the problems that the feedback addresses. Indeed, giving negative feedback about behaviors beyond someone's control is likely to be seen as unfair. Similarly, giving positive feedback about behaviors beyond someone's control may be viewed as insincere.Last, problem-oriented feedback focuses on the problems or incidents associated with the poor performance rather than on the worker or the worker's personality. Giving feedback does not give managers the right to personally attack workers. While managers may be frustrated by a worker's poor performance, the point of problem-oriented feedback is draw attention to the problem in a nonjudgmental way, so that the employee has enough information to correct it.
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The Johari Window
Open Area
Hidden Area
Blind Area
Unknown Area
Joe Luft and Harry Ingham
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Self
149
The Johari Window
Open Area
Hidden Area
Blind Area
Unknown Area
Joe Luft and Harry Ingham
149Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Knownto self
Self
149
The Johari Window
Open Area
Hidden Area
Blind Area
Unknown Area
Joe Luft and Harry Ingham
149Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Knownto self
Not knownto self
Self
149
The Johari Window
Open Area
Hidden Area
Blind Area
Unknown Area
Joe Luft and Harry Ingham
149Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Knownto self
Not knownto self
Self
Other
149
The Johari Window
Open Area
Hidden Area
Blind Area
Unknown Area
Joe Luft and Harry Ingham
149Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Knownto self
Not knownto self
Knownto others
Self
Other
149
The Johari Window
Open Area
Hidden Area
Blind Area
Unknown Area
Joe Luft and Harry Ingham
149Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga
Knownto self
Not knownto self
Knownto others
Not knownto others
Self
Other
149
The Johari Window
Open Area
Hidden Area
Blind Area
Unknown Area
Joe Luft and Harry Ingham
149Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Knownto self
Not knownto self
Knownto others
Not knownto others
Self
Other
150
Two Processes That Enable YouTo Build a Large Free Area
150Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga
Knownto self
Not knownto self
Knownto others
Not knownto others
Self
Other
DISCLOSURE
150
Two Processes That Enable YouTo Build a Large Free Area
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Knownto self
Not knownto self
Knownto others
Not knownto others
Self
Other
DISCLOSURE
FEEDBACK
150
Two Processes That Enable YouTo Build a Large Free Area
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Change your tone and you change your meaning:Placement of the emphasis What it means
Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? I was going to take someone else.
Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Instead of the guy you were going with.
Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? I’m trying to find a reason why I shouldn’t take you.
Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Do you have a problem with me?
Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Instead of going on your own.
Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Instead of lunch tomorrow.
Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Not tomorrow night.
Kiely, “When ‘No’ Means ‘Yes,’ ” Marketing, October 1993, pp. 7–9. Reproduced in A. Huczynski and D. Buchanan, Organizational Behaviour, 4th ed. (Essex, England: Pearson Education, 2001), p. 194. 151
Intonations: It’s the Way You Say It!
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Any other forms of communications ?
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Visual and Auditory cues
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Without credible communications, the hearts and minds of the troops are never captured - Kotter, 1995
Kotter, J.P., “Leading change: why transformational efforts fail”, Harvard Business Review on Change, HBS Press, Boston MA, 1995
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Barret, D.J., Using Strategic employee communications to facilitate major change, Corporate Communications Vol 7, 4, 2002
Strategic Communications Model
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Assume 600 SoldiersAmbush ahead: all 600 will be killed if they enter the ambushThe general can lead his men out by one of two routesRoute 1: 200 soldiers will be savedRoute 2: 1/3 chance that all 600 will be saved and 2/3 chance that none will be savedWhich route would you choose?
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Assume 600 SoldiersAmbush ahead: all 600 will be killed if they enter the ambushThe general can lead his men out by one of two routesRoute 1: 400 soldiers will dieRoute 2: 1/3 chance that no soldiers will die and 2/3 chance that all 600 will dieWhich route will you choose?
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Choices we have
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Language of change
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Language of Opportunity
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Discourse Vs Communication
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Barriers to communication
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Selective Perception
Barriers to communication
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Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga
Information Overload
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga
Information Overload
Emotions
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Emotions
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
©Aruna Kulatunga
Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Different meanings of words
Barriers to communication
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Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Climate
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Different meanings of words
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Climate
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Different meanings of words
Tension, anxiety
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Climate
Filtering
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Different meanings of words
Tension, anxiety
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Climate
Filtering
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Different meanings of words
Tension, anxiety
Sender’s manipulation
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Climate
Filtering
Size & complexity
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Different meanings of words
Tension, anxiety
Sender’s manipulation
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Climate
Filtering
Size & complexity
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Different meanings of words
Tension, anxiety
Sender’s manipulation
Organization Structure
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Climate
Filtering
Size & complexity
Status & authority
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Different meanings of words
Tension, anxiety
Sender’s manipulation
Organization Structure
Barriers to communication
163Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Information Overload
Emotions
Language
Climate
Filtering
Size & complexity
Status & authority
Selective Perception Based on own experiences
Inflows exceed individual’s capacity
Noise, interference
Different meanings of words
Tension, anxiety
Sender’s manipulation
Organization Structure
Democratic or Authoritative Mngt.
Barriers to communication
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Improving the way we communicate...
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Feedback
Improving the way we communicate...
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Feedback Inquiring
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Feedback Inquiring
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Improving the way we communicate...
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Vs.Hearing
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Medium
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Vs.Hearing
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Medium
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Vs.Hearing
Trust, Space
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Medium
Training programs
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Vs.Hearing
Trust, Space
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Medium
Training programs
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Vs.Hearing
Trust, Space
Working in groups
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Medium
Training programs
Motivation
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Vs.Hearing
Trust, Space
Working in groups
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Medium
Training programs
Motivation
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Vs.Hearing
Trust, Space
Working in groups
Respect and feel valued
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Medium
Training programs
Motivation
Communication PlansCommunication Plans
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Vs.Hearing
Trust, Space
Working in groups
Respect and feel valued
Improving the way we communicate...
164Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Dialogue
Schemas
Active listening
Medium
Training programs
Motivation
Communication PlansCommunication Plans
Feedback Inquiring
Discussion, Message
Symbols
Vs.Hearing
Trust, Space
Working in groups
Respect and feel valued
Accurate and timely information
Improving the way we communicate...
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Low channel richness High channel richness
Routine Nonroutine
R.H. Lengel and D.L. Daft, “The Selection of Communication Media as an Executive Skill,” Academy of Management Executive, August 1988, pp. 225–32; and R.L. Daft and R.H. Lengel, “Organizational Information Requirements, Media Richness, and Structural Design,” Managerial Science, May 1996, pp. 554–72.
Reproduced from R.L. Daft and R.A. Noe, Organizational Behavior (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt, 2001), p. 311. 165
Information Richness of Communication Channels
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166
Three Common Formal Small-Group Networks
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High concern for Others’ needs
Low concern for Others’ and Own
needs
High concern for Own needs
High concern for Others’ and Own
needsAccommodatingPassive
You win, I lose
NegotiatingAssertive
You win someI win some
AvoidingPassive
You lose, I lose
Forcing Aggressive
You lose, I win
CollaboratingAssertive
You win, I win
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Conflict Management Styles (illustrated)
167Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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1. Announce timetables for making important decisions.
2. Explain decisions and behaviors that may appear inconsistent or secretive.
3. Emphasize the downside, as well as the upside, of current decisions and future plans.
4. Openly discuss worst-case possibilities—it is almost never as anxiety-provoking as the unspoken fantasy.
L. Hirschhorn, “Managing Rumors,” in L. Hirschhorn (ed.), Cutting Back (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1983), pp. 54–56. 168
Suggestions for Reducing the Negative Consequences of Rumors
168Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Why KM is important:
Intellectual assets are as important as physical assets.
When individuals leave, their knowledge and experience goes with them.
A KM system reduces redundancy and makes the organization more efficient.
It makes knowledge available to the right person at the right time
A process of organizing and distributing an organization’s collective wisdom so the right information gets to the right
people at the right time.
169
Knowledge Management (KM)
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170
Understanding the Learning Organisation concept
The core is based on the five learning disciplines
– Personal mastery – expanding your personal capacity
– Mental models – reflecting & continually clarifying internal pictures that shape our actions
– Shared vision – building a sense of group commitment
– Team learning – transforming conversational & collective thinking skills to get true synergy
– Systems thinking – a way of thinking about & understanding behaviour in systems
‘The Fifth Discipline’ presents the conceptual underpinnings to building learning organisations
A discipline is not a subject of study, it is to be a lifelong learner on a never ending developmental path
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A Learning Organisation
What is it?
L >= EC (environmental change)
Single Loop Learning
Double Loop Learning
Note: all too often ‘proactiveness’ is reactiveness in disguise (see how you contribute to your own problems)
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Based on Action science that assumes a “theory-in-use” – that behind every action is a logical process inside the mind. The story exists in our rational,
and our emotions as well.Learning that stays at process level (singe-loop), or learning that questions
deep assumptionsCase for discussion: Look at finances (the language of business) as a reflection of
our mental models: “When all is said and done, the bean counters win” Fred Kofman, Professor of Managerial Accounting at MIT
So, if we want to create a different business world, then we had better find new ways to count beans > the language of double-loop accounting
Single and Double Loop Learning
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173
Learning Organisation
• How does an organisation learn?
– Maintenance learning (survival/adaptive/first order change)
– Innovative learning (Generative, second order change)
• Case of Vision
• Both levels of learning are needed
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Organisational Learning
• What facilitates organisational learning
– Openness and trust
– Culture that supports widespread participation in decision making
– Creative thinking & entrepreneurial learning
– Diversity of skills and viewpoints
– Feedback through monitoring and tracking of the vision
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Developing a Learning Culture
• 3 Phase culture development
– Phase 1: delayering the organisation
– Phase 2: Implementation of continuous improvement
– Phase 3: Greater delegation of authority to strategic business units
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• The culture encourages creativity, reward success, but is not afraid of failure
• It is an ‘empowered organisation’
Distinguishing a Learning Organisation
• Dialogue amongst workers and managers
• Management commitment to learning continuously
• Achievement of strategic balance between discipline and support
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Managing Learning
• At every level of the organisation, leaders must:
– transfer ownership of work to those who execute the work
– coach the development capability and competence
– learn faster by learning themselves
– create an environment of ownership
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• Align organisational systems and structures
• Engage individuals in the business
• Energise people around the focus of the business
Building Ownership
• Paint a clear picture of great performance for the organisation and individual
• Focus individuals on the few factors that create performance
• Develop the desire to win
(to be responsible for their performance)
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The Learning organisation...
Transformational leadership
Egalitarian culture
Dispersed strategy
Integrating mechanisms
Horizontal structure
Knoweldge workers
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The Learning Organization
Shared Vision
Discard Preconceived Ideas
System Thinking
Open Honest Communication
Team Commitment
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A Learning Organization
Horizontal structure
Empowered Roles
Adaptive culture
Personal Networks
Linked strategy
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A Learning Organisation
An organization that has developed the continuous capacity to adapt and change.
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CHANGE
An alteration in people, structure or technology
It is ongoing: an unchanging principle of life
For organisational survival change must be managed
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Three types of change
Incremental – fine-tuning, fixing problems, modifying procedures
Developmental – changes over time
Transformational – major restructuring, cultural overhaul
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Fine Tuning - org change which is an ongoing process. It’s usually at departmental level and deals with: Refining policies; Developing personnel through training and development; Increasing quality; fostering commitment to the company mission; clarifying established roles and so on.
Incremental Adjustment - incremental adjustments to the changing environment. It may mean: Expanding the sales territory; shifting emphasis among products; innovations in technology; modifying the mission statement; adjustments to org structures to achieve better service or product delivery.
Modular Transformation - Or change which is characterised by major re-alignment of one or more departments. The focus is on these sub-parts. Eg major restructuring of departments; changes in key executives and managerial appointments; reduced workforce numbers, reformed departmental goals; Significantly new technologies.
Corporate Transformation - Radical shifts in strategy, revolutionary changes throughout the whole organisation involving: new mission and core values; altered power and status; reorganisation in structures, systems and procedures; new work flows, communication networks and decision making; new executives in key managerial positions from outside the organisation.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
Responses to change take many forms
Obey
Resistance/Opposition
Silence
Acceptance with accommodation
Giving in (not really agreeing)
Feelings of loss
Cynicism
Leaving the organisation
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Acceptance = people who want the change to work do so often working long hours, dealing with problems, helping and reassuring others.
Ritualistic response - rejection of the change and defence of the status quo becomes the norm, almost like a SFP.
Acquiescence - people see that change is inevitable and give in to it.
Leave the organisation -
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu ([email protected])
What causes individuals’ resistance?
Loss of control
Uncertainty
Surprise
Fear of the unknown
Confusion
Concerns about competence
More workThreat
Breaking traditionChanging habits
Resource limits & competition
Conflicts with values
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Levin and Kotter, an integrated change model
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Unfreezing RefreezingChanging
Establish a sense of urgency
Consolidate gains, create
greater changeGenerate short-term
wins
Empower employees toact on the vision
Communicate the vision widely
Develop a compelling vision
Form a powerful guiding coalition
Institutionalize changes
in the culture
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Helping unfreezing – Creating a readiness for change
Communicate, explainTop level communication, supportChange reward systemLink to something happening alreadyConsult & allow participation by those affectedTrainRestructureAllow time -
DenialResistance Exploration Commitment
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Prevention..better than a cure?
Establishing a sense of Urgency:
Examining situational realities
Identifying and discussing crisis, potential crisis, all major opportunities
Forming a powerful guiding Coalition:
Assembling a group with enough power to lead the change effort
Encouraging the group to work together as a team
Creating a Vision
Creating a vision to help direct the change effort
Developing strategies for Achieving that vision
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Communicating the VisionUsing every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategiesTeaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition
Empowering others to Act on the visionGetting rid of obstacles to changeChanging systems or structures that seriously undermine the visionEncouraging risk taking and non traditional ideas, activities and actions
Planning for and creating short time winsPlanning for visible performance improvementsCreating those improvementsRecognizing and rewarding employees involved in the improvements
Change...leaders and followers
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Consolidating improvements and producing still more change
Using increased credibility to change systems, structures and policies that don’t fit the vision
Hiring, promoting and developing employees who can implement the vision
Reinvigorating the process with new project, themes, and change events
Institutionalizing new approaches
Articulating the connections between the new behaviors and corporate success
Developing the means to ensure leadership, development and succession
Change...being on top of the game
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Dolphins and whales...incremental change
Breaking change into its parts
Enhancing credibility with small and continous delivery
Minimising tension, disruption and conflict
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Change Readiness
“Reflected in organizational members’ beliefs, attitudes, and intentions regarding the extent to which changes are needed and the organization’s capacity to successfully make those changes”
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Culture change
Successful change needs a supportive organisational culture to sustain its results
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Motivation...is it relevant?
Is motivation major lever in change management ?
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Motivation Theories
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Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory of Motivation
Motivator Factors
Intrinsic (job autonomy, recognition, consideration)
Satisfied or not satisfied
Maintenance (Hygiene) Factors
Extrinsic (salary increase, promotion)
Dissatisfied or not dissatisfied
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Anger
Denial
Bargaining
Depression
Acceptance
Kubler-Ross Grief Cycle
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Affiliation Power
Achievement
Acquired Needs Theory(employees are motivated by their
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There would be 57 Asians, 21 Europeans, 14 from the Western Hemisphere, and 8 Africans:
51 would be female, and 49 would be male; 70 would be non-white and 30 white; 70 would be non-Christian and 30 Christian; 50% of the world’s wealth would be in the hands of only
6 people, and all 6 would be citizens of the United States;
80 would live in substandard housing; 70 would be unable to read; 50 would suffer from malnutrition; 1 would be near death, and 1 would be near birth; Only 1 would have a college education, and no one
would own a computer.
If we could shrink the earth’s population to a village of precisely 100 people with all existing human ratios
remaining the same, it would look like this:
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• Trompenaars– Universalism vs
particularism– Collectiveism vs
individualism– Affective vs neutral
relationships– Specificity vs ascription– Orientation towards time– Internal vs external control
Henry Land et al., International Management Behaviour, Blackwell, 2000
Cultural maps or frameworks
• Hofstede: 4 basic value patterns:
Individualism:Vs collectivism - (preference to act)
Power distanceDistribution of power unequally
Uncertainty avoidancePreference for structure
Quantity v Quality of lifeValue assertiveness/money vs relationships/concern
5th added value: Long term v short term (Confucian dynamism) – value thrift, persistence, look to future v past & present, respect tradition & social obligation
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Country Power Distance Individualism Quantity of
LifeUncertainty Avoidance
Long term
China HIGH LOW MOD MOD HIGH
France HIGH HIGH MOD HIGH LOW
Indonesia HIGH LOW MOD LOW LOW
USA LOW HIGH HIGH LOW LOW
W Africa HIGH LOW MOD MOD LOW
Examples of Cultural Dimensions
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Six Cultural Dimensions - Hofstede
Hofstede’s research concluded organizations could be distinguished from each other on the basis of six factors:
Process oriented vs. Results oriented [means or goals]
Employee oriented vs. Job oriented [people or job]
Parochial vs. Professional [organization or person identity]
Open system vs. Closed system [clear or secretive]
Loose vs. Tight control [structured or unstructured]
Normative vs. Pragmatic [procedural or customer oriented]
Linking cultural values to managerial behavior, Hofstede also concluded that, “leaders’ values become followers’ practices.”
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Key Characteristics Defining an Organisation’s Culture
204
Innovation & Risk Taking
Attention to Detail
Outcomes Orientation
People Orientation
Team Orientation
Aggressiveness
Stability
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Do Organisations Have Uniform Cultures?
Dominant culture
Expresses the core values shared by a majority of the organization's members
Subculture
Multi-cultures within an organization, typically defined by department designations and geographical separation
Core Values
Primary or dominant values that are accepted throughout the organization
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Culture as a Liability
When shared values do not contribute to organizational effectiveness
Barrier to change
Barrier to diversity
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How Employees Learn Culture
Stories
Rituals
Material symbols
Language They didthat?
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How Organisational Cultures Form
Philosophyof
organisation’sfounders
Selectioncriteria
Topmanagement
Socialisation
Organisationculture
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Two Models of OrganizationEfficient performance(Hard, rational model)
Formalsystems
Competitivestrategy
Rigid culture Learning Organization(Soft, intuitive model)
Horizontal structure
Empowered roles Adaptive culture
Personal networks Linked strategy
Verticalstructure
Routinetasks
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FACTORS FOR STRONG CULTURE
Strong founder or leader develops principles, practices, & behavior for:
Strategic requirement
Competitive environment
Total organizational commitment
To operating under these values
Unwavering commitment from:
Employees
Other stakeholders
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Leadership and Culture
For an organizational culture to become more transformational, top management must articulate the changes that are required . . . The behaviors of top level leaders become symbols of the organization’s new culture (Bass, 1999:16).
Bass, B.M. (1999). Two decades of research and development in transformational leadership. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 8(1), 9-32.
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ETHICS
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The code of moralprincipals and valuesthat govern thebehavior of a personor group with respectto what is rightor wrong
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Domain ofCodified Law(Legal
Standard)
Domain ofEthics
(Social Standard)
Domain ofFree Choice(Personal Standard)
Amount ofExplicit ControlHigh Low
Three Domains of Human Action
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ETHICAL DILEMMAS
214
An ETHICAL DILEMMA occurs every time a person must choose whether or not to pursue a course of action that, although offering the potential of personal and/ororganizational benefit, is also unethical and/or illegal in the broader social context.
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ETHICAL DILEMMAS
215
You made a costly error, but one of your peers was blamed for the mistake. You’re quite certain the false accusation won’t harm him or her career; however, the truth could hurt you.
Do you admit your guilt?
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UTILITARIAN APPROACH
Decisions are made on the basis of their outcomes or consequences
Moral or ethical behaviors are those that produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people
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INDIVIDUALISM APPROACH
Acts are moral or ethical when they promote the individual's long term interests
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MORAL RIGHTS APPROACH
Human beings have fundamental rights that cannot be taken away by an individual’s decision
Respect for rights e.g., to privacy, free speech, due process
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JUSTICE APPROACH
Moral or ethical decisions must be based on standards of equity, fairness and impartiality
distributive justice
procedural justice
compensatory justice
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How Unethical Practices Develop
Ethical behavior is a function of context
Acceptance of ethical erosion may develop over time
Over emphasis on conformity with an organization culture may promote complacency
Short term considerations may override long term ones
Justify unethical behavior by drawing distinction between personal and professional ethics
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Ethics Check
221
Is it legal?
Is is balanced? Fair to all concerned?
win-win relationships
How will it make me feel about myself?
proud?
if published in the newspaper?
if my family knew about it?
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The Elephant & the blind
menSession VI (11:00 - 12:30)
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223From the movie “Braveheart”
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In the i r sea rch for an integrative definit ion of leadership, Professors Bruce Winston and Kath leen Patterson, investigated over 26,000 articles, selecting 160, stopping when information started to become redundant. Describing their search as following the example of the three blind men and the elephant, where each blind man gave an accurate but insufficient description to unders tand the who le , Winston and Pat ter son (2006) built a model of 90 d imens ion , w i th each
d imens ion conta in ing a number o f l eadersh ip c o n s t r u c t s / s t a t e m e n t s , totaling over 1000, gleaned from their original database.The Winston and Patterson (2006) database was used to correlate exhibited personal leadership attributes of some of the personalities whose leadership has contributed to the CT/COIN body o f knowledge.
Winston, Bruce E., and Kathleen Patterson. "An Integrative Definition of Leadership." International Journal of Leadership Studies, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, 2006, pp. 6-66 1.2 (2006): 6-66.
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225Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind of the Insurgent." Army July: p 34.
Courage :Passion and courage (Napolitano & Henderson, 1998)
Miscellaneous :Charisma (Danzig, 1998; Whetten & Cameron, 1983)
Resources :Art and process of acquiring, energizing, linking, and focusing resources of all kinds (Bradshaw, 1998)
Direction of the vision:Process of giving purpose (meaningful direction) to collective effort (Jacobs & Jaques, 1990)
Thomas Edward Lawrence
Lawrence’s Six Fundamental Principles Of Insurgency
First, a successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base.
Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy.
Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts.
Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement.
Fifth, the irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence and logistical independence.
Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike at the enemy’s logistics and signals vulnerabilities.
225Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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226Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.19-20
Knowledge :Superior intelligence (Crabb, 1839)
Challenge the status quo:Challenging the process (Kouzes & Posner, 1995)
People oriented:Nurture the right relationship processes (Barnes, 1996)
Communication:Influence exercised in a situation and directed through the communication process (Tannenbaum, Weschler, & Massarik, 1961)
T.E. Lawrence...
Personal credibility and role remains controversial
Does not desist from original guerilla theory espoused by Lawrence
Perceived the importance of popular support with 2% active support could achieve victory given the remaining 98% acquiesced or sympathized
Defined command as a function of - Algebraic - biological - psychological (motivation, morale) impetus
Followers include
Mao
Wingate
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227Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.47
Miscellaneous :Unconventional behavior (Conger & Kanungo, 1998)Influence :Influence outside of formal authority (Blank, 1995)
Fresh thinking:Think in new and fresh ways (Lombardo & Eichinger, 1997)
Direction of the vision:Leadership revolves around vision-ideas-direction (Bennis, 1989)
Orde Wingate...
Helped to train the Haganah
Enlisted Haganah help to run clandestine attack groups to protect oil pipeline from Iraq to Port of Haifa
The Gideon Force
Chindits
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228NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.20
Stamina :Perseverance (Danzig, 1998)
Dedicated :Principal dynamic force (Davis, 1942)
Plans/guides/directs:Employs dynamic planning (Napolitano & Henderson, 1998)
Inspires and motivates:Conceptualization (nurture abilities to dream great dreams, think beyond the day today) (Spears & Lawrence, 2002)
Mao Tse Tung...
Born in Hunan Province
Son of a farmer who provided the son with a high school education
After a series of defeats relating to attacks on Nationalists held cities, Mao changes direction from an urban proletariat led revolution to rural peasant led insurgency in 1930.
Shift in emphasis termed the “single most vital decision” in the history of the CCP.
228Tuesday, 24 June 2008Mao developed Clausewitz theory and utilised it on the ground. The same theory applies in CT. As much as the Terrorist uses the masses or his/her own purposes, by acknowledging and identifying the power of the people, turn it against the Terrorist
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229NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.22
Deals with change in organizations:Enable continuous change and movement toward some desired destination (Bradshaw, 1998)
Togetherness :Builds an sense of unity (Daft & Lengel, 1998)
Inspires and motivates:Comprehend that humans have differing motivation forces at different times and situations (Koontz & Weihrich, 1990)
Mao’s 3 Rules and 8 Remarks
RulesAll actions are subject to commandDo not steal from the peopleBe neither selfish or unjust
RemarksReplace the door when you leave the houseRoll up the bedding on which you have sleptBe courteousBe honest in your transactionsReturn what you borrowReplace what you breakDo not bathe in the presence of womenDo not without authority search those you arrest
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230NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.28
Sells the vision:Ability to get members of the organization to accept ownership of vision as their own (Oakley & Kurg, 1994)
Communication:Articulate vision-values-strategy (Yeung & Ready, 1995)Communication:Align people by communicating (Kotter, 1990)
Knowledge :Critical thinking skills (Harung, Alexander, & Heaton, 1999)
The fish swimming in the water...
Mao description of a revolutionary as relying on the people for support - “Like a fish swimming in the water”
While the fish can be killed by polluting the water, this is not a desirable course of action -Frank Kitson
Trading space for time, first enumerated by Lawrence, leaving the Turks in Medina
“Politics is war without bloodshed. War is politics with bloodshed” (Becket, 2005, p.73)
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231NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.71
Inspires and motivates:Inspires people to understand the social, political, economic, and technological givens (Crosby, 1997)Problem-solver:Make decisions that solve problems (Bergman, Hurson, & Russ-Eft, 1999)
Visionary :Has a long-range perspective (Bennis, 1997)
Sells the vision:Energizes and attracts people to enroll in a vision of the future (Bennis & Goldsmith, 1997)
Lt. Gen. Harold Briggs
Unusual grasp of the political nature of insurgency and of measures required to defeat it.
“In the early days we didn't grasp how important the support of the local people was. It wasn’t until Briggs that we understood that the CTs got all of their support - food, supplies, intelligence - from the local people” - a veteran of the Malaya emergency.
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232Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.56
Influence :Influencing people toward cooperation (Tead, 1935)
Fresh thinking:Conceptual skills (Bennis, 1997)
Miscellaneous :Ensures that boundaries are porous and permeable (Bennis, 1997)Togetherness :Builds an sense of unity (Daft & Lengel, 1998)
Knowledge :Superior intelligence (Crabb, 1839)
Harold Briggs...
Promoted cooperation between military, police and civil arms of the government
Cooperation extended from the top to the bottom, pervading across all hierarchies through a system of integrated committees - Solving the problem of pulling in opposite directions
Emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering
Used intelligence in targeted, intensive, but small-scale operations
Concentrated full attention on fringe Chinese villages, improving, consolidating and isolating the villages from the CTs. - The draining the water process
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233NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.74
Flexible :Flexible about people and organizational structure (Maccoby, 1981)
Empowerment :Effective delegation by setting goals and trust staff (Essex & Kusy, 1999)
Empowerment :Empower each individual team member to take actions that are needed to achieve vision (Beck & Yeager, 2001)
Harold Briggs...
Flexibility of operations in the jungle - key note
Battalion commanders being reconciled to devolve leadership to where it matters, NCO’s taking responsibility to make decisions on the spot
“New Villages” stopped the fish from moving in the water and when the CT came into replenish his supplies, he ran the risk of being caught in the shallows!
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234NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.68-70
Self-confident:Determination (Cox & Hoover, 1992; Snyder, Dowd, & Houghton, 1994)
Goal-oriented :Adopt personal-active attitudes toward goals (Zalenznik, 1989)
Values :Resourcefulness (Giblin, 1986; Napolitano & Henderson, 1998)
Challenge the status quo:Breaks down hierarchy (McGee-Cooper & Trammell, 1995)
Lt. Col. Walter Walker..Malaya
Traveling light and knowing the land; the coming of the Ferrets
The Jungle war fare school in the old asylum...Determined personal leadership...pushing the boundaries of hierarchy
“For training only” Flame throwing cartridges - using available resources
234Tuesday, 24 June 2008 Lawrence, Wingate, Calvert - unorthodox, eccentric?Walker, Kitson, De La Billiere, - exceptional leaders
Paul, James, and Martin Spirit. "General Sir Peter De La Billiere". 2005. www.britains-smallwars.com. 16 Mar. 2007. <http://www.britains-smallwars.com/gulf/Billiere.html>.
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235NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.79-80
Challenge the status quo:Challenges the status quo positively (Caroselli, 2000)
Knowledge :Analytical thinking (Ulrich, Zenger, & Smallwood, 1999)
Culture :Integrate different cultures, sectors, and disciplines (Drucker, 1997)
Communication:Actively communicate a wide range of information to employees (Covey, 1996)
Walter Walker...
Bypassing command hierarchies, going direct to the top appealing for change(Other officers also similarly oriented towards positive change - Walker not an isolated case)
Walker’s superiors were generally available but not quite open to analytical thinking: - the case of the open top transport lorries
Different cultures in the field and at the HQ - Field wants innovative techniques implemented - HQ keeping records, looking for patterns and puzzling over the results
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236NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.97
Listening :Listens (accepts ideas, criticisms, feedback) (Smith, 1996)
Culture :Creates an environment that encourages trust, freedom, and innovation (Deming, 1986)
Knowledge :Learn from mistakes and successes (Kanter, 1995; Kouzes & Posner, 1995; McGee-Cooper & Trammell, 1995)
Training :Willing to teach skills (Smith, 1996)
Walter Walker...
Inviting feedback and implementing suggestions - Surrendered CTs used to evaluate units in operationsOperational innovations through learning from the CTs - crossing streams walking backwards - Purposefully leaving footprints
(Practices later abandoned in COIN operations in Vietnam, VCs learnt quickly to identify false trails by weight patterns)
Introduction of ATOM (The Conduct of Anti-terrorist operations in Malaya) to codify and indoctrinate COIN practices learnt through Jungle School
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237NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.76-77
Visionary :Has a long-range perspective (Bennis, 1997)
Plans/guides/directs:Articulate strategy (Yeung & Ready, 1995)
Influence :Influence behavior toward desired end (by word or deed) (Engstrom, 1976)
Goal-oriented :Successfully marshals his human collaborators to achieve particular ends (Prentice, 1961)
Oliver Lyttelton - Colonial Secretary
“Emergency is in essence a Police rather than a military task”
Creating and arming a Chinese home guard- propaganda starting from the school- “Children coming back $om school convert the parents to our way of thinking in the long term war of ideas, which we must win if we are to see a peaceful country and one which can some day be entrusted with self- government within the British commonwealth”
Sets the end-game clearly in instructions to Templer: - “Malaya should in due course become a fu'y self-governing nation” (p. 88)
237Tuesday, 24 June 2008Converting Prabhakaranʼs children
UNP government in 2003 issues Passport to Charles Anthony,
http://origin.island.lk/2003/02/26/news09.html
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238NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.88-89
Communication:Use language to touch the heart (Heskett & Sclesinger, 1996)
Courage :Passion and courage (Napolitano & Henderson, 1998)
Visionary :Physical stamina (Roberts, 1990)
Challenge the status quo:Breaks down hierarchy (McGee-Cooper & Trammell, 1995)
Empowerment :Distributes responsibility (Gastil, 1997)
Gerald Templer...
Suborned the fight against CTs to achieving nationhood, merging the British objective with that of the local population.
Uses symbolic language in the discourse of war
Shows resilience and personal courage- Travels to residence in the bullet-ridden car in which his predecessor was assassinated just days before on arrival in Malaya
Cuts across hierarchies and involves younger civil servants in the decision making process
Starts at the bottom - first things first - make political progress at local level
Involves local leadership in taking responsibility for directing the war effort
Listens to and incorporates suggestions from Junior officers - a secret ballot to collect information on CTs.
Physical Stamina- Tours the country unceasingly
238Tuesday, 24 June 2008discourse of warsymbols, legends, repetitive messages, the just war, futile war etc.Secret Ballot - remedied the situation where householders were scared of giving information. Given the secret ballot was enforced, i.e., balloting was compulsory, there was no indication who provided the information
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239NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.90-91
Listening :Listens (accepts ideas, criticisms, feedback) (Smith, 1996)
People oriented:Identify, evoke, and use the strengths of all resources in the organization-the most important of which is people (Batten, 1989)
Plans/guides/directs:Sets purpose/direction (Jaques & Clement, 1994; Kotter, 1990; Ulrich, Zenger, & Smallwood, 1999)
Plans/guides/directs:Establishes direction (Conger, 1992)
Templer’s six laws...
Get the priorities rightGet the instructions rightGet the organization rightGet the right people into the organizationGet the right spirit into the peopleLeave them to get on with it
Dividing the intelligence functions - Director of Intelligence to analyze and report - Special Branch to collect and collateDividing responsibility efficientlyEnergized the situation
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Incident of Templer’s boots (with Templar in them) suddenly standing on he paperwork on top of a policeman’s desk.
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240NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.95-96
Energy:Energizes (Bennis & Goldsmith, 1997; Nanus, 1989; Senge, 1990)
Empowerment :Effective delegation by setting goals and trust staff (Essex & Kusy, 1999)
Power:Power of the authority of the office (Deming, 1986)
Miscellaneous :Unconventional behavior (Conger & Kanungo, 1998)
Gerald Templer...
Entrusting responsibility to junior officers and backing them up with personal authority
Unconventional behavior
Issuing orders from the bathtub (Orde Wingate was also known for his eccentric bath routines...)
240Tuesday, 24 June 2008Wingate rarely bathed..prefered to scrub himself with a rubber brush...jungle warfare teaches soldiers to disguise body smell with mud and leaves, never to use soap, enemy trackers use smell to identify spoor
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241NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.98 -100
Influence :Influence outside of formal authority (Blank, 1995)
Resources :Focus on resources (Bradshaw, 1998)
Values :Show tolerance of diversity and intolerance of performance, standards, and values (Fitz-enz, 1997)
Deals with change in organizations:Coordinating leadership tasks in change cycles (Crosby, 1997)
Gerald Templer...
Expanding “oil spots” of security - Standardized and carried out throughout in an identical pattern
Use of pseudo Gangs- Mainly to trick CTs into surrendering- CTs eliminated only if there were no other options
Focussing on priorities - “To hell with drill, we want them to handle weapons and lay ambushes”-
(Negative impact in today’s warfare - untrained and undisciplined units - operational nightmares)
Ability to coordinate all of the efforts - Social, political, economical, civilian - police and military
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242NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.104
Feedback :Advocates feedback (Napolitano & Henderson, 1998)
Listening :Listens (accepts ideas, criticisms, feedback) (Smith, 1996)
Empowerment :Transfers ownership of work to those who execute the work (Belasco & Stayer, 1994)
Power:Ability to use power in a responsible manner (Koontz & Weiheich, 1990)
Gerald Templer...
Effective Feedback Loops in place..
Giving time to “Belly ache”
Subordinates offered substantiated criticism
Suggestions incorporated
The final version is owned by all, but had the personal authority of Templer
Never being afraid of bad news
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243NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.93
Miscellaneous :Credibility (Roberts, 1990)
Persuade :Persuasion (DuBrin, 1997; Hollander 1978; Spears & Lawrence, 2002)
Hugh Green...
Providing a credible alternative -
Cash rewards and rehabilitation for surrenders
Persuading the people that the government is capable of providing essential services and defeating the CTs.
Using ex-CTs in the PsyWar effort
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Propaganda head.. (later DG/BBC)
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244NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.164-166
Culture :Creates an environment that encourages trust, freedom, and innovation (Deming, 1986)
Challenge the status quo:Busts the bureaucracy (Shelton, 1997)
Influence :Influence outside of formal authority (Blank, 1995)
Inspires the vision:Marshalling, energizing, and unifying of people toward the pursuit of vision (Kent, Crotts, and Aziz, 2001)
Robert Comer...
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) - 1967-71
Vigorous Interventions ( The Blow Torch)Creative Bureaucratic infightingHad access to the President - by passing commandKey to the war was local security
Pulling together all military and civilian pacification programs under one command - shades of Briggs and TemplerEncouraged innovation from its personnel - Phoenix program (p.166) to destroy VC infrastructure Inflexible, Compartmentalized, not permeableWestmoreland screened by his his staff, bad news prevented from reaching the top (Nagl p.180)
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Bringing it together...
Some points to ponder!
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The unexpected leader...
The unexpected situation
The unexpected time
The unexpected ....
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Permeability and the onion skin
Onion skin - Osmosis
Territorial scanning - active osmosis
Is that enough...
Communicating intelligence
Specific information
No damage to sources
Credible, targeted, actionable
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Intelligence Challenge
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Can permeable communication make leaders better...
Strong listening skills
Projection of empathy
Onward distribution / Management of knowledge
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What is BATNA
The Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement
The lowest acceptable value to an individual for a negotiated agreement
Credible alternatives - Hugh Green in Malaya
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Leadership lenses
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Who moved my cheese...
Maze, Cheese, Hem, Haw, Sniff and Scurry
Disappearing cheese
Anticipating, Reacting, Denying, Responding
Different strokes for different people
252Johnson, Spencer. . Who Moved My Cheese? . New York: G.P. Putnamʼs Sons, 1998.
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Four Responses to Change
In his book, Who Moved My Cheese?1 Spencer Johnson uses a lighthearted, metaphorical story to illustrate four different responses that we can have to change. In the story, four characters⎯two mice (Sniff and Scurry) and two “littlepeople” (Hem and Haw)⎯reside in a maze, where they have amassed a great store of cheese. The cheese represents whatever each individual wants to have (the nature of which varies from one individual to the next), and the maze represents where they spend time looking for their cheese.
As the story unfolds, the four characters initially have their cheese and then respond differently when their cheese disappears (that is, when change happens). The four characters represent different ways of responding to change⎯all parts of ourselves, simple and complex.
Sniff “sniffed” out the situation and realized that the cheese was diminishing. He saw the change coming early on. ! Scurry immediately went into action to find new cheese.
! Hem denied the change, wanted to stay where he was, and waited for the cheese to come back. ! Haw at first was reluctant to look for new cheese. Eventually, he overcame his fear of going into the maze, found new cheese, and recognized that change could present opportunities.
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Buffaloes and Geese
Flight of the Buffalo
Herd of Geese
253Belasco, James A. , and Ralph C. Stayer. Flight of the Buffalo: Soaring to Excellence, Learning to Let Employees Lead. New York: Warner Books,, 1994.
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A herd of buffalo is solely dependent on one leader. Wherever the leader goes, the herd will follow⎯even if it’s over a cliff. Without the leader’s instructions, the herd cannot function either as a group or individually.
In a flock of geese, every single bird within the group knows exactly where it is headed and is ready and able to take over the leadership position at any given moment. The goose in the front of the formation leads for a while, but as it tires it will drop back and another goose will take its place in front. Leadership and responsibility are shared by all.
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Leadership... The Geese style
As each goose flaps its wings, it creates an “uplift” for the birds that follow. By flying in a “V” formation, the whole flock adds 71% greater flying range than if each bird flew alone.
254Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4
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Leadership... The Geese style
When a goose falls out of formation, it suddenly feels the drag and resistance of flying alone. It quickly moves back into formation to take advantage of the lifting power of the bird immediately in front of it
255Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4
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Leadership... The Geese style
When the lead bird tires, it rotates back into the formation to take advantage of the lifting power of the bird immediately in front of it.
256Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4
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Leadership... The Geese style
The geese flying in formation honk to encourage those up front to keep up their speed
257Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4
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Leadership... The Geese style
When a goose gets sick, wounded, or shot down, two geese drop out of formation and follow it down to help and protect it. They stay until it dies or is able to fly again. Then, they launch out with another formation or catch up with the flock
258Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4
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Lead or manage...
Effective leadership is about enabling ordinary people to produce extraordinary things in the face of challenge and change and to constantly turn in superior performance to the long-term benefit of all concerned (Charlton 2000, p. 30).
Definition of difference between management and leadership: legitimate power and control vs. empowerment and change
259JOOSTE, KARIEN. "Leadership: A New Perspective." Journal of Nursing Management 12 (2004): 217-23.
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Pulling together...
To compete in the information age, firms must increasingly rely on the knowledge, skills, experience, and judgment of all their people.
The entire organization, collectively, must create and assimilate new knowledge, encourage innovation, and learn to compete in new ways in an ever changing competitive environment.
260DESS, GREGORY G., and JOSEPH C. PICKEN. "Changing Roles: Leadership in the 21st Century." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Winter (2000): 18-34.
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Strategic Frameworks...
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, who knew a lot about maps according to which life is on its way somewhere or other, told us this story from the war due to which history is on its way somewhere or other: The young lieutenant of a small Hungarian detachment in the Alps sent a reconnaissance unit out into the icy wasteland. It began to snow immediately, snowed for two days and the unit did not return. The lieutenant suffered: he had dispatched his own people to death. But the third day the unit came back. Where had they been? How had they made their way? Yes, they said, we considered ourselves lost and waited for the end. And then one of us found a map in his pocket. That calmed us down. We pitched camp, lasted out the snowstorm and then with the map we discovered our bearings. And here we are. The lieutenant borrowed this remarkable map and had a good look at it. It was not a map of the Alps but of the Pyrenees. Goodbye now.Miroslav Holub’s (1977) poem ‘Brief Thoughts on Maps’ as it appeared in the Times Literary Supplement, Feb. 4, 1977, translated by Jarmila and Ian Milner, Used by Karl Weick to illustrate the necessity for a strategic framework
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The vignette above is extremely popular in courses that deal with strategy.The analogy is immediately recognizable.The notion that the value of a map, just like the value of a strategic framework,model or image,comes not just from its ability to represent the environment objectively in all its detail, but from its ability to focus minds and help people take a particular course, strikes a chord. This analogy, indicating the relation- ship between a map and the individual process of mapping a particular journey, is the key to understanding the unique philosophy of images of strategy
©Aruna Kulatunga
Distributed leadership...
AQ - model for distributed leadership and networked Knowledge Management (KM)
COIN/CT networks with distributed leadership and networked KM
The “not my fault” syndrome
Allocating individual responsibilities in a networked culture
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Quick takes on buzz words
RMA
4GW
Netwar
Guerilla
COIN
CT
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In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through fourgenerations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver,and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all availablenetworks—political, economic, social, military—to convince anopponent’s decisionmakers that their strategic goals are eitherunachievable or too costly
The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpowerand culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, whichwas quickly adopted by the world’s major powers, was dominated byfirepower and ended in World War I. In relatively short order, during WorldWar II the Germans introduced third-generation warfare, characterizedby maneuver. That type of combat is still largely the focus of U.S. forces. . . [4GW is an] evolved form of insurgency [that] uses all availablenetworks—political, economic, social, military—to convince the enemy’sdecision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or toocostly for the perceived benefit12 September-October 2004 MILITARYREVIEW
R ATHER THAN commenting on the specif- ics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for under- standing that and other conflicts. I call this frame- work the Four Generations of Modern War. I developed the framework of the first three gen- erations during the 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC).2 The Marines kept asking, “What will the Fourth Generation be like?” The result was an article I co-authored for the Marine Corps Ga- zette in 1989: “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.”3 (Our troops reportedly found copies of the article in the caves at Tora Bora, the al-Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan.) Modern Warfare The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the treaty that ended the Thirty Years’ War. With that treaty, the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different enti- ties had fought wars—families, tribes, religions, cit- ies, business enterprises—using many different means, not just armies and navies. (Two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue.) Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war
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Feed Before... Feed Back
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Leader
Team
Feed before Feed back
LearningOrganization
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The Red Army Factions
To follow
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PKK in Turkey...
To follow
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Stolen Laptops...
FBI lost over 200 laptops...
Why keep sensitive information in an insecure laptop...
Data to be stored in secured central (can be distributed like Akemi or Google systems) servers
What if you are not connected...
Download a only the necessary subset
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Changing rules of warfare...
War for nation building
Eliminate corruption, waste inefficiency
Improve distribution, access, communication
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Concepts
LeadershipCounter terrorism
Benchmarks / Examples
Application
Toolkits Theory
Practical Knowledge
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Intel.
Intelligence
Knowledge
Constantterritorial scanning
Human Intel.Signal Intel.BooksMagazinesInternetNewspapers
ConstantLearning
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Constant Scanning
Sharing Info. Permeability Access
CommunicationMotivation
Essential Leadership Skills
A KM owchart...
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©Aruna Kulatunga272 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
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Doctrine and the future
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([email protected])273TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998):
21-32.
The map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or to plan productively.
...engaging in such activities in the belief that we can predict the future and, to a degree, control it, is probably both illusory and dangerous, in that it allows a false and potentially debilitating sense of security.
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The focus of chaos is the web of feedback loops present in every system. In some systems, the feedback loops are linear; in others, nonlinear.
...organizations, because they are made up of people and, hence, are highly complex, are nonlinear feedback systems.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
([email protected])274
Without doctrine...chaos?
TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
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Chaordic Organizations...
Chaos + Order = Chaordic
Coined by Dee Hock
275TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
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Visa Southeast Asia | Visa Cards. 30 Mar. 2007 <http://www.visa-asia.com/ap/sea/mediacenter/imagelibrary/visa_cards.shtml>.
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([email protected])277
Chaordic Organisations...
US$4.4 Trillion Sales
1.51 Billion cards in circulation
Operating in 170 Countries
Owned by over 20,000 of world’s leading financial institutions
HQ in San Francisco, US
CEO - Kenneth Somme
Visa Corporate Information | Fact Sheets | Newsroom | Visa Corporate. 30 Mar. 2007<http://www.corporate.visa.com/md/fs/corporate/corporate.jsp?topic=corp>.
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Chaordic Organizations...
278TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
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Chaordic Organizations...
Decentralized
278TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
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Chaordic Organizations...
Decentralized
Non-hierarchical
278TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
278Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Chaordic Organizations...
Decentralized
Non-hierarchical
Evolving
278TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
278Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Chaordic Organizations...
Decentralized
Non-hierarchical
Evolving
Self-organizing
278TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
278Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Chaordic Organizations...
Decentralized
Non-hierarchical
Evolving
Self-organizing
Self-regulating
278TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
278Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Chaordic Organizations...
Decentralized
Non-hierarchical
Evolving
Self-organizing
Self-regulating
Does this remind you of
278TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
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Chaordic Organizations...
Decentralized
Non-hierarchical
Evolving
Self-organizing
Self-regulating
Does this remind you of
AQ
278TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
278Tuesday, 24 June 2008
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Chaordic Organizations...
Knowledge and Information Sharing
Innovation and Creativity
Teamwork and Project Orientation.
Diversity.
Strong Core Values.
279TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32.
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Integrity and Credibility...
The front page test -
What will my child / spouse / parents / friends say when they see this news in the front page of the newspapers
Positive - Do it!
Negative - Search for alternatives
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Sharing information...
The front page test...
What are the possibilities that this information may be published in the newspapers
If there is more than one in three chances of the information being public in the near future, disseminate it, credibly, correctly and lucidly, immediately
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Pyramids and Silos
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Organizations connected at top - thin information pipe lines
Organizations connected at bottom - thick information
pipe lines
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Pyramids and Silos
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Information takes time to trickle down, fill up and
disseminate
Information available uniformly, wider range of
critical analysis
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Pyramids and Silos
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More control of information, less chance of leakage
Less control of information, more chance of leakage
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Pech, Richard J., and Bret W. Slade. "Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorism: Why Do They Do It and What Do They Want?" Foresight, Emerald Group Publishing 8.1 (2006): 8-20.
Terror meme... a method of communication
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The terror meme...
Pech, Richard J., and Bret W. Slade. "Imitative Terrorism: A Diagnostic Framework for Identifying Catalysts and Designing Interventions." Foresight 7.1 (2005): 47-60.
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Insurgency
“Illegal measures including the use of force to overthrow a government or to persuade or force people to do things they do not want to do.”
- British Military Doctrine, 1987
Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
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Counterinsurgency
“A coordinated attempt to defeat insurgents, usually relying upon both civilian and military authorities either of the afflicted government or of its allies.”
- U.S. Field Manual 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, 1994.
288Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
288Tuesday, 24 June 2008American definition of counterinsurgency.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
Military Forces Hate COIN
“The long list of unsuccessful operations conducted against guerrilla activities is a product of the inflexibility of many military leaders as well as their intransigent attitude concerning the abandonment of conventional tactics. This military arteriosclerosis has existed down through the ages...”
LTC Joseph Kutger, USAF, 1960
289Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
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Organizational Culture
“Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.”
- James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy
290Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
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U.S. Army Organizational Culture
“The American view of war emphasizes combat, set-piece battles between organized units as the centrality of conflict. Americans also put a high priority upon the use of firepower and high mobility...The desirable aim of combat has been seen as the destruction of the enemy’s army in the field, with the inevitable consequence being that the enemy must submit.”
- Larry Cable, Conflict of Myths
291Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
291Tuesday, 24 June 2008The U.S. Army’s organizational culture is derived from the history of the United States Army and the perceptions of those who lead and who have led America’s Army.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
British Army Organizational Culture
“Historical experience has taught [the British officer] not to expect a flood of assistance from Britain--there was usually little to be spared--nor to look to some sacrosanct body of ‘doctrine’ for advice; there was none. Instead he must make do...In short, he must adapt.”
- David Charters, (“From Palestine to Northern Ireland”)
292Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
292Tuesday, 24 June 2008The British Army’s strategic culture is rather different, not least because of the different level of resources available to it.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
Organizational Learning
“A process by which an organization uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes.”
Richard Downie, (The U.S. Army as Learning Institution)
293Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
293Tuesday, 24 June 2008Organizational Culture affects the ability of that organization to learn.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
“Was the Army a Learning Institution?”
Bottom-Up Input?
Superiors Questioned, Available?
Theoretical Thinking?
Local Doctrine Development?
Local Training Centres?
Small, Responsive Staff?
294Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
294Tuesday, 24 June 2008Next, I will determine whether the armies were able to learn during the course of the war in which they were engaged.
1) Does the Army promote suggestions from the field?
2) Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies?
3) Does the organization encourage theoretical thinking about the problems it faces?
4) Are doctrine and training centers developed locally in response to local conditions?
5) Is the high command assisted by a a small, responsive staff or isolated by a large, unresponsive one?
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
Initial British Response
War of the Big Battalions
“Can’t Miss, Old Boy.”
“At this stage it has become a military problem to which we have not been able to find the answer.”
Colonial Secretary James Griffiths, 27 Oct 1950
295Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
295Tuesday, 24 June 2008The initial British response was the war of big battalions, based on a lack of solid intelligence about the guerrillas location in the jungle and their methods of warfare. Richard Clutterbuck describes the resulting scenario so well that I will quote him at length :“The predeliction of some army officers for major operations seems incurable. Even in the late 1950’s, new brigade commanders would arrive from England, nostalgic for World War II, or fresh from large-scale maneuvers in Germany. On arrival in Malaya, they would address themselves with chinagraphs to a map almost wholly green except for one red pin. ‘Easy’, they would say. ‘Battalion on the left, battalion on the right, battalion blocking the end, and then a fourth battalion to drive through. Can’t miss, old boy.’ Since it took the better part of a day, with more than a thousand soldiers, to get an effective cordon even a half-mile square around a jungle camp, the guerrillas, hearing the soldiers crashing through the jungle into position, had no difficulty getting clear before the net was closed. Except for a rare brush with a straggler, all the soldiers ever found was an empty camp, but this enabled the officers to claim they had ‘cleared the area of enemy.’ This would be duly marked on the maps, and the commanders would go to bed with a glow of satisfaction over a job well done. The soldiers, nursing their blisters, had other words for it.” (Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War)British efforts were also hampered by a confused chain of command which put the military effort under the nominal command of the Police Commissioner, and by the lack of a unified intelligence collection and analysis organization. These flaws were put right by LTG Sir Harold Briggs, appointed Director of Operations in April 1950; Briggs immediately created a Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee, established a Federal War Council to coordinate civil-military efforts, and focused on the need to separate the insurgents from their source of supplies and recruits - the Chinese squatters - through the creation of fortified “New Villages”. By the end of 1951 some 400,000 squatters had been resettled in over 400 New Villages.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
A Modern Lieutenant General
Templer Takes Over
ATOM
Operational Research Section (Malaya)
Intelligence as Basis for Operations
“Hearts and Minds”
296Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
296Tuesday, 24 June 2008These innovations provided many of the tactical steps necessary to defeat the CT’s; note the influence of Burma and of senior officers encouraging tactical innovation. However, it remained to put the campaign in some sort of strategic framework; this was the task of General Sir Gerald Templer, the very model of the modern Lieutenant General, who became Director of Operations after the assassination of Sir Henry Gurney on 6 October 1951. Templer continued the tactical innovations, ordering the creation of a manual that would ‘encapsulate the wealth of jungle fighting experience in such a way as to fit in the pocket of a soldier’s jungle greens.’ ATOM became the bible of British COIN. It was written by the same Walter Walker who had created FARELF Training Center and the Ferret Force. Templer also established an operations research training center to collate information on the progress of the COIN effort and to focus all efforts on the collection of intelligence on the abilities. locations, and intentions of CT leaders. This was done in conjunction with the most important of Templer’s innovations: a strategic focus on improving the responsiveness of the government of Malaya to the needs of all of the people. The Army and the military effort was secondary to the political effort of winning support for the government. Templer knew that only by winning the support of the inhabitants could he gain a flow of information about the insurgents. This information would allow him to move away from fruitless jungle bashing to actually find and defeat the insurgents. As Templer said, “In the jungle, most of the battle is finding the enemy.”
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
Institutional Culture over Leaning
“The solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm...till the other side cracks and gives up.”
MG William E. DePuy, 1st Infantry Division, 1966
“We’d end up shooting at everything-men, women, kids, and the buffaloes.”
LTC John Paul Vann, 1965
297Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
297Tuesday, 24 June 2008When JFK was assassinated in 1963 there were already 17,000 US Armed Forces in Vietnam. The numbers escalated quickly. Vann had foreseen the resulting problem: “The Viet Cong were so intermingled with the peasantry that the Saigon troops had difficulty distinguishing friend from foe. Then, Vann said, how much more difficult it would be for Americans. The American soldiers would soon start to see the whole rural population as the enemy. The Army and the Marine Corps would create a bloody morass into which they and the Vietnamese peasantry would sink. “We’d end up shooting at everything - men, women, kids, and the buffalos,” Vann said. (383)
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
USMC and the Combined Action Platoon
Regional Coordinating Council
Combined Action Platoons
“You cannot win militarily. You have to win totally, or you are not winning at all.”
Marine LTG Krulak, July 1966
298Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
298Tuesday, 24 June 2008MG Lew Walt, commander of the III MAF from mid-65 on, took advantage of the USMC’s organizational culture of pacification and small wars in I Corps, the northernmost part of South Vietnam,. Walt created a coordinating council of the regional civilian agency heads in sector, ARVN and US military commanders, and a Vietnamese government representative. He also integrated Marine rifle squads into Vietnamese Regional Forces platoons. These Combined Action Platoons lived in the villages of I Corps and focused on pacification, while regular Marine BTNs divided their time between squad and platoon sized patrols and ambushes, and civic action programs. The US Army did not approve of pacification programs. LTG Krulack, CG Marine Force Pacific, appealed to SecDef McNamara that the safer roads and more secure hamlets in I Corps, while “harder to quantify”, were a better measure of success than MAAC-V commander Westmoreland’s body count: “The raw figure of VC killed...can be a dubious index of success since, if their killing is accompanied by devastation of friendly areas, we may end up having done more harm than good.” (Sheehan, 636)
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
The U.S. Army in Iraq: Bottom-up Learning
Innovative Junior Officers/NCO’s
Empowered by Chain of Command (Bosnia Experience?)
Division Commanders understood/encouraged innovation
Power of the Internet
Army not capturing/controlling innovation
Doctrine trailing indicator of change
299Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
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The U.S. Army in Iraq: Intelligence Innovation
Local Source Development
CI/HUMINT Teams on Patrol
IPB of Networks
Police Work for Warfighters
Force protection through targeted patrolling
Every soldier an intelligence platform (implications for language/culture skills)
300Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
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The U.S. Army in Iraq: Training Local Forces
“Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly.”
Embedded trainers
Equipment fielding
TOE
Chain of Command
Schools
LEADERSHIP MATTERS
301Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
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