according to colonel effendi then DQ changez force on 8 December the enemy made a bold attempt to breach the minefield ...a blaze of 90 mm gun fire greeted the Indian trawls one managed to get through but the crew abandoned it with the engine running.....the second trawl was hit and stopped dead.... and the third one stayed without risking a cross But then something inexplicable happened, the infantry element (not 13 Punjab) sharing the same ridge with with C Squadron were unnerved by the sight of the three tanks, equipped with trawls rushing forward, and as a result they panicked and left their trenches and moved rearwards.

The enemy tanks covering the mine breaching operation started engaging our M-47s on the ridge, as a result two tanks were hit and the troop leader, a JCO , also lost his nerve and started pulling out, the neighboring troop also started following suit.

The squadron commander on seeing a fiasco developing, tried to stop the rot,but the order he gave was misinterpreted: --

Apne, apne purane position mein wapis jao (go back to your original position).This was understood by some to return to their original location near Shakargarh town that they had occupied prior to 5 December,this resulted in a stampede , as the squadron went out of control,the wireless network got jammed and the squadron commander watched helplessly as order and discipline crumbled around him.However one of his troops, on the extreme right flank,commanded by Captain Kazim, stood firm at Nathlan Kalan.

A Squadron 20 Lancers , located close by , witnessed the rout, and the squadron commander reported the situation to Lt. Col Tufail”.

Effendi went on and described the crisis of confusion in C Squadron 33 Cavalry in following words :--“ We had barely reached our HQ when a telephone call from 20 Lancers broke the news.It was stunning.Fortunately for us the unseemly withdrawal was not seen by the enemy, as it had occurred on a reverse slope and out of his view.In the meantime Tufail arrived black as thunder.Brigadier Nisar ordered him to go and personally check the position on the ground, and I was to accompany him as the squadron commanders representative.As we were driving on the main track , we saw an oncoming jeep,with Lt Col Abdur Rahman and his elegant second in command as the occupants.On seeing us ,the jeep stopped next to us and Lt Col Abdur Rahman shouted : - Everything is under control ,it was only a minor mishap, and we are reoccupying those positions”.

Lt Col Tufail looked at me and said “ since he says so we should accept his words , and since you are the commanders representative , you should have the fonal say”.

I felt extremely uncomfortable doubting Lt Col Abdur Rahman, considering the fact I held him in high esteem, so we decided to return to Tola,where we briefed the commander who took a sigh of relief and said to me he would take a little nap.By now it was dark.Things settled down in the bubker and I prepared for a long night vigil.”

Sadly the situation did not end here .Effendi stated further “ It was around midnight when in walked Lt Col Abdur Rahman followed by his second in command. “ Effendi , things have not turned out as they should have,the squadron is scattered and we have failed

to reoccupy our position”.He stumbled over every word, and I shared his embarrassment.

He further continued : “ Please GET the 20 Lancer Squadron to occupy the position”. http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Military-Review-Artillery-understood/dp/1523392053/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1452754290&sr=1-2