ntr d t n: P l t l L n nd P l t l p nth r f D l n z t n

N h l h n

Africa Today, Volume 53, Number 2, Winter 2006, pp. 3-24 (Article)

P bl h d b nd n n v r t PrDOI: 10.1353/at.2006.0071

For additional information about this article

Access provided by UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN (16 Apr 2015 17:53 GMT)

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/at/summary/v053/53.2cheeseman.html

The outcome of the

constitutional review

process confirms the

durability of the

“bureaucratic-executive”

system of rule, and the

importance of this post-

colonial continuity in

generating the relatively

high level of political

stability in Kenya.

Introduction: Political Linkage and Political Space in the Era of DecolonizationNic Cheeseman

The continuing importance of Kenya’s institutional colonial inheritance has been underestimated because the impact of decolonization on Kenya’s formal political institutions has rarely been systematically addressed. Consequently, there is a pressing need to reevaluate the structure of government in the colonial and postcolonial periods in a manner that takes a critical perspective on the domestic relationship between government and opposition. In addition to introducing the papers that follow, this essay examines the factors that under-pin the continued supremacy of the executive-administrative axis in the Kenya postcolony. It develops the twin concepts of political linkage and political space as tools to describe the political landscape of the colonial and postcolonial eras. Institutional factors, it is argued, must be central to any attempt to explain the longevity and eventual breakdown of KANU rule.

Introduction

The extent to which Africa’s colonial past has influenced its postcolonial present has long generated debate among students of African history and politics. Chabal and Daloz, for example, have warned against the ten-dency “to overestimate the impact of colonialism on the formation of the contemporary African state” (1999:11). Against this, others, most notably Mamdani in Citizen and Subject (1996), have sought to accord the colonial state a central role in explaining developments since independence. Others still have doubted the oft-implied contrast between a rational and stable colonial system and an irrational and unstable postcolonial era.1 Question-ing the value of such a distinction, Ranger concludes that “colonial Africa was much more like post-colonial Africa than most of us have hitherto imagined. And its dynamics have continued to shape post-colonial society” (Ranger 1996:280).

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N�

“Creating the Kenya Post-Colony,” a conference held at Oxford on 18 and 19 April 2005, addressed Ranger’s concerns by re-evaluating the significance of Kenya’s colonial past for its postcolonial state formation and development.2 The common theme that emerged in conference discussions was the importance of the continuities that bridge the colonial/postcolonial divide.3 The papers presented at the conference, five of which are included in this special issue, were underpinned by a common emphasis on how not to think about decolonization. This consensus is founded upon two central points of agreement. First, the achievement of independence was not so uniform, neat, and unidirectional a process as the term decoloniza-tion might be taken to imply. Consequently, those presenting were aware of the need to avoid a conceptualization of “decolonization” that “sanitizes struggle, eliminates contradictions and smuggles a plan” into Kenya’s politi-cal history (Atieno-Odhiambo 1995:26). History rarely proceeds in straight lines. Second, conference delegates agreed on the importance of resisting an understanding of decolonization that focuses solely on the question of national sovereignty. On this interpretation, decolonization is concerned not simply with one specific freedom (usually understood in this context as self-determination), but with a range of overlapping and sometimes compet-ing freedoms, incorporating political, economic, cultural, and psychological dimensions.4

The contributors to this issue, sharing a common belief that Kenya’s colonial past is ripe for re-examination, consciously focus on how indepen-dence has affected the political dimension of freedom. In part, this focus is inspired by the continuing political salience of Kenya’s colonial experience, most notably in the recent controversy surrounding the constitutional review process. In December 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeated the incumbent Kenya African National Union (KANU), promising comprehensive political and economic reforms, including the completion of the constitutional review process. NARC’s commitment to revise Kenya’s constitution highlighted the popular illegitimacy of a political system rooted in the structure of government established under colonial rule. Despite NARC’s election promise, the draft constitution finally approved by par-liament failed to reduce the powers of the president, reflecting President Kibaki’s desire to maintain Kenya’s “top heavy” structure of government ahead of general elections scheduled for December 2007. Disagreement over the proposed constitution split an already fractious NARC coalition. In the referendum on the draft constitution held in November 2005, cabinet members openly campaigned against one another. Ultimately, the “no” campaign emerged victorious, with 58 percent of those voting rejecting the new constitution. The proposed constitution’s defeat leaves in place Kenya’s “top-heavy” political system, and ensures that the legitimacy of these institutions will continue to be debated.

That neither the transition to multiparty politics, nor the transfer of power from KANU to NARC, has brought about an effective decentralization of power is not surprising. The survival of a political structure in which a

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N�

powerful executive rules through a highly centralized system of administra-tion has been the defining feature of all four of Kenya’s political transitions in the last sixty years.5 It is this “axis of power” that represents Kenya’s most striking and potent postcolonial continuity. The strength of this axis is the most distinctive feature of the Kenyan state, understood here to be “the his-torically conditioned set of institutions . . . which, more or less adequately, secures the social conditions for the reproduction of the dominant mode of production, in this case capitalism” (Lonsdale and Berman 1979:489).

The outcome of the constitutional review process highlights the dura-bility of the “bureaucratic-executive” system of rule (Branch and Cheeseman 2006), and suggests that it is the continuity in the centralized institutions of government that accounts for political stability in Kenya. Scholars have not recognized the importance of the Kenyan state in explaining political outcomes, even though all successive Kenyan presidents have recognized the indispensability of the political structure they have inherited. Assessments of the impact of decolonization on Kenya’s formal political institutions are rare. Ghai and McAuslan helpfully document Kenya’s legal inheritance (Ghai 1972; Ghai and McAuslan 1970), but like Okoth-Ogendo (1972), they do not develop the all-important connection between the theoretical continuity in colonial legal and political institutions and the decisions made by postcolo-nial political actors. In contrast, this connection is made by Gertzel’s seminal study (1970) of continuities in the legislative and electoral process, and in Bienen’s analysis (1977) of the basis of Kenyatta’s administrative and politi-cal control. These studies are well complemented by Bourmaud’s analysis (1988) of continuities in administrative power and Mueller’s account (1984) of how KANU defeated the challenge of the Kenya People’s Union. Taken together, this body of work makes a powerful case for a methodological focus that prioritizes the role of formal political institutions and, consequently, Kenya’s postcolonial institutional inheritance.

Despite its strengths, the early literature does not theorize about the nature of Kenya’s colonial legacy, nor does it assess the ways in which Kenya’s institutional inheritance is self-perpetuating. Unfortunately, there have been few attempts to build on the structural components of the work of Bienen, Bourmaud, and Gertzel. Much research that seeks to explain the “roots of political stability” in Kenya (e.g., Tamarkin 1978; Murunga 2004) is not concerned with tracing political phenomena back to the colonial period. In contrast, research that has viewed Kenyan politics in the long durée has tended to ignore the significance of formal institutions and their influence on the political landscape.6 Analysis has tended to focus on the role of ethnicity in conditioning political allegiances. Both Mutiso (1975) and Atieno-Odhiambo (1995) have documented the impact of the Mau Mau rebel-lion and the promotion of a loyalist elite, who gained preferential access to economic opportunities and political positions. Similarly, Anyang’ Nyong’o (1989), Kyle (1999), and Throup (1987a, 1987b) have highlighted the role of personal loyalty and ethnicity in forming the coalitions that contested the Kenyatta succession in the late 1970s.7 As a result, the role of the state in

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N�

explaining political outcomes in Kenya, including the salience of ethnicity, has been marginalized. Similarly, as Orvis argues in the conclusion to this edition, the literature on neo-patrimonialism has tended to underestimate the importance of formal political institutions, instead focusing on the role of informal institutions and the extent to which the state is “captured” by certain sections of society (2006). Where the question of the changing nature of the state is directly addressed, as in Ogot and Ochieng (1995), Oyugi (1994), and Widner (1992), there has been little attempt to provide a conceptual framework to enable systematic colonial–postcolonial compari-sons. While the state is seen as a central factor in shaping African politics under colonial rule, it rarely receives the same attention in discussions of the postcolonial era.

Only the dependency and underdevelopment literatures that came out of the “Kenya debate” in the 1970s and 1980s attempted to provide a system-atic framework through which to understand the institutional continuities and changes since independence. This body of work focused on the meaning of uhuru (independence) for economic self-determination, and consequently overlooked the importance of domestic political institutions. Within the “Kenya debate” of the 1970s and 1980s, African states were seen as being locked into structures of exploitation and development by the international system: the focus was on the constraints on Kenyan agency. Through the work of Kitching (1980), Leys (1975), and others, the immediate postinde-pendence period came to be characterized as an era of “neocolonialism,” in which the dominant theme was understood to be economic, rather than political, continuities. All too often, underdevelopment and dependency theorists depicted African peoples as “objects of outside manipulation,” and consequently overlooked the extent to which Kenyan leaders had molded the institutions they had inherited (Bayart 1993:3). The conflation of economic and political self-determination resulted in a systematic underestimation of the importance of domestic political institutions and the ability of Afri-can actors to engage with existing structures of domestic and international power.8 This tendency spread beyond the confines of the “Kenya debate,” in part because of the influence that this debate, and Leys in particular, exerted over the style and focus of Kenyan scholarship. To this day, Kenyan scholar-ship remains influenced by the legacy of the “Kenya debate,” and has yet to compensate fully for its shortcomings.

This issue is a first step toward remedying the gap left by this lit-erature. More specifically, there is a need to systematically reevaluate the formal institutions of the colonial and postcolonial period, since these structures have shaped the ideas and actions of political actors since inde-pendence. In seeking to perform this task, the papers presented here explore the relationship between government and opposition. Put most simply, they speak to the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Within the focus on postcolonial continuities, they adopt two main methodological approaches. The first endorses Ranger’s concern that the colonial period should not be

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N�

unquestioningly privileged by seeking a balanced comparison of the two eras. Matt Carotenuto’s work on the relationship between the Luo Union, its members, and the state employs this approach. By tracing the sixty-year existence of the Luo Union, Carotenuto shows how the organization attempted to establish and maintain a “space” within which its members could interact and unite. While its more “cultural” focus made it accept-able to the regime during colonial times, “after independence, ethnically based organizations increasingly began to be seen as being in direct conflict with the nation-building process” (Carotenuto 2006: pg. 54). By comparing the relationship between the Luo Union and the state in the two periods, Carotenuto demonstrates the continuing tension between the state and competing sources of power. In doing so, he makes the important point that the impact of independence on African associational life was complex, and in many cases did not empower African political actors.

The second approach underpinning these papers seeks to demonstrate that many of the roots of postcolonial discourses and structures lie in the colonial period. Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle’s analysis of the relation-ship between Mau Mau and contemporary human-rights defenders adopts this stance. By showing how contemporary human-rights defenders appropri-ate and utilize Mau Mau imagery, Pommerolle addresses the contemporary relevance of symbols and ideas cultivated during the colonial era. She shows that by adopting Mau Mau symbolism, human-rights defenders have been able to “impose their cause and to keep alive social and political demands regarding wealth and accountability in the national community” (2006: pg. 76). Her paper is significant, as it reveals both the contested nature of memory and the ability of postcolonial actors to imagine and reimagine Kenya’s past as a strategy for political mobilization.

Another study that adopts this approach is Daniel Branch’s analysis of African electoral politics (2006). Branch argues that the colonial government effectively manipulated elections in Central Province in 1957 and 1958 to ensure the promotion of an African elite sympathetic to British interests. Through an analysis of these elections, he demonstrates how Kenya’s found-ing fathers learned the lesson of the “triumph of the system.” His argument provides an insight into the extent to which colonial forces deliberately influenced the transition from colonial rule to suit their own needs; how-ever, the real value of his work is that it illuminates how an African elite that would bend Kenya’s inherited political institutions to its own needs was produced.

Taken together, these papers bring a broad range of perspectives to bear on a common theme. This introduction and the essays by Branch and Orvis focus on the significance of institutions in shaping the options available to Kenyan political actors. The two remaining essays, by Carotenuto and Pom-merolle, reverse this viewpoint to look at how different groups—explicitly political and otherwise—have responded to this process.

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N�

Conceptualizing Government and opposition in Kenya

In evaluating interactions among individuals, organizations, and the state, all four papers raise questions concerning the availability of “political space.” Often used but rarely defined, the concept of political space here refers to the arenas within which political actors engage in political activities in the absence of coercive pressure.9 As Haugerud argues, political space may exist in various arenas, ranging from “formal” political parties and national assemblies to “informal” spaces, such as public meeting places and theaters (Haugerud 1995:28–33). Of course, the degree of coercion and hence the availability of political space are not all-or-nothing concepts, and need to be thought of as a continuum. This continuum involves two dimensions: the number of arenas that support political space, and the quality of political space within any given arena. Both are needed to accommodate regimes that allow a small sphere of uncensored activity and regimes that tolerate many spheres of heavily regulated political activity. Defining political space in relation to the absence of coercion binds the concept of political space to the capacity of the state, and hence to the nature and effectiveness of the struc-tures through which the state is reproduced.10 It suggests that the concept of political space is inherently related to the concept of political linkage, where political linkage is understood to refer to those institutions that connect the population to the government. The term institution is here taken to refer to sets of rules, norms, or standards that regulate political action. On this interpretation, elections, bureaucracies, and patronage networks all count as institutions.

Political space is both made possible and constrained by the structure of political linkage, which may be provided by both formal (the electoral system, the administration) and informal (patron-client networks) institu-tions. In the Kenyan case it is formal institutions that have played a leading role in shaping political space. To understand when and how Kenyans express dissent, we need to understand how the structure of political linkage shapes the available political space; however, the need to “bring the state back in” does not mean that an institutional focus should be used in isolation.11 More “cultural” approaches are useful when dealing with authoritarian states in which much political activity occurs “underground.” The authoritarian ten-dencies of the Moi regime forced Kenyans to carve out their own democratic spaces in bars, matatu taxis, and funerals (Haugerud 1995:81–99). In this context, critiques of the government tend to become articulated in the form of commonly understood metaphors and symbols, the inherent ambiguity of such mediums providing some protection for the “performer” from state censorship; however, while recognizing the value of a cultural approach in illuminating these phenomena, it is crucial not to lose sight of the fact that such “underground” criticism is a direct response to the state’s coercive capacity. It is only when discussions concerning political space are located in the context of the structure of the state that the dynamic interactions among structure, culture, and agency can be revealed. In connecting the actions

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N�

of individuals and groups to the ongoing tension between government and opposition, the contributions of Pommerolle and Carotenuto in this issue speak to the dialectic between structure and culture. This relationship suggests that our understanding of the dynamics of Kenyan politics will be greater the more “institutional” and “cultural” approaches interact.

It is not just Kenya’s overarching political structure that merits greater attention: the organization of individual institutions shapes the type of linkage they provide, and hence determines the impact of the institution on political space. We therefore need to reevaluate political institutions from both a “macro” and a “micro” perspective. A typology of different modes of linkage differentiated by the mediating institution is suggested in Figure 1.12 (The typology is not intended to be exhaustive, and the types detailed are not exclusive.) More hierarchical organizations, such as bureaucracies and police forces, increase the control of those at the top over the activities of those at the bottom, hence limiting possibilities for feedback and interaction. Con-versely, more egalitarian institutions, such as political parties, trade unions, and electoral mechanisms, allow greater space for creative activity and so tend to offer greater possibilities for dialogue and interaction.13 Of course, terms such as bureaucracy and party help in the understanding of the nature of political linkage only to the extent that they conform to hierarchical or egalitarian organizational types (Douglas 1986; Hood 1998); however, these labels represent a shorthand through which to map out the broad structure of political space.

Participatory and representative linkage is essential to citizens’ ability to operate within the formal institutions of the political system. By contrast, the strength of coercive linkage determines the authoritarian capacity of the state and hence the ability of the state to regulate political space. Con-sequently, the combination of coercive and interactive linkage structures provides the context for the quantity and quality of political space available in any given system. It also helps us understand political stability. As Orvis argues (following Joel Migdal), political institutions are unlikely to endure if they lack meaning. While a range of factors may influence the degree to which a population finds “meaning” in an institution, the extent to which citizens feel they can participate in the political system is surely one of the most important. As demonstrated by Orvis, the longevity of KANU rule was underpinned by the ability to combine an effective structure of coercive linkage that allowed for the extension of central control with structures of interactive linkage that offered inclusion and meaning (2006).

the Evolution of Political Linkage

Using the concept of political linkage as a lens offers a new perspective on the continuing influence of Kenya’s colonial past. By tracing the possibili-ties for interactive linkage through political parties and elections, and the strength of coercive linkage through the administration, the analysis that

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N10

follows seeks to explore the structural context of political space in the colo-nial and postcolonial periods. In doing so, it will lay the foundation for the more detailed analysis found in the papers that follow.

The distinctive feature of political linkage in Kenya has been the government’s reliance on coercive linkage through the provincial admin-istration, since the local structures of ruling parties have been weak. In the immediate postindependence period, the desire to maintain political stability and the absence of effective party structures persuaded President Kenyatta and his clique within the Kenya African National Union (KANU) government to replicate the broad pattern of colonial rule. Consequently, linkage in the independence era tended to replicate the predominantly coer-cive structures of the colonial period. This had two main consequences for political space. First, the political space available within the institutions that provided political participation and were recognized by the state, most notably the party system and the electoral system, was progressively closed off. Second, the ability of individuals and groups to engage in political acts

Figure 1 Types of Political Linkage

Interactive linkage ExamplesUnidirectional linkage

Examples

Participatory linkage

Linkage through organizations that enable citizens to coordinate political activity

Political parties, interest groups

Coercive linkage

Linkage through directive institutions, used to maintain control

Police, Army, Provincial Administration

Representative linkage

Linkage through institutions that publicize citizens’ policy preferences

Elections, referenda, media

Reciprocal linkage

Citizens’ support is exchanged for favors, potentially integrating them into the political system

Patron–client networks

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N11

outside of officially sanctioned arenas was severely constrained. This con-straint forced “cultural” groups, such as the Luo Union, to continue their emphasis on “nonpolitical” activities, and dissenting political groups, such as the mysterious Mwakenya, to operate “underground.”

KANU’s longevity was a function of the regime’s ability to regulate political space without, in the short to medium term, totally undermining the “meaning” associated with Kenya’s participatory and representative linkage structures. To maintain the legitimacy of Kenya’s formal political institutions, Kenyatta, and later Moi, fused them with a system of patron-client relations and harambee cooperative development projects. In many areas, elections became referenda on local leaders’ ability to bring central funds, sourced from the executive, to the locality. The result was that while Kenya’s electoral and party system offered no chance to effect real change at the national level, the Kenyan electorate continued to be able to participate in the selection of the “community patron.” As a result, legislative elec-tions in Kenya remained more significant (and controversial) than one-party elections in nearby Zambia and Tanzania.

In merging inherited formal political institutions with informal struc-tures, the KANU executive fostered a state in which strong coercive linkage could coexist with more participatory and popular linkage structures. The colonial state was not only maintained: it was improved upon. The impact of independence was varied. The white settlers lost their privileged access to the colonial government, but they remained influential. By contrast, the wealthy “Kiambu elite,” who formed a core component of Kenyatta’s support, rose to a dominant position after independence. Others, including the Luo Union and ex–Mau Mau fighters, continued to experience a tense relationship with the state. Decolonization thus failed to bring about a revolution in the structure of the state, and it had a complex impact on the availability of political space.

Political Space and Political Linkage under Colonial Rule

For Africans until the very end, colonial rule allowed only for coercive forms of political linkage, maintained through the hierarchical organization of the provincial administration. The administration divided Kenya into eight provinces, each with its own provincial commissioner, appointed by the governor. Each province was broken down into a number of districts, presided over by a district commissioner. Indispensable to the work of the provincial commissioners was a layer of appointed chiefs, who formed the final link in the chain. Although ultimate authority resided with the colonial secretary, it was the governor, acting through the provincial administration, who ruled. The importance of the administration lay in its institutional capacity and the scope of its responsibilities, which included “three major functions: control, co-ordination and mobilization of the public for develop-ment” (Gertzel 1970:25). Significantly, it was the administration, and not the

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N12

police, that was ultimately responsible for law and order. This position was entrenched during the state of emergency, when the number of administra-tive officer posts increased from 184 to 370, and “as a result[,] the adminis-trative network was able to effect much closer control” (Gertzel 1970:26). In contrast to much of the African experience of colonial rule, the scope of the provincial administration in Kenya gave the colonial government great coercive capacity in rural and urban areas (Branch and Cheeseman 2006; Mueller 1984). By 1963, Kenya’s administration was approximately one-third larger than Tanganyika’s, though Tanganyika had a much larger population (Bienen 1977:30).

The administration was by far the most important linkage mechanism of the colonial era, but its hierarchical structure prevented wider participa-tion and offered only narrow avenues for feedback. Despite this, the extent to which the administration penetrated African society, and the ability of some administrative officers to make local policy as they saw fit (Asquith 1961), meant that it could have acted as a conduit for African grievances; however, the colonial government’s desire to suppress African political organization prevented the development of a more “inclusive” administration. Instead, the ability to make local policy was mostly used to entrench administrative control. Closer control, in turn, was used to limit African political space. The most prominent African political associations, most notably the Kikuyu Central Association and later the Kenya African Union, suffered frequent restrictions on their activities, including the exile of prominent leaders, restrictions on their ability to collect funds, and refusals to grant licenses for public meetings.14

In the early period of colonial rule, the administration’s strength effec-tively crowded out any form of participatory linkage that African political parties could have offered. In part, the impetus to regulate political space so tightly came from Kenya’s white settlers, who made the first breakthrough in creating new arenas of political space, and subsequently set about defending their right to access these arenas exclusively. In 1907, they persuaded the colonial government to establish a legislative council that included three nominated “unofficial” Europeans, paving the way for more substantial structures of representative linkage, through which setters could elect their own representatives. By 1922, 9,651 Europeans were in the territory, and their access to the colonial government enabled them to achieve a virtual monopoly over the best land. Henceforth, land and representation within parliament, and African demands for both, came to play a central role in Kenyan politics.

The settlers’ economic influence generated a struggle among them, the colonial government, Asian capital, and African small-scale agriculture for political power. This mix of interests, dominated by the struggle between Africans and settlers over who would inherit the colonial state, ensured that Kenya enjoyed a more complex path to independence than its East African neighbors. Wary of the growing sense of injustice among the African popula-tion, the settlers were keen to use their position on the council to maintain

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N13

a highly inequitable distribution of political space. Their efforts to prevent African political representation were partially successful: Africans were not appointed to the legislative council until 1944, and were directly elected to it only in 1957. The lack of representative linkage structures such as open elections, and the limited participatory linkage structures because of the repression of African political organizations, denied Africans access to political space within the formal structures of government. Consequently, Africans were forced to carve out “democratic space” in unconventional arenas. As Carotenuto shows, the Luo Union attempted to escape colonial interference by avoiding “political” activities. Other organizations, such as the Union’s sister association, the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation, sought to empower their members through economic, rather than political, advancement.

For the radical Kikuyu of Central Province, the combination of land grievances and political suppression led to a different and more confronta-tional outcome in the form of the Mau Mau rebellion. In 1951, prompted by concerns over the spread of secret oath-taking ceremonies and the promise of violent attacks against Europeans and collaborating chiefs, the colonial government declared Mau Mau unlawful. In 1952, Sir Evelyn Baring, then governor, declared a state of emergency. Shortly afterward, in “Operation Jack Scott,” Kenyatta and almost two hundred leaders were arrested. The emergency had a profound impact on the structure of political linkage in Kenya. African political parties were banned—and when they were legal-ized (in June 1955), it was only at the district level and at the discretion of colonial officers. This situation empowered the colonial government to pick and choose the local parties it wished to encourage. Such colonial policies had the effect of “nurturing local politics while hindering the expression of national aspirations” (Anderson 2005b: 3). The restrictions on African political organizations encouraged the development of “one-party districts,” which entrenched the bond between local leaders and their often ethnically homogenous supporters.15 As a result, the 1950s saw a proliferation of local organizations that competed with the colonial government for the right to exist and with each other for the right to exert the greatest influence on colonial rule.16 The strength of local political bosses and the tension between different ethnic communities created a powerful check on the integration of local political machines into a national party structure. As a result, the system of participatory linkage provided by African political parties that developed in Kenya was more fragmented and internally divided than in Tanzania. Even after 1969, when Kenya became a de facto one-party state, the legacy of this fragmented political evolution continued to undermine the effectiveness of the political linkage offered by KANU.

Mau Mau was eventually contained, but not before it had profoundly altered Kenya’s political landscape.17 As much as it was an anticolonial strug-gle, it was also civil war, albeit one forced upon the central highlands by the colonial state. Kikuyu loyalists were drafted to man the Home Guard, and Kikuyus made up the vast majority of the casualties. The policy of coopting

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N1�

African loyalists to act as a buffer between the colonial government and the more radical elements of African nationalism had far-reaching consequences for Kenya’s political institutions. In attempting to generate a sympathetic African middle class, both within the Kikuyu and without, the colonial government set out to manipulate electoral politics, the distribution of new economic opportunities, and the Africanization of the administration. The impact of this process on the elections to the Legislative Council in 1957 and 1958 is documented in Daniel Branch’s contribution to this issue. Branch shows the extent to which these elections for African representa-tives, held on a qualified franchise in eight constituencies, were designed to favor leaders sympathetic to the colonial government. To achieve this result, a loyalty test was enforced in areas directly affected by the emergency. As Branch notes, this policy effectively excluded the more radical elements of the Kenyan political community, whose votes had already been diluted by electoral boundaries that penalized the main centers of Mau Mau activity. Although his analysis focuses on events in Central Province, the use of a qualitative franchise that favored wealthy and educated men means that Branch’s analysis resonates outside that province.18 This manipulation of the electoral process denied Africans meaningful political space within the state’s representative linkage structure. It set a dangerous precedent, which would dog postcolonial elections. As Branch argues, the success of loyalist politicians was an early example of what Throup and Hornsby (1998) term “the triumph of the system.”

As the colonial government was forced to allow greater African politi-cal representation, the debate over the structure of the future Kenyan state intensified, splitting the African nationalist movement. In 1960, the divisions crystallized into the formation of KANU and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU was more radical and progressive, and mainly drew support from the Kikuyu and Luo communities; by contrast, KADU brought together a more conservatively minded coalition, united in their belief that a majimbo (regionalist) constitution was essential to protect their interests. This group included Moi’s Kalenjin Political Association, Muliro’s Kenya African People’s Party and Ngala’s Coastal African People’s Union. KADU’s majimboist ideology was encouraged by European liberals, led by Michael Blundell. The common thread uniting KADU and the set-tler community was the fear that KANU would inherit the strong coercive linkage structures of the colonial state, and that consequently their political space would be progressively closed off (Anderson 2005b). A regionalist con-stitution that would create arenas within which KANU could not dominate political space promised to protect minorities and exaggerate the role of moderate political forces.19

A decentralized system of government was initially an attractive proposition to the British government. Regionalism promised to protect groups sympathetic to colonial interests and diffuse some of Kenya’s more alienated groups’ demands for secession. One group that made this claim was the Somalis of the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD), who argued that

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N1�

their inclusion in Kenyan territory was an accident of history. Such demands were not solely related to ethnicity, but reflected the fact that colonialism had marginalized Northern Kenya. The “closed-districts policy” of the NFD was compounded by the fact that the colonial government saw the North as having little economic value. Institutionalized through legislation such as the Northern Frontier Province Poll Tax, the isolation of regions such as the NFD added a problematic dynamic to Kenya’s independence negotiations and to the development of the postcolonial Kenyan “nation.”

The potential for a regionalist system of government to resolve such tensions, and the natural sympathy of the British government toward the settlers and KADU, ensured that this coalition would prove far stronger than its electoral support might have suggested. Although KADU won just 16.4 percent of the vote in the election of 1961, the outcome of the Lancaster House constitutional talks, held in 1960, 1962, and 1963, favored their regionalist ambitions; however, over time, the personal popularity of the recently released Kenyatta and KANU’s clear dominance at the ballot box eroded British support for majimboism. In the final round of talks before independence, the British government agreed to a change that permitted amendments to the constitution via a two-thirds majority vote in the House of Representatives. This agreement undermined the protection offered by the regionalist tenor of the constitution, and transferred control over the structure of the postcolonial state to KANU (Gertzel 1970; Kyle 1999).

Political Linkage in the Postcolonial Era

Although the independence constitution failed to live up to KADU’s expec-tations, the creation of regional assemblies and plans for regions to take charge of their own finances represented a threat to the centrality of KANU’s authority. Consequently, KANU set about dismantling the majimbo consti-tution as soon as independence was secured. Responsibility for resisting the decentralization of the administration until KANU had an opportunity to introduce a new constitution fell on the Minister for Home Affairs, Oginga Odinga, who “improvised a new way of keeping as much central control as possible” (Odinga 1967:243). The subsequent republican constitution of 1964 abolished the regional system of government and created a strong president in place of the prime minister (Ochieng 1995:107). Not only was the admin-istration once again placed under the executive’s direct control, but the office of regional president was abolished, and provincial commissioners, directly appointed by the president, were put in its place.

As a result, political linkage in the postcolonial state came to closely resemble the political linkage structure of the colonial state. This continu-ity can only be understood as stemming from the conscious choice of the KANU executive to reinstitute the structures of colonial rule and govern through the administration at the expense of the party. This latter choice was primarily based on three main factors, to which the importance of Kenya’s colonial legacy is obvious. First, the continued strength of local political

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N1�

bosses within KANU ensured that it was the administration, not the party, that represented the path of least resistance to the extension of executive control. Second, the success of moderate political leaders during the colo-nial period meant that the KANU elite had an interest in pursuing a course of economic and political continuity, which led them to favor the more conservative administration. Third, the administration’s strength relative to KANU’s structural weakness supported the administration’s continued dominance over KANU.

Consequently, the formal party structure of KANU atrophied. By 1966, three years after independence, a delegates’ conference had not been held since October 1962 and a secretariat meeting had not been held since February 1964. Furthermore, by this date, KANU was some £20,000 in debt, and the telephones at KANU headquarters had been cut off (Good 1968:125). The supremacy of the provincial administration over party structures at this point is demonstrated by the regulation of party affairs by the provincial and district commissioners. During the 1960s, the administration’s role in approving public meetings was used to prevent activity in KANU branches where the loyalty of the branch to the executive was in question. Where branch disputes persisted, the administration was often brought in to act as arbitrator, as in Mombassa and Machakos in 1968.

The continued dominance of the coercive linkage structure of the administration crowded out any effective linkage role for KANU. As a result, there remained few state-sponsored arenas supportive of political space. While this situation constrained the organization and expression of dissatisfaction with KANU rule, it limited KANU’s ability to effect political mobilization. The administration’s hierarchical structure meant that the administration continued to be an unsuitable organization through which to include Kenyans in the process of government and to generate support for the regime. As Huntington has argued, organizations that develop a limited “set of responses” to deal with a specific set of challenges often cling to “past successes” and prove unable to adapt to provide new services (1968:13). In Tanzania and Zambia, the provincial administration, established to ensure the maintenance of law and order, was seen to be an unsuitable organiza-tion through which to meet the new challenges of economic development and political mobilization. Nyerere, and to a lesser extent Kaunda, sought to overcome this limitation by merging the party and the administration (Tordoff 1970), creating a one-party state, in which there was no separation between party and government. In contrast, although Kenyatta relied heavily on Kenya’s highly politicized administration (Branch and Cheeseman 2006), the marginalization of KANU meant that during this period, Kenya is better thought of as an example of a “no-party” state.

The limited participatory linkage provided by political parties exag-gerated the significance of the electoral system. Following the assimilation of KADU into KANU immediately after independence, the de facto one-party state offered the electorate a severely constrained choice. Apart from the brief period between 1966 and 1969, when the Kenya People’s Union

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N1�

(KPU) challenged KANU hegemony, the single-party electoral system failed to offer Kenyans a say over who should be president and the direction of public policy. The constraints on participatory and representative linkage, combined with the strong coercive linkage provided by the administration, meant that the structure of political linkage in the postcolonial era came to mirror that of the colonial period. Although the relationship between govern-ment and opposition changed, many groups found they were no more able to participate effectively in politics than they had been during the latter years of colonial rule. This was the experience of the Luo Union. As Carotenuto’s paper shows, the union’s disappointed expectations of independence led to the emergence of a specifically postcolonial tension. As ethnic welfare organizations increasingly came to be seen to be in conflict with the nation-building process, the union was forced to avoid explicitly political activities. Instead, it concentrated on providing social and cultural services, such as football matches and dances. In its attempts to find a role that would aid its members and be acceptable to the KANU executive, the union’s experience speaks to the constraints on political space after independence and to the extent of Kenya’s colonial legacy. As Carotenuto argues, “the Luo Union’s shape and structure extended colonial influences far into the history of independent Kenya” (2006: pg. 54).

The administration’s preeminence, and the continuing constraints on organizations such as the Luo Union, threatened the legitimacy of KANU rule. While attempting to regulate political space, the executive recognized the need to create an image of Kenya that was inclusionary and participa-tory. Although KANU was structurally weak, the symbolic potency of the KANU “brand” had to be maintained. Despite the limitations of the electoral system, it was largely through this institution that Kenya’s political leaders attempted to create a sense of local ownership of the political system. As Barkan and Okumu have argued (1978, 1980), in the absence of an effective party structure, interactive political linkage in Kenya came to depend on the role of independent legislators as local representatives. Importantly, Kenyatta’s focus on harambee self-help projects meant that in many con-stituencies, elections became local referenda on the ability of the incumbent member of Parliament to deliver development. This circumstance fused informal and formal institutions to enhance the importance of single-party elections. The formal structure of the electoral system, most notably the constituency-based system of representation, shaped the choice of Kenyans; however, it was the position of legislators as local patrons and their ability to link constituents to state funds that made this choice meaningful. The emphasis on local patrons built upon the development of local political leaders during the colonial period and played into understandings of “moral ethnicity” (Lonsdale 1993). The representative linkage structure of electoral politics became infused with, and strengthened by, a patron-client system that conferred resources and duties on patrons. Through the linkage role played by legislators, disparate communities could be incorporated into the KANU state. In the long run, this practice solidified lines of patronage

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N1�

and strengthened the relationship between local leaders and their often ethnically homogenous communities.

The role of harambee was important in adding “meaning” to electoral politics. By combining representative and reciprocal linkage structures and connecting them to the call for harambee, Kenyatta managed to link the development efforts of local communities to the activities of elite politi-cians. Members of Parliament were expected to help coordinate harambee projects and to contribute to them personally (Kenya 2003; Transparency International Kenya 2001; Widner 1992). The importance of harambee was not the same in all constituencies, and personal and ethnic ties played a key role in determining voters’ behavior. Nevertheless, the ability to select local representatives on the basis of candidates’ contributions to the community played an important role in maintaining the legitimacy of KANU rule. Though harambee projects may not always have been as “grass-roots” and voluntary as Kenyatta’s rhetoric suggested (Kenya 2003; Male 1976; Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977), the extent of participation in harambee projects, and the popularity of many of these projects with the local electorate, cannot be doubted (Holmquist 1984).

The structural foundations of KANU rule were premised on the com-bination of the “meaning” offered through the electoral system and the administration’s coercive capacity. The gradual decline in the legitimacy of KANU, and the increasing reliance upon the administration to main-tain order, owed much to KANU’s inability to maintain this set of linkage structures in the long run. Daniel arap Moi, who succeeded Kenyatta as president in 1978, attempted to entrench his own position by using state funds to enable himself and his supporters to make generous harambee contributions. In the face of dwindling resources through which to support public spending, he endeavored to maintain his popularity by distributing an increasing proportion of revenue through highly publicized harambee donations. Between 1980 and 1989, the number of reported harambees more than quadrupled, and the total amount of reported harambee contributions increased from Ksh. 30,724,807 in 1980 to KSh. 669,781,543 in 1989. From 1980 to 1989, Moi personally contributed Ksh. 130,594,285 (Transparency International Kenya 2001).

This pattern of contributions exaggerated the importance of haram-bee in the short run, but Moi’s refusal to countenance dissent led him to undermine the very electoral system through which patron-client networks and harambee projects connected the regime to the wider population. After initial attempts to sideline disobedient members of Parliament by support-ing rival candidates in the 1983 elections failed, the subsequent introduction of queue voting and the widespread electoral malpractice of the late 1980s discredited the electoral system (Throup and Hornsby 1998). As Orvis argues, by undermining an institution that had conferred legitimacy on the regime, Moi removed a pillar that had been helping prop up the KANU government. Consequently, his regime became increasingly reliant on the administration to suppress and intimidate opposition. To escape censorship and punishment

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N1�

by an increasingly oppressive government, critical voices were forced to operate underground. Mwakenya (Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Kenya) was one such organization. Although there are no reliably precise estimates of the size and composition of its membership, evidence suggests that it was largely composed of students and intellectuals (Amutabi 2002). Operating with a high level of secrecy, it attempted to coordinate opposition to the Moi regime through influential publications, including Mpatanishi (Reconciler) and Pambaba (Struggle). Fearful of the unknowable scale of the organiza-tion, Moi pursued an ever more confrontational and dictatorial approach. As human-rights abuses and intimidation of suspected Mwakenya activists escalated (Amutabi 2002:171–173), the quantity and quality of political space available to Kenyans reached its lowest point in the postcolonial era.

Recognizing the strength of the state’s coercive apparatus, human-rights activists sought to operationalize new tactics to defend political space. One method used to mobilize support for human-rights issues was the appropriation of symbolic events from Kenya’s past. Pommerolle, in her analysis of this tactic, demonstrates how symbols and images of the past can serve as a resource to political actors in the present. “Recurrent references to the past,” she argues, “allowed human-rights defenders to impose their cause and to keep alive social and political demands regarding wealth and accountability in the national community” (2006: pg. 76).

Keeping these demands alive did not, on its own, radically change the government or government policy. As Orvis documents, it required the intervention of international donors in 1991 and a further eleven years of KANU rule before Kenya witnessed a transfer of power; however, the actions of human-rights defenders, and of other organizations (such as the Law Soci-ety of Kenya), helped secure the survival of an undercurrent of resistance in Kenyan political life (Klopp and Orina 2002). Resisting the extension of government control over all aspects of Kenyan life, these groups were forced to look for new arenas of political space—ones that the government would not, or could not, regulate. The structure of political linkage continued to shape the availability of political space, and in turn to be shaped by debates and events occurring within these arenas.

Conclusion

The struggle of groups such as the Luo Union and human-rights defenders to carve out their own political space in independent Kenya is a testament to the continuities that cross the colonial–postcolonial divide. In the con-text of tight constraints on participatory and representative linkage, and of the strong coercive linkage provided by the administration, groups such as Mwakenya were forced to look for new and imaginative arenas within which to pursue their cause. The structure of political linkage shaped the availability of political space, at once supporting certain arenas (such as the electoral system), and closing off others through the regulation of political

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N20

activity. There is a need to reevaluate the political impact of decolonization in Kenya, and to do this from a perspective that recognizes the importance of formal political institutions.

Kenyatta and KANU overcame an unbalanced political landscape by fusing formal and informal institutions. The incorporation of a fast-emerg-ing network of patron-client relationships into the electoral system helped maintain the legitimacy of KANU and the political system as a whole. Underpinned by the harambee movement, this arrangement supported a linkage structure that, despite its limitations, enabled many Kenyans to feel connected to the political process. The gradual decay of these institu-tions undermined this connection, and in the long run greatly weakened the authority of KANU and Moi. With the decreasing effectiveness of Kenya’s interactive linkage structures, the regime became increasingly reliant on the coercive role of the administration. As at the end of the colonial period, it was the administration that played a defining role in marking out the boundaries of political space.

The papers that follow speak to this continuity from the perspective of the tension between government and opposition, and together demon-strate that while no group was unaffected by independence, decolonization did not represent the change that many hoped for. The significance and continued relevance of Kenya’s colonial legacy described in these studies calls into question a crude labeling of political time that references a “colo-nial” and a “postcolonial” era to imply that one was radically different to the other. Instead, Kenyan history during this period was made up of many strands, all of which started and ended at different points, with little respect for the boundary implied by the distinction between the colonial and the postcolonial.

aCkNowledgmeNtS

the research for this paper was carried out while a doctoral student at Nuffield College, university

of oxford and was supported by the economic and Social research Council. the author would like

to thank Julia labeta, adrienne leBas, david anderson, and the anonymous reviewers for their

comments and suggestions.

NoteS

1. for an example of such an approach, see Seibert 1���.

2. the “Creating the kenya Post-Colony” conference was convened by the author and daniel

Branch at St Peter’s College, oxford university, to bring together those working on kenya,

especially postgraduate students. the convenors wish to express their thanks to St. Peter’s

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N21

College (oxford university), the african Studies department (oxford university), and the

department of Politics and International relations (oxford university), without whose help

the conference would not have been possible.

3. there may, of course, be political continuities that stretch back to nineteenth-century political

structures. with so little available evidence, tracing such continuities is extremely difficult, but

none of the arguments presented in this issue is intended to rule out this possibility.

�. a helpful discussion of the different components of “decolonization” can be found in maloba

1���. Political commentators rarely address the issue of cultural and psychological freedom

explicitly. three exceptions are Cabral 1���; gifford & louis 1���; maloba 1���. others, includ-

ing postcolonial theorists, revolutionaries, and literary theorists, have sought to address these

issues from various perspectives. a powerful and influential discussion is provided by fanon

1��� and 1���. an intelligent discussion of cultural decolonization in relation to kenya can

be found in the work of Ngugi wa thiong’o 1��3 and 1���.

�. a comprehensive account of this process is provided in throup and hornsby 1���.

�. the most extreme variant of this trend has resulted in a literature that at times describes

an “institutionless” political landscape, which is then used to justify a heavy focus on the

personalities and actions of individual leaders. See decalo 1���; Jackson and rosberg 1��2.

�. other important contributions include Berman and lonsdale 1��2; Bienen 1���; lonsdale

1��0.

�. to a certain extent, these criticisms were raised by those sympathetic to the underdevelop-

ment and dependency literature. See Swainson 1���:3�0, 3��.

�. Coercive pressure is here understood to mean the use of threats of violence, reprisal, or other

intimidating behavior that puts a person in immediate fear of the consequences of his or her

actions so as to compel that person to act against his or her will.

10. the nature and capacity of the state has recently attracted much attention within the lit-

erature on “comparative government.” for influential examples, see almond 1���; evans,

rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1���; weiss 1���.

11. the phrase “bringing the state back in” originates in evans, rueschemeyer, and Skocpol

1���.

12. this typology borrows heavily from lawson’s discussion of political parties and political

linkage (1��0).

13. the terms hierarchical and egalitarian are Christopher hood’s; see hood 1���.

1�. for more on the development of african political parties during this period, see Bennett 1���;

gertzel 1��0:3–1�; hughes 1��3:123–12�.

1�. tom mboya, with his Nairobi constituency, was one of the few leaders of this period to develop

a genuinely multiethnic support base, built up on the back of his trade-union efforts. at a

national level, kenyatta’s appeal was similarly broad.

1�. among the first to be registered were the Nairobi district african Congress, the mombasa afri-

can democratic union, the abagusii association of South Nyanza, the taita african democratic

union, the Nakuru african Progressive Party, and the abaluhya People’s association.

1�. more comprehensive analysis of the meaning and impact of mau mau is provided by anderson

200�; Berman and lonsdale 1��2; elkins 200�; lonsdale 1��0; throup 1���b.

1�. for more details of the 1��� elections, see engholm 1��0.

1�. the origins of kaNu and kadu and the differences separating the two parties are covered at

length in anderson 200�:��1–���. on the impact of kadu and regionalism, see kyle 1���.

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N22

refereNCeS

almond, gabriel. 1���. return to the State. American Political Science Review �2:��3–���.

amutabi, maurice. 2002. Crisis and Student Protest in universities in kenya: examining the role of

Students in National leadership and the democratization Process. African Studies Review ��,

2:1��–1��.

anderson, david. 200�a. Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. New

York: w. w. Norton.

———. 200�b. Yours in Struggle for majimbo: Nationalism and the Party Politics of decolonization in

kenya, 1���–��. Journal of Contemporary History �0:���–���.

anyang’ Nyong’o, Peter. 1���. State and Society in kenya: the disintegration of the Nationalist

Coalitions and the rise of Presidential authoritarianism 1��3–��. African Affairs ��:22�–2�1.

asquith, tom. 1��1. harambee: an account of the use of traditional organizations in the Promotion

of Community development in kenya, afghanistan and turkey. unpublished manuscript:

kenya National archive.

atieno-odhiambo, e. S. 1���. the formative Years 1���–1���. In Decolonization and Independence

in Kenya 1940–1993, edited by Bethwell ogot and william ochieng, 2�–��. london: James

Currey.

Barkan, Joel, and John okumu. 1���. Semi-Competitive elections, Clientelism, and Political recruit-

ment in a No-Party State: the kenyan experience. In Elections without Choice, edited by

g. hermet, r. rose and a. rouquiâe, ��–10�. london: macmillan.

———. 1��0. linkage without Parties: legislators and Constituents in kenya. In Political Parties and

Linkage: A Comparative Perspective, edited by kay lawson, 123–1��. london: Yale university

Press.

Bayart, Jean-françois. 1��3. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. london: longman.

Bennett, george. 1���. the development of Political organization in kenya. Political Studies �:

113–130.

Berman, Bruce, and John lonsdale. 1��2. Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa. london: James

Currey.

Bienen, henry. 1���. Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control. Princeton: Princeton university

Press.

Bourmaud, daniel. 1���. Histoire Politique du Kenya: État et Pouvoir Local. Paris: Credu.

Branch, daniel. 200�. loyalists, mau mau, and elections in kenya: the first triumph of the System,

1���–1���. Africa Today �3, 2: 2�–�0.

———, and Nic Cheeseman. 200�. the Politics of Control in kenya: understanding the Bureaucratic-

executive State, 1���–�3. Review of African Political Economy 10�: 11–31.

Cabral, amicar. 1���. Unity and Struggle. New York: monthly review Press.

Carotenuto, matt. 200�. riwruok e teko: Cultivating Identity in Colonial and Post-Colonial kenya. Africa

Today �3, 2: �3–�3.

Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal daloz. 1���. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. oxford:

James Curry.

decalo, Samuel. 1���. african Personal dictatorships. Journal of Modern African Studies 23:20�–23�.

douglas, mary. 1���. How Institutions Think. New York: Syracuse university Press.

elkins, Caroline. 200�. Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya. New York: henry

holt & Co.

africato

Day

NIC

Ch

eeSema

N23

engholm, geoffrey. 1��0. african elections in kenya, march 1���. In Five Elections in Africa, edited by

william mackenzie and kenneth robinson, 3�1–��1. oxford: Clarendon Press.

evans, P., d. rueschemeyer, and t. Skocpol, eds. 1���. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge

university Press.

fanon, frantz. 1���. The Wretched of the Earth. london: macgibbon & kee.

———. 1���. A Dying Colonialism. New York: grove Press.

ghai, Yash. 1��2. Constitutions and the Political order in east africa. International and Comparative

Law Quarterly 21:�03–�3�.

———, and Patrick mcauslan. 1��0. Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the Legal

Framework of Government from Colonial Times to the Present. Nairobi: oxford university Press.

gertzel, Cherry. 1��0. The Politics of Independent Kenya. Nairobi: east african Publishing house.

gifford, Prosser, and william louis. 1���. Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of

Power, 1960–1980. New haven, Conn.: Yale university Press.

good, kenneth. 1���. kenyatta and the organization of kaNu. Canadian Journal of African Studies

2:11�–13�.

haugerud, angelique. 1���. The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya. Cambridge: Cambridge university

Press.

holmquist, frank. 1���. Class Structure, Peasant Participation and rural Self-help. In Politics and

Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, edited by Joel Barkan and John okumu, 12�–1�3. Nairobi:

heinemann.

hood, Christopher. 1���. The Art of the State. oxford: oxford university Press.

hughes, a. J. 1��3. East Africa: The Search for Unity. london: Penguin.

huntington, Samuel. 1���. Political Order in Changing Societies. New haven: Yale university Press.

Jackson, robert, and Carl rosberg. 1��2. Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant.

Berkeley: university of California Press.

kenya, republic of. 2003. Report on the Task Force on Public Collections or “Harambees.” Nairobi:

government Printer.

kitching, gavin. 1��0. Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite-Bourgeoisie

1905–1970. london: Yale university Press.

kyle, keith. 1���. The Politics of the Independence of Kenya. New York: St martin’s Press.

lawson, kay. 1��0. Political Parties and Political linkage. In Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative

Perspective, edited by kay lawson, 1–2�. london: Yale university Press.

leys, Colin. 1���. Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964–1971.

london: heinemann.

lonsdale, John. 1��3. the Political Culture of kenya. In Political Culture, Local Government and Local

Institutions, edited by Bodil frederiksen and kirsten westergaard, 100–12�. occasional Paper

No. �: roskilde university.

_______, and Bruce Berman. 1���. Coping with the Contradictions: the development of the Colonial

State in kenya, 1���–1�1�. Journal of African History 20:���–�0�.

_______. 1��0. mau maus of the mind: making mau mau and remaking kenya. Journal of African His-

tory 31:3�3–�21.

male, diane. 1���. Influence of government Patronage on grassroots harambee Self-help in kenya.

Paper presented to the fourth world Congress of rural Sociology: Poland.

maloba, wunyabari. 1���. decolonization: a theoretical Perspective. In Decolonization and Indepen-

dence in Kenya 1940–93, edited by Bethwell ogot and william ochieng, �–2�. london: James

Currey.

africato

Day

INtr

od

uC

tIoN

: PolItIC

al lIN

ka

ge a

Nd

PolItIC

al SPa

Ce IN

the er

a o

f deC

olo

NIz

atIo

N2�

mamdani, mahmood. 1���. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton university Press.

mbithi, Philip, and rasmus rasmusson. 1���. Self Reliance in Kenya: The Case of Harambee. uppsala:

Scandinavian Institute of african Studies.

mueller, Susan. 1���. government and opposition In kenya, 1���–��. Journal of Modern African

Studies 22, 3:3��–�2�.

murunga, godwin. 200�. The State, Its Reform and the Question of Legitimacy in Kenya. Identity, Culture

and Politics Vol. No �: CodeSrIa.

mutiso, gideon. 1���. Kenya: Politics, Policy and Society. kampala: east african literature Bureau.

ochieng, william. 1���. Structural and Political Changes. In Decolonization and Independence in Kenya

1940–93, edited by Bethwell ogot and william ochieng, �3–10�. london: James Currey.

odinga, oginga. 1���. Not Yet Uhuru. Nairobi: east african educational Publishers.

ogot, Bethwell, and william ochieng, eds. 1���. Decolonization and Independence in Kenya 1940–93.

london: James Currey.

okoth-ogendo, h. w. o. 1��2. the Politics of Constitutional Change in kenya Since Independence,

1��3–��. African Affairs �1, 2�2: �–3�.

orvis, Stephen. 200�. Bringing Institutions Back Into the Study of kenya and africa. Africa Today �3,

2: ��–110.

oyugi, walter. 1���. Politics and Administration in East Africa. Nairobi: english Press.

Pommerolle, marie-emmanuelle. 200�. freedom fighters were the first human rights defenders: a

Comparative Perspective on memory and the Politics of opposition in Postcolonial kenya.

Africa Today �3, 2: ��–�3.

ranger, terence. 1���. Postscript: Colonial and Postcolonial Identities. In Postcolonial Identities in Africa,

edited by richard werbner and terence ranger, 2�1–2�1. london: zed Books.

Seibert, gerhard. 1���. Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé

and Príncipe. leiden: research School of asian, african, and amerindian Studies, leiden

university.

Swainson, Nicola. 1���. State and economy in Post-Colonial kenya. Canadian Journal of African Studies

12:3��–3�1.

tamarkin, mordechai. 1���. the roots of Political Stability in kenya. African Affairs ��:2��–320.

wa thiong’o, Ngugi. 1��3. Barrel of a Pen: Resistance to Repression in Neo-Colonial Kenya. trenton: africa

world Press.

———. 1���. Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. Nairobi:

heinemann.

throup, david. 1���a. the Construction and destruction of the kenyatta State. In The Political Economy

of Kenya, edited by m. g. Schatzberg. london: Praeger.

———. 1���b. Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau, 1945–53. london: James Currey.

throup, david, and Charles hornsby. 1���. Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and

the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election. london: James Currey.

tordoff, william.1��0. Provincial and local government in zambia. Journal of Administration Overseas

�, 1: 23–3�.

transparency International kenya. 2001. Harambee: Pulling Together or Pulling Apart? Nairobi:

transparency International kenya.

weiss, linda. 1���. The Myth of the Powerless State. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell university Press.

widner, Jennifer. 1��2. The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya. oxford: university of California.