Local Political Corruption

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Local Political Corruption:Potential structural malfunctionsat the central–local, local–localand intra-local levelsItai Beeri a & Doron Navot ba School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa ,Mount Carmel, Israelb School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa ,Mount Carmel, IsraelPublished online: 30 Jul 2012.

To cite this article: Itai Beeri & Doron Navot (2013) Local Political Corruption: Potentialstructural malfunctions at the central–local, local–local and intra-local levels, PublicManagement Review, 15:5, 712-739, DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2012.707682

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LOCAL POLITICALCORRUPTIONPotential structuralmalfunctions at the central–local, local–local and intra-local levels

Itai Beeri and Doron Navot

Itai BeeriSchool of Political SciencesUniversity of Haifa

Mount CarmelIsraelE-mail: [email protected]

Doron NavotSchool of Political SciencesUniversity of Haifa

Mount CarmelIsraelE-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

Despite growing preoccupation on the part of

both the public and researchers with the

concept of political corruption and the

‘corruption eruption’ phenomenon, research

studies addressing corruption in local gov-

ernment are few and far between. This

exploratory research offers a theoretical

conceptualization of institutionalized corrup-

tion in local government, and identifies

structural factors that lead to such corrup-

tion. Further, this study empirically assesses

institutional corruption at the local level and

its correlation to attitudes and characteristics

of local authorities and their populations,

based on a survey of 1,709 residents of 156

local authorities in Israel and data on the local

authorities from a separate database. This

article proposes a model according to which

local corruption arises from structural factors

at three levels: the central–local level (rela-

tions between local authorities and the central

government); the local–local level (competi-

tion between local authorities) and the intra-

local level (factors relating to the performance

of local councils and local democracy). Our

analyses reveal correlations among charac-

teristics of the local authority and community,

residents’ perceptions of local performance

and perceptions of local corruption. Implica-

tions of the findings in light of strategies

conventionally employed against corruption

in local government are discussed.

Key wordsLocal government, political corruption, in-

stitutional political corruption, structural mal-

functions, central–local relations, Nimbyism

� 2013 Taylor & Francis

Vol. 15, No. , – , http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2012.70Public Management Review, 2013

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INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, there has been a dramatic rise in use of the term corruption inpublic discourse, alongside a surge in research on what is perceived or presented aspolitical corruption (Naim, 1995; Treisman, 2007). However, most of this research hasfocused on elucidating the causes, prevalence and effects of corruption at the nationallevel. Research on corruption in sub-national public organizations – including localgovernment – remains sparse.

This exploratory research has two goals, both geared to bridge this gap. Firstly, thisstudy offers a theoretical conceptualization of institutionalized corruption in localgovernment. That is, it strives to illuminate the characteristics that differentiateinstitutional corruption from individual corruption, and to identify the structural factorsthat systematically and consistently corrupt the leaders and stakeholders of localgovernment bodies, such as local councils. To do this, we consider factors at threeseparate levels: the balance of power between the central and local government;competition between local authorities; and factors at play within local councils that cangive rise to institutional corruption. It should be noted that, in this regard, ourdiscussion is most relevant to nations with European-style political systems that follow adual-state structure.

Secondly, this study empirically assesses institutional corruption at the local level andits correlation to attitudes and characteristics of local authorities and their populations.Our empirical analysis is based on a survey of 1,709 residents of 156 local authorities inIsrael, along with information on the local authorities compiled from a secondarydatabase. Israel offers a fruitful setting for such a study because its local authorities varyacross political, administrative and community characteristics. Israel has a dual-statestructure, and, on the whole, it follows a centralist model rooted in the 30-year BritishMandate of 1917–48.

INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL CORRUPTION

The most accepted definition of political corruption is the misuse of public powerfor private gain (Johnston, 2005; Treisman, 2007; Warren, 2004). Both parts ofthis definition need further clarification. Various criteria have been offered for thefirst part, ‘misuse of public power’; they include legal standards, the public interest,public opinion (Scott, 1972), democratic theory (Thompson, 1993), the politicalorder (Philp, 1997) and democratic norms (Warren, 2004). In the current study,we understand ‘misuse of public power’ in light of all of these criteria. The secondpart – ‘for private gain’ – describes the ends or motives of public officials whoengage in such misuse of power. What sets political corruption apart from otherimpermissible political actions is the attempt to produce a result – whether tangibleor intangible – that specifically benefits either the political agent himself or persons,

Beeri & Navot: Local political corruption 713

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institutions or collectives valued by that agent. This does not include outcomessought by political agents that accord with a reasonable understanding of thecommon good, the rights of others or the agent’s duties (Brooks, 1909; Kurer,2005; Philp, 1997).

Political corruption in local government can occur on an individual level, amongagents or officials of local government or its institutions, or indeed among anyindividual with interests in local government activities. Accordingly, politicalcorruption at the individual level encompasses any instance where government poweris used inappropriately by elected officials, persons with authority and/or any otherinterested party for the personal gain of individuals or groups in a manner detrimentalto the interests of local residents.

Alongside corruption at the individual level, political corruption in local governmentcan occur at an institutional level. This is the case when corrupt practices aresystematically engaged in or countenanced by two or more elected officials, personswith authority or other interested parties. More specifically, institutionalized corruptionis characterized by frequent occurrences of corrupt behaviour that have become thenorm rather than the exception (Caiden and Caiden, 1977). Importantly for ourdiscussion, institutional corruption can also mean that the actions, practices andprocedures of public officials and institutions enable public officials to control localresources in a way that threatens the interests of large categories of residents. In thissense, institutional corruption has much in common with Young’s (2007: 170) conceptof structural injustice.

According to Erlingsson et al. (2008), a precondition for public corruption is thatpoliticians and civil servants are given some degree of discretionary power over theallocation of public resources. Beyond this precondition, institutional corruption is arisk when the institutional environment gives stakeholders many opportunities toengage in corrupt behaviour; when high revenues tend to accrue fromcorrupt behaviour and when there is slack supervision over stakeholders withdiscrete power over public resources. In other words, institutionalized corruption isnot the outcome of purely individual failure. On the contrary, the source ofinstitutional corruption is the institution, its management and its routines andprocedures. As De Vries (2002) put it, honesty and ethics can be seen as a social,cultural, local and even council hall phenomenon; honesty is a social trait no lessthan a personal one.

Scholars differentiate between two types of institutional corruption. One type iscollective corruption, where the organization operates in a corrupt manner for thepurpose of achieving organizational goals and enhancing its power at the expense of thepublic interest and good administrative practice. In the second, employeessystematically take advantage of weaknesses within the organization in order to derivepersonal benefit against the interests of other organizational stakeholders. These twotypes of corruption are sometimes referred to as corporate crime and white-collarcrime, respectively (Palmer, 2008).

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The contemporary potential for institutional corruption in local government

Any discussion of corruption must take place in light of the dual nature of local –or indeed, any – government. On the one hand, governments are bureaucraticbodies charged with providing services and implementing policies. On the otherhand, they are democratic institutions with responsibility for representing the voiceand will of the people. This tension between politics and administration typical ofpublic bodies (Hayward and Menon, 2003: 120; Yang and Holzer, 2005) isparticularly pronounced at the local level (Svara, 2001), where local authorities areboth administrative arms of a higher level of government, charged withimplementing regional, state or national government policies, and autonomousand democratic political entities that are supposed to reflect the choices andpreferences of local community members.

In addition to these structural tensions, as we advance into the twenty-firstcentury, municipal and regional authorities face a tremendous, multifacetedmanagement challenge. To start with, the issues facing local authorities aremore complex than they used to be. Secondly, residents have come to expectand demand better local performance with fewer resources, and with increased riskof intervention by central government agencies (Stoker, 2004a). The combination ofhigh expectations and low resources creates not only central–local tensions, butalso ongoing competition between local authorities, each striving to meet goals andstandards derived from supra-state, regional and local values and needs. Theresult is that local authorities today are competitive environments that are politicalby definition, subject to varying degrees of central government oversight,and lacking resources. Unsurprisingly, given these circumstances, many localauthorities exist in a near-constant state of crisis (Boyne and Meier, 2009; Shamsud,2002).

The main argument set forth in this article is that the combination of today’smanagement challenges and the built-in conflicts typical of local governmentincreases the potential for local corruption and corrupt government practices. Ourresearch model proposes that the factors which engender corruption can beclassified into three main groups. The first comprises tensions arising from the dualnature of local government, as well as from the shifting balance of power betweenthe central government and local bodies – i.e. factors at the central–local level. Thesecond are tensions related to competition between local authorities and betweencommunities – i.e. factors at the local–local level. Finally, the third groupcomprises expectations and perceptions of local residents – i.e. factors at the intra-local level. Consequently, the hypotheses in this exploratory study proposean empirical assessment of the link between perceptions of local corruption and (1)perceptions of the relationship between the central and local governments;(2) characteristics of the local authority and its residents, as relevant tocompetition between local authorities and communities; and (3) perceptions of


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local performance and the local leadership. The research model is presented inFigure 1.

The dual nature of local government and the central–local balance of power

The tension between the two dimensions of any government – the functional/bureaucratic/service-oriented dimension and the representative/democratic/politicaldimension (Hayward and Menon, 2003: 120; Yang and Holzer, 2005) – is, as notedabove, particularly prominent at the local level (Svara, 2001). The distinction betweenadministration and politics is not absolute, since the local authority is a political entityby nature, and almost no decisions made within its boundaries are likely to be based onpurely administrative or formal considerations, without regard to local andorganizational politics (group interests, majority–minority conflicts, power plays,etc.). Yet the tension between politics and administration can contribute to a lack ofclarity surrounding the functions of local leadership, and the extent of (or limits to)local leaders’ authority. It raises questions about the legitimacy of local decision-makingand it is a potential source of poor management, financial misjudgements and inferiorservices, as well as wrongdoing (e.g. De Vries, 2002; Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Ionita,2005). This lack of clarity is a powerful source of individual and institutionalcorruption.

Figure 1: The potential for local corruption: built-in tensions and research variables


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The complex balance of power between the central and local governments derives,first and foremost, from the central government’s need for legitimation. The point isthat sometimes a policy that is deemed important for the collective good is unpopularwith the public, but telling the public the truth is not necessarily an attractivealternative for elected representatives at the national level. One solution to thisproblem is for the central government to make local governments responsible forputting the unpopular policy into practice. If the central government does this withoutgiving local bodies the tools to implement the policy, the result is a cynicalmanipulation of public discourse that is detrimental to both the ideal of a law-basedstate and the functioning of the local government (Carter, 2000).

In general, central and the local governments engage in an ongoing battle over publicopinion. Thus, for example, the local leadership will tend to attribute a local crisis orlocal corruption to external (global or national) factors, such as changes in nationalgoals, priorities or policies, reduced financial support and high consumer expectations.The central government, for its part, tends to attribute local crises to local governmentfactors such as poor leadership, mismanagement and internal conflicts (Boyne, 2006;Grinyer et al., 1990; Shamsud, 2002). Nonetheless, more often than not, localgovernment officials serve as active ‘soldiers’ for the central government, especiallyduring censuses, elections and other occasions when getting people out to vote or becounted is important. The central government’s dependence on local elected officials isliable to accelerate a tendency to overlook political corruption in local government, oreven to collaborate with it, for instance, by deal-making (for example, setting up agovernment office in a given city in return for the local leader’s political support).

Another key source of tension between central and local governments involvescompetition over resources. Local leaders may find that programmes dictated bynational policies are underfunded. Meanwhile, local authorities are asked to meetnational standards aimed at satisfying increased demand for quality services despitepersistent cuts in public spending. This state of affairs can lead to one or morestrategies: funding the policies through increased taxes; funding the policies throughreallocation of resources originally intended for other purposes (a sort of dirty handsapproach); or ignoring obligatory policies and covering up poor performance. Sincemany local authorities lack the capacity, authority or political will to raise taxes, thetendency is to adopt one of the two latter strategies, which encourage a culture ofillegal behaviour and violation of the law.

Ultimately, these structural tensions between the central and local governments arelikely to affect residents’ perceptions of the degree to which their local authority istainted by corruption. We can assume that residents who blame their local council forfailures in services, for example, will perceive the extent of corruption in the localcouncil as greater than residents who blame problems on national or global factors.Likewise, we can assume that residents who support central government intervention inlocal affairs will also perceive a greater degree of corruption than those who opposesuch intervention.


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H1: There will be a positive relationship between residents’ attribution of local failure to local authority

factors (as opposed to national factors) and residents’ perceptions of local corruption.

H2: There will be a positive relationship between residents’ support for central intervention in local

affairs and residents’ perceptions of local corruption.

Competition between local authorities and between communities

Over the past few decades, a policy favouring the devolution of political–administrativeand fiscal powers to sub-national governments has re-emerged, in many Westerndemocracies that follow a European model, following a period of more centrally drivenpolicies (Hadiz, 2004). New Localism – the term was introduced by Tony Blair’sLabour Government in the UK around the turn of the twenty-first century – seems tooffer a third-way approach to localism versus both centralism, at one extreme, anddecentralization, at the other. On the one hand, New Localism leaves power andresources in the hands of local institutions and communities; on the other, this is donewithin a framework of national minimum standards and priorities (Stoker, 2004a).

However, New Localism does not naively expect communities to endorse thecommon good (Stoker, 2004b). On the contrary, New Localism and decentralizationexport political tensions and conflicts of interests to sub-national units (Coaffee, 2005;De Vries, 2000). Indeed, as Ford (1999) argues in his history of territorial jurisdiction,no group can fully control its own fate without also exercising some control over othergroups around it. Therefore, communities, local authorities and their leaders strive toexpand their realms of authority and increase the resources at their disposal in order toestablish or reinforce their independence and political status (De Vries, 2000; Tiebout,1956; Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990). Sound communities strive to maintain the statusquo and preserve their relative advantage, in part by intimidating others or reducing theopportunities available to them (Ellison and Ellison, 2006). As Ford (1999: 917)expressed it, ‘Within the community the ethos may be sharing, but among communitiesit is every group for itself’.

Competition between communities and local authorities is a double-edged sword.Such competition is likely to foster excellence, as people demand services and outcomesthey observe in neighbouring communities; and it expands the choices available topeople. However, competition is liable to have three undesirable effects – especially instronger, more financially stable communities. The first is Nimbyism (from NIMBY,Not In My Back Yard). The term originally denigrated opposition to unpopular projectsand developments, but can also refer to public policies aimed at preserving localprosperity and preventing the redistribution of resources – for example, by striving toensure that austerity measures are applied only to weaker communities with poorlyfunctioning local councils (Haque, 2010; Stoker, 2004a). The second is a demand that


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all local authorities be subject to equal obligations, even if they are not on the samefinancial footing; this can lead prosperous communities to demand both autonomy forthemselves and, in the same breath, uncompromising central intervention for theirneighbours (De Vries, 2000). The third is a disproportionate fight against the free riderphenomenon. Municipal development drains a great deal of resources. The moreestablished the local authority, and the higher the socio-economic status of itsinhabitants, the more money it is likely to invest in multi-resource projects (Ellison andEllison, 2006; Gerber and Gibson, 2009). The authority will then feel justified inrestricting the right of non-residents to enjoy local facilities and services (De Vries,2000).

What do these three effects of competition have to do with corruption? InNimbyism, local leaders exploit their community’s economic advantage to benefit theirconstituents and, in doing so, enhance their own political stature; this can be perceivedas an abuse of power. The ‘equal obligations’ and ‘free riders’ arguments similarlyinvolve the excessive use of economic power to promote the interests or advantage of aparticular community and, thereby, its political leadership, over the good of thecollective – i.e. the public at large.

In any case, the connection between decentralization (of resources and authority) andcorruption may be simpler in nature. The contracts and tenders that are an inevitablepart of governing and that, by their nature, involve transferring public assets andresources to private hands and constitute fertile ground for corruption (Jain, 2001).These problems are more salient for authorities that have control over greater assets andresources, either because they are financially strong or for other reasons (such as theirsize). For instance, Karahan et al. (2006) found that the likelihood of observingsupervisor corruption is higher in local authorities where supervisors’ salaries arehigher. In large cities, where the scope of activity is so much greater, keeping track ofeach and every project and tender is nearly impossible, and the potential for corruptionis thus magnified (Fan et al., 2009). Goel and Nelson (1998) similarly found that largerstate–local governments were positively linked with higher levels of corruption.

In Israel, the phenomena described here are likely to be most typical of localauthorities that are centrally located, by which we mean not that they are situatedgeographically in the centre of the country, but that their residents have convenientaccess to the nation’s larger business centres. Local authorities that do not offer suchaccess to the national business centres are said to be located in the periphery. Thoseauthorities in the centre tend to be populated by well-organized, close-knitcommunities populated chiefly by members of Israel’s Jewish majority, whereasperipheral authorities are home to more of Israel’s minority citizens (mainly Arabs,including Muslims, Christians and Druzes). Unsurprisingly, the residents of the morecentral authorities tend to be of higher socio-economic status, and the authoritiesthemselves tend to be more financially sound.

In line with the reasoning presented above and the characteristics of Israel’s localauthorities, we propose the following hypotheses:


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H3: There will be a positive relationship between the strength of the local authority (that is, its size in

terms of population; residents’ socio-economic status; the degree to which the local authority is

centrally located [that is, offering access to national business centres]; the financial strength of the local

council; the degree to which the local authority is populated by the national majority; and residents’

perceived levels of social capital) and residents’ perceptions of local corruption.

Expectations and perceptions regarding local performance and localdemocracy

The apparent increase in institutional corruption over recent decades, and perhapsalso the management challenges besetting local governments, has produced efforts tomake local government more accountable. Through various reforms, there has beena shift in the conceptualization of local authority management which has beendescribed as ‘from local government to local governance’ (Stoker, 2004a). Underlocal governance, the traditional, hierarchical, top-down management model hasbeen replaced by lateral management – or ‘managed networks’ (Pratchett, 2004;Stoker, 2004a) – and greater collaboration of stakeholders in decision-making. Inother words, the devolution of authority from central to local government has beenaccompanied by a progressive devolution of decision-making power and resources toyet another level, from local government to the institutions, organizations andindividuals who are its stakeholders.

It is within this context that local authorities are expected to provide modern, high-quality services tailored to different stakeholders’ needs (Boyne, 2002) – and to do thiswith integrity, accountability, transparent decision-making, equality, and adherence tothe norms of good administrative practice and the rules of ethics. Indeed, scholars havefound a significant correlation between citizens’ perceptions of local corruption andtheir evaluation of other aspects of local government performance, including satisfactionwith local services and support systems as well as democratic practice (Kim, 2010;Weitz-Shapiro, 2008).

The governance model brings a potential source of local corruption. In the wake ofdecentralization, relatively small sub-units in the local council are likely to wielddisproportionate power with respect to residents’ quality of life. As noted by Gong(2006), heavy involvement of local officials in local economic affairs, coupled withunbridled discretionary power, provides both opportunities and incentives forcorruption. For example, local planning and building committees can determine thevalue of land and property, grant exceptional permits for transactions or developmentand arrange substantial discounts for individuals and business owners. Thus, a smallnumber of committee members become extremely important to interested parties.More often than not, these committee members lack the tools and experience to avoidwrongdoing under these circumstances.


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In short, the recent trends in local management – local governance, lateral manage-ment, and involving residents and other stakeholders in decision-making – do notrepresent some ideal redistribution of power. With local management defined as a co-production of organizations, institutions and individuals, the main task of the localmanager is to integrate the interests of these diverse parties. The skills needed for the jobare related to persuasion, consultation and communication, rather than authoritativedecision-making or managing subordinates. These circumstances also open the door toinappropriate influences (Crook and Manor, 2000; Ionita, 2005; Matei and Popa, 2010;Wildasin, 1995) which are liable to deteriorate into corruption. The scholar TheodoreLowi (1968) described similar processes in his book The End of Liberalism about half acentury ago.

All in all, the effect of decentralization on corruption is not clear-cut. Whilesome argue that political decentralization promises more accountability andtransparency, there is some evidence that decentralization is a source of corruption(Ionita, 2005). According to Blanchard and Shleifer (2001), decentralization is morelikely to be a source of corruption when it is accompanied by shifts in decision-making power. In other words, local decision centres with weak controlmechanisms may encourage discretionary behaviour and breaching of the law bylocal political elites.

Based on the foregoing, we propose the following:

H4: There will be a negative relationship between residents’ perceptions of local performance (that is,

residents’ satisfaction with local services; residents’ perceptions that their local council is accountable

and transparent; and residents’ perceptions of the quality of local leadership) and their perceptions of

local corruption.

H5: There will be a positive relationship between residents’ perceptions that their local council

is democratic (i.e. discriminatory, representative and responsive) and their perceptions of local

corruption.

METHOD

This study is based on quantitative data gathered from (i) a national survey and(ii) data published by Israel’s Ministry of the Interior and Central Bureau ofStatistics. The measures were designed to empirically test the relationship betweenperceptions of local corruption and various characteristics at the central–local, local–local and intra-local levels. The population of this study was defined as the adultpopulation of Israel, and the research unit was residents of local authorities.

Israel is home to 256 local authorities of four kinds: 75 municipalities (cities with atleast 20,000 residents), 126 local councils (towns with fewer than 20,000 residents), 53regional councils (federations of rural communities) and 2 industrial councils. Since the


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early 2000s, the gap between expectations and performance has increased throughoutthe country, and some local authorities have faced economic and functional crises(Carmeli, 2008).

Procedure and sample

The survey questionnaire was distributed in 2010 and 2011 to 1,709 residents of 156local authorities in Israel. We used a random quota method, sampling cities andcommunities based on their geographic location and the size and structure of theirpopulations. A direct return method using self-completed questionnaires (in Hebrew)was used to increase the response rate and ensure that all data collected were viewedonly by the researchers. Members of the research team contacted potential respondentsin various locations, including public places, government institutions and homes. Allparticipants were assured full anonymity, and no data was transferred to us via the localcouncil. Using this strategy, we had a return rate of approximately 75 per cent, where1,709 residents of 156 local authorities completed the questionnaires. The highresponse rate strengthens the representativeness of the sample.

Fifty-three per cent of the respondents were female (compared to 50.58 per cent inthe overall population, according to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics).Respondents had an average age of 35 years (SD¼ 11.89) and averaged 14.72 yearsof education (SD¼ 3.15). Net monthly income was below or well below average for51.5 per cent of the respondents, close to the average for 23.5 per cent and above orwell above average for 25.0 per cent (the average net monthly income in Israel in 2010was 2,000 USD. Even though the demographic characteristics of the sample were notidentical to those of the population as a whole (that is, our respondents were bettereducated), the data show that our sample was relatively representative of the generalIsraeli population (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011).

Measures

The questionnaire included forty-seven items designed to measure ten constructs basedon the theoretical foundations outlined above. Participants were asked to answer eachquestion in relation to their own local authority, local community, local leadership andlocal performance. Scales a–g, measuring satisfaction with/perceptions of local services,accountability, leadership, discrimination, representativeness, responsiveness andcorruption, were based on previous studies (e.g. Mason et al., 1985; Smith, 1981;Vigoda, 2000), and were previously used in an international project (Vigoda-Gadot andMizrahi, 2008). We modified some of the wording to make the questions relevant to themunicipal level. Scale h, measuring social capital, was drawn from Putnam (2000). Scales iand j, measuring causes of local failure and support for central intervention, respectively,


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were based on Beeri et al. (2011). The scales were calculated as the mean score of theiritems, and they were verified as reliable measures using reliability tests (Cronbach’s a).The ten measures were:

(a) Satisfaction with local services. Fifteen items measured respondents’satisfaction with a broad range of public services provided by the local councilon a five-point Likert scale (1¼ very dissatisfied, 5¼ very satisfied). A sampleitem: ‘Maintenance of infrastructure (e.g. public buildings and sidewalks)’.Cronbach’s a for this scale was .91.

(b) Local accountability. Five items covered the extent to which respondentsperceived their local council as accountable and transparent on a five-pointLikert scale (1¼ hardly at all, 5¼ to a very large extent). A sample item: ‘Thelocal council vigorously distributes information about its activities anddecisions’. Cronbach’s a for this scale was .79.

(c) The quality of local leadership. Four items measured perceptions of the skillsand professionalism of local leaders and managers on a five-point Likertscale (1¼ hardly at all, 5¼ to a very large extent). A sample item: ‘Theemployees of my local council are usually skilled and professional’.Cronbach’s a was .76.

(d) Local discrimination. Three items measured the degree to which the local counciltends to discriminate against residents. Items were answered on a five-pointLikert scale (1¼ hardly at all, 5¼ to a very large extent). A sample item:‘People like me may receive local service only through personal connections orindirect means’. Cronbach’s a was .65.

(e) Local representativeness. Two items covered the extent to which the local councilrepresents the community and its interests. Items were answered on a five-point Likert scale (1¼ hardly at all, 5¼ to a very large extent). A sampleitem: ‘In my local council, some populations’ interests are not appropriatelyrepresented’ (reverse scored). Cronbach’s a was .71.

(f) Local responsiveness. Four items dealt with the extent to which the local councilresponds to local demands and expectations. Items were answered on a five-point Likert scale (1¼ hardly at all, 5¼ to a very large extent). A sampleitem: ‘My local council is attuned to public opinion and tries to satisfy itsneeds’. Cronbach’s a was .90.

(g) Local corruption. Three items measured the extent to which respondentsperceived their local council to be corrupt. Items were answered on a five-point Likert scale (1¼ hardly at all, 5¼ to a very large extent). A sampleitem: ‘My local council is corrupt’. Cronbach’s a for this scale was .68.

(h) Social capital. Three items were used to measure respondents’ trust in theirsocial environment and the strength of their social bonds. Items were answeredon an eleven-point scale. A sample item: ‘Do you think generally that it ispossible to trust most people, or is there always room for suspicion?’


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(0¼ there is always room for suspicion, 10¼ it is possible to trust mostpeople). Cronbach’s a for this scale was .80.

(i) Causes of local failure. One item measured respondents’ perceptions of whetherthe main causes of local failure are internal or external to the local authority.The measure used was an eleven-point scale, where 0¼ completely internal(e.g. internal conflicts, mismanagement and incomplete tax collection) and10¼ completely external (e.g. low political support from central governmentand reduced financial support).

(j) Support for central intervention. Seven items measured the extent to whichrespondents support a policy of central intervention in local affairs. Items wereanswered on a five-point Likert scale (1¼ hardly at all, 5¼ to a very largeextent). A sample item: ‘The government should be allowed to inspect andintervene in local authorities’. Cronbach’s a was .76.

Five variables at the local authority level were drawn from the Israel Central Bureauof Statistics and data published by the Ministry of the Interior: namely the number,composition (national majority versus minority) and socio-economic status of residents;whether the authority was centrally located (i.e. the accessibility of national businesscentres); and the financial strength of the local council. The 156 local authorities rangedin size from 2,600 to 748,000 residents, with an average of 18,600 (SD¼ 151,000).Seventy-seven per cent were populated primarily by the national majority (Jewish), and23 per cent were populated chiefly by members of Israel’s three main nationalminorities (Muslims, Druzes and Christians). Residents’ socio-economic status (asmeasured by income, employment, education, housing and motorization) and theauthority’s centre-versus-periphery status ranged from 1 to 10, where 10 representedthe highest socio-economic status and the greatest access to business centres; themedian of both scales was 5. Thirty-six per cent of the local councils were classified bythe Interior Ministry as financially strong. The distribution of the local authorities alongthe various measures closely reflected the distribution of all local authorities withinIsrael.

Data analysis

We used the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 18.0 software for the dataanalyses. We first examined the linear relationships between the variables using thePearson coefficient and then used hierarchical multiple regression analysis to test theimpact of various factors at the demographic, individual, community and local authoritylevels (all p values are for two-tailed tests). We then employed hierarchical linearmodelling (HLM) 6.08 to further test the hypotheses. Using HLM ensured that theobservations were independent, given that the analyses were based on nested data(residents nested within local authorities), and enabled us to control for the five


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variables at the local authority level (size, composition, socio-economic status, centre-versus-periphery status and financial strength).

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Linear relationships

Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients for theresearch variables. Local corruption was normally distributed and its mean score was3.10 (SD¼ 1.23). Put differently, overall, participants seemed to assess corruptionwithin their local authority as moderate. As can be seen, the variables are presentedaccording to whether they best elucidate relationships at the central–local level (causesof local failure and support for central intervention), the local–local level (the fiveauthority-level variables plus social capital) or the intra-local level (the items onservices, accountability, leadership, discrimination, representativeness and responsive-ness). The bottom row of the table shows the relationship between perceptions of localcorruption and these variables. Looking at the central–local level variables, there is asignificant positive relationship between support for central intervention and perceivedlocal corruption (r¼ .069, p5 .01). That is, the more residents perceive their localcouncil as corrupt, the more they tolerate central intervention in local affairs. Lookingat the local–local level variables, there is a significant positive relationship between thefinancial strength of the local authority and perceived local corruption (r¼ .085,p5 .01). Residents of local authorities classified by the Interior Ministry as financiallystrong tend to perceive the local council as more corrupt. In addition, a significantpositive relationship was found between local corruption and social capital (r¼ .066,p5 .01). Residents who report higher levels of social capital within their communityalso perceive greater corruption within the local council. Finally, considering the inter-local level variables, high local corruption was related to high local discrimination(r¼ .200, p5 .001) and high representativeness (r¼ .052, p5 .05). That is, amongparticipants who perceived their local council as highly representative, perceptions oflocal corruption were high; among those who perceived their local council as highlydiscriminatory, perceptions of local corruption were high. These findings support H2,H3 and H5, but must be further confirmed with multivariate analysis.

To further test the hypotheses, we applied a hierarchical multiple regression analysisthat examined the relationship between the independent variables and perceived localcorruption. The analysis produced interesting results, which are presented in Table 2.As the table shows, the demographic variables were analysed in the first step of theequation to control for age, education and income. Perceptions of local corruptionwere positively related to education (b¼ .076, p5 .05), implying that the moreeducated the residents, the more they are likely to perceive the local council as corrupt.This finding goes hand in hand with arguments made by Wenzel (2006), who suggested


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Tabl

e1:

Mul

tiple

corr

elat

ion

mat

rix

and

desc

ript

ive

stat

istic

sfo

rth

ere

sear

chva

riab

les

(Cro

nbac

h’sa

inpa

rent

hese

s)

Mea

nS

DM

in–M

ax1

23

45

67

89

1011

1213

1415

1617

1.A

ge34

.98

11.9

018

–82

2.Ed

ucat

ion

14.7

23.

150–

30.1

70**

3.In

com

e2.

521.

191–

5.4

79**

.277

**

4.C

ause

sof

loca

l

failu

re

(hig

h¼

exte

rnal

)

4.44

2.62

0–10

.050

7.0

377

.011

5.S

uppo

rtfo

rce

ntra

l

inte

rven

tion

3.21

.61

1–5

.060

*.0

28.1

20**

7.1

19**

(.76

)

6.S

ize

(log

)1.

73.6

0.4

–2.8

7.0

73**

7.0

167

.048

.020

.045

7.S

ocio

-eco

nom

ic

stat

us

5.75

1.63

1–10

.064

*.0

12.0

96**

.010

.115

**.2

79**

8.C

entr

e(v

s

peri

pher

y)

5.72

1.68

1–10

7.0

06.0

66*

.061

*7

.014

.057

*.5

81**

.413

**

9.Fi

nanc

ial

stre

ngth

.53

.50

0–1

.053

*.0

33.0

077

.049

.088

**.3

47**

.496

**.3

57**

10.

Pop

ulat

ion

(nat

iona

lm

ajor

ity)

.88

.32

0–1

.060

*7

.033

.064

*7

.027

.223

**.3

16**

.534

**.2

31**

.350

**

11.

Soc

ial

capi

tal

5.46

2.14

0–10

.177

**.1

04**

.126

**.0

49.0

65**

7.0

90**

.022

7.0

39.0

52.0

97**

(.80

)

12.

Sat

isfa

ctio

nw

ith

loca

lse

rvic

es

2.96

.78

1–5

.028

7.0

56*

.039

.088

**.0

90**

.025

.263

**.0

67*

.194

**.2

51**

.196

**(.

91)

13.

Loca

l

acco

unta

bilit

y

2.80

.79

1–5

.016

7.0

69**

7.0

17.1

27**

.057

*.0

12.0

79**

.018

.074

**.0

98**

.160

**.5

05**

(.79

)

14.

Qua

lity

oflo

cal

lead

ersh

ip

2.86

.86

1–5

.008

7.0

82**

7.0

04.0

93**

.033

7.0

35.1

29**

.028

.123

**.1

34**

.191

**.5

54**

.641

**(.

76)

15.

Loca

l

disc

rim

inat

ion

3.08

.84

1–5

7.0

27.0

417

.057

*7

.017

7.0

277

.017

7.1

35**

7.0

56*

7.1

29**

7.1

28**

7.1

21**

7.3

25**

7.3

08**

7.3

47**

(.65

)

16.

Loca

l

repr

esen

tativ

enes

s

2.69

1.07

1–5

.022

7.0

91**

.052

*.0

40.0

017

.032

.105

**.0

32.0

69**

.025

.066

**.2

91**

.345

**.4

30**

7.4

27**

(.71

)

17.

Loca

l

resp

onsi

vene

ss

2.61

.98

1–5

.015

7.0

71**

.024

.126

**.0

477

.031

.141

**.0

37.1

17**

.130

**.1

50**

.606

**.6

95**

.700

**7

.324

**.3

62**

(.90

)

18.

Loca

lco

rrup

tion

3.10

1.23

1–5

.012

.047

.020

7.0

32.0

69**

7.0

297

.009

7.0

19.0

85**

.049

.066

**7

.041

7.0

05.0

32.2

00**

.052

*.0

11(.

68)

Not

es:

*Cor

rela

tion

issi

gnifi

cant

atth

e.0

5le

vel

(tw

o-ta

iled)

.**

Cor

rela

tion

issi

gnifi

cant

atth

e.0

1le

vel

(tw

o-ta

iled)

.


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that better educated citizens are more likely to be politically aware and to opposepolitical injustice.

In the second step of the equation, we added the variables at the central–local level.We found no relationship between corruption and beliefs about the causes of localfailure. On this basis, we can reject H1. However, we found a positive relationshipbetween support for central intervention and perceived corruption (b¼ .080,

Table 2: Findings of hierarchical multiple regression analysis (standardized coefficients for the relationship

between the independent variables and local corruption

Local corruption

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4

Variable b(t) b(t) b(t) b(t)

Demographics

Age 7.008 7.006 7.026 7.031

Education .076* .076* .067* .071*

Income .004 7.010 .000 .001

Main variables at the central–local level

Causes of local failure (high¼ external) 7.002 .003 .005

Support for central intervention .080** .064* .058*

Main variables at the local–local level

Size (log) 7.054 7.045

Socio-economic status 7.096* 7.089*

Centre (vs periphery) 7.007 7.015

Financial strength .115** .129***

Population (national majority) .055 .082*

Social capital .063* .086**

Main variables at the intra-local level

Satisfaction with local services 7.113*

Local accountability 7.103*

Quality of local leadership .104*

Local discrimination .281***

Local representativeness .169***

Local responsiveness .100*

R2 .006 .012 .031 .119

Adjusted R2 .003 .008 .021 .105

F 2.121 2.667* 3.137*** 8.479***

DR2 – .006 .019 .088

DF – 3.470* 3.498** 17.737***

Note: N¼ 1,709; *p5 .05, **p5 .01, ***p5 .001.


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p5 .01), supporting H2. This finding can be interpreted in two ways. It may bethat the ongoing struggle between central and local governments affects perceptionsof local corruption, where residents see government intervention as confirmationthat their concerns about local corruption are justified – i.e. as proof of itsexistence. Alternatively, provided that corruption is perceived to be limited to thelocal sphere, residents who perceive high levels of local corruption may be moreamenable to the intervention of higher government echelons in local affairs. That is,residents who feel that there is substantial corruption in their community areprepared to endure democratic deficit, that is, to compromise on the extent of localautonomy.

Next, predictors at the local–local level were added to the third step of the equation.The findings show that perceptions of local corruption tend to increase when the localauthority is financially strong (b¼ .115, p5 .01) and when it is populated primarily bythe national majority (b¼ .082, p5 .05), supporting H3. These data corroborate theconjecture that increased competition between local authorities and communities islikely to be correlated with greater perceptions of local corruption. In line with thefindings of Ionita (2005) and Blanchard and Shleifer (2001), the data indicate thatfinancial soundness coupled with increased business activity – i.e. a profusion ofdecentralization or privatization processes – is tantamount to leaving the door open fora thief and constitutes fertile ground for local corruption.

The results from this step of the analysis also show that perceived local corruptionincreases with social capital (b¼ .063, p5 .05), also supporting H3. There are twopossible explanations for this finding. Firstly, strong social capital can have a negativeeffect on individual members of the group (e.g. Oh et al., 2006), for instance,increasing inter-group conflict (Krivokapic-Skoko, 2007; Morrow, 2001; Putnam,1993). Moreover, negative social capital increases when community members holdnorms, values and interests that are at odds with the collective good. Hence, when the‘dark side’ of public transactions engenders strong personal relations, corruption hasgreater opportunity to grow (Albano and Barbera, 2010; Baker and Faulkner, 2004).Secondly, communities with high social capital are likely to adopt high standards ofsocial justice, public order and equality. Members of such communities may be moreattuned to violations of these standards, and may tend to hold a graver view of politicalbehaviour and its potential for corruption.

Contrary to our expectations in H3, the data show that perceptions of localcorruption tend to fall, as the residents of a local authority rise in socio-economic status(b¼7.096, p5 .05). These finding, are, however, in line with some previousresearch (e.g. Adejumo and Ogbewe, 2011; Brown and Shackman, 2007; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Mauro, 1998). These studies suggest that corruption has a deleteriouseffect on the economy by reducing productivity and investment. Consequently,wealthier residents – and those who have migrated to an area to better their economicprospects – are motivated to maintain close scrutiny over local institutions in order tomaintain the status quo and prevent the negative effects of corruption.


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The last step of the equation included the intra-local level predictors. As expected,low perceptions of local corruption were associated with higher satisfaction with localservices (b¼7.113, p5 .05) and greater perceptions that the local council wastransparent and accountable (b¼7.103, p5 .05). These findings support H4. Thefindings show that, in local government, corruption is an offshoot of performance.

Against our expectations, however, our data reveal a significant positive relationshipbetween the quality of local leadership and perceptions of local corruption (b¼ .104,p5 .05), thereby contradicting H4. This finding suggests that while the public expectstransparency and ethics in an abstract sense, it judges the quality of local leaders andpoliticians in part on the basis of their political sophistication and survival skills. In ademanding political reality, the public assesses politicians as capable or suited to the jobon the basis of whether they are willing and able to ‘dirty their hands’ (see also: Walzer,1973).

Last but not least, we found significant positive associations between perceptions ofcorruption and perceptions of local discrimination (b¼ .281, p5 .001), localrepresentativeness (b¼ .169, p5 .001) and local responsiveness (b¼ .100,p5 .05). These findings support H5. In other words, residents who had a highersense of discrimination and who regarded their local council as more representativeand/or more responsive also viewed their local council as more corrupt. Thesefindings – perhaps more than any of the others – reflect the acute crisis facing somelocal authorities in an era of New Localism and decentralization. The findings accordwith previous research suggesting that local authorities sometimes find it difficult tomanage the tensions, expectations and demands stemming from without and within,from above and below, from the media and from central government institutions (e.g.Crook and Manor, 2000; Ionita, 2005; Matei and Popa, 2010; Wildasin, 1995).Indeed, local government seems to suffer, in the public’s eyes, from both democraticdeficit and democratic overload. The first is a sense that the system is less democraticthan it could or should be; the second is a sense that the public is overwhelmed withinformation and responsible for too many choices. Apparently, the public perceives thattransparency, openness, collaboration, facilitation and responsiveness can go too far,and exact a high price in terms of reduced efficiency, poor governance and risingcorruption (see also Huntington, 1968; Philp, 2008).

HLM analyses

Next, in order to ensure that the observations were independent, we examined ourhypotheses using HLM analysis, which considers the local authority as the research unit.The initial step (unconditional model) was to estimate variance between the localauthorities in the outcome variable, i.e. perceived local corruption, with noindependent variables. The results revealed an effect of the local authority for theoutcome variable, justifying the use of HLM. The predicted mean of local corruption


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was 3.05, and its estimated variance between local authorities was significant (t¼ .21,SD¼ .45, p5 .001). The analyses suggest an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of14 per cent, meaning that 14 per cent of the variation in local corruption can beexplained by the local authority (see Table 3). This finding points to the fact that, asassumed, the intensity of local corruption varies between local authorities.

The next step, level 1 (a partially conditional model), tests whether various groupedresidents predict the extent of corruption within a local council. The slopes showing therelationship between local corruption and support for central intervention, socialcapital, discrimination, representativeness and responsiveness, using an estimated fixedcoefficient, were positive and significant (g¼ .13, p5 .05; g¼ .05, p5 .05; g¼ .31,p5 .001; g¼ .14, p5 .01; and g¼ .10, p5 .05, respectively). In addition, the slopefor the relationship between local corruption and satisfaction with local services wasnegative and significant (g¼7.15, p5 .05). Hence, the more likely respondentswere to perceive their local council as corrupt, the more likely they were to supportcentral intervention, to perceive their community as strong in social capital and toperceive the local council as representative and responsive; but also, the more likelythey were to perceive high levels of discrimination, and the less satisfied they were withlocal services (see Figure 2), supporting H2, H3 and H5. Altogether, these factorsexplain 24 per cent of the variance in local corruption. The random effect furtherreveals that, for local corruption, there is significant variance between the slopes – i.e.between local authorities – for support for central intervention (t¼ .11, SD¼ .33,p5 .05) and discrimination (t¼ .08, SD¼ .28, p5 .05).

Finally, since some of the differences between the level-1 intercepts and slopes weresignificant, we employed level-2 analysis. The fully conditional model views theintercepts and slopes – the means of grouped perceptions and their relationships withlocal corruption – as outcomes that may be explained by factors at the local authoritylevel, namely the local authority’s size, socio-economic status, composition (nationalmajority versus minority), centre-versus-periphery status and financial strength. As canbe seen in Table 3, perceptions of local corruption are significantly related to twovariables, namely socio-economic status (negatively) and financial strength (positively),and marginally significantly related to one variable – composition of the population(g¼7.09, p5 .05; g¼ .37, p5 .001; and g¼ .36, p¼ .057, respectively). Thus,local corruption is more likely to be perceived as high in local authorities that areclassified as financially strong, populated primarily by Israel’s Jewish majority, andcharacterized by low socio-economic status – findings that on one hand support H3 andon the other hand contradict the residents’ socio-economic status dimension of H3,respectively. In general, the factors at the local authority level explain 2 per cent of thetotal variance in perceived corruption between local authorities.

Additionally, in four cases, we found interaction effects, meaning that the slopes ofthe relationship between the predictors and local corruption differed significantlybetween different sets of local authorities. (i) The relationship between causes of localfailure and perceived local corruption differed significantly depending on residents’


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Tabl

e3:

Loca

lco

rrup

tion

vari

ance

expl

aine

dby

HLM

unco

nditi

onal

,pa

rtia

llyco

nditi

onal

and

fully

cond

ition

alm

odel

s

Unc

ondi

tiona

l

mod

el–

nopr

edic

tors

Leve

l1

–pa

rtia

llyco

nditi

onal

mod

el–

indi

vidu

alpe

rcep

tion

pred

icto

rs

Leve

l2

–fu

llyco

nditi

onal

mod

el–

final

inte

rcep

tsan

dsl

opes

asou

tcom

em

odel

Loca

lco

rrup

tion

Loca

lco

rrup

tion

Loca

lco

rrup

tion

Fixe

def

fect

(bet

wee

nLA

s)C

oeffi

cien

tS

E

Fixe

def

fect

(bet

wee

nLA

s)C

oeffi

cien

tS

EFi

xed

effe

ct(b

etw

een

LAs)

Coe

ffici

ent

SE

Mea

n(i

nitia

lsc

ore)

3.6*

**.0

6M

ean

3.11

***

.04

Mea

n2.

68**

*.1

7

Cau

ses

oflo

cal

failu

re

(hig

h¼

exte

rnal

)

.00

.01

Siz

e(l

og)

7.1

0.1

1

Sup

port

for

cent

ral

inte

rven

tion

.13*

.07

Soc

io-e

cono

mic

stat

us7

.09*

.07

Soc

ial

capi

tal

.05*

.02

Cen

tre

(vs

peri

pher

y)7

.01

.03

Sat

isfa

ctio

nw

ithlo

cal

serv

ices

7.1

5*.0

7P

opul

atio

n(n

atio

nal

maj

ority

).3

6*.1

9

Loca

lac

coun

tabi

lity

7.1

2.0

7Fi

nanc

ial

stre

ngth

.37*

.10

Qua

lity

oflo

cal

lead

ersh

ip.0

9.0

7C

ause

sof

loca

lfa

ilure

(hig

h¼

exte

rnal

)

Loca

ldi

scri

min

atio

n.3

1***

.06

Soc

io-e

cono

mic

stat

us7

.04*

*.0

1

Loca

lre

pres

enta

tiven

ess

.14*

*.0

5S

atis

fact

ion

with

loca

lse

rvic

es

Loca

lre

spon

sive

ness

.10*

.06

Soc

io-e

cono

mic

stat

us.1

7**

.06

Loca

lre

pres

enta

tiven

ess

Pop

ulat

ion

(nat

iona

lm

ajor

ity)

.43*

*.1

6

Fina

ncia

lst

reng

th.2

0*.1

0

Ran

dom

effe

ct(w

ithin

LAs)

Var

ianc

eS

DR

ando

mef

fect

(with

inLA

s)V

aria

nce

SD

Ran

dom

effe

ct(w

ithin

LAs)

Var

ianc

eS

D

Inte

rcep

t.2

1***

.45

Inte

rcep

t.0

4*.2

0In

terc

ept

.05*

.22

Cau

ses

oflo

cal

failu

re

(hig

h¼

exte

rnal

)

.00

.06

Cau

ses

oflo

cal

failu

re(h

igh¼

exte

rnal

).0

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socio-economic status (g¼7.04, p5 .01). Specifically, in local authoritiescategorized as low or medium in socio-economic status, the more respondents blamedlocal failure on external factors, the more they perceived their local council as corrupt.

Figure 2: Slope differences between local authorities for the relationship between predictors and localcorruption


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Yet in local authorities categorized as high in socio-economic status, the morerespondents blamed local failure on internal factors, the more they perceived their localcouncil as corrupt (see Figure 3). (ii) The relationship between satisfaction with localservices and perceived local corruption differed significantly based on socio-economicstatus (g¼ .17, p5 .01). In local authorities of low or medium socio-economic status,the greater respondents’ satisfaction with local services, the less corruption theyreported. Yet in authorities of high socio-economic status, the greater respondents’satisfaction with local services, the more corruption they reported. (iii) The relationshipbetween representativeness and perceived corruption differed significantly based oncomposition of the population (g¼ .43, p5 .01). In local authorities populated chieflyby members of the national majority, Jewish, we found a positive relationship betweenrepresentativeness and perceived corruption. In authorities populated chiefly byminority groups, we found a negative relationship between representativeness and

Figure 3: Slope and intercept differences between variables at the local authority level for the relationshipbetween predictors and local corruption


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perceived corruption. (iv) Finally, the relationship between representativeness andperceived corruption differed significantly according to the local council’s financialstrength (g¼ .20, p5 .05). Among respondents of local authorities classified asfinancially strong, we found a stronger positive relationship between representativenessand perceived corruption than among respondents from financially weak localauthorities.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper suggests that corruption at the local level may be a structural and not anindividual phenomenon. The most interesting finding of the current study – and insome ways, the most worrisome as well – is that the various measures of local councilperformance, including its financial soundness and representativeness, have a strongcorrelation with perceptions of corruption.

The fact that the public holds that corruption goes hand in hand with goodperformance shows that people believe corruption is structural. One cannot deliver ifone is not corrupt – which means the problem of corruption is deeply rooted ingovernance, structures and politics. The claim that corruption is structural is alsosupported by the fact that the ordinary liberal and democratic solutions to the problemof corruption – decentralization, representation and responsiveness – also seem to gohand in hand with perceptions of corruption.

These findings point to the possibility that changes in local government practicesover the past few years may have improved the financial position of some councils,but have not improved public perceptions of corruption in local government. Thismeans not only that corruption is perceived as structural, but also that thestructural solution – democratization – may pave the way for even greatercorruption. In other words, we have to rethink not only the causes of corruption,but also how to mitigate it. This does not mean that corruption in localgovernment is inevitable. Rather, we must uncover the structural factors thatencourage individual and institutional corruption.

As a rule, our findings reflect our theory that the division of authority between thecentral and local governments creates widespread potential for corruption. As is clearlyevident, some administrative practices adopted over the past few years have enhancedthis potential. The potential for corruption varies from place to place, with the extentof corruption depending not only on factors at the national level but also on localvariables. As described above, we found substantial differences in perceptions ofcorruption between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ local authorities – specifically, betweencentrally located authorities with a mainly Jewish population, and those in peripheralareas, many of them with a minority, i.e. Arab populace. In view of this, it may beworth considering the concept of ‘syndromes of corruption’ (Johnston, 2005) – i.e. theidea that patterns of corruption, including their causes and specific manifestations, can


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vary from place to place, whether between different countries or between differentgovernments in the same country.

This conclusion coincides with another argument which has gained credence in theliterature on local government, namely the argument that different local authoritiesshould not all be treated alike. Where our research is concerned, it is doubtful that anysingle solution – whether focused on transparency, inspection, scrutiny, decentraliza-tion or ethical principles – would significantly reduce local government corruption inevery instance. This recognition, too, reflects the idea that corruption is structural andnot individual.

Our findings point to several possible directions for future research. Firstly, to whatextent does corruption in local government – which appears to be structural andsystematic – affect the way the public perceives corruption in the central governmentand vice versa? Secondly, to what extent are residents bothered by perceived corruptionin their local government? Is this issue important to large numbers of people? Thirdly,do perceptions of corruption actually reflect the quality of the local government, orprimarily the nature of citizens’ expectations? And finally, on a more general level, howdo ordinary people perceive the divide between the democratic/political aspect of localgovernment, with the presumption that local government should be representative andadhere to values such as integrity and fairness, and its functional/administrative aspect?Is it possible that the perspective taken in this research, whereby the local council is ademocratic body, with all that that implies, is not shared by most ordinary citizens?These questions are well beyond the scope of the current study, and await furtherexploration.

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