1.4 - Saretzki, Thomas - Collective Action vs. Functionalism¿ Some Remarks Concerning Hans Joas's Critique (EN)

7/30/2019 1.4 - Saretzki, Thomas - Collective Action vs. Functionalism Some Remarks Concerning Hans Joas's Critique (EN)

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Collective Action vs. Functionalism? Some Remarks Concerning HansJoas's Critique

Collective Action vs. Functionalism? Some Remarks Concerning Hans Joas'sCritique

by Thomas Saretzki

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1 / 1988, pages: 52-72, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=31132ed2-cee0-4ddb-9e51-11fc25f75341http://www.ceeol.com/


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Thomas Saretzki1. Critical Social Theory and the "Project ofModernity"

The Theory ofCommunicative Action is not supposed to be a "metatheory"but instead "the beginning of a social theory concerned to validate its owncritical standards."1 The explication of these critical standards is the goal of atheory of rationality. In order to accomplish this task, the theory of rationalitymust refer to social theory. Without referring to processes of societalrationalization, the explication of the notion of "communicative rationality)' isimpossible (within the framework of formal pragmatics).2 It is hence one ofthe main intentions of the Theory of Communicative Action to point out the"internal connection between the theory of rationality and social theory".3As in the work ofMax Weber, the problem of using a concept of rationality(which always has normative implications) arises for every sociology whichclaims to be a theory of society at three different levels: 4a) on a metatheoretical level as the question of "a framework for actionconceived with a view to the rationalizable aspects of action";b) on a methodological level as the question of "gaining access to the objectdomain of symbolic objects through 'understanding''', whereby "understanding rational orientations of action became the reference point forunderstanding all action orientations";c) on the empirical-theoretical level as the question of "whether and in whatsense the modernization of a society can be described from the standpointof cultural and societal rationalization" and how these processes can beadequately conceived of within the framework of an analysis of society. 5The Theory of Communicative Action is not just meant to help clarify thefoundations of social theory, but also to make possible a conceptualization ofthe social life context that is tailored to the paradoxes of modernity."6*Corrected version; for critical comments and helpful remarks concerning the first draft of this article Iwould like to thank Jean Cohen, Simone Dietz, Frank Nullmeier and Joachim Raschke. An earlier Germanversion appeared as discussion paper no. 14 of the series "Reports and Discussion Papers" of the Instituteof Political Science, University of Hamburg, Allende-Platz 1, D-2000 Hamburg 13. For helpful suggestionsto the first draft of the English translation I am grateful to Birgit Ermlich, Det lef Murphy, and RolfSchmidt.Praxis International 8: 1April 1988 0260-8448 $2.00


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Praxis International 53Considering the general questions the Theory ofCommunicative Action aspiresto resolve, one can identify the problems of constructing a theory whichhopes- to validate its own critical standards without wandering off into relativismon the one hand, or falling "into the snares of foundationalism" on the other,7 - t o point out that there is a connection of metatheoretical, methodologicaland empirical-theoretical reflexions,- t o develop an evolution-theoretic framework to explain the emergence anddevelopment of modern societies,- t o initiate or keep in touch with empirical research,- t o show how the theory can be employed in a concrete diagnosis of thetimes.In view of the various components of this comprehensive and rather ambitiousprogram, one might very well ask, how, if at all, these different concerns andquestions might be consistently integrated into one theoretical framework,how the different levels of abstraction (from metatheory to a concretediagnosis of our times) might be mediated, and how empirical-theoretical,critical-normative and practical-political aspects are thereby related to oneanother. It should come as no surprise that some critics have pointed topossible tensions and conflicts between these different intentions. In particular, the ambition to formulate a systematic theory that can satisfy theexplanatory claims and fallibilistic principles of the established sciences is seenas a problem for the development of Habermas's critical theory.Thus Thomas McCarthy argues that since Habermas's "reconstructiveturn" he has begun developing a social theory primarily with a systematic

intent, whereas the critical and practical intent dominant in his earlierwritings are becoming less significant.8 While the paradigmatic shift fromradical self-reflection to rational reconstruction, that is, the shift from theparadigm of psychoanalysis to the paradigm of cognitivistic developmentalpsychology, has already been accompanied by much scepticism,9 the integration of some elements of systems theory now appears to many partisans ofcritical theory as a sort ofwatershed beyond which they obviously do not wantto follow. In order to revoke this step, Habermas has been criticized either inthe name of the "founding fathers" of Critical Theory or with reference topost-structuralism. Indeed, sometimes the "new" Habermas finds himselfconfronted with the "old" one, that is, with the arguments of his earlierwritings. 10 In the background of social theoretical controversies about therelevance and implications of borrowing from systems theory for criticaltheory, there are obviously different assessments of what Hans Joas calls the"substantive question of the extent to which societal processes occur independently of the intentions of individual actors".ll Clearly, one's views on thisquestion will partly determine how one evaluates the possibilities anddimensions of consciously planned social and political change in modernsocieties.Habermas has taken his partisanship for the "project of modernity" so

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54 Praxis Internationalseriously that a great many of those sympathetic to the ideas of earlier criticaltheory see him thus as having gone too far in accepting the c o n d i t ~ o n s of adifferentiated modern society. Habermas defends not only the differentiationand development of the internal logic of science and technology, law andmorality, and art' and literature in the sphere of cultural reproduction; he isalso accepting the differentiation of media-steered sub-systems (such asmonetarily regulated markets and law bound administration) from thecommunicatively structured lifeworld. Defending cultural modernity impliesrenouncing all programs which seek the "redemption" (Aufhebung) of adifferentiated culture and means giving up the idea of a complete reconciliation of theory and practice, morality and ethical life (Sittlichkeit), andultimately art and life.Accepting societal modernity implies abandoning theidea of the abolition of the state and of the market mediated by money. 12Neither the differentiation of cultural knowledge in different spheres nor theprofessional production of this knowledge in specialized expert cultures assuch can be seen as the cultural problem of modernity. The key questioninstead becomes how a fruitful and mutual exchange between the variousexpert cultures and everyday practises can be brought about. Furthermore,neither the differentiation of monetarily steered markets out of the communicatively structured lifeworld nor the institutionalization of the bllreaucraticadministration of the welfare state as such can be seen as the central societalproblem. Today what is central is how the further penetration of economicand bureaucratic system imperatives into spheres of action tailored to tasks ofsymbolic reproduction can be prevented through regulation. A differentiatedfeed-back between specialized expert cultures and traditionally impoverishedeveryday-cultures - this is the cultural-political concern which can renderpossible an overcoming of the apparent individual and social problems oforientation. Indirect limitation of the uncontrolled growth of media-steeredsubsystems of state and economy through the extension of institutions whichcan protect the communicatively structured domains of action in the privateand public sphere against the reifying dynamics of economic and administrative systems-a balance of power between the imperatives of system andlifeworld: this is the social-political concern which can prevent a further lossof freedom and a further threat to the conditions of personal identityformation and social solidarity. 13Many of the critical points raised against the theory ofmodernity, actuallyseem to be directed against Habermas's "project of modernity" in the firstplace. The critique of the "transformation of Critical Theory,"14 as broughtabout by Habermas in the Theory ofCommunicative Action, often seems to bemotivated by questions about the normative and political implications of thisnew type of critical s0cial theory: if one accepts the two-level conception ofsocial theory, does this not imply that one is more or less tacitly taking forgranted a degree of societal differentiation which makes the old utopias ofdirect democracy and economic self-management appear simply anachronistic? The assumption of a possibly "painless" handing over of functions ofmaterial reproduction to media-steered subsystems-does this not imply, forinstance, that the whole "world of work" will have to be written off as a


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Praxis International 55domain of possible communicative rationalization and hence as a terrain ofdemocratization and 8ocialization? Given the view that a balance of power isnecessary between the imperatives of system and lifeworld, does not criticaltheory find itself in an unnecessarily defensive position if it confines itself to areactive principle of limiting power instead of offensively pursuing theradical-democratic end of reducing or even abolishing power and domination?lS2. Hans Joas's metatheoretically oriented critique of Jiirgen HabermasQuestions like these underlie Hans Joas's critique of the Theory ofCommunicative Action. Yet Joas does not take issue with the "project ofmodernity" directly. His contribution is meant to be understood as ametatheoretically oriented critique of the foundations of the Theory ofCommunicative Action. 16Joas raises the question of the consistency of Habermas's comprehensiveprogram in the Theory of Communicative Action without, however, actuallytrying to clarify the question by means of an immanent critique (admittedly, a"thorny path"). Rather, he simply starts from the assumption that the Theoryof Communicative Action might merely be a '' 'personal union' of theoreticalpositions" and then proceeds by arranging Habermas's arguments in such away as if he had dealt with the following three questions, "namely thequestion of human action and that of the conditions of social order, and . . .the question of the central problematics of society in contemporary capitalistdemocratic societies. "17Despite the fact that the theory of rationality and the theory of societyobviously are interrelated in Habermas's work, Joas wants to pass overentirely what he himself regards as "the more philosophical questions havingto do with his use of the notion of rationality and thus also the question of thenormative implications of a critical theory of society."18 Whether this is anappropriate approach for what is supposed to be a "metatheoretically orientedcritique" which is itself to a great extent lllotivated by the assumed normativeimplications of system-theoretical elements in Habermas's concept of society,seems to be highly questionable. 19 In looking more carefully, one realizesrather quickly that the questions Joas wants to pass over and banish to thedomain of philosophy inevitably reenter through the back door when heelaborates his own argument for an alternative program of critical socialtheory.To a certain extent, my remarks concerning Joas's paper tend to become an"anti-critique" because I think his criticism is based on a problematicinterpretation of Habermas. In order to clarify what I regard as thehermeneutic weakness of Joas's critique, I shall follow his rearrangement ofHabermas's argument and deal successively with the questions of the theoryof action, of social order, and of society as a whole. Joa8's critique points toconsiderable "blanks" in Habermas's theory. Yet the alternative program hesuggests raises more problems than it is likely to answer, both in terms of anappropriate empirical-theoretical conceptualization of contemporary societiesand with regard to its own normative foundation.


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56 Praxis International2.1 . Alternative action-theoretic concepts as a foundation for the critical theory ofsociety?Joas starts his case by stating that Habermas's action theory is conceptually

"meager,"20 and he thus tries to demonstrate that Habermas "incorrectly"identifies a typology of action with a typology of the different kinds ofcoordination of action" and has not really attempted "to do justice to thediversity of kinds of action."21 Obviously, Habermas did not make such anattempt; considering the intention of his theory, however, one is inclined toask in what respect this might be a valid objection against Habermas'sconception. What would he have gained if he had-as Joas claims-attemptedto develop a "typology adequate to the rich variety of the different kinds ofaction" in the first place?22 To be sure, the Theory ofCommunicative Action isnot intended to give an encompassing answer to the question of human actionas such, i.e., in all its various forms, nor is it intended to be a "metatheory".Rather, it is supposed to be the beginning of a social theory which tries tomake explicit its own normative criteria.23Joas is right if he wishes to argue that Habermas sometimes seems tosuggest a problematic linear relationship of correspondence between abstracttypes and concrete social domains of action. 24 If, however, his critique beyondthat is meant to he of systematic relevance (in the sense of providing acomplelnentary or alternative action-theoretic foundation for a critical theoryof society), then he would have to show which alternative concepts of action(that are either non-communicative or communicative in a different sense) areto be taken into consideration.Since the concept of action one takes as a reference point has a decisiveimpact on how a social order is conceived, the fundamental relevance ofaction-theoretical foundations for the construction of a theory of society hasbeen repeatedly emphasized by Habermas.25 Thus, the relevant question iswhether there is a concept of action to be found in the "rich variety ofdifferent kinds of action" that can serve as an alternative action-theoreticalfoundation for a critical theory (and it is a theory of society which is at stakehere!) I am rather sceptical about this, since prima vista there are problemsattached to all the candidates named by Joas.First of all, 10as points to an "expressionistic counter-model" of the 18thcentury Enlightenment which would be directed against instrumentalisticreductions just as the concept of communicative action is. 26 Yet such anaesthetically inspired model of action generates serious problems if one isinterested in explicating normatively valid foundations for a theory of societywithin such a framework. Instrumentalistic reductions in the actiontheoretical foundations of a theory of society cannot be persuasively overcomeif one attempts to enrich the paradigm of the isolated subject (whichmonologically reflects about and purposively intervenes into a world ofobjective entities)27 with elements of aesthetic expression.Another candidate mentioned by 10as is "a conception of ritual as normconstituting action and as a counter-concept to the instrumentalist restrictionof the concept of action.,,28 Unless the characteristics of such a ritual


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Praxis International 57constitution of norms are explicated more detail, the question arises, to putit terms, whether it is to be understood as anything but a retrogressionto a pre-modern level of reflection. Certainly, norms can be expressed in aritual, and even a modern democratic society there may be rituals with suchan expressive function. Nonetheless, can a critical theory of society whichhopes to validate its own normative standards in earnest assign a "normconstituting" function to a conception of "ritual?" (One is immediately inclinedto ask-which one)?The reference to the model of action inherent in pragmatism seems to be lessproblematic.29 This model is based on the notion of an experimental, creativeaction which finds its ends only in situations. In considering the case of JohnDewey, whose conception Joas explicitly points to, one can see the crux of thisapproach. Dewey's theory of action is a theory of rational responses to givensituations which turns simultaneously to be a theory of being tied to given

situations-with all its positivistic and relativistic implications.30 After all, theinability of this type of pragmatism-which contains a radical-democraticself-understanding, to be sure-to provide a rational justification of its ownnormative positions within the framework of its theory of action31 was one ofthe main reasons why the first generation of the Frankfurt School heavilycriticized Dewey's "fair-weather" philosophy.32 In short: as long as Joas doesnot further explicate how his alternative program of "a more broadly basedtheory of action"33 can actually provide a better foundation for a criticaltheory of society and how he wants to get around the problematic normativeimplications indicated above, it is difficult to see in what respect his focus onthe neglected phenomenal diversity of actions actually represents a systematically relevant objection to Habermas's conceptualization of the problem. 34It is possible to limit the scope of one's critique of a social theorist to givingan account of the "costs" resulting from his specific views and intentions with

regard to the questions he tried to answer. Joas, however, obviously does notlimit himself to such a balancing of "costs" and "benefits," of strengths andweaknesses. W'hen we consider his systematic claims about action-theory, thequestion arises of whether his critique does not ultimately amount to sayingthat Habermas should have dealt with another problem altogether. To bemore specific: Is not Joas ultimately saying that Habermas-instead ofdeveloping an action-theoretical foundation for a critical theory of societywhich seeks to validate its own normative criteria-should have tried to workout a typological reconstruction of the phenomenal diversity of humanactions?Different interpretations of what is at stake and different strategies to dealwith these problem are to be found at other junctures. This can be seen inJoas's distinction between the theory of action and the theory of social order. Inprinciple, Joas is certainly right in pointing out that questions of human actionand of the conditions of social order can be analytically separated.35 However,what Habermas's formulation,of the issue amounts to is thematizing these twoquestions in regard to their interrelatedness.The question: 'How is social action possible?' is only the reverse of the other


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S8 Praxis Internationalquestion: 'How is social order possible?' A theory of action that wants to answerthis question must be able to specify those conditions, which allow alter to connect(anschlieBen) his actions to ego's actions. This expression reveals an interest in theconditions of social order as far as these are located on the analytical level of simpleinteraction. The sociological theory of action is concerned not only with formalcharacteristics of social action as such, but with mechanisms of action-coordinationwhich render possible a regular and stable connection (Vernetzung) of interactions.36

Habermas made it very clear that the search for connection-mechanismsconstitutes a specific perspective on the phenomenal domain ofhuman action.As he points out, the perspective of the sociologist predetermines the theory ofaction insofar as concepts of social action are analyzed only in relation toconcepts of social order.Considering the "task of explaining an intersubjectively shared socialorder,"37 Joas misses the level of abstraction of the Habermasian argument asfar as his reference to the neglected phenomenal diversity of actions and hiscritique of the concentration on problems of action-coordination are concerned. If one wants to clarify the social-theoretical question of the conditionsof social integration or the complementary question of avoiding social anomie,then it is difficult to see how on the analytical level of simple interaction thisproblem can be posed in any other way than as the problem of connecting orcoordinating actions. If we take as a starting point the model of communicative action, an "expressionistic counter-model," a conception of ritual, or thepragmatist model of action, it is always the problem of action-coordinationwhich is at stake if one wants to know the conditions of social order on thislevel of direct interaction. If there are questions which arise in this contextregarding the adequate conceptualization of the problems of social order, thenthese questions do not arise on the action-theoretic level but on the level ofsocial theory. Acritique of the Habermasian two-level concept of society that Iwould go along with, amounts to the following argument: being interested inthe conditions of social order, one cannot confine oneself to analyzing theseconditions only "on the analytical level of direct interactions."38 One mustrather expand the analysis to include the level of social organisation andinstitutions, the structure and functions ofwhich are not adequately graspedon the level of simple interaction.392.2 Systems' theory as a theory of social order?Speaking of the "essential limits of what the theory of action can accomplish, and of competition between approaches based on the theory of actionand on systems theory as a competition between two different paradigms,"Habermas would, according to Joas, confound "the distinction between thetheory of action and the theory of social order with, on the one hand, thequestion of changing over to the solution of the problem of social orderprovided by functionalist systems' theory and, on the other hand, with thesubstantive question of the extent to which societal processes occur independently of the intentions of individual actors."40 Considering the Habermasian


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Praxis International 59argument more closely, however, it is not at all clear who is confusing what inthis context. No one is likely to object when Joas tries to support his criticismby claiming:The theory of action does not per se compete with the theory of social order . . . Infact, the theory of action directly compels the posing of the problem of social order.Concomitant of every theory of action are theoretical assumptions about the natureof social order that implicitly or explicitly correspond to it.41

Now Habermas did not-as Joas seems to presuppose-speak of a competition b e t w ~ e n the theory of action and the theory of social order, but of acontrast of action- and systems-theoretical perspectives based primarily onmethodological and metatheoretical considerations. Apparently, Joas presumes that Habermas-simply by taking over elements of systems' theory inhis own theoretical framework-has thereby pleaded for a transition towards a"solution to the problem of social order provided by functionalist systemstheory".42 At this point, Joas seems to see the systenls-theoretical elements inHabermas's theory of society as a comprehensive theory of social order-andto me this seems to be an indequate interpretation of their status in the contextof Habermas's two-level concept of society. Within the framework of thisconceptualization, "system" and "lifeworld" do not-as Joas assumesrepresent two equivalent and contradictory models of social order.43 RatherHabermas maintains the primacy of the lifeworld both genetically andsystematically.44 In the context of the Habermasian account, Joas-to use hisown words-"incorrectly" identifies "system" as an independent concept ofsocial order. According to Habermas's conception, the continuity and identityof a society as a whole cannot be defined with reference to some media-steeredsubsystems, but only with reference to the structures of the lifeworld. If themechanisms of systems' integration, require institutional anchoring in thelifeworld, as Habermas keeps telling us again and again, then "the problem ofsocial order" does not exist on the level of the system but in the lifeworld. Or,to put it differently: even the problem of order in the system arises (if it arisesat all) on the level of the lifeworld.45 By understanding the two-levelconception of society, which integrates "system" and "lifeworld", as an"unhappy marriage", as an "infelicitous . . . joining together" of "a hermeneutic and a functionalist conception of social order,"46 Joas succumbs to aconfusion. If there is a theoretical conception of order in Habermas's theory,then one has to look for it in the sphere of the lifeworld. Since Habermas'snotion of a socio-culturallifeworld is rather broad, it seems appropriate, withregard to an empirically oriented analysis of problems of social order, todifferentiate the concept of the lifeworld further and to distinguish theinstitutional components analytically more clearly from the aspects of directaction-coordination. Mechanisms establishing or maintaining social order arenot only to be found on the level of simple interaction in the form of alreadypresupposed background knowledge, relations and competences. As far as theproblems of establishing and maintaining social order are concerned, sociallyobjectivated mechanisms also play an important role and they are to beanalyzed on the level of social and political institutions.


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60 Praxis International2.3 Theory of society as a theory of collective action?According to Joas, "Habermas's understanding of the status of the theory ofaction" is too narrow, and he strongly criticizes what he regards as a

misleading limitation of action theory to processes of the lifeworld.47 It is onlybecause of this "truncated version of the theory of action", Joas argues, thatHabermas is forced to "take recourse to functionalist lines of reasoning." Incontrast Joas wants to expand the scope of action theory to "the task ofdescribing collective actions, of describing the constitution of collective actorsand identities."48 First of all, it is clear that the "theory of collective action"postulated by Joas cannot be the same kind of action theory as a theory ofindividual action (since this would mean treating collectivities asindividuals-clearly an inappropriate idealization).49 This is granted by Joaswhen he points to the necessity of differentiating between the level ofindividual action and its rationalization and the rationalization of collectiveand organized action. 50 In order to avoid possible misunderstandings and tobe able to distinguish between aspects of constitution and aspects of theactions of social groups. I would prefer to speak about this point as thequestion of a (missing) theory of social actors.SI This might be just a questionof terminology. What appears to be amuch more serious problem, however, isthe overextended scope Joas wants to assign to such a theory of collectiveaction within the general framework of a theory of society. One could get theimpression that Joas thinks that a theory of society is to be transformed moreor less completely into a theory of collective action. This seems to beproblematic in at least two respects.The alternative program suggested by }oas, that is, a "theory of social ordercentered on the constitution of collective actors,"52 raises questions about thenormative implications of a theory of social order grounded in this way (as faras this alternative is supposed to be more than just a descriptive theory ofsocial order). If at least in modern societies a "theory of social order" denotes atheoretical structure that is to be built upon universalistic principles-and thisI take for granted-would not any "theory of social order centered on theconstitution of collective actors" willy-nilly have to presuppose that theseuniversalistic principles can be "read" out of "the constitution" of collectiveactors without greater difficulties? If inadequate idealizations are to beavoided, one has to concede that all the historical collective actors havingappeared so far (be they nations, social classes, political parties or socialmovements) actually represented not only universalistic but also particularistic interests (which after all resulted from the specific social position and thespecific problems these actors were primarily engaged in). The question thenbecomes how to distinguish universalistically oriented actors from those withmore particularistic interest. How do we distinguish generalizable andparticularistic positions when one is looking at the "program" and "practice"of an actor? Do not the criteria one thereby has to take into account have toprovide the normative foundation of a theory of order, rather than thehistorically specific "constitution" of a collective actor? In short: a theory ofsocial actors is hopelessly overcharged if it is supposed to solve the problems


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Praxis International 61of a theory of social order with explicable and valid normative standards. 53Such an undertaking runs the risk of doing injustice to either the normativeclaims of a theory of social order or to historical reality and the specificconditions and restraints of social actors.Trying to purge functionalism from social theory and to ground the theoryof society primarily on the foundation of a theory of collective actors,54 Joasexpects too much of the suggested theory of collective action in a secondrespect, too. In light of modern societies, which are differentiated not onlyvertically but to an increasing extent also functionally, the question of thescope and the adequacy-one might as well say: the question of empiricalcontent--of such an approach arises. According to Joa8, Habermas's emphasison the independence of processes of rationalization in the lifeworld springsfirst of all "from the pressure exerted against this direction by functionalistmodels." If one accepted this "alternative theoretical framework", Joasargues,. . . then it is not the deductive definition ofmicrosocial phenomena on the basis ofmacrosocial functions that guides us, but a reconstruction of the manner in whichsocietal conditions that have become autonomous can as such issue from thecomplex of normative traditions and everyday actions, of concrete historicalsituations and actions, and do so in the face of possibilities of resistance to themthat are produced anew over alld over again. The upside-down world of apparentlyautonomous social structures is then thereby left behind, at least theoretically. ss

Nonetheless, one is inclined to ask: what about the "upside-down world" if itis left behind by social theory, and conversely, what about a social theory, if itleaves behind the perverted realities of the world as it is? If I understand thecritical intention correctly at this point, Joas would like to have a theory thatconceives of societal conditions as directly produced-and hence changeable-bycollective actors. Considering the increasing complexity of different spheres ofaction in modern societies which are rationalized according to their own innerlogic and functionally differentiated, the question arises, however, whetherand eventually to what extent this idea of the formability of societal conditionsby a collective actor remains an adequate notion. 56One is almost inclined to think that in his critique Joas to a certain extentblames the messenger -for his bad message. Is there not a sort of hiddenidealism underlying Joas's critique? The "upside-down world" of autonomousstructures is but virtualized; apparently, it does not arise simply becauseHabermas applies systems-theoretical concepts in his theory of society. Ratherthe other way around: since in the actual development of modern societiesthere are tendencies of economic and administrative autonomization, a theoryof s'uch a society must try to grasp these tendencies conceptually if it does notwant to ignore the social reality it is supposed to analyse. If one is concerned towork out a theory of society not only in the manner of a critique of ideologybut also with systematic intent, then one will have to look for a theoreticalframework which allows an adequate description and explanation of overallsocietal development and its structures of conflict. And as far as this level of


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62 Praxis Internationaltheoretical conceptualization is concerned, this question for Joas is as follows:Can functionally differeptiatedmodern societies still be adequately grasped ina "theoretical framework that refers all phenomena of social order to an actualor virtual collective will of society's members"?57 The question is whether inthe alternative framework of a theory of collective action (taken as a programfor general social theory) the theoretical conception of society is not influencedtoo directly by critical and practical intentions, whereas this theoreticalconception should provide adequate categorical and analytical means for asober systematic analysis of societal developments in the first place. Does notthe theory of society surrender its critical function if it dissolves into a theoryof action oriented directly at practical action, thereby losing sight of structurally and functionally conditioned constraints upon action. Even the practicalintentions of a critical theory of society will be left unfulfilled if the functionalimperatives of a differentiated and complex mass-society are simply disregarded. This would mean disregarding the potential for disillusionment andfrustration embodied in these structures vis-a.-vis attempts of the direct andconscious steering of them. 58As far as the adequacy of the two-level concept of society is concerned, onemight very well ask whether Habermas has not been influenced too much bythe debate on technocracy and, as a consequence, has not overemphasized thetendencies toward the autonomization of economic and bureaucratic systerns. 59 Applying the abstract concepts of "system" and "lifeworld" to aconcrete diagnosis at an empirical level of analysis without further analyticdifferentiation and without reflecting about the necessary steps of "operationalization", might indeed lead to an inadequate "block-like notion of themonetary-bureaucratic complex."60 Hence Habermas's "structural" conception tailored to the functional imperatives of the "system" and to the processesof communicative rationalization of the "lifeworld" must be supplemented (a)by an analysis ofmediating institutions that regulate the exchange of "system"and "lifeworld", Cb) by a dynamic analysis of the conflictual interaction ofsocial actors, if an adequate diagnosis of contemporary societies is to beaccomplished in the end.61To do justice to the dynamic aspects however, one does not have to abandonthe framework of the Habermasian approach entirely. To supplement or toenlarge a "structuralist" conception by introducing neglected aspects is adifferent strategy than to replace it with a theory of collective action. Incriticizing Habermas for not having paid attention to the aspects of develop

mental dynamics, one should not fall into the opposite extreme and start outfrom the assumption that a theory of society-which aspires to grasp society inall its interconnections-can indeed abandon a structural framework andelements of functional analysis entirely.We can sum up these considerations as follows: The two-level concept ofsociety that Habermas introduced in an evolution-theoretical context andthat-as a "structuralist" concept (in the sense of genetic structuralism)-concentrates on aspects of developmental logic, requires supplementing:- with regard to questions of the mediation of "system" and "life-world" by a

theory of institutions,62


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Praxis International 63- with regard to questions of developmental dynamics by a theory of socialactors.63The Habermasian two-level concept of society could be supplemented anddeveloped further in the direction of a multi-dimensional conception of society,that is, as a framework which would render possible a sufficiently differentiated and theoretically guided diagnosis of contemporary societies and theirvarious conflicts. Contrary to this strategy, the alternative program suggestedby Joas abandons the evolutionary perspective of Habermas's conception,which is oriented towards processes of rationalization. This raises questions ofa different but still normatively explicable reference point for the theory ofsociety. Beyond that there are problems that arise with respect to theformulation of a systematic theory concerned with describing and explainingthe development of society as a contradictory whole. According to Joas'sprogram, aspects of functional and structural analysis-and institutiontheoretical questions in particular-would have to be analyzed and explainedwithin the limited framework of a theory of collective action. As tar as itssocial-theoretical scope and analytical potential are concerned, Joas's theory ofcollective action concentrates primarily on the level of conflictual interactionsbetween social actors, while the general external conditions of these conflicts,the structurally and functionally conditioned opportunities and constraints ofspecific forms of action, are more or less neglected. The theoretical strategysuggested by Joas runs the risk of conceptualizing the structure and dynamicsof societal development primarily in the vertical dimension of social stratification, ultimately, in line with the "old" model of "class struggle" (albeit amore or less fragmented one).64

3. Hans Joas's alternative program of a critical social theory3.1 Social-theoretical problems of a broadly based theory of actionAs far as a critical theory of society is concerned, Joas's critique can besummarized in the following fashion: if Habermas had developed a broadertheory of action (instead of his "meager," "truncated" version), he would nothave been forced to take over functionalist conceptions of systems' theory inhis own theory of society (which are to be avoided because of their normative

and political implications). Hence what is needed is an alternative approach tothe critical analysis of society, namely a "more broadly based theory of action"and a "theory of social order centered on the constitution of collective actors" .I do not share the premises of this critique. They are based on a questionableinterpretation of Habermas's theory and its intentions. Nor do I find theconclusion compelling since it suggests an alternative approach for a critical theoryof society that has problematic social-theoretical and political implications."Broadly based theory of action" apparently means two strategies of broadening: (1) introducing other types or modes of action and (2) introducing otheractors (i.e. collectives). As far as the first point is concerned it might be useful


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64 Praxis Internationalto develop alternative typologies or refer to alternative models of action if oneis interested in analyzing other phenomena than those of action-coordination(particularly phenomena of the aesthetic sphere). It might also be helpful todifferentiate further the concepts of communicative and strategic action (e.g.with regard to different means of influencing or communicating). To reestablish a broad and undifferentiated concept of "praxis" as an actiontheoretical foundation for a critical theory of society which seeks to validate itsown normative standards, however, is to fall behind the level of analyticaldifferentiation accomplished by Habermas. This strategy suggests a paradigmof action that is basically grounded on a subjectivistic rather than intersubjectivistic notion and that blurs the relevant distinctions between instrumental, communicative and expressive aspects of action. As far as the secondpoint is concerned, several critics have pointed out the level of social actorsthat is lacking in Habermas's conception and therefore must be introduced if acomprehensive analysis of contemporary societies is to be accomplished.However, I would lay special emphasis on the fundamental differencebetween individual and collective action (and the differences between variouscollectivities) to avoid from the outset any notion of collectivities asmacrosubjects-a myth that haunted critical social theory for so long.Secondly, I would restrict the scope of a "theory of collective action" to thelevel of conflictual interaction of social actors which is not the only level ofanalysis required for a critical theory of society.6S3.2 Action-centered vs. multidimensional analysis of societyJoas seems to play the action-oriented approach off against the functionalone, turning the structural analysis of institutional order into something likean appendix of the analysis of collective actors. In contrast to this more or less"one-dimensional" approach, I would argue for an explicitly "multi

dimensional" concept of society which tries to combine at least the followingdistinct levels of analysis:66functional analysis of steering-problems and reproduction mechanisms ofdifferentiated subsystems of societystructural analysis of normative principles and institutional order of asocietydynamic analysis of the confiictual interaction of social actors competingover the distribution of resources and the interpretation of norms.Compared to this three-dimensional framework, }oa8's alternative program isboth a reduction and an extension in scope. If functional analysis has no rightof its own and structural analysis is to be centered on the constitution ofcollective actors, Joas has to refer (if not reduce) the analysis of functionalsystems-imperatives and institutional order to the level of conflictualinteraction of social actors. As a consequence, he is forced to broaden theobjective of a theory of action to explain the functions of systems and thestructures of institutions-if his alternative program is supposed to represent

an approach to a systematic theory of society.


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Praxis International 65Clearly the imperialism of a systems-theoretical approach which redefinesall social phenomena in functionalist terms and absolutizes a certain conceptual perspective is no adequate framework for critical theory and hence mustbe criticized for its extreme one-sidedness. Trying to avoid the "functionalist

fallacy," however, should not lead one to fall into the other extreme andcommit an "intentionalist fallacy," that is, one should not conceive ofreproduction mechanisms of functionally regulated systems as if they arenothing but the outcome of deliberately planned collective action. Such anaction-oriented conception of society refers to certain problematic assumptions about the extent to which complex systems of functional regulation are atthe disposal of any collective actor and hence can be consciously steered bypurposive intervention. If a concept of society does not systematically payattention to the internal and external limitations of the capacity for action of acollective actor, then it runs the risk of fostering a voluntaristic concept ofactionwhich neglects functionally conditioned restrictions and the limitedeffectiveness of direct interventions.Within a framework that concentrates on the level of confiictual interactionbetween social actors, the functional imperatives embedded in systems ofmaterial reproduction appear primarily as an expression of the specificsocio-economic interests of the dominant collective actor. What gets obfuscated is the evolutionary aspect, namely the question of the degree to whichsocieties differ with regard to their capacities to solve problems of materialreproduction. If we were to clarify to what extent different systems ofreproduction vary in terms of their efficiency, complexity, and "steeringcapacity" independently of their distributional effects, a functional analysis isrequired. 67As far as the institutional dimension of }oas's approach is concerned, one isleft in doubt about the reference point of his alternative theory of order. On theone hand, he suggests a "theory of social order centered on the constitution ofcollective actors," yet on the other hand he characterizes his approach as a"theoretical framework that refers all phenomena of social order to an actualor virtual collective will of society's members."68 Either his use of the term"social order" is equivocal or he draws an analogy between the level ofcollective actors and society as a whole. I would argue that any attempt tounderstand the problem of the institutional order of society by referring to theconstitution of a collective actor is misleading because it tends to ignore thefundamental difference between the specific constitution ofa collective actor andthe constitution ofa modern society as a whole. The institutional structures andprocedural rules of a modern society are more formalized, generalized and atthe same time more differentiated than they would be in any collective, thusbeing in conflict with the concretely substantiated identity and solidarity ofany specific collective actor. Yet these institutions and procedures must bebuilt on abstract universalistic and formalistic principles abstracting from anysubstantially defined identity, otherwise they characterize the social order Qf acommunity rather than the institutional order of a complex modern society ..Any approach to social theory that conceives of society primarily or evenexclusively on the level of conflictual interaction collective actors is in danger


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66 Praxis Internationalof reestablishing another "old" notion of conflict resolution, namely the clashof two opposing actors, traditionally thought of as classes. This applies notonly to the marxist tradition, but also to contemporary approaches that try toformulate a theory of society as a theory of collective action-Touraineprobably being the most prominent example.69 Within a framework thatconcentrates on the level of conflictual interaction between collective actors,the normative rules and political institutions of a society appear primarily asan expression of the specific ideology and as a repressive instrument of adominant collective actor. What gets tossed to the wayside, however, is theevolutionary aspect of different stages of normative principles and institutional regulations. In order to clarify to what extent the existing norms andinstitutions embody universalistical principles, a structural analysis isrequired.3.3. Social-theoretical approaches and political optionsWhile 10as is right in pointing out that metatheoretical considerations cananalytically be distinguished from the level of concrete social diagnosis, itmight nonetheless be helpful to look at their interrelatedness in order toclarify what the underlying social-theoretical and political stakes of the debateare. Joas's alternative program for a critical theory of society that could be

characterized as an (over-)extended action-theory based on a broad concept of"praxis" and associated with some form of class analysis is likely to reestablishin new shape some of the notions prominent in the New Left (and some oftheir theoretical weaknesses and political illusions, too). The political implications of Habermas's dualistic conception seem to be different. Of courseabstract theoretical concepts are only indirectly politically relevant. Yet anyinterpretation of society and its problems has an important impact on any viewofwhat counts as a possible solution to these problems. In order to clarify thespecific "selectivity" of the Habermasian approach for possible problemsolving strategies, consider the following theoretical "experiment": if contemporary "collective actors", such as the "new social movements", started outfrom Habermas's diagnosis ofmodernity and its pathologies, what would thepolitical implications for their approach be? While a diagnosis does notdirectly suggest or even determine a certain therapy, it at least limits the rangeof possible options by excluding others that appear less appropriate.With reference to the dualistic conception of system and lifeworld, theincreasing trends of over-differentiation that threaten the communicativeinfrastructure and the cultural variety of the life-world, would not be opposedwith a program of complete dedifferentiation. Instead of neglecting thefunctional imperatives embedded in the differentiated subsystems of societyor returning to a "monistic" communitarian organizing principle for society asa whole, the actors would take a more complex societal development intoaccount. The problem of social differentiation would not be posed as aneither/or-question but in all its various aspects: how much social differentiation in which sphere of action with regard to solving which problems?As far as the dynamics of social and political change are concerned, the


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Praxis International 67actors would abandon the notion of a complete break with the existinginstitutions of civil society and define their political project as a continuationof the emancipatory democratic movement. The idea of a "totally different"society would be given up in favor of a gradualistic concept of development.However, this self-understanding would not be "reformist" in the old sense.One of its characteristics would be the clear awareness of the ambivalence ofmany processes of modernization. The legal measures of the welfare-stateintended to extend freedom and equality do have negative side-effects (such asincreasing juridification, professionalization, therapeutization etc.) whichthreaten the conditions of identity formation and solidarity. Recognizing theseambiguities, the actors would still not reject all accomplishments of the socialwelfare-state comprise nor advocate a strategy to bypass its institutionscompletely. Their vision of a "post-welfare state" would rather combine twoelements: a more autonomous societal self-organization and self-help on theone hand and a partial devolution of bureaucratic administration and monetary systems with a further opening and decentralization of democraticinstitutions on the other. 70The conceptualization of the normative and institutional dimension wouldin principle be determined by the central features of modernity-autonomy,universality and reflexivity. This implies precisely what is under attack bypost-modernists, namely the reference to some sort of meta-Ievel. Thischaracteristic principle of modernity can be expressed by asking a questiol1which Kant first raised in an epistemological context: what are the necessaryconditions of the possibility of ... ? As far as its scope is concerned, thisproblem can be posed in all sorts of areas. Hence the question of institutionalization is: what are the necessary institutional conditions for the possibility of. . . ? The implications of this reflexive form of institutionalization can beillustrated for example with regard to the differentiation of state and society orwith regard to the meaning of utopian thought. While Marx still criticizedHegel for his separation of state and society, any call for a total socialization ofthe state would have to count as a premodern concept, since it neglects thenecessary institutional preconditions for a principle-guided form of conflictresolution in a differentiated society.71 Secondly, any form of utopia compatible with this reflexive principle would have to be "meta-utopia" in the firstplace, that is, an institutional setting which would render possible andregulate a plurality of substantially defined "concrete utopias." A politicalproject that holds on to utopian perspective and is bound to an emphaticnotion ofmodernity at the same time, does not aim at the realization of certainmaterial values nor at the carrying out of substantially defined forms of life inthe first place. It is rather concerned with providing the necessary infrastructure, with producing conditions that allow and enable different lifestyles todevelop, and with establishing necessary procedures for conflict regulationbetween these different lifestyles.Clearly it is a substantially defined utopia that provides motivating power inpractical contexts, since it is directly related to one's needs, interests, andaspirations. Once the reflexive mode of institutionalization is established,however, it is hard to escape its consequences, and one of those is the


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68 Praxis Internationaldifferentiation of the notion of "utopia", which allows the theorization ofpossible tensions and conflicts between concrete and meta-utopia. To theextent that the relationship to utopias is broken by reflexivity, these utopiasget a different status as a guiding principle for practical action. As far as itssocietal scope is concerned, the actors define their own specific project asself-limiting-rather than totalizing-in character.72

NOTES1. J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2 vols., (Frankfurt, 1981), p. 7; TCA (1), p.xxxix. In footnotes 1 shall cite the German original and the English translation of volume one as TeA

(1) (Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. One, Reason and Rationalization of Society, transl. byThomas McCarthy, Boston, 1984)2. Ibid., p. 9; TeA (1), p. xli3. Ibid., p. 23; TCA (1), p. 7, for the relation of the theory of rationality and the theory of society cf. H.Schnade1bach, "Transformation der Kritischen Theorie" in Philosophische Rundschau 29, No.3-4/1982, pp. 162f.4. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 8, 22; TCA (1), pp. xl, 75. Ibid., p. 22; TCA (1), p. 6.6. Ibid., p. 8; TCA (I), p. xl.7. Ibid., p. 9; TCA (I), p. xli.8. Cf. Th. McCarthy, "Complexity and Democracy, or the Seducements of Systems Theory" in New

German Critique 35 (Spring/Summer 1985), p. 53; see also McCarthy, Kritik der Verstiindigungsverhiiltnisse, (Frankfurt, 1980), pp. 148ff., 297ff. and "Rationality and Relativism: Habermas's'Overcoming' of Hermeneutics" in J.B. Thompson/ D. Held, eds, Habennas - Critical Debates,(Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 57ff.; for a similar argument see D. Misgeld, "Critical Hermeneuticsversus Neoparsonianism?" in New Gennan Critique 35 (Spring/Summer 1985), pp. 57ff., 82.

9. For the implications of these paradigms see an earlier paper by A. Wellmer on "Reason,Emancipation, Utopia" now published in A. Wellmer, Ethik und Dialog, (Frankfurt, 1986), pp.175ff.10. Cf. McCarthy, "Complexity and Democracy ... ", op. cit., pp. 30ff. and H. }oas, "Dieungliickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus" in A. Honneth/H. joas, eds. Kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt 1986), p. 165. In footnotes I shall refer to the published German versionof Joas's paper, although I shall cite the authorized English translation "The Unhappy Marriage ofHermeneutics and Functionalism" kindly provided by Hans Joas.11. ]oas, "Die ungluckliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit. , p. 155. It is not at allclear in what sense ]oas is talking about this question as a "substantive" one - descriptive,

prognostic, or normative?12. Cf. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 481ff.; Habermas, "DieModerne - ein unvollendetes Projekt" in Kleine politische Schriften (I-IV), (Frankfurt, 1981), pp.

452ff.; Habermas,Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, (Frankfurt, 1985), pp. 394ff.13. Cf. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 484; Habermas, Die neueUnubersichtlichkeit, (Frankfurt, 1985), pp. 157ff.; Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne,op. cit., pp. 361ff.14. Schnadelbach, "Transformation der Kritischen Theorie", op. cit., p. 16115. ef. J. Berger, "Die Versprachlichung des Sakralen und die Entsprachlichung der Okonomie", in:Zeitschriftfur Soziologie 11, No. 4/1982, pp. 361f.; McCarthy, "Complexity and Democracy ... ",op. cit., p. 28 and Joas, "Die ungliickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit.,

pp. 170ff.16. Joas, "Die ungliickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit ., p . 17117. Ibid., p. 145. By choosing this approach Joas at least implicitly rejects the assumption of consistencyin the "Theory ofCommunicative Action" without further justification of this reading.


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Praxis International 6918. Ibid., p. 14619. Ibid., pp. 170ff.20. Ibid., p. 147.21. Ibid., p. 149.22. Ibid., p. 154.23. Cf. Habermas, cheorie des kommunikiitiven Handelns, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 7; TCA (1), p. xxxix.24. Joas, Die ungliickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit., p. 154. Several critics(see e.g. Berger, "Die Versprachlichung des Sakralen und die Entsprachlichung der Okonomie", op.cit., p. 360 and A. Honneth, Kritik der Macht, (Frankfurt, 1985), pp. 282, 296) have already pointedout that Habermas (cf. e.g. "Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns", Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 458) usescategories, which he introduced as abstract analytical distinctions, on a concrete empirical level ofanalysis in a somewhat problematic way, i.e. without reflecting on the corresponding problems of"operationalization" (to put it in the language of empirical social research). To establish a linearrelationship of types of action-coordination (strategic vs. communicative) and functions of reproduction (material vs. symbolic) seems to make sense at all only as long as one remains within a purely

functionalist perspective (see I-Iabermas, "ErHiuterungen zum Begriff des kommunikativen Handelns" in Vorstudien und Ergiinzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, (Frankfurt, 1984),pp. 602ff. for such an attempt. To localize these abstract types of action-coordination and functions ofreproduction "topologically", i.e. on the empirical level of concrete domains of action without furtherclarification of the problems of "operationalization" involved, however, is to commit the fallacy ofmisplaced concreteness.25. Habermas, "ErHiuterungen zum Begriff des kommunikativen Handelns", op. cit., p. 572.26. Joas, "Die ungluckliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit., pp. 147ff. withreference to Ch. Taylor, Hegel, (Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 13ff.27. Habermas has - I think convincingly - elaborated this point under the title of a "critique of

praxis-philosophy", cf. "A Reply to my Critics" in J.B. Thompson/ D. Held (eds.), Habermas Critical Debates, (Canlbridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 223ff.; Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, op.cit., pp. 78ff., 95ff.. See his critique of C. Castoriadis, Gesellschaft als imaginare Institution,(Frankfurt, 1984), probably the latest attempt to develop a theory of institutions based on thepraxis-model, in Der philosophische Diskurs der Modenle, op. cit ., pp. 368ff., 380ff.28. Joas, "Die ungllickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit., p. 148.29. Ibid., pp. 148, I50f.30. Cr. J. Dewey, Hu.man lValure and Conduct, (New York, 1930), pp. 210ff. Joas himself mentions that,according to this conception, "we find our ends in the world, and that prior to any setting of ends weare already, through our praxis, embedded in our various situations" (p. 150). But what if the ends tobe found in any specific world are anything but desirable?31. CL R. Bernstein, J)raxis und Handeln, (Frankfurt, 1975), pp. 91ff., esp. p . 97.32. I cannot explicate this point in detail here, for a more elaborate discussion see T. Koch/T. Saretzki,"Pragmatisnlus und Padagogik John Deweys aus der Sicht der Kritischen Theorie" inMuWi-akluell.Afatenaliel'l zur Urzte1Tichtswissenschafi 2 (edited by M. TrederlW. Schulz), No. 1/1982, pp. 24-36 andNo. 211982, pp. 11-22. To mention just one aspect: the Eclipse ofReason with its central theme - the"critique of instruruental reason" - can also be read as an answer to Dewey's "instrumentalism" and"experinlenralism", which Horkheimer regarded as "the most radical and consistent form ofpragmatisnl"; see j\J\. fIorkheimer, Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vemunft, (Frankfurt, 1974), p. 55,for a discussion of the problem mentioned above cf. pp. 58ff.33. Joas, "Die ungliickliche Ehe van Hermeneutik und Functionalismus", op. cit., p. 170.34. 'These very short remarks concerning the action-theoretic concepts which Joas mentions as possiblecandidates for an alternative action-theoretic foundation of a critical theory of society are introducedprimarily f()r illustrative purposes. Of course they cannot replace a comprehensive critical analysis ofthese a c t i o n ~ t h e o r e t i c models. At this point my remarks are only meant to point out what kind ofproblenls arise with regard to the task of explicating and justifying the normative standards of criticalsocial theory if one followed the theoretical strategy suggested by Joas.35. Joas, "Die ~ n g l i i c k 1 i c h e Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit., p. 145.36. I-Iabermas, "ErHiuterungen zum Begriff des kommunikativen Handelns", op. cit., p. 571; my

translation.37. Ibid.


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70 Praxis International38. Ibid.39. See for example J. Cohen "Warum noch politische Theorie? in W. Bonfi/A. Honneth (eds.),Sozialforschung als Kritik, (Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 356ff.40. loas, "Die ungliickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit., p. 15541. Ibid. It is precisely this interconnection that Habermas put in the center of his considerations, cf. thereference cited above (note 36).42. Joas, Die ungHickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit., pp. 150, 160.43. In this context one would, of course, have to clarify in more detail, what Joas means when he speaks of"the problem of order."44. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 461f., 507.45. For an early discussion of this point see Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spatkapitalismus,(Frankfurt, 1973), pp. 9ff.46. Joas, Die ungliickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. ch., p. 155.47. Ibid.48. Ibid., p. 166.49. Assuming a pre-stabilized harmony of the individual and collective level with respect to the dynamicsof organisation of interests is naive, since-as, for example, Olson demonstrated in his famous

study-the "logic of collective action" and the logic of individual action are different, cf. M. 0lson,The Logic ofCollective Action, Public Goods and the Theory ofGroups (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). Evenfor those who reject the "rational choice" assumptions underlying his approach, it should be clear thatany "theory of collective action" has to take into account possible tensions and conflicts betweenindividual and collective interests and actions. Hence what is called "theory of action" actuallydenotes rather different theories that will have to have a rather different structure depending first ofall on who the actor is, or more precisely: how "the actor" is conceived of. Beyond the fundamentaldistinction of "individual vs. collective" a further differentiation according to the constitution of thecollective in question seems to be appropriate with respect to criteria such as size (from smallcommunities to whole nation-states), degree of organization (low in social movements and citizeninitiatives, high in parties and unions), mode of integration (by common norms and values, economicinterests, common ethnic or cultural characteristics ...), etc.

50. In a passage of the original German version of his paper(p. 157), which is left out in the abridgedEnglish translation. Yet the interesting conceptual problem, i.e. the question of how the interconnection of these levels can be conceived of, is not discussed by Joas.51. Cf. O. Kallscheuer, "Auf der Suche nach einer politischen Theorie bei Jiirgen Habermas" inAsthetik und Kommunikation 12, No. 45/46, pp. 179ff.; Cohen, "Warum noch politische Theorie?",op. cit., pp. 342, 358; Honneth, Kritik der Macht, op. cit., p. 314.52. Joas, "Die ungliickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus, op. cit., p. 17053. Joas mentions the sceptical arguments Habermas presented in this context (p. 166), but he merelyrefers to them without taking up issue with these points in an argumentative discussion, cf.Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 110ff.; Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, 5th edition, (Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 529ff.; Habermas, Der

philosophisehe Diskurs der Moderne, op. cit., p. 418f., 424ff.54. One gets this impression in spite of loas's remark that he would not be condemning social scientificfunctionalism entirely, cf. p. 176, note 26 of the English translation.SS. loas, Die ungliickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit., p. 171.56. Cf. Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, op. cit., pp. 415ff.57. Here Joas contrasts the Habermasian two-level concept of society with a primarily normative model(p. 172). Of course one would have to clarify further, what Joas means by referring to a "virtual"collective will and what mediating steps (which are always connected with effects of alienation, to besure) he would assume.58. As far as "opportunity structure" and effectiveness of action are concerned, even very dynamiccollective actors such as social movemens are exposed to constraints which result not only from theirlimited resource potential, from among solidified patterns of socialization partisans or from thecounterstrategies of their (mostly statist) opponents. Rather, restrictions of action effective indifferentiated societies follow from function imperatives, too, which can beldescribedlas the "innerlogic" of different spheres of society, cf. j. Raschke, Soziale Bewegungen, (Frankfurt, 1985), pp.110ff., 396ff., 42Off. , 457ff. These general macro-sociological connections cannot be adequately


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Praxis International 71situations and actions" (cf. note 55) and which disregards functional constraints of systems regulatingsocial in terac tions d ismissed from ind ividua l subjects and thei r p rimary intentions (such asmoney-steered markets and law-bound administration).

59. ef. Honneth, Kritik der Macht, op. cit ., pp. 274ff., 291ff., 306ff., 332ff.60. Berger, "Die Versprachlichung des Sakralen und die Entsprachlichung der Okonomie", op. cit., p.

363. Societal power for instance is not only a resul t of functional imperatives that are embedded instructures of economic, bureaucratic or technological systems. Without doubt there is a dynamic sideof power accumulation as well. There are processes of establishing power and counter-power, whereactors mobilize resources, form alliances etc. It is with respect to these processes that a theory ofcollect ive act ion as a framework for the analysis of (usually) conflictual interaction between socialactors is appropriate. Yet the structural and functional conditions that frame this interaction also haveto be explained. Therefore any approach concentrating exclusively either on the structural, functionalor on the dynamic aspects of power would surely be insufficient for a comprehensive analysis.

61. Cf. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 2 , op. cit., pp. 465ff.; Habermas, Die neueUnubersichtlichkeit, op. cit., pp. 188ff.

62. This is not to say that institutions are not thematized at all by Habermas (cf. Theorie deskornmunikativen liandelns, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 249ff., 524ff. for a discussion of social and politicalinstitutions). What is lacking, however, is a clarification of the concept of institution itself and ananalysis of the problem, which institutions will be able to protect the lifeworld against the reifyingdynamics of economic and bureaucratic systems and which insti tutions will be able to bring about a"new permeability" of the relatively autononlOUS cultural spheres and its specialized experts on theone hand and everyday life on the other hand, cf. A. Wellmer, "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic ofEnlightenment" in Praxis International 3, No. 2/1983, p. 105; see also R. Zimmermann, UtopieRationalitiit-Politik, (Freiburg, Munchen, 1985), pp. 427ff.63. In this context Habermas himself repeatedly pointed to the necessity of integrating a theory of socialmovements, cf. Zur Rekonstruktion des Histonschen Materialismus, op. cit., pp. 40f.; Theorie deskomtnunikativen Handelns, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 468.64. In search of the revolutionary subject, theorists of the New Left interpreted the protests andmovements of the 1960s and early 1970s in terms of nlarxist class analysis. Yet today, in view of theincreasing heterogenity of the "new social movements", the concep t of class seems to be lessappropriate than ever for an adequate explanation of the development of contemporary forms ofcollect ive act ion. Besides i ts economist ic bias, there are at least two proble.matic notions associatedwith the concept of class that are relevant in this context, namely the hidden functionalism of classanalysis and the lack of the institutional dimension. The functional analysis of the capitalist systemand its contradictions and the dynamic analysis of political change supposed to be brought about bythe emancipatory collective action of the progressive class somehow merged in marxist class analysiswithout a sufficient clarification of their interconnection. The proclaimed unity of the class strugglewas simply hypothetical in the first place, that is, it was "logically" deduced from the mode in whichthe capitalist systenl functions. Subsuming the dynamics and historical variety of social contestationunder hypothetical "general interests" of class conflict deduced from the "logic" of the capitalistsystem is, however, loosing its persuasive power in view of the increasing heterogenity of social strata,divers ity o f needs and plurality of values. Moreover, if politics is identified with class relations ofdomination and contestation, this subsumption suggests the well known notion of conflict resolution,namely the clash of two opposing classes. This power-oriented approach implies a primarilyinstumentalist understanding of the existing institutions, while the question of an institutional settingfor the emancipated post-capitalist society remains unanswered. For a general critique of the marxistconcept of class see J. Cohen, Class and Civil S o c i e ~ y : The Limits ofMarxian Critical Theory, (Amherst,1982), esp. pp. 183ff .; its s trengths and weaknesses with regard to the explanation of socialmovements are discussed in Raschke, Soziale Bewegungen, op. cit., pp. 128ff., 448ff., for theinstitution-theoretic deficits cf. U. Bermbach, UDefizite marxistischer Politik-Theorie" in PolitischeVierteljahresschri.ft 24, No. 1/1983, pp. lSff., see also Zimmermann, UlOpie-Ralionaliliil-Polilik,op. cit., pp. 182ff.

65. To explain collective act ion , one cannot limit the analysis to a hermeneutic reconstruction of theself-understanding of the actors in question (i.e. their world view, perception of interests, motivs,strategies etc.). One rather has to take into account the societal context of these actions, that is, onealso has to analyze th e functional problems and the "inner logic" of the societal subsystems these


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72 Praxisactors are dealing with primarily and the normative principles and institut ional structures whichshape their actions. Hence the dichotomy of "collective action vs. functionalism" is an unfruitfulone-for the analysis of collective action itself and even more so for the analysis of society as awhole-if it is presented as a principle either/or-question.

66. Conceptually aB these dimensions are to be found in Habermas's theory, although he elaborated hisframework on these levels with a different degree of intensity, cf. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 465ff.

67. Habermas did not-as Joas claims-criticize Marx for his "lack of understanding capitalism'scivilizing role" (cf. Joas, "Die ungH.ickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. c it .,p. 178, note 31of the English translation), but for not being able to dist inguish between a newevolutionary stage of systems-differentiation leading to improved steering-capacity and its classspecific forms of institutionalization. Since Marx did not clearly distinguish between the level ofconflictual social relations and the level, of functional steering-capacities, the capitalist system ofproduction appeared primarily as an expression of class-relations. Hence Marx did not acknowledgethat the media-steered subsystems represent an evolutionary value of their own when evaluated byfunctional standards of efficiency, cf. I-Iabermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 2, op.cit., pp. 499fI.

68. Joas, "Die ungli.ickliche Ehe von Hermeneutik und Funktionalismus", op. cit., pp. 170,172.69. ef. e.g. A. Touraine, The Self-Production ofSociety, (Chicago, 1977), for a critique see Cohen, Classand Civil Society, op. cit ., pp. 211ft. and J. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New theoretical Paradigmsand Contemporary Social Movements" in: Social Research 52, No. 4/1985, pp. 685ff.

70. According to some observers, such a dualistic strategy is actually characteristic for the mainstream ofthe "new social movements", cf. A. Arato/J. Cohen, "Social Movenlents , Civil Society, and theProblem of Sovereignty" in Praxis International 4, No. 3/1984, pp. 267ff.

71. Cf. Bermbach, "Defizite marxistischer Politik-Theorie", op. cit., pp. 18ff.; Cohen, Class and CivilSociety, op. cit ., pp. 23ff.72. Such an orientation can be seen as a characteristic feature of the self-understanding of actors in someparts of the "new social movements", cf. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity ... ", op. cit., pp. 668ff.

Documents

1.4 - Saretzki, Thomas - Collective Action vs. Functionalism¿ Some Remarks Concerning Hans Joas's Critique (EN)