1.5 - Meznaric, Silva - A Neo-marxist Approach to the Sociology of Nationalism. Doomed Nationas and Doomed Schemes (en)

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A neo-marxist Approach to the Sociology of Nationalism. DoomedNationas and doomed Schemes

A neo-marxist Approach to the Sociology of Nationalism. Doomed Nationas anddoomed Schemes

by Silva Menari

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1 / 1987, pages: 79-89, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=9e4d6499-94a7-47c0-b6d3-48244233281fhttp://www.ceeol.com/


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79

A NEO-MARXIST APPROACH TO THE SOCIOLOGY

OF NATIONALISM. DOOMED NATIONS AND

DOOMED SCHEMES

Silva Meznari

The neo-Marxist ideological community in contemporary sociology1 haslately defined Marxisms failure to (analytically) approach nationalism as oneof the blank spots in its main theoretical scheme, namely, historical materi-alism. One could almost say, considering how widespread and vigorous thediscussions about this assumed failure are, that neo-Marxists are examiningthe future response of historical materialism to modernity according to itstheoretical capability to conceptualize and explain modern nationalism. Theexplanatory theory (historical materialism) expressed in the metaphor of baseand superstructure may be somewhat further clarified, if we indicate briefly

what it could mean in the relation to two important problems, religion andnationalism, or religious and national conflicts . . . Relatively little Marxist

work has so far been done on either religion or nationalism.2

Perry Anderson goes even further; by reopening the loop between Marxisttheory and mass practice in the advanced countries we might recreate someof the conditions that had once formed the classical canon of historialmaterialism in the generation of Lenin and Luxemburg . . . and shift the

whole center of gravity of Marxist culture towards the set of basic problemsposed by the movement of the world economy . . . [and] the meaning andfunction of the nation,3 which, among other problems, had beensystematically neglected for many years.

Even the most orthodox of Marxists are today prepared to concede thatthere is little to be found in Marxs writings relevant to the interpretation of

the rise of nationalism . . . While there is a very large literature on nation-alism, theoretical interpretations of the phenomenon have been notoriouslylacking.4 A majority of neo-Marxists seem to concede that Marx andMarxists writings about the nation, the nation-state, and nationalism weremainly of a tactical nature; that the problem has received confused treatmentand that it survived in Marxism only through a still more confusing andabstract analysis, penned by none other than Stalin.5 It is difficult to resistthe conclusion recently reached by Tom Nairn that the theory of nationalismrepresents Marxisms great historical failure.6 Nonetheless, as Giddens andNairn would have it, other traditions of Western thought have for the most

part not done much better.7 Despite the stockpile of the non-Marxistliterature on the topic of nationalism in contemporary societies, the verynature, meaning, and function of todays nation has not been sufficientlyexamined.8

One of these failures, virtually without rival in the attention devoted


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Praxis International80

nations without history (geschichtslose Vlker).9 This dichotomized schemeprovided the following cluster of European nations:

a) nations with historyrevolutionary nations

England, France, Germany,Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Poland,Russia, Spain, Scotland,Scandinavian states.

non-a) nations without history:counter-revolutionary

Albanians, Bohemians,Bulgarians, Croats, Estonians,Livonians, Rumanians,Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovenes, and

various remnants of scattered

groups in Europe (Basque, BasBretons, Welsh).

This distinction was made in Engels articles on the 1848 revolutions inEurope;10 national groups without history, Engels wrote, had not developed

viable state systems in the past. Therefore, during the revolutionary year of1848 they lacked the ability and energy to achieve their own independentstates. Their role in world history has long since been played out, and theirfate in the future of Europe is to perish from the stage of history, thus clearingthe way for the great civilized nations of central Europe to pursue their ownrevolutionary development. This development of the great nations is far moreimportant than the struggle of these small, crippled and impotent nationalgroups for independence.11

Why was this dichotomized distinction so widely recognized as a failure ofMarxisms understanding of nations and of their future in Europes develop-ment? The reason for this probably does not lie in its blatantly abortivepredictive power; the same weakness might be attributed to various otherschemes in the history of social thought. In this respect, such an obvious fauxpas would certainly not deserve the series of analytical works which fordecades have been questioning its premises. Thus established the dividing

line, starting with contemporary ethnic borders between Poland and Ger-many, and following the borders between Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, andSouth Slavs is factually the border between Eastern and Western Europe,

which was established as the main division of two economically and sociallydifferent spaces from the time of the second serfdom in the XVIth century.It appears that Marx and Engels added apolitical and developmental justificationto a developmental pattern that had already taken place in Europe.12 Thussupporting the already existing dividing line with their own taxonomy ofnations they in fact created a typology of developmental patterns for Europeannations which, until the end of the Second Internationale, served as a

prevailing model of political development for the European Left. Thisdividing line continues to surface as inalterable reality. Even the mostsuperfluous glimpse of this dichotomy could reveal that its relevance is notdiminishing. On the contrary, somehow it continues taking on various labels(even walls), to shape modern European history into two antagonized worlds.

aCEEOL NL Germany


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Praxis International 81

Along this line, confined now to their legitimate borders, the lives ofnational groups are still negotiated. From Poland to Bulgaria, after the Second

World War, having ceased to bargain over physical spaces by military forces,

Eastern and Western negotiators negotiate over areas of influence. With twoexceptions,13 Czechoslovakia and Eastern European countries are still negoti-able commodities among the superpowers.

At this level of analysis Marxs and Engelss dichotomy does not appear tobe wrong. We can manipulate the labels of historic or non-historicnations by giving them for instance the status of indicators of socialdevelopment or of degree of conflict or consensus within these nations. Still,the overall picture would retain its basic contours from the time it was drawn acentury and a half ago. Therefore, we could conclude that however ridiculousat first sight, whether this dichotomization is judged a failure or not, it is moreor less a matter of ones taste for facts.

Where are we to search, then, for the failure of historical materialism toconceptualize the nation? The answer could be there is no failure, becausehistorical materialism has had no conceptual room for a theory of the nation.

Within this scheme, both orthodox and neo-Marxists could not reach farbeyond the functional statement that the nation is an historical phenomenonthat appeared on the contemporary historical stage together with an indus-trialized class society which is capitalism.14 Without going further into thepossibility of historical materialism to provide the necessary schemata for a

theory of nationalism, I would only concede to the assertion of Gerald Cohen:in assigning explanatory primacy to productive forces Marxist theory of historybecomes a coherent story. Perhaps history is not really coherent, but Marxthought it was, and he said the development of material power made it to.15

For the neo-Marxist sociology of nations and nationalism this statement couldhave a double message. First, do not search for the possibilities of a theory ofthe nation within the existing primacy scheme of historical materialism,implying that there is still lofty space in the superstructure for ideologies,symbolic universes and human agencies. Second, there is no need to lean onthe benefit of the bias and wait for the next interpretation of the basic

Marxist scheme to provide us with a new, clarified discourse within thesecurity of that which is known. The chances of such a coupure to appearsoon are slight.

What lies ahead of us is to move sociology out of the fetters, as Marxwould put it, of the dominating scheme, to preserve its structure and changeits content, thus, if nothing else, to acquire an altered model of nations inhistory.16 This is what some historians and sociologists are already doing.17

Only if historical materialism is regarded as embodying the more abstractelements of a theory of human Praxis, snippets of which can be gleamedfrom the diversity of Marxs writings, does it remain an indispensable

contribution to social theory today.18 This direction could be pursued if wekeep in mind that it is still necessary to take into account the analytical powerof finer distinctions of production relations proper, of different strictlymaterial conditions in different European regions: if the problem cannot besolved that way, then so much the worse for historical materialism, not for the


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claim that historical materialism distinguishes between base and superstruc-ture.19

(1) A Case Study: Positional-historical ideology of the nation

The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether it is possible to determinethe generation and articulation of a particular national ideology.

The elaboration presented here assumes: (a) general definition of nation-alism as the existence of symbols and beliefs, everyday practicalconsciousness, ideologies which are propagated by elite groups and held bymany of the members of regional, ethnic and linguistic categories of popul-ation, which imply a communality among them and at the same time, aboundaries-defining processes against others;20 (b) that nationalism is bothan inclusive and a positional-historical ideology, in the latter form constitutingthe position within an international system; (c) that the main accent of a givennationalist ideology may lie on an inward or outward oriented differenti-ation of communality, and (d) that there is no single criterion which forms thefocus of communality.

The topos of our analysis are national ideologies of the two Yugoslavnations without history, the Slovenes and the Croats. The time of formationof these ideologies is of particular importance here; we decided to look into theformation of their national ideological universes in a period between 1850 and

1940. At the beginning of this period these nations entered the Europeanpolitical scene: at its end, before the Second World War, the new powercontainer entered into the formation of these universes. This was theCommunist Party of Yugoslavia; it organized national ideologies in quite aspecific manner which will not be dealt with centrally in this paper.21

During the period of formation of national ideologies (18501940) bothprocesses, that of inclusive and of positional-historical definition of the nation

were going on, and, in fact, were overlapping.The importance of this formative period was confirmed in findings of

empirical research on national ideologies in Slovenia.22 It was found that (1)

these processes of positioning the nation within the European and Yugoslavspace are ongoing, and (2) that the basic ontological dimensions of positioningare more or less similar to those from the previous century.

Among both elites and ordinary subjects, in both political decision-making processes and everyday practical consciousness perceptions of thenations historical position operate: being small, numberless; being without a

viable state system throughout a history; being threatened by the environ-ment, either Balkans or European; being, even, without indigeneous Slovene(Croat) bourgeoisie and, therefore, without an experience of political strugglefor independence. It is as if the negative, oppressive European heritage of the

nation without history, and therefore of the nation without a future, still hasa certain impact on the ideologies of the nation-formation. Hence, it becamerather important to investigate the period of these nations early formation inthe first decades of this century. Particular attention, we decided, should bepaid to these ideologies which were of decisive significance in perceiving and


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explaining this European heritage of doomed, peripheral nation(s).Therefore, works of some prominent writers and public figures will bepresented here: Miroslav Krlea, Ivan Cankar, Edvard Kocbek, Edvard

Kardelj were among those who confronted the issue of a European space; theytried to delineate its role in Slovene and Croatian nation formation and,combining the procedure of historical positioning of the nation within theEuropean as well as Yugoslav space, they tried to define the inclusive andexclusive social spaces of each nation.

They all tried to answer basic questions: What exists who are we inrelation to this European world; who are we as national and political subjects;

what patterned our ambitions, hopes, fears; how was Europe, imposing itsHerrenmoral on us, successful in subjecting us and thus forming a specificSklavenmoral?

Our history, wrote the Sloven writer Kocbek, does not reveal even themost mediocre passion; it is not even capable of defining its own mission in the

world; nor does it rest on a major religion or a common temperament. Evenour land appears convex rather than concave, it has no true fulcrum as either ageographic or a moral center. Therefore we have no centripetal thinkers, nofigures, who crystallize our fate, no people convinced of their originality. In theentire course of our history, we have known only apostolic leaders anduniversal ideas which the people scattered more than gathered together; eventoday we beget agitators, travelling salesman, polemicists. We have never

treated our national bordersas a scale, as a link, as a measure of things, or as aninspiration; we have rather experienced them as temptation, timidity orsmuggling. The nostalgia of the Slovenes outside their homeland is sheersentimentality, a longing for the polka and strudel, not a responsibility for the

heritagewhich, for instance, for the Irish and Basques is almost mystical.23

To mutter something about Europe, about the European way of thought,about the European duties of citizens toward themselves. What Europe? I

would like just once to hear what that Europe is in reality? Where is thatEurope situated? What does that Europe want? How have I offended thatEurope? When? Why?24

For Kocbek, it is not even legitimate to ask about national being thereis no element which could define national space, there is not even thecapability and motive to do it. According to him, history has no commonground for Slovene people; there was no passion, nor religion; land isphysically fugitive, so are thinkers; leaders are universally oriented, mereagitators, predestined to be too universal to be nationally, and too national to beuniversally accepted; borders are for smugglers, heritage for emigrants.

Krlea and Cankar, on the other hand, faced the negative image Europeimposed on the Slavs, while trying to define the inner national and class spacein relation to Europe. Doing so, both were advocating the only plausible

solution of emancipation of South-Slavs, through communality within thefederal Yugoslav state.

The most influential writer and polemicist in the thirties, Krlea notonly questioned Europe and the subjection of South Slavs to its particularpatterning; questioning the national and social space of Slavs Krlea provided


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a certain logic of change of the prevailing Sklavenmoral of the nationalideologies among Slovenes and Croats.

(2) Sleeping vagabonds and the European prince

Cabals; freebooters; petty squabblers; ignorant fanatics; bloody rottentyrants in wholesale and retail; dying agricultural race; Vlkerabflle;butchers (of Europe); and outlaws of Europe.25

These words greeted the appearance of Slovenes and Croats on theEuropean historical stage. At the time this might not have been an ideology,but it certainly became one later, particularly during the eventful history ofthe European workers movement. The facts behind these reports werevexatious as well. Slovene, Croatian and Serbian soldiers, together withRussian troops, were used by the Monarchy to overthrow the revolutionaryHungarian government and to help fight against uprisings of workers inVienna during 1848 and 1849. In Vienna, Karl Marx wrote in November1848, Croat freedom and order has conquered and the subjects celebrated the

victory with arson, rape, pillage, with nameless atrocities. The victory ofkroatischen Ordnung und Freiheit in Vienna was conditioned by the victoryof the honetten Republic in Paris ... In both, the armed Lumpenproletariat

were against the working and thinking proletariat.26 Croats, together withCzechs, Slovenes, and similar riff-rarr strangled German freedom, while the

Tsar was omnipresent in Europe.27

Where, asked Engels, was the history of the Slovenes? of Croats? of Czechs?Since the eleventh century, he argued, the South Slavs had lost all appearan-ces of political independence ... Out of these remnants, he asked, one wouldhave wanted to assemble a strong, independent, viable nation?

According to Engels, their languages were almost extinct, confined to thecommunication of groups of village people. In towns, the indigeneous groupshad everywhere been replaced by German, Hungarian, and Italian bour-geoisie. Therefore, the projected South Slav empire would not be unfied buttorn apart into fragments of national groups and delivered into the hands of

the Italian bourgeoisie of Trieste and Fiume, and the German bourgeoisie ofLaibach and Agram.28 Furthermore, thought Engels, these people could nothave been united because of the ancient hatred among Austrian and TurkishSlavs. . . . these people knew each other for centuries as pickpockets andbandits, . . . hated each other in spite of the fact that all were related.29

Krlea reacted in his own way to such a gloomy interpellation of SouthSlavs. He clearly distinguishes among the bearers of the ideologies of thistime. His subjects are Peasants, Radicals, Bourgeoisie, whose space, physicaland mental, is defined by remote ideas of what Europe was, whose symbolicspace is myth, ritual, witchcraft, fairies. Thus, the new Yugoslav state,

established 1918, was born when everything was suffocated in its own dirt,all our ideas were adjusted to the petit-bourgeois realities . . . everything

would remain unchanged, as it was in the past, with the sole difference that,instead of the Counts Khuen or Tisza or Franz Josef I, some new faces wouldrule . . . 30


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Subjects? These beggars, intellectual good-for-nothings, bluebloodedfools, scribblers abounding in unhealthy ambitions . . . insignificant mer-chants dealing in horseshoes and patent nails, stout chief clerks, jewelers,

shoedealers, freethinkers, bankrupt bankers, state finance administrators,smugglers, descendants of umbrella manufacturers, forgers of workersinsurance certificates, retired military court judges . . . 31

To the thus described cluster of the bourgeoisie, which was the supposedbearer of the newly formed national ideological and economical space, Krleaadded The People signs attributed to the peasant-worker, assigning himthe position in the historical worlds around him. He, Pannonian coachman,together with million such coachmen, whose way of thinking had certainlynot changed for the last two thousand years, who are livestock breeders,

whose worlds are separated by incomprehensibly wide gulfs from Europe.They live in a world without duration in time, without any inner drivingmotive, truly purposeless. Existence amidst objects and events, they areconfused and stick to concrete facts, but even that only partially . . . [Thiscoachman] was neither a Catholic nor a supporter of the Emperor, not aRussian prisoner of war. He was neither a patriot, nor a citizen; he believedneither in God nor in the Church; he served with Hungarian regiments allover the world . . . in Galicia, in Russia, he had been at Tehran and Tiflis, at

Tashkent . . . he fought against those red Moscovites . . . 32

Such a subject is a part of public opinion, influenced by babblings of former

radical intellectuals, by their lectures, talks about the cooperative movement,the founding of consumer unions, the parties, the masses, the universalsuffrage, the elections, the mandates . . . 33

(3) Nation as non-position in history

According to the accounts of Kocbek and Krlea, inner national space is anundifferentiated dwelling of non-subjects; their universe is covered, struc-tured by the types of interpellations that constitute main forms ofsubjectivity existential, historical, positional; but at the same time, they do

not respond to the interpellations other than in a negative way, bywithdrawing from or destroying the social worlds.

The relation of Krleas individual/subject toward the Prince is a relationof non-position; his subjects are not reflecting upon their ideological interpel-lations. They, together with other coachmen, live in the world withoutduration, amidst objects and events . . . If there is a stronger existentialcomponent, it is not reducible to revolution or class consciousness; it appears,as Kocbek shows, as deference, as ideology of being small, without majorideas or religion, without leaders . . .

Keeping in mind both the negative European interpellation of the South

Slavs and their own evaluation of their position in European worlds, we couldargue that both positions disclose a high degree of congruence. The differencebetween them lies probably in their respective ideological universes. Europespositioning of the South Slavs out of modern history has probably had aspecial function in the universalisation of modern European ideologies. The


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South Slavs positioned themselves within European history, but on theside as Hegel would say of the labour of the negative. Their historicalpositioning within European history was settled, in their interrelation,

through subjection and by rendering work of self-interrogation and self-interpretation.

This wrenching work of negative and the destructive was nevertheless theprocess of self-understanding, which succeeded in defining the ideologicaluniverses of Slovene and Croat nations as a non-position in history

At this point, we should consider the essential failure of historicalmaterialism in dealing with the ideologies of nation(alism); the primacyscheme does not include the labour of the negative in its explanatoryapparatuses on ideology. It could not conceive of the non-position in history asposition as well. What should be explained is the positioning process assuch, its internal dynamics, its own centers, fulcrums of the nationalsocial world. The primacy scheme could not grasp the positioning-in-history process as a particular organization of human subjectivity.

The question What is Europe to me? What am I to Europe? triggeredsubsequent labour on defining what could be communality among SouthSlavs.

Krlea, Cankar, Kardelj, Josip, Broz, each started to search for their ownsolution, sharing the common ground in defining Yugoslav communality asessential in overcoming the non-position in history.

Thus the Yugoslav case could be a model in showing how the labour of thenegative helped constitue the actual processes of ideological mobilization inovercoming non-position in history. Previously established delimitationsmade it possible for the Partys solution of the national question inYugoslavia to be successfully implemented as a main mobilizational forceduring the liberation war. The works on delimitations, on depictingsubjects enabled the Partys theorecticians and organizers to set a commonagenda for the masses, to interpellate them as subjects in making their ownnational histories. It allowed them to sum up the dominant aspects of thenational crises during the war identifying the crucial target as first, national,

and second, as class-social and to define what could be achieved in solvingthe national problems in Yugoslavia (federal state as a goal). The Partysucceeded in mobilizing nations, because it efficiently fused and condensedseveral ideological national discourses into a single major threat an exis-tential one. Elements of the class ideology as in all successful revolutions,have been fused and sometimes hidden behind national types of ideologicalmobilization.

(4) Conclusion

We return now to the main question of this paper, namely, from whatstandpoints might neo-Marxist sociology approach the ideological universe ofnations?a) it seems that the ideological universe of nations must be scrutinized as a

dynamic element of the formation of a particular social space; which


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means to analyze the power of (national) ideology in the processes of socialchange;

b) these processes should be dealt with as a particularity of defined social

spaces; it is not conceivable, so far, to install any universal laws inaddressing national(isms). Let us mention the most popular failure onthis account Marxs prediction about the future of Czechoslovakia;

c) the ideology of (national) universe should be approached as an ongoingprocess of interpellation, in which two opposed subjects are involved: thesubject of history and the Prince. We would agree with the originator ofthis idea, G. Therborn, that ideologies not only subject people, they alsospeak to them and qualify them for conscious social action.

I would like to conclude by paying tribute to the Yugoslav writers whoseworks I used for this analysis. As was noted, the work of Krlea, Kocbek,Cankar, preceded that of the normative paradigm developed later on byYugoslav communists. Nevertheless, the importance of their work was notconsumed by the actual success of the Partys fusing discourses on thenational question. The relevance of their works for the recent development ofnational ideologies in Yugoslavia could be epitomized by Krleas revelationson how ideologies of nation(alism) are generated and articulated, and abouttheir future. In his completed opus he clearly stated that nationalism known inthe Balkans is a conventional, mythical type of consciousness, which does nothave the space for the production of the surplus of meaning.

Ideologies of nation(alism) often have ambitions to confine subjects withinthe borders of pre-given worlds; within such borders, humans could produceonly the surplus of non-meaning. If, and only if, the ideology of nation-(alism) is capable of overcoming such borders, if it is capable of producing asurplus of meaning over the pre-given worlds, it could exist also as human.

Borders, which Krlea had in mind, are not only physical, these bordersare also unquestioned interpellations. Being Slovene, being Croat,being national proletarian . . . are nationally defined positions in history

which, according to Krlea, should be continually questioned on the groundof the eternal heresies of self-determination.

NOTES

1. Term used by Goran Therborn, for somewhat different purpose; here it is used to describe a

community of sociologists and historians who, as a common social-philosophy, share the need to

re-think historical materialism as a critique of contemporary sociology. See: Goran Therborn, Science,

Class and Society (Verso/NLB: London, 1980).

2. G. Therborn, op.cit. p. 40.

3. Perry Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1984),p. 19.

4. Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. 1 (University of CaliforniaPress: Berekeley, 1981), p. 11, 13.5. Horace B. Davis,Nationalism and Socialism(Monthly Review Press: London/NY, 1967), p. 112 and

passim.

6. Tom Nairn, The modern Janus, in: The break up of Britain (NLRB: London/NY, 1977), p. 329.7. A similar standpoint was expressed by Theodor Shanin in his paper presented recently to Wilson


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Centers colloquium: Natsional nost: the case of the missing term and of alternative approaches, 1984,MS.

8. See, for example, recent issues of Canadian Review of Studies of Nationalism, and particularlyproblems of delimitations of ethnic, kinship and national consciousness as evolutionary sequences inthe development of collective identity, problems raised in the disputes over the notion of nation,between L. Snyder and K. Symmons-Symonolevicz. Cf. CRSN, Vol. X, No. 2, Fall 1983

9. According to Alexander Koyr, distinction was first made by the Russian writer Polevoi (1857), whoattempted to offer a justification in the Slavophile spirit for the destiny of Russia; see: AlexanderKoyr, La philosophie et le probleme national en Russie au debut du XIX siecle (Gallimard: Paris, 1976),quoted by Samir Amin, Class and nation(Monthly Review Press: London, 1980); The distinction wasfurther used by: G. W. F. Hegel, Encyklopdie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, in Grundrisse, andalso in: Vorlesungen ber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Smtliche Werke (Froman: Stuttgart, 1949),paragraph 549, p. 497.

The term was also used by: Karl Kautsky, Die Befreiung der Nationen, Die Neue Zeit, Vol. 2, No. 8,May 1917, pp. 184-185; F. Engels, K. Marx, Neue Rheinische Zeitung, (N. Rh. Ztg.), Editorials,November 1848February 1849, Nos 137, 184, 194, 222, 223; Karl Marx, Revolution andCounter-revolution in Europe; Germany, dispatches in: New York Daily Tribune (NYDT), FebruaryMay 1852; See also: Charles Herod, The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought (M. Nijhoff: TheHague, 1976), p. 41.

10. F. Engels, N.Rh.Ztg, FebruaryMarch 1849.11. F. Engels, Ibid.12. The impact of such a development in Europe is analyzed also by: Samir Amin., op. cit.; Perry

Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (NLB/ Verso: London, 1979); Robert Brenner, AgrarianClass Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe, Past and Present, No. 70, 1976;Brenner debate; A Symposium on Development in Pre-industrial Europe, Past and Present, Nos. 7880,and 85, 1978-1979; Anthony Giddens, op.cit., p. 187; Ivan T. Berend and Gyrgy Ranki, Economicdevelopment in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries (Columbia University Press:

NY/London, 1974).13. Albania and Yugoslavia.14. A. Giddens, op. cit., p. 182.15. Gerald Cohen, Karl Marxs Theory of History; A Defense (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1978), p. 150.16. also in A. Giddens, op. cit., pp. 190-193.17. see, for instance: P. Anderson, op. cit.; A. Giddens, op. cit.; G. Cohen, op. cit.; G. Therborn. op. cit.;

and Goran Therborn, The Ideology of Power and Power of Ideology (Verso and NLB: London, 1982),2nd printing; Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend (Verso and NLB:London, 1983); Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (Columbia Press: NY, 1982).

18. A. Giddens, op. cit., p. 2.19. G. Cohen, op. cit., p. 248.20. A. Giddens, op. cit., p. 190.

21. Edvard Kardelj, The National Question in Yugoslavia and the Revolution, STP, Belgrade, Vol. XIX,No. 45,1979; Also in: Josip Broz Tito, The National Question (STP: Belgrade, 1983); Paul Schoup,Communism and the Yugoslav National Question(Columbia University Press: NY, 1968); Steven Burg,Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia (Princeton University Press, 1983); Joseph Rotschild,East-Central Europe between the Two World Wars, (University of Washington Press, 1974), pp.201280.

22. Project: The Changing Identity of a Small Nation within the Multinational Socialist State, (Progressreports), Institute for Sociology University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana 1980, 1981, 1982.

23. Edvard Kocbek, Krogi navznoter (Inward circles) (Slovenska Matica: Ljubljana, 1977), p. 18.24. Miroslav Krlea, On the Edge of Reason (Vanguard Press, NY, 1976).25. Descriptions given by Karl Marx, Die Revolutionre Bewegung, N.Rh. Ztg., Nos 137, 184, 1848;

Karl Marx, Revolution and Counter-revolution in Europe, New York Daily Tribune, April 24, 1852, p.6; Congress discussed Non-intervention resolution, Editorial, New York Daily Tribune, February 17,

1852.

26. K Marx, N.Rh.Ztg., No. 137, 1848.

27. K Marx, N.Rh.Ztg., No. 184, January 1849.

28. F. Engels, Der Panslavismus, N.Rh.Ztg., No. 223, February 1849.


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29. F. Engels, ibid.

30. M. Krlea, On the Edge of Reason, p. 75.

31. M. Krlea, op.cit., pp. 43 and 49.

32. Miroslav Krlea, The Return of Philip Latinowicz (Vanguard Press: NY, 1969), pp. 5255.33. M. Krlea, On the Edge of Reason, p. 74.

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1.5 - Meznaric, Silva - A Neo-marxist Approach to the Sociology of Nationalism. Doomed Nationas and Doomed Schemes (en)