To: General Groves.

SUbJ: History Psychological Warfare, Manhattan ProJect.

1. At the request of Mrs. O'Leary, information on subject

phase of Manhattan Project's history is herewith submitted.

Since the i'ormat of the history is unknown to the undersigned,

this information is being submitted informally for rewrite

into the proper form. Delay in submitting this was due to the

necessity of having to send to New Jersey for the enclosed

leaflets, which unfortunately are no longer available in the

number requested.

2 . By a classified cable, General Arnold to General Spaatz,

information copy to General Farrell at Tinian dated 7 August,

1945, (copy available in Manhattan records) General Farrell

was charged with the implementation of a program of psycho­

logical warfare against the Japanese in connection with the

new weapon . The Army Air Forces was instructed to lend all

assistance. An informational copy was sent to CINCPAC .

3. General Farrell received the cable as he was boarding a

C-54 Green Hornet at Tinian with a group including Rear Admiral

Purnell, Captain Parsons, Colonel Tibbetts and others. Purpose

of the trip was to report to Admiral Nimitz on the Hiroshima

strike. l

4. General Farrell enlisted the aid of the Advanced Unit of

CIncPac Psychological Warfare which was in the dIrect charge

of Lieutenant Robert Morris, USNR. Liaison was prompt1l

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raoilitate details. At Saipan, Mr. Richard Harris who wae in

oharge or Olil's Radio Saipan and the printing press at Saipan,

met with Lt. Morris and General Farrell's representative. Pro­

duotion potentials were estimated and the basic plans, subject

to General Farrell's approval and determined by the media at

hand, were outlined. Inventory of T-3 leaflet bombs and paper

available was accomplished. Decision was made to use half-size

leaflets in order to double distribution. A second conference

followed with Lt. Col. Crocker Snow, A-2 of the 73rd Wing,

based at Saipan which had had in addition to its combat schedule

the function of leaflet distribution over Japan. At that time

the distribution program was formulated. The decision was made,

subject to General Farrell's approval, to attempt distribution

of 6,000,000 leaflets. The question of selecting targets was a

very real problem whi ch demanded lengthy analysis of enelllJ' popu­

lation concentrations. The arbitrary conclusion called for 60

per cent saturation of enemy cities with a population exceeding

100,000. These totaled 47.

5. Problem of what to tell the enemy was the next order of

business. Lt. Morris drew up a draft with an assistant, Ensign

Sheehan. This entire program was of top priority and the time

element was the dominating factor. Therefore, work on the pro­

ject, which actively began on the evening of the 7th of August,

progressed straight through the night. In addition to the above,

with Brigadier General O'Donnell'. there was a aidnight conference

operation people. General O'Donnell was 1n command of the 7~

wine. This conference developed a certain reluctance te ~

Single 8-28's over the Empine, reluotance arising

that enemy opposition to single flights was expected to be in­

oreased as the result of the total damage to Hiroshima by one

airp~ane. At that time knowledge of the two accompanying obser­

Ver B-~9's was extremely limited flS was all knowledge of the

combllt use of the new weapon except for the barest details. As

a Sidelight, intense interest was encountered by the few Manhattan

personnel in the theater. In the course of setting up the psycho­

logical plan this was at times a positive obstruction.

6. On the morning of 8 August, after a flight from Saipan at

dawn, the entire plan was presented to General Farrell at Tinian

who edited the copy of the proposed message to the enemy and

promptly approved it . The text was immediately flown to Guam

where it received the Army Air Forces and Navy approval, required

by General LeMay and by Admiral Nimitz. By interisland telephone

from Guam to Saipan, a difficult method of communciation at that

time, Radio saipan was notified to implement the radio aspects

of the plan which called for broadcast of the message to the

enemy every fifteen minutes. No record of the actual time this

began is available here. It is respectfully suggested, however,

that this point of information plus the basic documentation of

the entire psychological warfare plan is available in Manhattan

Project records in the form of several progress cables and a

final report cabled by General Farrell to General Groves.

7. Three Japanese officers in the prisoners/stookade at Guam

.ere detailed to tho task of making the message oalligraphic

(clear copy attachedY with Japanese tran8lat1on~. As a re.ult

the Japanese captives who held the equivalent

captaIn and first lieutenants, it was decided to attempt

• preaentation new to psychological warfare: an objective,

f'actual reportorial piece of the f ate of Hiroshima with a photo-

graph of the bomb burst. Format of an existing psychological

warfare Japanese language newspaper, a weekly, was utilized.

(Copy attached).

8. Two problems were met and solved. By midnight flight from

SBipan to CINCPAC at Guam, priority unloading of T-3 leaflet

bombs which ran low was effected. Russia's entry caused a second

leaflet edition, combining the atomic bomb use with the Russian

move . Unfortunately, clear text for this second piece is not

available.

9 . Sequels to the atomic psychological warfare were the fact

that distribution was not coordinated with the Nagasaki strike

causing Nagasaki to receive its quota of leaflets the day after

it was hit and a subsequent analysis of effectiveness of total

Japanese psychological warfare reportedly placed this campaign

second only to the Army Air Forces technique of naming targets

before strikes were accomplished. (Source unknown).

10. The above includes basic details, submitted by the under­

signed as material for ~anhattan Project's history. Continued

cooperation on this subject, which can be better told by General

Farrell, is assured.

Re ectfully,

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Amdrica asks that you take jmmediate heed cf what we say on this

leaflet.

We are in possession of the most destructive explosive eVer devised

by man. A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the

equivalent in e>""P1osi.re pmofer to '''l".a~ 20~O of our giant B-29' s can carry

on a single mission. 'l'his awful faC":t ~s cne for you to ponder and we

solemnly assure you it is grimly acc~rat~ .

We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland. If you

still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when

just one atomic bomb fell on that city.

Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by

which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you no .. petition

the ilnperor to end the war. Our President has outlined for you the

thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender: We urge that you accept

these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and

peace-loving Japan.

You should take steps now to cease military resist~~ce. Otherwise,

we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons

to promptly ahd forcefully end the war.