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' CONCORDE •  Flight International ///fi///////////////////////Av/£W///W//W7l CONCORDE atmosphere  Oi Its concentration at Concorde cruising heights is up to 4 parts per million compared with .02 parts at sea level. Above 0.3 parts the odour (an electrical smell) becomes objectionable and causes a headache and sore throat; above 1.5 parts it becomes toxic. Fortunately, ozone is very unstable chemically and is readily converted to oxygen by heat. The source of the Concorde's cabin air are the engine compressors, off which air is tapped at a temperature of about 500° C. At this temperature ozone decomposition is almost instantaneous; any residual ozone above 0.2 parts will be removed by a catalytic filter. COS T ND ECONOM ICS The technology in the Concorde is more advanced than that in any previous civil aircraft, including the Comet. There are more unknowns, and inevitably the cost is high. The latest (mid-February 1969) estimate including production tooling is not far short of £1,000 million, broken down as follows: — Research, development, design, construction and 4,000hr flight-testing of six aircraft (two prototypes, two pre- production aircraft, and two production aircraft), two structural test specimens, and 44 Olympus flight engines plus 15 bench engines £570 millionf General machine tools for production, to be rented to the firms by the Government in the case of Br ita in ... . £60 million Cost of work done at British and French Government establishments reckoned to be accountable to the Con corde programme (e.g.. Olympus Vulcan. Mirage IV. BAC-221.  HP.115, and structural testing) £60 million Production-financing loan £250 million £940 million Thus the total amount at risk before production materials and labour will, assuming a 3 per cent inflation per year, reach well over £1,000 million by the time the Concorde is certificated. Off-setting this is the estimated revenue from sales of 250 aircraft and spares between 1970 and 1980 of £2,500 million—mostly foreign exchange—and the value to European technology as a whole of Concorde advanced engineering and technical collaboration. Certification now appears likely in the first quarter of 1973, though provisionally aircraft will be in the hands of the air lines for l,500hr of route-proving— which is required before certification—by the beginning of 1972. Purchase price will be about £8 million (S19.4 million) for a fully equipped aircraft. Operating cost per seat-mile will be about 25 per cent above that of the cheapest contemporary subsonic transport, the Boeing 747. The -airlines used to say that supersonic seat-mile costs must be no higher than the best contemporary subsonic costs; and the makers said they would be happy to oblige. But the argument now is what the supersonic surcharge should be—to cover the higher operating cost, and to protect the airlines' investment in subsonic jets. It will obviously have to be at least 25 per cent. If it is to be more than this, pricing judgments will have to be made about the market value of the Concorde's speed and the com- t Including the cost of special-to-C oncorde tooling; £80 million for post-certification of the definitive 25,00001b-payload aircraft in 1973; plus a £50 million contingencies allowance (now spent). Not included is the cost of further modifications to improve pay- load—first officially mentioned but not disclosed in January 1969. t  Of which £50 million is to be raised by the companies but- guaranteed by the Governments. THRUST REVERSAL The powerplant, comprising  the intake engine and  exhaust assemb ly is of complex configuration and f unction in order to cope with the wide variety of flight conditions. Variable geome try was chosen in preference to the simpler long-duct but theoreti cally less efficient arrangement of the Soviet Tu-144 parative market value of the slower but wider-cabin subsonic jets.  To quote from  Flight  for November 28, 1968: Passengers will always pay more for less time travelling. Will they spend 25 per cent more for, say, halved time between London and New York? Today's first-class passengers already pay 40 per cent more for decent seating and cabin service. So they will certainly pay at least that much more for Concorde travel. At first, therefore, the Concorde will be exclusively first-class, and the surcharge could be as high as 50 per cent. Since it will make a profit, or so the makers claim, half full at present economy fares—and putting on a bit of a factor for the natural exuberance of all aircraft salesmen—it is clear that a 50 per cent Concorde surcharge will make a fortune. Everyone should be happy with a surcharge of that size. It will protect investment in wide-bodied subsonics, which will handle the mass trade, while the supersonics will handle the first-class market. A two-speed fare structure will have been established. But the Concorde have-nots may react with really spacious sub sonic saloon travel: and as more and more Concorde capacity comes on the market the less it will be satisfied with rich people. Pressures for a lower supersonic surcharge will develop: and this will be resisted by Concorde have-not airlines, because it will attract their economy-class business. Passengers may not like the people-packed eight-abreast and even ten-abreast aircraft. They want wide seats, not wide cabins. Many people thought that the Concorde's cabin would be unaccept- ably small after those of the 707 and 747. Anyone who has been in the wide-body mock-ups may wonder whether the small cabin of the Concorde will not actually be a plus—especially if the seats are wide. The Concorde may well attract existing economy class passengers who don't like herd-class travel. And it will tap new markets which are always opened up by shorter journey times. It is probably fair to say that the engineering problems involved in making an airliner that will fly at supersonic speed, that will meet the safety and airworthiness standards required for the public transport of old ladies and infants rather than fit young men in bonedomes and pressure suits, that will last a guaranteed 45,000 hours (or 20 times the life of a combat supersonic aircraft), and that will make a profit for its operators, presents engineering problems which make a supersonic airliner as technologically challenging as putting a man on the Moon, and perhaps a little more useful.

1969 - 0417

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' CONCORDE •  Flight International

///fi///////////////////////Av/£W///W//W7l

C O N C O R D E

a t m o s p h e r e   Oi I t s concent ra t ion a t Concorde cru is ing he ights

is up to 4 parts per mill ion compared with .02 parts at sea

leve l. Abo ve 0.3 par t s the odou r (an e lec t r ica l smel l ) becomes

objec t ionable and causes a headache and sore throa t ; above

1.5 parts i t becomes toxic.

Fortunately, ozone is very unstable chemically and is readily

conver ted to oxygen by hea t . The source of the Concorde ' s

cabin air are the engine compressors, off which air is tapped

at a temper a ture of abo ut 500° C. At th is tempe ra ture ozone

decompo si t ion i s a lmost ins tan ta neous ; any residual ozon e

above 0.2 parts will be removed by a catalytic f i l ter .

C O S T N D E C O N O M I C S

Th e technology in the Con corde i s mor e advanced than tha t

in any previous civil aircraft , including the Comet. There are

more unknowns, and inevi tab ly the cos t i s h igh . The la tes t

(mid-F ebruary 1969) es t imate inc luding product ion tool ing i s

not fa r shor t of £1 ,000 mi l l ion , broken down as fo l low s: —

Research, development, design, construction and 4,000hr

flight-testing of six aircraft (two prototypes, two pre-

production aircraft, and two production aircraft), two

structural test specimens, and 44 Olympus flight engines

plus 15 bench engines £570 m il l io nf

General machine tools for production, to be rented to

the firms by the Governm ent in the case of Br ita in. .. .£60 million

Cost of work done at British and French Government

establishments reckoned to be accountable to the Con

corde programme (e.g.. Olympus Vulcan. Mirage IV.

BAC-221.  HP.115, and structural testing) £60 million

Produc t ion-f inanc ing loan £250 mi l l i o n

£940 mi l l ion

Thus the to ta l amount a t r i sk before product ion mater ia ls

and labour will , assuming a 3 per cent inflation per year,

reach well over £1,000 mill ion by the t ime the Concorde is

certif icated. Off-sett ing this is the estim ated rev enue from

sales of 250 aircraft and spar es betw een 1970 and 1980 of

£2 ,500 mi l l ion—most ly fore ign exchange—and the va lue to

European technology as a whole of Concorde advanced

engineer ing and technica l co l labora t ion .

Certif ication now appears l ikely in the first quarter of 1973,

though provis ional ly a i rc raf t wi l l be in the hands of the a i r

l ines for l ,500hr of route-proving— which i s requi red before

certif ication—by the beginning of 1972.

Purchase price will be about £8 mill ion (S19.4 mill ion) for

a fully equipped aircraft . Operating cost per seat-mile will be

about 25 per cent above tha t of the cheapes t contemporary

subson ic tr ansp ort , the B oeing 747. The -airl ines used to say

tha t supersonic sea t -mi le cos ts must be no h igher than the

bes t contemporary subsonic cos ts ; and the makers sa id they

would be happy to obl ige . But the a rgument now is what the

supersonic surcharge should be—to cover the h igher opera t ing

cost, and to protect the airl ines ' investment in subsonic jets .

I t will obviously have to be at least 25 per cent. If i t is to

be more than th is , p r ic ing judgments wi l l have to be made

about the market va lue of the Concorde ' s speed and the com-

t Including the cost of special-to-C oncorde tooling ; £80 million

for post-c ertifica tion of the definitive 25,00001b-payload aircraft

in 1973; plus a £50 million contingencies allowance (now spent).

Not included is the cost of further modifications to improve pay-

load—first officially mentioned but not disclosed in January 1969.

t  Of which £50 million is to be raised by the co mpanies bu t-

guaranteed by the Governments.

THRUST REVERSAL

The powerplant, comprising   the intake engine and  exhaust

assemb ly is of complex configuration and function in order to

cope with the wide variety of flight co nditions. Variable geome try

was chosen in preference to the simpler long-duct but theoreti

cally less efficient arrangeme nt of the Soviet Tu-144

para t ive market va lue of the s lower but wider-cabin subsonic

jets.

  To quote f rom  Flight  for November 28 , 1968:

Passengers will always pay more for less time travelling. Will

they spend 25 per cent more for, say, halved time between London

and New York? Today's first-class passengers already pay 40 per

cent more for decent seating and cabin service. So they will

certainly pay at least that much more for Concorde travel.

At first, therefore, the Concorde will be exclusively first-class,

and the surcharge could be as high as 50 per cent. Since it will

make a profit, or so the makers claim, half full at present economy

fares—and putting on a bit of a factor for the natural exuberance

of all aircraft salesmen—it is clear that a 50 per cent Concorde

surcharge will make a fortune.

Everyone should be happy with a surcharge of that size. It

will protect investment in wide-bodied subsonics, which will handle

the mass trade, while the supersonics will handle the first-class

market. A two-speed fare structure will have been established.

But the Concorde have-nots may react with really spacious sub

sonic saloon travel: and as more and more Concorde capacity

comes on the market the less it will be satisfied with rich people.

Pressures for a lower supersonic surcharge will develop: and this

will be resisted by Concorde have-not airlines, because it will

attract their economy-class business.

Passengers may not like the people-packed eight-abreast and

even ten-abreast aircraft. They want wide seats, not wide cabins.

Many people thought that the Concorde's cabin would be unaccept-

ably small after those of the 707 and 747. Anyone who has been

in the wide-body mock-ups may wonder whether the small cabin

of the Concorde will not actually be a plus—especially if the seats

are wide.

The Concorde may well attract existing economy class passengers

who don't like herd-class travel. And it will tap new markets which

are always opened up by shorter journey times.

It is pro bab ly fair to say that the engineer ing p robl em s

involved in making an airl iner that will f ly at supersonic

speed, that will meet the safety and airworthiness standards

required for the public transport of old ladies and infants

ra ther than f i t young men in bonedomes and pressure su i t s ,

tha t wi l l las t a guaranteed 45 ,000 hours (or 20 t imes the l i fe

of a combat supersonic aircraft) , and that will make a profit

for i t s opera tors , presents engineer ing problems which make

a supersonic a i r l iner as technologica l ly cha l lenging as put t ing

a man on the Moon, and perhaps a l i t t le more usefu l .

Page 2: 1969 - 0417