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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSBPP) Thesis Day Programs and Documents 2013-03 Manpower System Analysis Thesis Day Brief / Class of March 2013 Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/39528

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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSBPP) Thesis Day Programs and Documents

2013-03

Manpower System Analysis Thesis Day

Brief / Class of March 2013

Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/39528

Welcome Naval Postgraduate School

Thesis Day March 2013

1

U.S. Navy Officers’ Attitudes on

the Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t

Tell” (DADT)

LT Ryan Appleman

LTJG Pete McLaughlin

Advisors: Professor Mark Eitelberg

Professor Frank Barrett

2

Background

• Continuation of 5 previous NPS studies:

– 1993, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2010

• Literature Review:

– RAND Corporation reports, 1993 & 2010

– Comprehensive Review Working Group

report, Nov 2010

– Palm Center report, Sept 2012

– Psychological and sociological models of

acceptance 3

How have Navy officers’ attitudes on gays in

the military changed: - since 1993?

- since the repeal of DADT?

What are Navy officers’ impressions

regarding the effects of repeal on fleet

readiness?

Research Questions

4

Methodology

• Qualitative study:

• 59-question survey administered over a two-

week period

• Four focus-group interview sessions

Survey

Requests

Sent Out Respondents

Skipped

Questions Total

Response

Rate

573 334 24 358 62.5%

Total Collected Requested

Focus Group

Participants

Respondents 358 573 19

Completely

Filled Out

Surveys 334 334

Rate 93.3% 58.3% 5

Survey Demographics

Category Survey

Respondents

NPS Target

Population Category

Survey

Respondents

NPS Target

Population

Gender n=329 n=573 Pay Grade n=327

Male 85.4% 91.1%

O-1 2.4% 0.7%

n=281 n=522 n=8 n=4

Female 14.6% 8.9%

O-2 3.1% 5.1%

n=48 n=51 n=10 n=29

Race/Ethnicity n=330 O-3 55.7% 58.8%

n=182 n=337

Caucasian 77.9% 65.4%

O-4 28.4% 24.8%

n=257 n=375 n=93 n=142

African

American

3.9% 6.5% O-5

8.3% 8.0%

n=13 n=37 n=27 n=46

Hispanic 5.5% 5.1%

O-6 2.1% 1.2%

n=18 n=29 n=7 n=7

Asian/Pacific

Islander

3.9% 5.8% Enrollment n=329

n=13 n=33

Native

American

1.2% 1.4% Resident

62.6% 54.8%

n=4 n=8 n=206 n=314

Other 7.6% 15.9% Distance

Learning

31.6% 43.6%

n=25 n=91 n=104 n=250

Staff/Other 5.8% 1.6%

n=19 n=9

6

Data Picture

Data Analyzed Utilizing Four Methods:

1. Navy (NPS Survey) vs. Society (Gallup Polls)

2. Trend Analysis of Navy over Time

3. Demographic Breakdown

4. Focus-Group Analysis

7

Results

Navy officers vs. Society: Homosexuals in the

Military

Question 16. Gays and Lesbians should be allowed to serve openly in our

military. (2010-2012) [Homosexuals should not be restricted from serving

anywhere in the Navy (1994-2004)] (Percent who Strongly Agree or Agree)

Do you think Homosexuals should or should not be hired for each of the

following occupations…The Armed Forces? (Percent who agree they should

be allowed)

Year Navy Society

1992/1994 24.6% 57%

1996 35.8% 65%

1999 39.2% 70%

2004 49.7% 80%

2010 59.8% 76%

2012 73.4% N/A 8

Navy officers vs. Society: Same-Sex Marriage and

Benefits

Question 44. Same-sex spouses of homosexual service members should be

entitled to the same benefits provided to the spouses of heterosexual service

members? (2012) [If homosexuals were allowed to serve openly, their

dependents should be entitled the same benefits provided to dependents of

heterosexuals? (2004-2010)] (Percent who Strongly Agree or Agree)

Do you think there should or should not be health insurance and other

employee benefits for gay and lesbian domestic partners or spouses? (Percent

who believe there should be)

Year Navy Society

2004 69.2% N/A

2009/2010 76.5% 67%

2012 70.2% 77%

Results (cont’d)

9

Trend Analysis of Navy Officer Attitudes:

Policy

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

201220102004199919961994

Percent

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

201220102004199919961994

Percent

18. The current policy is good for

national defense.

33. On the whole, I like the current

policy better than the old policy.

Results (cont’d)

10

Trend Analysis of Navy Officer Attitudes:

Leadership

7. I would have no difficulty working for

a homosexual Commanding Officer.

21. A division officer’s sexual

preference has no effect on the

officer’s ability to lead.

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

201220102004199919961994

Percent

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

201220102004199919961994

Percent

Results (cont’d)

11

Trend Analysis of Navy Officer Attitudes:

Comfort and Habitability

3. I would prefer not to have

homosexuals in my command.

20. I feel uncomfortable in the

presence of homosexuals and have

difficulty interacting normally with them.

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

201220102004199919961994

Percent

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

201220102004199919961994

Percent

Results (cont’d)

12

Trend Analysis by Demographic Group: Pay Grade

Results (cont’d)

13

• Major Themes from Focus Groups

– Nothing changed

– No adverse effect of repeal on unit cohesion,

morale, readiness

– Leadership and professionalism matter

– Equal benefits for equal service

Results (cont’d)

14

• Views have shifted dramatically since 1994 from strongly negative to strongly positive toward repeal of DADT and homosexuals serving openly in the military

Data Analysis: Conclusions

15

Data Analysis: Conclusions

• A vast majority of Navy officers say they have no

difficulty serving with homosexuals, even though

a number claim to feel uncomfortable sharing

living quarters with a homosexual

16

Data Analysis: Conclusions

• Higher-ranking officers and officers with 16-20 YOS are less tolerant than other YOS groups

17

Recommendations

• Further analysis into reasons behind 16-20 YOS group acceptance level

• Continue to monitor post-repeal effects on fleet readiness, particularly fairness and potential harassment

18

Questions?

19

NAVY ENLISTED RECRUITING:

ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING

RECRUITER PRODUCTIVITY

LCDR Todd C. Winn

Advisors: Professor Jeremy Arkes

Professor Steve Mehay

20

Background

• Efficient management of the Navy’s enlisted recruiter force has become increasingly important.

– 1980s Production per Recruiter (PPR) 2.4

– 1990s average PPR 1.3

– 2000s average PPR 0.86

• New strategies needed in an effort to improve recruiter productivity

• Alternative to the current 8-month “On-Boarding” Process

21

Primary:

Can NRC increase recruiter productivity by

altering the on-boarding process from eight

months to six months with minimal to no cost to

the Navy?

Research Question

22

Methodology

• Interviews conducted over the past 7 months – Navy Recruiting Orientation Unit (NORU) instructors-5

– LPOs (formerly called RINCS)-26

– LCPOs (formerly called Zone Supervisors)-12

– CRs-2

• Policy Analysis-comparing current on-

boarding timeline vs. alternative

• Focus of study (E-5/E-6) active duty enlisted

production recruiters

23

The Inverted U

Inverted U Enlisted Recruiter Production Curve

FY94-FY02 Average New Contracts

(From Samuelson et al., 2006). 24

NORU

(5 weeks)

PCS

(30 days)

NRD

Basic PQS

(45 days) SDAP$450

Recruiter

tour

starts

NRD

RDB

(45 days)

Recruiter

is fully

qualified

0 months 3.75 5.25 8.25 1.25 2.25

NRD

Advance PQS (4.5 months)

Current On-Board Process

NORU

(5 weeks)

NRD

Basic PQS

(30 days)

Recruiter

tour

starts

NRD

RDB

(45 days)

Recruiter

is fully

qualified

0 months 3.75 6.25 1.0 2.25

NRD

Advance PQS (4 months)

Alternative On-Board Process

Cost Comparison

Differences in cost

• PCS cost is approx. $12,000 per recruiter based on TEMDUINS orders followed by PCS orders

• 2010-Avg Navy PCS cost $4,500

• TEMDUINS cost $7500 (travel, per diem, lodging)

• Under the proposed system, the additional TAD cost per potential recruiter should be less than $600

27

Funding

• NPC writes PCS orders to NRD, NRD writes (not funds) TAD orders to NORU

• NRDs do not have the funding to send recruiters TAD to NORU

• Cost for TAD orders $8,100

• Alternative funding

• Reallocation of funds from NPC to NRD

• Funding code assigned that would not come out of NRDs budget

28

Costs/Benefits of Alternative On-

Boarding Process

•Cost of new approach ≈ $600/recruiter •1000 new recruiters/year total cost ≈ $1.8M/year

•Benefit will be reduced recruiters needed if recruiters sign more contracts in tour

•Depends on:

•# recruiters

•Productivity per recruiter

•Increased # contracts per tour

•Increased # contracts per tour is unknown: •More from shortening the on-boarding process

•Less from sending TAD to NORU 29

Back-of-envelope initial estimates

Results of sending a recruiter TAD to NORU and the additional productivity needed

to break even.

30

Recommendations

Conduct a Randomized Experiment:

• Proposed design: • Treatment group - 600 enlisted sailors receive PCS

orders to their NRD, complete basic PQS, then report to NORU

• Control group – All recruiters who are not in the treatment group and are randomly selected

• Recommended length of study is 3 years with intermittent results after every year

• Reallocation of funds from NPC to NRC = $4.86 million

• Analysis of data to determine results: • Compare and contrast productivity between the two

groups

• End of experiment surveys with LPOs from both groups.

31

Questions?

32

Retention Elasticity and

Projection Model For U.S.

Medical Corps Officers

CDR Abdullah AlShehri, RSNF

LCDR Hyrum Brossard, MSC, USN

Advisors: Professor Dina Shatnawi

Professor Yu-Chu Shen

33

Background

• Medical Corps Mission Statement: “We enable readiness, wellness, and healthcare to Sailors, Marines, their families, and all others entrusted to us worldwide be it on land or at sea.”

• Environment has Changed

– GWOT

– Economic Recession

• Replicate a previous study that was conducted by

CNA in 2002 using data from FY02 through FY11

– Civilian-Military Pay Gap’s effect on Navy Medical Corps

Retention

34

Primary: 1. How does a change in the civilian-military medical

providers pay gap affect the retention of Navy medical specialists?

2. What are the projected retention rates for Navy medical providers, and how would adjusting special pay incentives influence their retention?

Secondary: 1. Has the prolonged GWOT and recent economic

downturn influenced the Navy Medical Corps retention rate from FY02 through FY11?

Research Questions

35

Methodology

• Multivariate probit model

– Dependent Variable: • Whether a person stays or leaves the Navy after their initial obligation

– Explanatory Variables: • Variable of Interest

– Civilian-Military Pay Gap

• Demographics

– Gender, race, age

• Military Experience

– Years of Service, Rank, Accession Source

• Years/Specialty Dummy Variable

• Forecasting Methods:

– Mean, Moving Average, and Exponential

Smoothing

36

Data Source

• Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)

• BUMIS data (FY02 through FY11)

•Special Pay

• Incentive Special Pay (ISP)

• Multi-year Special Pay (MSP)

•DFAS

• Database for Base Pay, BAH, & BAS

•Medical Group Management (MGMA)

• Civilian Physician Compensation Data 37

Preliminary Data Analysis

Table 1. Number of unobligated providers at a decision point to leave the Navy

Fiscal Year

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total

N= 634 642 726 633 534 475 377 331 324 284 4,960

Stayers= 453 484 563 449 329 303 207 200 174 164 3,326

Figure 1. MC Retention Rate vs. Civilian-Military Pay Gap

38

Description of Demographics

Figure 2. Delta between FY02 & FY11

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

FY2002

FY2011

39

Results

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

Main Model Primary Care Surgical Specialties Other Specialties

% Change of Probability of staying in the Navy if Civilian-Military pay gap is reduced by $10,000

40

Results (cont’d)

USUHS= Uniformed Service University of the Health Sciences

AFHPSP Deferred= Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program

FAP= Financial Assistance Program

-20%

-15%

-10%

-5%

0%

5%

10%

USUHS AFHPSP Deferred FAP

Probability of Retention in The Navy (Relative to AFHSPS)

41

Elasticity Results

*p<0.1

Specialty Elasticity

Family Practice –0.37

Internal Medicine –0.51

Pediatrics –0.19

Occupational Medicine –0.06*

General Surgery –0.76

Neurological Surgery N/A

Orthopedic Surgery –0.68

OB/GYN –1.42

Ophthalmology –0.42*

Otolaryngology –1.0

Specialty Elasticity

Urology –0.45

Anesthesiology –0.54

Dermatology –0.14*

Emergency Medicine –0.50

Neurology 0.75*

Pathology 0.07*

Physical and

Rehabilitation N/A

Psychiatry –0.46

Radiology –0.74

42

Results

• The effect of GWOT: • The retention probability decreased by 14.1 percentage points after

FY05 compared to FY02-FY04

• Probability of leaving the Navy is 23 percentage

points higher for African Americans compared

to their White counterparts • Asian and Hispanic Physicians are not statistically different from their

White Counterparts

• Military Tax Advantage showed no significant

change on retention 43

Recommendations

1. The Navy should increase or shift its funding in support of the USUHS program.

2. Increase the MSP amount & offer the MSP earlier to LT’s and LCDR’s before their initial obligation of service is over (Regardless of Specialty).

3. Increase MSP amount to primary care and surgical specialty categories (Regardless of Rank).

44

Questions?

45

Evaluating the Tailored Adaptive

Personality Assessment System

(TAPAS) on Navy Recruits

LT Jessica Fahrman, USN

Advisors: Professor Steve Mehay

Professor Elda Pema

46

Background

• Civilian studies have documented the effect of non-cognitive attributes on

• Job performance

• Schooling decision

• Army has used TAPAS to assess the “whole-person”

– Effect of TAPAS scores on attrition

• Within Navy, attrition rates vary within education/AFQT categories

– TAPAS may help to better categorize recruits

47

1. Does TAPAS bring in new information?

– Evaluate the correlation of TAPAS with observables (demographics, ASVAB, AFQT, education).

2. Do TAPAS scores predict whether an applicant will enlist?

– Estimate the probability that an applicant enlists, controlling for TAPAS and all other observable background characteristics.

Research Questions

48

•TAPAS is a computer adaptive test designed

to capture personality characteristics.

– 15 total measured personality facets

– 5 broad categories (extraversion, conscientious,

agreeableness, emotional stability, openness to

experience)

– 2 composites

• “can-do” – designed to predict job knowledge

and training graduation

• “will-do” – designed to predict motivation,

commitment, and attrition

TAPAS Description

49

Methodology

• TAPAS administered to Navy recruits at

MEPS from April 2011 to March 2013

1.Measure correlations of TAPAS scores

with select demographics and cognitive

test scores

2.Estimate a probit model for probability to

enlist, conditional on TAPAS scores, and

other observables.

50

Composite scores by Race

•TAPAS composite scores among races compared to

Caucasians

Standard Deviation :

Will Do: 17.432

Can Do: 17.271 51

TAPAS scores by Race

•TAPAS Traits with strongest correlation among

races

Asian Black Hawiian Hispanic Std Dev

achievement -0.179*** -0.0758*** -0.0718 -0.0238 0.507

adjustment -0.0823*** 0.0191 -0.0493 0.0112 0.526

dominance -0.177*** 0.00962 -0.129** 0.0455*** 0.553

inteleff -0.148*** 0.0906*** -0.117** 0.0179 0.572

nondelinquency -0.121*** -0.0410** -0.0912* -0.0446*** 0.497

physical -0.129*** -0.118*** -0.00891 -0.0327* 0.597

selfcontrol -0.0327 0.0761*** -0.0390 -0.0175 0.545

sociability -0.0755*** -0.0666*** -0.0887 -0.0277 0.565

tolerance 0.110*** 0.0677*** 0.163*** 0.112*** 0.531

****Control variables: gender, age, marital status, number of dependents,

waiver, education, AFQT, and ASVAB subtests.

Base group: Caucasians

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 n=11,042

52

Composite scores by Education

•TAPAS composite score correlation among

education levels compared to HSDGs.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

53

TAPAS scores by Education

•TAPAS Traits with strongest correlation among

education levels

NHSD College Std Dev

achievement -0.0634* 0.0397** 0.507

cooperation -0.0720** 0.00689 0.454

dominance -0.119*** 0.0208 0.553

eventemper 0.0265 -0.0322** 0.456

inteleff -0.0268 -0.0468** 0.572

nondelinquency -0.0614* -0.0339* 0.497

physical -0.0937** 0.116*** 0.597

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 n=11,042

****Control variables: race, gender, age, marital

status, number of dependents, waiver, AFQT, and

ASVAB subtests.

Base group: HSDG

54

Non-Cognitive vs Cognitive

•TAPAS Traits with strongest correlation among

AFQT and ASVAB sub-tests

55

Probability to Enlist

•The likelihood an applicant enlists based on

composite scores

Probit controlling for

cognitive tests

Probit without controlling

for cognitive tests

Coefficient 0.00262*** 0.00168**

Std error (0.000818) (0.000795)

Partial effect [0.00103]*** [0.000660]**

Coefficient 0.000445 0.00332***

Std error (0.000758) (0.000733)

Partial effect [0.000175] [0.00131]***

Can-do

Will-do

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors in parentheses

56

Results

• TAPAS scores vary significantly by

– Race

– Education level

• Minimal to no correlation between cognitive and non-cognitive test scores

– It appears that TAPAS is picking up new information about a recruit

• TAPAS composites significantly predict the probability of an applicant to enlist

57

Future Work

• As the cohorts age evaluate TAPAS’s predictive effect on Navy attrition

1. DEP attrition

2. Boot camp attrition

3. First term attrition

58

Questions?

59

Manpower Requirements

Estimation for UCLASS

Squadrons

CDR Gary Lazzaro

Advisors: Professor Bill Hatch

Professor Cary Simon

UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System

60

Background

• Largest cost of any new system is manpower

– Up to 70% of total system cost

• Most research is performed on technical aspects of UCLASS aircraft

– Scant research in manpower requirements

– “Autonomy” may reduce manpower

UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System

61

• Primary:

– What are the manpower requirements for a deployable UCLASS squadron?

• Secondary:

– How will UCLASS manpower requirements compare to F/A-18F manned squadrons?

Research Questions

UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System

62

Methodology

• Determine squadron manpower requirements

– Squadron support departments

– UCLASS aircraft maintenance

– UCLASS aircraft operators

– Deployable squadron vs. deployable detachment

• Assumptions must be made for some

UCLASS squadron parameters

UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System

63

Data Picture

• Squadron manpower requirements may be

grouped into four common areas

– Some requirements depend upon number of

aircraft, and others depend upon unit configuration.

64

• Data from squadron manpower documents

– Analyzed VFA, VAW, VRC, VP & HSL units

– Identified common manpower requirements

• Theoretical analysis to determine UCLASS

aircraft operators requirements

– Autonomy vs. ethics

– AVO/MPO requirements change during mission

Data Explained

UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System

65

Results of Data

• Fully deployable squadron estimate:

UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System

• Detachment concept squadron estimate:

Manpower comparison Officers Enlisted Total Difference

Completely deployable

UCLASS squadron36 161 197 86

One F/A-18F squadron 44 239 283 --

Manpower comparison Officers Enlisted Total Difference

UCLASS shore component

with five detachments103 540 643 772

Five F/A-18F squadrons 220 1195 1415 --

66

Data Analysis: Results

• Total annual manpower costs (FY13 $):

– UCLASS shore component

with five detachments: $60M

– Five UCLASS squadrons: $89M

– Five F/A-18F squadrons: $119M

• Manpower costs compared to five F/A-18F

squadrons:

– UCLASS shore component

with five detachments: $62M less

– Five UCLASS squadrons: $30M less

UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System

67

Recommendations

• Manpower planners should consider the detachment concept configuration for a future UCLASS squadron

• Research assumptions will need to be revisited as the UCLASS program matures

• UCLASS aircraft operator requirements should be allowed to vary during a mission

UCLASS = Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System

68

Questions?

69

Thank You!

70