CHAPTER 10

Unlike(ly) Twins?Democracy and Oligarchy in Context

Hartmut Leppin

The dichotomy between oligarchy and democracy was a central concept of Greek politicalthinking.1 By opposing these two types of constitutions, the main differences in thepolitical order of the various poleis in Classical Greece seem to be defined: inclusivedemocratic order, in cities such as Athens and Argos, and exclusive order, for whichSparta appears to be the foremost example. In this view, the Peloponnesian War, theconfrontation between Athens and Sparta, is emblematic of the political constellation inClassical Greece. But the most perceptive observer of this war, Thucydides, had alreadyraised doubts about the adequacy of this dichotomy:

The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and fromthese passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in contention. The leadersin the cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry ofpolitical equality of the people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes forthemselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling fromno means in their struggles for ascendancy, engaged in the direct excesses; in their acts ofvengeance they went to even greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good ofthe state demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only standard, andinvoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an unjust verdict or the authority of thestrong arm to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion was in honor with neitherparty; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation. Meanwhilethe moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in thequarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape. (Thuc. 3.82.3, trans J.M. Dent)

There are several problems with the plain dichotomy between oligarchy and democracy.First, these are, as Thucydides had already observed, ideological concepts which mighthide the ruthless pursuit of personal interests. Second, the empirical base available to

A Companion to Ancient Greek Government, First Edition. Edited by Hans Beck.© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Unlike(ly) Twins? Democracy and Oligarchy in Context 147

modern scholars is weak, as the change from an aristocratic order to democracy in thesense of an extension of the participatory rights of the citizens was a slow process inmost cities; it is generally difficult to reconstruct from our sources. It becomes stillmore obscure because almost every polis, oligarchic and democratic, shared, at the heartof their governments, similar if not the same political institutions: a popular assembly,a council, and public magistracies. Their interplay varied widely depending on therespective laws or traditions, and this might have been decisive in determining a moredemocratic or more oligarchic government. But the real differences between democraciesand oligarchies were at times so blurred that even Sparta could be called a democracy(Isok. 7.60–61) – not implausibly so, as all Spartan citizens had participatory rights andenjoyed a certain equality.

Indeed, their genesis and their reality put democracy and oligarchy much nearer toeach other than their proponents would have wished. Thus, the dichotomy betweenthese types of constitution and their identification with Athens and Sparta seems toobscure the extreme variety of constitutions which could be observed (or expected) inClassical Greece.2 This was not unknown to the great political theorists of the time:Aristotle, typically, strove to collect all these constitutions, as he knew that every citywas different.

A Plethora of Constitutions

Although our sources define many towns as democracies or oligarchies, or as changingtheir constitutional form from the one to the other, it is difficult to identify the characterof their individual constitutions precisely. The word demokratia and its derivatives, whichare first attested in the 430s BCE, can have a broad range of meanings – as becomes clearfrom Herodotus’ work. It can stand for a constitution which is opposed to tyranny, butit can also denote a democracy in the sense of modern scholarship, in other words, aconstitution which is based on a very high degree of popular participation.3 If a townhas been called a democracy by an ancient author, this does not mean that it can beclassified as a democracy by modern standards. Moreover, there were many towns whichgradually enlarged (or, later on, reduced) the body of citizens who were entitled andenabled to participate politically in some way or other. There is no clear mark on thespectrum from oligarchy to democracy which might serve as the boundary betweenthe two because in many cities some form of census existed, even in Athens in regardto certain magistracies. When our sources allow more than a glimpse of constitutions,which is already rare enough in itself, the information mostly eludes any clear definition:not even in well-documented Athens is it clear what exactly was meant by the Soloniancensus qualifications still being mentioned in the fourth century BCE. In his Politics,Aristotle demonstrated which variety of constitutions could be referred to as democraciesor oligarchies.

Athenian sources sometimes specify certain key features of democracy (for examplepublic remuneration for officials, ostracism, selection of most officials by lot, publicaccountability of officials). Although such features might have existed in other poleis, inmost cases it is almost impossible to prove. Thus, discussing Greek democracy requiresthat we discuss Athenian democracy in particular, even though we always have to keep

148 Hartmut Leppin

in mind that this was a singular democracy out of an unknown number of poleis withsimilar constitutions.

There are, however, some cities for which there exists a certain academic consensusregarding their constitutions: fifth-century Korinth is generally regarded as an oligarchy,while Argos developed into a democracy. The little we know about Argos, the best-known democracy outside Athens, gives the impression that it was a democracy of itsown kind; for example, the bola (council) was arguably much weaker than in Athens.Syracuse experienced a democratic interlude between its older and younger tyrannies,and this short-lived order seems to have had a character of its own – but again we haveno clear idea how it worked. Thebes again presents an entirely different picture, with itsfrequent changes of constitutions.4

On the other hand, not even the Delian league can be regarded as an organization ofdemocracies. Among the members both of the first and the second league there weretyrannies as well as democracies, and poleis with constitutions which did not mirror theAthenian example, even in some famous cases when Athens imposed her democracy onother cities, as the regulations for Erythrai make clear (M&L 40/IG I3 14). The idea ofGreek cities forming alliances according to their political order is too simplistic.

The political order of Sparta is almost exclusively known from non-Spartan, mostlyAthenian sources. Although many details remain obscure, one thing was uncontested:Sparta was a special case. Therefore modern scholars were not tempted to reconstructoligarchies on the base of the Spartan model. Democracy and oligarchy were importantconcepts in their time, but they overshadow a much more complex reality.

Justifications for Democracy and Oligarchy

Texts from Athens provide a more solid base for discussing democracy and oligarchy interms of political ideas.5 Although they do not always refer to Athens explicitly, one hasto remember that they were products of Athenian discourses. Athenocentrism cannot beavoided when the political ideas of Classical Greece are discussed, but a general caveatmust be provided.

A common ground: opposition to tyranny

The experience of tyranny accelerated the emergence of political thought in Greece andchanged the normative order. The rapid alteration of the political structure, when atyrant came to power and also when he was deposed, demonstrated the instability ofany political order and the possibility for men to influence those changes. Moreover, theopponents of tyranny, who typically had an aristocratic background, had to justify theirposition and therefore reflect on the legitimacy of the political order.

This seems to have been the historical context for the birth of the political usage ofthe word isonomia and its derivatives.6 Like other composites on the base iso- (suchas isegoria and isokratia; Hdt. 5.78, 92α; cf. Nakategawa 1988), the word underlinedequality among aristocrats and was directed against the fellow-aristocrat turned tyrant.But as the Greek aristocracy was not clearly distinguished from other classes by legal

Unlike(ly) Twins? Democracy and Oligarchy in Context 149

or other criteria, the word easily extended to a wider meaning, perhaps as early as thetime of Kleisthenes. Thus, it could include any group that participated in the fightagainst tyrants. Soon it became a word used to designate democracy, even in oppositionto oligarchy.

As a result, a triad of constitutional types emerged, which usually comprised monarchy,oligarchy and democracy. It can be recognized for the first time in Pindar (Pyth. 2.86–88)who seems to presuppose his audience’s familiarity with this concept. But not every formof government was of equal importance. While in Aischylos’ Suppliants of 463 BCE

democracy is still opposed to monarchy (399–432), monarchy in itself soon lost itsappeal as an alternative political order, perhaps due to the fact that the age of tyranny hadended in the Greek motherland and there seemed to be no real danger of a monarchicrevolution. On the other hand, the enlargement of participatory rights in several poleiscreated a growing need to distinguish between democracy and oligarchy, at least in termsof ideology. In the fourth century BCE the comparative success of monarchic orders inthe Greek world directed more attention to their justification.

Twin birth: the invention of oligarchy and democracy

Democracy and oligarchy did not emerge from theories about the best form of govern-ment; they were the results of political practice. Democracy first appeared in post-tyrannyAthens. Having established itself as a political force in the conflict with Sparta whichfollowed the demise of the Peisistratids, the people of Athens benefited from elite com-petition. Aristocrats had to contend for power before the unusually self-confident peopleof Athens, and also had to win the support of the masses which, as a result of the ruleof tyrants, were less dependent on aristocrats than in other cities. Athenian aristocratsthus had to find mutual arrangements with the people and even to enlarge the rights ofthe common citizens. Up to the middle of the fifth century, a stable democratic orderwas in full force, the elements of which seem to have remained consistent, at least inhindsight; in fact, they were the result of concrete political situations which eventuallyharmonized. Seen from the perspective of the aristocrats, the democratic order, with itsclose control of counselors and magistrates, created a restriction of political activity: theywere expected to give heed to the voice and the voting behavior of the common peopleand to account for what they had done.

After the establishment of democracy there was an obvious need to reflect on whathad emerged. (Probably) the first text to contain precise information on democracy ispolemical. It is a short pamphlet that was transmitted among the works of Xenophon,which has led to its author being called Pseudo-Xenophon, or sometimes the OldOligarch.7 Written from an oligarchic point of view, it suggests that the workingprinciples of democracy were first detected by its opponents. But perhaps the questionof whether criticism of democracy or rather its defense came first is not well posed,as democracy and oligarchy were defined in relation to each other. Significantly,justifications for these politeiai are presented in the form of dialogues, as in Herodotus(3.80–82) or in Euripides’ tragedies (Suppl. 399–455). In the following passages I willtry to give a systematic overview of the various justifications of these types of constitutions(which may include polemic against the others). They do not form a consistent theory

150 Hartmut Leppin

of democracy or oligarchy, but illustrate modes of justification for those orders (seeRaaflaub 1989, 1992, for a more extensive guide to the sources).

Democratic discourses

No theoretical treatise On Democracy has survived, if such a text was ever written.The first emergence of the concept of democracy in opposition to monarchy mightbe detected in Aischylos’ Suppliants. The ruler is obliged to ask the people for theirpermission in a difficult case, which is depicted as being surprising to other characters ofthe tragedy (Aisch. Suppl. 368–369, 397–401, 483–489 and 604, which is a referenceto the word demokratia). The Old Oligarch presupposes certain elements of democraticideology (the struggle for equality for example); he describes democracy in order toattack it. Several further texts have survived which argue in favor of democracy. Forexample, the conversation of the Persian nobles in Herodotus; the speeches of Periklesand Athenagoras as well as other orations in Thucydides; the myth of Protagoras inPlato’s dialogue of the same name; the dialogue between Theseus and the Thebanherald in Euripides’ Suppliants; and the fragments of the Anonymus Iamblichi, whichare contained in the work of a Late Antique philosopher. Besides, many speeches offourth-century rhetoricians such as Lysias, Demosthenes, and Aischines indicate what wasregarded as central to democratic government. Finally, inscriptions on public monumentsshed light on the values and understandings of Athenian democracy.8

These texts represent different genres and different situations: some of them are con-strued as debates between democrats and oligarchs, some are justifications of democracyon their own, and some supply an implicit theory of democracy. None of them waswritten in order to hand down political theory. Nevertheless, if interpreted with sufficientcare, they provide certain elements of a more or less consistent theoretical framework ofdemocracy. There seem to have been six main justifications for democracy.

Equality

The core value of democracy was the equality of all citizens (not of all human beings),no matter what their origin, family, or economic background was. Equality expresseditself in everyday life – nobody was to be offended because of his low social status – andprimarily in the idea that every (male) citizen had the right to participate in politics. It didnot mean social equality, but prevented social superiors from having political dominance.The most impressive formulation of this idea which pervades every democratic text canbe found in the funeral speech which Thucydides ascribes to Perikles (Thuc. 2.37).

The competence of the individual citizen

While oligarchy defined itself as the rule of the best, democracy presupposed that everysingle citizen was able to fulfill his political duties, at least in the boule and in thedikasteria, and also in most of the magistracies. This is expressed in Aristotle’s insistenceon the importance of the change between archein and archesthai, between being in officeand being ruled by people in office (Arist. Pol. 3.1277b14–15). From an aristocraticpoint of view the idea of the broad competence of every citizen was provocative.

Unlike(ly) Twins? Democracy and Oligarchy in Context 151

The political competence of every single citizen is underlined by a myth which isconnected with the name of Protagoras and handed down by Plato (Prot . 320c–323c):after the gods had created the world they employed Epimetheus and Prometheus to givecertain qualities to the animals. Epimetheus began, deliberately distributing the qualitiesin an unequal way. When he came to man, nothing was left, but Prometheus asked othergods to instruct human beings in those technical skills which they needed to survive.They still lacked, however, the art necessary for living together, political wisdom, whichbelonged to Zeus alone. Zeus sent Hermes who then gave respect (aidos) and judgement(dike) to man – both Greek words are extremely difficult to translate. In difference toevery other quality aidos and dike were equally distributed in every human being. Thatis, every human being is equally able to participate in political debates, which require nospecial competence 9

The concept underlying this myth is fundamental to the democratic norm thateverybody is allowed to participate in politics. It fits well with what was said aboutdemocratic equality, but with one major difference: in this myth democratic valuesare regarded as anthropological values, whereas the critics and proponents of Atheniandemocracy underlined that this form of democracy was specific to Athens. The reflectionof Protagoras makes the Athenian norms universal, but this was a lone view, and perhapsnot even the main intention of the author, although he refers to the consensus of man.

A more nuanced concept is put forward by Athenagoras in a speech given to theekklesia of Syracuse: ‘‘If the best guardians of property are the rich, and the bestcounselors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the many; and that all thesetalents, severally and collectively, have their just place in a democracy’’ (Thuc. 6.39.1).In this speech a functional differentiation between the various groups of the populationis proposed. Not everyone is regarded as equally competent, but the combination ofthe competences of the citizens creates a perfect whole. This remains, however, within adecidedly democratic framework.

Thucydides’ Perikles adopts another approach in his funeral speech. He underlinesthat every citizen is employed for society so as to use his capacities in the best possibleway. Everybody participates in the way he knows best. No political order is more suitableto allow people to develop their personalities than democracy. In that sense, democracy isthe true aristocracy. Like Athenagoras, he presupposes that human beings have differentabilities, but he goes even farther as he accepts the multifariousness of aptitudes.

The advantage of the masses

While oligarchic polemic looked down on the masses on which democracy depends,adherents of the democratic order saw an advantage precisely in the fact that there wereso many people involved. This argument could have at least two ramifications. Aristotleput forward the theory of summation,10 declaring that a collective body may be moreeffective than single persons even if not one of the individuals of the many is actually fit forsupreme power: ‘‘As they are many, each person brings in his share of virtue and wisdom;and thus, coming together, they are like one man made up of a multitude, with manyfeet, many hands, and many intelligences’’ (Arist. Pol. 3.1281b3–5, trans. W. Ellis).Demosthenes makes a more pragmatic point: masses cannot be bribed (Dem. 24.37).This was certainly a motive generated from democratic practice and can best be illustrated

152 Hartmut Leppin

by the Athenian law courts which were comprised of thousands of jurors. In Thucydides,however, Athenagoras introduced a specification, as he thought the people competentto decide after hearing the counsels of the intelligent (Thuc. 6.39.1).

Freedom

Freedom was the central catchword of democratic orders, although the concept and theword are older than democracy itself (Raaflaub 2004a) and have complex meanings.At first freedom was merely opposition to slavery, but later on it became important fordefining Greek identity during the wars against the Persians. The Hellenic victory wasput down to the free character of the Greek soldiers as opposed to the oppressed Persians.As Athenian soldiers had beaten the Persians at Marathon in 490 and were central to thevictories of 480/479, Athens could claim to be the defender of freedom. The conceptsoon became a democratic value which was not defined as the right to be protectedagainst intrusions by the government, but rather as the right to participate in politicaldecisions. Therefore, free speech (parrhesia) was regarded as an attribute of citizens.Consequently, the idea of human (or for that matter citizen) rights was not developedin Athens (D. Cohen 2004). It was precisely this kind of freedom which guaranteed theabilities of the common citizen as praised by Perikles in his funeral speech. Although, asfar as we know (and that is little enough indeed), the oligarchs of Athens did not referto freedom during the Peloponnesian War, Sparta, as an agent in international politics,did. This slogan, however, mainly referred to external politics, as Athens was regardedas behaving like a tyrant against the other cities of its league.

The functioning of institutions

Democrats could also choose a political language which did not focus on personalities.While oligarchs grounded their justification on the quality of the political elite, democratsput forward the importance of institutions, as is already observable in Herodotus’Otanes: ‘‘There, places are given by lot, the magistrate is answerable for what hedoes, and measures rest with the commonalty. I vote, therefore, that we do away withmonarchy, and raise the people to power. For the people are all in all.’’ (Hdt. 3.87, trans.G. Rawlinson). Drawing lots, accountability of the magistrates, and public participationin decisions are the main points in this defense of democracy. In a similar way, Euripides’Theseus in the Suppliants underlines everybody’s right to speak and the yearly changein office – whereas Thucydides’ Athenagoras sees counseling as the privilege of theintelligent (6.39.1). The prescript of most Attic decrees underlines that they have beendecided on by the council and the people; moreover, in the fourth century it alsocontains the names of the archon of the year, the prytany, the secretary, the chairman,and the proposer.

Rule of law

Obeisance to the law was not only regarded as compatible with the idea of freedom, butas an indispensable corollary of freedom; it could even be deemed a specifically Greek anddemocratic virtue. This is already the case with Otanes in Herodotus and with Theseusin Euripides (Suppl. 433), a point which is further emphasized by the speeches both of

Unlike(ly) Twins? Democracy and Oligarchy in Context 153

Perikles and Athenagoras in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. That relianceon law was central for democrats is further highlighted by Kleon’s speech in Thucydides,which is the quintessence of a demagogue’s way of discussion (Thuc. 3.37.3–4), andin the court speeches of the fourth century (e.g., Dem. 21.224). The rule of law hadalso an apologetic connotation, as the polemic against freedom and democracy oftenconjured up the danger that citizens might get out of hand.

Tradition

The democratic discourse underlined that democracy represented an old traditionwhich had proved its worth during the struggle against the Persians. The patriospoliteia (‘‘ancestral constitution’’) highlights the claim of tradition, which fortifiedthe existing democracy against any attack. This aspect grew in importance during thefourth century, when King Theseus was held to be the founder of Athenian democracy(Heftner 2003). In this sense, then, democratic justifications often had conservativeovertones.

When modern political thinking is considered, it becomes clear that it was difficultin this society to argue that the people simply had the right to make decisions in orderto protect their legitimate interests. This concept was by no means unthinkable, asPseudo-Xenophon, for example, repeatedly referred to the interests of the people andthe aggressiveness with which they were articulated. But this thought probably wasnot regarded as virtuous enough to serve as a justification narrative for democracy.The common aim in political theory is to find the way to make the correct, or atleast the best possible, decision. This being said, Athenian democracy was especiallysuccessful in motivating citizens to participate in their institutions and even to fight forthem. The citizens were expected to have certain (originally aristocratic) virtues such asloyalty (eunoia), eagerness to serve their city (prothymia), courage (andreia) and piety(eusebeia). It was further expected of them to fulfill their duties generously, which wasusually also expressed in inscriptions (Whitehead 1993; Liddel 2007).

Oligarchic discourses

Oligarchic thinking was old and new at the same time. An aristocratic order was alreadytaken for granted in Homer, when Thersites is depicted as unfit for participation inpolitical debate because of his looks (Il. 2.216–219). The aristocrat’s ascendancy isevident by his habitus; he adopts a certain style of life, which demonstrates that heis one of the best (i.e. a member of the aristoi; van Wees 1992; Stein-Holkeskamp1989). He defends his community and enlarges its glory. As many Greek texts areimbued with an aristocratic attitude, there was less need to justify explicitly the powerof the few. Consequently, there are not many treatises arguing for an aristocratic orderin great detail. Spartan or Korinthian texts which might have defended the politicalorders of their cities do not exist and probably never did. Therefore, oligarchic thinkingis pervasive in the Greek world, but difficult to grasp. Characteristically, in Euripides’Suppliants monarchy and democracy are discussed, but not oligarchy. With the growingimportance and consistence of the democratic order oligarchic thinking was reshaped, asis visible in Pseudo-Xenophon.

154 Hartmut Leppin

Above all, the concept of aristocracy is ambiguous in itself. The individual can bethe best, but there can also be a group of the best. The term ‘‘oligarchy’’ is moreprecise in this regard since it refers explicitly to a (small) group. The best individualcan assert himself even in a democracy, as for example Perikles did, and he could asserthimself against his peers. The oligarchs, however, formed a group by definition andneeded a corresponding constitution. As a result, aristocracy and oligarchy can be usedinterchangeably in certain contexts (and might seem to be in my use), but they are notidentical and must be differentiated carefully.

Therefore, the conceptual framework of aristocratic ideology is relatively simple.In their self-description as aristoi or kaloikagathoi (‘‘beautiful and virtuous ones’’) ajustification of aristocratic ascendancy was implied. This attitude is still discernible inPseudo-Xenophon’s treatise which presupposes that the audience would disapprove ofthe rule of the many, who in his depiction, are ruthless in carrying out their interests,whereas the author takes it for granted that oligarchs are eager to defend their interestsagainst other citizens. An important justification for the political influence of thearistocrats was the fact that they were able to enjoy leisure and therefore had time tothink about what was right. A more sophisticated justification could be based on theimportance of physis (nature) as a justification of superiority against the nomos (custom),the importance of which many democrats underlined.

In a comparative perspective, most aristocracies in other epochs and in other parts ofthe world claim to consist of scions of good families in order to justify their position.Among Greek aristocrats, however, a competitive style of living was central. Individualshad to demonstrate that they were both strong enough and rich enough to pursuethis style of life; the ensuing intense rivalry made solidarity difficult (Schmitz 2008).Only rarely was noble birth put forward as an argument in favor of aristocracy ina world which seemed to be dominated by greed (Pind. Pyth. 8.44–45; 10.71–72;Theog. 1.182–195). Therefore the situation of aristocrats was more precarious than,for example, in Early Modern continental Europe, and the need to justify the positionbecame correspondingly more urgent. Moreover, democracy was successful even interms of military power, which strengthened the need to explain the qualities of anoligarchic order.

Oligarchic and democratic thinkers had one core concept in common: justice. Butjustice was defined differently for each. Whereas equality was central to the democraticconcept, the oligarchs underlined adequacy, which justified the privileged position ofthe better. Consequently, oligarchy could never renounce this aristocratic justification.Generally speaking, however, the oligarchic discourse provided more arguments againstdemocracy than in favor of oligarchy.11 A good illustration is given by Herodotus’Megabyzos, the proponent of aristocracy in the famous debate about the constitution ofthe Persian Empire after Gaumata’s fall:

In that which [Otanes] said urging that we should make over the power to the multitude,he has missed the best counsel: for nothing is more senseless or insolent than a worthlesscrowd; and for men flying from the insolence of a despot to fall into that of unrestrainedpopular power, is by no means to be endured: for he, if he does anything, does it knowingwhat he does, but the people cannot even know; for how can that know which has neitherbeen taught anything noble by others nor perceived anything of itself, but pushes on matterswith violent impulse and without understanding, like a torrent stream? Rule of the people

Unlike(ly) Twins? Democracy and Oligarchy in Context 155

then let them adopt who are foes to the Persians; but let us choose a company of the bestmen, and to them attach the chief power; for in the number of these we shall ourselves alsobe, and it is likely that the resolutions taken by the best men will be the best. (Hdt. 3.81,trans. G.C. Macaulay)

But the oligarchic discourse cannot be reduced to anti-democratic thinking because itis much more complex and has certain intrinsic values, although it seems less nuancedthan what can be said about democratic thinking. The key justification of oligarchyremained the individual quality of the oligarchs. Therefore the concept of oligarchy,as far as we can see on the basis of the fragmentary tradition, is much more per-sonalized than the concept of democracy, which focuses heavily on institutions andtheir control.

Athenian democracy survived two oligarchic coups. In both cases oligarchs tried toput their theories into practice, which included powerful boulai (consisting of men fromthe elite) and restricted access to the popular assembly, but they failed in the end becausethey were not able to control the ambitions of the individual aristocrats who competedfor sufficient influence (Brock 1989; Lehmann 1997). Interestingly, the first coup waspresented as another form of democracy (Thuc. 8.53.1) which shows that the boundariesbetween democracy and oligarchy were not as fixed as some Athenian authors seem topresuppose.

In the fourth century the discourses on democracy and oligarchy became part of moregeneral and more sophisticated concepts on the proper political order, as propoundedby Plato and Aristotle, who are treated in separate chapters of this volume. It wastypically formulated as a trichotomous model of three forms of government throughwhich oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy could be described by various terms, andparallel degenerate forms were described. This led to the idea of a cycle of constitutions,which might have been ended by the creation of a mixed constitution. The typology ofpolitical constitutions formed the base for an important strand of Greek and Europeanpolitical thinking, which was to influence many intellectuals, especially in during theEnlightenment, and eventually the American constitution.

Beyond Democracy and Oligarchy

Democracy and oligarchy were important political concepts in Classical Greece and theyhad been propagated with disastrous consequences during the Peloponnesian War, butthey simplified a rather more complicated reality. Many contemporaries were consciousof this and several thinkers dismissed the typology of constitutions and stressed theimportance of the disposition of the individual agent, as, for instance, Thucydides. Forhim, the most important factor which guaranteed a good order within the state was notthe constitution, but the correct use of institutions in order to making a polis strong.The historiographer deems the strong (or, more precisely, the able and responsible) manas important for any constitution. Perikles provides the best example. The internal andexternal success of the Athenian democracy depended on his abilities, whereas his lesscompetent successors ruined Athens in war.12 In this way, the personalized discourse onoligarchy is connected with the idea of democratic stability – a connection which againshows how artificial the distinction between oligarchy and democracy is.

156 Hartmut Leppin

Agency: the challenge of the strong

When the idea of the importance of the individual was connected with the oligarchicconcept of the privileges of those who were superior, this combination could developinto the idea that the individual strong man was entitled to claim a special role. Thisclaim was in a certain way embodied by the historical figure of Alkibiades and wasconceptualized by various thinkers who highlighted the natural rights of the strong.The foremost examples are two Platonic figures, Thrasymachos (in the Republic) andKallikles (in Gorgias) (Barney 2004). Thrasymachos’ ideal is the man who manages toacquire as much wealth and power as possible, thus earning happiness and the applauseof other people. For such men, laws are a restriction hindering them from pursuing theirself-interests. The consequence is an inversion of the democratic idea of justice, which iselucidated by a remark put into the mouth of Thrasymachos by Plato: ‘‘Thus, Sokrates,injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and a more masterful thing thanjustice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is thejust, while the unjust is what profits man’s self and is for his advantage’’ (Plat. Rep.344c, trans. J. Adam). Kallikles gives the argument yet another twist by arguing thatnature had created a natural order which should be reflected by the social order; thus,conventional laws which tend to inhibit the strong are not just in a Kalliklean sense, sincehis understanding of freedom consists of satisfying one’s appetite with what is desired(Plat. Gorg. 481b-506c, esp. 484a-c, 491e-492c).

Independently of the difficult question of whether their views as delivered by Platocorresponded to the views which the historical personalities (if they ever existed in thefirst place – Kallikles is only known from Plato) propounded, their contributions giveevidence to a certain way of thinking which is usually interpreted as the expression of anantidemocratic attitude. This is true to a certain degree, as the strong man obviously didnot intend to interact with other citizens on an equal basis. Kallikles explicitly criticizesthe democratic way of making laws by an assembly of unworthy people (Plat. Gorg.489c); he wishes to find a leader whom he can follow, but his world is the democraticworld, and he acts in a democratic context with democratic means (Aichele 2003). Inthis regard rhetoric was of extreme importance: Plato’s Gorgias stresses that rhetoricgives the power to be convincing within democratic institutions such as the popularassembly or the judicial courts, thus conveying power over other people (Plat. Gorg.452e). The misuse of democracy presupposes a democratic order.

Democracy could thus provide an environment in which a strong man was able toact as successfully and effectively as Alkibiades – who, interestingly, was also influentialin Sparta (in that sense an oligarchy) and at the court of a Persian satrap, and thus amonarchic order – had demonstrated. Therefore, the strong could be powerful in allconstitutions, but the concept was, characteristically, developed within a democracy,since this order offered more possibilities to prove one’s worth than the closely knitoligarchic systems.

Isokrates and the wide concept of democracy

Isokrates was a loyal Athenian citizen and thus an adherent of a democratic order. Histhought includes concepts meant to change the democratic order, such as strengthening

Unlike(ly) Twins? Democracy and Oligarchy in Context 157

the wise and the institution of the Areiopagos (which had been regarded as the oligarchicboule). The idea of patrios politeia was interpreted by Isokrates in the sense of a returnto elder traditions which led to a certain ethical attitude to be gleaned from the wise.Seen from this perspective, there was an aristocratic element in his thoughts. He evenpropounded the idea of electing the best for every office, which he projected into theearlier history of Athens:

But what contributed most to their good government of the state was that of the tworecognized kinds of equality – that which makes the same award to all alike and that whichgives to each man his due – they did not fail to grasp which was the more serviceable; but,rejecting as unjust that which holds that the good and the bad are worthy of the samehonors, and preferring rather that which rewards and punishes every man according tohis deserts, they governed the city on this principle, not filling the offices by lot from allthe citizens, but selecting the best and the ablest for each function of the state; for theybelieved that the rest of the people would reflect the character of those who were placed incharge of their affairs. Furthermore they considered that this way of appointing magistrateswas also more democratic than the casting of lots, since under the plan of election by lotchance would decide the issue and the partisans of oligarchy would often get the offices;whereas under the plan of selecting the worthiest men, the people would have in theirhands the power to choose those who were most attached to the existing constitution.(Isok. 7.21–23)

Characteristically, true democracy was achieved by an oligarchic procedure. Althoughthis sounds aristocratic, this consideration is to be regarded as a criticism of democracycreated within a democratic framework, which was never explicitly questioned byIsokrates. For him, the disposition of the individuals in a community is more importantthan the constitution itself and its laws (cf. 7.41). Aristocracy in its literal sense becomesan alternative to both oligarchy and democracy. Against this background, Sparta canbe viewed as a restricted democracy (Isok. 12.178), and Isokrates can exhibit a certainsympathy for monarchy, or more precisely, monarchs, as they also can be representativefor good behavior. But the nucleus of his political concept lies in paideia, in hisidea that everybody has to be educated in an adequate way. The notion that ethicalattitudes transcend political institutions was not consciously directed against the ideaof democracy, but nevertheless contributed to undermining democratic values (Ober1998: 248–289; Poulakos and Depew 2004).13

Conclusion

The poleis of Classical Greece experienced a wide variety of political orders guaranteeingrights of participation to their citizens of various kinds and to varying degrees. Greekpolitical discourse and theory tended to list those political orders under the labels ofeither democracy or oligarchy. The concepts of oligarchy and democracy, however,should not be taken as essentialist descriptions of historical reality, but as constructionsconceived to structure the multifariousness of the political orders in the Classical polis,although they were also useful for mobilizing political forces in the individual politician’sstruggle for ascendancy. They are, in the words of Max Weber, ‘‘Idealtypen,’’ useful forinterpreting the world, but not mirrors of reality.

158 Hartmut Leppin

NOTES

1 For a general overview, cf. Balot (2006) and Salkever (2009).2 An impression of the variety of polis structures is given by Hansen and Nielsen (2004);

cf. Brock and Hodkinson (2000).3 Contrast to tyranny, cf. Hdt.4.137.2 and 6.43.3; Kleisthenic constitution: 6.131.1; for

alternative terms: 5.78, 92α); not focused on institutions, Forsdyke (2006); cf. Forsdyke(2001: 333 n.13).

4 On democracies outside Athens see Robinson (1997), who follows a rather broad approach,even affirming that certain democracies existed earlier than the Athenian one; but the relevantevidence seems to be late. Korinth: Stickler (2010: esp. 25–34); for Argive peculiaritiesLeppin (1999b); Bearzot and Landucci (2006); Syracuse: Rutter (2000); Thebes: P. Salmon(1978); Beck (1997: 90–94).

5 Demokritos, more famous for his atomic theory, might be regarded as a democratic thinkeroutside Athens: Farrar (1988: 192–264); Procope (1989–1990–1990); Mejer (2004).

6 For the earliest attestation cf. 893 and 896 PMG; cf. for the use of the word in a medicalcontext Alkmaion of Kroton DK 24 B 4. For Herodotus: 3.80.6, 83.1, 142.3; 5.37.2.

7 Cf. now G. Weber (2010) with a good overview of recent research.8 For the implicit theory of ancient democracy from different methodological perspectives

cf. Loraux (2006); Ober (1989). For the various texts Leppin (1999a: 41–55; 2011).9 Farrar (1988: 44–98); cf. also Saxonhouse (2006: 60–65, 179–205), on questioning the

democratic interpretation of Protagoras’ myth.10 Arist. Pol. 3.1281a40–b13. Cf. Athenagoras in Thuc. 6.39.11 For the development of oligarchic ideas cf. Ober 1998 who distinguishes various phases of

‘dissent’ thinking in classical Athens; cf. Blosel (2000); Ostwald (2000).12 Thuc. 2.65, with Leppin (1999a) and Raaflaub (2006c). For a divergent view, cf. Mara

(2008: 87–142).13 For Isokrates’ democratic attitude, cf. Sancho Rocher (2008).