A Defence of Minimalism

PAUL HORWICH

A DEFENSE OF MINIMALISM

My aim in this paper is to clarify and defend a certain ‘minimalist’ thesisabout truth: roughly, that the meaning of the truth predicate is fixed bythe schema, ’The propositionthatp is true if and only ifp’.1 The severalcriticisms of this idea to which I wish to respond are to be found in therecent work of Davidson, Field, Gupta, Richard, and Soames, and in aclassic paper of Dummett’s. But before addressing these criticisms let mebegin by saying something more about the thesis itself.

Consider biconditionals like

〈snow is white〉 is true↔ snow is white

and

〈lying is wrong〉 is true↔ lying is wrong2

– that is, instances of theequivalence schema

〈p〉 is true↔ p

It can be argued that such biconditionals areepistemologically funda-mental: – we do not arrive at them, or seek to justify our acceptance ofthem, on the basis of anything more obvious or more immediately known.It can be argued, in addition, that our underived inclination to acceptthese biconditionals is the source ofeverything elsewe do with the truthpredicate. For example, from the premises

What he said is that he was abducted

and

What he said is true

we are prepared to infer

He was abducted

Synthese126: 149–165, 2001.© 2001Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

150 PAUL HORWICH

This particular use of the word “true” is explained by supposing that wefirst employ Leibniz’ Law to get from our pair of premises to

〈He was abducted〉 is true

and then invoke the relevant instance of the equivalence schema. And,more generally, it can be made plausible that no further fact about the truthpredicate – nothing beyond our allegiance to the equivalence schema – isneeded to explainanyof our ways of using it. It is for this reason that weare entitled to conclude that the meaning of “true” is determined by thatschema. For, plausibly, the property of a word that constitutes its havingthe particular meaning that it has should be identified with the propertythat explains thesymptomsof its possessing that meaning – and thesesymptoms are the various characteristic ways in which it is used.3 Thus myminimalist thesis is the product of two prior claims: first, that our under-ived endorsement of the equivalence schema is explanatorily fundamentalwith respect to the overall use of the truth predicate; and second, that themeaning of any word is engendered by the fact about it that explains itsoverall use.4

This line of thought can be challenged at various points and no doubtstands in need of considerable further justification.5 But my main aim hereis not to defend myrouteto the minimalist conclusion, but rather to defendthat conclusion itself: namely, that the meaning of “true” stems from theequivalence schema. For most of the recent objections to this thesis donot target any particular rationale for it, but purport to demonstrate thatthe thesis itself cannot be correct. However, before addressing these objec-tions, let me help to prepare the ground for my replies to them by sayinga little more to clarify just what the proposal is, and is not, intended toencompass.

Several different kinds of theory, with very different explanatory object-ives, might appropriately be labeled “theories of truth”. So it is importantto be clear about what sort of theoretical work the minimalist proposalis not meant to do and should not be blamed for failing to do. In thefirst place, it is not intended to provide anexplicit definitionof the word“true”, neither descriptive nor stipulative. Therefore it does not offer a wayof rearticulating the contents of sentences containing the word. Indeed, itimplies that no such reformulations are possible.6 In the second place, theproposal does not amount to a substantivereductive theoryof the propertyof being true – something in the style of ’water is H2O’ – which would tellus how truth is constituted at some underlying level. Again, it suggests thatthe search for such a theory would be misguided.7 And in the third place,it is not a ‘theory of truth’ in the sense of a set of fundamental theoretical

A DEFENSE OF MINIMALISM 151

postulates on the basis of which all other facts about truth can be explained.Its immediate concern is with the word “true” rather than with truth itself.It purports to specify which of the non-semantic facts about that word isresponsible for its meaning what it does; and the fact it so specifies is ourunderived allegiance to the equivalence schema.

Now let me turn to an array of objections. I will look at two difficultiesraised by Donald Davidson, one posed by Hartry Field, three devised byAnil Gupta, one due to Mark Richard, one that I put to myself, and oneold, but still influential, objection of Michael Dummett’s. My discussionof each of these problems will be fairly brief – merely indicating the linesalong which I think the response should be given, rather than giving it infull.

Objection 1: The minimalist proposal implies that the meaning of “true”is established on the basis of the meaning of “the proposition that. . . ”. Forsomeone’s acceptance of, for example, “The propositionthat snow is whiteis true if and only if snow is white” manifests a standard understanding ofthe truth predicate only to the extent that the component expression, “Theproposition that. . . ”, is beingunderstood in the standard way. Thus minim-alism implies that one must already understand that-clauses – i.e., one mustunderstand sentences of the form “u expresses (i.e., means) the propositionthat p” – in order to be in a position to acquire the concept of truth.But this surely gets things the wrong way round! Surely the intimatelyrelated notions of meaning and proposition must be analysedin terms oftruth.– Otherwise we wouldn’t be able to account for thecompositionalityof meaning. More specifically, we must (for the sake of compositionality)suppose that

‘u expresses the proposition (i.e., means)thatp’

consists in the fact that

‘u is true (i.e., expresses a truth) if and only ifp’

Thus truth is conceptually prior to meaning, contrary to what is requiredby the minimalist proposal. (Davidson8)

The compositionality of meaning is the fact that the meanings of sentencesdepend on the meanings of their component words and on how those wordsare put together. Or, in other words, it is the fact that our interpretations ofthe complex expressions of someone’s language derive from our interpre-tations of that person’s primitive terms. Now, despite the considerations

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advanced by Davidson in his influential essay, “Truth and Meaning”, andelsewhere, this fact does not really call for an analysis of meaning in termsof truth conditions.9 A viable alternative to the Davidsonian strategy isto suppose, with Frege, that whenever a complex expression is formedby applying a function-expression (e.g., a predicate) to a sequence ofargument-expressions (e.g., names) the meaning of the complex is theresult of applying the meaning of the function-expression to the meaningsof its arguments. For example, the meaning of the result of applying thepredicate “rotates” to the name “Hesperus” – i.e., the meaning of that sen-tence – is the meaning of “rotates” applied to the meaning of “Hesperus”.On the basis of this principle, and given specifications of the meanings ofthe words in a language, it is possible to deduce characterizations of themeanings of every sentence (structurally described) and hence to interpretthe entire language.10

Davidson’s objection to the Fregean view of compositionality is thatit is “vacuous” – that it implies merely that “Hesperus rotates” meanswhatever it means, that it fails to show how that meaning depends on thestructure of the sentence, and that it does not help us to give interpretationsof complex expressions. But these objections are wrong. The Fregean prin-ciple can be no emptier than the compositionality it expresses; it says that“Hesperus rotates” means the result of applying the meaning of “rotates”to the meaning of “Hesperus” – which is not a tautology; it does offer astructure-dependent characterization of what the sentence means; and forthe sake of interpretation such characterizations are all that are needed.

Moreover, this account of compositionality puts no constraint at all onhow the meanings ofwordsare in turn constituted. In particular, it squaresperfectly well with supposing that the meanings of words are engenderedby non-truth-theoretic aspects of their use. Indeed, I believe such a viewof word meaning can be made highly plausible.11 In that case, our under-standing of (and ability to deploy) “u means that Hesperus rotates” willemerge from our knowledge of the uses (hence meanings) of “Hesperus”and “rotates” and from our appreciation of how the sentence results fromapplying one of them to the other. Thus, contrary to this initial Davidso-nian objection, it is quite reasonable to allow that we could first possessthe concepts of meaning and proposition and then, on that basis, fix themeaning of the word “true” (and acquire the concept of truth) by acceptinginstances of the equivalence schema.12

Objection 2: Sentences like “The propositionthat Hesperus rotatesistrue”, insofar as they are construed as predicating truth of the propositionsto which that-clauses refer, are in fact unintelligible, since that-clauses


cannot be regarded as referring terms. And this is so because thereis no way of seeing how their referents would be determined by thereferents of their component words. But if such truth ascriptions (so con-strued) are unintelligible, then the minimalist proposal cannot be correct.(Davidson13)

Davidson’s basic reason for maintaining that alleged referents of that-clauses would not be determinable by the referents of the parts of theseclauses is – following Frege – that substitution of co-referential terms (e.g.,putting “Phosphorus” in place of “Hesperus”) within a that-clause occur-ing in some sentence (e.g., “John believes that Hesperus rotates”) may notpreserve the truth value of that sentence. But why does he not continuealong Fregean lines, and conclude that an expression within a that-clausedoes not have itsstandardreferent, but instead refers to themeaningofthat expression? Why not identify the referent of “the propositionthatHesperus rotates” with the meaning of “Hesperus rotates” and identifythe referents of the contained words “Hesperus” and “rotates” withtheirmeanings? And why not suppose, as suggested in the response to Objection1, that the meaning of “Hesperus rotates” is the result of applying (in thesense of applying afunction to anargument) the predicative meaning of“rotates”, to the nominal meaning of “Hesperus”?

Davidson has made two objections to this Fregean proposal. His firstobjection, given in “Truth and Meaning”, is that it is unilluminating. But,as we have just seen, this criticism is overstated. No more substantiveaccount of compositionality than is contained in the Fregean principleis required to derive interpretations of complex expressions from inter-pretations of their parts. Admittedly, on this account, compositionality isstrikingly easyto explain. But that shows merely that there is much less tothe so-called ‘problem’ of compositionality than is often supposed.14

More recently (in his “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth”) Davidsonhas advanced a somehwat different reason for rejecting the Fregean picture(and hence for concluding that the referents of the parts of a that-clausecould not determine a referent for the whole). He observes that the mean-ings of words in that-clauses are just their normal meanings. – After all, weunderstand “The proposition that Hesperus rotates” only if we understandthe isolated sentence “Hesperus rotates”. And in the biconditional, “Theproposition that Hesperus rotatesis true↔ Hesperus rotates”, the twooccurences of “Hesperus rotates” are clearly supposed to be understoodin the same way. But in that case – since meaning determines reference –how could words in that-clauses fail to have their standard referents. Andif they do have their standard referents then that-clauses cannot refer, since

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what would be determined by those standard referents would be thewrongthing (e.g., “that Hesperus rotates” would acquire the same referent as “thatPhosphorus rotates”).

To this line of thought it seems to me that two reasonable responses areavailable. In the first place we might well deny that meaning determinesreference. We might suppose, on the contrary, that the referent of a termis fixed in part by the context in which it occurs. More specifically, wemight say that the single meaning of “Hesperus” yields one referent (theplanet) for standard (non-opaque) occurences of the word, and that it yieldsa different referent (the meaning of “Hesperus”) for occurences of the wordwithin that-clauses.

An alternative response would be to deny that the referent of a com-plex expression is determined by the referents of itsgrammaticalparts.We might prefer to say instead that it is only forlogically articulatedex-pressions that their referents are determined by the referents of their parts.For we might suppose that although the words “Hesperus” and “rotates”are indeed used in the superficial grammatical form of “The propositionthat Hesperus rotates”, the underlying logical form might be somethingin which those words are not used, but are merely mentioned (e.g., “Theproposition expressed by the sentence ‘Hesperus rotates’, as I currently un-derstand it”). Admittedly, this is no longer Fregean. Nonetheless, it wouldtreat that-clauses as singular terms, and it would conform to Davidson’s re-quirements on such a treatment: namely, that their referents be determinedby the referents of their logical parts, and that these parts have the samemeanings inside that-clauses as they do outside.15

Objection 3: The minimalist proposal would leave it mysterious how weare able to attribute content to sentences that predicate truth of foreignstatements we can’t understand. For if an utteranceu is known to mean(say) that dogs bark, then (according to the proposal) the sentence “u istrue” (or “u expresses a truth”) might be interpreted as saying roughlythatdogs bark; whereas if u is not understood, then the proposal enables us toattach no meaning at all to “u is true”. But we surely do think that it ismeaningful to predicate truth of statements we cannot understand. So theminimalist proposal is defective. (Field16 )

But, as we have already seen, the proposal is not intended as a definitionof “true”: it does not purport to provide a way of reformulating or re-articulating the content of each sentence containing the word “true”. Onthe contrary, it implies that such a thing is not possible. So one cannotreasonably complain that the minimalist proposal fails to yield a concep-


tual analysis of the sentence “u is true”. One certainlycould complainif the proposal implied that this sentence lacked content.– But it has nosuch implication. It aims to specify the underlying use property in virtueof which the truth predicate means what it does. To that end, it identifiescertain tokens of that predicate as explanatorily fundamental and hencemeaning-constituting – namely, those that appear in instances of the equi-valence schema. But other tokens may perfectly well have the very samemeaning, as long as their deployment stems from the fundamental ones.Thus someone who reasons inductively to “u expresses something true”on the basis of the fact that the other assertions of the speaker – those thatcanbe translated – have turned out to be true, uses the truth predicate witha constant meaning, one that is engendered by the equivalence schema.

Objection 4: The equivalence schema is not enough to fix the meaningof the truth predicate, because exactly parallel schemata are satisfied bypredicates that do not mean the same as “true”. For example, instances ofthe schema, ‘〈p〉 is true and not red↔ p’, are just as obviously correctas instances of the equivalence schema. But “is true and not red” is not asynonym of the truth predicate. More generally, the schema, ‘〈p〉 is f ↔p’, will be endorsed relative to a variety of predicates, “f ”, with differentmeanings from one another; therefore, for any given “f ”, it cannot be thatour acceptance of instances of ‘〈p〉 isf ↔ p’ is what fixes “f ”’s meaning.(Gupta17)

Indeed. However, according to minimalism, what fixes the meaning of thetruth predicate isnot merely ourallegiance to the equivalence schemabut, in addition, the fact that this allegiance is epistemologically basic –i.e. the fact that our endorsement of the equivalence schema is that useof “true” which is not derived from any more fundamental assumptionsformulated by means of the truth predicate. Certainly there are parallelschemata, constructed with other predicates in place of “true”, that areequally acceptable. However, in every such case our commitment to theschema isderived. For example, it is as a consequence of our endorsingthe equivalence schema for truth, and of our accepting “No propositionis red”, that we accept instances of ‘〈p〉 is true and not red↔ p’. Onlyin the case of thetruth predicate does the corresponding schema capturewhat is epistemologically basic in our usage of the predicate. And it is thisproperty that engenders its meaning.

Objection 5: The minimalist proposal implieseither that the word “true”cannot be fully understoodor that the meaning of each person’s truth pre-

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dicate depends on, and varies with, whatever else is in his vocabulary. Forthe proposal is tantamount to the definition:

x is true≡ [x = 〈dogs bark〉 & dogs bark; orx = 〈pigs fly〉 &pigs fly; or . . . and so on]

Therefore, if the “and so on” is intended to coverall propositions, then –since some of them must involve concepts that no-one possesses – themeaning of “true” cannot be fully known to anyone. And if, alternat-ively, the definition of each person’s truth predicate is supposed to coveronly those propositions he can grasp, then, as new concepts are deployedand new terms coined, his definition of “true” will change. But neitherof these alternative implications of minimalism is acceptable. Surelyour understanding of the truth predicate is both complete and constant.(Gupta18)

Agreed. But my proposal is perfectly consonant with such intuitions,because it is not at all equivalent to the above definition. As alreadyemphasized, the minimalist thesis does not offerany explicit definition.Rather it purports to specify the fact of usage that provides the truth pre-dicate with its meaning. That fact of usage, it claims, is our underivedinclination to accept instances of the equivalence schema – a fact thatremains the same as the rest of our language evolves. So, for example,at the moment that the term, “tachyon”, enters our language, we becomeinclined to accept

〈tachyons go backwards in time〉 is true↔ tachyons go back-wards in time

But this is merely one more application of a single and invariable regularity– our inclination to accept any instance of the schema that we understand.That inclination preceded the introduction of the term “tachyon” and wasin no way altered by it. Thus the minimalist thesis does not imply that themeaning of the word “true” can’t be fully grasped, or that it changes withthe expansion of our vocabulary.

Objection 6: Our reliance on the equivalence schema will not suffice toexplain our knowledge ofgeneralfacts about truth. Consider, for example,“All propositions of the form,〈p → p〉, are true”. No doubt our partic-ular logical convictions together with our commitment to the equivalenceschema can explain,for any single proposition, why we take it to be truethat this proposition implies itself. Thus we can explain, given our logicalcommitment to “dogs bark→ dogs bark”, why we also accept “The pro-position that dogs bark→ dogs barkis true”. But we have not thereby


explained how the abovegeneralizationis reached. Thus our allegiance tothe equivalence schema does not really suffice to account forall uses of thetruth predicate. Therefore that practice does not fix the meaning of “true”,contrary to what the minimalist maintains. (Gupta, Soames19)

Granted, some further explanatory premise is needed. But this concessionprovides an objection to the proposal only if the needed additional premisespecifies properties of the word “true”. For only then will it emerge thatour commitment to the equivalence schema, together with facts that havenothing specifically to do with the truth predicate, are insufficient to ex-plain its overall use. But actually it is far from obvious that the premise weshould add will explicitly concern the truth predicate.

Suppose, for example, it were a fact that whenever someone can es-tablish, for everyF , that it isG, then he comes, on that basis, to believethat everyF is G. Combined with such a fact (which does not explicitlyconcern the truth predicate) our disposition to accept, for each propositionof a certain form, that it is true would suffice to explain our acceptance ofthe generalization, “Every proposition of that form is true”.

Of course this response to the objection will not do as it stands, be-cause the proposed extra explanatory premise is clearly incorrect. It isnotalways the case that the ability to establish, regarding eachF , that it isG, engenders the belief that allFs areG. For example, suppose someonemistakenly suspects that there are planets within the orbit of Mercury. Inthat case he might nevertheless be able to show, of every planet, that itsdistance from the sun is not less than Mercury’s; but he does not believethe generalization that all the planets have this property.

Obviously, he is not tempted to draw the generalization because, al-though in fact he can establish for eachF that it is G, he does notappreciate this fact – indeed he would deny it. This suggests that a moreplausible version of our extra premise would run along the following lines:

Whenever someone can establish, for anyF , that it isG, andrecognizes that he can do this, then he will conclude that everyF isG.

It seems to me that this is more-or-less what we need to explain ouracceptance of the generalization about truth. We can establish, for anyproposition of the form ,〈p → p〉, that it is true. Moreover, we canbecome aware of this ability. For we can see that any of the propositionsin question may be designated by some expression of a certain form. Andwe can also come to see that there is a general strategy which, given anysuch expression, will establish the sentence that results from writing theexpression before “is true”.20

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Thus we have a plausible explanatory premise which, in conjunctionwith our endorsement of the equivalence schema, will enable us to explainthe acceptance of generalizations about truth. And since that premise doesnot explicitly concern the truth predicate, the need for it does nothing tosuggest that the basic regularity governing the truth predicate has to gobeyond our underived commitment to the equivalence schema.21

Objection 7: Certain people (mostly philosophers) do not have a com-pletely general inclination to endorse the equivalence schema. They mighthold, for example that ethical pronouncements, contingent statementsabout the future, applications of vague predicates to borderline cases, orsentences containing empty names, fail to yield acceptable instances. Butthese people nevertheless mean the same thing as we do by the word “true”.After all, we might disagree with them on the question, “Can ethical pro-nouncements can be true?” – yet each of us expresses the issue in just thatway. Consequently, it cannot be that to understand the English truth pre-dicate one must have an inclination to acceptall instances of the schema.(Richard22)

Notice that the present objection is not based on the claim that certaininstances of the equivalence schema are incorrect, or that they are unhes-itatingly rejected by everyone.23 The point rather is thatif someone hasno inclination to accept a certain class of instances (despite understandingthem) he might nonetheless understand the truth predicate as we do. Andso we have to conclude, it would seem, that ageneralendorsement of theschema isnot what provides that word with its meaning.

But this conclusion is unwarranted. For we can invokesocial extern-alism in order to accommodate our minimalist thesis to the facts underconsideration. We might suppose that the tendency of some people to re-strict the equivalence schema stems from confusion about the meaningof the truth predicate. We might suppose that their basic use of it doesnot quite match its meaning-constituting use; but that they are nonethelesscorrectly ascribed the standard concept of truth because they belong to alinguistic community in which that concept is the ‘right’ one to have –the one deployed by the appropriate ‘experts’. Moreover, a good case canbe made that it is indeed those who restrict the schema, rather than thoseof us who do not, who are confused and mistaken. For they tend to bein the grip of the idea that truth is a substantive property, analysable interms of ‘correspondence with facts’. They do not appreciate the real roleof the truth predicate as a device of generalization – a role which requiresthat it be applicable toany proposition (i.e., to what is expressed byany


declarative sentence). Thus one can say that the meaning-constituting factabout the truth predicate is the fact that explains the overall use of it bythose who are not confused. And this fact is our allegiance to the fullygeneral equivalence schema.

Objection 8: But couldn’t we come across someone who denies that thereis such a thing as truth – someone who is not prepared to acceptanyinstances of the equivalence schema? Couldn’t such a person nonethelessunderstandour talk of truth, and nonetheless mean what we do by the word“true” when he says, for example, “Even though dogs bark, it is not truethat they do”?

I believe this is correct. Moreover, the social externalism of meaning doesnot suffice to reconcile minimalism with such a scenario. For our imaginedsceptic’s use of the word “true” is not evenapproximatelya matter ofendorsing the equivalence schema. The moral would seem to be, rather,that there must be some use of “true” that (a) is implicit in, but weakerthan, an endorsement of the equivalence schema, (b) is displayed by thesceptics and by ourselves, and (c) constitutes what we both mean by thatword.

This conclusion is also suggested by the plausibility of allowing – con-trary to what we have been supposing so far – that our endorsement of theequivalence schema isnot epistemologically fundamental. For it wouldseem to be the product of two deeper factors: first, there beingsometerm,“f ”, such that all instances of an equivalence schema involving that termare accepted as basic (i.e., instances of ’〈p〉 is f ↔ p’); and second,the conditional decision that,if there is such a term, it shall be the word“true”. Given this way of factorizing our endorsement of the equivalenceschema, then it is plausible that although that endorsement issufficienttofix the meaning of “true”, it is notnecessary. Rather, all that is necessaryis the second of these factors – the conditional commitment to express theconcept which satisfies the schema,if any concept does, using the word“true”. In that case, someone might reject the antecedent of the conditional– he might deny that there is any concept satisfying the schema – and yetagree with us about what the truth predicate means.24

Thus our initial minimalist proposal must be revised. Meaning whatwe do by the truth-predicate isnot constituted by an inclination to acceptinstances of the equivalence schema; but rather by the commitment to havethat inclination, on condition that one is inclined, for some “f”, to endorse‘〈p〉 is f ↔ p’.

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Objection 9: Truth is valuable: we ought to pursue it and we ought toavoid false belief. But these sentiments are not contained in (nor can theybe extracted from) instances of ‘〈p〉 is true↔ p’, which are entirely non-normative. Consequently, our concept of truth is not fully captured by theequivalence schema: so the minimalist proposal is false. (Dummett25)

On the contrary, the equivalence schemadoessuffice to explain the norm-ative force of truth. To see this, consider specific norms of belief suchas

One should believethat wombats fly↔ wombats fly

Clearly our commitments to norms like this one have nothing to do withthe concept of truth; for that concept is completely absent from their artic-ulation. Not of course that there is no call to explain why we adopt suchcommitments. The point is merely that one should not expect the conceptof truth to be doing any of the explanatory work.

Let us then imagine that all such specific norms of belief are somehowexplained.26 Suppose, that is, we can account for our attachment to allnorms of the form

One should believethatp↔ p

Given the equivalence schema, we will then be able to explain ourattachment to every norm of the form

One should believe〈p〉 ↔ 〈p〉 is true

that is, to every norm of the form

One should believex ↔ x is true

But this engenders (via the mechanism discussed in the response toObjection 6) a commitment to the generalization

(x)(One should believex ↔ x is true)

– or, in English, to the principle

One should believe what is true and only what is true27

Thus the value we attach to true belief is explained by the role of truthas a device of generalization – which is itself explained perfectly by theequivalence schema.


The full minimalist picture of truth includes considerably more than thethesis I have been defending in this essay. It involves, besides the presentclaim about how the meaning of “true” is constituted, an affiliated viewabout thefunction of the truth predicate (namely – as just illustrated –that it is merely a device of generalization), an affiliated view about theunderlying nature of truth (namely, that there is no such thing), and anaffiliated view about the general shape of the basic theory that will bestexplain all the facts about truth (namely, that its postulates are instancesof the equivalence schema). I have not attempted to elaborate or estab-lish these further minimalist doctrines. However, since what I have beenconcerned with here is the central component of minimalism, my defenseof that thesis, if successful, provides important support for the view as awhole.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Hartry Field and Michael Lynch for their commentson a draft of this paper.

NOTES

1 A note on the relationship betweendeflationismandminimalismabout truth. Deflation-ism is the somewhat vague idea that truth is not a ‘substantive’ property, that no reductivetheory of it should be anticipated, and that our grasp of the truth predicate comes from ourappreciation that each statement specifies its own condition for being true. But philosoph-ers who sympathize with this general point of view disagree amongst themselves abouthow best to elaborate it. Minimalism is one such strategy – the one defended here andpreviously articulated in myTruth (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1998). Besidesminimalism, the main alternative forms of deflationism about truth are: (1)disquotation-alism, according to which sentences (rather than propositions) should be regarded as thebearers of truth and the schema, “p” is true↔p, will be what defines the truth predicate;(2) prosententialism, which stresses the use of “That is true” to save having to repeat whathas just been asserted and which denies that “true” should be logically formalized as apredicate; (3)the redundancy theory, whereby “The proposition that p” means exactlythe same as “p”; (4)the quantificational theory, which analyses truth-talk in terms ofsubstitutional quantification into sentence positions: – ‘x is true’ means ‘(∃p)(x = 〈p〉& p)’; and (5)Tarski’s theory, which explains the truth of each sentence of a language interms of the referential properties of its components and the logical structure in which theyare embedded. The relative advantages of the minimalist version of deflationism cannot bespelled out here. But, in a nutshell, its merits are (a) that it deals with ouractualconcept oftruth, rather than some allegedly superior one; (b) that it does not attempt to explain truth interms of notions that should themselves be explained in terms of truth (e.g. substitutionalquantification); (c) it recognizes that there is no call for an explicit definition; (d) it can

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countenance the attribution of truth to propositions whose logical forms we do not know;(e) by acknowledging truth as a property, it squares perfectly with its role as a device ofgeneralization.2 “〈p〉” abbreviates “the proposition thatp”; and “↔” is the materialbiconditional.3 This view of how meaning-constituting properties are to be identified is an instance ofthe general idea that an underlying propertyU constitutes a relatively superficial propertyS whenU ’s being co-extensive withS explains why possession ofS has the symptoms thatit does.4 I am inclined to say that a word’s meaning-property (e.g., ‘w means TRUE’)is con-stituted by(or reduces to, or may be analysed as) a certain way of using the word. But,in light of the relational character of meaning-properties, this thesis is in tension with theprinciple that any analysis of a complex property must result from the analysis of (at leastone of) its constituents. One strategy here is to criticize that principle. Thus the Frege-Russell reduction of ‘the number of dogs owned byx = 0’ to ‘−(∃y)(y is a dog ownedby x)’ is a plausible counterexample. Another strategy is to retreat to a slightly weakerthesis. Rather than speaking of constitution (or reduction, or analysis), we might say thatthe use-property of a wordengenders(or determines, or is the explanatory basis for) itscorresponding meaning-property.5 For justification of the claim that the equivalence schema is explanatorily fundamental,see myTruth (op. cit.). For justification of the use theory of meaning, see myMeaning,Oxford University Press, 1998.6 To claim that “x is true↔ x isP ” is the explicit definition of the truth predicate (where“P ” might be replaced with “in correspondance with reality”, “verifiable”, “useful”, etc.)is to claim that our acceptance of this principle is explanatorily fundamental with respect toour overall use of that predicate. But this claim is incompatible with the minimalist thesisaccording to which it is our endorsement the equivalence schema that is explanatorily basic.7 I would argue that the axioms of the fundamental theory of truth – those that willprovides the best explanation (i.e., simplest derivation) of all facts about truth – are in-stances of ‘〈p〉 is true↔ p’. For (a) such axioms would suffice (in conjunction withtheories of other matters) to explain every other fact about truth; and (b) it is hard to imaginea simpler body of principles on the basis of which those instances could themselves beexplained. For further discussion seeTruth, pp. 25–31, 50–51 (op. cit.).8 Davidson, D. “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth”,Journal of Philosophy87 (1966)267–78. Objection 1, with its focus on compositionality, seems to me to present Davidson’sstrongest reason for concluding, contrary to minimalism, that truth is conceptually priorto meaning. However, he does not elaborate this point in any detail, but instead stressesvarious other arguments for that conclusion. First, he infers it from the fact that thereare sentences (such as “That is red”) whose meaning-constituting, assertibility conditionsare to accept those sentences only when they aretrue. But this reasoning presupposes(wrongly, in my view) that meaning-constituting regularities of use areexplicitly knownby the speakers of a language. Second, he infers it from the fact that someone’s acceptanceof a sentence may be justified only if he believes that the sentence is true. But that factis better explained by minimalism, together with the fact that one should only assert whatone believes. And third, he urges a direction of explanation which goes from (a) factsabout the circumstances that cause the acceptance of sentences, to (b) facts about theirtruth conditions, to (c) facts about their meanings. But there is a long-standing, notoriousdifficulty with that line of thought: namely, to articulate a conception of ‘truth condition’that is strong enough. For, given amaterialconstrual of the conditional, “p” may very well


be true iffq, without meaning thatq. And stronger construals of “iff” merely make suchcounterexamples slightly harder to construct.9 Davidson, D. ‘Truth and Meaning’,Synthese17 (1967) 304–23.10 For further discussion of this approach, see my “The Composition of Meanings”,Philo-sophical Review106 (1997) 503–31, reprinted as chapter 7 ofMeaning(op. cit.). In thatwork I defend the idea that the meaning-property of a complex expression isconstitutedby its being constructed in a certain way from words with certain meanings. This proposalis stronger than the Fregean principle deployed in the present essay; for it implies thattwo expressions have the same meaning, not onlyif, but alsoonly if, they are similarlyconstructed.11 SeeMeaning (op. cit.). A rationale for the use theory of meaning is sketched at thebeginning of this paper, where I motivate the minimalist view of how the meaning of thetruth predicate is constituted.12 One might be tempted by a moreholistic theory whereby truth and meaning (and pro-position) are on the same conceptual level and are jointly explained in terms of one anotherand in terms of other matters. Such a theory would be less simple and less explanatory –hence, less attractive – than a more atomistic view such as the one proposed here, andshould be embraced only as a last resort.13 Davidson, D. “Truth and Meaning” and “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth”.14 Strictly speaking, the Fregean approach that I am recommending does notexplainthe fact that meaning is compositional, but takes this fact, in its Fregean form, to beexplanatorily fundamental.15 Davidson is careful to emphasize that his critique of minimalism does not amount tothe claim that there are no such things as propositions. Presumably he thinks that, if theyexist, they must be designated by expressions of the form, “The proposition expressed byu” (where “u” refers to a sentence-token), rather than by expressions of the form “Theproposition thatp”. But even if this point were correct – and I have been arguing that itis not – the essence of the minimalist proposal would not be affected. For it can be re-formulated in terms of the schema, “The proposition expressed by the following sentence-token is true↔ p”. We can suppose that this is what fixes the meaning of “true”.

In addition to Davidson’s critique, which concerns the way that propositions aredesig-nated, there are several objections to the veryexistenceof propositions – objections that aminimalist must be able to rebut. The main ones are (1) that propositions lack satisfactoryidentity conditions; (2) thatfalsepropositions do not exist (because any actual combinationof objects and properties would amount to afact; (3) that propositions are ontologicallyweird and explanatorily unnecessary. For discussion of these issues, seeTruth (op. cit.).16 Field, H.: 1992, ‘Critical Notice: Paul Horwich’sTruth’, Philosophy of Science59, 321–30.17 Gupta, A.: 1993, ‘A Critique of Deflationism’,Philosophical Topics21, 57–81; and his‘Minimalism’, Philosophical Perspectives7 (1993) 359–69.18 Gupta, A. ‘A Critique of Deflationism’ (op. cit.) and ‘Minimalism’ (op. cit.)19 Gupta, A. ‘A Critique of Deflationism’ (op. cit.) and ‘Minimalism’ (op. cit.). Thisobjection has also been forcefully articulated by Scott Soames in his “The Truth AboutDeflationism”, E. Villanueva (ed.)Philosophical Issues8, Atascadero, Cal., RidgeviewPublishing Company, 1997. See also “Some Remarks on Deflationism” (unpublished) byPaolo Casalegno (University of Milan).20 One might well wonder whetherall general facts about truth can be explained in thisway; but I think that we have some reason to think that they can be. For it would seem

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that any such fact could be put into the form: All propositions of typeK have propertyJ .For example: (1) Given any conjunction, if it is true then so are its conjuncts; (2) Givenany proposition of the form〈p → q〉, if it and its antecedent are both true, then so is itsconsequent; (3) Given any atomic proposition, it is true if and only if its predicate is trueof the referent of its subject; etc. Now, for any such generalization, if we can show, withthe help of the equivalence schema, that it holds of an arbitrary proposition, we can theninvoke the proposed additional premise to explain our acceptance of that generalization.

Hartry Field (in his “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content”,Mind 103, 1994, 249–85) offers a solution to the ‘generalization’ problem, which supposes, roughly speaking,(1) that we can reasonschematically– e.g., we can prove and assert “(p & (p → q))→q” – and we then have the right to substitute sentences for schematic variables; (2) thatwe can introduce a rule allowing us to go from any schematic theorem, ‘〈p〉 isK ’, to theconclusion ‘All propositions areK ’; and (3) that we assert the schema, “〈p〉 is true↔ p”(and not merely its instances).

My proposal differs from this only in that, instead of clause (3), I have a claim (ineffect) about the circumstances in which our disposition to believe all propositions of acertain form entitles us to assert the corresponding schema. This enables me to preservethe thesis of this paper – namely, that the meaning of “true” is fixed by our inclination toacceptinstancesof the equivalence schema – rather than having to move to the claim, thatit is our inclination to acceptthe schema itselfthat fixes the meaning of the truth predicate.‘Assertion of aschema’strikes me as too sophisticated an activity to be plausibly attributedto ordinary people.21 A further objection of Anil Gupta’s – one that Ido think is correct – is that our under-ived endorsement of the equivalence schema will not explain our confident acceptance ofsentences like “Julius Caesar was not true”. To accommodate this point we can supposethat the explanatorily-basic, meaning-constituting facts about “true” include, not merelyour underived allegiance to the equivalence schema, but also our underived acceptance ofthe principle, “Only propositions are true”.22 Richard, M. “Deflating Truth”, E. Villanueva (ed.),Philosophical Issues8, op. cit.23 I would argue that the moral of the ‘liar’ paradoxes is that notall instances of theequivalence schema are correct. But I don’t believe that those who come to accept thismoral, and who come to balk at certain instances, are thereby altering what they meanby the truth predicate. This is my motivation for supposing that the meaning-constitutingfact about “true” is a mereinclination to accept any instance of the schema, rather than adispositionto accept any instance. In problematic cases the inclination will be over-ridden.But its continued existence is what sustains the sense of paradox.24 N.B. the factoring of a scientific theory,T (f 1, . . . , f n), into its Ramsey sen-tence,(∃x1) . . . (∃xn)T (x1, . . . , xn) (which says that there exist properties that relateto one another and to observable facts just as the theory says) and the conditional,(∃x1) . . . (∃xn)T (x1, . . . , xn) ⇒ T (f 1, . . . , f n) (which says thatif such there are suchproperties they aref1, f 2, . . . , f n). It is plausibly just the second of these commitmentsthat is needed to fix the meanings of the theoretical terms. For further discussion seemy “Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth and Apriori Knowledge”,Nous, 1997, reprinted(slightly revised) as chapter 6 ofMeaning(op. cit.); and my “Stipulation, Meaning, andApriority” in New Essays on the A Priori, edited by P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke, OxfordUniversity Press, 2000.25 Dummett, M. “Truth”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society59, (1958–59), 141–62.


26 I would argue that the basis for our commitment to these specific norms ispragmatic:we are more likely to get what we want if we abide by them. See chapter 8 ofMeaning(op.cit.) and my “Norms of Truth and Meaning”, inWhat Is Truth, edited by Richard Schantz,Gruyter: Berlin and New York, 2001.27 Clearly this is merely a first approximation of the proper norm. For one thing, thereis nothing wrong with not bothering to investigate, and hence failing to believe, certainextremely trivial facts.

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A Defence of Minimalism