ARTICLE IN PRESS

Energy Policy 38 (2010) 116–127

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy

0301-42

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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

A light left in the dark: The practice and politics of pico-hydropower in theLao PDR

Mattijs Smits a,�, Simon R. Bush b

a School of Geosciences, University of Sydney, Australiab Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 3 June 2009

Accepted 25 August 2009Available online 18 September 2009

Keywords:

Pico-hydropower

Political ecology

Lao PDR

15/$ - see front matter & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. A

016/j.enpol.2009.08.058

esponding author.

ail address: mattijs.smits@gmail.com (M. Smi

efinitions of micro-hydropower sometimes

wer. Because pico-hydropower generates el

inction avoids confusion with larger micro-

erate at village level.

a b s t r a c t

The article describes the widespread use of an estimated 60,000 low-head pico-hydropower turbines

and well-developed networks of supply and support in the Northern part of the Lao People’s Democratic

Republic (Lao PDR). This apparent widespread use is contrasted with the policy narratives of key actors

in the government, multilateral organisations and the private sector which show an often simplified and

overly negative attitude towards pico-hydropower. Based on empirical research carried out in three

upland districts and the capital, Vientiane, the paper critically investigates the apparent disjuncture

between policy and practice by placing pico-hydropower within the broader political context of rural

electrification in the Lao PDR. It is argued that the neglect of pico-hydropower and other off-grid

household electrification technologies is a result of an endemic lack of information on which to base

policy decisions, the orientation of the government to facilitate large scale foreign investment in large

hydropower dams, the universal applicability of solar home systems, and the broader state agenda of

centralisation and control over service provision to remote upland areas.

& 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LaoPDR) is currently operating or constructing 15 hydropower plantswith a generating capacity of over 1 MW, with a further 70memoranda of understanding signed for further feasibility studies(GoL, 2009). Hydropower development in Laos and the MekongBasin has emerged as a highly contested natural resource debatefor almost 25 years (Bakker, 1999; Hirsch, 1987; Sneddon and Fox,2006). Large and medium scale dams have been the main focus,but the role of micro-hydro,1 or village hydro, as a decentralisedprovider of electricity has also been increasingly questioned(Graecen, 2004). Pico-hydro technology (r1 kW), operating atindividual household level, has until now received scant atten-tion; largely because of a systematic lack of information about itscurrent application, but also partly because of the energyprovisioning policies of the Lao government. Table 1 shows thatin 2005 pico-hydropower was not reported in official energystatistics and information on other technologies, such asphotovoltaic (PV) solar panels, was grossly incomplete.

ll rights reserved.

ts).

include what we call pico-

ectricity at household level,

hydropower systems which

Understanding the contribution pico-hydropower makes to ruralelectrification and its position in domestic energy policy is ofparticular importance if the Lao government is to reach its goal ofproviding 90% of the households with electricity by 2020-especially so given 10% of this energy should be providedthrough off-grid technologies (GoL, 2001).

The economic development of the Lao PDR has been closelytied to harnessing the potential of hydropower. The almostcompleted 1080 MW Nam Theun 2 project alone costs around80% of the country’s annual gross domestic product and oncompletion will contribute 7–9% of the government’s annualnational budget (Whaley et al., 2009). More than 10,000 MW ofelectricity is already contracted out through exports to Thailandand Vietnam and should be delivered by 2020 (Vientiane Times,2008). Plans for hydropower are no longer limited to thetributaries of the Mekong but extend to the mainstream river aswell, including the Don Sahong dam on the Khone falls and a1.4 GW dam in Luang Phrabang province. Despite the macro-economic benefits of hydropower, there are considerable concernsover the impact these large dams have on the ecology of theMekong River system and livelihoods of the largely semi-subsistence rural population in Laos (see for example, Baird,2006; Baran et al., 2005; Shoemaker et al., 2001).

The Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) finance model throughwhich most large dams are built concentrates mainly on exportingwith only around 10% for urban domestic markets. The high costof extending the electricity grid to relatively isolated rural

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Table 1Total installed energy capacity in Laos.

Ownership Small to largehydro 41 MW

Mini hydro100 kW–1 MW

Micro hydro1–100 kW

Pico hydroo1 kW

Dieselgenerator

PV solar Totalinstalledcapacity

Share

kW kW kW kW kW kW kW %

EdL 307,548 - 307,548 45.81

Province 1200 951 454 860 3465 0.52

IPP 360,000 360,000 53.63

Other – 297 297 0.04

Total 668,748 951 454 860 297 671,310 100.00

Percentage 99.62% 0.14% 0.07% 0.13% 0.04% 100%

Source: MEM (2005).

EdL=Electricit�e du Lao, IPP=Independent Power Producers.

Note: This table is a direct copy from the Electricity Statistic of Lao PDR: 2005 (MEM, 2005), only the lower row of percentages has been added. The blank spaces are also

blank in the original document.

M. Smits, S.R. Bush / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 116–127 117

communities means that off-grid rural electrification, usingrenewable energy technologies, remains an important option forthe government and international development organisations toconsider. So far, most attention and investment has been given tothe development of solar home systems (SHS) and dieselgenerators for off-grid electrification (Klauß-Vorreiter et al.,2006). However, as this paper demonstrates, pico-hydropower isa technology that holds considerable potential given it is alreadyestablished across the country, has not required any donor financeor support and has a wide market-based network of technicalsupport for spare parts and complementary appliances. Tounderstand the apparent neglect of pico-hydropower in Laosrequires delving into both the external role that developmentorganisations play in driving policy agendas in developingcountries, and the internal political landscape of centralisationand rent seeking behaviour over the country’s land and waterresources.

Based on a study conducted in four upland districts (see Fig. 1)in Laos during 2008 this article explores the apparentcontradiction between the relatively widespread use of pico-hydropower and its near total neglect in energy policies of thestate and non-state actors. The first objective of the article is tounderstand the characteristics of pico-hydropower in Laos as asuccessful market-driven renewable energy technology. This isdone by empirically describing in detail the hardware, market anduse of pico-hydropower technology. The second objective is toanalyse how actors involved in off-grid energy policy making haveneglected pico-hydropower as a viable option as well as themechanisms guiding this neglect. As such, the article seeks tocritically investigate the potential of pico-hydropower as anestablished off-grid electricity technology in its broader politicalcontext.

To understand the apparent neglect of pico-hydropoweramongst policy actors in the energy sector, we apply Roe’s(1991, 1994, 1999) narrative policy analysis. This approach focuseson the rhetoric used to problematise or ‘frame’ issues and enableactors to give meaning to actions and policies in the absence ofempirical information. The approach is particularly useful indetermining the disjuncture between policy and practice whenthere is a dearth of information on which to base a moretraditional, data-rich policy analysis. The approach has been takenup in academic studies of environmental politics to understandthe source and nature of contested environmental policy agendasacross a range of sectors (e.g. Forsyth, 2003; McBeth et al., 2007;Walker, 2006). Our analysis concentrates on the key policy actorsbased in the capital city Vientiane, critically focusing on how pico-hydropower is framed, understood and promoted as an off-gridelectrification technology.

The paper begins with an overview of energy politics in the LaoPDR, highlighting the tension between centralised production forexport and domestic off-grid rural electrification. Subsequently,the article discusses the policies of actors involved in off-gridelectrification on the national level analysing their attitudes andinterests around pico-hydropower. The paper then elaborates onan empirical investigation of the hardware, installation, use andsystems of support around pico-hydro in three provinces andcompares how this socio-material reality matches the apparentneglect of pico-hydro by key state and non-state policy actors.Finally, the underlying mechanisms for the apparent neglect ofpico-hydro are discussed before exploring the wider implicationsfor future energy provisioning in Laos.

2. Energy policy and politics in the Lao PDR

Laos is one of the fiscally poorest countries of Southeast Asia,with a population of 6.5 million spread across a largelymountainous terrain which covers three quarters of the total landarea (UNDP, 2009). Strong state control combined with adependency on aid and donor funding means that the populationis dependent on the government for access to fragmented publicservices and infrastructure. As one of the few remaining single-party socialist states, the Lao government is particularly keen onmaintaining control over its natural resources and population, asis evidenced by the control on media and the strongly centralisedpolitical and fiscal control of provincial and district governments(Stuart-Fox, 2004). However, in order to gain access to largestreams of foreign aid, the government has gradually movedtowards a market economy since the mid-1980s. The gradualliberalisation of many sectors, including agriculture, mining andenergy, highlight the influence of bilateral and multilateral donorsover domestic policy (Rigg, 2005). It is within this complexinteraction between state control and development aid thatenergy and water resources policies currently take shape.

2.1. Focus on large hydro and grid electrification

The development of large hydropower has enabled thegovernment to centralise control of water resources in some ofthe most remote and isolated parts of the country. Currently, only10 large dams generate around 700 MW of hydropower. Thesedams have a capacity ranging from 1 to 210 MW with average of74 MW (GoL, 2009). This figure will change dramatically onceNam Theun 2 and other large dams currently under constructionare finalised. Memoranda of understanding have been signed withThailand and Vietnam to deliver 3000 and 2000 MW, respectively,

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Fig. 1. Map showing vertical relief and location of study sites.

M. Smits, S.R. Bush / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 116–127118

by 2010 (UNDP, 2006). These figures will reportedly increase to7000 MW for Thailand and 3000 MW for Vietnam by 2020 with25 large dams currently being planned or constructed and thefeasibility of 45 more under investigation.2 China and Cambodiaare also seeking electricity produced in Laos in the next decade astheir economies expand (Vientiane Times, 2008; GoL, 2009).

Large hydropower projects are usually financed and executedby foreign companies through BOOT contracts, with the Laogovernment (often through Electricit�e du Lao or the Lao HoldingState Enterprise) typically claiming 20–25% of the initial equity.However, only 10% of the electricity generated from the large

2 In the list of the GoL all dams bigger than 1 MW are included. However, most

of them are larger than 100 MW, the more common definition of large hydropower.

dams currently in place is made available for domestic consump-tion. That leaves some of the relatively smaller hydropower plants(100 MW and less) exclusively for domestic consumption. More-over, because the national grid in Laos consists of four separatesegments, in 2006 367 million kWh had to be imported above thetariffs for the 547 million kWh exported in the same year (CIA,2009).

Grid electrification is the most important strategy to provideelectricity to the domestic market. Although domestic gridelectrification has expanded rapidly in the last decade, additionalextension has proved financially and technically prohibitive. Thehousehold electrification rate has gone up from 19% in 1996 to48% in 2005 (MEM, 2005) to 60% in 2008 (Phomsoupha, 2008).This has been achieved through loans and grants from the WorldBank and the Asian Development Bank to fund grid extension.

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Fig. 2. Proportion of electrified households by province and region. Adapted from: MEM (2005).

M. Smits, S.R. Bush / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 116–127 119

However, as Fig. 2 shows, a larger share of households in theSouthern provinces, with a larger proportion of lowland areas, hasa higher rate of electrification. The lower population density anddifficult terrain in upland areas continues to make furtherexpansion technically difficult and much less cost effective.

Besides opportunities for large scale funding, the expansion ofthe national grid also fits well within the implicit command andcontrol policies of the Lao government. According to Baird andShoemaker (2007), improved access to services, such as gridelectricity, is one of the main reasons for promoting centralisationof settlements in remote areas. In addition, Evrard and Goudineau(2004) point out that ‘‘resettlement is also conceived as a meansof speeding up the integration of the many ethnic minoritycultures into the Lao ‘national culture’’’ (p. 398). It thereforeappears that the provision of access and services, such as grid

electricity, is a means of keeping or (re)gaining control overisolated and remote rural populations.

2.2. Blind spot of small and household off-grid electrification

The lack of political will to support ‘decentralised’ off-gridelectrification has also been compounded by poor technicalperformance. Alternatives to grid electrification that have beenimplemented, such as mini- and micro-hydropower and dieselgenerators, have often failed. According to official figures from theMinistry of Energy and Mines (MEM, 2005), the smaller thehydropower and diesel generators are, the more frequent thesystems get damaged or break down completely (see Fig. 3).Although there has not been any systematic research on the

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8 96

10

39

21

3 00

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Dieselgenerator(<1 MW)

Micro hydro(1 -100 kW)

Mini hydro(100 kW -1

MW)

Small to largehydro

(<1 MW)

Num

ber o

f ins

talle

d un

its

Type and size of installed electricity producingtechnology

Working

Damaged/broken

Fig. 3. Overview working and damaged/broken hydropower and diesel generators

in the Lao PDR. Source: MEM (2005).

M. Smits, S.R. Bush / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 116–127120

causes of these failures, anecdotal information from Laosand experience from Thailand (Graecen, 2004) indicatethat both technical problems (sizing, quality of equipment,lack of spare parts) as well as social issues (no ownershipstructure, improper use, not enough technical know-how) arelikely causes.

In areas where there is no grid electrification and attemptsfor larger off-grid electricity systems have failed, people continueto use traditional energy sources, such as firewood and/or diesellamps, as well as a range of household electrification technologies,including small diesel generators, car batteries, solar homesystems (SHS) and pico-hydropower turbines. Many of thesetechnologies exhibit very high uptake rates in off-grid areas.It is estimated that the total amount of SHS installed in Laos isaround 7000 (VOPS, 2009; Sunlabob, Pers. Comm. 6/3/08). Thereare no figures available for the number of diesel generators, carbatteries and pico-hydropower systems, but observations suggestthat the numbers of these technologies are much higher. However,with the exception of SHS, household electrification technologieshave not been supported by government or developmentorganisations. The alternative technologies that do exist cantherefore be considered ‘market-driven’. Moreover, these technol-ogies are systematically underrepresented (if at all) in officialstatistics and reports on rural electrification, and little specificresearch has been carried out to understand how they are used, bywhom and where. Based on field evidence the remainder ofthis article addresses this dearth of information by ana-lysing the extent and nature of pico-hydropower use as anoff-grid electrification technology in remote areas of thecountry.

3. Actors and policies involved in off-grid electrification

The Lao energy sector is comprised of a relatively narrow groupof state and non-state actors. The small and nascent private sectorhas been most active in off-grid technology innovation, however,like international development organisations working in thecountry they too must conform to centralised government policy.The following describes the official policies of energy relatedactors in Laos as a basis to investigate how pico-hydro has beenrepresented in national rural electrification debates and the

implication this has for the development of appropriate house-hold level electrification technologies.

3.1. Actors on national level

By reaching the target of providing 10% of rural householdswith off-grid electricity by 2020 the government hopes to fostereconomic development ‘‘in all areas and regions of the country’’(GoL, 2004, p. 3). To achieve this, the Ministry of Energy and Mineshas been working in partnership with the World Bank RuralElectrification Program (REP) to bring together the wider devel-opment goals of electricity provision and environmental sustain-ability. The overall objectives of the REP are ‘‘to provide electricityto villagers in remote areas of Lao PDR, to provide support torenewable energy utilisation for rural villages in order to protectenvironment and natural condition and to help poor people byproviding electricity for income generation activity in order toimprove their quality of life.’’ (VOPS, 2009). The off-gridcomponent of the REP is outsourced to the Village Off-gridPromotion and Support (VOPS) enterprise, which is funded bythe Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and supported by theWorld Bank. VOPS is the largest national provider of subsidisedoff-grid electrification technologies in rural Laos with about6000 solar homes systems already installed and another 9000systems planned for 2009 (Klauß-Vorreiter et al., 2006; VOPS,2009).

There is not much involvement of the private sector in ruralelectrification on a national level in Laos. Sunlabob, a private Lao-German company, sells and rents out renewable energy technol-ogies, such as solar panels, solar water heaters, lighting systemsand other hardware. Part of Sunlabob’s business is aimed at ruralelectrification of remote areas. This mainly involves renting out ofsmall solar home systems (about 1250 throughout the country),but also rehabilitating micro-hydropower sites and turning theminto hybrid village grids, using multiple sources of renewableenergy. Sunlabob’s SHS are different from those promoted byVOPS, since the monthly fee is based on commercial operationand includes service, maintenance and replacement of parts, suchas batteries.

Policy narratives relating to off-grid electrification policy inLaos are strongly overlapping, and dominated by a small group ofactors led by the GoL and the World Bank. Although numerous inLaos, international NGOs are hardly involved in developing ruralelectrification. Other actors, such as the Japanese InternationalCooperation Agency (JICA), the Netherlands Development Orga-nisation (SNV), the National University of Laos and the LaoInstitute for Renewable Energy have had a minor influence in thisfield so far. It is therefore likely, at least in the short-term, that anysignificant innovations to off-grid rural electrification will emergefrom GoL-World Bank collaboration and the private sector.

3.2. Policies related to household level electricity production

Within national and international organisations most of theemphasis on off-grid rural electrification is limited to solar homesystems. The Lao government and the World Bank use VOPS astheir unit of implementation to expand the number of solar homesystems through their rent-to-buy programme. The other majorplayer, Sunlabob, uses a (non-subsidised) commercial rentingscheme to extend their solar home systems. In principle bothactors support alternative off-grid electrification technologies,such as pico-hydropower.

The government has reported that it wishes to ‘‘[c]ontinuemini-developments (micro-hydropower, solar and wind energyprojects) for off-grid power supply in remote areas’’ (GoL, 2006, p.

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Table 2Existing data and estimation of the number of pico-hydropower turbines in the Lao PDR.

Area Data Source

MEM VOPS Smits and Bush Estimationa

North Nr of surveyed villages n.a. 337 8 3200

Nr of households n.a. 19,535 444 240,000

Nr of pico-hydro turbines n.a. 7,051 293 47,000

Nr of households connected n.a. 10,683 293 72,000

% of households connected n.a. 55% 66% 30%

Sharing factor (households/unit) n.a. 1.52 n.a. 1.5

South Nr of villages n.a. n.a. 3 2800

Nr of households n.a. n.a. 245 300,000

Nr of pico-hydro turbines n.a. n.a. 118 11,000

Nr of households connected n.a. n.a. 118 17,000

% of households connected n.a. n.a. 48% 6%

Sharing factor (households/unit) n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.5

Source: MEM (2005), VOPS (2007) and own data.

Note: Northern provinces include: Bokeo, Huaphan,Luang Namtha, Luang Prabang, Odomxay, Phongsaly, Xayabouly and Xieng Khouang. Southern Provinces include:

Attapu, Bolikamxay, Champassak, Khammouan, Saravan, Savannakhet, Vientiane municipality, Vientiane province and Xekong

a Based on 20% ownership and 30% of the households connected in the North and 4% ownership and 6% connection in the South. Round figures used.

M. Smits, S.R. Bush / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 116–127 121

122) and ‘‘[t]he use of renewable energy based on local andregional conditions has to be promoted’’ (GoL, 2004, p. 104).According to Sunlabob, these kinds of projects are a necessity,because ‘‘[a] large number of villages in the Lao PDR will not behooked up to the grid for many years to come. Their only resourceof electricity (sic.) will be decentralised small systems, i.e. solarsystems or micro-hydro.’’ (Sunlabob, 2008). Additional argumentscan be found in a World Bank (2005) comparative assessment ofelectrification technologies, which states that ‘‘micro- and pico-hydro systems are simple, reasonably reliable, and low cost, theyprovide a source of cheap, independent and continuous powerwithout need for environmental safeguards’’ (p. 41).

Although the general policies of the most important actors fullysupport the development of off-grid technologies, the practicewithin the sector remains narrowly focused on SHS with little or nosupport to alternatives such as pico-hydropower. The only activesupport provided through VOPS was the instalment of communitypico-hydro systems in two demonstration villages and a survey onpico-hydropower in five Northern provinces in Laos. Currently, alltheir activities on pico-hydropower appear to have ceased.

3 Official figures from PowerPal (2009). In practice, people use even less head

and flow at some times, especially in the dry season.

4. Pico-hydropower electricity generation in Laos

Pico-hydro has until now remained largely invisible withinpolicy because of the lack of information about how, why andwhere it is used. If our estimates of the number of units inoperation across Laos are correct, it is also relevant to ask whatsupport systems have allowed households to persist with thetechnology. The following provides the first detailed empiricalaccount of the hardware, market and use of pico-hydropower inthe Lao PDR, based on field-work in three provinces. These resultsare then compared with the main development narratives, whichprovide a justification to pico-hydropower use, as well as counternarratives, which focus largely on the problems and limitations ofpico-hydropower. By doing so, the results illustrate the sharednarratives that emerge in the politicised and information-poorpolicy landscape within which water and energy resources sit.

4.1. Hardware, occurrence, supply and support

There are different types of pico-hydropower units, whichinfluences the installation, the civil works needed and the range ofpower that can be generated. The most prevalent type of unit in

Laos is the low-head type, requiring a small head (starting at1.5 m) and flow rate (starting at 35 l/s).3 The water falls into thepropeller at the bottom of the unit, making the shaft turn. In theupper part of the unit, AC-electricity is generated by an alternator.These low-head turbines are available in rated capacities from200 W up to several kilowatts, but the units producing one kWand less are the most popular in Laos. Less common are the‘turgo’-type pico-hydropower units, requiring less flow but a headof at least several metres.

As mentioned above, there is very limited data available onthe number of pico-hydropower units in Laos. In a survey offive provinces covering a total of 337 villages or 19.535households, VOPS found that 36% of the households own a unitand 55% of the households had access to electricity through thistechnology. The latter shows that the sharing factor (householdsper unit) is on average 1.5 (VOPS, 2007). The smaller and morequalitative survey carried out for this article found even higheruptake rates. However, it should be noted that both surveyswere aimed at areas with known high incidence of pico-hydro-power.

Based on these surveys a careful and conservative approxima-tion of the amount of units can be made. It is assumed that in theoff-grid villages in mountainous provinces in Northern Laos 20%of the households own a unit which, through familial or villagerigged cables, provides 30% of the households with electricity (i.e.a sharing factor of 1.5). In the more lowland and hilly villages inthe Southern provinces, it is estimated that 4% of householdsowns a unit, providing 6% of the households with electricity. TheNorth-South divide in pico-hydropower distribution can beexplained by the strong difference in topology, which makesSouthern Laos in general much less suitable for pico-hydro.Moreover, the occurrence of the technology is largely limited toanecdotal evidence (for example Baird, 2008). If these estimatesare linearly extrapolated across the 6000 non-grid connectedvillages in the North and South of the country, there may be asmany as 60,000 pico-hydropower units in Laos, providing anestimated 90,000 people with electricity (see Table 2). By contrast,linear extrapolation of the 36% uptake rate from the VOPS surveywould result in almost 90,000 units in the North of Laos only(7600 units, within a 95% confidence interval).

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Although the continuing grid expansion is replacing pico-hydropower use in areas along main roads, for remote uplandareas, pico-hydro will remain a viable (and often the only)electrification option. By comparison, in neighbouring Vietnam,a country with a much higher overall electrification rate,similar rough estimates quote a figure between 100,000 and130,000 pico-hydropower units (DfID, 2004; ENTEC, 2000;ESMAP, 2005).

Interviews and observations at shops in several parts of thecountry revealed that there is a strong system of provision forpico-hydro products and services, extending from neighbouringChina and Vietnam, which has developed without any interven-tion. According to ESMAP (2005) and Entec (2000), most of theunits are produced around Nanning city in Guangxi provinceChina and in Vietnam, and units and spare parts are sold throughtrade networks extending through China, Vietnam, Cambodia, andMyanmar to Laos. Most shops have fixed traders for pico-hydropower products, who pass by at intervals ranging from afew days up to a month, depending on the volume of sales and thesize of the shop.

Shops selling pico-hydropower units also usually sell a range oftools, machines and other hardware. Importantly, in addition tothe turbines themselves, these shops often sell spare parts(bearings, windings and propellers), cables, light bulbs, electricalappliances, plugs and other secondary products to use in house-hold pico-hydropower systems. Some support services for pico-hydropower systems can also be found in markets such as weldingshops to make draft tubes and extended shafts. About halfthe interviewed shopkeepers indicate that they occasionallysell to other merchants. These merchants in turn go to othershops or villages in remote areas to sell the units directly to theend-users.

Like many products from China and Vietnam, the pico-hydropower supply chain has evolved around low cost, low-quality products, since there are no standards or regulations andbranding is limited and susceptible to copies. There is also verylittle technical information and support within the supply chain isrelatively low. Only some types of turbines come with a manual,but only in Chinese language. Moreover, in some areas there arecultural and language barriers, as many Chinese shop owners havelimited command of the Lao language. As a result, respondentsbase their choice of unit on the experience of family and friends,the labelled price and a range of other methods, such as weighingthe unit and counting the copper windings. It seems that thelimited and opaque information available about quality and thespecifications of the units confuses the shop owners and favoursthe position of the traders.

In contrast to the large numbers of pico-hydro users estimated,the technology is nearly absent in the prevailing energy policynarratives. Government, NGOs and multilateral organisationskeep no record of pico-hydro units, or of the networks thatsupport the technology across remote parts of the country. Indeed,most policy actors, including the World Bank, the Ministry ofEnergy and Mines and Sunlabob, regard pico-hydropower as asource of off-grid electrification not even worth supporting. Someof the multilateral organisations interviewed have never seen a

Table 3Generalised classification of terrains, water resources and seasonality.

Terrain Type of water resource Main water source Seasonality

Mountainous Currents and streams Spring-fed Usage all ye

Hilly Streams and small rivers Spring- and rain-fed Cannot be u

Flat Rivers Rain-fed Cannot be u

Source: Smits and Bush.

pico-hydropower turbine and yet others have not even heard of it.As such, pico-hydropower is an ‘invisible’ energy sub-sector.The absence of a clear and comprehensive policy narrative aboutpico-hydropower shows the sharp contradiction between thenumber of units and the distribution network in the field andthe conscious or unconscious neglect of key actors involved inoff-grid electrification. This contradiction needs to be exploredin more detail for the installation, maintenance, load manage-ment and cables, energy use and cost of pico-hydropowerin Laos.

4.2. Installation of pico-hydropower turbines

The installation of pico-hydropower units is dependent onthe type of water resources available at different villages. Many ofthe respondents who install a pico-hydropower unit do nothave the means and knowledge to obtain information on theflow and the head of streams. Instead, they use their expe-rience, copy others and rely upon trial and error to select asuitable site.

There are two main types of installations in Laos: ‘standing’ or‘lying’ installations (see Electronic Annex 1 in the online version ofthis article). The first type is the intended use, according to thesporadically available manuals, and involves using an inletchannel and draft tube and requires at least 1.5 m of head, usuallycreated by making a small weir or diverting a part of the river. Thesecond type of installation is used when there is not enough heador no inlet channel can be made. In this case, respondentsreported replacing the lower part of the turbine by an extendedshaft and boat propeller. In this way, large rivers and very low-head sites can be used to install the systems. However, there aremany creative adaptations to these two main types of installationsto be found, depending on the local circumstances.

Seasonally fluctuating water levels inhibit pico-hydro unitsfrom being used all year around in some areas. The units do notgenerate power when there is too little water in the dry seasonand are in danger of being swept away in the rainy season.According to our research, the usage varies from eight or ninemonths to all year around and varies annually as well. Table 3gives an overview of the different types of water resourcesavailable and their consequences for pico-hydropower usage.

Policy actors working with off-grid electrification commonlypoint out the limitations of location and seasonality on pico-hydro. The policy narrative follows that pico-hydro systemscannot be used all year around, because of high water levelsduring the rainy season and the lack of water during the dryseason. Key actors, such as a representative of VOPS, mention thatsometimes pico-hydropower units cannot be used up to sixmonths per year due to this seasonality. Similarly World Bankofficials rule out pico-hydropower on the basis that it cannot beused throughout the country because some villages are notsituated near suitable rivers or streams.

Both the site and seasonal dependency arguments areconfirmed by our research, but it is also clear that the availabilityof suitable sites is highly variable. The simplified answers of some

effects on pico-hydro Area surveyed by Smits and Bush

ar around Mai and Kuah districts, Phongsali

sed in rainy season (May to September) Kham district, Xieng Khouang

sed in rainy season (May to September) Vieng Thong district, Bolikamxay

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actors about the six months in which the pico-hydro units cannotbe used are not verified by the field work. Our data shows that thetype of sites used and the seasonality of water use is verydifferent, with a maximum of four months within which the unitscannot be used. In some areas, people install units in perennialstreams providing steady flows all year around, whereas in otherareas people suffer from too much or too little water in the rainyor dry season respectively. Thus, the site and seasonal limitationsof pico-hydropower depend on the specific location in the river,the type and strength of the installation and the intensity of theannual monsoon.

4.3. Maintenance, load management and cables

The research showed that households typically have toperform daily maintenance activities on their pico-hydropowersystem. This includes the removal of leaves and branches from theturbine and the optional bamboo mesh, as well as checking thefunction of cables and turbines. Units are often taken out of thewater during the day to prevent wear when the demand forelectricity is lower. If there is a problem with the unit, therespondents reported always trying to fix it themselves or withhelp from others in their village. If they cannot carry out the repairby themselves they go back to the shop where they bought theunit from to ask for help. Most of the time the problems relate tothe bearings and windings, making it necessary to replace themfrequently: bearings on average 2.5 times per year and windingsapproximately one time per year. Pico-hydropower units are oftenshared by a group of households, usually relatives. In someoccasions, the owner asks the beneficiaries for a monthly fee, buthelp with the construction and maintenance of the unit is morecommon practice.

Load management for pico-hydropower systems has to bedone manually and often results in breaking light bulbs andappliances, thereby adding considerably to the costs. Pico-hydro-power generates a fluctuating amount of power because it isdependent on the flow of the river. In addition, the electricitycables are connected directly to the lights and appliances, withoutany load controller. This means people have to manage theelectrical load manually and find out by trial and error what thebest load configuration is for a particular time of the year and theprevailing weather. Despite the efforts of users, the voltage,current and frequency have been found to fluctuate heavily.Respondents reported having to install new light bulbs everymonth as a result of these fluctuations and electronic devices,such as televisions, can also break down.

The quality and installation of cables are a key area of concernto end-users because of their high initial costs and concernsover safety. Cables connect units and houses over distancesvarying from 20 m to 1.5 km, hung on a combination of trees,bushes and bamboo poles. The quality of the cables used is highlyvariable, but many respondents use low-quality Chinese cables,which are up to four times as cheap as their equivalent fromThailand, to reduce costs. Cables without plastic insulation werealso observed, although are reportedly used much less than in thepast. Cables break frequently because of poor quality, weatherconditions and strain, resulting in frequent repairs and knots atregular intervals. The number of accidents related to the use ofturbines and broken cables is unknown, but anecdotal storiesabout injuries and death of people and animals were recordedduring the research.

The dangers of pico-hydro are also one of the most dominantnarratives brought forward by key stakeholder in off-gridelectrification. The narrative is commonly stated in terms of thepoor safety record of pico-hydro directly discounting any potential

of pico-hydropower for rural electrification. Representatives fromthe World Bank and the Rural Electrification Department allmentioned anecdotes of people getting killed and the inherentdanger of using the turbines as a key reason not to support thetechnology.

The responses of policy actors clearly indicate a lackof knowledge on the type, extent and development of therisks associated with pico-hydro. The results therefore show thatpico-hydropower is certainly not risk-free, but also, we contend,that the prevalent narrative is often too negative and argumentstend to be conflated. We agree that the installation andmaintenance of the cables is the most dangerous part andimproper usage has caused injuries and sometimes death.However, this risk appears to be relatively marginal in relationto the number of users and the other risks of life in remote areas.The risks of pico-hydro should not be ignored, but equally,pico-hydro should not be discounted out of hand becauseof a disproportionate concern for safety based on partialinformation.

4.4. Energy use

The main function of electricity generated by pico-hydropoweris to provide light. All pico-hydro units studied for this researchwere connected to at least one or more light bulbs, used for eitherlighting during the evening meal, to find their way to the toilet, todo housekeeping, for reading, or for homework. Lighting was alsoused to extend income generating activities into the evening, suchas weaving and making bamboo mats, or for charging smallbatteries for flashlights used to catch frogs. Additionally, thosehouses with light tend to become places for social gatherings,where people meet, talk and drink.

Entertainment is the second most important use of electricityfrom pico-hydro in the three field-work areas of this research.Entertainment devices are mainly televisions (often with satellitedishes), CD-player and VCD-players. In the villages included in ourresearch, 20% of households had televisions and roughly the samepercentage had CD/VCD-players. Even more than for light, houseswith entertainment sets become places with a lot of socialactivity, such as meetings and gatherings.

The fourth commonly used narrative used by policy actors toseemingly downplay the potential of pico-hydropower is that thetechnology does not contribute to income generation. Indeed, oneof the goals of the REP is ‘‘[t]o help poor people by providingelectricity for income generation activity in order to improve theirquality of life’’ (VOPS, 2009). According to one representative ofthe World Bank, electricity generation should lead to additionalincome generating activities and, he points out, this is not the casefor pico-hydropower. When confronted with the fact that SHShave comparable uses and are therefore expected to have thesame impact on income generation, his reply was that SHS aremerely a transition technology.

The relationship between rural electricity provision and anincrease in productivity leading to higher income is questionable(see also Green, 2004), despite claims from the World Bankand Sunlabob that off-grid technologies, such as solar panelsprovide income generating opportunities (Sunlabob, 2003).Nevertheless, pico-hydro turbines (and indeed all other lowelectricity output systems) do provide a source of light andentertainment which, according to our respondents, is convenientand contributes to their feeling of ‘being modern’. Althoughthe results of this research do not necessarily challenge thenarrative that pico-hydropower does not lead to economicdevelopment, it does question the link between electricity

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Fig. 5. A comparison between the annual lifecycle costs of off-grid electricity

generation technologies: pico-hydro in Laos and family and community pico-

hydro, PV-solar home system, small wind and small diesel generators in Vietnam.

Adapted from: ESMAP (2005) and Smits and Bush (pico-hydro in Laos).

M. Smits, S.R. Bush / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 116–127124

provision and income generating opportunities in rural off-gridareas in general.

4.5. Quality and cost

The costs of procuring pico-hydropower turbines are very low.However, in order to make a good comparison, the total life-cyclecosts have to be taken into account. Fig. 4 shows the annual costsrelated to the use of different types of units. The costs of a newturbine or new cables are divided by the average lifetime, todetermine the average costs per year. For the most common500 W turbine, this comes down to an average annual cost ofabout US$31 per year. The most striking observation is that theamount of money respondents spend on replacing windings andbearings is the highest share in the average annual expenditure,compared to, for example, the depreciation of the turbine. Theprice of the cables, which can be the largest part of the initialinvestment, does not have a major impact on the average annualcosts, because the assumed lifetime is 10 years. Replacing lightbulbs, not included in Fig. 4, can also add up to 70% to the averageannual costs of a 500 W pico-hydropower system.

These analyses can be used to compare pico-hydropower in thefield-work areas with findings from other countries and otherelectricity generating technologies. Fig. 5 shows a comparisonbetween off-grid pico-hydro in Laos and pico-hydro, family hydro,PV solar home systems, small wind and small diesel generator inVietnam. Despite the ongoing maintenance costs of pico-hydropower the results show that the technology provides thecheapest source of electricity for individual households. The life-cycle costs of pico-hydropower in Vietnam as calculated byESMAP (2005) are higher than the authors’ calculation of pico-hydro in Laos, probably because the Vietnamese ones include aload controller. The additional costs for the load controller areexpected to offset the replacements costs of light bulbs andelectronic applications to a certain extent. However, due to thevariability in the incidence of breaking of appliances and lightbulbs, it is difficult to compare.

The last prevalent policy narrative put forward by the keyactors as a reason not to support pico-hydropower was the highcosts associated with pico-hydro operation. In interviews withSunlabob and VOPS, respondents emphasised the high frequencyat which pico-hydro units break down and the high costs related

to replacing the entire unit and light bulbs. According to arepresentative of Sunlabob, households with a pico-hydro unithave to buy new light bulbs every week because of breakagescaused by power fluctuations. Moreover, he stressed the inabilityof villagers to plan their energy investment, claiming that mostvillagers opt for short-term solutions which can turn out to beexpensive in the long run.

Although the cost of replacing equipment is a real concern forusers, the policy narratives contrast with our results showing thatpico-hydropower has the lowest life-cycle cost amongst the off-grid household electrification options. The high uptake of thistechnology indicates that the price-quality ratio is well-adapted tothe economic and social circumstances of people in off-grid areasof Laos and indeed to the way they plan their energy investments.The fact that many people can pay the relatively large initialinvestment up front is contrary to the underlying assumptions ofmany PV-based rural electrification projects that rental or loan-schemes have to be provided because people cannot afford theinitial investment in electrification technology. Information fromour interviews suggests that villagers can either save money (e.g.from wage labour outside the rice growing season or selling rice,vegetables or livestock) or get the unit on credit from the seller(kaai daao). Once they have invested in a pico-hydropowersystem, users do not often replace their entire unit, but regularlyreplace relatively inexpensive (and easily accessible) parts.

5. The broader political context of pico-hydropowerdevelopment

The policy actors involved in rural electrification in Laos appearto underestimate the existing use of pico-hydropower. The lack ofinformation available to them means they make simplified andsometimes unsubstantiated policy claims based on broad ‘pro-blem narratives’ that are not supported by our empiricalobservations. To understand why these narratives are sustainedin policy we now turn to an analysis of the broader political andinstitutional context of pico-hydropower development in Laosthat is driving the apparent contradiction between policy andpractice. The following focuses specifically on the informationpoor and politicised environment of Laos in which energy,environmental and rural development policy is developed.

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5.1. Information poor environment

In Laos, policy related to a number of sectors is developed withinwhat can be described as an ‘information poor environment’. Withinthis environment, policy makers have limited access to coherentsystems for gathering and presenting information between actorsinvolved in policy and implementation. Like previous work onpolicy formulation in other sectors in Laos (Bush, 2004), we believethis lack of information is one of the underlying mechanisms for thedisjuncture between the observed reality of pico-hydropower andthe policies of key actors in rural electrification.

The limited knowledge and information available on pico-hydropower is clearly apparent in the responses of the key policyactors, many of whom have not seen the turbines despite the largenumbers being used in rural areas across the country. Most of theirdecisions are made on national statistics aggregated from villagethrough to national levels. There are very few statistics availableon rural electrification in general and household level electricitygeneration in particular. Reports often cite a limited amount ofsources, which are sometimes flawed, outdated or incorrect (forexample see Klauß-Vorreiter et al., 2006). Some of these sourcesdo not mention pico-hydro at all (e.g. TRI, 2004; VOPS, 2004),whereas others do so often at the bottom of all other technologiesand only on the basis of anecdotal information (e.g. ADB, 2006).

The implication of this inherent lack of information is theemergence of the problem narratives outlined above, which are ablend of the interests of government departments and dominantpopular international narratives on issues such as poverty and/orenvironment. The existence of international narratives is particu-larly relevant in the Lao PDR, since the country is highly dependenton foreign aid and because of the influence of many internationaland multilateral organisations across a range of sectors (Baird andShoemaker, 2007; St John, 2006; Stuart-Fox, 2006). The danger, asBush (2004) notes, is that ‘‘as government funds are limited, datacollection often reflects the agendas of externally funded projectsrather than the need for a broad and detailed understanding of theimportance and extent of natural resources’’ (p. 267). By analysingthe narratives underlying the policies and activities of the mainlocal and international actors active in Laos, mechanisms drivingthe neglect of pico-hydro in policy emerge.

Prevailing discourses about safety, risk, quality and environ-ment frame alleged problems in a way and reifies interventionstrategies (Adger et al., 2001). Problems arise when these framingsand strategies are not in line with the location-specific circum-stances. Studies in other resource sectors have shown howpopular narratives often dominate discussions around environ-mental degradation when there is a high degree of uncertaintyarising (in part) from a lack of grounded research (Stott andSullivan, 2000; Li, 2002; Bush, 2008a, 2008b; Forsyth, 2003).Misguided orthodoxies can become the prevailing policy narra-tive. This is especially evident in Laos where there is littlealternative information or counter-narrative available and wherepolicy and planning has a tendency to reflect knowledge that hasgained political prominence rather than the needs of resourceusers.

5.2. Influence of large scale hydropower development

The large investments made in large scale hydropower, andopportunities for rent seeking behaviour within the government,may also influence the popularity of small-scale rural electrifica-tion technologies in policy. The 70-plus large hydropower projectsthat are currently underway in Laos are mostly constructedthrough the BOOT model by foreign companies. These largehydropower dams bring the promise of cheap electricity that has

the potential to dramatically increase export earnings. However,these dams have reportedly provided considerable scope for rentseeking behaviour within government departments at bothnational and provincial levels, which have driven expansion withlittle reflection on social or environmental impacts (Virtanen,2006; Lawrence, 2008).

In stark contrast to large hydro, the pico-hydro market iscontrolled by a highly dispersed network of Vietnamese andChinese traders. The nature of this informal and largely ‘invisible’system of provision makes it much harder to monitor and controlthe sales and use of this technology, let alone capture staterevenues. It is only at the border crossings that an occasionalsmall amount of tax is paid for each pico-hydro unit, of whichprobably only a fraction makes it to the central level. Moreover,the use of pico-hydropower only takes place in the off-grid areas,far from the capital. All these features of small-scale off-gridelectrification possibly make it less interesting for the govern-ment, and indeed other actors, to engage with pico-hydropowerand similar technologies.

Pico- and large-scale hydropower take place in differentgeographical and economical settings, therefore the interactionbetween the development in both technologies is often notphysical, but rather emerges from the discourses upheld by actorsin energy policy development. However, in Viengthong district,Bolikamxay, the construction of the Nam Theun 1 dam will forcevillagers to relocate and most likely to give up their current pico-hydropower use. Further upstream, as part of the Nam Theun 2dam project, the Nam Theun 2 Watershed Management ProtectionAuthority is providing villagers with SHS where they previouslyused pico-hydropower. These examples demonstrate relativelyrare occasions in which the physical impact of large hydropowercan be seen on existing pico-hydropower systems. However, if allof the planned dams in the Mekong and its tributaries are going tomaterialise, the physical threat of large hydro will have a far morelasting effect than the institutional marginalisation described inthis article.

5.3. Universal applicability

The third underlying mechanism driving the neglect of pico-hydropower is the preference of the identified actors foruniversally applicable technologies over those that are morelocally adapted and developed, such as pico-hydropower. Pico-hydropower and solar home systems are, to a certain extent,comparable. Both technologies are used at the household leveland produce enough electricity for light and small entertainmentdevices. However, our analysis shows that pico-hydropower hasthe advantage that it is cheaper than SHS of Sunlabob and,excluding subsidies, the ones of VOPS. However, SHS is still thetechnology of choice for VOPS and Sunlabob, despite theapparently larger number of pico-hydropower systems in Laos.The success off pico-hydro may be attributed to the broad marketsupport from traders, shopkeepers and users, something whichSHS have not as yet accomplished.

A possible explanation for the strong formal institutionalsupport to SHS may be the limited need for local adaptation,making the implementation of the technology easy to copy fromone country to the other and to control centrally. The World BankGroup has implemented 44 projects using PV in almost 40developing countries of which the costs, for the equipment only,are about US$700 million (IFC, 2007). This makes it easy for themto implement a similar project in Laos. Even though the successesof SHS for rural electrification have been criticised (e.g. Green,2004; IFC, 2007), VOPS and Sunlabob will probably continueworking with it, because of this universal applicability.

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5.4. Centralisation and control

A final mechanism explaining the neglect of pico-hydropower isthe command and control system of governance of the GoL. Withonly some influence from donor-led fiscal decentralisation in theearly 2000s (Arshad and Soukhamthut, 2003) the Lao governmenthas continued to work towards political centralisation and controlover the highly dispersed population since it came to power in1975. Rural areas are being transformed through the developmentof so-called ‘growth poles’ or ‘development centres’ where ruralcommunities are encouraged, and sometimes forced, to leave theirremote upland areas and resettle in new villages along the road(Baird and Shoemaker, 2007). The explanation given by the govern-ment is that they are unable to provide basic needs and services forall small remote villages individually (e.g. roads, water, electricity,schools, health centres). This relocation has been part of a widerprogramme of control which has seen the colonisation of remotenatural resources including swidden agriculture, forests, waterresources (Hirsch, 2006; Rigg, 2005; Vandergeest, 2003), and thecentralisation of electrification provision through the national grid.

Resettlement of villages to development centres can, however,also be interpreted as a means to exert control over people in ruralareas, notably ethnic minorities, and to integrate them in thedominant Lao culture (Rigg, 2005). This process of state control tomake upland minorities part of the dominant culture is not uniquein Laos. Li (2002), for example, analyses how the implementationof Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) inthe Philippines has lead to ‘‘the establishment of control overupland populations by pinning them in place, regularising theirresource use according to state-defined rules and procedures and,through the extension of institutions and bureaucratic processes,enmeshing them more firmly as state clients’’ (p. 274).

Grid electrification fits very well within a centralisationnarrative, since grid expansion is only viable when sufficientnumbers of people can be connected relative to the costs ofextending the grid to a certain area. However, the low populationdensity and rugged terrain of the Lao PDR makes further gridexpansion to many areas unviable, even in the long run.Decentralised electricity generating options, such as pico-hydro-power, diesel generators and SHS, have proven to be a moresuitable and cost effective option for these areas. However, similarto what Graecen (2004) shows for Thai village micro-hydropowerdevelopment, these kinds of rational explanations are sometimesoverruled by institutional and political reasons of grid expansion.While large hydropower in Laos allows for centralised electricityproduction and water resources, pico-hydropower represents ahighly decentralised generation of electricity.

The donor-led fiscal decentralisation of the Lao government inthe in the 2000s has not been accompanied by a correspondingdevolution in decision making. Districts are therefore responsiblefor fiscal management and technical implementation, but are stillguided by regulations from Vientiane. Only limited discretion oversome sectors is given to the provincial governor’s office, partlyincluding the provision of land concessions. The informal natureof pico-hydro means that it exists even beyond the control of thedistrict government as the lowest level of state. The informal andindependent nature of pico-hydro trade and support networkstherefore means that remote rural areas remain largely outsidethe government’s control, providing an unwanted counter narra-tive to the wider programme of centralisation.

6. Implications of policy for practice

Pico-hydropower is a small-scale market-driven renewableenergy technology that is virtually neglected in the complex

policy arena of the Lao PDR. Despite this, it appears that with anestimated 60,000 units already in place, pico-hydropower pro-vides a low cost, low environmental impact, local alternative tomeet electricity demands in the current struggle for water andenergy in a country focused on the construction of large hydro-power dams. This article demonstrates that the narratives of thedominant national and international actors involved in developingrural electrification policy show their political underpinnings andinterests rather than empirical information. By triangulatinghousehold level and expert interviews with secondary dataand placing these within the historical and political context ofLaos, explanations for the lack of interest in pico-hydropoweremerge.

The mechanisms driving the neglect of pico-hydropowerdevelopment reflect the complex policy environment in the LaoPDR which promotes the strong centralisation narrative of the Laogovernment and an interest of multilateral development actors topromote universal approaches to rural electrification. This over-riding approach comes at the expense of context-specific locallyappropriate technologies for electrification in remote rural areasand has led the World Bank, through VOPS, to bring in their solarhome system model which has been implemented in severaldeveloping countries. Sunlabob, a major stakeholder on thecommercial side, also propagates solar home systems in a similarfashion, but without subsidies. The government, on the otherhand, is more focused on maximising foreign investment andexport revenues by prioritising the construction of large scalehydropower dams through granting concessions to foreigninvestors. The responsibility of rural electrification has thereforelargely been left to multilateral organisations and a small privatesector. Additionally, the government has continued to steer theirefforts towards centralisation and control over the remote ruralareas with ethnic minorities. Overall, NGOs have not invested inthe provision of electricity as one of their priorities. Pico-hydropower, despite its merits of providing affordable andrenewable energy to many households in off-grid areas, doesnot fit in the narratives of these actors and is therefore ignored intheir policies.

Given the active neglect and marginalisation of pico-hydro-power, some policy reorientation of the actors involved is requiredin order to make the systems safer and improve their quality. Asan example, the Lao Institute for Renewable Energy, a small non-profit association, has started a promising initiative to build onthe strong local networks of pico-hydro and support traders,sellers and end-users of pico-hydro through workshops and bytraining local technicians (LIRE, 2009). However, without acorresponding institutional effort to promote pico-hydro as aviable alternative off-grid electrification technology and tochallenge some of the problem narratives currently surroundingthe technology, it is unlikely there will be a substantial shift inattitude and policy. Moreover, the diffusion of pico-hydropower isnot a goal in itself. Energy technologies have to ‘fit’ within thecurrent livelihoods and energy needs of rural households. Thismeans that higher output electricity production technologies,such as micro-hydro, diesel generators or grid connection, couldbecome viable alternatives in villages that have higher populationdensities and higher energy needs for productive usage.

The implication for the current debate around the largehydropower dams in the Lao PDR is that efforts should be madenot only to balance the potential macro-economic advantagesagainst the social and environmental disruptions resulting fromthe construction of these dams, but also focus on potentialappropriate small-scale alternative energy sources. Strong counternarratives are needed that steer the debate towards helping thepoor villages, often ethnic minorities, in off-grid areas, throughaccess to electricity.

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In addition, bilateral and multilateral donors, NGOs, investorsand companies should become aware about the deeply politicisednature of energy and resources in the country to make morallysound decisions that affect many people in Laos without a voice inthe policy making process. This in turn, can only be done on thebasis of sound data and data collection methods and highlycontextualised rural development policies tailored to their needs.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the generous cooperation of allinterviewees in the Lao PDR who made this research possible. Inaddition, we would like to thank Olivia Dun and two anonymousreviewers for their constructive comments on drafts of this paper.

Appendix A. Supporting Information

Supplementary data associated with this article can be foundin the online version at doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.08.058.

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