A Moon of Many Shades

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book review

A Moon of Many Shades

Anur adha Bhasin Jamwal

Our Moon has Blood Clots: The Exodus of theKashmiri PanditsbyRahul Pandita(Noida: RandomHouse India), 2013; pp 258, Rs 499.

George Bernard Shaw wrote, All

autobiographies are lies. There

is no denying the truth of this

though t here may be no reason to doubt

the integrity of a person who pens his or

her own story. Memories are tricky

things to write down because they are

not all the same they are good, bad, or

insignifi cant and depend on ones per-

ception. Nor do they uniformly dwell in

the mind. The worst memories stick

w ith us, while the nice ones alwa ys seem

to slip t hrough our fi ngers, w rites

Rachel Vincent in My Soul t o Save. In

striking contrast, Gabriel Garca Mr-

quez says in Love in the Time of Cholera,

He wa s still too young to know that the

hearts memory eliminates the bad and

magnifi es the good, and that tha nks to

this a rtifi ce we ma nage to endure the

burden of the past. Whatever the case,

memory compartments in every mind

fi lter out some part a nd preserve the restfor posterity, often making autobiogra-

phies and memoirs repositories of half

truths. How much of an authors memo-

ry is part of a manuscript or how much

of it is a pa rt of the author himself?

No wonder then that Our Moon has

Blood Clots, a memoir of Kashmir of the

1990s by journalist-turned-author Rahul

Pandita , ha s become a subject of contro-

versy. Kashmir is one of the most com-

plex regions in the world, not just be-

cause of a rmed confl ict and being a nu-

clear fl ashpoint. It is a lso a region t hat

has multiple claima nts a nd multiple his-

torical nar rat ives the of fi cial na rra-

tives of India and Pa kista n, the vary ing

and competing narratives of communi-

ties and ethnic groups from areas other

tha n the Kashmir Valley, and t he contra-

dictory narratives of Kashmiri Muslims

and Kashmiri Pandits, especially in the

last tw o decades.

The majority of Pandits fled the Valleyin the 1990s and ever since everything

about their fl ight ha s been a bone of

academic contention from their num-

bers to the reasons they fl ed. It is not un-

common to hear Kashmiri Muslims con-

cluding that the Pandits suddenly fled

one day when militancy began, often

holding former Jammu and Kashmir

Governor Jagmohan responsible for the

exodus. The Pandits vehemently chal-

lenge this and instead cite an atmos-

phere of xenophobia open threats, se-

lective killings, and fear tha t triggered

the fl ight in ba tches, the fi rst one on 19

Ja nuary 1990. The popular na rrat ives

located within these black and white ex-

tremes do not match nor sound very

reasonable. They, however, are histori-

cally situated aga inst the background ofharmonious relations between the two

communit ies before the 1980s and to

some extent th rough the 1980s as well.

At One Extre me

Rahul Pa nditas book more or less adopts

one of the simplifi ed extremes, offering

hand-picked memories that are bitter

but undenia ble. The other problem w ith

the book is that it tends to locate the in-

cidents of 1989-90 w ithin a history that

is sifted out to contextua lise his sense of

collective victimhood. The history is told

without references and forms a continu-

um of incidents of victimisation as if

there were no intervening period be-

tween 1947 and 19 J anuary 1990, t he

day of the fi rst mass exodus, and March

1990, w hen he left the Valley w ith his

family. Historical events, particularly

the events of 1947 in Bara mulla, a re cru-

cial to understanding the fear psychosis

of the Pandits, though the Pa ndits werenot the only ones killed by the armed

Pathan tribals nuns in Baramulla

church, and Sikhs and Muslims were

also victims. The manner in which this

victimisation is magnifi ed, especially by

citing incidents in Muzaffarabad, where

there were only a minuscule number of

Pandits who were targeted along withmany more other Hindus and Sikhs,

seems to suggest the author is desper-

ately looking for every bit of evidence to

show Kashmiri Pandits have been hard

done by. Though this makes for an emo-

tive narra tive, it does not lend much au-

thenticity to the claims of persecution of

Kashmiri Pa ndits.

Pandita makes a similar mistake

while writing about the painful death of

his cousin Ravi at the hands of militants

in Gool, an area in the Jammu region,

without adding the sub-context of the

selective nature of killings in the hilly

area s of Ja mmu in the 1990s. Ravi and

another person were taken out of a bus

because they were Hindus and not

because of their ethnicity and brutally

done to death. Though this gory death

forms an important part of the narra-

tive, the lack of the sub-context leaves

the memoir open to cha llenge.

The most powerful part of the narra-tive concerns the days of fear Pandita

spends as a 14-year old in the winter of

1990, a long w ith some incidents preced-

ing it, which contextualise his sense of

fear, shock, and horror. But why does

this sense of fear and the exodus that it

triggered remain a t odds w ith the popu-

lar narrative of Kashmiri Muslims? The

writer cannot be faulted for the isolated

memories of the two communities of

those very chaotic times when access to

real information was limited because of

the sudden turn of events and the impo-

sition of a curfew, which leaves only

sketchy deta ils in newspaper archives to

grapple w ith.

The Jagm ohan Fac t o r

To understa nd t he exodus, the days pre-

ceding and follow ing 19 Ja nuary 1990

are crucial markers. A right-wing Kash-

miri Pandit organisation, Panun Kash-

mir, observes the day as Holocaust Day.For Kashmiri Muslims too 19 January

was a turning point, not particularly


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Economic &Political Weekl y EPW apr il 27, 2013 vol xl vii I no 17 27

because of the fl ight of the Pandits and

other minorities that eventually robbed

the Valley of its secular character, but

more for the curfews and shocking mas-

sacres by the security forces that fol-

lowed. Thus, for both the day is an im-

portant part of collective memory for

entirely different reasons. The day alsomarked Jagmohan taking over as gover-

nor of the state, which had suddenly

been placed under presidents rule. The

move had probably been in the making as

heightened militancy between September

and December 1989 saw New Delhi send-

ing in reinforcements of armed troops.

The state government collapsed by the

end of December and t he Valley had been

under a strict and unprecedented cur-

few for days when Ja gmohan a rrived.

A large chunk of Pandits left the Val-

ley on the night of 19 Ja nuary amid

strict curfew many of them on buses of

the government-controlled state road

transport corporation. On 20 January,

house-to-house searches, raids, cordons,

and random arrests began in many

areas of Srinagar, particularly in Muslim-

majority ones, with allegations of harass-

ment and other atrocities. Caught bet-

ween the devil and the deep sea, people

began pouring into the streets in protest,violating prohibitory orders. Street pro-

tests with slogans of azadiand religious

symbols became a regular feature. And

so did massacres on the streets, be-

ginning w ith Gaw Kadal on the morning

of 21 Ja nuary, which left at least 35 dead

and hundreds injured, many of whom

succumbed to their injuries later.1 The

Alamgari Bazaar massacre followed on

22 Ja nuary and Handw ara on 25 Ja nuary.

Did Ja gmoha n engineer t he fl ight of

the Pa ndits? Whether he did or not, Ja g-

mohan did see the Kashmir problem as a

Muslim versus Hindu one, where Mus-

lims were the perpetrators and Hindus

the victims. In an interview to Currentin

May 1990, Ja gmoha n stated,

Every Muslim in Kashmir is a militant to-

day. All of them are for secession from In-

dia. I am scuttling Srinagar Doordarshans

programmes because everyone there is a

militant ... The bullet is the only solution

for Kashmir. Unless the militants are fully

wiped out, normalcy cant return to the Valley.Jagmohan fi rst landed in Jammu to

take over as the governor before he left

for Srinaga r on 19 Ja nuary. In Jammu,

he shared his idea of evacuating Kash-

miri Pandits with a cross-section of in-

tellectuals a nd senior journa lists he met

in closed-door meetings. The idea was

that this would make it easier to deal

with the militants, even though he was

warned against the wisdom of sucha move.2

That t housands of Pand its fled at the

same time was odd, especially because

there had been no known Pandit killing

close to tha t dat e. However, this is not to

say that t he Pand its foolishly picked up a

suitcase each and suddenly left to suit

the designs of a short-sighted ruler. Fear,

panic and distress among the Pandits

had been on the rise since militancy

began. Already a minority in the Valley,

they had reasons to look at every call

for a zad i with suspicion. Much of their

sense of security ca me from Indian a rmy

and their identity as Indian citizens.

That was cha llenged by gun-toting Mus-

lim youth, who returned after training

from across the border and opposed any-

thing Indian. Fear also arose because a

number of Pandits had been killed and

the aza di movement began to w ear a re-

ligious cloak through the use of mosques

and Islamic slogans.

Slogan s an d Beyond

It is diffi cult to assume tha t there w as a

uniformity to the slogans that rend the

air across the Valley. Islamic sloga ns had

been an undeniable part of Kashmirs

history even before 1989. But when the

armed insurgency began Ham kya

chahte hain Azadi very conveniently

blended with Azadi ka matlab kya La

elaha el-allah as also with Naara-e-

Tadbeer Al lah o Akbar and Jeeve Jeeve

Pakistan. Many Kashmiri Muslims have

contested a slogan Pandita mentions

(Assi gacchi panunuy Pakistan, batav

rostuy, bataenein saan) deeming it a

creation of t he Pandit imaginat ion.3 The

controversy is not new to this book.

What is the true picture?

After years of grappling with this co-

nundrum of slogans, in 2008 I began to

understa nd the multilayered complexity

of such sloga ns on the memory of people.I was in Srinagar when the Amarnath

land row began and on 27 June 2008,

af ter the Friday prayers, people bega n to

pour out of mosques raising azadi slo-

gans and heading for Lal Chowk. There

were hundreds and thousands of people,

coming in big a nd small groups from all

directions and converging on Lal Chowk

where I was with a small contingent of

local and visiting journalists. Most ofthem chanted azadi slogans, some pep-

pered it w ith religion, and there wa s one

group, comprising mainly boys aged

nine to 16, who bega n dancing and clap-

ping Jeeve Jeeve Pakistan and Naara

e-tadbeer Allah o Akbar when they saw

us. Many of my journalist colleagues

sensed that the slogans had been pro-

voked by my presence and advised me to

leave. That day it dawned on me that

even one slogan was enough to create

panic and an unforgettably unpleasant

memory. Some Kashmiri Muslims do ad-

mit the slogan that Pandita mentions

was used, but maintain that it was not

really a pa rt of t he popular d iscourse it

may ha ve been used by a few odd people

in some places. Strange are the effects

of some incidents and events and the

different ways they play on the memory

of people. A slogan that became deeply

embedded in the hearts of one comm-

unity because of the fear it evokedwas not even noticed all that much by

the other.

As for the killings that lie at the core

of the fear psychosis of the Pandits,

there is no empirical evidence to sug-

gest that there were selective killings

on the basis of community.4 According

to research by the Strategic Foresight

Group, 29 Muslims were killed in 1988 in

militancy-related violence across Jammu

and Kashmir. There were no Hindu kill-

ings. In 1989 and 1990, six and 177 Hin-

dus respectively were killed, against 73

and 679 Muslims and six Sikhs. The

number of slain Hindus included non-

Kashmiri Pandits of the Valley and

from parts of Jammu. Yet, given that

the proportion of Pa ndits in t he Valley

was less tha n 5%, t his may ha ve been a

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apr il 27, 2013 vol xl vii I no 17 EPW Economic &Political Weekl y28

disproportionately high number and a

cause for worry. Besides, one cannot rule

out that some Kashmiri Pandits were

killed for purely communal or at least

personal, reasons.

I ssues Over looked

The problem of Panditas book is that itis unable to offer a larger picture, and

that it is contextualised in fragments of

historical nar rat ives he chooses to weave

into an uninterrupted sequence of

events, without interpolating anything

that would mitigate the bitterness of be-

ing betrayed as a community. His own

memory blends into collective memory

and unreferenced historical events with

so much ease that it is diffi cult for some-

one unfamiliar with Kashmir to sift

through t hem. He recalls an India versus

West Indies cricket ma tch of 1983 and

his anger at how the crowds reacted, not

to mention a taunt of the Muslim milk-

man t he next day. This was w hen he was

only seven. It is surely ra re to reca ll feel-

ings of identity and anger one had at

that age w ith any precision. How much

of it is his ow n memory?

However, it would not do to t rash the

book. It is important because it offers a

very interesting insight into how the

Pandits found themselves cornered in

Ja nuar y 1990, of the unea se they lived

with and endured, and of the insecurities,

played up by frenzied slogans, that be-

came a pa rt of their psyche. One can un-derstand the horror Pandita felt on

overhearing a conversation about dis-

tributing the houses of Pand its that took

place among Muslim teenagers he

played with in his locality. But one

would have liked to know more about

his relationship with these boys. One

would also have liked to know how he

and his family coped between January

and March 1990 and t heir interactions

w ith Muslim friends and a cquainta nces.

What sense did they make of the mas-

sacres in January 1990 in which their

Muslim counterparts were killed, even

if such incidents paled into insignifi -

cance before their own deep sense of

fear and isolation? By skirting these,

Pandita leads us to believe that he has

located the story of Kashmiri Pandits in

a simplifi ed context of Pandit v ictim

and Muslim perpetrator. Even a bomb

blast on a busy Srinagar road ha s a Pan-

dit victim, but there is no mention of

any Muslim killed by either the mili-

tants or the security forces.

There is an interesting subtext of cop-

ing in Jammu a fter the exodus, where he

briefly hints at being innocently temptedto join a Rashtriya Swaya msevak Sangh

(RSS) shakha(branch). One would have

liked to know if people he knew did so.

Aga in, one w ould have liked his story to

go beyond the simple us and them to

describe the role of Kashmiri Pandits in

Jammus culture, which is very cosmo-

politan and represents the assimilation

of many streams. This could have

offered us greater insights into why a

sense of isolation and alienat ion pervad-

ed. Had he talked about these multi-

layered complexities or even offered

subtle glimpses of them, it would not in

any way have diluted the narrative of

the suffering of Kashmiri Pandits. It

would only have lent much more credi-

bility a nd authent icity to t he memoir.

Any memoir, a t t he end of the day, is a

birds-eye view. But you get a feeling that

www.sagepub . i n Los Angeles London New Delhi Singapore Washington DC


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Economic &Political Weekl y EPW apr il 27, 2013 vol xl vii I no 17 29

Pandita chooses to see only one half of

the sky and the life beneath it. He sees

his moon has blood clots, painful and

real, but does not catch a glimpse of the

other shades of the sa me moon.

Anuradha Bhasin Jamw al (anusaba@gmail.

com) is Executive Editor, Kashmir Times, anda huma n rights activist based in Ja mmu and

Kashmir.

Not es

1 The offi cial and unofficia l fig ures of the Gaw

Kadal massacre are contested, but 50 to 80

people died when Central Reserve Police Force

(CRPF) personnel sprayed bullets on an un-

armed procession crossing a bridge.

2 Balraj Puri in Kashmir: Towards Insurgency

points out that Jagmohan encouraged the

flight of many Pandit leaders and was not very

interested in efforts to restore intercommunityunderstanding and confidence.

3 The controversial slogan loosely tra nslates as

We are going to be with our ow n Pakistan, t hePandit men can go, well take their womenalong.

4 Pankaj Mishra w rites in Kashmi r: The UnendingWar, The Kashmiri Pandits formed a kind ofelite in the Valley; they had a la rge presence inthe bureaucracy, both in the Valley a nd in Del-hi, where government policy on Kashmir wasoften dictated by the fear s and concerns of thistiny minority. Their connections with India

and their relative affluence made them highlyvisible targets during the fi rst few months ofthe insurgency in 1990.

Documents

A Moon of Many Shades