A New Regional Cold War? American and Chinese Posturing in the Pacific

Original Article

A New Regional Cold War? American and Chinese Posturing inthe Pacific

Steven Ratuva*

Abstract

It is often argued that the United States andChinese engagement in the Pacific manifests aclash of foreign policies that mimics the coldwar confrontation of the post-World War IIera. The article argues that rather than adichotomous contestation of foreign policies,the United States–China engagement is morecomplex in nature and needs to be understoodusing more ‘syncretic’ lenses to understand thecomplex synergy in their relationship, whichoscillates between tension and accommoda-tion, cooperation and competition. While thereare areas of policy contestation, there are alsoareas of policy appeasement and convergence.This may act as a stabilising factor in theregion as the two powers acknowledge the sig-nificance of the other and the long-term cost ofdirect confrontation on their respective inter-ests. This potentially contributes to a ‘stable’environment where the Pacific Island Coun-tries are prevented from taking sides, whichcould potentially exacerbate tension andregional instability.

Key words: diplomacy, aid, strategic, pivot,cold war

1. Introduction

When the late Fijian–Tongan anthropologistEpeli Hau’ofa (1993) coined the phrase ‘oursea of islands,’ which became a popular apho-rism in Pacific Studies discourse, he wasmaking reference to the Pacific, not as a groupof tiny and disparate islands in an emptyocean, but as a large oceanic continent thatdefined the Pacific people’s sense of being andprimordial claim to sovereignty and ownershipof their oceanic cosmology. Ironically, thenotion of ‘our sea’ has been expropriated andredefined in a new lexical context as compet-ing hegemons in the form of the United Statesand China stake their claim and legitimacy inthe Pacific. The geopolitical dynamics hasconsequently stretched the ontological bound-aries of ‘our sea’ to include the United Statesand China who now see themselves as aninseparable ‘part’ of the Pacific.

This article is not about deconstructing theepistemological and ontological dimensionsof ‘our sea’ as the philosophically inclinedHau’ofa would have loved me to do, butsimply attempts to examine some salient fea-tures of the geopolitical engagement betweenthe United States and China in the Pacific asthey attempt to assert the legitimacy of theirrespective claims as Pacific states. Thus, thequestions we need to pose here are: Is thisexertion of influence and legitimacy in thePacific by the United States and China to beframed through the cold war prism, whichdepicts relations in terms of fundamental con-testation of strategic and economic policies?

* Centre for Pacific Studies, University ofAuckland, Auckland 1142, New Zealand; email�[email protected]�. The author wishes toacknowledge the New Zealand Marsden researchgrant for supporting the regional security programof which this article is part.

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Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 409–422doi: 10.1002/app5.38

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Or is the engagement between the twopowers shaped by more complex diplomaticpolicy considerations to maintain power‘equilibrium’?

This article makes the argument that therelationship between the United States andChina in the Pacific is more complex thansimply framing it fundamentally in cold warhyperbole. The dynamics are more syncreticthan dichotomous. The term ‘syncretic’ is usedhere to refer to the coexistence and complexsynergy between tension and accommodation,cooperation and competition (Ratuva 2004).While there are areas of policy contestation,there are also areas of policy appeasement andconvergence.

The conceptual boundaries and the specificcontexts of the often ambiguous term ‘Pacific’needs clarification here because of the diverseways and situations in which the term is used.In this article, the term needs to be understoodin terms of two interlinked geopolitical enti-ties. The first is a rather loose generic referenceto the Asia-Pacific region, which incorporatesthe Pacific Rim countries in East Asia as wellas the Pacific island states. The second refersspecifically to the Pacific Island Forum coun-tries (PIFCs). Where appropriate, the specificdesignation is used.

2. The Context: China–United StatesEngagement in Oceania

Because of its central location between the twopowers, the Pacific Ocean is where the UnitedStates and Chinese sovereign claims and stra-tegic projections intersect, and as a conse-quence, PIFCs find themselves as ‘collateral’players in the wider geopolitical chess game.

Of the two, the United States is closer andmore influential to the PIFCs politically, eco-nomically and culturally (Keown et al. 2014).Unlike China, it has been a colonial power inthe Pacific for a long time, and since the begin-ning of the twentieth century, US influence inmusic, fashion, film, art, media, food, educa-tion, literature and corporate culture has con-tributed significantly in the transformation ofthe sociocultural landscape of Pacific islandcommunities in profound ways (Crocombe

2001). As the dominant power since WorldWar II, US strategic posturing was to ‘preventany potential adversary from gaining a strate-gic posture in the South Pacific’ that couldpose a challenge to its hegemony (CongressResearch Service 2007, p. 2). Key to US inter-ests were protection of its territories (Guam,the Northern Mariana Islands and AmericanSamoa), the Freely Associated States (Mar-shall Islands, Micronesia and Palau) and mili-tary bases on Guam and Kwajalein atoll(Marshall Islands) (Erickson & Mikolay 2006;Lutz 2010). Other interests include preventingtransnational crime and the harbouring of ter-rorist cells, and working with Australia andNew Zealand to meet common regional goals(Friedman 2001; Congress Research Service2007).

During the cold war, the Pacific was oftendubbed the ‘American Lake’ because of the USstrategic and military dominance through itsnumerous bases, military networks and alli-ances around the Pacific and Pacific Rim coun-tries (Zarsky et al. 1986). The approach wasbased on the ‘strategic denial’ doctrine, whichinvolved the central role of the ANZUS alli-ance, consisting of Australia, New Zealand andUnited States, to keep the Pacific free of Sovietinfluence through aid, diplomacy and othermeans. At the end of the cold war, the UnitedStates reduced its active engagement with thePIFCs because of priorities elsewhere and itwas assumed that Australia, the UnitedStates’s closest ally in the Pacific, was to takecare of the Pacific on its behalf as ‘deputysheriff’ (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008). However,recent increase in Chinese influence hasaltered the US strategic approach from indirectengagement to direct involvement.

On the other hand, China is not as culturallyand politically influential as the United Statesamong the PIFCs, although the presence ofChinese settlers dates back to the 1800s. Overthe years, a significant number of them hadsettled in several countries such as Fiji andSamoa as labourers and small-scale entrepre-neurs and many intermarried with localwomen (Pan 1998). By the mid-1900s, manyPIFCs had sizeable Chinese populations whowere mostly involved in commerce and some

Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies May 2014410

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studiespublished by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University

of their descendants even became prominentpersonalities in politics, civil service, aca-demia and sports (Crocombe 2007). Since thebeginning of the twentieth century, there havebeen further waves of Chinese migration toPIFCs either as traders, farmers or as part oftransnational crime networks. The firstChinese embassy to be established in thePacific was in Fiji in 1975 followed by Samoain 1976, and since 1980, competition againstTaiwan over recognition became a dominantfactor in China’s economic and political rela-tions with PIFCs (Wesley-Smith 2007;Atkinson 2010; Brady 2010). There is a viewthat the growth in Chinese interests in thePacific has been attributed to ‘a politicalvacuum created by US neglect’ since the endof the cold war (Congress Research Service2007, p. 14). This US-centred perception doesnot take into consideration China’s geopoliti-cal competition with Taiwan as well as China’sown global ambitions and ‘grand strategy’ as agrowing power to maintain a certain degree ofdiplomatic and economic influence in variousregions of the globe including the Pacific(Yang 2009a, 2009b, 2011b).

The United States deploys three basic strat-egies in its engagement with China in thePacific. The first is extensive diplomaticengagement to rekindle US historical ties andpro-US loyalty among the traditionally pro-USPIFCs. This started when President GeorgeBush pledged to ‘re-engage’ with the regionand declared 2007 ‘The Year of the Pacific’during the Pacific Islands Conference ofLeaders (PICL) triennial meeting in Washing-ton DC in May of the same year. Issues dis-cussed in the conference included expansionof public diplomacy, strengthening economicties, US military expansion in Guam andimpact on the region, cultural and educationalexchanges, aid, trade, global warming anddemocracy (U.S. Department of State 2007).To further bolster its commitment to thePacific, in September 2012, Ms Clintonattended the Post-Forum Dialogue at thePacific Island Forum leaders meeting inRarotonga, Cook Islands, where she commit-ted long-term US aid and engagement with thePIFCs and declared that ‘the Pacific is big

enough for all of us,’ an obvious reference toChina and other foreign powers (AustralianBroadcasting Corporation 2012a).

The second strategy is enhancement of itsaid delivery in the region as symbolised by thereopening of the United States Agency forInternational Development office in PortMoresby, Papua New Guinea, in 2011 (15years after the Suva office closed), promise ofmore aid and increased investment. InRarotonga, Ms Clinton made the assurancethat ‘the United States is already invested inthe Pacific’ and ‘we are increasing our invest-ments, and we will be here with you for thelong haul’ (Australian BroadcastingCorporation 2012a). She also announced newaid initiatives worth US$30 million on issuessuch as sustainable development, climatechange and marine protection.

The third strategy is to revive and strengthenthe ANZUS alliance with Australia and NewZealand and a key to this is to rejuvenate mili-tary links with New Zealand after 30 yearssince New Zealand’s active participationlapsed following its 1984 nuclear-free policy,which disallowed US nuclear powered shipsfrom entering its ports. The United Statesresponded in 1986 by banning New Zealandwarships from entering the United States, butthis was lifted in September 2012 as the twocountries have decided to revive and expandmilitary cooperation (Australian BroadcastingCorporation 2013).

In contrast, China is more focused on ‘softpower’ approach through diplomacy and eco-nomic relations (Wesley-Smith & Porter2010). Although the figures are not conclusive,in the last 10 years, China has spent aboutUS$600 million in aid in the Pacific and this isexpected to rise significantly (Lowy Institute2012). Another estimate puts Chinese aid dis-bursed in the Pacific from 2006 to 2011 atabout US$850 million, which is roughlyUS$141 million a year, or around 6 per cent oftotal aid to the region (Pryke 2013). China’said has been largely in the form of visible andsymbolic public infrastructure compared withthe less visible US aid. Because of the Chineseeconomy’s sustained surplus in contrast tothe United States’s constricted economic

Ratuva: A New Regional Cold War? 411


situation, China’s aid to PIFCs is expected tobe more sustainable in the long run. However,the cost of Chinese aid to the PIFCs has beenan issue of concern especially the amount ofdebt incurred through soft loan, inferiorquality of workmanship by Chinese companieswho are often contracted for the projects andthe tendency by Chinese contractors to floutlocal building codes and employment legisla-tions. The Chinese contractors usually bringtheir own workers with them from Chinadespite the abundance of local labour.

Both China and the United States, as well asother regional powers such as Australia, NewZealand, Taiwan and Russia, see the PacificIsland Forum (PIF) as an important mecha-nism for regional influence. In as far as Chinais concerned, bilateral and subregional engage-ment is far more critical especially given thefractured and weakening state of the PIF.China’s soft power strategy as manifested inits support for the increasingly powerful Mela-nesian Spearhead Group (MSG) as well as theFiji-led Pacific Islands Development Forum(PIDF) gives it the head start and edge over theUnited States whose tactic tends to be basedmore on appeal to historical loyalty than focuson the PIFCs contemporary interests. A signifi-cant feature of Chinese aid has been the shiftfrom the classical ‘cheque book diplomacy’where grant was readily provided without anyobligation for repayment to provision of ‘softloans’ on badly needed public infrastructure.Unfortunately, this has worsened the accumu-lated debt burden for some PIFCs.

One of the most critical components in theUnited States–China posturing in the Pacific isthe ‘Fiji factor’. Because of Fiji’s importanceas a regional hub and its regional dominanceover the years, both China and the UnitedStates consider it vital to their interests.

3. Fiji: Centre of United States–ChinaContestation?

Fiji’s close relation with China was influencedby Fiji’s ‘look north’ policy, which endeav-oured to seek alternative friends as a conse-quence of sanctions by Australia and NewZealand following the 2006 coup (Yang 2011a;

Firth 2013). In his article ‘A cold war in thewarm Pacific’, John Wineera, a New Zealandmilitary analyst, argued that because of itscentral location as the economic and politicalhub of the South Pacific, Suva has become the‘mid-point of confrontation’ for United States–China geopolitical rivalry, which will reverber-ate around the Pacific (Wineera 2012, p. 1).While the cold war rhetoric may be a bit of anexaggeration, the pertinent issue here is thepotential Fiji has to be leveraged by eitherpower as a fulcrum for influence among theother PIFCs. It appears that the United Statesis not so much concerned with Chinese aiditself but how much influence China is able towield as a result of aid and diplomacy as wellas China’s latent long-term strategic interests,which are often denied publicly (Yang 2011a).

A critical issue in this regard is the anxietyover increasing military and political linksbetween China and Fiji, traditionally a US ally.Visits to Fiji by Chinese surveillance ships andsenior Chinese officials have become acommon occurrence within the last 6 years.The most senior official to visit Fiji was VicePresident Xi Jinping in 2009. According toleaked cables from the New Zealand embassyreleased by Wikileaks, New Zealand and Aus-tralia had attempted unsuccessfully to stopJinping’s visit to Fiji because it would ‘sendthe wrong message in light of internationalefforts to urge the government in Suva to carryout democratic reforms’ (Field 2011, p. 1). Thecable went on to say that ‘Fiji remained stra-tegically important for China and Beijing wasprivately candid about linking developmentassistance and economic engagement withguaranteed political support on issues of inter-est to China’ (Field 2011, p. 1). A number ofsenior Chinese officials have visited Fiji sincethe 2006 coup, and in May 2013, Fijian PrimeMinister Frank Bainimarama visited Chinaand met President Xi Jinping and Premier LiKeqiang who promised to engage in furthereconomic, military and diplomatic cooperation(Islands Business 2013).

Apart from the usual infrastructural aid, oneof the most politically significant Chineseprojects in Fiji will be the setting up ofa Centre for International Studies and



Diplomacy incollaboration with the ShanghaiInstitute of International Studies (SIIS) one ofthe leading foreign policy research institutesand think tanks for the Chinese government(Fiji Ministry of Information 2013). The SIIShas been tasked with training Fijian diplomatsand other civil servants for local and foreigndeployments. This is significant becausecreating a cadre of Chinese-trained Fijianintelligentsia would be a powerful tool forintellectual and ideological hegemony to shapepolicies, which are sympathetic to China’sregional and global interests.

Also of considerable concern is the highlyspeculative assumption that China may set upa military base of sorts in Fiji and this suspi-cion is continuously fuelled by the increasingmilitary ties between the two countries interms of training and provision of equipment.In January 2013, Major General Qian Lihua,Chief of Foreign Affairs Office in China’sMinistry of Defence visited Fiji as part of an‘annual defence co-operation briefing’(Pacnews 2013, p. 6). Being the highestranking Chinese military official to be wel-comed into Fiji, Lihua’s visit was both sym-bolic and strategic, more so after he discusseddelivery of military hardware in the form ofChinese-made naval boats and other equip-ment to strengthen Fiji’s military capability.The two sides made an agreement that the Peo-ple’s Liberation Army ‘would help andsupport the Fiji Military Forces (FMF)’ in theareas of ‘co-operation, training and develop-ment’ (Pacnews 2013, p. 6).

Amidst the anxiety, China’s Vice ForeignMinister Cui Tiankai denied rumours of apotential Chinese military base in Fiji bysaying, ‘We are not interested in sending ourmilitary forces everywhere in the world-wehave no interest in doing that . . . What we aredoing there (Fiji) is to help the country, thepeople there, to achieve their development’(Reeves 2012). Nevertheless, the dilemma forthe United States is that while the pivot (whichshall be discussed later) is meant to containChinese military overtures, the challenge is todevise a diplomatic strategy to win back Fiji’sloyalty. The United States’s military links withFiji goes back to WWII when Fiji was used as

base for the US military during the Pacific war(Lowry 2006) and this continued over theyears through training for Fiji military officersin the United States. During the cold war, Fijiwas ideologically aligned with the UnitedStates, and Fiji, like many other PIFCs, hasalways been part of the pro-US voting bloc inthe United Nations.

Fiji’s suspension from the PIF and imposi-tion of sanctions by Australia and NewZealand compelled Fiji to redefine its regionaland global options and alliances. Among thesewas the pro-China policy to make up for thesevered links with Australia and New Zealand.Fiji also mobilised the support of the Chinese-funded MSG subregional block consisting ofPapua New Guinea, Solomon Islands,Vanuatu, Front de Libération Nationale Kanaket Socialiste (the Kanak political group in NewCaledonia) and Fiji as a counter to PIF, whichhas been described as ‘Australian-dominated’(Grynberg 2013, p. 1). Fiji also supported therelocation of the African Caribbean Pacificsecretariat from the PIF to Papua New Guineain a move that ‘weakens both the Pacificislands Forum and the influence that Canberrahas long enjoyed through it’ (Herr 2012, p. 1).In addition, Fiji formed the PIDF as a possiblealternative to the PIF, and China is already saidto be a possible funder of the proposed Suva-based secretariat. Fiji’s growing self-confidence was given a major boost after it waselected chair of the G77 plus China, an asso-ciation of 132 member developing countrieswithin the UN (Swami 2012).

In a way, all these developments have seenthe strengthening of China’s power and therelative demise of regional influence by Aus-tralia and New Zealand, the United States’smajor regional allies (Zhang 2007). By liftingsanctions and intensifying engagement initia-tives with Fiji, the United States probablyhopes to counter Fiji’s growing support forChina. The lifting of sanctions on Fiji by Aus-tralia and New Zealand in early March 2014 asa result of positive developments towardsFiji’s election in 14 September 2014 may thawthe situation to some extent; this is notexpected to change the regional power dynam-ics significantly in the short term.



While playing the China card may provideFiji with temporary psychological advantageover Australia and New Zealand in the geo-political manoeuvring game, the down side isthat there seems to be an increase in China-aid fatigue in Fiji. The poor quality of work-manship, failure to pay for worker’sprovident fund and breaching of local build-ing laws and regulations by Chinese compa-nies have become controversial subjects ofdiscussion in Fiji. On the basis of these nega-tive experiences, the Fiji government hasreassessed its technical preference by con-tracting three New Zealand companies toconstruct and repair Fiji roads instead of theonce preferred Chinese companies such asChina Railway. Beneath the veneer of diplo-matic showmanship is the growing anxietyand concern about the appropriateness ofChinese technology and development ethics.

Moreover, both Fiji and China use theirclose relationship as means of achieving theirrespective political and economic interests.For China, it’s a way of establishing a vitalfoothold in Oceania to facilitate its diplomatic,economic and strategic reach, while for Fiji,China is a generous source of developmentmoney and a convenient political leverage touse against its hostile neighbours, Australiaand New Zealand (Zhang 2007; Yang 2011). Itmust be noted that for economic, political andstrategic reasons, China values its relationshipwith New Zealand and Australia more than Fijiand thus one would expect it would be sensi-tive to unnecessarily antagonising them.

The validity in Wineera’s suggestion thatSuva has become the centre of cold war con-testation in the Pacific is perhaps in relation tothe United States’s calculated response toChinese influence; however, there does notseem to be any evidence of direct gunboat-typecontestation. Both countries use delicate dip-lomatic engagement strategies with Fiji. TheUnited States is trying to revive historicalfriendship with Fiji and China is trying to con-solidate new ties, and they both do so with theconsciousness that they need to coexist in amutual way, as Ms Clinton suggested, andmindful of the fact that open competition canonly be detrimental to both sides’ interests.

Meanwhile, Fiji appears to enjoy playing oneagainst the other to fulfil its own aspirations asa mini regional power.

4. The Asia-Pacific Pivot

In the broader scheme of things, it would berelevant at this point to situate the recentUS-increased engagement in the Pacific in thecontext of the Asia-Pacific pivot. While Bush’sdeclaration of ‘Year of the Pacific’ was ratherlow keyed, the new surge in US interest in thePacific under Obama’s pivot is much morecomprehensive and encompassing.

The Asia-Pacific pivot is the United States’broad strategy to ‘rebalance’ power in theAsia-Pacific region in response to Chineseeconomic, political and military interests(Congressional Research Service 2012). Whilemore focus seems to be on Asia as a largemarket and source of raw materials, the‘spill-over’ of the pivot on the PIFCs arestill significant because of the geopoliticalinterconnectedness between Asia and thePacific. The Pacific is the common ‘shared’space between China and the United Statesbecause it is where they define, project andprotect their respective sovereign sea borders;thus, both see themselves as Pacific powers.

In his speech to the Australian Parliament inNovember 2011, President Obama referred tothe Asia-Pacific as a ‘top priority’, and addedthat ‘as a Pacific nation, the United States willplay a larger and long-term role in shaping thisregion and its future . . . The United States is aPacific power, and we are here to stay’ (quotedin Powers 2013, p. 1).

Inherent in this broad strategy is proactivediplomatic engagement as well as consolida-tion of US military deployment in the Pacificthrough increased projection of naval power. Itis envisaged that by 2020, about 60 per cent ofthe US naval forces will be stationed in thePacific, an increase of 10 per cent from thecurrent situation (BBC 2012) and there is alsoa plan to increase troop numbers from thecurrent 320,000 stationed in the Pacific region.Extra locations for US military bases havebeen identified in addition to the existing onesand among these is Darwin in Australia where



2,500 marines will be stationed by 2016(Packham 2011). There are also plans for moreUS ships and military aircraft—including B52bombers—to operate from Australian bases(Packham 2011). In addition, the United Stateshas consolidated its foothold in the Asian con-tinent by strengthening its links with countriessuch as Japan, Vietnam and Philippines, whichhave been involved in sovereignty disputeswith China (Powers 2013).

The pivot allows the United States to dem-onstrate its unsurpassed prowess in war tech-nology and strategy. For instance, it has beenargued that ‘the pivot is not just a redirectionof attention toward Asia; it is a proclamation ofa new form of warfare, Air-Sea Battle, to solvethe problem of China’s presumed militaryambitions in the Pacific with an assemblage ofexisting and new long-range, precision-strikeweapons’ (Wheeler 2013, p. 1). The notion ofAir-Sea Battle (ASB), which is a central plankin the pivot’s military posture, is based on pro-jecting an integrated air and sea power in theAsia-Pacific to directly confront China at itsown doorsteps. The Micronesian islands ofGuam, Northern Marianas and MarshallIslands, which have important US militarypresence, may be directly involved in thebroader ASB strategy. The same could be saidof Australia and New Zealand, which havevital communication bases for US global mili-tary and strategic networks. Although the otherPIFCs may not be directly linked to ASB inpurely military terms, the political and diplo-matic spillover from the United States–Chinacontestation may impact their diplomatic andpolitical alignment as well as socio-economicdevelopment. In order for the United States toextend its military foothold in the Pacific, itneeds to have loyal friends in the vicinity.

The pivot is strongly associated with thedocument ‘Global Trends 2030: AlternativeWorlds’, released in early December 2012 bythe National Intelligence Council and whichcomes out once per presidential administra-tion. It maps out the possible trajectory ofglobal geopolitics in the next couple ofdecades to 2030. The most significant factorsidentified in the document are China’s expand-ing power and the need for decisive response

(US National Intelligence Council 2012). Theobsession with Chinese threat is reflected inthe fact that China is mentioned 300 times inthe report and the final verdict is that theUnited States–China relationship is no doubtthe most crucial bilateral engagement shapingthe future.

Part of the larger pivot project is intelligencegathering through high tech electronic means,not only by the United States but also by Aus-tralia on Asian and Pacific countries such asChina, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malay-sia, East Timor and Papua New Guinea(Symonds 2013). The revelations in November2013 regarding the role of the AustralianSignals Directorate in establishing a ‘string ofcovert facilities’ inside Australian diplomaticposts for the US National Security Agency(NSA) has raised widespread condemnation(Symonds 2013, p. 7). This came in the wakeof embarrassing revelations of NSA spying ona number of world leaders.

In a way, the pivot has ‘raised’ the strategicvalue of some Pacific island states used for USbases (Palau, Guam, Marianas, AmericanSamoa, Australia, New Zealand, MarshallIslands and Federated State of Micronesia) aswell as enhanced the diplomatic and politicalvalue of others in the vicinity as the UnitedStates increases engagement in a more proac-tive way to rebalance the increasingly deepen-ing Chinese influence (Bremme 2012). Thismeans that the Pacific will be more militarised,and US aid may increase significantly in thefuture. These will potentially shape the geopo-litical dynamics in the Pacific substantially, butI suppose the critical question here is, does thepivot constitute a new cold war scenario or is itmerely symbolic posturing?

5. The Pivot and Cold War Rhetoric

The use of the cold war rhetoric is not onlylimited to the pivot. Way back in 2005, promi-nent US strategic adviser Robert Kaplan(2005, p. 1) referred to the post-1990 situationas ‘this second cold war—which will linkChina and the United States in a future thatmay stretch over several generations’. He goesfurther to make the prediction that ‘Given the



stakes, and given what history teaches us aboutthe conflicts that emerge when great powers allpursue legitimate interests, the result is likelyto be the defining military conflict of thetwenty-first century: if not a big war withChina, then a series of cold war—style stand-offs that stretch out over years and decades’(Kaplan 2005, p. 1).

More recently, in an article titled ‘USdeclares cold war on China’, Robert Maginnis(2011, p. 1), a US military analyst, succinctlycaptured the classical realism stance when hedemonised China for its ‘aggressive behaviourand threatening rhetoric’, which are ‘comple-mented by massive militarization’. As if pre-empting and even encouraging a militaryshowdown, Maginnis referred to Obama’svisit to Asia in September 2011 as an attempt‘to declare a cold war with China’ (Maginnis2011, p. 1).

Expressing the same sentiments but withlesser dogmatism, Ian Bremmer, a geopoliticalanalyst and President of the Eurasia Groupdeclared: ‘It’s already becoming a new kind ofcold war,’ however, he later made the restrain-ing assertion that ‘Americans and the Chinesewill be frenemies’ meaning they will be neitherfriends nor enemies (World Economic Forum2012).

The new cold war rhetoric is predicated uponthe assumption that US dominance is part of anunquestioned historical destiny and China’semergence, as a potential competitor, needs tobe kept in check and if need be, vehementlyresisted. This view has resonance with the uni-polar thesis, first advanced in the immediatepost-cold war period of early 1990s, whichunequivocally assumed that ‘no single powercan come close to the United States in its role asa unipolar world leader’ (Christopher 1992, p.ii). The United States’s undisputed global rolein this unipolar scenario is elaborated thus:

Under the unipolar system the single world leaderwould preserve world order by making othernations follow the rules. It would attempt to sta-bilize the world by seeking and obtaining secu-rity, a concert of world community actions and, toa certain extent alignment of the major worldplayer’s foreign policies to that of the leader(Christopher 1992, p. 18).

The rise of China is seen as a threat to thisunipolar system and United States’s status as‘single world leader’, and this needs to beresisted militarily, politically and economi-cally to ensure that the United States reposi-tions itself again as undisputed global power.The current bipolar United States–Chinafracas is seen as a temporary phase in the his-torical mission to make the world truly unipo-lar where the United States is the lawmaker,policeman, prosecutor and judge of the globalorder.

This ideological grandstanding could divertattention away from some deeper interests(Trout 1975). For instance, an important aspectof the pivot posturing, which is not oftenunderstood, is the corporate marketing factorwith potential for the increased militarisationof the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed the propa-ganda against a supposed imminent Chinesethreat can also be seen as an effective market-ing device for US arms sale in the region. FredDowney, Vice President for National Securityat the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA),a trade group that includes top US armsmakers, said that the pivot ‘will result ingrowing opportunities for our industry to helpequip our friends’ (quoted in Wolf 2013, p. 1).The increase in the Asian arms sale has thepotential to offset the slowdown in Europeanarms sale by AIA, a trade group that engagesPentagon suppliers such as Lockheed MartinCorp., Boeing Co. and Northrop GrummanCorp. The Pentagon’s Defence Security Coop-eration Agency, which has overseen a boom inworldwide deals under President Obama,revealed information that there was a 5.4 percent increase in arms deals to US$13.7 billionduring the 2012 fiscal year compared with theprevious year in the US Pacific Command’sarea of activity (Wolf 2013).

In 2012, there were about 65 notifications toCongress of proposed government-brokeredforeign military sales and this constituted acombined potential value of more than US$63billion. Also, more than 85,000 licencerequests were received by the State Depart-ment office that regulates direct commercialsales in 2012, a record to date (Wolf 2013).According to the nonpartisan Congressional



Research Service, in 2011, the United Statesreached arms transfer agreements totallingUS$66.3 billion, or nearly 78 per cent of allsuch worldwide agreements on arms. Thepivot will no doubt increase the defencebudgets of Asia-Pacific states and possiblyclose the gap with the largest two arms buyersSaudi Arabia (US$33.4 billion in 2011) andIndia (US$6.9 billion in 2011) in the future asthe demand for more American military hard-ware increases (Wolf 2013).

The increased militarisation in the Asia-Pacific region may have a direct impact on thePIFCs (and observer countries) with directmilitary links with the United States but by andlarge the secondary impact in terms of Chinaand the US competition for diplomatic influ-ence cannot be easily discounted. This haspotential to reshape regional geopolitics as thetwo powers attempt to carve out their respec-tive extended spheres of influence in thebroader Pacific region.

It appears that the pivot is vital to help keepthe wheels of the US military industrialcomplex spinning at a time when the USeconomy is at a critical juncture in its recoveryfrom the recession. Making profit fromdemonisation of the enemy is clever businessacumen. Although Leon Panetta, US Secretaryof Defence, assured that the pivot was ‘notaimed at containing China’ while addressingmilitary cadets Beijing in 2012, whether theChinese will buy the argument so easily is ofcourse highly debatable. While Panetta’sOrwellian overtures were aimed at reinforcingthe US appeasement strategy to balance itsmilitary expansion into the region, it may notnecessarily lessen the tension. Because thePIFCs are minor pawns in the global game, theeconomic fallout of the pivot may not beimmediately obvious but in the long run, thePIFCs would be seriously sought after forresources such as sea bed mining.

The economic value of the pivot to the USmilitary industrial complex and the USeconomy generally through market and rawmaterial access makes it imperative for theUnited States to play multiple cards at once.This means demonising China and magnifyingits threat to keep other Asian countries on the

US side while appeasing China at the sametime to maintain their critical economic rela-tionship (Round 2013).

Does the cold war thesis really stand up tothe complexities of pragmatics?

6. Cold War or Diplomatic Appeasement?

China’s response to the pivot and the associatedmilitary and economic sabre rattling is largelyrestrained and based on the use of ‘soft power’diplomacy. This is perhaps because of recogni-tion of its own comparative inferiority in mili-tary capacity and also, as a developing country,its priority is consolidating its economic inter-ests rather than strategic expansionism.

A view among some Chinese policy thinkersis that there should be a strategically balancedapproach to ensure potential cooperation withthe United States, but at the same time, one hasto be fully conscious of the implications of thestrategic shift towards the region to China’ssovereignty and interests (Chase & Purser2012). For instance Major General Luo Yuan,Deputy Secretary-General of the China Asso-ciation for Military Science, proposed anapproach that was ‘simultaneously vigilantand calm’ (yi yao jingti, er yao danding),which in practical terms means that Chinashould intensify its economic power andstrengthen its military capability while main-taining good international relations. Yuanadded that the best way to deal with the UnitedStates was not through military confrontationbut to outmanoeuvre it diplomatically in theregion (PLA Daily 2012).

Prof Zhu Feng of the Center for Interna-tional and Strategic Studies at the Peking Uni-versity endorsed similar sentiments suggestingutilising the power of political charm ‘by cou-pling strength and gentleness, and using soft-ness to conquer strength’ (gangrou bing ji, yirou ke gang) (Global Times 2012). TheChinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankaiwas adamant that China should not get carriedaway by US threatening behaviour by ensuringgood and stable relations between the UnitedStates and China (Xinhua 2012).

Interestingly, the Chinese soft diplomacyapproach may have compelled the United



States to rethink its assertive stance. Forinstance, while responding to attempts by theRepublicans to cut US aid program in 2011,Ms Clinton made very strong commentsbefore the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-tions thus:

We are in a competition for influence with China.Let’s put aside the humanitarian, do-good side ofwhat we believe in. Let’s just talk straight real-politik. We are in competition with China(Washington Post 2011).

She then accused China of ‘wine and dine’diplomacy by inviting and entertaining Pacificleaders in Beijing as well as its support forFiji’s ‘dictatorial regime’ (The Telegraph2011).

However, a year later while visiting Austra-lia, Ms Clinton’s tune had suddenly changedinto a conciliatory one. The projected image ofChina suddenly changed from that of a hostiledragon with fiery nostrils to that of a friendlycuddly panda:

The entire region can benefit from a peaceful riseof China and as I’ve said many times wewelcome a strong and prosperous China thatplays a constructive and greater role in worldaffairs. The Pacific is big enough for all of us andwe stand to benefit from increased cooperationacross the Asia-Pacific region as long as it is alevel playing field (The Telegraph 2012).

Ms Clinton sounded as if she was readingfrom a Chinese script because very similarwords were uttered earlier by China’s Assis-tant Foreign Minister LeYucheng in December2011:

In my view, the United States has never left theAsia-Pacific, so there is no ‘return’ to speak of.China does not want to and cannot push theUnited States out of the Asia-Pacific. We hope theUnited States can play a constructive role in thisregion, and that includes respecting China’smajor concerns and core interests. The PacificOcean is vast enough to accommodate the coex-istence and cooperation between these two bigcountries . . . In the face of the changing situation,we should seek cooperation, not confrontation, tosolve issues. We must be confident that as long asChina is committed to peaceful development,openness and cooperation and can attend our own

affairs well, nobody can encircle us or keep usout’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’sRepublic of China 2011)

Without any need for serious content or dis-course analysis, it is of interest to note that MsClinton’s utterances about a year later wasalmost an exact copy of Yucheng’s statementwhen she said, ‘We never actually left Asia.We’ve always been here and been a presencehere, we consider ourselves a Pacific powerbut in the 21st Century, it’s important that wemake absolutely clear that we are here to stay’(Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2012b).

This emerging consensus for coexistence isa far cry from the pre-emptive and hostile sce-nario painted by the cold war enthusiasts.However, having said that, this unlikely spiritof mutuality does not necessarily imply anyconvergence of political interests. It is morelikely that as they size each other up, bothpowers are keen to play the game of psycho-logical appeasement and manoeuvring toavoid tension, which might be detrimental toboth side’s interests.

Nevertheless, this consensus is evolving in ascenario where both sides are fully consciousof the significance of the region as the new‘centre of gravity’ where their economic andstrategic interests intersect as reflected in MsClinton’s words:

It is becoming increasingly clear that in the 21st

century, the world’s strategic and economic centerof gravity will be the Asia Pacific, from the Indiansubcontinent to the western shores of the Ameri-cas.And one of the most important tasks ofAmeri-can statecraft over the next decades will be to lockin a substantially increased investment—diplo-matic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in thisregion (US Department of State 2011)

By openly declaring its interests in suchmanner, the United States may hope to lessentension, give more moral strength to its claimas a ‘Pacific power’ as well as redefine theglobal boundaries of US hegemony.

7. Conclusion

The ongoing geopolitical dynamics in thePacific has probably stretched the boundaries



of Hau’ofa’s ‘our sea’ as the two hegemonicstates, the United States and China, stake theirclaims as Pacific powers, and as a conse-quence, different layers of contestations andalliances come into play. Diplomaticmanoeuvrings to win hearts by China and theUnited States have redefined the ontologicalsense of the Hau’ofan ‘our’ in a dramatic way.China sees the PIFCs as potential members ofits sphere of influence and so does the UnitedStates, which has traditionally saw the Pacificas its backyard and PIFCs as its loyal allies. Tocomplicate the equation further, there are alsoforeign powers involved in mobilising alli-ances in the Pacific. These include Russia andGeorgia (competing for support for the Geor-gian breakaway provinces of South Ossetia andAbkhasia) as well as the Arab League, throughthe United Arab Emirates aid, and Israel(support for Palestinian vote in the UN) andIndonesia (to lobby against support for WestPapua independence) (Firth 2013). It appearsthat sovereignty has become a political com-modity that can be bought or sold in the inter-national geopolitical market (Firth 2013). Inshort, if ‘our sea’ is defined purely in geopoliti-cal terms, as opposed to cultural cosmology, itsontological boundary has extended far beyondwhat Hau’ofa had originally envisaged.

Having said that, it must be re-emphasisedthat there is little evidence to suggest that thegeopolitical contestation between the UnitedStates and China is potentially destabilising ina cold war-type confrontation. The situation isfar more complex than using the prism of adichotomous relationship based on irreconcil-able ideological differences. While there is acertain degree of distrust between the twopowers, there is also a shared understandingthat their interests are best served through dip-lomatic appeasement and mutual agreementfor coexistence in the Pacific. Although thetwo powers have divergent strategic interests,their economic interests are deeply integratedthrough mutual dependency. In a way, thisglobal interdependency contributes to lessen-ing tension and helps generate conditions forgreater mutuality.

This developing consensus, no matter howtactically and conspiratorially framed it may

be, has the possible effects of neutralising anyserious cold war-type confrontation. It is thustoo simplistic to frame the relationshipbetween the two powers purely in terms of therealist lenses, which depicts the two powersengaged in sabre rattling and uncompromisingzero-sum gamemanship. The situation is muchmore complex and involves a syncreticmixture of geopolitical contestation and diplo-matic accommodation as both powers attemptto allay the anxiety of regional states that aresandwiched between the two powers. For thePIFCs, the mutual diplomatic posturingbetween the two powers provides them withthe opportunity to engage in a more enterpris-ing way with the two powers to ensuremaximum economic and political benefits. Fijihas been doing it, and some have taken advan-tage of the situation to play one power againstthe other to extract aid and other benefitswithout having to take sides.

While the pivot is seen as a declaration ofcold war by some, the reality is that it hasmuch more complex characteristics. It consistsof military, economic as well as diplomaticposturing where tension and diplomaticappeasement take place simultaneously in asyncretic way. At one level, there is sabre-rattling politics and at another level there isintensive diplomatic appeasement driven bypragmatic rather than ideological interests,unlike the United States–Soviet global contes-tation of the classical cold war period. Ratherthan deploying a cold war, strategic, denial-type strategy to keep its adversary out of thePacific, the United States is keen to engage ina game of appeasement and consensus withChina in the shared belief that the Pacific is bigenough for both and both are inherently part ofthe Pacific.

Unlike the classical cold war where theUnited States and Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics were in direct ideological, cultural,economic and political contestation with eachother, the current situation between the UnitedStates and China is far more subdued and in factthe ideological line of demarcation is not easilydiscernible. Although the PIFCs may not haveland resources nor provide an attractive marketcompared with Asia, the Pacific Ocean they



occupy provides the security buffer andmeeting place for both the United States andChina and having influence among ‘our sea ofislands’ may have long-term strategic value.

May 2014.

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Documents

A New Regional Cold War? American and Chinese Posturing in the Pacific