AReportonCameraSurveillanceinCanada

PartOne

SurveillanceCameraAwarenessNetwork(SCAN)

January2009

WadeDeismanPatrickDerbyAaronDoyle

StéphaneLeman‐LangloisRandyLippertDavidLyon

JasonPridmoreEmilySmithKevinWalby

JenniferWhitson

SCANWebsite:http://www.surveillanceproject.org/projects/scanFundedbytheContributionsProgramoftheOfficeofthePrivacyCommissioner,Ottawa,andbytheSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanada.

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TableofContents

ExecutiveSummary ..................................................................................3

Introduction .............................................................................................6

CameraSurveillanceinCanada.................................................................9

FactorsBehindtheImplementationofCameraSurveillance ................... 21

CameraSurveillance,PrivacyRegulation,and‘InformedConsent’ .......... 29

PublicPerceptionsofCameraSurveillance ............................................. 41

WorksCited............................................................................................53

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ExecutiveSummaryThisisareportaboutcamerasurveillanceinCanada.Althoughcamerashavebeenappearingforsomeyearsinthestreets,shoppingmalls,airports,trainstations,arenasandevenconveniencestoresandtaxi‐cabs,noonehasundertakenasystematicsurveyofwhat'shappeningintheCanadiancontext.ThisreportofferssomeofthehistoryofcamerasurveillanceinCanada,thedrivingforcesbehindthetrends,thedeploymentofcamerasinspecificsitesandsomeoftheissues,suchastheeffectivenessofsystems,andprivacyandcivillibertiesquestions,raisedbythisrelativelynewdevelopment.ThereportiswrittenbyresearchersbasedatCanadianuniversities,inagroupcalledSCAN–SurveillanceCamerasAwarenessNetwork–operatingunderthebanneroftheSurveillanceProjectatQueen'sUniversity.Ouraimistomakeareportthatisnotonlyevidence‐basedandaccurate,butalsoattunedtotherangeofviewsheldaboutcamerasurveillance,andtofindingappropriatewaysofusingsuchcameras,inwhateverlocationstheyarefound.Withthisinmind,wehavetriedtowriteaccessibly,attemptingtoexpressthekeyfindingsasplainlyaspossible,consciousthatthesewillindicatehowsomegroupsaremorelikelythanotherstobenegativelyaffectedbycameras.OurworkissupportedbytheContributionsProgramoftheOfficeofthePrivacyCommissioner,Ottawa,andbytheSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanada.Thisfirstpartofthereporthasjustfoursections,butthefullreport,tofollowlaterin2009,willfilloutthepicturewithseveraladditionalsections.Thefollowingsummarizesthemainsectionsofthereport.CameraSurveillanceinCanada:Thestorysofar

Publiclyownedopen‐streetcameras–monitoringpublicspacessuchascitystreets–makeuparelativelysmallportionofoperatingcamerasurveillance,buthavebeenthefocusofmostmediacoverageandresearch.Privatelyownedcameras,inspacessuchasconveniencestores,shoppingmallsandbanksandCCTVmonitoringpublictransportationsuchasbuses,subways,andairports,areincreasinglynumerousandrequirefurtherresearchandanalysisontheirsocial,ethical,politicalandfinancialimplications.

Thefearofcrimehasbeenusedtojustifythegrowthofthesesystems.Morerecentlyfearofterrorismhasprovidedanimpetusforintroducingcameras,particularlyinpublictransportationsystemsandairports,inthewakeofterroristattackssuchas9/11intheUnitedStatesand7/7intheUnitedKingdom.

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ThegrowthofCCTVinCanadahasbeenlargelyinfluencedbythegrowthofCCTVintheUKanditspubliclyperceivedsuccess.BritainhasthemostextensivepublicCCTVnetworksintheworld(estimatedat4.2millioncameras).

AgrowingnumberofCanadiancitiesareimplementingopen‐streetCCTV,withatleast14townsorcitiescurrentlyusingorhavingtriedopen‐streetCCTVby2007andatleast16moremunicipalitiesconsideringorhavingconsideredit.

DespitethegrowthinCCTV,thereisnotconvincingresearchevidencethatitaidsindeterring,respondingtoandinvestigatingcrime.

CCTVoperatorsmaytargetspecificindividuals‐suchasvagrants,runaways,andidleyouth‐andactivities‐suchasdruguseandtrafficking,prostitution,publicintoxicationandpanhandling‐inanefforttomakesureonlythe‘right’sortofpeopleusecityspaces,andtorepelthoseseenas‘undesirable’.

CCTVsystemsaresusceptibleto‘functioncreep’‐camerasystemsinstalledforonepurposebecomeusedforotherpurposes.Forinstance,theinstallationofprivateCCTVsystemstomonitorpotentialconsumertheftatretailstorescanalsobeusedtocapturesustainedemployeebehaviourinclosedetail.

FactorsBehindtheImplementationofSurveillance

Various‘push’(Canada’ssecurityorientation)and‘pull’(Canada’ssecurityclimate)factorsservetoframetheavailablepolicyoptionsandimpactpolicychoices.Prominentglobaleventshaveelevatednationalsecurityconcernstothetopofthepublicsafetyagenda.

TheproliferationofcamerasurveillanceinCanadamaybebetterunderstoodthroughaclaims‐makingmodelthanarationalprocessofdecision‐making,wherebythepoliceandsecurityexpertsarelikelytohavemoreinfluenceonperceptionsofcamerasurveillance.

Claimsaboutthebenefitsofcamerasurveillancefor‘nationalsecurity’areprivileged.AddingthethreatofterrorismtothemixofillsthatcamerasurveillancecancounterconstrainspublicdebateasparticipantsdonotenjoyanequalabilitychallengethevalidityofclaimsmadebytheState.

Theadditionofnationalsecuritybenefitstothelistofpublicgoodsclaimedforcamerasurveillancehasservedasatippingpointinitsproliferation.

CameraSurveillance,PrivacyRegulationand‘InformedConsent’

CamerasurveillancesignageisthemajorandoftenonlysignificantmeansofnotificationofovertcamerasurveillancethatissuggestedorrequiredwithinCanadianprivacyguidelinesandpoliciestoachieve‘informedconsent’ofthepublic.

Visiblesignagepostedattheperimeterof‘open‐street’camerasurveillanceareasisrequiredtoindicatethatpersonalinformationwillbecollecteduponentry.Thesesignsarealsointendedtoindicatenotmerelythepresenceofcamerasurveillance,butwhyitisinplace,howmoreinformationaboutthe

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camerasurveillanceprogramcanbegained,andhowacomplaintcanbeinitiatedifnecessary.

However,camerasurveillancesignageinacasestudyoffourOntariocitiesdemonstratesthatthesesignsrarelyfulfiltheserequirements.

Themeansbywhichmoreinformationcanbeobtained(throughfreedomofinformationrequests,telephonenumbers,websites)areindicatedpoorlyatbest;thepurposesofthecamerasurveillanceoftendidnotmatchthepubliclystatedpurposesbytheauthorityororganizationthatimplementsthesurveillance;andreferencestothelegalauthoritybywhichthesurveillanceisoperatedwasoftenunclearorobscure.

Camerasurveillancesignagerarelyallowsforthefull‘informedconsent’ofthosewhoarewithinthegazeofcamerasurveillance.Thisisparticularlytrueforpersonswithvisualdisabilitiesandliteracydifficulties,andoftenthelocationofcamerasurveillancesignageisalreadywithinthegazeofthecamerassurveillance.

PublicPerceptionsofCameraSurveillance Currentpublicopinionresearch,whetherfrommarketingfirms,political

organizationsandmediaoutletsorfromthesocialsciences,consistentlyshowsstrongsupportfortheuseofcamerasurveillanceinpublicandinprivatespaces.Scholarlystudiesdoreportsignificantlyloweracceptanceandfocusgroupfindingsshowanambivalencetowardssurveillancecameras.

Regardlessofthesetting,camerasareseenasusefulagainstcrime,thoughtheirusefulnesshasnotbeenproveninquantitativeevaluations.Thepubliclargelypresumes,orevenhopesforusefulness:camerasareseenasworthinstallingeveniftheywillgenerallynotbeuseful,onthehopethattheymightproveusefuleventually.

Despitemisgivings,clearlyidentifiedproblemsorothertechnologicalorsocialdeficiencies,camerasareadesirablefeatureofmodernsecurityfortheoverwhelmingmajorityofsurveyrespondents.Yet,thepublicareoftenaskedtochoosebetweenprivacyandsecurity,whentheyoftenwouldpreferboth.

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IntroductionDavidLyonInthesummerof2008surveillancecamerasappearedonJasperAvenuenear109thStreetinEdmonton,Alberta.SeveralnightclubshaveopenedinthatareainrecentyearsandinMay2008twopoliceofficerswereattackedwhentheyintervenedinafightoutsideoneofthem.Thecamerasrun24/7butareunmonitored.Videofootageiskeptforthreedaysbeforebeingdestroyedunlessitisrequiredforevidenceincourt.SpeakingfortheDowntownBusinessAssociation,JimTaylorsaid‘Yougetthetoolstoinvestigateafterthefactwiththevideoandyougetadeterrenteffectinthatthebadguysarealwaysthefirsttoknowwhenbeefed‐upsecurityisunderwayandthey’llgosomewhereelse”(CBC2008).ThisstorytallieswithothersinCanadaabouthowvideosurveillancehasbecomecommonplace,especiallyinurbanareas,butalsohowitsdeploymentfitsnoonelogicoroverallplan.Theimplementationofcamerasurveillance,oftenreferredtoasCCTV(ClosedCircuitTelevision)1,providesthemeansto‘watchover’citizens,consumersandtravellers.UnliketheUK,thathasearnedthemoniker‘CCTVcapitaloftheworld,’Canadaisnotmarkedbyahighdensityofcamerasurveillancenearpublicbuildings,onstreetpoles,inhousingprojects,inallpublicandsemi‐publicspaces,inpublictransitandintaxisandevenconcealedinthehelmetsofpoliceofficersonbicycles.YetthegrowthofcamerasurveillanceinCanadaisundeniable,andissteady.Itisalso,generallyspeaking,unremarkable.Unlesstheyareplacedataparticularlysensitivespot,thepublictendseithertowelcomethem,tentatively,ortobeindifferent.ThecommonassumptionthatthesecamerasactasbothausefulforensicinstrumentandasadeterrenttowrongdoersappearsinthestatementaboutEdmontoncamerasfromJimTaylor.Asweshallseeinthisreport,however,bothassumptionsaredifficulttobackupempirically.Theequallycommonassumptionthattechnologyupgradesincreaseeffectivenessisalsopresentinthisstory.In2003and2004cameraswereinstalledonWhyteAvenueinEdmontoninanattempttoreducecrime,butweretakendownin2005.Edmonton’smayor,StephenMandelexplainedthattheseweretechnicallyinferiortothenewcameras,butitisalsothecasethatcivillibertariansandresidentsobjectedtotheearliercameras.Indeed,theearliercameraspromptedacomplainttoAlberta’sPrivacyCommissioner,whoconcludedthat‘placingsurveillancecamerasinpublicplacesisanextraordinarymeasuretobeusedonlywhentheneedforandtheeffectivenessofthecamerasareclear’(CBC2008).Thisappearstobeastringentstandard,buteverythinghangsonthewords‘need’and‘effectiveness.’Itisnotclearthat,

1CCTVusuallyreferstostationary,closedcircuittelevisioncamerasthatsendimagestoacentrallocation.Camerasurveillanceisnowmoremobile,produceshigherresolutionimages,andtransmitsimagestomanydestinationsatonce.

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howeverthesewordsaredefined,thisstatementwastakenaswarrantforthe2008camerainstallations.Thereisalsosomeuncertaintyamongmembersofthepublic.Ina2006survey(SurveillanceProject2008),onlyaboutonethirdofCanadianspolledclaimedtobe‘somewhatfamiliar’withCCTVasasurveillancetechnologyalthoughwhenaskedspecificquestionssuchaswhethertheirworkplacesshouldbemonitoredbycamerathemajoritybelievedittobeacceptablebutonlyifinformedconsenthasbeenobtained.Thissuggeststhatmembersofthepublicdocareaboutsuchmatters,butthattheydonotnecessarilyunderstandthem–say,thatsomecamerasmayhaveTPZ(tilt,pan,zoom)capabilities–andtheymaysimplysurmiseabouttheireffectiveness.RoughlyhalfCanadianssurveyedthinkcamerasurveillanceissomewhateffectiveinreducingcrime.Itis,however,unlikelythatmembersofthepublicobtaintheirinformationfromstatisticalsourcesorfromthosechargedwithresponsibilityforrunningCCTVsystems.HadsuchpeopledonesointheUK,theywouldbeawarethataseniorpolicedetectiveintheUKobservedin2008thatonly3%ofstreetrobberiesinLondonaresolvedusingCCTV,despitethefactthatBritainhasmorecamerasthananyothercountryonEurope(Bowcott2008).Muchmorelikely,accordingtosomeresearchers,isthatpublicknowledgeofCCTVeffectivenesscomesfromTVpoliceshowsandprogramssuchas‘Crimestoppers.’AsCliveNorrisandGaryArmstrongnote,bothCCTVandtelevisionarevisualmedia.Theyare‘madeforeachother’(NorrisandArmstrong1999:67).Theysuggestthatpublicopinionisaffectedbyseeingthe–over‐represented–roleofcamerasincrimedetection.Thereisaneedforconcertedresearchtoencourageandguidemoreevidence‐basedapproachestowardcamerasasatechnologicalmeansforsurveillance.WhilesomepolicedepartmentsandprivacycommissionsinCanadahavemadestepstowardsbringingmoresystematicstudytoissuesofvideocameradeployment,muchworkisyetrequiredtogetahandleonwhatishappeningtoday.Statisticalstudieshelp,butsodothekindsofethnographicandinterviewworkdonebysocialscientists.Inordertograspthemagnitudeofchangestakingplace,somehistoricalunderstandingandsomesenseofthetechnologicalchanges–especiallyinareassuchasdigitizingimagesandfacialrecognitiontechnologies–arealsovaluable.Intheattempttoobtaina‘bigpicture’ofcamerasurveillanceinCanadaitalsohelpstousetheoreticalresourcesandtoinsertthesealongwithknownfactsaboutthesecamerasintomediacoverageandpublicdebates.Althoughsometheoristsjumpedontheratherobviousmetaphorofthe‘panopticon’–theeighteenthcenturyprisondesigninwhichinmateswerewatchedbyanunseeninspectortoensurethattheywoulddisciplinethemselves–camerasurveillancedoesnotseemtohaveachievedsuch‘God’seye’scope.Itisnotmerelythetechnicalcapabilitiesofcamerasurveillancesystems,butthepoliticalandeconomiccontextsinwhichandforwhichtheyaredevelopedthatgivethemwhatpowertheypossess.ThusinthecaseoftheJasperAvenuecameras,cleaningupcitystreetsforconsumption,andensuringthat

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peopleonthisstreetatleastactas‘responsiblecitizens,’seemstobethelimitofcamerasurveillanceaspirations.ThisreportexaminestheseissuesandotherrelatedonesinCanadiansettings.Itdrawsuponseriousresearchdonebyvariousagenciesandacademicbodiesinordertoobtainanoverviewofwhytheuseofvideocamerasforsurveillanceisgrowing,whatthemaintrendsofusageare,whatsortsofpeopleareaffectedandinwhatways.Thereportexaminesnotonlyhowpeopleareaffectedbycamerasurveillancebutalsoathowpeopleaffectthedevelopmentofthesesystems,whetherthroughlegalregulationviaprivacycommissions,orthroughorganizedgroupsofconsumersorcitizens,orsimplyasmembersofthepublicwhowriteoccasionalletterstothenewspaper.Itshouldbenotedthatthisremainsawork‐in‐progress.Ourtaskbeganwithcollatingalreadyexistingresearchbutouraimistogeneratefresh,clear,independentresearchfindingsoncamerasurveillanceinCanada.ThiswillbeseeninpartIIofourreportbutitisalsoprominentinourplansforongoingstudyofthisgrowingfield.Inpartoneofthereport,thedevelopmentofcamerasurveillanceinCanadaisshowntobeinpartanechoofdevelopmentselsewhere,especiallyintheUK.Thevariouswaysinwhichvideosurveillanceisusedaredocumented,andthedifferentresultsdiscussed.DifferentcontextsforCCTVandotherformsofcamerasurveillancearedescribed,whetheropenstreet,privatespaceorothers,suchasinpublictransitsystems.Theroleof‘NationalSecurity’initiativesinfosteringthegrowthofcamerasurveillancehasbeenconsiderable,especiallysince9/11andthisisanalyzedintheCanadiancase.Intermsofresponsetocamerasurveillance,thewaysinwhichlegalmeasuresaremade,andhowdoctrinessuchas‘informedconsent’aremobilized,isalsodiscussed.Thisinturnisalsodependentonpublicperceptionsofcamerasurveillancewhich,asthisreportalsoshows,variestremendouslyacrossthecountry,butalsohassomecommonelements.Forthoseinterestedinreadingoncamerasurveillancemorebroadlyweencourageyoutoaccessthe‘camerasurveillancebibliography’,whichwehavemadeavailableunderthe‘resources’sectionofourwebpage.Thisreferencetoolwillbeupdatedperiodically.

www.surveillanceproject.org/projects/scan

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CameraSurveillanceinCanadaJenniferWhitson,AaronDoyleandKevinWalbyThissectionofthereportsummarizeswhatweknowsofaraboutcamerasurveillanceinCanada:specificallywhatwecansayabouthowmanycamerasexist,wheretheyare,reasonswhytheywereinstalled,andwhatresearchcanandcannottellussofaraboutthecostsandbenefitsofimplementingcamerasurveillancesystems.Thesectionconcludesbyoutliningsomeofthepolicyconsiderationsindecisionstointroducepubliccamerasurveillance.Althoughtheuseofcamerasurveillanceoccursinmanykindsofspaces,therearethreebroadcategoriesofcamerasurveillanceuseinCanada:

1. Publicoropen‐streetCCTV.Inthesesystems,camerasaremostoften

mountedonwalls,streetlamps,fencesandroofs,forthepurposesofmonitoringspacessuchascitystreets.PublicagenciessuchastheRCMPgenerallyoperatethesesystems,thoughopen‐streetCCTVmayalsobeoperatedbyprivateagenciesoracombinationofthetwo.

2. Privatecamerasurveillancesystems,commonlyinstalledtomonitorentrancestobuildingsandtheirinteriors,allowindividuals,businessesandpublicinstitutions(e.g.universities)tomonitortheirownspaces.Thesearefrequentlyseeninlocationssuchasconveniencestores,shoppingmalls,andbanks.

3. Publictransportcamerasurveillance,whichmonitor,forexample,buses,subways,andairports.

TheGrowthofOpen‐StreetCameraSurveillanceinCanadaThegrowthofpublicoropen‐streetcamerasurveillance2inCanadabeganinthe1990s.In1991,Sherbrooke,QuebecbecameoneofthefirstCanadiancitiestoinstallacamerasurveillanceinapublicspaceforthepurposesofcurbingdelinquentbehaviour.Thesinglecamerawasintroducedbylocalpolicetowatchaparticularareainthedowntownbardistrict,butwassubsequentlyremovedafteritwasruledtoviolateQuebec’sprivacylegislation(Superle2003).ThegrowthofpubliccamerasurveillanceinCanadahasbeensignificantlyinfluencedbythepreviouswidespreadintroductionofopen‐streetCCTVintheUK.TheUKhasthemostextensivepublicCCTVnetworksintheworld,andtheperceivedsuccessofthesesystemshasbeenusedtojustifytheestablishmentand

2‘Open‐street’referstotheuseofCCTVinopen,publicplacessuchasstreetsandparks,mostoftenrunbymunicipalgovernmentagencies.

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expansionofCCTVnetworksinCanadaandothercountries.ThemostpublicizedperceivedsuccessesincludeusingCCTVimagesfrommallcamerasintheinvestigationofthecaseoftwoten‐year‐oldboyswhoabductedandkilledtwoyearoldJamieBulgerinMerseysidein1993,andtheuseofCCTVfootagetoinvestigatetheJuly2005(7/7)suicidebombingsthattargetedLondon’spublictransitsystem.InBritain,theHomeOfficehasprovidedhighlevelsoffundingforsurveillancecamerainitiatives,spendingover£250millionofpublicmoneyonopen‐streetCCTVbetween1992and2002(McCahillandNorris2002:22).Bythemid1990s,threequartersoftheBritishgovernment’scrimepreventionfundingwasspentoncamerasurveillance.Researchersestimatedin2004thattheremightbeasmanyas4.2millioncamerasintheUK,althoughitisimpossibletogetanaccuratecountofcamerasgiventheirvastnumbers,rapidproliferation,andthediversityofpublicandprivateusesofthesecameras(Norris,McCahill,andWood2004).WhileCanadianauthoritieslackequivalentnationalfundingforsurveillance,theycommonlyconsultUKauthoritieswhenconsideringsurveillancecameraschemes.Forexample,the‘Lion’sEyeintheSky’open‐streetCCTVschemeinSudbury,Ontario,oneofCanada’searliest,wasconceivedin1994whenPoliceChiefAlexMcCauleylearnedofGlasgow’sdowntownCCTV.McCauleyvisitedScotlandin1995andthenplannedasimilarsystemforSudbury(KPMG2000).In1996,Sudburyintroducedfivecamerasmonitoringthedowntownareaandrailyard.SudburyhasoneofthelongestrunningsurveillancecamerasystemsinCanadawhichhas,inturn,becomeamodelforotherCanadiansurveillanceinitiatives,suchasthoseinLondon,Ontario,Hamilton,BarrieandVancouver.Theinfluenceofthe‘Lion’sEyeintheSky’systemincreasedafterKPMG,aconsultingfirmhiredbytheGreaterSudburyPoliceService(GSPS),releasedanauditofthesystemstatingthat‘atleast300,andasmanyas500robberies,assaults,theftsandothercriminaloffenses’havebeendeterredbytheLion’sEyeintheSkyproject,savingasmuchas$800,000indirectmonetarylosses(KPMG2000:1).InCanada,differentfundingplanshavedevelopedfromcitytocityforsurveillancecameraschemes,andimplementationofcamerasurveillancehasneverbeenextensivelydebatedasanationalpolicyissue.Fundingislargelypiecemealanddependsonlocalpoliceagencies,businessimprovementassociations(BIAs)andotherprivateandpubliccontributions.The‘Lion’sEyeintheSky’project,forexample,wasoriginallyfundedbytheLion’sClub,aswellasalocalbusiness,NorthernVoiceandVideo(whichdonatedthefirstcamera),SudburyHydro,CPRail,theSudburyMetroCentreandOntarioWorks.MuchofthelimitedCanadianresearchonpubliccamerasurveillancethusfarhasbeenconcernedwiththeprocessofestablishingthesesystems,andwithhowthedevelopmentofsurveillancecamerainitiativesareinfluencedbyvariousstakeholdersintheprogramme,fromgovernmentandpoliceagenciestoprivatebusinessesandmediarepresentationstocitizeninitiatives.Thisworkhighlightstheimportanceofboththemediaandthepublicintermsofestablishing,andinsome

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cases,resistingcamerasurveillanceinitiatives(Hier2004;Hier,Greenberg,Walby,andLett2007;Walby2006a)3.MostpubliccamerasurveillanceinCanadahavebeenintroducedsince2000.Widelypublicized,violentincidentsarecommonlyusedtojustifyopen‐streetsurveillancesystems.The1999murderofMichaelGoldie‐RyderinLondon,Ontario’sdowntowncoreprecipitatedaflurryofmediacoverageandculminatedintheformationof‘FriendsAgainstSenselessEndings(FASE).’Thiscitizen’sgroupwasinstrumentalinraisingover$200,000forLondon’ssurveillancecamerainitiative(Hier,Greenberg,Walby,andLett2007).Asimilarhigh‐profilecrimeinHamilton(themuggingofCanadianfigureskater,AlexandreHamel)sparkedanewsseriesdetailinga‘crisis’inHamilton’sdowntowncore,whichinturnledtotheeventualestablishmentofHamiliton’ssurveillancecameraprojectin2004(Hier,Greenberg,Walby,andLett2007).WhiletheHamiltonsystemwasinitiallypurchasedin2001,itwasnotactivateduntilyearslaterduetocontroversyaboutaperceivedlackofpublicconsultationabouttheinitiative.InToronto,thepushforpubliccamerasurveillancewasfuelledbytheBoxingDay2005shootingof15‐year‐oldJaneCreba.ApilotprojectinstalledcamerasinthesamedowntownareawheretheCrebashootinghadoccurred.Itisdifficulttoknowexactlythecurrentnumberofopen‐streetsurveillancecamerasinCanadabecausethesystemsareinfrequentflux,dependingonthelocalsituation.By2007,atleastfourteenCanadiancitieshadimplementedopen‐streetcameras(Lett2007)andatleastsixteenmunicipalitieswereconsideringinitiatingcameraschemesorhadconsideredcamerasurveillanceinthepast(Walby2006a).CitiesasbigasTorontoandMontreal,butalsotownsassmallasAntigonish,hadopen‐streetsurveillancecamerasystemsinoperation.InOctober2008,theprovinceofBritishColumbiaannounced$1millioninfundingtargetedforcamerasindowntownVancouver,theVancouversuburbofSurrey,andthecityofKelowna.InJanuary2009,thecityofWinnipegbeganaone‐year‐pilotproject,introducing10camerasin6downtownlocations.Inthenation’scapital,OttawapolicechiefVernWhitehascalledrepeatedly,supportedbyneighbourhoodgroups,fortheintroductionofsurveillancecamerasindowntownpublicspace.ItisimportanttonotehoweverthatsuchpubliclyoperatedcamerasondowntownstreetsonlyrepresentasmallfractionoftherangeofsurveillancecamerasoutthereinCanadiancities.InOttawa,forinstance,therearehundredsofcamerasaroundthecityrunbyarangeofpublicandprivateorganizations.Forexample,temporarycamerasinpublicparksduringsummer,camerasonlamppostsinoutdoormalls,traffic

3TheSurveillancePracticesandSocialProblemsinCanada(SPSPC)ProjectthatisbeingconductedbySeanHieroftheUniversityofVictoriaandJoshuaGreenbergofCarletonUniversityisacomprehensivereviewoftheimplementationofCCTVinCanadiancities.Thethree‐yearstudyaimstoinvestigateeachcitythathasopen‐streetCCTVinCanada,includinginterviews,mediaanddocumentanalyses.AbookisplannedwithUniversityofBritishColumbiaPress.

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camerasatintersections,camerasoutsidenightclubsandcamerasintaxicabs.TheUniversityofOttawaalonehasover600camerasoncampus.Somemunicipalitieswithopen­streetcamerasurveillanceasof2007(Lett2007)

Somemunicipalitiesconsideringcamerasurveillanceorthathavepreviouslyconsideredcamerasasof2006(Walby2006a)

Kelowna,BC SturgeonFalls,ON Vancouver,BC Saskatoon,SKSudbury,ON Sherbrooke,QC Nanaimo,BC Winnipeg,MBHamilton,ON Drummondville,QC Victoria,BC Dauphin,MBLondon,ON Baie‐Comeau,QC Calgary,AB Selkirk,MBWindsor,ON Montreal,QC Lethbridge,AB Midland,ONToronto,ON Hull,QC St.Albert,AB Brockville,ONThunderBay,ON Antigonish,NS MedicineHat,AB Guelph,ON FortQu‐Appelle,SK Charlottetown,PEIOtherCameraSurveillanceUseinCanadaPrivatelyoperatedcamerasurveillancesystemshaveproliferatedmoreandhavealongerhistoryinCanadathanpubliclyownedsystems.Weusethetermprivatehereinabroadsensetorefertoanyspacethatisownedbyaparticularbusinessorinstitution.Thisalsoincorporatespublicinstitutionsandincludescamerasinuniversities,forexample.Camerashavebeenusedenmasseinspacessuchasconveniencestores,banks,andshoppingmallssincetheearly1980s.Despitethisubiquity,therehasbeenlittlesystematicresearchanddataonprivatecamerasurveillancesystemstodate.OneexceptionisthesmallresearchprojectbyKevinWalby(2005,2006b)onprivatecamerasurveillancesystemsinVictoria,BC.Privatecamerasurveillancesystemsofficiallyoperateindependentlyfromlawenforcementagencies,althoughthesesystemsarecommonlyusedinco‐ordinationwithpolicing,forexample,usingcamerastomonitorandreportonsuspiciousactivitiestopolice,orprovidingthemwithfootage.Privatecamerasurveillanceinitiativesareevenlessdocumentedandresearchedbecausetheyaresowidespreadandalsobecauseresearchersmayhavedifficultygainingaccesstothesesites.Thosewhooperateprivatecamerasystems,suchasbanksandprivatesecuritycompanies,sometimesturnresearchersandmediaawaycitingconcernsaboutprotectingclientprivacy,legalcomplications,andconfidentialityissues(Mopas2005:94).Notsurprisingly,therearenocurrentestimatesofthenumberofprivatecamerasinCanada.Thereare,however,reportsoftheprevalenceofcamerasurveillanceincertainurbanspacesthatcanhelpusroughlyestimatetherelativedensityofcamerasinsimilarlocales.InVancouver,anorganizationofbarownerscalledVancouverBarWatchrequireseachofitstwenty‐twomemberstoinstallcamerasurveillanceatbarentrancesandexitstohelpdeterrowdybehaviouratbarclosingtimes.Inaddition,asurveyconductedin2006bytheVancouverPublicSpaceNetworksuggeststhatthereareatleastonehundredprivatelyownedcameraslocatedatATMmachines,bars,retailstoresandrestaurantsintheGranvilleMalldistrictalone(Haggerty,Huey,andEricsonforthcoming).PeopleinareassuchasGranvilleMallarethusunderfrequentsurveillance,evenwithouttheintroductionofopenstreetcamerasurveillance.

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Anotherubiquitous,butrarelyresearched,formofcamerasurveillanceisthatwhichmonitorspublictransportation,suchasbuses,subwaysandairports.Historically,thefearofcrimehasbeenusedtojustifythegrowthofopen‐streetsurveillancecamerasystems;thethreatofterrorismisincreasinglyusedtojustifytheintroductionofthesesystemsintopublictransportationsystemsandatairports.Giventheincreasingdemandtosecurepublictransportationinthewakeofterroristattackssuchas9/11intheUnitedStatesand7/7intheUnitedKingdom,researchersarenowbeginningtoexaminetransport‐relatedcamerasurveillance,althoughthisbodyofresearchisstillinanearlyform,andexactnumbersarestillemerging(Cameron2006;Lyon2006).Theuseofcamerastomonitorflowsofpassengersinairportshasgrownsubstantiallysince9/11(Lyon2003a;Lyon2003c).Vancouver,again,givesusanexampleofthemonitoringoftransportationroutesandtheflowoftrafficoncitystreets.Transportationflowsareincreasinglyreliantuponcamerasurveillancenetworksand‘red‐light’cameras.TheCassiarConnector,forexample,usestwenty‐foursurveillancecamerastorecordtrafficenteringthecityfromtheeast,whiletheLionsGateBridgeusestwelvecamerastomonitorwest‐andnorth‐boundtraffic.Nearlyeighthundredcamerasmonitorallcommuteractivityonthe28‐kilometreVancouverSkyTrainroute.Travelbytaxiisoftenmonitoredbya‘taxi‐cam’–miniaturecamerasmountedonthetaxi’sdashboardthattakepicturesofthecustomeruponentryandeveryfewsecondsthereafter.Dispatchersonageographicpositioningsystemcanalsomonitorthetaxi’sphysicallocation(Haggerty,Huey,andEricsonforthcoming:25).TheexpansionofsimilartransportcamerasystemsinotherCanadiancitieshassometimesmetwithconsiderableresistance.Forexample,theTorontoTransitCommission(TTC)intendstoimplement12,000camerasacrossToronto'stransportationnetworkofbuses,streetcars,andsubwaysatacostof$18million(Cavoukian2008).A2007complaintfromtheUK‐basedPrivacyInternationalorganizationallegedviolationsoftheMunicipalFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct,andpromptedtheOfficeoftheInformationandPrivacyCommissionerofOntariotoreviewtheproject.Keyargumentsinthecomplaintwerethattherewasalackofevidenceshowingthatsurveillanceonpublictransitsystemssignificantlyreducesthelevelofcrimeorthethreatofterroristattack,therewasamarginalimpactofcamerafootageonpoliceinvestigations,thatcamerasareplaguedwithtechnologicalandmanagementissues,andthattherewasalackofpublicconsultationontheproject.Inresponsetothecomplaint,theTTCreferredtoasurveyof26transitagenciesinNorthAmerica.Themajorityofagenciesreportedpositiveoutcomeswithcamerasurveillanceincludingdecreasesincrime,reductionsinoperatorandcustomerassaults,reductionsinfraudulentinsuranceclaims,reductionsincomplaints,improvedperceptionsofsecurity,increasedcontrolofstudentbehaviourproblems,andimprovedidentification,apprehension,andprosecutionofsuspectsincriminalinvestigations(Cavoukian2008:25).TheCommissionerultimatelyfoundthatwhiletherewasalackofpublicconsultationabouttheproject,theTTCwasnotinviolationofthePrivacyAct,and

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thusallowedtheprojecttocontinue.AsimilartransitsurveillancecameraschemeisalsoplannedforMontreal.FactorsinfluencinginstallingCameraSurveillanceinCanadaandMeasuresofTheirEffectivenessThereasonsgivenforinstallingcamerasinCanadacanbeseparatedintothreemaincategories:

1. Deterringcrime2. Detectingcrime,gatheringevidenceanddeployinglawenforcement3. Increasingpublicperceptionsofsafety.

Howtheeffectivenessoftheseobjectivesmightbemeasureddependslargelyonwhichofthesecategoriesareprioritized.Camerasurveillancesystemsarecommonlyinstalledtodetercrime.Theintroductionofopen‐streetCCTV,inparticular,isusuallyunderstoodasaresponsetocrimeandfearofcrime.Manyopen‐streetsystemsareintroducedindowntownretailstripsandnearconcentrationsofbarstotargetcriminaland‘anti‐social’activity,especiallyaroundbarclosingtimes(Lippert2007).Deterrenceorcrimepreventionstrategiesaimtocreatepracticesorconditionsthatwillleadpotentialoffenderstorefrainfromengagingincriminalactivities,delaycriminalactions,oravoidparticulartargets.Forthemostpart,deterrencestrategiesaimtomakethepotentialoffenderawaretheyarebeingmonitored,andawarethatthismonitoringmayresultinanincreasedriskoftheirapprehensionbypolice.AlthoughtheKPMGreportcommissionedbySudburypoliceandthesurveyoftransitagenciesmentionedabovebotharguethatcamerasurveillancehasledtodecreasesincrime,researchontheabilityofcamerasurveillancetodetercrimeislargelyinconclusive.SystematicevaluationsoftheabilityofcamerasurveillancetodetercrimeinCanadainparticularhavebeenfewinnumber.A2003studybyWelshandFarringtonperformedameta‐analysisontwenty‐twoCCTVevaluationsintheUKandNorthAmerica.Theyfoundthattheoverallreductionincrimeaveragedapproximately4%,andthatinthefiveNorthAmericanstudiesinparticular,nonedemonstratedevidenceofareductionincrime.WelshandFarringtonconcludedthatwhilecamerasurveillancewaseffectiveindealingwithvehiclecrimesandreducingcrimeinparkinglots,onthewholeithadnoeffectonpreventionofviolentcrimes(WelshandFarrington2003;seealsoArmitage2002).A2003reviewofliteratureonCCTVpreparedbyWadeDeismanfortheRCMPfoundthat‘theeffectsofCCTVoncrimearebothquitevariableandfairlyunpredictable.DeterrenceeffectsofCCTVarenotconstantovertimeandtheyvaryacrosscrimecategories’(Deisman2003:2).Theabilityofcamerasurveillancetodetercrimemayvaryaccordingtolocationandthetypeofcrimecommitted.Forexample,thereviewfoundthat,whilecamerasurveillanceseemstohaveapositiveeffectinreducingsomeformsofpropertycrime,thereislittlesupportforitsutility

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inpreventingcrimesagainstpersons.TheDeismanreviewsuggeststhatdeterrenteffectsofcamerasurveillancemightbehighestwhenusedalongwithothercrimereductionmeasures,suchasimprovedlightingandanincreasedpolicepresence,andwhenthesystemistailoredtothelocalsetting.Theabilityofcamerasurveillancetodetercrimeisobviouslyreliantonpotentialperpetrators’awarenessoftheirpresence.Ifpublicityaboutthesystemisnoton‐going,thereviewsuggestedinitialreductionsincrimeanddisorderfollowingtheinstallationofacamerasurveillancemightdecline(Deisman2003:15).Whileinitiativestointroducecamerasurveillancehassometimessparkedsignificantpubliccontroversy,twoCanadianstudiesthatmonitoredthepublic’sviewoflocalcamerasurveillanceinitiativeshavebothfoundthatmostresidentswereunawareofcamerasentirely,oronlyhadlimitedknowledgeaboutwherethesecameraswereplacedandhowtheyoperate,suggestingthatdeterrenteffectsthusmightbequitelimited.(Lett2007;Leman‐Langlois2008).StéphaneLeman‐Langlois’studyofcamerasurveillanceinMontrealadditionallyraisesconcernsaboutthedisplacementofcrime.Thepossibilitythattheintroductionofcamerasmaysimplyencouragetherelocationofcriminalactivitytootherareasisanissuethatsurfacesrepeatedlyinstudiesofcameraeffectiveness.Leman‐Langloisfoundthatthecamerasreducedsomeopendrugdealing,butinsteadofdeterringdealersentirely,illegalactivityseemssimplytohaveshiftedintoareasthatwerenotmonitoredasheavily,particularlyresidentialareas(Leman‐Langlois2008).Similarly,preliminaryresultsofastudybasedattheUniversityofCaliforniaBerkeleyoftheintroductionof68publicsurveillancecamerasinSanFranciscoindicatedthathomicideswithin250feetofthecamerasweredownbuttheyspikedinthearea250to500feetawayfromthecameras.Otherviolentcrimesshowednochange,althoughtherewasa22percentdropinpropertycrimewithin100feetofthecameras(Knight2008).A176‐pageUniversityofLeicesterreportfortheHomeOffice(GillandSpriggs2005)evaluatingtheeffectivenessof14BritishCCTVsystemsfoundthat“themajorityoftheschemesevaluateddidnotreducecrimeandevenwheretherewasareductionthiswasmostlynotduetoCCTV.”Theauthorsofthereportfoundthattherewasa“lackofrealismaboutwhatcouldbeexpectedfromCCTV”andthatitwasoversoldbygovernmentsastheansweror“magicbullet”tothecrimeproblem.Theydetailedhowcamerasurveillancewasnotproperlyimplementedinmanycases,butaddedthatevenifitwasimplementedcorrectly,itwasunclearwhetheritwouldactuallyworktoreducecrime.Whiletheeffectivenessofcamerasurveillanceindeterringandpreventingcrimedependsinpartonthevisibilityofcamerastothepublicandpotentialoffenders,theusefulnessofthesecamerasindetectingcrime,gatheringevidenceanddeployinglawenforcementdependsonhowwelltheyoperateandhowwellanyrelevantimagesarecollectedandtransmittedtopolice.Thisholdsitsownparticularchallenges.Camerasaresometimesinstalledimproperlyormaybecome

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obscuredbydensefoliage,birds’nests,cobwebs,andbuildings.Thefootagemayalsonotbemonitored,thecamerasmayhavedeficienciesintheirrecordingapparatus,ormaybeentirelyinoperative.InMontreal,forexample,manyprivatelyinstalledcamerasare‘inadequateeithertopreventortorepresscrimebecauseoffaultyinstallation,lowqualityandothertechnicalproblems’(Leman‐Langlois2008:34).The2003RCMPreportbyDeismansaid:

…thereisnosimplecorrespondencebetweenthediscoveryofacriminalactivityandtheresultingdeploymentandarrest.Furthermore,thereislittleevidencetosupport/contradictclaimsofincreasedconvictionrates.Finally,[thereis]apaucityofresearchonimpactofCCTVincriminaljusticeproceedings(Deisman2003:3).

InthestudyofMontrealpolice,someresidents’perceptionofthemonitoringofcamerasurveillancewasthatitwasineffectivebecausepolicewouldarrivetoolatetorespondtocriminalactivities,evenifthecameraswereconsistentlymonitored.Infact,thesecameraswereviewedbysomemembersofthepublicastoolsthatpoliceandsecurityguardsusedtoreducecrimesagainstthemselves,allowingthemtopurposelywaitforfightstobeoverbeforearrivingonthesceneinordertoavoidconflictanddangertothemselves(Leman‐Langlois2008).PeterFussey(2008)reviewedtheconflictingresultsofstudiesofsurveillancecameraeffectivenessandnotes“thepaucityofmethodologicallyrobuststudiescitinganybenefitsofCCTVsharplycontrastswiththerepeatedclaimsofmanypractitionersandpolicymakersthatcamerainstallationsareaneffective,rationallyderivedandobjectiveresponsetoidentifiedcrimeproblems.”Whilethereislimitedevidence,atleastsofar,thatthesecamerasystemsaidindeterring,respondingto,andinvestigatingcrime,accordingtosomesourcestheinstallationofsurveillancecamerascanincreaseperceptionsofpublicsafety(Deisman2003).Thismaybeanimportantexplicitorimplicitgoalofbothopen‐streetsurveillanceandmasstransitsurveillancecamerasystems.Ifmembersofthepublicdonotfeelsecure,theymayavoidusingpublicspacesandtransit.Increasingfeelingsofpublicsafetywillencourageincreasedflowintodowntownareasandaswellasstimulatepublictransituse.Theincreasedflowofcitizenscorrelateswithincreasedspendinginthedowntowncore,andaccordinglyishopedtostimulateeconomicactivityandrevitalizeareasdeemedtobefailing.Whethercamerasindeedhavetheseeffectsonpublicperceptionsisinquestion.CanadianresearchhassolicitedtheopinionsofindividualswholiveandworkunderthegazeofsurveillancecamerasinbothMontrealandKelowna(Leman‐Langlois2008;Lett2007).TheseprojectsinMontrealandKelownaexaminedhowordinarypeoplereacttosurveillancecamerasandwhateffecttheimplementationofthesecamerashasontheirperceptionsofsafetyandsecurity.Thisresearchindicatesthat

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peopleseemtohavelittleknowledgeabouttheuseofcamerasurveillanceandthescopeofitsoperation.Theygenerallysupporttheuseofcamerasforcrimedetectionandprevention,especiallywhentheseinitiativesaretheresultofparticularlyabhorrentincidents(e.g.rape,childmurder,andassaultsonseniors).However,thesestudiessuggestthatthesesurveillancemeasureshavelittleimpactonpublicperceptionsofsafetyduetoalackofknowledgeaboutlocalsurveillancecamerasystems.Theseissuesareaddressedinfurtherdetailinalatersectionofthisreport.PolicyConsiderationsinDecisionstoImplementPublicCameraSurveillanceTherearemanyconsiderationsthatshouldbetakenintoaccountbeforedecidingtoimplementapubliccamerasurveillancesystem.Theseconsiderationsincludenotonlyassessingempiricalevidenceoftheeffectivenessofcamerasurveillance,butalsootherissuessuchasthecostofimplementingandmaintainingthesesystems,negativepublicreactiontowhatmaybeseenasinvasive‘BigBrother’surveillanceinitiatives,andconcernsaboutfunctioncreepandracialprofiling.Asnotedabove,alargeconsiderationisthelackofconsistentevidenceprovingtheefficacyofthesesystems.TheInformationandPrivacyCommissionerofOntarioperformedareviewoftheempiricalresearchontheeffectivenessofvideosurveillancein2008.Thefindingswerethat:

Sincethebulkoftheempiricalresearchisdeficientinanumberofrespects,itisdifficulttodrawanydefinitiveconclusionsabouttheeffectivenessofvideosurveillancecameras.Withoutanabilitytocontrolthemanyfactorsthatinfluenceoutcomesandthecontextandmechanismsthatproducetheseoutcomes,itisnotsurprisingthattheresultsofearlierevaluationshavebeenmixed,conflictingand,attimes,contradictory.Videosurveillancesystemsdonotappeartohaveuniformeffectsacrossawiderangeofcrimecategories.Atpresent,itisdifficulttofindunequivocalevidencethatvideosurveillancedetersorpreventscrime(Cavoukian2008:10).

Measuringtheoveralleffectivenessofcamerasurveillanceisaverydifficultundertaking.Furthermoreitisdifficulttogeneralizefromoneschemetothenext,astheydifferintermsofnumbersofcameras,geographicalareasundersurveillance,purpose,monitoringpractices,technologies,operationalguidelines,politicalcontext,legalandregulatoryframeworks,leveloffunding,andmore.Whilecamerasurveillancemaybeeffectiveinsomecontexts,measuresoftheirsuccessmaybequitedependentonthesevariousfactors.Whileresearchmaynotsupportthenotionthatcamerasurveillancesystemsdeteroraidindetectingcrime,thereareotherconsiderationsatstake.Someresearchershavearguedthatthepoliticalappealofcamerasurveillancehaslittletodowithitsproveneffectivenessinreducingcrime,andfarmoretodowithitssymbolicvaluein

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fosteringthebeliefthatsomethingisbeingdoneabouttheproblemofcrime(Norris,McCahill,andWood2004).ThisconclusionfitswithresearchevaluatingcamerasurveillanceinEdmonton.TheEdmontonPoliceService(EPS)usedCCTVcamerastomonitortheshoppingandbardistrictofWhyteAvenueinthesummersof2003and2004,inorderto‘deter,detect,andassistintheinvestigationofcrimetherebydecreasingthefearin,andprovidingasaferandlessintimidatingatmosphereforthepublic’(EdmontonPoliceService2005:3).A2005in‐houseevaluationconductedbyEPSfoundthattherewasnotsufficientevidencetoconcludethattherewasanydeterrenteffectoncrime.Thecamerasonlydetectedelevenincidents,fourofwhichrequiredpoliceresponseandtherewasnoindicationthatcamerasurveillancefootageassistedinanyinvestigations.Theprojectwasabandonedin2005duetoinconclusivefindingsandcostconsiderations(theprojectrequired$85,000overtwosummers).Despitethefailuretodemonstratethattheprojecthadactuallydeterredcrimeorhelpeddetectandrespondtocrimeeffectively,thesystemapparentlyhadconsiderablesuccessintherealmofpublicperception.SurveysconductedbyEPSdidindicaterisingpublicsupportforcamerasurveillance–increasingfrom39%approvalbeforethesystemwasinstalledto61%approvalduringitsoperation(Lai2007).Otherresearchonpublicperceptionofcamerasurveillanceindicatesthatthepublicislargelysupportiveofcamerasurveillance,despitethelackofconcreteevidenceprovingthatitactuallydeterscrime.Likewisethepublicisnotoverlyconcernedabouttheimpactofcamerasurveillanceontheirownindividualprivacy(Deisman2003).Asurveyonprivacyandsurveillanceconductedin2006bytheSurveillanceProjectfoundthatthemajorityofCanadianrespondentsbelievebothcommunity(asinpublicCCTVsystems)andin‐store(asinprivatesystems)camerasurveillanceissomewhatorveryeffectiveinreducingcrime(GPD2008).Howeveritisworthnoting,aswedocumenthere,particularinitiativesinCanadatointroducecamerasurveillancehavealsometsubstantialpublicresistance,asintheexampleofBrockvillediscussedshortly.AsinthecaseofEdmonton,costconsiderationsmayderailsurveillancecamerainitiatives.BothWinnipeg’sandMedicineHat’splansforcamerasurveillancewerescrappedaftertheirrespectivecitycouncilsraisedconcernsregardingtheaffordabilityandnecessityofcamerasurveillance,andtheSudbury‘Lion’sEyeintheSky’project,despitethereportedpositiveeffectsoncrimereduction,wasnearlyabandonedinlate2001duetocost(Walby2006a).Thoughadvancesintechnologylimittheneedforexpensivecableorfibre‐opticinfrastructures,withwirelessnetworksallowingthesesystemstobecomemoreaffordableandlessdisruptivetoinstall,labourcostsforoperatorsthatmonitorandmaintainthesesystemsremainadeterrentfortheproliferationofopen‐streetCCTVinCanada.Somelawenforcementagencieshavedistancedthemselvesfromcamerasurveillanceinpartbecauseofcosts,butalsobecauseofthenegativepublicresponseassociatedwith‘BigBrother’televisioncameras.Forexample,theChiefof

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PoliceofGuelphrejectedcallsforopen‐streetCCTVinboth1999and2003,reasoningthat:1. CCTVschemesdrivenbythepolicefaceconsiderablepublicscrutinyand

opposition.2. CCTVopensthedoortoanumberoflegalissuesaroundthepotentialabuseof

tapesandmonitoringequipment.3. Systemstartupandmaintenanceoftenprovestoocostly.4. Safetyissuesinthedowntowncorecouldbeaddressedthroughothermeans

(Walby2006a).ThepublicmayalsobeveryconcernedaboutthelossofprivacyasexemplifiedinthecaseofBrockvilleinthelate1990s.Originallyendorsedbythelocalchiefofpolice,theprojectfacedconsiderablemediaopposition.Thelocalnewsmediaarguedthatcamerasurveillancewouldinvadecitizen’sprivacyandthatthemoneyforthecameraswouldbestbespentelsewhere.Brockvillecitizens,evidentlyworriedabouttheimplicationsofincreasinglevelsofsurveillance,inundatedCityCouncillorsandtheMayorwithphonecalls.Theireffortsresultedinaunanimous‘no’votedagainsttheCCTVinitiative(Hier,Greenberg,Walby,andLett2007;Walby2006a).Amongtheprivacyconcernsareworriesthatthedatagatheredbycamerasurveillancewillbeusedforpurposesotherthancrimeprevention.Whilemostsystemsareinstalledforthepurposesofdeterrenceandtheincreaseinpublicperceptionsofsafety,thesesystemsaresusceptibletowhatsociologistscall‘functioncreep’–camerasystemsinstalledforonepurposebecomeusedforotherpurposes.Forinstance,theinstallationofprivatesurveillancecamerasystemstomonitorpotentialconsumertheftatretailstorescanalsobeusedmonitoremployeebehaviour.Thissurveillancecouldbeusedforavarietyofreasons,forexample,reducingworker‐relatedtheft,investigatingconductthatviolateshumanrightslegislation,andmanagingworkforceproductivity.CamerasystemsinstalledtodetercrimehavebeenusedtolocatemissingchildrenandwanderingpatientsfromhospitalsandnursinghomesindowntownHamilton,butalsotocatchable‐bodieddriverswhoparkinspacesforthehandicappedinLondon,Ontario(Hier2004).Criticschargethatsurveillanceinitiatives,bothpublicandprivate,maysometimesbelinkedwiththedesiretoattractthe‘right’sortofpeopletocityspaces,andtorepelthoseseenas‘undesirable.’Visiblyidentifiablecategoriesofindividuals,suchasvagrants,runaways,and‘idleyouth’areoftenassociatedwithdisorderandincivilityoncitystreets.Camerasurveillanceinitiatives,asaresult,maytargetspecificactivitiesandpersons.Forexample,theHamiltonPolice’sCCTVReportadvocatedafocusondruguseandtrafficking,prostitution,publicintoxicationandpanhandling(Hier2004:551).Surveillancesuchasthisserveswhatsociologistscallasocialsortingpurpose,separatingthosewhobelong(e.g.pedestriansandothershoppers)fromthosewhodonot(e.g.transients,panhandlers)(Lyon2003b).Indoingso,camerasurveillancesystemsrelyonthejudgmentoftheiroperators.Withtheabsenceofformalizedguidelinesforoperators,thereisahigherlikelihoodof

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profiling,stereotypinganddiscrimination(Norris2003).Surveillancecameramonitoringinsomecasesfacilitatesracialprofiling,asexemplifiedinrecentresearchonVictoria,B.C.cameraoperators(Walby2005).OnesecurityofficeratasuburbanVictoriamallwhosejobincludingmonitoringcamerasputitthisway:“Asforwhatwelookfor(pause)…Natives.Hatetostereotype,butIknowinCentralSaanichtheyhavehousesontheirreservesthatarebasicallyashoppingstoreofmerchandisestolenfromrealstores…”(Walby2005:206).

SummaryAgrowingnumberofCanadiancitiesareimplementingopen‐streetCCTV.Camerasurveillancesystemsarenowveryoftenfoundinprivatespacessuchasbanks,conveniencestores,andmalls,andtheiruseisexpandingtoothervenuesaswell,especiallypublictransportationsystems.Asdetailedabove,camerasurveillanceisembracedbythepublicinsomesituationsandactivelyresistedinothers.Despitetheclaimsofsupporters,thereisnodefinitiveevidenceabouttheeffectivenessofthesesystems.ThesituationisbestaddressedbyastatementfromtheInformationandPrivacyCommissionerofOntario:

Atpresent,itisdifficulttofindunequivocalevidencethatvideosurveillancedetersorpreventscrime.However,itisequallydifficulttoconcludetheopposite.Amorevaluableroleforvideosurveillancemaybeasasourceofevidenceinthedetectionandinvestigationofcrime.Amuchlargerbodyofresearch,withaconsistentdegreeofmethodologicalrigor,isneededbeforedefinitivestatementsmaybemade(Cavoukian2008:10).

Moreresearchisrequiredtoevaluatetheconsequencesoftheintroductionofcamerasurveillancebeforeweachieveasatisfactoryunderstandingofthesocialandethicalimplicationsofthesesystems.

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FactorsBehindtheImplementationofCameraSurveillanceWadeDeismanTheprevioussectionsofthereportnotethatvariousrationalesareusedtosupporttheimplementationofcamerasurveillance(thisincludes:deterringanddetectingcrime,enhancingpublicsafety,assistingcriminalinvestigations,andservingasevidenceinprosecutions).Thediscussionthusfaralsonotesthatthereisnoclearevidencedemonstratingthatcamerasurveillancecanproduceanyofthesedesiredeffects,andthatnumerouspolicyconsiderationscomeintoplaywhentheimplementationofcamerasurveillanceisbeingconsidered.Thislackofclearevidencetosupporttheefficacyofcamerasurveillanceshouldnotbemistakentomeanthatsuchsystemscannot,ordonot,producetheeffectsintendedofthem.However,itdoesmeanthattheadoptionandexpansionofcamerasurveillanceinitiativescannotbeattributedtotheirprovensuccess.SowhatexplainstheattractionandgrowthofsuchsystemsinCanada?Togaininsightintothismatterrequiresacloserlookatthepolicyformationprocessesanddeliberationsthatoccurpriortocameradeployment.4Wemustexploretherolethatlargersetsofcontextualandstructuralforcesplayincreatinganenvironmentconducivetotheselectionofcamerasurveillanceasapolicyoption.Camerasurveillanceisdrivenbyseveralfactorsincludingpublicdemand,influencesofthemedia,thepolice,localauthorities,commercialinterests,insurancecompaniesandnotleastthe‘surveillanceindustrialcomplex’.Researchontheimplementationofcamerasurveillanceschemessuggeststhatdecisionsregardingtheirup‐takeneedtobeunderstoodinrelationtoboththelocalcrimepreventionstrategiesalreadyinplace,andthebroadersocialandpoliticalforceswhichinformandimpactuponthisdecision‐making(Fussey2008).Morepointedly,theresearchsuggeststhattheconventionalpolicyformationmodel(wherepolicydecisionsaremadebasedonrationaldeliberationand/orrobustcostbenefitanalysis)doesnotapplyincaseswherethepolicyinstrumentatissueiscamerasurveillance.Rather,thepolicyformationprocesscanbebetterunderstoodintermsofthepowerandinfluenceofvarious‘push’and‘pull’factorsthatservetoframetheavailablepolicyoptions,aswellasimpactuponpolicychoices.Amongthese,prominentglobaleventshaveelevatednationalsecurityconcernstothetopofthepublicsafetyagenda,whichhashadasignificantimpactonthedeploymentofcamerasurveillancesystems.ThissectionbeginsbyprovidingabroadsketchofCanada’ssecurityclimateandsecurityorientation.Itthengoesontoinvestigatehowthese‘push’and‘pull’factors

4Thismodelassumesanisolatedpolicyformationprocessaccordingtowhichtheonlyquestionatissueiswhetherornottoadoptcamerasurveillanceandinwhichprocessesofdeliberationanddebateprecedingthedecisionaredevotedsolelyandonlytoassessingthemeritsofsuchsurveillancesystems.

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havecombinedtocreateastructuralcontextmuchmorereceptivetoCCTV,facilitatingtheimplementationofcamerasurveillanceinanumberofCanadiancontexts.FromOrdinarytoExtraordinaryRationalesCombatingterrorismhascometooccupyan‘extraordinary’positionalongside,andinadditionto,the‘ordinary’rationalesofpreventingcrimeandenhancingpublicsafety.UnderstandinghowthiscametoberequiresanappreciationofthewaysthatCanadahaschanged,andcontinuestochange,asaconsequenceofwhatoccurredonSeptember11,2001.Inresponsetoconcernsaboutterrorism,theCanadiangovernmentinitiatedaseriesofpolicyandlegislativechangesthatreorganizedfederalapproachestonationalsecurity.Newlaws,withunprecedentedpowersforpolicingandsecurityagencies,weredraftedandpassedwithconsiderablehaste5.ForthefirsttimeinCanadianhistory,acomprehensivenationalsecuritypolicywasimplementedtocoordinatecriticalinfrastructureprotection,threatassessment,riskmanagementandemergencyresponse.ItisagainstthisbackdropthatcamerasurveillanceinCanadamustnowbeunderstood.Concernsaboutterrorismhavenotonlyplayedaroleinre‐shapinghowwethinkaboutcamerasurveillanceinCanada,theyhavealsoreshapedthinkingaboutthebalancebetweenprivacyandsurveillanceitself.Issuessurroundingnationalsecurityhavebeensopronouncedthattheycannotsimplybefactoredintoanalreadyexistingunderstandingofthebenefits,problems,andcostsassociatedwiththeuseofcameras.Rather,‘nationalsecurity’concernsincreasinglyunderliealldiscussionsregardingcrimedetectionandprevention.NationalsecurityhasbeenanimportantmotivationfortheproliferationofcamerasurveillanceinCanada.ThecitiesofToronto,Montreal,andVancouverhaveallcitedcounter‐terrorismtojustifytheimplementationofnewand/orexpandedcamerasurveillancemeasures.Thefollowingsectionsdescribethefactorsassociatedwiththeemergenceofcamerasurveillanceasasecuritystrategyinasecurityclimatethatischaracterizedbyvolatility,uncertainty,andfear.Acomplexsetofpushandpullfactorsleadtotheimplementationofcamerasurveillance.Pullfactorsincludethe‘securityclimate’,whichisproducedbytheinterplaybetweenpoliticalandmediamessagingwithrespecttothelevelofperceivedsecuritythreat,publicperceptionsofvulnerability,publicdemandfor(andtheassuranceof)safety,aswellaspublicbeliefsabouthowsuchsafetycanbeachievedandaboutwhomoughttoberesponsibleforsupplyingit.Similarly,push

5ChangesassociatedwiththepursuitofthisnewsecurityorientationincludeBillC‐36‘TheAnti‐terrorismAct”butalsoBillC‐7‘ThePublicSafetyAct’.ItshouldbenotedthatwhentheAnti‐TerrorismActwasconceived,itwasgenerallyunderstoodthatmorespecificchangeswithrespecttopublicsafetyarrangementswouldberequired.ThecompanionpieceoflegislationinthisregardisthePublicSafetyAct.Inmanyrespects,itisdifficulttothinkabouttheimpactoftheAnti‐TerrorismActwithoutattendingtotheconcomitantchangesassociatedwiththePublicSafetyAct.

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factorsexistsintermsofthe‘securityorientation’,whichstrivestowardsspecificsecurityresponsesandoutcomes.Therelationshipbetweenthepushandpullfactorsshouldbeunderstoodasinterdependentandoverlapping.Thefollowingdiscussionindicateshowquestionsaboutcamerasurveillancehavebeenrecastagainstabackdropofone,pushfactorsofthevolatilesecurityclimateinfusedwithheightenedpublicfearfulnessandtwo,pullfactorsofthesecurityorientationwhichincreasinglyemphasizesprecautionarylogics,preventionprograms,andtechnologicalfixes.

UnderstandingthePre­DeploymentPhaseFACTORSTHATMAYINFLUENCETHEASSESSMENTOF

CAMERASURVIELLENCEASAPOLICYCHOICEPUSHFACTORS PULLFACTORSSITUATIONALLEVEL

STRUCTURALLEVEL

SITUATIONALLEVEL

STRUCTURALLEVEL

Crimepreventiondirectivescharacterizedbyemphasisonmakingthebuiltenvironmentresistanttocriminalbehaviours.Theseare‘brokenwindows’principleswhichaimtocleansepublicspacesofsignsofdisorder,andazerotoleranceapproachdictatingthateventhemostminorviolationsbesubjecttofullsanction.

Securityorientationcharacterizedbyperceptionofexceptionalcircumstanceswhichnecessitateasuspensionoftheusualchecksandbalancescriticaltodemocraticaccountability,anemphasisonroleofgovernmentinsettingoutanewsecuritystrategy,decliningconcernforprivacy,andemphasisontechnologicalsolutions.

Heightenedlevelsofpublicpreoccupationwithcrimeanddisorder,andheightenedcommitmentwithincommunitiestotakemeasuresatthelocalleveltoaddresstheseissues,frequentlyinvolvingresorttoself‐helpsolutions.

Securityclimatecharacterizedbypersistentmessagingabouttheimmanenceandimmediacyofthethreat,theneedforconstantvigilancefromthepublicandaninsistenceontheimportanceoftheroleplayedbyeverydaycitizensindetectingandcounteringterrorism.

AVolatileSecurityClimate:UncertaintyandFearFuelledbyFrequencyofTerroristActivityAbroadandAtHomeWhileCanada’semphasisonnationalsecuritymayhavebeenpromptedbythe9/11attacksontheUnitedStates,itisimportantthatthesearenottreatedasisolatedevents.Indeed,therehavebeenaseriesofsubsequentterroristacts,andthesemustalsobeviewedasinfluencingCanada’sbroadersecurityclimate,aswellasitsspecificsecurityorientation.Furthermore,anadequateunderstandingoftheeventsthathavealteredthesecurityclimateinCanadamusttakeintoaccounttheeffectofbothdomesticandinternationalactivity.WhilethethreatposedbyterrorismhasbeenunderscoredbyavarietyofeventsthathaveoccurredbeyondCanada’sborders,someofthesehadCanadianconnections,amplifyingtheireffecton

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Canada’ssecurityclimate.Tobesure,themajorityoftheseeventsmightbeunderstoodascautionarytalesandtestimonytotherealityofthethreat.InterpretationsoftheDegreeoftheThreat:TheEmergenceofaNewSecurityOrientationTerrorismiscommonlyinterpretedastangiblethreattowesternnations6.Thisinterpretationhashadasignificantimpactonthebasicorientationto,andunderstandingof,securityinmanywesternnationstates,suchthattheyhavedeemeditnecessarytoundertakebroadprogramsofpoliticalandgovernmentalreorganizationinthenameofsecurity.TheresponseoftheCanadiangovernmentandpoliceauthoritiesto9/11andsubsequenteventsarebasedonthepremisethatCanadatooisatrisk.Theideathattheverycountryisunderthreatisseenassufficientwarrantforthegeneralclaimsthatthecountryfacesextraordinary(ratherthanconventional)circumstances,whichnecessitateexceptionalsecuritymeasures.Thisleadstoashiftinthebalanceofpublicsecurityandhumanrights,andageneralredrawingofwhatwereoncesacredlimitsonthesurveillancepowersofthestate,inthenameofpublicsafety,andchangesinsecurityregulations.Oneoftheimmediateconsequencesofinterpretingthethreatofterrorismthiswayisthatitauthorizesexceptionalsecurityresponses.Intheirprocessesofcomingtotermswiththenatureofthethreatrevealedbythe9/11attacks,manynationsembarkeduponbroadprogramsofbureaucraticandlegalreorganizationinthenameofenhancingsafety.Significantconsequencesmayresultifthispremiseofexceptionalityisallowed.Sincethesituationitselfisan‘extraordinary’one,exceptionalmeasuresmustalsobetakeninresponse.Policyalternatives,interventionstrategies,andavenuesofsocio‐politicalresponsethatmightotherwiseappearabsurd,orinconceivable,arenowinuse,onthetable,orunderseriousconsideration.Theimplicationisthatthestandardchecksandbalancesoughttobeover‐riddenoratleastsetaside.Furthermore,whenrangedaccordingtoacostbenefitanalysis,nationalsecurityconcernstendtosupersedeallothers.IntheCanadiancontext,theprocessbeganintheaftermathoftheattacksofSeptember11,2001.‘Nationalsecurity’clearlytrumpedcivillibertiesandhumanrightsconcernsinBillC‐36.Thus,ashiftoccurredinthebalancingofsecurityandhumanrights,andageneralredrawingofwhatwereoncesacredlineslimitingtheexerciseofstatesurveillancepowers.RenewedandmorerigorousattentiontoquestionsofsecuritywasneededfollowingtheattacksofSeptember11,2001.ThecentralthemethatemergedinCanadafocusedontheneedforabalancebetweenthedesireforincreasedsecurityandrespectforcivilliberties7.6ThisassumptioninformsresponsestothethreatofterrorisminAustrailia,theUSAandtheUK.7Sunstein(2003)offersaninterestingdiscussionofwhythis‘tradeoff’issooftenseenasanecessityandembracedbythepublic.

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Oneoftheprincipalareasofconcernwasprivacy.TheAnti­TerrorismActamendsthePersonalInformationProtectionandElectronicDocumentsAct,thePrivacyActandthefederalAccesstoInformationActintwoways.ItallowstheAttorneyGeneralofCanadatoissuesecrecyorders,whichexcludeinformationfromtheauthorityofthesestatueswhereitisdeemedthatdisclosuremayharmnationaldefense,securityorinternationalrelations.TheamendmentstothePrivacyActwereprimarilyintendedtoreflectthenewpowersprovidedforundertheEvidenceAct,whichallowstheMinisterofPublicSafetyandEmergencyPreparednesstoprohibitthedisclosureofinformationduringthecourseoflegalproceedingswheredisclosuremayhaveaharmfulimpactoninternationalrelations,nationaldefenseand/orsecurity.ThePrivacyActwasamendedsuchthatwhereacertificateprohibitingdisclosureofinformationisissued,undertheauthorityoftheEvidenceAct,beforeacomplaintisfiledwiththeOfficeofthePrivacyCommissioner,theprovisionsofthePrivacyActdonotapplytotheinformationthatissubjecttothecertificate.However,ifacertificateprohibitingdisclosureisissuedafterarequestforaccesshasbeeninitiatedallproceedingsunderPrivacyActwithrespecttothatinformation(includinganinvestigation,audit,appealorjudicialreview)arediscontinued.TheAnti­TerrorismActalsoexpandedthegovernment’sabilitytointerceptwire,oral,andelectroniccommunicationsrelatingtoterrorism,toshareinformationrelatedtocriminalinvestigations,andtoconductelectronicsurveillance.Furthermore,theactgaveincreasedpowerstotheCanadianSecurityEstablishment,allowing,insomeinstances,fortheinterceptionofdomesticcommunications.TheActprovidedforCanadatosignontotheEuropeanconventiononCyber‐crime–acommitmentrequiringCanadatodevelopInternetsurveillanceapproachesandprotocolsithadnotpreviouslyaccepted.Atfirstglanceitmayappeartosomethat,atleastwhereprivacyissuesareconcerned,thechangesintroducedafter9/11wereminormodificationstoexistingstatutoryprotections(Regan2004).However,amoremethodicalanalysisofthecontextofthelegislationsuggests“afundamentalreshapingofthelargerenvironmentinwhichpersonalinformationflows,andaconcomitantlossofprivacyanddueprocessprotectionsforindividualswithinthatenvironment”(Regan2004:483.WhatseemstohavehappenedasaresultofBillC‐36isaloweringofstandardsforindividualizedsuspicion,ageneralweakeningofavarietyofjudicialsafeguards,andavarietyofpotentiallydangerousconsequencesforprivacyanddueprocess.DecidingtoImplementCameraSurveillance:Claims­MakingandtheImpactofNationalSecurityWhatistheimpactofthechangingsecurityclimateinCanadaanditscurrentsecurityorientationonthedeploymentofcamerasurveillance?Asalreadynoted,wedonotyetknowenoughaboutthefactorsthatinfluenceacommunity’sdecision

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toembraceoravoidcamerasurveillance8asapolicyoption,orabouttheprocessofopinionformationleadinguptothepointoftakingadecision.Previousstudiesofdecision‐makingaboutcamerasurveillancesuggestthattheseprocessesdonottypicallyfollowa‘rational‐objectivemodel’.DecisionstoavoidorembraceCCTVdonotappeartohingeuponevidencethatvideosurveillanceisthe‘mosteffectivestrategy’torespondtocrimeand/ordisorder9.ThisissignificantintheCanadiancontextbecauseonesuchrational‐objectivemodeliswidelyassumedasaninstructiveguidetodecision‐makingbyCanadianpolice,aswellaswithinthewidersecurityandpreventioncommunities.Whileweoughtnotpresumethatrationalprocessesofdecision‐makingoraclearrecordofevidencearenecessaryfortheadoptionofCCTV,itdoesnotpreventusfromexaminingtheprocessesofdeliberationunderaclaims‐makingmodelandconsideringthekindsofclaimsmadeonbehalfofCCTVinrelationtonationalsecurity.Thisisespeciallysosincenationalsecurityconcernshavetransformedthebackdropagainstwhichsuchclaimsoccur.Inthiscontextitisimportanttoexamineboththeclaims‐makers,thecontentofclaims‐making,andtheuniqueconstraintsthatnationalsecurityissuesplaceonanactororagent’sabilitytoparticipateinthedecision‐makingprocess,andtheirfeelingthattheywouldbequalifiedtodoso.Withrespecttoclaims‐makers,wemustaskhowcredibleandauthoritativecertainclaimsare.Forexample,industryrepresentativestryingtoprovideeffectivesecuritysolutionstoclientsstresstheefficacyofcamerasurveillanceandemphasizetheirbeliefthattheinstallationofsuchsystemsrepresentsaneffectivechoiceinrespondingtoissuesofcrime,disorderandterrorism.Butclaimsbythesepartiesmaybetemperedbytheperceptionthattheyareself‐interestedandprofitmotivated.Ontheotherhand,otherplayersmayenjoymoreauthority.Claimsmadebypoliceservices10andsecurityexpertsarelikelytohaveastrongerimpactontheperceptionofcamerasurveillance.Turningtotheissueofcontent,claimsaboutthebenefitsofcamerasurveillanceseldomcomealone.Anassortmentof‘publicgoods’istypicallyattributedtotheoperationofCCTVsystems,includingcrimepreventionandagreatersenseofcommunitysafety.Inthiscontext,CCTVisalsoregularlycitedasanimportanttoolaidinggreatlyinthefightagainstterrorism(Fussey2008).ProponentsofCCTVclaimthecapacityofcamerasurveillancetodeter,interceptorprosecuteterroristactsasapublicgood.ThiswasparticularlypronouncedaftercamerasurveillancefootageseeminglyallowedtheauthoritiestoidentifytheculpritsinvolvedintheJuly7,2005transitattacksandalsotocapturesomeofthoseinvolvedinthefailedattemptsofJuly21,2005inLondon.IntheUnitedStates,DepartmentofHomeland

8AsFussey(2007)notes:‘investigationsintotheimplementationofpublicsurveillancecamerasconstituteanunder‐populatedregionintheburgeoningfieldsurveillancestudies’.9Anapproachalsoarticulatedasascanning/analysis/response/assessment’model(Fussey2007).10See,forexample,‘CCTV:ToolofTattler’,byStevenChabot,DirectorGeneral,CanadianAssociationofChiefsofPolice.9thAnnualPrivacyandSecurityConference,Victoria,2008.

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SecurityfundshavebeenusedtopurchaseCCTVsystems.SimilarclaimsaboutthebenefitsofsuchsystemshavebeenusedtoendorsestateadoptionofsuchsystemsinAustralia,aswellasencouragetheiruseinprivatecontexts11.InCanadatoowehaveseenclaimsthatcamerasurveillanceisanimportantandeffectivecounter‐terrorismtoolinordertojustifyitsdeployment.Indeed,intherecentdecisiontodeploycamerasthroughouttheTorontoSubwaysystem,theTorontoTransitCommissioncited‘counter‐terrorism’effectsasfundamental.AsimilarrationalewasusedtojustifytheinstallationofcamerasonMontrealbusesinMontreal.Inthemostrecentcase,theFederalgovernmentannouncedthatNorthShoreSeaBusandferryproviderswillreceiveapproximately$5.6‐milliontomakesecurityimprovementsaspartofalargerplantobringmarinesecurityuptonationalsecuritystandards.PartoftheallocationistobeusedfortheinstallationofcamerasurveillancesystemsatSeabusterminalsandontheboatsthemselves12The‘threatofterrorism’isnowafeatureofcallsfortheuseofcamerasurveillancesystems.WhereasproposalsforCCTVsurveillanceschemeswereonceaccompaniedbyrobustpublicdebateinwhichpromisedsecuritygainswereweighedagainstexpectedimpactsuponcivilliberties,now,provisionforsuchpublicdebatemaybecompletelyexcluded.Forexample,whentheGreaterVancouvertransitAuthorityannouncedacomprehensive,anti‐terroristsecurityplanthatincludescamerasurveillanceatthelocalWestCoastExpressstationsandtheAlbionFerrynoprovisionwasmadeforpublicconsultationregardingthechange.Insuchcases,itseemsthatwiththeadditionofcounter‐terrorisminthemix,theneedforacost‐benefitcalculushas,atleastinsomecases,beendiscarded.ThisisallthemoreremarkableconsideringthatthereisanabsenceofempiricalevidencetosupporttheclaimthatCCTVisaneffectivedeterrenttoterrorismandthattheclaimthatitisaneffectivetoolfortheapprehensionofterroristsuspectsissupportedbyonlyone‐highlycontested–instance(Fussey2007).SuggestingthattheadditionofnationalsecuritybenefitstothelistofpublicgoodsofferedbyCCTVhashadatippingeffectdoesnotmeanthatresistancetocamerasurveillancehasvanished.Whatisbeingclaimedissimplythatthereissomethingratherdistinctiveanduniqueaboutthecontextinwhichstrugglesfor,oragainst,theuseofCCTVnowoccur.Thatis,claimsaboutthemeritsofCCTVsystemsinreducingthethreatofterrorismpresentauniquesetofchallengesassociatedwithjudgingsuchclaims.Inordertounderstandhowthisisso,itisnecessarytosituatedebatesaboutthedeploymentofcamerasagainstabroaderhistoricalbackdrop.

11AustraliahosteditsfirstNationalForumonCCTVsystemin2005‐onaimofwhichwastopromotetheuseofCCTVintheprivatesector–softtargetslikerestaurantsandbars.http://www.standards.org.au/downloads/051026_CCTV_forum.pdf12‘$5.6Mfundingforferries'security’,JessicaBarrett.NorthShoreNews.NorthVancouver,B.C.:Jan16,2009.pg.1

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ClaimsaboutthebenefitsofCCTVfor‘nationalsecurity’areprivileged.Whenterrorismisinthemix,thejudgmentcapacitiesofthoseinvolvedinpublicdeliberationanddebate,sovitaltoensuringtheconsensualcharacterofpolicyinstruments,arehandicapped.Tobemoreprecise,becauseoftheprovisionofsecrecyandthewaythisistypicallyusedtowithholdkeyinformationaboutthenature,characterandextentofterroristthreats,participantsdonotenjoyanequalabilitytochallengethevalidityofclaimsmadebytheState.Itisalsoextremelydifficultforcitizensactingatthelocalleveltoarriveatanyclearideaabouttheexistenceandextentofthethreatterrorismmayposetotheirparticularneighbourhood.Muchofthisdifficultyderivesfromthefactthatthesecurityandintelligenceagenciesthatpossessclearknowledgeaboutthethreatcannotshareitforavarietyofreasons.Themantleofsecrecymeansthatthethreatofterrorismremainsbothexceptionalandessentiallyunquantifiable.Successfulpolicymakingatthelocallevelreliesonaclearunderstandingofthenatureofoffenceswhichmightbeprevented,oratleastaddressed,bytheinstallationofsuchsystems.However,theparticularcharacteristicsofthesecurityclimateandorientationstronglyinfluencedeliberationsaboutcamerasurveillanceasapolicychoice.

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CameraSurveillance,PrivacyRegulation,and‘InformedConsent’RandyLippertThepresenceofcamerasurveillanceisoftenadvertisedbyaccompanyingsigns,statingawarningsuchas“Thisareaisundervideosurveillance”.Suchsignsareoftenknowninlegalterminologyas‘notification’.AccordingtobothfederalandmostprovinciallawinCanada,ifthereisastationarysurveillancecamera,thereshouldbeasign.Thissectiondescribesnotificationofcamerasurveillanceinthebroadercontextsofprivacyregulationand‘informedconsent’.First,currentguidelinesandrequirementsofCanadianfederalandprovincialprivacycommissionsfornotificationofthepresenceofcamerasurveillanceinpublicspacesarediscussed.CamerasurveillancesignageisthemajorandoftenonlysignificantmeansofnotificationofovertcamerasurveillancethatissuggestedorrequiredwithinCanadianprivacyguidelinesandpolicies.Giventhis,thecontentandlocationofcamerasurveillancesignageisthenconsideredwithafocusonwhetheritistantamounttoobtaining‘fullandfree’consentofthoseenteringareasmonitoredbycamerasurveillance.Second,severalissuesregardingtheadequacyofthissignageasthechiefmeansofnotificationandtheprovisionof‘informedconsent’13arediscussed.Overall,theheavyrelianceoncamerasurveillancesignageraisesquestionsabout‘informedconsent’andthetransparencyandfairnessofpoliciesguidingnotificationofsurveillancecamerauseinpublicandprivateareas.Theseinclude:

• Whethersignagealertsthepublictothepossibilityandmeansoffilingafreedomofinformationrequestorprivacycomplaintwhenencounteringcamerasurveillance?

• Whethersignsadequatelyconveyagivencamerasurveillanceprogram’spurposes,basicarrangements,andrelatedlegalauthority?

• Whetherexistingsignagediscriminatesagainstpersonsunabletoreadunilingualtextandfailstoalertthemtothepresenceofcamerasurveillanceandthepurposeofthesystem?

• Whethersignageisplacedinrelationtothecamera’sfieldofviewsoastoallowthepublictochoosewhethertoenterasurveilledzoneandgiveuptheirpersonalinformation?

13ItmaywellbethatprivacylegislationandsubsequentrulingsbyCanadianprivacycommissionersarebaseduponreasonablenessratherthaninformedconsent,asarguedbyAustin(2006)inrelationtofederalprivacylegistlation(PIPEDA).However,inreferencetoCCTVsignagewithina‘open‐street’programinEdmonton,theAlbertaprivacycommissionerina2003decisionruledthatenteringamonitoredareawheresignswerepostedwasnottantamountto‘implicitlyconsentingtohavingtheirimagescollected’andthatAlberta’sprivacylegislationdoesnotallowforimplicitconsent(FOIP,2003).

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PrivacyRegulationandCCTVSignageInCanada,thelegalregulationofcamerasurveillanceoccursprimarilyviaprivacylaw.Specificallythisinvolvestheoversightprovidedbyofficesofthefederalandprovincialprivacycommissionersratherthan,forexample,constitutionallaw(theCharterofRightsandFreedoms)orcriminallawprovisions(seeBennettandBayley2005).PrivacylegislationandtheofficeoftheprivacycommissionerintheprovinceofOntarioaretypicalinthisregard.Open‐street14camerasurveillanceinpublicspacesfallundertheprivacycommissioner’smandateinsofarastheycollectpersonalinformationfrompersonsapproachingandenteringcameras’fieldofview.15AccordingtoOntario’smunicipalprivacylegislation,“personalinformation”referstorecordedinformationaboutanidentifiableindividual,including,

‘(a)informationrelatingtotherace,nationalorethnicorigin,colour,religion,age,sex,sexualorientationormaritalorfamilystatusoftheindividual,(b)informationrelatingtotheeducationorthemedical,psychiatric,psychological,criminaloremploymenthistoryoftheindividualorinformationrelatingtofinancialtransactionsinwhichtheindividualhasbeeninvolved,(c)anyidentifyingnumber,symbolorotherparticularassignedtotheindividual,(d)theaddress,telephonenumber,fingerprintsorbloodtypeoftheindividual,(e)thepersonalopinionsorviewsoftheindividualexceptwheretheyrelatetoanotherindividual,(f)correspondencesenttoaninstitutionbytheindividualthatisimplicitlyorexplicitlyofaprivateorconfidentialnature,andrepliestothatcorrespondencethatwouldrevealthecontentsoftheoriginalcorrespondence,(g)theviewsoropinionsofanotherindividualabouttheindividual,and(h)theindividual’snamewhereitappearswithotherpersonalinformationrelatingtotheindividualorwherethedisclosureofthenamewouldrevealotherpersonalinformationabouttheindividual’(OntarioMunicipalFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct).

Thisessentiallymeanssomeopen‐streetcamerasurveillancearrangementsareexcludedfromprivacyregulation,forexample,thosedeployingcamerasplacedhighatopfreewaystandardstomonitortrafficflows,butwhichundernormaloperationsareincapableofcollectingthedetailedpersonallyidentifiableinformationabove.

Ontario’sprivacycommissionerpublishedGuidelinesforUsingVideoSurveillanceCamerasinPublicPlacesin2001(IPC2001).AswithprovisionsinFrance,Germany,theNetherlands,Sweden,andmorerecently,theUnitedKingdom(Gras2004:225),akeyguidelineistopostvisiblesignsattheperimeterofopen‐streetcamerasurveillanceareastoindicatetoanyoneapproachingwhytheirpersonal14‘Open‐street’referstotheuseofcamerasurveillanceinopen,publicplacessuchasstreetsandparks.Forexample,municipalpoliceservicesinToronto,aswellasmunicipalgovernmentsinLondonandWindsor,fallundertheOntarioprivacycommissioner’sscopeofopen‐streetcamerasurveillance.15Thereforethosebodiesresponsibleforopen‐streetcamerasurveillance,includingmunicipalpoliceservicesinTorontoandHamiltonandmunicipalgovernmentsinLondonandWindsor,fallundertheOntarioprivacycommissioner’sjurisdiction.

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informationwillbecollecteduponentry.Thisrequirementissignificantsinceitdemandssignagebeameansofnotifyingthecitizenrynotmerelyofthepresenceofcamerasurveillancenearby,butalsowhyitisinplace,howmoreinformationaboutthecamerasurveillanceprogramcanbegained,andhowacomplaintcanbeinitiatedifnecessary.Thus,inthelanguageofprivacyregulation,signsareacentralcomponentofanotificationstrategyandakeyelementof‘fairinformationpractices’(Lyon2007:7).16

Thesesignsarepresumedtobetheprimarymeansofnotificationofthepresenceofcamerasurveillanceinmostbutnotall(e.g.,Saskatchewan)Canadianjurisdictions.Furthermore,inOntarioinparticular,signsalsohavebeenakeyfocusofinterventionfollowingacomplaintandduringdiscussionswithorganizationsimplementingopen‐streetcamerasurveillance.Whethertheyequateto‘fullandfree’or‘informed’consentwillbeconsideredinwhatfollows.Signageisthedominantandoftenonlyformofnotificationofthepresenceofsurveillancecamerasbothinpracticeandinthecontextofresponsestocomplaintsinspecificsites.Tobesure,‘pamphlets’arementionedasameansofnotificationintheOntarioguidelines,butevenwheretheseareproduced,theyarenotmadeavailableuponentrytoareasbeingmonitoredviacamerasurveillance.

Consultationwiththepublicbeforeimplementationisalsoanimportantmeansofnotification.Recentlyamajoropen‐streetCCTVpilotprojectwasannouncedbythepoliceserviceinToronto.Afterreceivingatwomilliondollarprovincialgovernmentgrant,nineconsultativemeetingsencouragedTorontoneighbourhoodresidentstoinspectdetailsofnewtemporaryCCTVarrangementsbeforeimplementation.However,fewpeopleactuallyattendedthesemeetingsabouttheCCTVpilotprogram.Thetwentytofiftypersonsinattendance(Interview2)couldhardlybeseenasrepresentativeofthepublic.Norwastheremuchofaconsultation.ItsimplyentailedaPowerPointpresentationbypolice.Moreover,oncethepilotprogrambegan,camerasweremovedtootherneighbourhoodswithoutanyformalpublicconsultationbeforehand(Interview3).

Whilemostprivacyguidelinesanddiscussionsareorientedtowardopen‐streetarrangements,itisworthnotingthattheOfficeofthePrivacyCommissionerofCanadaalongwithB.C.andAlbertacounterpartspublishedGuidelinesforOvertVideoSurveillanceinthePrivateSectorinMarch2008.Thispublicationaimedatproviding‘principlesforevaluatingtheuseofvideosurveillanceandforensuringthatitsimpactonprivacyisminimized.’WherethePersonalInformationProtectionandElectronicDocumentsAct(PIPEDA)anditsAlbertaandB.C.equivalentsarefocusedontheprotectionofpersonalinformation–itscollection,useordisclosure‐intheprivatesector,theguidelinessuggestthatimagesdonotnecessarilyneedto

16‘Fairinformationpractices’areunderstoodtoentailseveralcoreentitlementsthattrytolimitdataprocessingand/ormakethisprocessaccountableandtransparent.Hereprivacyistypicallyviewedastheprimaryinteresttobeprotectedandindividualconsentisthemeansviawhichprotectionistobeachieved.

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berecordedtofallundertheirlegalmandate.Significantly,aswithCCTVinpublicspaces,theguidelinessuggestanorganization’snotificationeffortcanbe(limitedto):

‘aclearandunderstandablenoticeabouttheuseofcamerasonitspremisestoindividualswhoseimagesmightbecapturedbythem,beforetheseindividualsenterthepremises...andincludeacontactincaseindividualshavequestionsorwantaccesstoimagesrelatedtothem’(p.3).

ThisismorevaguethanOntario’sguidelinesbutnonethelessmirrorstheirgeneralintentaboutnotificationand‘informedconsent’.Thus,inprivatespaces,wherecamerasurveillanceisarguablymoreprevalentandentrenched,heavyrelianceuponsignagetocommunicatethesite‐specificpresenceandpurposesofcamerasisexpected.

CameraSurveillanceSignageContentTheFederalandOntarioPrivacyCommissioner’sguidelinessetnoparametersorlimitsonthevolumeoftextoriconiccontentthatcanbeconveyeduponcamerasurveillancesignage.Arecentstudyofopen‐streetCCTVsignageinfourOntariocitieswhereCCTVisdeployedyieldedinstructivefindingsregardingthetextualandiconiccontentandlocationofopen‐streetCCTVsignageinthedowntowncoresofToronto,London,Windsor,andHamilton(Lippert2008).Thetextualcontentofthesesignswasgatheredatapproximatelythesametimeandisasfollows:

Toronto:

Notice:CCTVCamerasarebeingusedinthisarea.

SurveillanceCameraIcon

PersonalinformationiscollectedbyCCTVcamerastopromotepublicsafetyandreducecrime.AnyquestionsaboutthiscollectioncanbedirectedtotheStaffSuperindendent,DivisionalPolicingCommand,40CollegeStreet,Toronto,Ontario,M5G2J3,416‐808‐2288.TAVIS(TorontoAnti‐ViolenceInterventionStrategy).

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London:

YouhaveenteredanareathatmaybemonitoredbyClosedCircuitVideoCameras.

ThisprogramisacommunityinitiativetoreducecrimewithintheDowntownAreaoftheCityofLondon.LegalAuthorityforcollectionofinformationisSection29(1)(g)oftheOntarioMunicipalFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsorconcernsaboutthisprogram,pleasecontacttheManagerofCorporateSecurity,663BathurstStreet,Londonorcall661‐2459.

Windsor:

Youhaveenteredanareamonitoredbyclosedcircuittelevisioncameras.

Thisprogramisacommunityinitiativetoreducecrime.LegalauthorityforcollectionofinformationisSection130oftheMunicipalAct.Toreportcriminalactivitycall911.Forfreedomofinformationrequestscall311.

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Hamilton:

VideoSurveillanceArea/EndroitSousSurveillanceVideo

SurveillanceCameraIcon

ThisareaoftheCityofHamiltonisbeingmonitoredbyvideosurveillanceforthepurposeofLawEnforcementinaccordancewiththeMunicipalFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct.LegalAuthority:Section42:PoliceServicesActofOntario,1997.ForFurtherInformationcall:HamiltonPoliceServicesat905‐540‐5606.

FreedomofInformationAccessandComplaints State‐fundedprivacyagenciesthatregulateprivacyinrelationtocamerasurveillanceinCanadatypicallyalsohavethetaskofoverseeingfreedomofinformationaccess(BennettandBayley2005).ItisthereforesurprisingthatCCTVsignsinonlyoneofthefourOntariocitiesstudied(Windsor)explicitlyreferstothepossibilityofmakingafreedomofinformationrequest.Eventhenthissignageisunclearaboutwhethertherequestwouldbetoexaminethesurveillancecameraimage(thepersonalrecord)orsomeotherrecord.Similarlystrikingbyitsabsencefromthecontentofopen‐streetCCTVsignsinthefourcitiesisindicationofthepossibilityandmeansoffilingaprivacycomplaint.Thisissignificantbecauseprivacyregulationismostoftenreactive,andlikeotherformsofstateregulation,interventionoccursonlyasa‘lastresort’(seeHawkins2003).Inthisprocess,interventioncanpotentiallyoccurintheformofissuanceofanorder,howevernoordersconcerningopen‐streetCCTVhaveeverbeenissuedinOntario.Indeed,thelackofcommunicationaboutcomplaintproceduresoncamerasurveillancesignsorelsewherehelpsexplainwhyfrom2001‐2007theofficeoftheOntarioprivacycommissioner(IPC)receivedonlyonecomplaintaboutopen‐streetcamerasurveillancearrangements.

OrganizationsandnotindividualshaveinstigatedthemostwellknowncomplaintsaboutcamerasurveillanceinCanada.ArecentcomplaintlaunchedbyPrivacyInternational,aprivacyadvocacygroupfromtheUK,focusedonaproposedplantoinstallcamerasinpublictransportationinToronto.AcomplainttothefederalprivacycommissioninrelationtothemostpublicizedCanadianopen‐streetcamerasurveillancesystemtodate,operatedbytheCommissionairesundertheauspicesof

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theRoyalCanadianMountedPolice(RCMP)intheresortcityofKelowna,BritishColumbia(BC),issimilarlyinformative.Onesurveillancecameralinkedtothelocaldetachmentwassetupinalocalcityparkin1999andthenanothertowatchanoutdoordowntownpublictransitareatoallegedlymonitorthedrugtrade.Significantly,bothcamerasweresetupwithoutpublicconsultationorcamerasurveillancesignage.Thecomplaintwaslaunched,notbyanindividualcitizen,butbythosealreadypossessingknowledgeaboutthepossibilityoflodgingacomplaint,specificallytheofficeoftheprovincialprivacycommissionerofBritishColumbia(OIPC).

PurposesByspecifyingpurposesforthepublic,camerasurveillancesignsareakeyformofnotification.Statedopen‐streetCCTVprogrampurposesinWindsorandLondonincludereducing‘anti‐social’behaviourand‘downtownrevitalization’(CityofWindsor2006;CityofLondon2007).Yet,bothareabsentfromthesignsthatarepresentinthesurveilledareas.Hamilton’ssignsrefertothepurposeof‘lawenforcement’,avaguetermpotentiallycoveringallmanneroflawsandby‐laws,includingcriminal,administrative,andmunicipal.Itrevealslittleaboutthepurposesofcameras’installationtothoseconsideringgivinguptheirprivateinformationastheyenterthedowntowncamerasurveillancezone.Ifthecameraswereinstalledprimarilytoaddressanidentifiedcrime‘hotspot’immunetoregularcrimereductionefforts(asinToronto’sprogram)–ratherthanforotherpurposes–itissurprisingthisfactisdeemednecessarytoconveytoindividualscontemplatingentry.

Signsalsocanbeinappropriatefortheirpurposes.Onereasonfortheincreasingpopularityofcamerasurveillanceliesinitswidelyperceivedbenefits,themosttoutedofwhichisdeterrenceofundesirableconduct.TheOntarioprivacycommissioner’sguidelinescitedeterrenceasaviablecamerasurveillancepurpose,whichpresumesthesecamerasarepresent,visible,andcapableofdeterrence.Nonetheless,itisstrikingthatthesignageabovefailstoindicatepotentialpunishmentormentiondeterrenceasageneralprogrampurpose.

InWindsoraswellasotherCanadiancities,surveillancecamerashavebeenmostoftenintroducedindowntownbaror‘entertainment’districtstomonitorcriminaland‘anti‐social’conduct,particularlyfollowingearlymorningclosings.Theintroductionofalcoholretailindustriespresumesincreasedalcoholconsumptionandbehavioursassociatedwithincreasedratesofintoxicationonthestreet.However,itisunclearwhetherthesespecificcamerasurveillancesignsarewelldesignedforviewinginlowlight(evening)conditionsandwhethernotificationactuallyoccursgiventhatmanypersonsundertheinfluenceofalcoholorapproachingintoxicationmaybeunableorunwillingtofullycomprehendtheimportofthesenotifications.

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‘MonitoringorRecording’ArrangementsSomeofthesignsindicatecamerasare‘monitoring’;othersindicate‘recording’and‘in‐use’.Absentonthesignageismentionofthedifferingimplicationsoftheseterms.‘Monitored’impliesalikelihoodthatauthoritiesattheotherendofthevisualinformationflowwillact(e.g.,activitydeemedbymonitorstobecriminalor‘anti‐social’inopen‐streetCCTVprotocols)givencertaincriteriabymoreorlessimmediatelydispatchingpoliceorprivatesecuritypatrolsorbyforwardingimagestopoliceoranotherrelevantlawenforcementagency.‘Recorded’impliesauthoritiesmaynotbe(currently)activeattheendoftheimageflowandthatthereisasignificantlagtimebetweentheidentificationofproblematicconductofthosewhoarewatchedandconsequences.Thisissignificantsincedeterrenceiscitedinpoliciesasapurposeofcamerasurveillance,andswiftnessofpunishmentisoneofseveralfactorscommonlyconsideredinseekingtoachieveageneraldeterrenteffect.Theuseof‘recording’or‘in‐use’insteadof‘monitoring’mayentaillesslegalliabilityforlegalauthoritiesbecausethesignavoidssuggestingreal‐timemonitoringofimagesforcriminalvictimizationoracapacitytorespondtovictimizationinrealtime.

Similarly,useofthephrase‘reduce’crimeratherthan‘eliminate’or‘eradicate’crimeonsignagereinforcesthemessageforanynaïveobserversthatthecamerasurveillanceisonlyableto‘reduce’crimeinadesignatedarea.Thus,thereisnosuggestionofthecreationofanareafreeofcrimeandrisk.Heretoooperatorswouldlikelynotbeheldlegallyliableforcrimesthatoccur,assumingtechnologywasproperlymaintainedandkeptoperational.Inthisway,cameraoperatorscouldnotbeblamedforfailuretowarnpotentialvictims.Liabilitylikelywouldbeacentralconcerntopoliceservices,eversincetheparticularlypoignantcaseofJaneDoe,asexualassaultvictimwhomsuccessfullysuedtheTorontoPoliceServiceforfailuretonotifyherofaserialrapistactiveinherneighbourhood(OntarioWomen’sActionNetwork2008).

LegalAuthority,Auspices,andProvidersThelegalauthorityusedincamerasurveillancesignagevariesdramaticallyeveninthesamejurisdictions.InfourOntariocities,allsubjecttothesameprovincialprivacylegislationandguidelines,thefollowinglegislationisinvoked:TheOntarioMunicipalAct(Windsor),theOntarioMunicipalFreedomofInformationandProtectionofPrivacyAct(London),andtheOntarioPoliceAct(Hamilton).TorontoPoliceServiceinvokesnolegalauthorityonitsCCTVsignage.Thisvariabilitysuggeststhatsomeexistingsignageisnotadequatelyinformingthepublicaboutthelegaljustificationforwhytheirpersonalinformationisbeingcollected.

Whilemoreinformationmightbeobtainedbyindividualsthroughatelephonecalltothenumberprovidedonasign,itisnotroutedtotheactualmonitorsorobservers,nordoesitrevealinformationaboutthosepersonswhomonitorthesystem.Totheextentthatlegalauthorityisstated,camerasurveillancesignagedisplaystheauspicesofthecollectionofpersonalinformation.However,itdoesnot

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identifythosepersonsororganizationsprovidinginitialoroperatingfunding(suchasbusinessimprovementassociations–Lippert2007),whichiscrucialif‘informedconsent’istoberealized.Revealingwhomfundscamerasurveillanceprogramswouldhelprevealtheirpurposes,especiallyifthisinformationisotherwiseabsentfromsignage.

Openstreetcamerasurveillanceschemesintwocities(LondonandWindsor)aremanagedandattimesmonitoredbycontractprivatesecuritythatfallunderprovinciallicensingregimes,buttherearenosignsinWindsororLondontoindicatethis.Noristheredisclosureofthelikelyinsecuritythatcomeswithrelyingonalow‐paid,highturnoverprivatesecurityworkforce(seeLippertandO’Connor2003)tooperatethecameras.Inparticular,itislesslikelythatprivatesecuritypersonnel,comparedtopolice,willbeproperlytrainedconsistentwithhumanrightsandprivacylaworwillproperlysafeguardandmanagegeneratedimages.

DiscriminationThecamerasurveillancesignsinthesampleoffourcitiesalsosystematicallyexcludeinformingpersonswhoareilliterate,visuallyimpaired,orunabletoreadEnglishorFrenchinonecase.Forexample,thissignagedoeslittletoinformrecentimmigrants,foreigntourists,youngchildrenorthosewhoareundereducatedandthathavelimitedlegalknowledgeofwhata‘MunicipalAct’mayentail.Thesesignsnecessarilyassumesubjectswithbothliteraryandvisualcapabilities.Theiconspresentonthreeofthefoursignspotentiallycommunicatethepresenceofcamerasandmaybeseentoovercomethelimitationsofthetext,however,theyrevealnothingaboutvitalaspectsaboutcamerasurveillancediscussedabove.Aniconofacameradoeslittletoinformthepublicaboutwhythesesurveillancecamerasareinplace,howtoreceiveadditionalinformationaboutthem,themeansforlodgingacomplaintorrequestingafreedomofinformationrequest,andsoon.

CCTVSignageLocationTheOntarioprivacycommissioner’sguidelinesnoteonlythatsignsshouldbeplacedattheperimeterofacamerasurveillancezoneandbe‘prominentlydisplayed’.Thereisnoindicationregardingthesizeofsigns,thepositioningofthesigninrelationtoothersigns,ortheirheight.Inthecitiesindicated,someofthesignswerefoundtobeunaccompaniedbyoperatingcameras.Thecamerashadeithermalfunctionedorwerenot(yet)installed.Thismaysuggestoperativesurveillancecamerasareattimesnotassumednecessarytogenerateadeterrenteffect.Thisisafactnotlostonpurveyorsofcomparativelyinexpensive‘dummycameras’andsurveillancecameranotices(‘stickers’)designedtoaffixtoentrancesofresidentialorcommercialbuildingswhetherornotconsumershavepurchasedasurveillancecameraanditsrelatedtechnology.Thispresumesthatadeterrenteffectisachievedwithoutfunctioningsurveillancecameras.

Insteadofseeingthisformofopen‐streetcamerasurveillancesimplyintermsofitsoperationalabilityorlackthereof,thesignageprovidesamorecomplexsetofpossibilities.Somesignsaccompanyworkingsurveillancecameras;othersigns

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remaininplaceadjacenttemporarily‘down’,inoperative,orabsentcameras;othersaccompanyworkingcamerasbutnotreal‐timehumanmonitoringoftheirgeneratedimages;somesignsareaccompaniedbyonlyoccasionalhumanmonitoringofgeneratedcameraimages;andsomesignshavebeenremovedoreliminatedinmonitoredareas.17Anyoneencounteringcamerasurveillancesignsoracameramonitoredareawouldnotbeawareofthispossiblevariabilityandthereforewouldnotbeinformedaboutthehighlyvariablelevelofsafetyandsecurityprovidedbyagivensetofcamerasurveillancearrangements.

Open‐streetCCTVsignsinthefourcitiesrefertoan‘area’,implyingaknownlimitofcamera’sgazeandaprecisebeginningandendpointofpersonalinformationcollection.Butsurveillancecameraimagesarefarlesscategoricalthanthisimplies.Theactualperimeterofanycamerasurveillancezoneinopen‐streetcontextsisunknowablewithcertaintyandisinflux.Whatconstitutesprivateinformation,forexample,dependsonawiderangeoffactors,includinglightingconditions,capacityofthesurveillancecamerastozoomandfocus,butalsotheknowledgeandexperiencesofagivencameraoperatorwhenimagesareactivelymonitoredorofagivenpoliceanalystsiftingthroughcameraimagesinthecaseofrecordedimages.Aswellitwouldbedependentontheconduct,apparel,anddemeanourofanindividualenteringthecamerasurveillancezone.Forcamerasurveillancesignagetosuggestotherwiseishighlymisleading.Moreover,twoofthefoursignsindicate‘youhaveenteredanarea’,whichunfairlyimpliestotheobserveruponreadingthesignthatitisalreadytoolatetoavoidpersonalinformationcollection.

InformedConsentAswithotherinvasivenewtechnologies,privacyregulationstypicallyrequirethosebeingsurveilledbepermittedtogiveinformedconsenttothecollectionofpersonalinformation.Basedonwhathasbeendescribedabove,thereissomedoubtaboutwhetherthisispresentinopen‐streetCCTVprogramsinOntariocities.Informedconsentisnotequivalenttoabrief,andoftenvagueormisleadingstatementabouttheexistenceofcamerasurveillanceandaminorityofitspurposesonpostedsigns.

Somegeneralinformationabouttheexistenceandpracticesofopen‐streetCCTVprogramsinaparticularcityisavailableonwebsites,butnoneofthesignsdirectspersonstothesewebpages.Relevantwebpagesarealsooftenburiedwithinelaboratemunicipalorpoliceservicewebsites.Dueinparttothevariednamesandauspicesunderwhichcamerasurveillanceisoperatedandnotnecessarilyknowntothepublic,thesitesarenoteasilylocated.ThisarrangementalsoassumesaccesstoandproficiencyinusingtheInternet.

Thepublicremainslargelyunawareofwhoisconductingopen‐streetcamerasurveillance.Thoughthecameraoperatorsandimageanalystscanacquireidentityknowledgeofthosetheywatchintermsofsubjects’gender,age,class,andethnicity

17ArecentvisittothemonitoredareainWindsorrevealedthatthesignsindicatedCCTVweremissing,thoughthecameras(presumablymonitored)remained.

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(gleanedfromobservingtheirdress,gait,height,andsoon),aswellaspatternsofbeingatparticularlocationsatspecifictimesofday(imagesatnightondowntownstreetsinthebardistrictaremorelikelytobeofyoungmenandwomen)(Interview1),thisformof‘socialcategorization’and‘pattern’knowledgeisnotavailabletothosebeingobserved.Inreadingasignthatindicatesanareasurveilledbycameras,thoseobservedareeitherkeptfromknowingwhoiswatchingoronlyinformedofageneralcategoryofcameraobserver(‘staffsuperindendent’)andlearnnothingabouttheactualobserver’sidentityorcharacteristics.

Asnotedabove,somesignagerefersinterestedpersonstoatelephonenumbertoreceiveadditionalinformationinToronto’scase,ormakea‘freedomofinformation’requestinWindsor.CallingthespecifiedTorontonumbergivesabriefrecordedmessageabouttheprogram,unlesssomeoneisavailabletotakethecall.Acallerto‘311’inWindsor,duringoperatinghours,ifarequestismadetoreceiveadditionalinformationabouttheprogram(whichisnotastatedoption)ismerelyprovidedwiththetelephonenumberofthechairofthe‘SurveillanceAuditCommittee’,acommitteethathasyettobeofficiallyformed.

Astheuseofsuchsurveillancecamerasandthesubsequenttransferandstorageoftheirgeneratedimagesisbothvariedandcomplexandthereisdoubtaboutthedegreetowhichthepublicknowshowcamerasurveillanceactuallyworks(SquiresandMeasor1996:8).Theseformsofnotificationrevealsnothingaboutwhereimagesarebeingreceived,thesecurityofthistransfer(whethertheycanbe‘tapped’intobyoutsideparties),howthisdataisbeingstored,orforhowlongandforwhatpurposesthedataisused.Intheabsenceofthisknowledge,thereisclearlynoinformedconsent,noristhereanyclearsenseofhoweffectivecamerasurveillanceisinreducingtheincidenceofundesirablebehaviourandcriminalactivity.Intheabsenceofreliableandcontextspecificinformationofthiskind,camerasurveillancesignagemayhelptoproduceaneffectoppositetothatwhichisintended.Individualsmayassumethatanareathatis‘monitored’suggestsamoreimmediateresponsefromauthoritiesifthereisdangerousorundesirableconductinthearea.Theymaythenconcludethereisnoneedtoreportcriminalconductortakeprecautionsagainstit.

Evenifcamerasurveillancesignscouldbeunderstoodtoclearlyprovide‘informedconsent’,theyalsocanbecome‘inoperative’duetovandalism,naturaloccurrences,orconstructionprojects.InWindsor,whichhashadadowntownopen‐streetCCTVprogramsince2004,thesesignsareplacedatentrypointstothedowntownbetweenthesidewalkandmajorstreets.Onesignwastakendownonthemainstreetduringadowntowninfrastructureupgradeandstreetconstructionandaftercompletionhasyettobereplacedmorethanayearlater.Thus,anyoneenteringthedowntowncamerasurveillancezoneonWindsor’smainstreetfromtheNorthreceivesnonotificationthattheirpersonalinformationisbeingsystematicallycollectedandstoredbyprivatesecuritypersonnelandisfullyaccessibleandalmostimmediatelyretrievablebylocalpoliceuponrequest.

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ConclusionEvenwhereitisinplace,manypedestrianswalkpastopen‐streetcamerasurveillancesignagewithouttakingnotice.Othersmaybeunabletoreadthesignage,buteventhosethatdowilllearnlittleabouthow,whyoriftheirpersonalinformationisbeingcollectedinthatspace.Signageappearstohavenotbeenwellthoughtout,withevenlessdiscussionaboutcontext‐specificnotificationforcamerasurveillance.Inpractice,thisprovides–atbest–rudimentaryandincompleteinformationthatfallsfarshortofan‘informedconsent’ideal.

Giventhelackof‘informedconsent’regardingcamerasurveillance,itfollowsthatthesharingofsurveillancecameraimagesthatconstitutepersonalinformationwithexternalinstitutions(e.g.,privatesecuritysharingimageswithpolice,ortherespectivemunicipalgovernmentsharingimageswithlawenforcementpersonnelofonekindorother)remainsproblematic,asdoesthetransparencyofobjectivesofsurveillancecamerausageinopen‐streetarrangementsinthefirstplace.

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PublicPerceptionsofCameraSurveillanceStéphaneLeman‐Langlois

IntroductionCurrentpublicopinionresearchconsistentlyshowsstrongsupportfortheuseofcamerasurveillanceinpublicandinprivatespaces.Warinessorconcernsaboutcamerasurveillancetendstooccurwhencamerasareusedforspecificpurposes,suchasintoilets,fittingroomsorotherintimateplaces(wheretheyarerarelyseen).Althoughamajorityofpeopleremainsomewhatconcernedaboutissuesofprivacyandthepotentialforstateandcorporateintrusionsintotheirdailylives,thereisevidencethatthepublicdoesnotseecamerasurveillanceasasignificantfactorinrelationtotheseconcerns.Thisbeingsaid,afewconsiderationsleadustobelievethatthepictureisnotquitethisstraightforward.First,publicopiniononmattersofsecurity,risk,institutionsandindividualsresponsibleforprotectingsocietychangeswithtimeandisheavilyinfluencedbycurrentevents.Second,camerasurveillancecomesinavarietyofshapesandformsanditcanbedifficulttoknowwhattypeofvideosurveillanceindividualrespondentsarereferringto.Finally,itmaybeoverlysimplistictosingleoutonetypeofcamerasurveillanceinasocietyinwhichwebcams,cameraphones,hiddencameras,road‐sidespeedcameras,personalvideorecorders,andmorehavemadeusaccustomedtohavingourimagetakenanddistributed.Thissectionsummarizespublicopiniondataaboutcamerasurveillance.Inwhatfollows,publicopinionpollfindingsoncamerasurveillanceisoutlined,conductedeitherbymediaoutletsorbysocialscienceresearchgroups.Thentherelevantpsychosocialandpsychometricstudiesarediscussedthathavetriedtoestablishtheemotionalstatesassociatedwiththepresenceofcamerasandothervisiblesecuritymeasures.Last,someofthefindingsofalimited,microsocialstudyofcameraperceptionsareexamined. PublicOpinionPolls:MediaandSocialScienceThissectionpresentstwogeneraltypesofpollfindings,thosefrommarketingfirms,politicalorganizationsandmediaoutletsandthosefromthesocialsciences.Pollscomingfromthesocialsciencestendtobemorerigorousandmorerepresentative,yetbyandlargebothtypesofpollingproducesimilarresults.Bothareabletogiveabroadpictureofpublicattitudestowardcamerasurveillance,howeverthesocialscientificpollstendtoofferamorecompletepictureofthesituation.MediaandMarketOpinionsWhenevaluatingopinionpollsoncamerasurveillancefromcountriessuchasCanada,theUnitedKingdom,France,AustraliaandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica,similarresultsemerge:respondentsoverwhelminglysupporttheinstallationanduseofcamerasurveillance.Howeverthequalityofthepollsvarieswidely,makingit

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difficulttocomparetheirresults. 18 Table6.1presentsaverysmallsampleofsurveysconductedoncamerasurveillanceworldwide.Thiscollectionofsurveyresultsleadstoafewveryclearconclusions:first,thereisoverwhelminglystrongsupportforvideosurveillance,whateverthestatedgoal.Variationsexistbetweenthegoalsofhavingthecamerasystems,withterrorismraisingthemostscepticismbyrespondents,butinallcasesthereisindisputablesupportinfavourofthecameraswhichchangeslittlewithtimeorplace.19Infact,thegreatmajorityofpeoplefeelboththatcamerasareusefulandthattheyinvadeprivacyandmanychoosetoanswerthattheyhavenoopiniononthemattersincenoneofthecompetingcharacteristicsappearsasclearlydominant.

18Duetotheextremevariationinsamplingmethodology,questionorderandformulation,aswellasinactualcontext(policingstrategy,politicaltrends,crimetrends,etc.),noneofthepollscanbecomparedtooneanothereasily,andfewappeartobereliable.AsJasonDitton(2000)observed,morerigorouslyconductedpollsgenerallyindicatelesssupportforcameras.19WiththeexceptionoftheFoxNews2007poll,whichshowsuncharacteristicallylowsupport,morethan2/3ofrespondentssupporttheinstallationofcameras,andfewerthanoneinfourbelievetheretobeaproblem,thoughthisdoesnotsuggestoppositiontotheinstallationnecessarily.NotethatthoughtheFoxNewspollshowslowsupport,italsoshowsextremelylowopposition(11%).Thistypeofdiscrepancyresultsfromtheparticularwordingofquestionsandtheinitialpresentationofthepoll’sintendedgoals.

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Table6.1:Samplingofpublicopinionpollsaboutvideosurveillance

Source support(reason) oppose(reason)

ABCNews/WashingtonPost,July18‐21,2007

71%(capacityto“solvecrimes”) 25%(possible“governmentintrusiononpersonalprivacy”)

FOXNews/OpinionDynamicsPoll,July17‐18,2007

58%(“wouldhelpstoporcatchterroristsandothercriminals”)

11%(“wouldviolatetheprivacyoflaw‐abidingcitizens”)

LegerMarketingCanada(trafficcameras),November2007

80%,64%inQuebec(reductionofmovingviolations)

—

CBSNewsPoll,July13‐14,2005

71%(“mayhelptoreducethethreatofterrorism”)

23%(“mayinfringeonpeople'sprivacyrights”)

Harris(US)PollFebruary2006

67%(“dealingwithpeoplesuspectedofterroristactivity”)

32%(“wouldalsoaffectourcivilliberties”)

SouthAyrshire’s(UK)CommunitySafetyPartnership,April2004

Maybole:56%(reducescrime)

Prestwick:72%(reducescrime)

Maybole:21%(infringementonprivacy)

Prestwick:14%(infringementonprivacy)

Harris(US)Poll2004 61%(“dealingwithpeoplesuspectedofterroristactivity”)

37%(“wouldalsoaffectourcivilliberties”)

IFOPsondageParis,2002

88%(toreinforcesecurityinmetro);79%(toreinforcesecurityinbuses);66%(toreinforcesecurityinpublicspaces)

—

CBSNewsUSpoll,April2002

77%(“inordertopreventpossibleterroristattacks”)

24%(invasionofprivacyrights)

Harris(US)Poll2001 63%(“dealingwithpeoplesuspectedofterroristactivity”)

35%(“wouldalsoaffectourcivilliberties”)

GallupNorway(1998)* 66% 25%

StatisticsNorway(1997)*

68%(show“verylittlediscomfort”aboutvideosurveillance)

—

*ReportedinWiecekandSætnan,2002.Asecondpointregardsthetimingofsuchpolls.Almostallmediapollsfollowunfoldingcurrentevents,afteranincidentrelatedtocamerasurveillance(oritsabsence)hastakenplace.TheCanadianpolldescribedaboveillustratesthis;respondentswerepolledinthemiddleofintensemediaattentiontotheLondonterroristattacks,completewithactualrecordingsoftheattackersenteringtheTube

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beingpublicizedinthemedia.Thoughthesevideosshowthatthecamerasystemwasincapableofpreventingtheattacks,itwaspresentedbythemediaasagreathelpinidentifyingthesuspects,despitethefactthatmostcamerasrecordedwhollyunusableimages.Highlightsandrecommendations,fromaprivacyprotectionpointofview:

• Theclassictensionbetweenprivacyandsecurityconcernsisnotunderstoodbythepublicatlargeasanexclusiveopposition.Alargeportionofpollrespondentsestimatethatsurveillancecamerashavebothprivacyandsecurityimpacts.Further,forthemajorityofthosewhoperceiveaprivacyissueincamerasurveillance,thetrade‐offbetweenprivacyandsecurityissettledinfavourofsecurity.

• Thepublicdoesnotperceivethatcamerasystemsarealwayseffectiveinreducingcrimerates.Instead,theyseeitashavingthepotentialtobeeffectivesomeofthetime,oreven,inthecaseofmajorcrimes,once.

• Therefore,thedesireforprivacycannolongeroutweighthatofsecurityinpopulardiscourse.Privacymightfinditsplaceincurrentcultureasaformofsecurity,andlossofprivacyorintrusionasaninadequateorfaultydistributionofsecurityresources.

SocialScienceOpinionPollsSocialscientistsapproachpublicopinionwithstrategiesembeddedintheirquestionswhicharemeanttoisolatefactors,testpriorknowledgeofthesubject,andmakecomparisonspossible. Consequently,theytendtoofferamuchmoredetailedviewofthevariousaspectsofrespondents’attitudes.Ingeneral,thesepollsoncamerasurveillancealsoshowsignificantlylesssupportamongrespondentsthanmediaandprofessionalpolls(rarelyabove65%). Thefindingsofthesepollscanbesummarizedasfollows.First,bothquestionorderandwordinghavepowerfulimpactsonresults.AsJasonDitton(2000)hasobserved,whenquestionsaboutcamerasurveillanceareprecededbystatementsorotherquestionsreferringtocriminalityandsecurity,supportforsurveillancegoesupby20%.Second,mostpeopleareconvincedthatcamerashaveapositiveeffectagainstcrime,aswellasbeingusefultosolvecommittedcrimes(Dixon,LevineandMcAuley2003;HonessandCharman1992;Phillips1999).Third,atthesametime,onaverage,aboutonethirdofrespondentstothesepollsagreethatcamerasrepresentathreattoprivacy.However,thisdoesnotmeanthattheydisapproveofcamerasurveillance,sinceformanyitrepresentsanacceptabletrade‐off(Wells,AllardandWilson2006).Othersdonotperceivethreatstoprivacybutstillrejecttheideaofvideosurveillance.Fourth,respondentsalsoweighotherfacetsofcamerasurveillance,besidesprivacyandsecurity,forinstance,thepossibilitythatitwillsimplydrivecrimeelsewhere,

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willserveasajustificationforreducingthenumberofpoliceofficersonthebeat,thatsystemscostsaretoohighorthatmanytypesofcrimeescapevideosurveillance(Wells,AllardandWilson2006;Phillips1999).However,todatenostatistical,poll‐basedstudyhasmanagedtosortouttheactualreasoningbehindtheacceptanceorrejectionofcamerasurveillance.Afifthpointraisedbysocialscientificpollsisthatfundamentaldifferencesexistbetweensocialgroupsinallmattersrelatedtocrime,fearandsecurity.Oldercitizenstendtofeellesssecureandaremarkedlymorefavourabletocamerasurveillance.Youngercitizensarethemostlikelytoraiseprivacyconcernswithcamerasurveillance.Womenaresignificantlymorelikelytoapproveofcamerasurveillanceandtodismissconcernsofprivacylossandunnecessarysurveillanceandcontrol.However,womenarealsomorelikelytoraiseconcernswhencamerasareinstalledinmoreprivateareas(changingrooms,toilets,etc.),aretypicallymoreafraidofcrimethanmen,andaremorelikelytobewaryofwalkingaloneatnight.Victimizationhasanunexpectedeffectoncameraacceptance:respondentswhohavebeenvictimizedare(slightly)lesslikelytoacceptcamerasthanthosewhohavenot(Ditton2000).Akeytothisparadoxmayinfactliewiththefactthatasfarasvictimsareconcerned,camerasfailedtofulfilltheirpromise(Leman‐Langlois2008).Theareawhererespondentslivehasanimportantimpactontheirevaluationofcamerasurveillance.Proximitytostreetsundersurveillancegenerallyresultsinrespondentsthataremorecriticalofcamerasurveillancewhereasthosewholivefartherawayaremorelikelytoindicateapproval(Ditton2000).Thisreiteratescriminologicalfindingsaboutsecurity,thatmostpeoplefeelsafeintheirownneighbourhoodbecausetheyknowtheareawell.Thisfeelingofsafetycomesfromthe(perceived)predictabilityofourenvironmentandstatisticalresearchwhichindicatesrelativeratesofsafety.Respondentslivingawayfromsurveilledareastendedtoindicateadesiretosecurespaceswithwhichtheyarelessfamiliar.Sixth,onestrikingfactdrawnfromthesefindingsisthatthemajorityofrespondentshavelittleknowledgeofcamerasurveillanceintheirownneighbourhood.Amajorityofthosewholivenearcamerainstallationsdonotknowthelocationofthosecameras,andmostwhoareawareofthecameralocationsbecomeawarethroughthemediaandnotthroughtheirownpersonalexperiences(Wells,AllardandWilson2006;Leman‐Langlois2008).Evenopinionpollrespondentsdonotrealisethepresenceofsurveillancecamerasuntilbeingaskedaboutit(HonessandCharman1992).Seventh,asaBritishHomeOfficestudydemonstrates(Spriggs,Argomaniz,GillandBryan2005),mostpeoplegrosslyoverestimatethecapabilitiesofcamerasincapturingdetails,seeingthroughobstacles,detectingmotion,trackingtargetsautomatically,nightandinfraredcapacity,andmore.Finally,manypolls,whethersocialscientificornot,regardthecamerasor‘CCTV’asasingle,homogenousobject.However,thesocialenvironmentwhereacameraisinstalledhasaprofoundimpactonitsperceptionbymostpeople,andespecially

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women.Table6.2showstheresultsofastudywhererespondentswereaskedtoevaluatetheuseofcamerasindifferentlocations.

Table6.2:Attitudestowardscamerasinvariouslocationsfor5Europeancities20

CameraLocation Good Neutral Bad

Bankcounters 91.9% 3.8% 4.3%

Subway/railwayplatforms 86.7% 9.3% 4.0%

Highstreetshops 82.9% 10.2% 6.8%

Shoppingmallwalkways 62.5% 23.4% 14.1%

Alongmotorways 62.6% 21.9% 15.5%

Openhighstreets 56.1% 21.5% 22.3%

Taxipassengerseats 46.6% 24.9% 28.5%

Hospitalwards 42.7% 28.6% 28.6%

Outsideentrancetohomes 36.1% 27.1% 36.8%

Publictoiletwashrooms 22.2% 17.5% 60.3%

Sportscentrechangingroom 13.8% 17.8% 68.4%

Clothingstorefittingroom 13.0% 13.6% 73.4%

ThoughTable6.2seemstoestablisharelativelypredictablehierarchyofintimacy,wherecamerasareprogressivelylessandlesswelcome,theseclassificationsarepurelyabstractanddonotincludecontextualelements.Forinstance,camerasinhospitalwardsareseenaslessacceptable,howeverarecentconcerninQuebecforthewelfareofolderpatientsincrowdedhospitalshasraisedthepossibilitythatcamerascouldbeinstalledtomonitorpatienttreatment. Highlightsandrecommendations,fromaprivacyprotectionpointofview:

• Byandlargesocialscientificopinionpollsshowsupportforcamerasurveillance,butalsounderlinethedynamicandfluidsocialconditionsthatimpactcameraacceptability.Inshort,opinionsaboutsurveillancearetheproductofmultiplefactors,somelinkedtodevelopingtrends,otherstospecificeventsandaredifficulttopredict.

20FromHempelandTöfler,2004:44.ThecitiesareBerlin,Budapest,London,OsloandVienna.Resultsareofferedasillustrationonly,assamplesineachcityweretoosmalltoberepresentative.Onlyextremedifferencesaresomewhatreliable.

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• Thoughrespondentsrejecttheuseofcamerasinmoreintimatesettings,theirnotionofprivacydoesnotextendfurther.Intimacyiscloselylinkedtotheexposureofthebodyandbodyfunctions.Ithasatangiblecorethatprivacylacks.Outsideofthiscoreonlythehomeseemstoprovokeresistancetosurveillance.However,itistobenotedthatprivate,individualsystemsofcamerasurveillancearebecomingpopularinprivatehomesecuritysystems.Someapartmentblocksalsogiveresidentsaccesstoallfeedsfromtheirvideosurveillancesystems.

• Thereforefromaprivacyprotectionpointofviewitmustbenotedthatthesecurityaspectofprivacyiscloselylinkedtocontrolovertheinformationproducedbythecamerasratherthantotheproductionitself(ofbeing“oncamera”).

PsychometricsandSocialPsychologyPollsSocialpsychologicalresearchuseopinionpollsorinterviewstosupplementtheirresearch,butratherthanconcentrateonpersonalopinionstheytendtofocusontheeffectofcamerasurveillanceontherespondentsattitudes.Thereareseveraldifferentapproachestothis.First,studieshavemeasuredthepsychologicaleffectofsecuritymeasuresonindividualperceptionofdanger.Commonsensedictatesthatmorevisiblesecuritymeasures(fromsecurityagentstocamerastometaldetectorstodogs,etc.)shouldmakethosewhoareawareoftheirpresencefeelsafer.However,studiesoftenindicatetheopposite,dependentuponcertainconditions.Criminologistshavedemonstratedthatincreasingthevisibleaspectofsecurityproductioncanhaveunintendedconsequences,asinthecaseofthe“KansasCityPolicePatrolExperiment”(Kelling1974).Theseresearchersfoundthatincreasedpolicepatrolshadlittleeffectoncrimeratesbutmadesomecitizenswonderhowdangeroustheirneighbourhoodhadbecometoresultinsuchintensepoliceactivity.Seeingmorepolicemadethemfeellesssafe.InasimilarmannerKevinGrosskopf(2006)describesfindingsfromtwostudiesconductedontheperceptionofvisiblesecuritymeasures,includingprofessionalsecurityguardsandsurveillancecameras.Onthewhole,visiblesecuritygreatlyincreasedtheimpressionofsafetyandtestsubjectsweresixtimeslesslikelytofeelvulnerableinthese‘protected’areas.However,whenpresentedwithaterrorismscenario,subjectsreportedincreasedvulnerabilityinhigh‐securityenvironments.Figure1mapsattitudestovarioussecuritymeasuresfollowingterroristscenarios.Surveillancecamerashaveanear‐neutral‘arousal’scoreandanegative‘pleasure’score,indicatingthattheyincreasethefeelingofhelplessness,orvulnerabilityoftestsubjects.

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Figure1:PerceptualMapofrespondentemotionsfollowingexposuretovisibleandnon­visiblesecuritymeasures(Grosskopf2006:6).Otherstudieshavesoughttoevaluatetheeffectofpolicecamerasurveillanceonbehavioursadoptedbycitizens.Criminologicalresearchdemonstratesthattheprimarysourceofcontrolinanyneighbourhoodcomesfromitscitizens,whoexertinformal,non‐officialformsofcontrolthroughtheirreactiontovariousformsofdeviancethattheymaywitness.Inthissense,surveillancecamerascanbeseenmoreintermsofafinal‘horizon’forordinarycitizenauthority.Someresearchsuggeststhatwhenformalcontrolsbecomemoreapparent,orareconsideredmoreeffective,citizenstendtobeproportionatelylessactivecontrolagents(LoubetdelBayle2007).RaySurette(2006)hasmeasuredtheimpactofvideosurveillanceonthisinformalmeansofsocialcontrol,whathetermed“citizenguardianship”.SurrettesuggeststhatCCTVcanbeseentolowercitizeninvolvementininformalsocialmeansofcontrolovertime.Thisstudycomparedrespondentswhowereawareoftheexistenceofcamerasintheirneighbourhoodandthosewhowerenotandobservednodifferenceintheirindicatedwillingnessto“helpsomeoneintrouble”orthelikelihoodthattheywouldtakesomekindofaction,eitherbyinterveningorcallingthepolice,inahypotheticalassault.Surettealsorancomparisonsin“guardianship”callstopolice(thoseregardingsuspiciouspersonsbutexcludingtrafficcalls,forinstance)betweenareaswithandwithoutcamerasandalsofoundnoeffect.Psychologicalandsocialeffectsofcamerasurveillancecanalsobeassessedstatisticallywithpsychometrictools.DavidBrooks(2005)measuredvideosurveillanceperceptionon2scalesof‘dread’(uncontrollability,gravity)and‘unfamiliarity’(rarity,novelty)inordertolocatetherelatedsociallyperceivedrisksspatially.Ofcourse,thepersonalevaluationoftheactualdevicesisalmostentirelyconditionedbythewaytheyarepresentedinthemedia(bothnewsandfiction)by

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politicians,localelitesandtheirmanufacturersandinstallers(Leman‐Langlois2003).Infact,theactual,objectiveeffectofcamerasonindividualsecurityisrigorouslyimpossibletoevaluate,eitherfromasocialscientificoranordinarycitizen’spointofview.Thebestscholarlyevaluationsonlyprovidegeneralized,averageestimatesofrisk,whichofcourseapplytonooneinparticular.Withthatinmind,Brooks’resultsshowthat‘CCTV’isafamiliarandverylowdreadriskcomparabletothatofhomeswimmingpools.Inotherwords,respondentsdonotconsidercamerastobeadangertothemselvesortotheircommunities.However,anotherinterestingfindingwasthatbetweenphasesofthestudythespatiallocationofcamerasurveillanceactuallychanged,asshowninFigure2.Thissuggestsaverydynamic,andvolatilesocialconstructionofrisk,inkeepingwiththemanyfloatingvariablesidentifiedabove(especiallycurrenteventsandincompleteknowledge). Figure2

1:Mobilityofspatiallocationofrisks*

*CCTV,radioactivewaste(raw),chlorination(wch),homeswimmingpools(hsp)andcoal‐miningdisease(cmd);Surette,2005:26.

Highlightsandrecommendations,fromaprivacyprotectionpointofview:

• Camerasurveillance,beingoncamera,seeingcamerasandothersecuritysystemsinone’simmediatesurroundingsisnowacommonoccurrenceandisseenasroutinebymostpeople.Forvariousreasons,camerasurveillanceisnotperceivedasproblematicandgenerallyinnocuous.

• Accordingtothesestudiesthepresenceofsurveillancesystemsdoesnotaffectthebehaviourofrespondentsinanyway,eitherinconvincingthemtheynolongerneedtomindtheirneighbourhoodsortochangetheirday

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todayactivitiestobetterconformtohypotheticalstandardsofgoodbehaviourwhileoncamera.

• Technologiesofsurveillancearebecomingentirelyintegratedineverydaylife.

AttitudesandPerceptionsThoughthestudiesabovedoofferglimpsesofcitizens’attitudesandperceptionsofcamerasurveillancethroughrepresentativesampling,theydonotallowforindividualarticulationofindividuallyrelevantaspectsinthesocialandphysicalenvironment–aperson’s‘lifespace.’Theymerelymeasuretheextenttowhichrespondentsagreeorrecognizethemselvesinthephysical,social,criminal,politicalandtechnologicalenvironmentasconceivedofandasdescribedbytheresearcher.Othertypesofresearcharemorequalitativeintheirstructureandallowrespondentsmoreleewayindeterminingthesignificanceandtherelationshipsbetweenobjects.Leman‐Langlois(2008)hasrunaseriesoffocusgroupswithordinarycitizenslivingunderandnearpolice‐operatedcamerasinalargeCanadiancity.Since2004,Montrealhashadahandfulofspeciallyidentifiedcamerasaroundtwoareasofthedowntowncoredeemedespeciallyproblematicintermsofcrime.Onehasacentralsubwaystationandabusterminalinit,aswellasaparknotoriousforitsinhabitants—squeegeekids,addicts,drunks,vagrantsanddrifters.Theotherhasastripknownforprostitution,opendrugdealingandalargeconcentrationofbars—allclosing,undercitybylaws,at03:00.Bothalsohaveshops,dwellingsandlargeinstallations,amongwhichareacollege,amajoruniversityandQuebec’snationallibrary.Thefocusgroupswereundirected,meaningthatthemoderatorintervenedonlywhendiscussionsfelltoastandstill,otherwisewaitingforissuestobeframedinthewayparticipantssawfit.Asastartingquestion,groupswereaskedwhethertheyfelttheirneighbourhoodwassafe.Thestrategywastofindoutatwhatpointpolicecameraswouldcropupinthediscussion,asameasureoftheirimportanceinpeople’sminds.Asarule,mosttimesthetopiconlyappearedafterlengthydiscussionsofotherelementsrelatedtosecurity.Forinstance,mostgroupslistedquiteafewsourcesofinsecurity,suchasgeneralizedlackofcareforothers,thefeelingthatnoonewouldhelpintimesofdistress.Theyalsomentionedtheabsenceofvisiblepoliceofficersandtheextremelyslowresponsetocalls.Massivenumbersofpettycrimes,aggressivepanhandlingandtheoccasional,unpredictableburstofviolencewerealsomentioned.Whencameraswerereferredto,mostofrespondentswereparadoxicallyambivalent.Ononehand,theybelievedthatfurtherreductionsofstaffhadbeenobviouswhenpoliceinstalledthecameras,andthatpoliceactiondidnotseemtorespondtocrimesobviouslydetectablebythecameras.Respondentslivinginintensesurveillanceareasagreedcrackdealinghadvanished,butfeltalotofother

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incivilitiesandcrimesremained,whilerespondentslivinginlowerintensitysurveillanceareasfeltthatdealinghadappearedaroundtheirhomes.Somebelievedthatcameraswereasignofunequal,unfairpolicingresourcesdistribution:other,ritzierareasbenefitedfromphysicalpresenceonthegroundwhiletheirshadtomakedowithcameras;othersthoughtthatcamerashadbeendemandedbyoccasionalvisitorswholivedoutsideoftheareaand/orbyshop/bar/theatreownerswhoneededtoattracttheseoutsidersasclientsOntheotherhand,mostresidentscouldnotplacethecamerasonamap,evenamongthosewholiveand/orworkinacamera’sfieldofview;afewdidnotknowcamerashadbeeninstalled.Perhapsconsequently,privacyconcernswereneverraised,exceptbythemoderator,followingwhichrespondentsreportednoparticularworries.Interestingly,mostcamera‐relatedfrustrationswerethoughttoresultfrominsufficientimplementation(bothinsufficientnumbersofcamerasandinadequatemonitoringofexistingones).Thisparadoxmayinfactberesolvedbysuggestingthatcameras,astheembodimentofthepromiseofhigh‐techprotectionandcomfort,havebecomeauniversalpositive.Anyperceivedflawsareexplainedintermsofimproperorinadequateimplementationorinefficientfollow‐upbypoliceofficers.Highlightsandrecommendations,fromaprivacyprotectionpointofview:

• Camerasareatthesametimeobjectsofscorn,forinefficiencyagainstcrime,displacementofcrimesandreductioninpoliceofficersonduty,andobjectsofdesire,believedtohavethepotentialtoimprovesecurity.Mostbelievethatmorecamerasareneeded.

• Open‐streetcamerasraisenoprivacyconcernswhatsoever.

• Camerasurveillanceisconceivedasadesirablecrime‐fightingtechnologyevenwhenexplicitlyunderstoodtobe,andpresentedas,adangerousfailure.

• Therefore,neitherefficacy(securityimprovements)norefficiency(costanalyses)argumentsarelikelytobeeffectiveinprivacyprotectionrepresentations.

GeneralConclusionsAfewconcludingremarkscanbeextractedfromtheinformationabove.• Whateverthemethodologyused,surveillancecamerasarenotseenbythepublicasominous,threateningordangerous.Scholarlystudiesdoreportsignificantlyloweracceptanceandfocusgroupfindingsshowanambivalence

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towardssurveillancecameras.However,ingeneralthepublicseemstoacceptcamerasurveillanceinpublicspaces.

• Regardlessofthesetting,camerasareseenasusefulagainstcrime,thoughtheirusefulnesshasnotbeenproveninquantitativeevaluations.Thepubliclargelypresumes,orevenhopesforusefulness:camerasareseenasworthinstallingeveniftheywillgenerallynotbeuseful,onthehopethattheymightproveusefuleventually.

• Despitemisgivings,clearlyidentifiedproblemsorothertechnologicalorsocialdeficiencies,camerasareadesirablefeatureofmodernsecurityfortheoverwhelmingmajorityofsurveyrespondents.Yet,thepublicareoftenaskedtochoosebetweenprivacyandsecurity,whentheyoftenwouldpreferboth.

• Whenprivacyconcernsareraised,theyareconceivedofintheirmostbasicform:theabilitytohidethebodyfromview,whichwouldbebetteridentifiedasintimacy(somethingexplicitindiscussionsaboutchangingroomsandwashrooms/toilets).

• Fromaprivacyprotectionpointofview,thisreducesthecogencyofafewtraditionalarguments.Clearly,thestatisticalcrimeratereductionaspectofcamerasisnotconsideredimportantbyrespondents.Mostfirehydrantsareinfactneverusedtofightfires,butnoonewouldconsiderdoingawaywiththem.Mostcamerasmaynevercatchcriminals,buttheirsecurity/safetyfunctionisperceivedasequivalent.Thenoveltyandresultingsuspiciontowardscameratechnologyhaslongwornoff.Privacyhasnoequivalenttothetangiblecoreofintimacy–thebody.Privacyinopen‐streetsettingshasnoresonancewhatsoeverformostrespondents.

• Privacymightregaincogencyifitwererecastasaformofsecurity.Withinthevariousformsofsecurityproduction,roomshouldbeleftforthesecurityofprivacy.Thiscanbedoneeasilyifprivacyisconceivedasasumofinformationaboutpersons,whichshouldbeprotected.Argumentsaroundcamerasystemswouldthenrevolvearoundtheappropriateness,orequilibrium,ofanydistributionofprotectionresourcesamongvariousobjects:spaces,personsandinformation.

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Interviews

Interview1,Anonymoussurveillancecameramonitor/operator.2007.

Interview2,AnonymousTorontoPoliceServicerepresentative.2008.

Interview3,AnonymousTorontoPoliceBoardrepresentative.2008.

LegislationCited

OntarioMunicipalPrivacyandFreedomofInformationAct.

PersonalInformationProtectionandElectronicDocumentsAct.