A role for a pan-European trade union movement?–possibilities in European IR-regulation

Industrial Relations Journal 26:l ISSN 0019-8692

A role for a pan-European trade union movement?-possibilities

in European IR-regulation Carsten Strnby Jensen,

Jarrgen Steen Madsen and Jesper Due

Steps towards internationalisation of the trade union movement are considered in the context of the process of political and economic integration taking place in the EU. The trade unions are trying- partly via the ETUC-to play a role at pan-European level. However, the European trade union movement is not a cohesive entity. Besides, it has no significant transnational power-resources. These factors suggest that any European ZR-system will be based primarily on political regulation rather than on a system of collective agreements.

The issue of internationalisation of trade unions merits consideration in any comprehensive appraisal of the political and economic integration taking place in the EU. Whereas firms in Europe have expanded the scope of their operations since the end of World War I1 to become international, 'multinational' or even 'global', the same pattern is far less evident among trade unions, which have by and large conducted their activities and exerted their influence within the boundaries of the single nation-state, despite moves towards transnational alliances and collective agreements covering workplaces

0 Carsten Strnby Jensen is Senior Researcher in Organisational Sociology and Industrial Relations, in the Department of Sociology, University of Copen- hagen. Jnrgen Steen Madsen is Senior Researcher in Organisational Sociology and Industrial Relations in the Department of Sociology, Jesper Due is Senior Researcher in Organisational Sociology in the same Department, University of Copenhagen.

in more than one country. However, the creation of the European

Single Market and the political integration that has taken place since the mid-1980s under the aegis of the EU have left the national trade unions with no option but to consider the extent to which they wish to co-operate across national boundaries and to devise an appropriate framework for this co-operation.

This article thus focuses mainly on the growing internationalisation of trade unions. The issues will be analysed in the context of the closer co-operation between trade unions in Europe within the framework of the European Trade Union confederation, ie. the ETUC, during the past 5-10 years. These closer links between trade unions in the EU member states can-at least partially-be attributed to moves by the EU member-states to promote the integration of social- and labour market policies, with a view to developing the Single Market.

0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK and 238 Main St., Cambridge, MA 02142, USA.

4 Industrial Relations lournal

The underlying intention is evident from the designation selected for the process: the Social Dimension of the European Single Market.

internationalisation.* Nevertheless we shall attempt to base our approach on a number of theories of the development of trade unions, even though these theories consider

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The article will submit some perspectives on internationalisation of the trade unions, commencing with a review of some of the discussions on trade unions emerging from industrial relations studies during the past thirty years. We shall also attempt to analyse some of the EU political measures forming part of the background to the trend towards internationalisation observed in the trade union movement, especially developments in the Social Dimension of the Single Market as promoted by the EU Commission. In this context we shall consider some of the politico-sociological aspects of the role played by supranational interest groups in the process of European integration as formulated by the so-called neofunctionalists. We shall outline some of the differences between national trade unions in the EU member states. Despite the comprehensive economic co-operation in West- ern Europe since the end of World War 11, there still exist essential differences in the character of these unions and in their impact on industrial relations in the single EU member state. These differences may be expected to constitute a major obstacle to European co-operation between the national trade unions. We shall attempt to analyse the development of co-operation between European trade unions in the ETUC in recent years. We shall attempt to evaluate the power, resource potential and strategy of the European trade union movement in the context of the possibility of establishing an international level for negotiating and discussing industrial relations.

Theories of trade unions and internationalisation

the unions primarily in the context of the nation-state.

In industrial relations studies conducted over the past thirty years two perspectives have dominated in the analysis of the function and organisational development of trade unions. These two perspectives-each in its own way-have emphasised various aspects of trade union development. We shall consider the perspectives in the following section, focusing on their relevance in promoting or hindering internationalisation in the EU member states.

One of the perspectives which we shall explore in this context is applied in UK industrial relations studies, where the main component in the understanding of trade unions has been an analysis of their role in the collective bargaining process, augmented by an analysis of how such collective bargaining is established[l]. An attempt is made to expiain the role of the trade unions, their function and development largely by examining the nature of collective bargaining as a means of creating a framework for regulation of the buying and selling of labour subject to the conditions of a market economy.

We shall focus on three aspects of Clegg’s theoryt of the development of trade unions which we regard as central to an understanding and discussion of a possible internationalisation or Europeanisation of industrial relations and of Europe’s national trade unions. Clegg submits-as the first of his points-argumentation for approaching an understanding of trade unions’ development and organisational features in relation to the character of the collective bargaining process. Organisational power in the trade unions is concentrated at the level at which collective bargaining is conducted. As Clegg writes:

* It should, however, be noted that many studies treat the development of trade union organisations in a comparative perspective. t Although Clegg’s study of the organisation of trade unions aims primarily at explaining and national differences in trade unions, we regard his considerations as relevant in any appraisal of forms of supranational trade union organisations.

The theories of industrial relations have so far paid scant attention to the internationalisation of trade unions, partly because of the absence of any tangible moves to such

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Briefly stated, the theory holds that power within the unions is concentrated at the level where collective bargaining is conducted. Industry bargaining centralises power at union headquarters. Regional and plant bargaining decentralize power[2].

The obvious question prompted by this is: what influence will the concluding of collective agreements at European level exert on national trade union organisations? Will a possible European collective agreements structure imply a centralisation of labour market organisation power in European organisations, whether at umbrella organisation level or sector organisation level? Or, on the contrary, will the national trade unions constitute an obstacle to collective bargaining at European level?

The second of Clegg’s points relates to his thesis that it is primarily employers and their organisations who determine the level at which collective bargaining is conducted. And, indirectly, that it is thus the form of employer organisations that determines the organisation of trade unions in centralised or, as the case may be, decentralised bodies.

Nevertheless unions cannot determine their methods of government by choosing their levels of bargaining, for the main influences on levels of bargaining are the structure of the management and the authority of employers’ organisations[3].

Clegg’s point on the structure of employers’ organisations is interesting in a European perspective, particularly as the employer side at European level has revealed two disparate features. Firstly there are hardly any real European employers’ organisations, corresponding to those operating at national level. There are, however, numerous European branch organisations which pursue specific branch interests within the framework of the EU. The influential European employers’ organisations-especially UNICE-have demonstrated a distinct reluctance to discuss a European level for collective bargaining. There is justification for maintaining that the national employer organisations have not taken any initiative to place the issue of a European level for legislation and collective agreements on industrial relations on the agenda; rather the contrary[4].

Secondly, the thesis deriving from Clegg‘s point-that the level of collective bargaining is determined by the employers’ organisations-is that the opposition dis- played by the latter to a European level of collective bargaining suggests that such a

level will either not be created or will fail to achieve any real significance in the context of actual regulation of workers’ terms of employment.

The third aspect to be considered is one submitted in industrial relations theory, suggesting that the basic characteristic feature of national collective bargaining systems is to a large extent created during the system’s establishment phase. If these observations- at national level-are related to the possibility of collective bargaining at EU level, a thesis emerges; decisions currently being taken and the institutions resulting from such decisions will impose their stamp at the European level of industrial relations for a long time to come.

Another dominant perspective applied in empirical and theoretical studies of industrial relations is associated with Dunlop’s theory of industrial relations systems[5]. Dunlop goes beyond UK industrial relations theory to produce a broader perspective in his analysis of the development of trade union organisations. Dunlop perceives collective bargaining as just one of many relationships which trade unions pursue with other actors in the field of industrial relations.

An industrial-relations system is comprised of three groups of actors-workers and their organisations, managers and their organisations, and governmental agencies concerned with the work place and work community. These groups interact within a specified environment comprised of three interrelated contexts: the technology, the market or budgetary constraints and the power relations in the larger community of the actors. An industrial-relations system creates an ideology or a common shared body of ideas and beliefs regarding the interaction and roles of the actors which helps to bind the system together[6].

What makes Dunlop interesting in an analysis of the internationalisation of the labour market organisations is his emphasis on trade union participation in industrial relations systems. These systems are characterised by numerous specific features which are formed by the system’s actors, and via these systems 1) numerous rules for job regulation are drawn up and 2) numerous procedures are stipulated for the drawing up of new rules for job regulation or for alteration of the old rules. We regard the overall perspective applied in Dunlop’s theory of industrial relations systems as relevant in relation to an analysis of the internationalisation of European trade unions. There

6 lndustrial Relations Journal 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995.

appears to be justification for the hypothesis that the first truly internationalised industrial relations system will be established as an extension of the creation of the Single Market and the further political development of the EU’s institutional co-operation. Such an internationalised industrial relations system would have independent international actors, such as the EU Commission, the European Parliament and internationalised labour market parties.

Following Dunlop’s line of thinking it can be held that in any internationalisation of the labour market organisations there is more at stake than a mere development of some form of transnational collective agreements. The dynamics governing the conditions which can lead to internationalisation of the trade unions prevail not only in the collective bargaining, but-in equal measure-in the initiatives and positions adopted by the international actors, especially the EU Commission.

Background to internationalisation of the

trade union movement-the social dimension

The internationalisation of firms constitutes the trade unions’ fundamental reason for intensifying efforts to achieve a corresponding internationalisation of trade union organisation[7]. However, the significant factor is that this internationalisation of firms has been in progress for several decades, without so far implying a concomitant internationalisation of the unions. The problems confronting the trade union movement in relation to the creation of the Single Market are not of recent origin. They have existed for years, without prompting any essential transnational measures among the trade union organisations. One could say that the collapse of the 2nd Internationale on the eve of World War I may have marked the demise of important efforts towards internationalisation of trade union organisations. The unions failed to agree for political reasons. This schism still prevails at international level, where the most important organisations are the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU), which is Social Democratic in orientation, the World Feder- ation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which has Communist leanings, and the World Confed-

eration of Labour (WCL), which is Christian Democratic in its orientation.

The current trends towards internationalisation of the trade union movement can thus-in our opinion-not be attributed solely to the internationalisation of firms. The internationalisation of the trade union movement must also be considered in the context of political developments in the EU, and of the EU’s vastly increased willingness to adopt political initiatives in areas of direct relevance to the trade unions. We refer to the initiatives which have been launched since 1987-1988 under the designation ’The Social Dimension of the Single Market’.

In our opinion the Social Dimension should primarily be regarded as an expression of the pattern of institutional and political development in EU co-operation, in which the central political actors-the nation states, the EU Commission, employers’ organisations and trade union organisations-attempt to draw up a new political agenda for the corpus of issues covered by this same co-operation. In the co-operation process the various actors attempt to mobilise their respective resources-in terms of power and political influence-in discussions to determine the items listed on the political agenda. The Social Dimension in EU co-operation is, in fact, hardly new. What is new is that it is now taken seriously as an item on the agenda in discussions of the further development of EU co-operation.

The respective attitudes of trade unions and employer organisations to the creation of the European Social Dimension is of particular interest in this broader pattern of EU co-operation. The significance of the contributions made by various supranational interest groups to European integration is thus an important factor in the theoretical approach to the development of the EU. The potential of these groups to promote European integration has been emphasised, especially by researchers drawing on the neofunctionalist tradition[8]. These supranational interest groups-such as trade unions and employer organisations-will tend to promote the Eur- opean viewpoint at the expense of national political systems. As Streeck and Schmitter point out:

Having been drawn into the ambit of the Com- mission, a multitude of political players would learn from experience that management from the

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top, from the center, from Brussels, was more efficient and effwtive than national policymaking. When returning to their national capitals, they- it was hoped and in fact predicted-would again become a lobby: this time not of their interest group vis-a-vis Brussels, but of Brussels vis-a- vis their national leaders, including their governments[9].

However, up to the end of the 1980s there was little evidence of any willingness on the part of the supranational organisations to bring social and labour market policy within the scope of integration. While it is obvious that business interests in particular have played a key role in the establishment of the Single European Market[lO], these same business interests have repeatedly rejected the notion of regulating industrial relations at pan-European level[ll]. However, as we shall suggest in this article, since the late 1980s the trade union organisations have supported integration measures and adopted a much more positive attitude to the concept of regulation of industrial relations at Euro- pean level.

A glance at the current agenda, as manifest in a series of the initiatives which have been formulated by the EU Council of Minis- ters and the Commission, eg. the Social Charter, the action programme for the Social Charter and various white papers, shows that the Social Dimension in EU co-operation is primarily directed towards establishing a set of rules for industrial relations in Europe. The discussion centres on the creation of a common system for regulating industrial relations, a form of ’labour market consti- tution’. And the political actors engaged in the debate on the Social Dimension focus mainly on these aspects of labour market policy.

The main thrust of the steps being taken by the EU institutions with regard to the Social Dimension can be specified under four headings: 1. The creation of a common European

labour market with the rights of free establishment and freedom of movement of labour within the EU. This is regarded as a vital component in the development of the Single Market. Development of a system of rulesAegis- lation, covering a) general terms of employment for wokers in the EU and b) protection of workers in work situations, ie. the work environment dimension. The Commission is basing its approach

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on the Social Charter and its own action programme. The possibility of deriving further concrete results from the Com- mission’s initiatives appeared to be con- siderably enhanced by the Maastricht treaty and the 11-country agreement. The Maastricht treaty has introduced the qualified majority voting procedure for several new areas of policy (Article 2), making it applicable to some of the draft directives submitted by the Com- mission, eg. the proposal on works- councils.* The qualified majority voting procedure can thus be applied in cases which before the ratification of the Maa- stricht-treaty demanded unanimity. Development of a dialogue at European level between the labour market parties, which can lead to collective agreements between European workers and employer organisations. Work on this item has been based on the results achieved at the so-called Val Duchesse meetings, conducted under the aegis of the EU Commission, attended-among others-by UNICE and ETUC. The Maa- stricht treaty has allowed the social dialogue to play a more direct role in EU co-operation (cf. Article 3, section 4 and Article 4), so that the parties have a new opportunity-during a period of nine months-to produce collective agreements covering areas for which the Com- mission is planning a draft directive[l3]. Development of more direct measures in areas of social policy, through the EU structural fund, so as to ensure greater equality in regional economic development and in the conditions for various groups of the population[l4].

The main aims of the Social Dimension are thus, as formulated by the EU institutions, a) to develop legislation to cover the European labour market and b) to augment this legislation by developing a European structure for collective agreements and organisations, with the involvement of the labour market parties.

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* The directive on work-councils has been adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1994, with reference to the 11-country agreement in the Maastricht Treaty. The consequences of the Maastricht-treaty for this proposal have been discussed by Gold and Ha11[12].

8 lndustrial Relations Journal 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995.

Differences in European trade unionism

In a historical perspective, the European trade union movements are rooted in the nation states. In terms of organisation, the structure of trade unions has been shaped to fit a nation-state framework. Branches or occupational groups, organised along regional or national lines (or both) have formed the nucleus of union structures. And the percentage of workers organised in unions varies greatly from country to country.

In functional terms too the scope of union activities and their orientation have been national in character, while the other central actors in the organisation and collective agreement systems have also been 'national'. The employers' organisations-the counterpart in the collective agreements systems- have been organised along national lines[l5]. And the political level has been dominated by the nation state and the national political parties, through which the trade union organisations have tried to promote the interests of their members, via legislation or broader welfare policy initiatives.

We shall accordingly deal briefly with some of the features-or, more accurately, the difference in the features-which today characterise the European trade union movement, while identifying some of the problems implicit in an internationalisation of the trade union movement. There is a striking difference-familiar in EU circles-in the percentage of workers organised in unions in the various countries, as shown in Table 1.

The major differences in the percentage of union membership in the EU countries provide a clue to some of today's and tomor- row's problems affecting international co- operation between the trade unions.*

Another key feature of trade union struc-

* However, these differences need not indicate a difference in the impact of the trade unions at national level on industrial relations. For example, the low union membership in Spain need not imply that the trade union organisation is of little importance in Spain's industrial relations. This viewpoint is supported by the fact that the majority of employee representatives are members either of the UGT or of the CC.00. Thus in 1986 34.5% of the representatives in workers' committees were members of the CC.00, while 40.9% were members of the UGT, cf. Valverde, A. M.[15].

Table I: Percentage of workers organised in a trade union in the EU and EFTA countries,

1990

Country Percentage of workers organised

UK Germany Italy Portugal Greece Spain Denmark Ireland Belgium Netherlands France Luxembourg Sweden Norway Finland Austria

39 'Yo 32 '/o 4o'Yo** 32 'Yo 25'Yo**

79%* 52'Yo** 51°/o

11 Yo

26 O/O

10% nn

83 '/o 56 'Yo 72 '/o 46 Yo

Source: OECD: Employment Outlook, July 1994, p. 172. * Due et al, 1994, The Survival of the Danish Model, p. 158. ** OECD: Employment Outlook, 1991. The figures cover 1988.

ture in the EU countries is the existence of competing main organisations representing the same worker classifications. Most of the EU countries can be characterised by the existence of trade union pluralism and by the existence of main organisations which compete both organisationally (recruitment of members, collective agreements etc.) and ideologically. These main organisations are traditionally split-in the single EU country-into Christian, Communist, Social Democratic or more neutral factions, but the impact of the competing unions differs from country to country. In certain countries the competition between the trade union organisations is a central feature of industrial relations. This applies, for example, to several South European countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, but also to France and The Netherlands.

In other EU countries, such as Germany, the UK and Denmark, the conflicts between the various trade unions play a more limited role in industrial relations, one reason being that peace and demarcation agreements have


been concluded by the competing trade unions. And in these countries a single main organisation plays the dominant role.

The tradition of competing trade union organisations so prevalent in Southern Eur- ope leads to a situation in which several important national trade union organisations with a Communist ideology have decided not to participate in European trade union co-operation under the aegis of the ETUC.

The significant differences in union membership from country to country in the EU will pose yet another serious problem, if- for instance-the issue of general collective agreements or framework agreements is scheduled for top level treatment in a Euro- pean context. In several EU countries the trade unions, because of the composition of their membership, are insufficiently rep- resentative and have inadequate support among workers, so that collective agreements concluded between trade unions and employer organisations at European level cannot be expected to become operative in the single EU member states.

At national level, however, in some EU countries we find various regulatory mechanisms which link the membershiphep- resentational issue to the influence of the single trade union. In some EU countries the so-called 'erga omnes' principle is applied, whereby collective agreements concluded between the labour market parties are later enshrined in legislation, and thus acquire legal validity for all workers in the relevant branch. There are numerous variations in the application of this 'erga omnes' principle-eg. in Germany, The Nether- lands, Belgium, France and Spain[l7]. The provisions of the Maastricht treaty covering social and labour market policies represent an attempt to introduce the 'erga omnes' principle at European level. As pointed out earlier, this grants the parties on the Euro- pean labour market the possibility, for a period of nine months, of concluding a bargain to cover a specific area, which-if the parties so agree-can be transformed into a decision by the Council which can have legislative validity (Article 4, section 2).

European trade union co- operation-ETUC

The organisational structure of European trade unions is, in many respects, parallel

to some of the structures which are characteristic of the various national trade union organisations. Since its formation in 1973 the ETUC has constituted a European trade union aggregation at federal level, with the most important main organisations from most of the EU countries as members, so that the ETUC today represents 40 main organisations from 21 West European countries. And-parallel to this development- several branch or sector organisations have been established at European level, with several of the independent national trade unions as direct members. EMF (The Euro- pean Metalworkers' Unions) and EURO- FIET (European Regional Organisation of the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical and Technical Employees) are among the 16 sectodbranch organisations which are today linked to the ETUC.

Both the ETUC and a number of the European sectodbranch organisations have been established as a direct consequence of developments in the EU and its institutions. In a historical perspective both the ETUC and a number of these sector organisations can be regarded as engaging mainly in general organisational lobbying, in respect to various Community initiatives which are perceived as being of importance in the context of worker and trade union interests in the EU countries. It can be held that an essential feature of the ETUC and the sector organisations-considering them as trade unions-is that the organisations have lacked that which distinguishes the national trade union organisations-involvement in the concluding of collective agreements with an employer counterpart.

The interesting question is the extent to which the ETUC and the sector organisations will in the future develop from this status of loosely structured coalitions into organisations with real independent power and competence. It can be maintained that the creation of an international industrial relations system will imply this development.

The question is the extent to which the national trade union organisations will be prepared to cede competence to the ETUC and to the branch organisations. Obviously, a ceding of competence by trade union organisations from national to supranational level is a prior requirement if the ETUC, for example, is to become a real actor at Euro- pean level.

10 Industrial Relations Journal @ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995.

If the developments which have taken place under the aegis of the ETUC in recent years are considered, what emerges is a certain willingness on the part of national trade union organisations to cede more and more competence to the ETUC, although not in the sense that the national trade union organisations have been prepared to grant the ETUC any form of carte blanche to conduct direct negotiations with the Com- mission or with the employer side at pan- European level. But, albeit indirectly, the willingness to cede competence has been present, as is evident from the efforts by the ETUC’s member organisations to make the body’s decision-making process more effective. At the 1991 Congress, steps were taken to improve the ETUC’s capacity for action, by establishing the so-called management level, which today consists of 15 representatives from, respectively, the national main organisations and three of the sector organisations [ 18 J.

However, one of the problems involved in ceding competence to the ETUC arises from the fact that many of the ETUC’s member organisations have very little real competence at national level.* This aspect of some national trade union organisations is thus one of the problems involved in creating the formal competence required for the internationalisation of the trade unions in any real sense.

Similarly, it can be held that even if the national trade union organisations decide to cede competence to the ETUC, this in itself will not solve the very real problems involved in establishing mechanisms for proactive international co-operation among trade union organisations.

Here we tend to agree with the observation made by Streeck and Schmitter; that the more important the issue under discussion, the greater the difficulty of co-operation between national trade union organisations. They state:

Also, there is no reason to believe that an increase in political opportunities for labor at European level, assuming it will ever come to pass, will make consensus-building in European labor organizations less difficult. In fact, if outcomes

matter more, interest differences assume more weight[l9].

Despite this view, which emphasises the difficulties of achieving consensus, it is worth noting that even if the European trade union movement is fragmented, thus resulting in the failure to empower the ETUC by granting it the competence which some of its members hold at national level in a number of areas, there is still considerable external pressure on the national trade union organisations, signalling the need for a joint supranational approach by the unions. In the following section we shall consider what form this joint approach might assume.

The European trade union movement: control of resources and strategy

The strategy of the European trade union movement is basicaIly focused on four areas, which the ETUC and the sector organisations have addressed in recent years. Obviously, these areas must be considered in the context of the development of EU co-operation and of the initiatives taken by the EU Com- mission.

There is justification for summarising these four areas as: 1) development of Euro- pean legislation in the area of social- and labour market policy (primarily in relation to the Social Charter and the Commission’s action programme); 2) establishment of general collective framework agreements or agreements with the employers, primarily the UNICE, at European level; 3) establishment of collective agreements at sector level between the European branch trade unions and the corresponding employer organisations; and 4) establishing transnational industrial relations procedures with multinational corporations in Europe.

So far, fewer than 20 procedures, which might accurately be described as transnational in character, have been concluded at European 1evel.t

The trade union movement’s general response to the creation of the Single Market and to the problems which it has considered

* This applies, for example, to the TUC in the UK and to Germany’s DGB. These organisations are not empowered to act as one of the parties to collective agreements at national level.

t The adoption-in the autumn of 1994-by the Council of Ministers of the directive on work-councils will lead to a considerable increase in the flow of information and in the number of hearings in transnational companies.

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capable of discounting in this connection has been to demand that the EU should establish an independent ’Social Dimension’ within the framework of EU co-operation. This demand was first tabled in the mid- 1980s, when the ETUC called for the establishment of ‘parallelism’ in EU co-operation between the steps taken in the field of trade and economics and the field of social policy, so as to safeguard workers‘ interests vis-a- vis an internationalised business community. The demands made by the ETUC and by the national trade union organisations have to a large extent been linked to the political argumentation directed towards the threat of ‘social dumping’.

In general terms, the ETUC regarded the Social Dimension as embodying a desire to create a dual strategy at international level. On the one hand there was an attempt to push ahead with efforts to create a European level for legislation in a number of areas which are also-to a greater or lesser extent- covered by national legislation. On the other hand there was a parallel attempt to develop a European level for establishing collective bargaining. It can be held that the ETUC’s strategy in this context has been closely linked to the initiatives tabled by the EU Commission.*

As an extension of our outline of the challenges to be faced by the European trade union movement, we shall analyse-in the following section-the movement‘s possibilities of action in a European context. We shall do so by analysing our perception of the position of power (and power resources) achieved by the European trade union movement in relation to the other actors on the European labour market.

The analysis will focus on an evaluation of the transnational power potential of the

* For example, the ETUC has not independently been capable of establishing, at European level, anything resembling collective agreements with employers. A single transnational collective agreement, covering training and other items, has been concluded between the ETUC and CEEP on 6 September 1990. However, in terms of content this transnational collective agreement does not differ essentially from the joint opinions formulated by the ETUC in association with the UNICE. The significance of the ETUCKEEP agreement is thus sym- bolic, isofar as it marks the first occasion on which the trade union movement can claim to have concluded a general transnational collective agreement at Euro- pean level.

trade union organisations. We shall thus concentrate on an approach towards understanding and evaluating the European trade unions’ possibilities of realising their strategies.

In our opinion an analysis of the real and potential power of trade union organisations can be conducted in relation to three levels which exert a decisive influence on the strength of trade union organisations- nationally and internationally. Firstly, we consider the power of a trade union organisation in conflict situations, ie. the possibility of monopolising firms’ access to a specific type of labour. Secondly, we shall examine the institutional power of a trade union organisation, ie. the direct or indirect power resources inherent in or linked to various institutional arrangements with the state, with employers or their organisations. The third factor to be considered relates to the political strength or power of a trade union organisation, ie. the capacity for-and possibility of-exerting influence on the given political system.

Conflictual power

Conflictual power resources can be regarded as a given trade union organisation’s capacity for-and possibility of-limiting or totally blocking the access of one or more firms to the supply of labour, and-as a corollary to this-the social significance of a given trade or occupation. The conflictual power potential is the fundamental power base of the trade union organisations in relation to the employer-counterpart in a system based on a market economy. The power to limit employers’ access to labour can derive from a given trade union organisation’s capacity for, and possibility of, monopolising a specific type of labour for a longer period of time. Or the limitation can manifest itself as a concrete conflict in relation to the trade union organisations‘ possibility of effecting a strike or blockade.

If the conflictual power potential of the trade union organisations is considered in a European perspective, we can safely maintain that-so far-it is generally national in scope. The power potential reveals itself initially in the ability of the trade union organisations to establish continuous agreements on wages and terms of employment, via which-directly or indirectly, and to varying degrees-the employer counterpart

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recognises that a given trade union organisation, or an aggregation of trade union organisations, organises specific trade or occupational qualifications or specific forms of labour. This trade or occupational power potential is evident mainly in the capacity for, and possibility of, entering collective agreements on behalf of a group of workers. According to Clegg, this aspect is an important key to an understanding of trade union organisations. As we have briefly mentioned, so far there are very few transnational collective agreements, so that the vast majority of collective agreements are still concluded at national, regional or enterprise level. And the vast majority of enterprise level agreements are, in turn, national rather than trans-national.

The second element in the conflictual power potential of the trade union organisations, ie. the capacity for and possibility of launching concrete strike activities, is similarly national, regional or enterprise- oriented. Organised strike activity conducted across the boundaries separating the EU’s nation states is virtually unknown.

The point here is that the conflictual power potential of the European trade movement is almost exclusively national in its scope. This means that the level at which trade union organisations are capable of mobilising power resources via various forms of monopolisation of access to labour is almost exclusively national. Here it can be added that the fundamental problem facing the trade unions in relation to the (post World War 11) internationalisation of enterprises is that this very internationalisation severely restricts the power of the unions to monopol- ise access to labour. This produces a situation in which internationalisation poses a threat to the trade union organisations, while sim- ultaneously conferring a distinct advantage on the enterprises (especially multinational employers) [20].

The process of internationalisation being conducted in connection with the Single Market and the European Union adds impetus to this trend, precisely by seeking to abolish the restrictions imposed by national states on freedom of movement for goods, capital, services and labour[21]. The aggre- gate strategies of the European trade union movement, as expressed via the ETUC, where steps are taken to establish a) collective agreements with multinational enterprises and b) collective agreements at

sector level, must be considered in this perspective. They must be seen as a longterm attempt to re-establish the trade unions’ capacity for and possibility of monopolising access to labour. However, in the prevailing situation, ie. the current development of the EU, there is little to suggest that the European trade union organisations-either singly or acting in unison-are capable of mobilising conflictual power in relation to enterprises and employer organisations in Europe. It seems that the trade union organisations possess no real conflictual power on a scale sufficient to tackle the problems with which they are confronted, as a result of the internationalisation of enterprises.*

Institutional power

The second level in our analysis of the trade union movement’s power resources pertains to what we shall designate institutional power, ie. the power and power resources which are directly or indirectly linked to the institutional structures, eg. the main agreements which are concluded with employer organisations.

The significance of the institutional structures with respect to the power of the trade union organisations is, in particular, evident in their stabilising effect. Institutional arrangements, which regulate the buying and selling of labour over a protracted period of history, cancels out some of the deviations in the historical balance of strength (in concrete terms), between a) employers and their organisations and b) between workers and their organisations. Particularly in periods marked by crisis, with high unemployment, trade union organisations will have a power resource in existing institutional

* The attempts made by the trade union organisations to establish works-councils with multinational enterprises have also been based on the consensus- orientated approach. The transnational collective agreements between the trade unions with Bull, Elf Aquitaine, Volkswagen and others were achieved via argumentation-not industrial strife. The trade union organisations, fully aware that they lacked the resources to force such agreements on the employers via industrial action, have concentrated on convinc- ing the management of the relevant firms of the logic in setting up European works councils. Cf. Gold, M. & Hall, M.1221: ’Report on European- level Information and Consultation in Multinational Companies-An evaluation of practice’, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin, 1992.

@ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995. Possibilities in European 18-regulation 13

arrangements with employer organisations. These existing institutional arrangements will in certain areas nullify the market effects of a crisis. Conversely, during periods with favourable economic trends and low unemployment, the employers and their organisations will derive an advantage from institutional arrangements with the trade union organisations, as these will correspondingly reduce the pressure of market forces on the single enterprise.

In a number of EU countries these institutional arrangements between trade union organisations and employer organisations have a long historical background, produc- ing a situation in which employer organisations in some countries will prefer to retain the existing institutional structures during periods of high unemployment, even though an immediate short-term advantage might be achieved by attempting to redefine the existing institutional structures.

If we consider the concrete historical situation in the EU countries, we currently detect only feeble steps towards what might. accurately be termed Europeanised or international institutional structures. The employer organisations in the EU countries are, even in the post-Maastricht era, still in a position where they can challenge the legitimacy of the very idea of establishing such European institutional structures, intended to impose binding obligations on the parties. Thus we find no significant institutionalised structure at European level which is remotely comparable with the national institutional arrangements; nor does this confer any significant power potential on the European trade union movement.

Political power The third level selected for an evaluation of the strength of the European trade union organisations relates to their opportunities of exerting political influence, ie. the organisational capacity for and possibility of exerting influence on the political system prevailing in the industrial relations environment. Such influence would derive from the creation of various forms of improvements among the members of trade union organisations. In relation to the establishing of Europeanised industrial relations, it can be held that the political system surrounding such relations consists of the EU institutions and the political decisions produced by this

political system. A concrete assessment of the strength of

the European trade union movement at the political level implies a) an assessment of the national trade unions’ possibilities of exerting influence on the national political decision-making process and b) an assessment of influencing and achieving political support from the European institutions, including the EU Commission and the Euro- pean Parliament.

If the overall efforts of the EU institutions in the field of social and labour market policy over a shorter historical period are examined, it emerges that during the period prior to the adoption of the European Single Act there was very limited political will to extend international co-operation on labour market policies.

The period between adoption of the Euro- pean Single Act and formulation of the Maastricht treaty at the end of 1991 was marked by a growing political willingness to launch supranational initiatives in the field of social- and labour market policy. This political willingness was reflected in the fact that all the member states, with the exception of the UK, were prepared to adopt the Social Charter, and was also reflected in the continuous efforts by the EU Commisi- son and Parliament to induce the member- states to accept initiatives in the field of social- and labour market policy at EU level.

It should be noted in particular that the Commission‘s action plan for the Social Charter and the European Parliament, and the alliance between the Christian Democrat and Socialist groups are clear indications of the determination of supranational institutions in the EU to develop the Com- munity’s Social Dimension. This viewpoint is supported by the fact that during the pre- Maastricht period the Commission continu- ously adopted an active, aggressive approach when interpreting the draft treaty in relation to the Social Dimension. The directives pertaining to atypical work and hours of work were thus both promoted with reference to articles requiring only a qualified majority decision in the Council of Ministers. In applying these interpretations of the treaty, the Commission has tried to circumvent opposition from the member-states in the Council of Ministers. The aggressive approach was supported by the European Parliament. As Addison & Siebert suggest, what emerged was tantamount to an alliance

14 Industrial Relations Iournal 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995.

between the Commission and the European Parliament in relation to development of the Social Dimension[23]. At the same time there has also been-partly on account of the difficulty of having the Commission’s draft directive for social policy adopted-a growing understanding among the member- states for the introduction, in the longer term, of simple majority voting in the EU for matters pertaining to social- and labour market policy.

It can be held that during this period, the European trade union movement in general has had a certain measure of success in promoting-in the EU’s political institutions-its viewpoints on the need for supranational regulation of industrial relations. And at the same time, at nation- state level, the trade union movement has in certain countries succeeded in persuading national governments to adopt a more favourable attitude to the Social Dimension.

Whatever the ultimate outcome, the Euro- pean trade union movement has notched up a string of impressive successes in promoting its ideas in the EUs political system, even going so far as to persuade UNICE- against the background of political development trends in the EU-to accept, in October 1991, the possibility of concluding transnational collective agreements with the Euro- pean trade union movement. Admittedly, the UNICE had hitherto been strongly opposed to such transnational collective agreements, but has now recognised that they may be preferable to comprehensive European legislation on labour market matters[24].

Although Clegg argues that the level at which collective bargaining is conducted is determined by the structure of the employers’ organisations, it must be noted that his thesis is not supported by the above shift in the position of the UNICE. The structure of employers’ organisations appears to be of less significance in a possible European system of collective agreements. It may be more relevant to refer to Sisson, when observing that the employer side at European level is attempting to meet the challenge posed by the trade union movement and its potential for political influence by going so far as to accept the establishment of a supranational collective agreements structure. Sisson writes:

Clearly employers are an important influence on the structure of collective bargaining, especially

in upholding those elements that maximize their advantage and minimize the impact of trade unions. But it is a moot point whether, as Clegg has suggested, they are the most important influence in any of the countries. Certainly employers are not free to pick and choose the structure of collective bargaining; and even where it might be said that employers took the initiative . . . the structure of collective bargaining very much reflected the nature of the trade union challenge[25].

The result of the UNICE’s more favourable attitude towards the issue of European collective agreements has also been apparent in relation to the new provisions on access for the European labour market parties to common European collective agreements to cover areas for which the Commission may be planning proposals (Article 3, section 4 and Article 4). These provisions in the Maastricht treaty are, in fact, the main result of close ad hoc co-operation between the Commission and the European parties on the labour market, leading in autumn 1991 to agreement on an outline of the longterm role of the parties in social and labour market policy.

Similarly the general provisions of the Maastricht treaty on social- and labour market policy (Article 2) refer to an increased use of decisions based on qualified majority voting and even though many problems remain unresolved, it must be assumed that there will be progress in a number of fields in the development of European initiatives.*

In the context of the theories of industrial relations[26], insofar as they point out that the establishment of the collective bargaining structure or of the industrial relations system plays a decisive role in determining the further development of the system-it is worth noting that the result of this establishing phase depends to a large extent on the strategic choices made by the central actors. For example, the extent to which a European industrial system becomes based on collective agreements or on legislation depends on the strategic choices of the actors, especially the ETUC’s and UNICE’s, including their respective assessment of their own strength vis-i-vis a) one another

* Because of the difficulties of member-states in having the Maastricht treaty ratified, the EU Com- missions has not been in a position to implement this new procedure until early 1994. And the result has led, as already reported, to the adoption of the directive on works-councils in the autumn of 1994.

@ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995. Possibilities in European IR-regulation 15

and b) the political system. Thus the incorporation in the Maastricht

treaty of a number of perspectives pertaining to a European structure for collective agreements was made possible solely against the background of the strategic choices made by the actors. The willingness of the UNICE to accept the possibility of concluding collective agreements at European level is essentially an expression of such a strategic choice. This strategic choice has made it possible to apply the section of the Maastricht treaty on direct involvement of the parties to a European structure for collective agreements.

At the same time the Commission has similarly had its strategic and political interests in creating a space or a s t r u c t u r e at European level-for the labour market parties. These interests refer in particular to increasing the legitimacy of the EU among citizens of the EU member states., The Commission and the EU institutions have a general strategic interest in ensuring the support of the trade union organisations in moves towards EU integration, so as thus to ensure for themselves added political legitimacy. In any case it is important to emphasise that the contours of a European industrial system are emerging from a long series of strategic choices among the actors in the political system and on the labour market.

It can also be held that these strategic choices are important in reaching an understanding of how supranational organisations act in a European context. We agree with Streeck and Schmitter, who point out that the neofunctionalists’ prediction that supranational interest organisations would, at least to some extent, automatically promote integration has remained unfulfilled in the area of social- and labour market policy. On the contrary, European employer organisations have vigorously opposed regulation of industrial relations at European level. However, in response to pressure from other actors, UNICE has altered its strategy, accepting the feasibility of concluding collective agreements with the ETUC. UNICE’s decision can, however, be perceived largely as an attempt to impose a curb on the Commission’s moves to introduce legislation. UNICE’s revised strategy and its will-

~ ~~

* This was made clear by the results of the Danish and French referendums on the Maastricht treaty.

ingness to enter into collective agreements is thus based on a desire to avoid decisions rather than a new preference for agreements. Obviously, the question which can be posed (but not answered at this stage) is to what extent this non-decision-orientated strategy adopted by UNICE will be allowed to suc- ceed.

In attempting to produce an overall assessment of the resource control and strategy of the European trade union movement, we have formed the opinion that the main strength of the trade union organisations has been-and still is-linked to the political system. What has been missing, as we have described earlier, in the attempts made by trade union organisations to establish a pan- European industrial relations structure, is the ability to mobilise conflictual power resources. It is only comparatively recently that the possibilities of drawing on the resources offered by institutional structures and power resources have begun to emerge. On the other hand, the European trade union movement has succeeded in promoting its viewpoints in the context of the EU institutions. Thus the main resource available to the European trade union movement in applying pressure to persuade employers to adopt a more favourable attitude towards the idea of concluding collective agreements at European level has been in the form of political alliances rather than an ability to mobilise conflictual power.

Conclusion If one attempts to produce an overall assessment of some of the trends towards internationalisation of the European trade union movement, as we have in this article, it is clear that organisational co-operation among trade union organisations has been mainly linked to general political development in EU co-operation. This is the source of the dynamics in trade union co-operation, and it is in the political sphere that the trade union organisationsat European level- have had the power resources and influence to gain acceptance for their viewpoints.

If we revert to our outline of some of the theories of trade unions, it is worth noting that the initial driving force in intemationa- lisation of the European trade unions has not been rooted in collective bargaining. Nor has collective bargaining served as the stimulus towards development in

16 Industrial Relations Journal @ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995.

international co-operation between trade unions. And even though the Maastricht treaty explicitly mentions involving the parties in the Commission’s draft proposals for regulation of the labour market (Article 3, section 4 and Article 4), it must be assumed that this involvement will be subject to detailed scrutiny at the relevant political levels. The international industrial relations systems, an outline of which is discernible in the Maastricht treaty, thus seems-on account of the nature of European co- operation-to concur with Dunlop’s stance, with its emphasis on the political institutions as central actors[27].

There is ample reason for suggesting that in an EU context, the determining factors are political power and the political institutions. The Social Dimension must be regarded primarily as a political regulation of terms of employment via the establishing of mini- mum standards, partly as a sort of compen- sation for the (possibly adverse) economic effects of the Single Market. The Maastricht treaty links an institutional element by making it possible for the labour market parties to conclude collective agreements on terms of employment. However, the important point is that in general it must be assumed that such collective agreements will be transformed into European legislation in the form of decisions adopted by the Council of Min- isters. An institutional element has also been created at national level, as measures can be implemented via collective agreements concluded between the parties rather than via legislation[28].

It can thus be maintained that in determining the EU regulation of terms of employment it will be political power-and not conflictual power-which will form the basis of the European industrial relations system. Nonetheless, this political power will still be linked to the capacity of the trade union organisations to mobilise conflictual power. And in a EU perspective it must be assumed that a lack of ability to organise and control national and transnational labour markets will detract from this political influence. As stated earlier in this article, one of the major problems facing the European trade union movement in its efforts to establish a strong European industrial relations system is the weak position and fragmented nature of the movement in a number of EU countries.

Acknowledgements Research for this article was supported by the Danish Ministry of Labour, the Danish Ministry of Finance, the Danish Social Sci- ence Research Council, the Danish Teachers Union (’DLF‘), the Association of Danish State Employee Organisations (’STK), The Industrial and Municipal section of the Union of Commercial and Clerical Employees (‘HKIIndustri and HK/ Kommunal’), the Danish Lawyers’ and Econ- omists’ Association (’DJQF’), the Danish Nurses Organisation (’DSR), the Danish Trade Union of Public Employees (‘FOA’), the State Public Servants Trade Union (’COII’), the Danish Association of Masters and Ph.Ds (‘DM’) and the National Union of Danish Upper Secondary Teachers (GL), the Municipal VAT Fund and the Metal Industry’s Education and Training Fund. The article has been translated by Se6n Martin. Thanks to the IRJ referee for com- ments on the article.

1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

References Here we refer mainly to the tradition based on the work of Clegg, H., ‘Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining: A Theory Based on Comparisons of Six Countries, Blackwell, 1976; and on Sisson, Keith, ’The Management of Collective Bargaining-An International Comparison’, Blackwell, 1987. Clegg, 1976, op. cit., p. 41. Clegg, 1976, op. cit., p. 41. Cf. UNICE: ’The Social Dimension of the Internal Market-UNICE Position’, Brussels, 1988 or Teague, P. & Grahl, J., ’Industrial Relations and European Integration’, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1992. Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers: ’Industri- alism and Industrial Man’, Heinemann, 1962; Dunlop, J. T., ’Industrial Relations Systems’, Harvard University Press, 1958. Dunlop, 1958, op. cit., p. 383. This internationalisation has for example been discussed in Marginson, P., Buitendam, A., Deutschmann, C. and Perulli, P., ’The Emerg- ence of the Euro-Company: Towards a Euro- pean Industrial Relations’, in Industrial Relations journal, vol. 24, no. 3, 1994. Cf. Haas, E. B., ’The Uniting of Europe: Polit- ical, Social and Economical Forces, 195&1957’, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1958; Lindberg, L. N. and Scheingold, S. A. (ed.), ’Regional Integration-Theory and Research‘, Harvard University Press, 1971. Streeck, W. and Schmitter, P. C., ’From National Corporatism to Transnational Plural- ism, Organized Interests in the Single Euro-


10.

11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

pean Market’, in Streeck, W., Social Znstitutions and Economic Performance, London, Sage 1992, p. 198. Cf. Green, M. L., ‘The Politics of Big Business in the Single Market Program’, Paper presented at the European Community Studies Association’s Third Biennial International Conference, May 27, 1993, Washington, D.C., 1993. Streeck and Schmitter, 1992, op. cit., p. 206. Gold, M. and Hall, M., ‘Statutory Works Coun- cils: the final countdown’, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3, September 1994. Cf. the Commission’s reports on the involvement of the parties, Com (93), 600 final, 14Dec. 1993. This area appears to have been expanded in connection with the Commission’s latest white paper on :ocial- and labour market policies, cf. Com (94), 333, final, 27.07.1994, Bruxelles. Cf. Sisson, 1987, op. cit. Valierde, A. M., European employment and industrial relations glossary: Spain, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Luxembourg, 1991, p. 203.

, By contrast, in Denmark only persons who are members of trade union organisations are entitled to the rights achieved via collective bargaining, cf. Due, J., Madsen, J. S., Strplby Jensen, C. and Petersen, L. K., The Survival of the Danish Model-a historical sociological analysis of the Danish system of collective bargaining, Copenhagen, DJ0F Publishing, 1994.

18. Cf. ETUC, ’European trade-unionism at the heart of changes in a world of movement’, ETUC-congress resolution, Luxembourg, 1991, and ETLJC: ”ETUC-Statute”, Luxem- bourg. 1991. The role of sector organisations in the ETUC was boosted at the ETUC Con- gress in 1991, when they were granted a seat on the management committee.

19. Streeck and Schmitter, 1992, op. cit., p. 226. 20. As pointed out by Kjellberg, A. in Facklig

organisering i tolv lander, Lund, 1983, p. 10, employers derive an essential organisational advantage from internationalisation, as the process ineluctably implies that enterprises, considered as organisations, conduct their activities across national boundaries.

21. Streeck pinpoints the problems faced by the trade unions as a result of the creation of the Single Market when he writes: ”Up to the present day, one of the strongest attractions of the Internal Market for European business is that it might loosen what is regarded by many as the stranglehold of organized labor over the European economy”. Streeck, W.,

‘The Rise and Decline of Neo-Corporatism’, in IIRA: Economic and Political Changes in Europe-Implications for Industrial Relations, papers presented at the 3rd European Regional Congress, Bari, 23-26 September 1991, Cacucci Eitore, Bari, 1993, p. 37.

22. Gold, M. and Hall, M., ‘Report on European- level Information and Consultation in Multi- national Companies--An Evaluation of Prac- tice’, European Foundation for the Improve- ment of Living and Working Conditions, Dublin, 1992.

23. Addison, J. T., Siebert, W. S., ’The Social Charter and the European Community: Evol- ution and Controversies’, in Industrial and labour Relations Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 597-625.

24. On this point we feel that Streeck and Schmitter underestimate the importance of the so-called Social Dialogue, when they maintain: ”The celebrated ’Social Dialogue’ . . . strongly confirms the fundamental deficiencies of the European Community as a would-be agent of social concentration”. 1992, op. cit., p. 225.

25. Sisson, 1987, op. cit., pp. 190-191. 26. Cf. Dunlop, 1958, op. cit., p. 307. 27. The fact that the IR-system has its roots in the

political system rather than in the collective bargaining system was also noted by Clegg. In his comparison of the organisation of trade unions in six countries, Clegg emphasises the differences between the French trade unions and unions in other countries, noting that the French unions are not primarily concerned with collective bargaining with the employer- counterpart. On the contrary, the French trade unions concentrate mainly on the political system and on gaining political influence, cf. Clegg, 1976, op. cit., p. 105. In this sense there are very close parallels between the French trade union traditions and the traditions which the ETUC seems to have adopted when pursuing its aims.

28. However, here again the point is that such national collective agreements must be fol- lowed up by legislation to ensure that the EU standards apply to all-ie. also to non- unionised workers and non-affiliated employers. We have discussed this problem in relation to the Scandinavian countries in: Strplby Jensen, C., Due, J., Madsen, J. S., ’Towards a European IR-system? The Impli- cations of the Maastricht Treaty for Danish Industrial Relations’, paper presented at the Third Biennial Conference of the European Community Studies Association (ECSA), Washington D.C., 15-17 May 1993.

18 lndustrial Relations Journal @ Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1995.

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