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247 If claims about which character traits are environmental virtues are to be more than rhetoric, there must be some basis or standard for evaluation. This natural- istic, teleological, pluralistic, and inclusive account of what makes a character trait an environmental virtue can be such a standard. It is naturalistic because it is consistent with and motivated by scientific naturalism. It is teleological because character traits are evaluated according to how well they promote certain ends. It is pluralistic because those ends are both agent-relative and agent-independent. It is inclusive because it counts environmentally justified, environmentally respon- sive and environmentally productive virtues as environmental virtues. This theory of environmental virtue provides the basis for the development of a typology of environmental virtue that includes virtues of sustainability, virtues of commun- ion with nature, virtues of respect for nature, virtues of environmental activism, and virtues of environmental stewardship. A Theory of Environmental Virtue Ronald Sandler* I. IDENTIFYING ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE The approach to identifying environmental virtue employed in this article is to defend a general account of what makes a character trait a virtue and then apply that account to environmental and environmentally related interactions, relationships and activities. This virtue theory approach is not among those most commonly employed by environmental ethicists. One common approach is the environmental exemplar approach. This approach is grounded in firm beliefs about who is environmentally virtuous. It proceeds by examining the character of those exemplars to derive substantive accounts of particular environmental virtues, as well as a general account of what makes a character trait an environmental virtue. For example, on the basis of careful study of the lives and characters of Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, and Henry David Thoreau, Philip Cafaro concludes that “any environmental virtue ethics worthy of the name must . . . include: (1) A desire to put economic life in its proper place—that is, as a support for comfortable and decent human lives, rather than * Department of Philosophy and Religion, Northeastern University, 371 Holmes Hall, Boston, MA 02115-5000. Sandler’s research interests include ethical theory, environmental ethics, and ethics and technology. He is the author of Character and Environment (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming), editor with Philip Cafaro of Environmental Virtue Ethics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), and with Phaedra Pezzullo of Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement (Cambridge: MIT Press, forthcoming). Sandler thanks Philip Cafaro, Jason Kawall, Jennifer Welchman, Stephen Nathanson, Michael Meyer, and Rosalind Hursthouse for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the material that appears in this article. He also thanks John Basl and Benjamin Miller for their research assistance. www.umweltethik.at

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If claims about which character traits are environmental virtues are to be morethan rhetoric, there must be some basis or standard for evaluation. This natural-istic, teleological, pluralistic, and inclusive account of what makes a character traitan environmental virtue can be such a standard. It is naturalistic because it isconsistent with and motivated by scientific naturalism. It is teleological becausecharacter traits are evaluated according to how well they promote certain ends.It is pluralistic because those ends are both agent-relative and agent-independent. Itis inclusive because it counts environmentally justified, environmentally respon-sive and environmentally productive virtues as environmental virtues. This theoryof environmental virtue provides the basis for the development of a typology ofenvironmental virtue that includes virtues of sustainability, virtues of commun-ion with nature, virtues of respect for nature, virtues of environmental activism,and virtues of environmental stewardship.

A Theory of Environmental Virtue

Ronald Sandler*

I. IDENTIFYING ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE

The approach to identifying environmental virtue employed in this article isto defend a general account of what makes a character trait a virtue and thenapply that account to environmental and environmentally related interactions,relationships and activities. This virtue theory approach is not among thosemost commonly employed by environmental ethicists. One common approachis the environmental exemplar approach. This approach is grounded in firmbeliefs about who is environmentally virtuous. It proceeds by examining thecharacter of those exemplars to derive substantive accounts of particularenvironmental virtues, as well as a general account of what makes a charactertrait an environmental virtue. For example, on the basis of careful study of thelives and characters of Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, and Henry DavidThoreau, Philip Cafaro concludes that “any environmental virtue ethics worthyof the name must . . . include: (1) A desire to put economic life in its properplace—that is, as a support for comfortable and decent human lives, rather than

* Department of Philosophy and Religion, Northeastern University, 371 Holmes Hall, Boston,MA 02115-5000. Sandler’s research interests include ethical theory, environmental ethics, andethics and technology. He is the author of Character and Environment (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, forthcoming), editor with Philip Cafaro of Environmental Virtue Ethics(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), and with Phaedra Pezzullo of EnvironmentalJustice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement(Cambridge: MIT Press, forthcoming). Sandler thanks Philip Cafaro, Jason Kawall, JenniferWelchman, Stephen Nathanson, Michael Meyer, and Rosalind Hursthouse for their helpfulcomments on earlier versions of the material that appears in this article. He also thanks John Basland Benjamin Miller for their research assistance.

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1 Philip Cafaro, “Thoreau, Leopold, and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics,”Environmental Ethics 23 (2001): 13–16.

2 Geoffrey Frasz, “What is Environmental Virtue Ethics that We Should Be Mindful of It?”Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8 (2001): 5–14.

as an engine powering endlessly more acquisition and consumption . . .; (2) Acommitment to science, combined with an appreciation of its limits . . .; (3)Nonanthropocentrism; (4) An appreciation of the wild and support for wilder-ness protection . . . ; [and] (5) A bedrock belief that life is good: both humanand nonhuman.”1

One limitation of the environmental exemplar approach arises from theprivilege it places on obtaining beliefs about who is environmentally virtuous.To the extent that those beliefs can be distorted, narrow or otherwise inad-equate, the approach can result in mistaken assessments of some charactertraits and an inaccurate account of what makes a character trait an environmen-tal virtue. A second limitation of the approach is that it does not provideresources for adjudicating between competing beliefs about who is environ-mentally virtuous. The lives and characters of the heroes of North Americanenvironmentalists may differ substantially from those of the environmentalheroes of North American sportsmen, ranchers, loggers or developers, as wellas from those of people in other parts of the world. For these reasons, the barefact that some of us, or even quite a lot of us, find a particular person to beenvironmentally admirable is not sufficient to establish that the traits sheexemplifies are environmental virtues. This is not to dismiss the importance ofthe study of exemplars in identifying environmental virtue. It is to recognizethat obtaining beliefs about who is environmentally virtuous is only one amongseveral considerations that must be taken into account when developing atheory of environmental virtue. It is also to recognize that our regarding aparticular character trait as an environmental virtue is not what makes it anenvironmental virtue.

Another common approach for identifying environmental virtue is theextensionist approach. This approach begins with a character trait consideredto be a virtue in interpersonal interactions or relationships and proceeds byarguing that the virtue ought to be operative in environmental interactions orrelationships as well. For example, Geoffrey Frasz defends friendship with theland as an environmental virtue on the grounds that one’s relationship with theland can provide mutual enrichment and benefits analogous to those attendinghealthy interpersonal friendships. So just as one ought to cultivate friendshipwith other persons, one ought to cultivate friendship with the land.2

As with the study of exemplars in identifying environmental virtue, thinkingin terms of extension from interpersonal virtues can be useful as part of anapproach for specifying environmental virtue, but it is inadequate on its own.

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Whether a particular interpersonal virtue is appropriately extended to some environ-mental or environmentally related context, activity or relationship must be deter-mined case by case, virtue by virtue. One virtue might be appropriately extended inone way, another in a different way, and a third not at all. The crucial issue ineach case is whether the bases of responsiveness of a virtue and the consider-ations that justify it as a virtue in interpersonal contexts are present also in someenvironmental contexts. But claims about a virtue’s justification presuppose anaccount about what makes a character trait a virtue. Moreover, extensionism cannotitself be an exhaustive approach to determining the substantive content of envi-ronmental virtue, since it is possible that there are virtues specific to environmentalentities, interactions or relationships. One way that distinctive environmentalvirtues might be justified is through distinctive environmental values. If there aresuch values, then environmental virtue may involve dispositions to appropri-ately acknowledge and respond to them, whether or not those dispositions havea ready analog in interpersonal ethics.

Thus, while the extensionist and environmental exemplar approaches can befruitful ways of identifying the substantive content of environmental virtue,neither is an adequate alternative to the virtue theory approach. With respectto the environmental exemplar approach, a background theory about whatmakes a character trait a virtue is necessary as a remedy against distorted,biased, or otherwise limited beliefs about who is an environmental exemplar,as well as for adjudicating among conflicting claims about who are the appropri-ate environmental exemplars. With respect to the extensionist approach,assessing a candidate extension involves determining whether the justification forthe virtue and the conditions of its exercise really are present in some environ-mental interactions or relationships. Doing so requires an account of the consid-erations that make the character trait a virtue, and so a background theory ofvirtue. Moreover, neither approach tracks what actually makes a trait an environ-mental virtue. There is thus no getting away from the virtue theory approachand the need for an account of what makes a character trait a virtue whenidentifying environmental virtue.

In what follows, I defend an account of what makes a character trait a virtue,develop a theory of environmental virtue on the basis of that account, and applythe theory of environmental virtue to develop a typology of environmentvirtue.

II. A THEORY OF VIRTUE

That scientific naturalism is true and that human beings are essentiallybiological beings are premises from which the theory of environmental virtueadvocated in this article begins. Ethical naturalism is ethics done against thebackdrop of scientific naturalism and a naturalistic understanding of human

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3 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); PhilippaFoot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

4 “[W]hen we talk about ethically good human beings, we have not suddenly started to use theword ‘good’ in a totally new ‘moral’ or ‘evaluative’ way,” (Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 226).“Judgments of goodness and badness . . . [have] . . . a special ‘grammar’ when the subject belongsto a living thing, whether plant, animal, or human being. . . .‘[N]atural’ goodness, as I define it,which is attributable only to living things themselves and to their parts, characteristics, andoperations, is intrinsic or ‘autonomous’ goodness in that it depends directly on the relation of anindividual to the ‘life form’ of its species” (Foot, Natural Goodness, pp. 26–27).

5 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 202.

beings. In recent years, a new approach within ethical naturalism, the naturalgoodness approach, has been gaining favor in philosophical circles.3 Thethought driving the natural goodness approach is that scientific naturalism anda naturalistic understanding of human beings provide a presumptive case thatthe concept of “goodness” should not be radically transformed when used toevaluate human beings from when it is used to evaluate members of otherspecies.4 If this thought is correct, then it may be possible to model ethicalevaluations of humans on biological evaluations of individuals of otherspecies. In particular, advocates of the natural goodness approach believe thatit is a promising way to identify which character traits are virtues. A commontheory of virtue is that the virtues are character traits that make their possessora good human being, since they are conducive to or constitutive of theirpossessor flourishing or living well. Within the context of the natural goodnessapproach, this theory suggests that what makes a character trait a virtue shouldbe analogous to what makes a trait an excellence in individuals of other species.

What, then, is meant by good when it is ascribed to a nonhuman living thingqua living thing? Rosalind Hursthouse, a prominent proponent of the naturalgoodness approach, proposes that the goodness of psychologically sophisti-cated social animals is evaluated as follows:

. . . a good social animal . . . is one that is well fitted or endowed with respect to(i) its parts, (ii) its operations, (iii) its actions, and (iv) its desires and emotions;whether it is thus well fitted or endowed is determined by whether these fouraspects well serve (1) its individual survival, (2) the continuance of its species, (3)its characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic enjoyment, and (4) thegood functioning of its social group—in the ways characteristic of the species.5

On this account, a free-riding wolf, a brittle hoofed moose, and an antisocialbonobo are defective. They are, in those respects, poor specimens of their kind.Claims such as these are meant to be familiar. They do not go much, if anything,beyond the kind of claims that botanists, ethologists, zoologists, and natural-ists regularly make. Because there is a fact of the matter about how the parts,processes, emotions, and actions of individuals of a particular species functionin the form of life (e.g., survival, sociability and reproduction) of individuals

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6 Ibid., pp. 206–07; Foot, Natural Goodness, chap. 4.7 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 208–11.

of that species, there is a standard for judging the goodness of individuals quamember of their species.

Natural goodness assessments will not always be clean and easy. Specieslimits sometimes can be hard to define, and often there will be significantvariation for how individuals of a species characteristically go about pursuingthe relevant ends. It is important to be mindful of this indeterminacy andcomplexity when making judgments of the natural goodness of individuals.However, it does not undermine the legitimacy of such judgments. Althoughsome cases will be difficult or even inscrutable, others will be quite clear, evenif contextualized—i.e., that a particular individual is a good or bad specimen,in certain respects, given its environment, age, etc. Moreover, it is not ashortcoming of natural goodness evaluations that they can be messy in thisway. The imprecision is built into the subject matter. It is in the evaluations ofnatural goodness, because it is in the science; and it is in the science, becauseit is in the world.

Proponents of the natural goodness approach simply advocate extending thenatural goodness form of evaluation to humans. They do so not only withrespect to biological evaluations (i.e., evaluations of good health), but alsowith respect to evaluations of character (i.e., virtue and vice), which involveevaluating what remains after the bare biological parts and processes areseparated off: emotions, desires, and actions from reason and inclination.6 Thisextension generates the following natural goodness thesis:

A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE

A human being is ethically good (i.e., virtuous) insofar as she is well fittedwith respect to her (i) emotions, (ii) desires, and (iii) actions (from reasonand inclination); whether she is thus well fitted is determined by whetherthese aspects well serve (1) her survival, (2) the continuance of thespecies, (3) characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic enjoy-ment, and (4) the good functioning of her social group—in the waycharacteristic of human beings.

The natural goodness thesis is attractive for several reasons. First, it isinformed and motivated by scientific naturalism and a naturalistic understand-ing of human beings. Second, the aspects of human beings that are evaluated(i.e., desires, emotions, reasons and actions) are those standardly associatedwith ethical character. Third, the criteria against which these aspects areassessed cohere well with commonly held beliefs about the role that virtuesplay in our lives.7 If a character trait was typically detrimental or thought to betypically detrimental to one’s social groups, longevity and enjoyment andavoidance of pain, it likely would not be considered a virtue. Fourth, as

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08 Ibid., chap. 10; Foot, Natural Goodness, chap. 3.09 “Our way of going on is just one, which remains the same across all areas of our life. Our

characteristic way of going on, which distinguishes us from all the other species of animals, is arational way. A ‘rational way’ is any way that we can rightly see as good, as something we havereason to do. Correspondingly, our characteristic enjoyments are any enjoyments we can rightlysee as good, as something we in fact enjoy and that reason can rightly endorse” (Hursthouse, OnVirtue Ethics, p. 222). “For it can be said that while animals go for the good (thing) that they see,human beings go for what they see as good. . . . Human beings not only have the power to reasonabout all sorts of things in a speculative way, but also the power to see grounds for acting in oneway rather than another” (Foot, Natural Goodness, p. 56).

10 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, chap. 10.

discussed above, it fits well with commonly held views about what makes acharacter trait a virtue.

Moreover, proponents of the natural goodness approach have shown that thenatural goodness thesis can accommodate, in two important and intercon-nected ways, the principal disanalogy between human beings and members ofother species: our forms of rationality. First, advocates of the approachrecognize that there is no single way that human beings “characteristically”pursue or realize the naturalistic ends.8 Our biology constrains us to someextent. Human infants cannot survive on their own and we require someinterpersonal relationships, for example. But even given these sorts of con-straints, human social systems, ways of taking pleasure and avoiding pain, andapproaches to raising children have varied widely over time, among cultures,and between individuals. Furthermore, we might go about doing these thingsquite differently in the future than we do right now or have done in the past. Itis our capacities to conceive, execute, and propagate the alternatives, whichrequire theoretical and practical rationality, as well as imagination and particu-lar forms of social learning, that make this variation possible. Thus, althoughhuman beings do not have a characteristic way of going about things in thesame sense as do other species, we do characteristically go about the world ina rational way, where “A ‘rational way’ is any way that we can rightly see asgood, as something we have reason to do.”9 The identification of “a rationalway” as our characteristic way of going about the world is a point at which thenaturalism that is descriptive for other species and our bare biological aspectsgives way to a normative naturalism. The idea that there are a variety ofcharacter traits we might have and that our characteristic way of going aboutthe world is “rational” enables us to evaluate and prescribe the character traitson the basis of their conduciveness for promoting endorsable or “rightly [seen]as good” realizations of the naturalistic ends. Doing so is the second way inwhich proponents of the natural goodness approach believe our rationalitymakes a significant difference.10

For the reasons discussed above, I believe that the natural goodness approachprovides a generally accurate account of how a naturalistic theory of virtue oughtto be structured: character traits ought to be evaluated according to howconducive they are to promoting certain ends; those ends must be informed by

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11 These objections have been raised also by David Copp and David Sobel, “Morality andVirtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics,” Ethics 114 (2004): 514–44.

12 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952); Brad Hooker,Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Paul Taylor, Respect forNature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Thetheory of virtue being defended here can be modified easily if this commitment should change.For example, if we are or really ought to be concerned with norms at the cultural level, then thetheory can be revised such that character traits are evaluated according to their conduciveness to

the sort of living, sentient, social, rational animals that we are; and what aresubject to evaluation are our dispositions regarding actions, desires, andemotions. Moreover, the approach identifies crucial ways in which our ratio-nality makes a difference when it comes to evaluating human goodness.However, there are some difficulties with the natural goodness thesis and thenatural goodness approach. First, there are problems with how scientificnaturalism is used to justify the approach. Second, there are differences thatour rationality makes that the natural goodness thesis does not recognize. Ourrationality gives rise to additional ends that are part of our flourishing. It alsoallows us to recognize ends independent of our own flourishing as making aclaim on us. I discuss these difficulties in turn.

The natural goodness approach is thought to follow from scientific natural-ism, including a naturalistic understanding of human beings, and that “good”has a distinctive evaluative, grammatical or logical structure when applied toa living thing qua living thing. The justification for the approach therebysupposes that there is a single naturalistic or scientific perspective for evalu-ating a living thing qua living thing, something along the model of evaluationdone in botany and ethology, in which individuals are evaluated on how wellfitted they are for fulfilling the “life-form” of the species of which they are part.However, there are quite a lot of ways to divide up the natural world into kindsother than by species. Why not model our ethical evaluations on evaluations ofliving things as a member of a genus, or a bearer of a particular genotype, ora member of a local group or population? Moreover, there are quite a lot ofways to evaluate individuals scientifically other than as ethologists andbotanists do. For example, an evolutionary biologist might evaluate livingindividuals according to how well adapted they are for promulgating theirgenes through future generations, and an ecologist might evaluate livingindividuals according to how well they promote the integrity and stability ofthe ecosystems of which they are a part. Such evaluations are as naturalistic andscientific as the evaluations made by ethologists and botanists. Why, then,model our ethical evaluations of humans on one rather than the other?11

The answers to these questions come from the “ethical” side of ethicalnaturalism. When we do ethics, we are concerned with norms at the level of“human moral agent.” Privileging species level evaluations in ethical natural-ism is the result of this generality commitment in ethics.12 It is also part of ourconception of ethics that human flourishing is understood from the perspective

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realizing the naturalistic ends in an endorsable form for members of culture X or within the contextof culture X.

13 Hursthouse also defends this claim. She argues, following John McDowell, that ethicalreflection cannot proceed independent from or outside of one’s “acquired ethical outlook”(Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 165–6). For this reason, on her version of the natural goodnessapproach, “ethical naturalism is not going to be just a branch of biology or ethology” (Hursthouse,On Virtue Ethics, p. 223).

14 There is room for discussion about the details of the ends appropriate to living, social,sentient animals. For example, it may be that the ends should include the promulgation of one’sgenetic material through future generations, not merely continuance of one’s species. Both thenatural goodness thesis and the theory of virtue being defended here can be modified easily toaccommodate such revisions.

15 Foot also defends the claim that “when we think about the idea of an individual’s good asopposed to its goodness . . . human good must indeed be recognized as different from good in theworld of plants or animals, where good consisted in success in the cycle of development, self-maintenance, and reproduction” (Foot, Natural Goodness, p. 51).

of the individual’s physical, emotional, and psychological experience, not theperspective of his or her genes or his or her ecosystem. So it is our occupationin ethics with flourishing understood from the “life-form” perspective thatjustifies modeling ethical evaluations on a form of naturalistic evaluation thatemploys that perspective. The implication of these commitments is not thatthere is something mistaken or unsubstantiated about adopting the “life formof the individual as a member of a species” perspective when making ethicalevaluations. Rather, they show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that there are ethicalcommitments involved in ethical naturalism, which scientific naturalism doesnot itself justify.13 In this case, these commitments orient ethical naturalism byprivileging a particular naturalistic perspective. So while the general frame-work of character trait evaluation at work in the natural goodness approach iscorrect, its theoretical underpinnings are somewhat different than its advocatespropose.

Let us turn now to the second difficulty and the differences human rationalitymakes that the natural goodness thesis does not recognize. The ends constitutiveof human flourishing are not fixed by the biological or anthropological facts abouthuman beings. It is not merely, as proponents of the natural goodness approachemphasize, that how we can realize the ends is left unsettled by our evolution-ary history, the biological functioning of our parts and systems, and how wehave realized the ends in the past. It is also that what the ends are is leftunsettled by them. Because human beings are essentially biological beings andthe life-form perspective is appropriate for ethical evaluation, the type of endsthat are emphasized within the natural goodness thesis are the proper place tobegin developing an account of human flourishing.14 However, our forms ofrationality raise the possibility of additional ends being appropriate to us eitherbecause we are rational in those ways or because our rationality enables us tomodify our form of life.15 Specifying the ends constitutive of human flourish-ing therefore requires considering, in addition to facts about our evolutionary

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16 It is possible that autonomy and knowledge are accounted for as part of Hursthouse’sconception of “the rational way” of realizing the ends. If so, this discussion simply makes explicitwhat is included implicitly in the natural goodness thesis.

17 The distinction here is one of degree. Groups and individuals of some nonhuman species usetools, farm, learn from each other, cooperate, alter their environment, and so on. But no nonhumanspecies innovates or accumulates social practices and technologies (i.e., culture) on anythingclose to the scale, complexity or pace as do humans.

past, our anthropological history and the functions of our biological systems,the possibilities that our rationality opens to us both in itself and throughculture and technology, as well as common beliefs about human flourishing.As mentioned earlier, the biological ends suggested by our being living,sentient, social animals gain support in this way, since they cohere well withcommonly held pre- and post-theoretical beliefs about the role that the virtuesplay in our lives, as well as with common beliefs about what makes a charactertrait a virtue. However, there are other commonly recognized components ofhuman flourishing that are not appropriate to non-rational (or significantly lessor differently rational) social animals: meaningfulness, autonomy, and knowl-edge.16

The case for including meaningfulness as an end is that we have the capacityto be concerned about the meaningfulness of our lives in a way that bears,pigeons, squid, and gophers cannot be about theirs, and that it is a considerationthat is often appealed to in evaluations of individuals. Scientific naturalismconstrains what can be endorsed as “a meaningful life” or “a life with meaning.”It cannot be a conception of meaningfulness concerned with explanations forwhy a species is here or why a particular individual is here. It must be understood,as are the other ends, within a naturalistic framework or through what goes onin this world—e.g., our projects, endeavors, relationships and our efforts andaccomplishments regarding them. But scientific naturalism certainly does notpreclude meaningfulness in life as an end constitutive of human flourishing.

The case for including knowledge as an end is the role that the accumulationof knowledge plays in human life and that possessing knowledge is commonlyconsidered to be a human good. Just as we are social, emotional, and sentient,so too we are knowers. We continually process data and information, and form,sort out, choose among, deliberate upon, and accept and reject beliefs. Theaccumulation and transmission of acquired knowledge between people andover generations is among the most striking and distinctive features of the wayhuman beings go about the world. It is what enables our complex cultures andtechnologies, which distinguish us from other species.17 Beliefs, and gettingthem right and building off of them, are thus central to human activity, andhuman beings across all cultures spend considerable time and effort onknowledge creation, accumulation and transmission.

The case for including autonomy as an end is that it is possible for an individualto realize the other ends in a way that is endorsable, without it being a way thatshe has endorsed. However, such a life would seem to be missing something

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18 As with the ends appropriate to living, social, sentient animals, there is room for discussionabout the details of the ends that are appropriate to us as rational animals, and the theory of virtuebeing defended here can be modified easily to accommodate any necessary revisions to them.

19 This is not to claim that eudaimonistic virtue theories are egoistic. There may be eudaimonisticreasons for cultivating genuine concern for the welfare of others for their own sake and for beingmotivated to act on that basis. For a discussion of this point, see Julia Annas, The Morality ofHappiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 258–60. What I am suggesting here isthat there may be non-eudaimonistic reasons for cultivating such concern and motivation as well.

20 Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2003), pp. 90–4.

that is a part of our living well because of what our rationality makes possible,and something that is commonly thought to be relevant to the quality of peoples’lives. Autonomy, then, refers to a person’s capability to identify for him orherself the projects that orient his or her life and how he or she would realizethe ends constitutive of human flourishing, as well as the capabilities (social,material, and psychological) to pursue them in the manner of his or herchoosing.18

Besides making possible additional constituents of human flourishing, ourrational and emotional capacities enable us to value things in themselves,independent of whether doing so promotes or is constitutive of our ownflourishing.19 That we can do so raises the possibility that some character traitsare at least partially justified as virtues on agent-independent grounds. Forexample, it is commonly thought that other human beings have a good of theirown that justifies concern for them for their own sake, independent of theirrelationship to the agent’s own flourishing. If so, then some character traits,such as compassion and benevolence, might be virtues at least in part becausethey promote other people’s good. The bare possibility of such values requiresmoving to a more inclusive account of what makes a character trait a virtue thanis accommodated by a strictly eudaimonistic account, such as the naturalgoodness thesis.20

Revising the natural goodness thesis to include the ends appropriate to us asrational beings and the possibility of agent-dependent ends generates theteleological pluralism thesis:

A human being is ethically good (i.e., virtuous) insofar as she is well fittedwith respect to her (i) emotions, (ii) desires, and (iii) actions (from reasonand inclination); whether he or she is thus well fitted is determined bywhether these aspects well serve (1) his or her survival, (2) the continuanceof the species, (3) characteristic freedom from pain and characteristicenjoyment, (4) the good functioning of his or her social group, (5) his orher autonomy, (6) the accumulation of knowledge, (7) a meaningful life,and (8) the realization of any non-eudaimonistic ends (grounded in non-eudaimonistic goods or values)—in the way characteristic of humanbeings (i.e., in a way that can rightly be seen as good).

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21 It should be clear from the discussion regarding the ends constitutive of human flourishingthat on the teleological pluralism thesis evaluations of character traits are biologically informed,but they are not reducible to biological assessments.

The teleological pluralism thesis is a naturalistic, teleological, and pluralis-tic account of what makes a character trait a virtue. It is naturalistic because itis consistent with and motivated by scientific naturalism.21 It is teleologicalbecause character traits are evaluated according to how well they promotecertain ends. It is pluralistic because those ends are both agent-relative (ofwhich there are a plurality) and agent-independent (possibly plural as well).Given this pluralism, as well as the occasional complexity and imprecision ofnatural goodness judgments discussed earlier, deriving substantive accounts ofthe dispositions constitutive of particular virtues will sometimes be difficultand messy. This difficulty is to be expected. We are complex and finite beingsthat are the product of natural processes that happened to throw up rational,self-aware, reflective beings in a world of similarly unscripted events andindividuals. We are not designed to fit a prescribed role in an orchestratedworld. This does not imply that we cannot do better or worse given oursituation. I have argued that there are standards against which those assess-ments can be made. But it does suggest that it is unrealistic, and perhaps evenmisguided, to expect a single, unified, precise and neat specification of humanvirtue. Such tidiness would not fit well with the vagaries and imprecision wefind in the rest of the natural world. There is no reason to think that evaluationsof ourselves should be any different.

III. ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE

Different virtues have different fields (e.g., individuals, objects, or situations)for which they are operative. For example, the field of compassion is (roughly)the suffering of others, the field of honesty is (roughly) the withholding anddisclosing of truth, and the field of gratitude is (roughly) being benefited byanother. An environmentally responsive virtue is any virtue whose field isconstituted at least partially by environmental entities. Many environmentalvirtues are environmentally responsive, but not all are. Some virtues mightserve environmental ends or be justified by environmental considerations,even though they do not involve responsiveness to environmental entities. Anenvironmentally justified virtue is any virtue that is in part justified byenvironmental considerations, such as the good of nonhuman entities, benefi-cial relationships with environmental entities, or the material resources theenvironment provides. An environmentally productive virtue is any virtue thatpromotes or maintains environmental health, the well being of nonhumanliving individuals, or any other environmental goods or values. These categoriesare not exclusive. For example, an environmentally responsive virtue might be

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22 Laura Westra, “Virtue Ethics as Foundational for a Global Ethic,” in Ronald Sandler andPhilip Cafaro, eds., Environmental Virtue Ethics (Lantham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).

23 Louke van Wensveen, “Ecosystem Sustainability as a Criterion for Genuine Virtue,”Environmental Ethics 23 (2001): 227–41; Ronald Sandler, “The External Goods Approach toEnvironmental Virtue Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 25 (2003): 279–93.

24 Louke van Wensveen, “Attunement: An Ecological Spin on the Virtue of Temperance,”Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8 (2001): 67–78; Peter Wenz, “Synergistic Environmen-tal Virtues” in Sandler and Cafaro, Environmental Virtue Ethics; Geoffrey Frasz, “Benevolenceas an Environmental Virtue,” in Sandler and Cafaro, Environmental Virtue Ethics; Philip Cafaro,“Gluttony, Arrogance, Greed, and Apathy: An Exploration of Environmental Vice,” in Sandlerand Cafaro, Environmental Virtue Ethics.

environmentally justified, as well as environmentally productive. But neitherdo they entail each other. For example, an environmentally productive virtuemight not be environmentally responsive. Environmentally responsive virtues,environmentally justified virtues, and environmental productive virtues are allenvironmental virtues. One implication of this inclusive account of environ-mental virtue is that the environmental virtues are legion, which is appropriategiven humanity’s multifaceted and ubiquitous relationships with the naturalworld.

In the remainder of this section, I highlight the variety of considerations that,given the teleological pluralism thesis and this inclusive conception of envi-ronmental virtue, play a role in specifying the dispositions constitutive ofenvironmental virtue. I also develop a typology of environmental virtue on thebasis of those considerations.

A. BASIC ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: VIRTUES OF SUSTAINABILITY

Perhaps the most straightforward way in which the environment is relevantto the specification of virtue is that it provides the goods necessary for humanbeings to survive at all. We depend for our well functioning on the intake ofcertain materials—e.g., food, water, oxygen—and avoiding the intake ofothers—e.g., lead, mercury, PCBs. These goods are basic in the sense that theyare necessary for life and health, as well as for the other components of humanflourishing insofar as survival and good biological functioning are prerequi-sites for them.22 As long as we depend on the natural environment for suchgoods, dispositions that maintain them in a sufficiently unpolluted state arejustified, whereas dispositions that tend to undermine their quality or availabil-ity are unjustified.23 Among the virtues of sustainability that are justified atleast in part on these grounds are temperance, frugality, simplicity, attunement,humility, and farsightedness.24

Not all virtues of sustainability are dispositions regarding the production ofgoods and the consumption of resources. This is possible because what makesa character trait a virtue is not always the same as what the virtue is responsive

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25 David Solomon, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics,” in Peter A. French, Theodore E.Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue (Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1988). For example, I argue below that wonder is a virtue in part becauseit opens its possessor to certain pleasures, but it is neither a disposition to seek pleasure nor adisposition to respond to pleasure in a particular way.

26 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home); United Nations Environment Programme’s Post Conflict Assessment Unit(http://postconflict.unep.ch/).

27 See, for example, the “Water Conflict Chronology,” compiled by Peter Gleick of the PacificInstitute (www.worldwater.org/chronology.html). For additional information on fresh watershortages, see Peter Gleick, The World’s Water: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resource,2004–2005 (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002) and UNESCO, United Nations World WaterDevelopment Report: Water for People, Water for Life (New York: UNESCO Publishing andBerghahn Books, 2003).

28 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home; United Nations Environment Programme, http://www.unep.org.

29 It is for this reason that Wangari Maathai was awarded the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize: “TheNorwegian Nobel Committee has decided to award the Nobel Peace Prize for 2004 to WangariMaathai for her contribution to sustainable development, democracy and peace. Peace on earthdepends on our ability to secure our living environment. Maathai stands at the front of the fightto promote ecologically viable social, economic and cultural development in Kenya and in Africa.She has taken a holistic approach to sustainable development that embraces democracy, humanrights and women’s rights in particular,” (Nobel Committee Press Release, 8 October 2004).

30 Consideration of social stability can also justify dispositions of respect for the status of

to.25 For example, dispositions that are conducive to peace and opposed toviolent conflict are virtues of sustainability, since warfare and violent conflictcompromise the availability of basic environmental goods. They often involvethe destruction of wilderness, wildlife and agricultural lands, as well as agricul-tural contamination of air and water. They disrupt food production even whenthe land is not spoiled, dislocate people from land that they know how tosteward, and creates refugees who must degrade the environment in order tosurvive.26 Dispositions that are conducive to social stability are not onlyenvironmentally justified and environmentally productive, they can also beenvironmentally responsive. Growing sources of international and intranationaltensions are scarce environmental resources27 and environmental refugees.28

So not only are peace and social stability good for the environment, environ-mental sustainability is conducive to peace and social stability,29 and thisconduciveness justifies dispositions that tend to maintain sufficient levels ofavailable environment goods such that conflict and instability are not fos-tered.30

B. KNOWLEDGE, ENJOYMENT, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: VIRTUES OF

COMMUNION WITH NATURE

The environment provides not only basic goods, but also aesthetic goods,recreational goods, and a location to exercise and develop physically, intellec-

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particular natural entities. Many natural objects, areas, and events have cultural, historical, orreligious significance within a community. Respecting that status can be important to maintain-ing the integrity and well-functioning of the community or advancing its worthwhile projects. Soenvironmental virtue will include dispositions of concern and care for environmental entities thatare sacred sites, components of a culture’s history, or vital to a community’s way of life.

31 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Art,” in Brooks Atkinson, ed., The Essential Writings of RalphWaldo Emerson (New York: Modern Library, 2000), p. 278.

32 The Sense of Wonder (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 42–43.33 Kathleen Dean Moore, “The Truth of the Barnacles: Rachel Carson and the Moral

Significance of Wonder,” Environmental Ethics 27 (2005): 265–77.34 Carson, The Sense of Wonder, p. 88.

tually, morally, and spiritually. That the environment provides these goods andopportunities straightforwardly justifies dispositions to conserve and, whenappropriate, preserve them. It also justifies cultivating virtues of communionwith nature or character traits that allow one to enjoy and take advantage ofthem. An individual who is unable to appreciate the beauty of the sunset or thecall of a songbird literally misses out on the experience—“Though we travelthe world over to find the beautiful, we must carry it with us, or we find itnot31—and although the natural environment provides the opportunity forintellectual challenge and reward, those benefits come only to those who aredisposed first to wonder and then to try to understand. For these reasons, amongothers, Rachel Carson casts wonder as a preeminent environmental virtue:

It is our misfortune that for most of us that clear-eyed vision, that true instinctfor what is beautiful and awe-inspiring, is dimmed and even lost before we reachadulthood. If I had influence with the good fairy who is supposed to preside overthe christening of all children I should ask that her gift to each child in the worldbe a sense of wonder so indestructible that it would last throughout life, as anunfailing antidote against the boredom and disenchantments of later years, thesterile preoccupation with things that are artificial, and alienation from thesources of our strength.32

The benefits of wonder to its possessor are many: challenge, engagement,exhilaration, joy, and satisfaction. So too, Carson believes, are the benefits ofwonder for the natural world, since it is a gateway to love, gratitude, apprecia-tion, and care for that which is found wonderful.33 Wonder is thus environmen-tally justified, environmental responsive, and environmentally productive.

Nature also provides opportunities for renewal of energy and spirit. “Thereis something infinitely healing in the repeated refrains of nature,” writesCarson. “Those who dwell among the beauties and mysteries of the earth arenever alone or weary of life. Whatever the vexations or concerns of theirpersonal lives, their thoughts can find paths that lead to inner contentment andto renewed excitement in living.”34 But, once again, these benefits are notavailable to everyone. A person must be willing to put forth the effort required,if only to go outdoors and pay attention, to cultivate genuine engagement with

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35 John Muir, Our National Parks (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1901), p. 56.36 John Muir, The Yosemite (New York: Century Co., 1912), p. 256.37 For social, economic and environmental reasons, opportunities for cultivating these charac-

ter traits and types of relationships are not equally distributed. As discussed below, among theenvironmental virtues are dispositions conducive to remedying those inequalities and promotingjust distribution of environmental goods and opportunities.

38 Philip Cafaro, Thoreau’s Living Ethics: Walden and the Pursuit of Virtue (Athens: Universityof Georgia Press, 2004), pp. 162–64.

39 A pertinent issue not addressed here is how to encourage the development of these attitudesand dispositions. Many of the thinkers discussed above suggest that spending time and beingactive in nature is an effective and enjoyable way. Carson (The Sense of Wonder), Leopold (ASand County Almanac), and Thoreau (Walden) each offer a variation on this theme. There is alsoa growing social science literature on the development (and non-development) of ecologicalawareness and values. See, for example, Peter H. Kahn, Jr., The Human Relationship with Nature:Development and Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999) and Peter H. Kahn, Jr. and Stephen R.Kellert, eds., Children and Nature: Psychological, Sociocultural, and Evolutionary Investiga-tions (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).

and openness towards nature. If you are receptive, then, John Muir exhorts,“Climb the mountains and get their good tidings. Nature’s peace will flow intoyou as sunshine flows into trees. The winds will blow their own freshness intoyou, and the storms their energy, while cares will drop off like autumnleaves.”35 After all, “Everybody needs beauty as well as bread, places to playin and pray in, where nature may heal and give strength to body and soul.”36

Communion with nature may not be as ecstatic for everyone as it was for Muir.But for those who are open to it, nature can be a source of nurturing, renewal,knowledge, and joy.37

Each of these varieties of enrichment requires engagement with the naturalenvironment, albeit with different forms of intimacy, duration, familiarity,faculty and investment. They indicate the bounty of opportunity, whichextends well beyond what has been discussed, for meaningful and beneficialrelationships with the land and its denizens. The point is not that nature aloneprovides these sorts of goods. Meaningfulness, joy, recreation and beauty canbe found in the interpersonal and artificial. The point is that they are goods, andthat nature and natural entities often enable a rich and unique form or realiza-tion of them.38 To the extent that our interactions and relationship with naturecan be pleasurable and beneficial for us, we have reason to be disposed topreserve the opportunities for them and to open ourselves up to them.39

Moreover, as Carson emphasizes, these personal benefits are attached toecological ones, since those who are familiar with the land tend to care for itand are less likely than others to exploit and degrade it. The implication of theseaspects of the human-nature relationship is not that we ought to tend to natureand natural entities with the idea that doing so will benefit us, and that awelcome by-product of doing so is that it is also good for the biotic community.In many cases we must care for them for their own sake for the benefits to

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40 John O’Neill, Ecology, Policy, and Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World(Oxford: Routledge, 1993), pp. 24–25.

41 Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton UniversityPress, 1986); Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: New York Review, 1975); Bill Shaw,“A Virtue Ethics Approach to Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic,” Environmental Ethics 19 (1997): 53–67; Jason Kawall, “Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue,” Environmental Ethics25 (2003): 339–58.

accrue, in the same way that the full benefits of friendship can be realized onlyupon sincere concern for the welfare of the other.40

C. HUMAN-INDEPENDENT ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES:VIRTUES OF RESPECT FOR NATURE

I have not defended here any human-independent environmental values orargued that any environmental entities have worth independent from humanflourishing. However, whatever such values or goods there might be, the teleologi-cal pluralism thesis can accommodate them, since it allows for agent-indepen-dent and human-independent ends to inform the substantive content of thevirtues. If there are such values, environmental virtue would include disposi-tions to appropriately acknowledge and respond to them, as well as disposi-tions that are productive and justified by them. Moreover, these values need notbe of one kind. The teleological pluralism thesis can incorporate a plurality ofends based on, for example, the inherent worth of individual organisms or environ-mental collectives, the intrinsic value of wild nature, or aesthetic values in nature.Among the virtues of respect for nature that have been defended on the basisof such values are compassion, reverence, considerateness, ecological sensi-tivity, and restitutive justice.41

This theory of environmental virtue is thus nonanthropocentric in severalrespects. It does not imply that only humans have inherent worth or intrinsicvalue. It does not imply that the value of all nonhuman entities is derived fromthe value of human beings. It does not imply that the value of all nonhumanentities is dependent upon their being valued by human beings. It does notimply that the only demands of the world upon human moral agents are theirown flourishing and the flourishing of other humans. It does not locate humansin a special, privileged place within nature (or outside of nature). It does notattribute to individuals special moral standing merely on the basis of theirbeing members of the species Homo sapiens. In these ways the theory avoidswhat many environmental ethicists find objectionable about some forms ofanthropocentrism.

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D. PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AND VALUES: VIRTUES OF

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND VIRTUES OF ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP

Some character traits are virtues because they are conducive to achieving nearlyany worthwhile end (e.g., creativity, courage, self-control, cooperativeness, andperseverance). Other traits are particularly important in the context of environ-mental advocacy and activism. Because of the regulatory, legal, social, politi-cal, cultural and economic dimension of many environmental issues, environ-mental gains are rarely achieved quickly or easily. Those who are pessimistic,apathetic, complacent, or easily frustrated, discouraged or distracted are notlikely to be successful. In many cases, securing environmental goods is neverfully won, since zoning laws, wilderness protections, and pollution regulations,for example, can always be changed, and individuals can slip easily into consump-tive or otherwise environmentally degradative practices or lifestyles. Moreover,those who wish to protect basic environmental goods for themselves and theircommunities must be alert for all manner of possible threats, since they are lostwhether they are made unavailable through ruin (e.g., chemical contamination ofpublic water resources), removal (e.g., water privatization and bulk water sales),or frivolous use (e.g., watering golf courses in the desert). Virtues such ascommitment, discipline, attentiveness, discernment, and fortitude are, there-fore, crucial to efforts to achieve and maintain protection of environmentalgoods and values. It can be easy to overlook these environmentally justifiedand environmentally productive virtues of environmental activism by focusing

Environmental Virtue:Environmentally Responsive, Environmentally Justified, Environmentally Productive

Virtues ofSustainability

Virtues ofCommunionwith Nature

Virtues of Respectfor Nature

Virtues ofEnvironmental

Activism

Virtues ofEnvironmental

Stewardship

temperance wonder reverence diligence benevolence

frugality openness compassion cooperativeness loyalty

far-sightedness appreciation restitutive justice commitment justice

attunement attentiveness considerateness optimism honesty

humility love ecological sensitivity creativity diligence

etc. etc. etc. etc. etc.

TABLE 1

A TYPOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE

NOTE: This table organizes the typology of environmental virtue developed in this article.Environmental virtue includes environmentally responsive virtues, environmentally justifiedvirtues and environmentally productive virtues. Varieties of environmental virtue are distin-guished by different considerations that make character traits environmental virtues. A particularenvironmental virtue need not be exclusive to one variety.

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on character traits that are operative in the context of wilderness or natureexperiences. But a loving, caring, compassionate, wondering, humble, open,receptive person lacks environmental virtues if he or she is not also engaged,competent and effective in achieving environmental ends.

There are also character traits that are particularly important for thosepeople, such as regulators, conservation biologists or leaders in environmentalorganizations, who by position or avocation are specially occupied, responsible,qualified or empowered to maintain environmental goods and values. Thesevirtues of environmental stewardship involve dispositions to appreciate thefull range of environmental values and ways in which the environment functionsas a public good, as well as dispositions to maintain them, appropriately protector conserve them, and justly distribute them. Among the virtues of environ-mental stewardship are benevolence, diligence, trustworthiness, justice, loy-alty, and honesty.42

IV. CONCLUSION

I have defended an account of what makes a character trait an environmentalvirtue that can be used to specify the dispositions constitutive of environmentalvirtues. I have also developed a typology of environmental virtue that empha-sizes the many considerations relevant to those specifications. I have not madeany claims regarding how a theory of environmental virtue fits within theoverall structure of an environmental ethic that includes also a theory of rightaction. The issue of what makes a character trait an environmental virtue isdifferent from the issue of what role environmental virtue should play in acomplete environmental ethic. This article has focused exclusively on theformer.

42 Jennifer Welchman, “The Virtues of Stewardship,” Environmental Ethics 21 (1999): 411–23 and “Stewardship: Olmsted, Character, and Environmentalism,” International Society ofEnvironmental Ethics Group Meeting, American Philosophical Association Eastern DivisionMeeting, New York, December 2005.

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