Accommodating Islam

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International Relations and Islam


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International Relations and Islam:

Diverse Perspectives

Edited by

Nassef Manabilang Adiong


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International Relations and Islam: Diverse Perspectives,

Edited by Nassef Manabilang Adiong

This book first published 2013

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright 2013 by Nassef Manabilang Adiong and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or

otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-4438-4896-4, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4896-1


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures and Tables ........................................................................ vii

Contributors ............................................................................................... ix

Introduction ................................................................................................ 1

International Relations and IslamNassef Manabilang Adiong

Chapter One ................................................................................................ 9

Veil: Meaning and Failure of a Political SymbolJessica L. Daniels

Chapter Two ............................................................................................. 39

Turkey: Where East and West Meet

Didem Doanylmaz

Chapter Three ........................................................................................... 59

Islam and Democracy: Arab Spring and the Turkish ExperienceGkhan Duman

Chapter Four ............................................................................................. 73

Who is an Islamic Feminist and What Does He Look Like?Alessandra L. Gonzlez

Chapter Five ............................................................................................. 91

Ahmet Davutolu: Role as an Islamic Scholar Shaping

Turkeys Foreign Policytar Gzaydn

Chapter Six ............................................................................................. 111

Islamic Identity Politics and European PolityAri Varon


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Table of Contentsvi

Chapter Seven ......................................................................................... 139

Accommodating Islam into IR: The Case on Nation-State

Nassef Manabilang Adiong

Index ....................................................................................................... 145


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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

NB. All figures and tables are from Chapter Four authored by

Dr. Alessandra L. Gonzlez

Figure 4-1 Islam is a Source of Motivation for me to Fight for

Womens Rights (by Gender)

Figure 4-2 I Consider Myself a Feminist (by Gender)

Table 4-1 Male Islamic Feminist Descriptive Statistics

Table 4-2 Binary Logistic Regression of Feminist ID on

Demographics, Religiosity Measures, and ReligiousSocialization Variables (by Gender)

Table 4-3 Principle Components Factor Analysis of Social and

Political Attitudes by Gender (Varimax Rotation)


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CONTRIBUTORS

Jessica L. Daniels holds a Masters Degree in

Historical Studies and a Bachelors Degree in Social

Inquiry, both earned at The New School of Social

Research in New York. Her research has been

primarily focused on The Middle East and Iran pre-

revolution in particular. In June of 2012, Jessica

relocated to Boston and hopes to find a careerwithin International Relations. For now, she is

writing, creating websites and teaching yoga.

Jessica is available to be contacted at

.

Didem Doanylmaz is currently a PhD candidatein Historical Societies at Rovira I Virgili University

in Tarragona, Spain. She is also one of the projectresearchers in UNESCO Chair of Intercultural

Dialogue in the Mediterranean. She completed her

Masters degree in the same university in the

department of Mediterranean Cultural Studies,

while her Bachelors degree was from Mimar SinanFine Arts University in Istanbul in the department

of Statistics. Her main research interests are

interrelationships between state and religion,

laicism, secularism, and religious identity. She is interested in the complexrelations between Islam and laicism concentrating on the history of

Turkey. In addition, she focuses on Alevism, its history and a sociologicalapproach to Alevi identity. You may contact her at

.


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Contributorsx

Gkhan Duman is currently a PhD student in

historical societies, land and heritage at the University

of Rovira i Virgili in Tarragona, Spain. He is alsoone of the project researchers in UNESCO Chair ofIntercultural Dialogue in the Mediterranean. He

completed his Masters degree in Mediterranean

Cultural Studies at the same university, while his

Bachelors degree in Political Science and

Administration (French language as the medium of

instruction) was from Marmara University. The

Mediterranean is his region of specialization, with research interests in

nationalism, minorities, terrorism, Middle East, and Turkish foreign

policy. He can be reached at .

Alessandra L. Gonzlezis a post-doctoral research associate at John Jay

College, City University of New York, and a non-resident research fellow

at the Institute for the Studies of Religion at Baylor University in central

Texas. She is the principal investigator of the Islamic Social Attitudes

Survey Project (ISAS), a study in conjunction with Baylors Institute for

the Studies of Religion (ISR) on Islamic Religiosity and Social Attitudes,

including Womens Rights Attitudes in the Arab Gulf Region. She haspublications in Womens Encounter with Globalization (Frontpage

Publications), the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, the Annual

Review of the Sociology of Religion, and an op-ed on Islamic Feminism

in theDallas Morning News. She has presented her research at the Center

for the Study of Islam and Democracys Conference on The Rights of

Women in Islam, the American Council for the Study of Islamic

Societies, the Dialogue of Civilizations Conference hosted by the Institute

for Interfaith Dialogue in Houston, the Gulf Research Conference at the

University of Exeter, and various other academic settings. Her most recentbook manuscript on Islamic Feminism in Kuwait is expected for

publication this year. Dr. Gonzlezs email address is

.


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International Relations and Islam: Diverse Perspectives xi

tar Gzaydnis a professor of law and politics atDouUniversity, Istanbul. She received her MCJ

(Master of Comparative Jurisprudence) at NewYork University, School of Law, in 1987; and herPh.D. at stanbul University. Her publicationsinclude Regulating Religion in Turkey, University

of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2013 (forthcoming);

Diyanet leri Bakanl, in John L. Esposito(ed): Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Oxford

University Press, February 2009; The Fethullah

Glen Movement and Politics in Turkey: a chance

for Democratization or a Trojan Horse?, Democratization, vol. 16 no. 6

(December 2009), 1214-1236; Religion, Politics and the Politics of

Religion in Turkey, in Dietrich Jung & Catharina Raudvere (ed.),

Religion, Politics and Turkeys EU Accession, Palgrave-Macmillan,September 2008, 159-176; Diyanet and Politics, The Muslim World,

vol. 98, no. 2/3 (April/July 2008) 216-227; Turkey: A Womens

History, in Bonnie G. Smith (ed): The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Women

in World History, v.4, Oxford University Press, 2008, 255-258; Adding

Injury to Injury, in Evil, Law and the State: Issues in State Power and

Violence, ed. John Parry, Rodopi Press, 59-69, Amsterdam/New York,

2006 (ISBN:90-420-1748-1). You may contact Prof. Gzaydn at.

Ari Varon holds a Ph.D. in political

science in a joint program at Sciences Po,

France and Tel Aviv University, Israel. He

focuses his research on the developing

contemporary European Islamic identity. Ari

analyses the internal debate of Muslimintellectuals in Europe as they integrate, or

not, European and Islamic values when

defining religion-state relations, as well as

the effects on political mobilization and social integration. He has

presented his research at conferences and universities throughout Europe

and the United States. Ari can be reached at .


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Contributorsxii

Nassef Manabilang Adiongis the founder

of the IR-IS Research Cohort, an online

community interested in advancingcomparative research between InternationalRelations and Islam. His research interests

include theories of International Relations

and their major debates and contemporary

discourses, conceptualizations of and

debates about Nation-State and

Civilization phenomena in IR and Islam, and relations between religion

and politics concentrating on Political Islam. He is the author of

numerous articles, including Nation-State in IR and Islam in theJournal

of Islamic State Practice in International Law, The U.S. and Israel

Securitization of Irans Nuclear Energy in The Quarterly Journal of

Political Studies of Islamic World, The Palestinian Refugee Question: AConstitutive Constructivist Interpretation inAlternatives: Turkish Journal

of International Relations, Ideology that Spawns Islamist Militancy in

Frank Shantys Counterterrorism: From the Cold War to the War on

Terror, and encyclopaedic entries such as civilization, nation, nation-state,

Turkey, International Relations, nationalism, Qatar, and Suez Canal for

various publishers including ABC-CLIO, SAGE Publications, Inc., Oxford

University Press, and Wiley-Blackwell. He can be contacted via hiswebsite at .


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INTRODUCTION

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ISLAM

NASSEF MANABILANG ADIONG

This edited book is a follow up of a two-part panel proposal for the2011 Middle East Studies Association annual meeting. The authors whosubmitted their articles were the participants of the proposed panels. Mygoal was to present and put forward the idea of finding a middle way

between two bodies of knowledge which were conceived from twodifferent hemispheres of the world. International Relations (IR), a socialscience discipline conceived in the UK and the US (comprising the West),and Islam or Islamic Studies which was conceived in the Arab world anddeveloped in Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia and many non-Arab countries (comprising the East).

If scholars and members of the English School of InternationalRelations were able to associate and converge their thoughts onconceptualizing International Relations with Christianity (of course themajority of them are Christians and so Western Europe is), then it is a

precedent and an indication that along the strand of the Abrahamic Faiths,Islam is putatively feasible and probable to understand and interpretInternational Relations (IR) and vice versa. Though the danger of this ideamay suggests a myriad adherence to two extreme poles of risky

paradigms: (1) those IR scholars who totally ignore Islamic concepts, and

(2) those Islamic scholars (ulama and Islamicists) who aim for theIslamization of knowledge. This is a matter of how we are going to findtangency or via media between Islam and IR without committingsubmission to those extreme poles.

The proposed idea is on the study of relations between InternationalRelations and Islam, which primarily presents the title of this edition,International Relations and Islam: Diverse Perspectives. This wasinitially conceptualized with the aim of looking at their conceived

perceptions side by side; how Islam is interpreted by IR scholars, and vice

versa. It has been the proponents quest to feasibly and scholarly presentIslam as non-alien in the Western discourse of the IR field.


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Introduction2

The aims of this initial initiative are to show juxtaposed positions ofmutual perceptions or diverse perspectives between Islam and IR based on

conceived notions of contested conceptions, to eliminate deplorable andpejorative (mis)conceptions of IR scholars towards Islam and vice versa,and to add Islam to the epitome of global discourse of internationalrelations as a major causal factor that affects the behaviours of actors(states, sub-state system, individuals, international and regional organizations,and multinational corporations) in the international community, particularlythose who have an interest in and peculiar relations to the Muslim world.The process of constructing this initiative involves selecting perspectivesand categories to bring to bear on the research idea.

Contemplating the Idea of an Islamic IR

The title alone of this book will surely cause havoc in the Westernacademia of IR, particularly those who were trained in an American IRschool. European IR schools are somewhat more pluralistic in terms ofhow they view IR, as compared to their American counterparts. Thisinitiative (an edited book project) is not an all-knowing term project, butit is delimited by an interrogative descriptive structure of explanation. Itwill be about various perspectives and cases on the complex relations ofIslam and IR; how both conceptions perceive each other; its repercussionson implicit and explicit notions of human and society; and whether thereare mutual or reciprocal relations or even relative relatedness, or in short,interrelationships constructed.

But this question is apparently not the primal concern of IR; it may bemore significant to sociology, psychology, theology and political science.However, we cannot deny IRs multidisciplinary approach as an academicdiscipline. For many years since the interwar (interbellum) period, a bulkof IR scholars research work has been dealing with statecraft, war andconflict studies, state-to-state relations, and the international system,

paying little attention to human affairs, human-to-human, or human-to-society relations concomitant with the roles of culture, religion, language,and other determining given identities. Only then, at the post-Cold War

period, were these matters given importance, of course, ignited by theconstructivist project in the US.

Looking for an Intellectual Patronage

In the first year of my graduate studies, I did some little research on thefaculty list of the IR department and noted those who may help me in this


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International Relations and Islam 3

endeavour. I initially talked to the chairwoman during the registrationperiod and she told me that she did not know if my proposed thesis (this

was done verbally not the formal process of submitting a thesis proposal)was feasible enough because, in her view, Is there a need to formulate aninternational relations theory based on religious perspective? If this is so,then there should be Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, and Jewish conception(s)of IR. I replied that this is not the point; it is as if you are saying thatIslam is similar or identical to other religions or ideologies.

Further, I lamented, Why can Western scholars, particularly thepioneers of the English School of IR, associate their thoughts withChristianity? Was this because of the Peace of Westphalias resolutions todisputes between Catholics and Protestants, later leading to theestablishment of sovereign nation-states, whereby sovereignty has been aword so used (rehashed) for research by IR scholars which resulted ingrand concepts like anarchy, self-help system, balance of power, nationalinterests, power, and complex interdependence, among others? Thoughthis is not to mean that when the notion of sovereignty emerged, the grandconcepts that I mentioned immediately were conceived. Simple causationhere is not enough, but a complex method of correlation is the appropriatestructure of explanation.

Another professor just shrugged me off and answered that my proposal

was too ambitious (period). In my mind, there is no ambitious researchproposal; it is only those who have concluded their research and failed todefend their work that make it ambitious. A few other IR professorsresponded to my inquiry that they could not help me in my research work

because, simply, they are not experts on Islam, but instead, gave me linksand other important resources salient to my research. However, when Iapproached a certain professor (we had an interesting discussion thatlasted an hour or so), it gave me hope and widened my thoughts to many

possibilities.

First, he was asking me several questions regarding what was on mymind. He talked about vehemently avoiding two extreme poles which Idiscussed in the beginning. I asked: Can we find a via media or a middleway from these two ends of a spectrum? because I do not want to patternmy research in a pendulum-style way, wherein I might become tooadherent to one or other of the extreme poles. And he answered that it is

possible if we can rework (adjust) its ontological propositions and find ordiscover appropriate epistemology. The thing that I can think of is to use amethod that is immune and has defensive mechanisms in avoiding or is

capable of avoiding these extreme poles.


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Introduction4

But for now I will focus first on asking questions, observing thephenomena, and gathering a plethoric survey of literature. Secondly, he

suggested possible research undertakings, like looking into the works ofEdward Said, Mohammed Arkoun, Giorgio Shani, al-Zuhili, and he gaveme Sabets book to make some reports. Though I criticized Sabets bookat first, suddenly I was overwhelmed by the arguments he presented in hisconclusion. He presented a conundrum style of inquiry (like puzzlesdesigned to test lateral thinking) and basically in those puzzles you canfind answers. And lastly, he humbly suggested that perhaps I might altermy research inquiry; instead of developing an Islamic theory of IR, whynot divert my attention to postcolonial studies, because (in his words) it isappropriate and plausible.

International Relations and Islam, Strange Bedfellows

International Relations and Islam, two intricate terminologies; but howcan I make them tangent (meeting along the same line or point)? This isnot to sound like an orientalist, projecting the incompatibility enterprisethus you cannot find harmony; or manipulating the study based onupbringing or normative biases, e.g. using Western culture as a point ofreference and making it superior to oriental culture. The orientalist hasdone such a great deal to make Islam incompatible, or worse, hostile toWestern values, ideas, norms and traditions, declaring and pronouncingIslams incompatibility with democracy (hinting at Western democratic

peace theory that democratic countries or democracies do not go to warwith one another, though this argument can also be associated withopposed totalitarian governments), human rights, particularly of womenand gay rights, and international law, etc.

How can we advance our scholarship if we already have a preconceivedperception, notion, impression and bias against Islam and its adherents, i.e.Muslims? Why did most IR scholars write that the area studies of theMiddle East in the US failed miserably? According to them, experts ofMiddle Eastern studies in America failed to predict the war in Afghanistanand Iraq; failed to warn the West about the rise of radical or fundamentalIslamic revivalist movements; failed to suggest and give guidelines for

policy making procedures or to their foreign policy that would haveprevented wars or mitigated hostilities or tensions between the West withthe Muslim world.

I would argue that the reasons above were not the causes that made

Middle Eastern studies vulnerable. There is a remarkable preconceivedperception that Middle Eastern experts were unimportant in policy


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making, and moreover, most of them were neoconservatives withattached Israeli propaganda on their belt, e.g., Daniel Pipes (director of

the Middle East Forum and Taube), Fouad Ajami (Harvard CIA/NadavSafran Chair on Middle East Politics), Mark Steyn (a self-proclaimedexpert on Muslim culture), Ibn Warraq (founder of the Institute for theSecularisation of Islamic Society), among others.

Other reasons were my following assumptions or hunches: (1) youcannot penetrate the governments circle of advisers to the president, theCongress, and the Judiciary if your views are pro-Islamic world, (2) youcannot survive academia in the US if you are straightforwardly criticizingIsrael, of course with an exception of being established with the security oftenure, e.g. Edward Said and Noam Chomsky, and (3) you cannot be sooutwardly visible and outspoken in the US in your rants against its foreign

policy towards the Middle East and Israel. Anti-Israel has become ataboo in the public and academic spheres of the US.

Even Edward Said experienced the orientalist backlash. It was rightafter the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, many reports were pointing outthat the suspects were of Middle Eastern origin. Saids office was

bombarded with calls and emails from the media who wanted to know hisopinion regarding the matter while he was in Canada giving lectures. Saidthought that the reason they were calling him was because he was

apparently from the Middle East; he was a Christian Palestinian. Little didthey know that the suspect(s) was/were home-grown white Americancitizen(s).

How can we avoid, mitigate, and solve this orientalist enterprise? Isuggest that Muslim countries or even non-Muslim countries whosympathized with the goals of Muslim countries can create a multilateralagreement condemning anti-Muslim acts. Muslim countries can invest inthe international media to establish a worldwide News company vis--visBBC or CNN. Invest more in popular culture by creating movies, TV

series, documentaries, concerts, and other tools propagating orgerminating informative means that would directly hit or influence peopleabout the stories in the Muslim world. Muslim countries, particularly theArab world, can extensively invest in international education by fundingresearches about Islam, the Middle East, and Muslims around the worldwithout political strings attached to them. However, this all changed afterthe events of 9/11.

Moving on, we should intensively and rigorously look into theetymology of International Relations and Islam. If we talk about Islam, are

we referring to the religious aspects of it or to political Islam? Are wespeaking of Islam as a total way of life that transcends its religious status?


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Introduction6

How will Islam provide a structure of explanation in interpretinginternational relations theory? Is IR embedded within the realms of Islam

naturally or constructively? IR scholars see Islam as the Other, whilemost of the Islamic scholars interpret IR as alien. I think this is because ofthe dogmas or fatwas imposed by the Hanafi school of law, whichdelineated Muslims from non-Muslims by identifying two abodes: theabode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) and the abode of war (Dar al-Harb).Sometimes most of the early Muslim jurists relegated the abode of war asthe abode of unbelievers (Dar al-Kufr).

We should be careful in contextualizing these terms and applying themto the present. During the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim jurists placed athird abode which is at the middle or between the first two abodes: theabode of covenant (Dar al-Ahd). It refers to non-Muslim governmentswhich have a peaceful relationship (through binding agreements ortreaties) with Muslim governments that prioritize protection and securityof Muslims land and property. The abode of Islam does not only refer toMuslim nations or states, it also refers to Muslims practicing their faith innon-Muslim countries. The concept of ijtihad, or making someindependent interpretation for legal decisions, had greatly impacted Islam.Since the inception of the four schools of Islamic laws and jurisprudencewithin the strand of the Sunni tradition, the Hanafi, Maliki, ShafiI, and

Hanbali have developed Islam (on a positive note) as more colourful andevolving.

But, on the other hand, this has weakened Islam because of theirdifferent legal interpretations concerning the hadith (sayings of ProphetMuhammad), and sometimes they no longer refer to the source of Islam,the Holy Quran. They made conflicting and contradicting fatwa (bindingor nonbinding) and legal decisions implemented under Shariah law, acombination of the Holy Quran and Sunnah (practices of ProphetMuhammad). But how will this affect finding a convergence with

International Relations? Declaring and imposing different interpretationsof Islam by Muslim jurists themselves made it possible for other Muslim

jurists in other parts of the world, e.g. in China, Malaysia, Indonesia,Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, etc., to give their own interpretations,sometimes basing them on their own culture to express appropriateness orapproximation, applicability, and adjustment.

IR scholars tended to perceive and study Islam in the prism of thesecularist epistemology of great Judeo-Christian tradition, i.e. the conceptof separation of Church and government. How is it possible to find a

middle ground between two ends of a spectrum? In Islam, religion andpolitics are in unison, in contrast with IR, where religion and politics are


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totally separated. It sounds like a melodramatic sentiment with theingredients of Rudyard Kiplings famous saying, Oh, East is East, and

West is West, and never the twain shall meet.

Finding a Remedy?

If we are going to look for some putative solution and avoidhindrances, whether ascribing Islam as an ideology or religion towardsinternational relations, then we might find answers. Katerina Dalacourastext on Political Islam and International Relations: A Dangerous Case ofMutual Neglect? in 2004 talks about the concept of globalization as a via

media framework. She argued that Islamist movements can be seen asexamples of non-state actors par excellence and their impact on theinternational system can be understood in their capacity to bypass the stateand establish direct relations with other societies. The problem I see hereis how she will be able to differentiate those movements that were state-driven with irredentist motivation from those with Islamicatecharacterizations. In the context of globalization, it is still debatable howMuslim societies are affected and of course how they respond or react toit.

The remedy I can think of is to construct or reconstruct ontologicalpropositions and find appropriate epistemology to decipher Islam in theschema or views of a specific or certain international relations theory;

put all possible ideas and concepts together and initially develop atheoretical or conceptual framework. It will guide me in determining whatthings or variables I should look for. Though I do not want to use the wordvariable because it is a scientific term, I do however see it as a usefulword for this initiative to denote cases supporting my claim or main idea.Consequently, most of what I have written here are inquiring ideas that

bedazzle my mind regarding Islam and IR.


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Introduction8

Chapters Presentations

Two various divisions are presented, the first one being generalperspectives from different backgrounds or cases: the veil, feminism, andEuropean polity. The second one is a specified case in Turkey, withvarious perspectives: significance of Turkey, its democratic experience,and the role of a scholar/practitioner.

Daniels take on the meaning and political symbol of the veil is tochallenge the Western stereotype that the Islamic veil is oppressive, andoffer new avenues of insight illustrating that the symbolism of theIranian revolution is relevant today. The article on Islamic feminismauthored by Gonzlez addresses the demographic profile of Islamicfeminists based on a pilot study of Kuwaiti college students. Varondiscusses the debates and discourses that are taking place in Europe ofwhether there can be various levels of integrating Islamic and European

principles into a Muslims daily life.Doanylmazs article tells the unique story of Turkeys international

relations. Duman deciphers the relations of Islam and democracy via theArab Spring and Turkish experience. And lastly, Gzaydns biographicalrepresentation of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, AhmetDavutolu, details his scholarship and its impact on Turkeys foreign

policy.The chapters were alphabetically arranged by the authors surname,

e.g. chapter 1 Daniels, chapter 2 Doanylmaz, chapter 3 Duman,etc. Please be advised that it is the sole discretion of the chapters authorregarding how s/he expresses his/her posited claims, arguments, and facts.However, for any erroneous grammatical or typographical words, phrasesor statements, the editor expresses full responsibility. Mea maxima culpa!


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CHAPTER ONE

VEIL:MEANING AND FAILUREOF A POLITICAL SYMBOL

JESSICA L.DANIELS

Abstract:In academia, as in the political realm, discourse divides the worldbetween two cultural poles: East and West, where historic Orientalistpositions reaffirm Western cultural superiority and Eastern inferiority.Nowhere is this more evident than in the pervasive practice of veilingamong Muslim women, which has stimulated a great deal of debate sincethe 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 symbolicallyrejected the Eurocentric ideology that one must conform to Western

stereotypes in order to follow Western models of change. The followingstudy first brings attention to the rise of Islam in political rhetoric, and theconflicting interests which it breeds. I end with a discussion of veiling,discussing relevant scholarly works. My foremost aim is to challenge theWestern stereotype that the Islamic veil is oppressive, and offer newavenues of insight illustrating that the symbolism of the Iranianrevolution is relevant today.

Key Words:Veil; Hijab; Niqab; Burqa; Orientalism, Iranian Revolution.

The political map of the Middle East was redrawn to a large extent byEuropean colonial powers in the first half of the twentieth century.Conventional wisdom assumed Middle Eastern regions and territorieswould adopt the European model of a nation-state through colonialtutelage, or at least, through contact with the West. Underlying this claimis the assumption that ideologies, such as modernism and nationalism, areEuropean in essence, as any attempt made by non-European nations toadopt these ideologies is an explicit attempt to copy the West. Thisdichotomy nonetheless leaves the Middle East in a bind: it is unable tomaintain the current state of affairs or to initiate change without invitingaccusations of harbouring colonialist aspirations. As historian ReinhardSchulze explains, it demands that the Islamic World be on principle


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Chapter One10

excluded from the history of modernities because it is bound to a religionwhich it has not traversed the politico-ideological progress that made

Europe into a historical idea.

1

Here, Schulze illustrates the complexdivide, while also drawing attention to the historical context ofsecularization, which engendered the modern world, and thus erased fromthe history of political entities that did not follow a similar trajectory.

The imperialist design that gave rise to the contemporary Middle Eastdirectly influenced the understanding of modernity in the region. Historieswritten on behalf of modernization theory produced a style of writing andthinking about the Middle East that became prevalent throughout theDeveloping World.2Edward Said illustrates this relationship in Covering

Islam. He warns that the history of the Wests efforts on behalf ofmodernization and development in the Middle East can never beunderstood unless it is noted how the policy itself produced a thought andhabit of seeing the region in a certain way, a way which increased the

political, emotional and strategic investment in the idea of modernization.3Engagement with the meaning of modernity became the primary meansthrough which imperialism impacted the Middle East.

Since to be modern meant to have a modern state, the early years of thetwentieth century saw the nation-state concept evolve into the ideologicaland political focus of the Islamic world. There is no doubt that the rise of

imperialism and creation of nation-states during the nineteenth centuryEurope dramatically impacted history; but it is false to presume thatsocieties that have not followed the same trajectory are less progressive.For instance, the majority of contemporary writers assume that ideologicalmovements that occurred in Europe were exclusively of European origin,whereas similar aspirations in other parts of the world are regarded asEuropean imports, and evidence for the superiority of Western thought.For this reason, revolutionary movements in the Middle East are oftendepicted as backward, regressive and undemocratic. As Edward Said puts

it, given the current state of academic studies of Islam, there is not toomuch to be found there by way of rectification generally, this hasdisqualified it to cover Islam in ways that might tell us more than we areotherwise aware of beneath the surface of Islamic societies.4The Islamicdoctrine can be seen as justifying capitalism, socialism, militancy,fatalism, ecumenism, exclusivity, or a tremendous lag between academic

1Reinhard Schulze,A Modern History of the Islamic World.p.2.2Formerly known as Third World.

3Edward Said. Covering Islam. (Vintage Books, 1997), p.3.4Ibid, iv.


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Veil: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol 11

descriptions that particular realities to be found in the Islamic worldbecomes apparent. In other words, scholarship on the Middle East tends to

be biased, causing an extremist or militant view.Many academic experts on Islam fail to admit the offensively politicalcontext of their work.5 The study of Islam is situated within a biasedcontext as many writers fail to present the objective truth in what they say,emphasizes Said. Objectivity is accustomed to inhere in learned discourseabout other societies, despite the long history of political, moral, andreligious concern felt in all societies, Western or Islamic, about the alien,the strange and different, he writes.6For this analysis, I will follow JoanWallach Scotts interpretation of discourse, which she finds to refer to areading, to the imposition of meaning on phenomena in the world.7While it is false to say that all discourse on Islam and the Middle East iscoloured by the political, economic and intellectual contexts in which it

begins, the majority of academic writing is devoid of regional perspectives.Prime among such misconceptions is the deployment of religious

terminology in contemporary ideologies in the Islamic world. Generallyspeaking, there is a consensus on Islam, which takes the form of makingit a scapegoat for everything we do not happen to like about the worldsnew political, social, and economic patterns. There is evidence within thediscourse of broad generalizations, without sufficient knowledge of the

region and culture. Accordingly, the radical acts of a few politicallymotivated Islamists (commonly referred to as fundamentalists) are adeclaration of the intent of the majority, and the actions of the few havecome to represent the voice of all Muslims. This notion of a fixed Muslimculture obscures the realities and complexities of the civilization at large.For example, in recent years Islamic Fundamentalism has been portrayedin Western media as a major world threat. The term fundamentalist hascome to imply a singular identity for the region and religion at large, whenit does not provide an accurate account of reality.8It is thus impossible to

approach the Islamic world without first disaggregating the history fromits historiography.

As such, it is important to begin with a discussion of this discourse,and the connection between power and knowledge in the modern world, asevidenced in the manifold linkages between academic writings on the

5Ibid, Ivii.6Ibid, Ivii.7 Joan Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

2007), p.7.8http://www.twf.org/News/Y1997/Fears.html.


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Chapter One12

Middle East and the formulation of foreign policy in the Western world.Studying this political discourse is best understood through specific

political and historical contexts in order to grasp the implications being putforth. In order to grasp the implications of the ideas being advanced it isimportant to look at the way in which ideas are expressed and implementedin an effort to highlight the local nature of the global conflict betweenIslam and the West. Consider, for example, the Iranian revolution of 1979,wherein Islam rendered itself a chief adversary to colonialism, andcompeted directly and explicitly with liberalism and socialism, rather thanwith Judaism or Christianity. In this instance, the discourse containingIslamic terms and symbols are not necessarily religious. Here, Islam is notcommunicating with other religions, but with a European political discourse.9

Scholarly Rhetoric

For the abovementioned reasons, the following analysis is primarilyfocused on Iran, as the Iranian example highlights the importance ofconsidering religious, political, and ideological principles. The case of Iranshows that, while it is surely inevitable that such styles of politics will befavourably and unfavourably compared, taking a one-size-fits-all approachto politics for such diverse cultures is not an effective approach. Theconsistent failure to introduce Western societal norms into the regionabundantly illustrates this point. Iran embodies both the essence of Islamiccomplaint against the West, while representing its unique culture separatefrom its neighbouring nations. Iran, for example, has its own language andis the only nation, aside from Iraq, that is predominantly Shiite.

Yet it is evident that Western misinterpretations of Islamic politicallanguage have had a number of effects on the historiography of the MiddleEast. Among the many misapprehensions that persisted in modernizationtheory was one that seemed to have a special pertinence to the Islamicworld, namely, that before the advent of the United States, Islam existedin a kind of timeless childhood, shielded from true development.10Schulze further emphasizes the tendency of scholars to undervalue changewithin the Islamic world. He criticizes views that argue that Islam is anauthoritarian, homogenizing structure that lacks basic citizenship rightsand freedom, and instead embodies a world in which human life does nothave the same value as it does in the West, in which freedom, democracy,

9Ibid, p.10.10Said 30.


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openness and creativity are alien.11Propagated by the media and withinacademia, the East/West dichotomy reinforces the negative stereotype

because the complicated West/East division enables simplistic equations tobe made. The separation evidently fuels and shapes European andAmerican political projects within and outside of the region which shapethe primarily Muslim Middle Eastern citizens, into an other to be fearedand separated from.

Of all the culturalist explanations that are invoked to explain thealterity of the Islamic world, none is more poignant and loaded than thestereotype of an oppressed Muslim woman. From apologists to detractors,the field of Middle East studies is obsessed with either disprovingallegations of Islamic misogyny, or confirming the validity of suchgeneralizations. In the absence of serious studies that aim at understandinghow Muslim women figure out their status within what is like all othersocieties a complicated social fabric, most of the current discourse either

bemoans the stigmatization of gender in Islamic law, or seeks to shieldwhat must be a helpless Muslim woman from being deployed as a pawnin the existential conflict between the West, and its imagined nemesis, theIslamic world. Brown women, we are told, do not need the white manto save them from brown men.12

This paper will address the political undercurrents of various aspects of

the discourse on the veil, which is used principally to highlight theoppression of women in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is a particularlyfecund site for exploring culturalist explanations of political events, notonly because it is at present considered the Wests single greatestchallenge, but also because it is quintessentially well-suited to the clash ofworldviews that dominate international relations today. Brought to powerin the aftermath of the twentieth centurys last great revolution, the Islamicgovernment in Iran offends not only Americas global hegemony but alsoattacks liberalism and socialism with equal zeal. It is a game-changer, and

its very existence undermines uncritical investigation. If the veil is seen asthe symbol of Islamic oppression, it thus binds religious difference,cultural and societal diversity, and varied political motives into one solidrepresentation that receives the most scrutiny. As Scott describes, the

11 Asef Bayat. Making Islam Democratic. (Stanford: Stanford University Press),2007, p.3.

12 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak? (Turia + Kant, 2000),p.287.


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Chapter One14

symbolism of the veil reduces differences of ethnicity, a culture thatstands in opposition to another singular entity.13

My analysis seeks to break the cycle of ridicule and present an outlookwhich is grounded in Iranian history, taking into account pluralities withinIslamic culture, and the nuanced political language of Islam, which isseeking to redress imperialist and domestically generated politicalinjustice. By focusing on Iran, I will show that one of the means throughwhich Middle Eastern political movements can create solidarity isembracing authentic cultural practices that are alien to the culture they areopposing, as well as using Islamic political symbolism to foster socialcohesion and nation-building among Muslims. To make sense of how therevolution in Iran still holds relevance in contemporary politics, I willshow how the political discourse created a community of identification forMuslims that might not have existed otherwise. The veil became a rallying

point, something to defend, which had symbolic value even for those whodid not wear it.

Section 1: Iran in Historical Context

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran sparked a shift in socialscholarship regarding the effects of the reinvigoration of Islam in theIranian state, as well as the relationship of Islamic values to the formationof modern nation states. Reza Shah Pahlavi became the leader of Iran afteroverthrowing the Qajar king in 1925, establishing the Pahlavi Dynasty(which ended with his son, Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was forced to leaveIran in 1979). Reza Shahs attempt to establish a modern Iran centred onthe idea of the nation-state as the central form of political organization.Characterized by centralized authority and military strength, the Shahs

plan was part of a general engagement with the meaning of modernity thatbecame the primary concern for Iran in the early years of the twentiethcentury. As the Iranian government consolidated its rule, much of the

propagated rhetoric regarding womens rights was contrary to the visionthe electorate.

The role of women within society was of considerable importance forthe modernizing aspirations of the Shah. Inspired by Kemal Ataturksdrastic reforms in Turkey, and impressed by his modernizing policies,Reza Shah encouraged the formation of a ladies centre. His mission in

13Joan Scott, The Politics of the Veil, p.17.


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building this was to prepare the grounds for unveiling women in 1936.Accompanying that were several changes made to personal status laws in

Iran, hitherto the domain of the Islamic sharia. Arzoo Osanloo explains,legal developments [under Reza Shahs rule] included the formalcodification of laws for the first time. Personal status laws, including lawson marriage, divorce, custody, guardianship, and inheritance, wereintegrated into the civil legal system and codified in increments during this

period.14 He instituted policies that affected womens lives within thepublic sphere (including laws on marriage, divorce, etc.) as well aswomens dress.

Further, the growing gap between socio-economic classes, caused bythe Mohammad Reza Shahs top down modernization policies, paved theway for growing opposition to his rule. As a result, many liberal andIslamic groups began to expand, as well as many Islamic groups callingfor a reversal of unveiling and reforms throughout the 1960s and 70s.15As

Nikki Keddie states, it became clear that unveiling was part of a classcultural division with modernized middle and upper classes wearingWestern styled clothes, and in popular bazaar class returning to allcovering chador, though without face veils.16There was thus an evidentdistance from those who benefited from Western influence and those whodid not.

Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the 1979 revolution, argued that therevolution would pave the way for an Islamic Republic, which in timewould lead to an Islamic society, adhering to the tenets of Islam. Khomeinisought to transform the educational and judicial systems and make themcompatible with Islam, thus demonstrating to the world true social justiceand true cultural, economic, and political independence. As such, womenwere encouraged to take up the chador to show that there has been arevolution of profound change in Iran distinct from any revolution that

previously occurred in the United States and Europe.

Beginning of the Pahlavi State

World War I ended with the growing influence of British and Russianmilitary and political nobles in Iran. The country did not have a standing

14Arzoo Osanloo, The Politics of Women's Rights in Iran(Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2009), p.25.15Nikki Keddie, Women in the Middle East(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 2006), 88.16Ibid.


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Chapter One16

army and, therefore, lacked the military power to resist their Europeanadversaries and to prevent the country from becoming a pawn between the

two superpowers.

17

Keddie describes the political climate of this time inModern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution: when war began, theIranian government declared neutrality, but Iran was strategically locatedand four powers used it as a battlefield. The Turks moved intoAzerbaijan18in the fall of 1914 after the Russians withdrew. The Germans

played on anti-British and anti-Russian sentiments.19 With Russianinfluence spreading in the northern part of the country, Reza Shahsuccessfully overthrew the standing Qajar monarch in 1921.20

The condition of the state under the rule of Ahmad Shah Qajar (r.1909-25), the last ruler of the dynasty, was weak and decentralized. TheIranian monarchys lack of initiative regarding reforms crucial to

preventing foreign intrusion led political interest groups to considerregime change. Among them were the Majlis the parliament, the lowerhouse of the Iranian government that came into power at the conclusion ofthe 1906-07 Constitutional Revolution; the ulama thereligious scholars;and the bazaris urban merchants involved in small scale production,

banking and trade. Though these political groups have continuouslyaligned together throughout history to prevent foreign intrusion andcorrupt government practices, this time they diverged on specific issues of

reform and the means of limiting Qajar power.21The coup dtat that eventually saw the appointment of Reza Pahlavi to

the throne marks a turning point in modern Iranian history. Reza Shahssuccession came at a time when international powers posed a significantthreat to the countrys territorial integrity. Because of the rise of Europeanimperialism in the Middle East at the conclusion of World War I, hisattempts at state building were favoured by political elites who saw astrong central government as the surest guarantee of Irans independence.If Iran was to withstand further European interference the government had

17Anasri notes: Ulama is the plural of m, a learned individual, more commonlyassociated with religious scholars, and generally utilized with reference to theclerical class; see Ali Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After(Longman, 2003).Majlis is literally translated as Assembly, or more commonlyas Parliament. Ibid, pp.ix, 12-13.18Azerbaijan is bounded by the Caspian Sea to the east, Iran to the south, Armeniato the west, Georgia to the northwest, and Russia to the north.19Nikki Keddie.Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution(New York: YaleUniversity Press, 2006), p.73.

20Anasri,Modern Iran since 1921,p.32.21Anasri,Modern Iran since 1921,p.13.


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to change, and the weak Qajar dynasty (1779-1925) to be deposed. Thus,the early years of Reza Pahlavis ruling were spent on a series of

opportunistic moves directed toward maintaining government control andgaining support of the political elites and intellectuals. The monarchsreliance on military force as the way to build a strong centralized state isone of the main defining characteristics of the of Pahlavi autocracy.

By 1923 Reza Shah was the prime minister and was pushing throughfundamental social and political reforms in the country. In Modern IranSince 1921, Ali Ansari draws attention to the work of M.R. Ghods whostates, In the early years of Reza Khans rise to power, he was seen as amodernizing reformer who could give Iran national unity and restore thecountrys pride and independence.22 There was initially no markedopposition to the reform measures by Reza Pahlavi, and the Maljisterminated Qajar rule.23 A month later the Majlis invested dynasticsovereignty in him.

Although the Shahs power was met with little opposition from theMajlisand political elites, the reforms initiated by the Shah were contraryto his promises, acting conversely with the orders of the ulama.24 Forexample, he established ten new ministries including Financial Affairs,Justice and Education. Anasri points out that the Shahs changes, includingthe registration of family names and the adoption of a new calendar, were

viewed by the ulamaas a break with the countrys traditional governmentand the reordering of society to a Western model.25The Shah also imposedthe draft as an instrument to state building. The Shahs relationship withthe ulama, the Majlis and the bazzaris was further severed with theinitiation of a universal conscription program. However, this program wasmet with opposition from the bazzaris who would be deprived oflabourers. As Anasri puts it, needless to say this enthusiasm for themilitary, it is primacy over all other organs of government, and the generaltrend towards the militarizing of society which is presaged did not bode

well civil-military relations in the Pahlavi era.26Therefore, in establishingan army aimed to centralize state power the government was met withopposition.

The armys grasp on civilian life and the lack of representativegovernment formed the basis for political opposition to Pahlavi rule to

22Ibid.23Schulze.A Modern History of the Islamic World,p.85.24Anasri,Modern Iran since 1921,p.38.

25Ibid, p.45.26Ibid, p.28.


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Chapter One18

come throughout the twentieth century. Schulze states, The new Shahdeliberately gave himself a military appearance, and the army itself

controlled vast realms of the bureaucracy and was in practice the executivebody of the various reforms.27The most profound change enacted by theShah was the elimination of the veil. On Jan 8, 1936 Reza Shah announcedthe law according which wearing chador was against the law, therebyofficially outlawing the veil. From that day, the police were ordered toforcibly remove the veil from women if necessary.28 This clasheddramatically with many of the religious and moral values of Iraniansociety. Moreover, an Islamic society was resistant to changing itsattitudes towards veiling because of the law. Consequently, policies suchas this led to the decline of Reza Shahs popular appeal. Laws requiringunveiling were later enforced by literally pulling the veil off womensheads.29

The Shahs regime remained absent of a political compromise that couldprotect a balance of power and simultaneously legitimize the regime. Theexistence of the government was based on strong militaristic rule, and hadnot succeeded in convoking a national congress that would depart from thetradition of the Majlis.30 Although Reza Pahlavis reforms wereundertaken to create a unified nation, incremental centralization was metwith increased resistance. As Evrand Abrahamian tells in Iran BetweenTwo Revolution, the Pahlavi state, in short, was strong inasmuch as it hadat its disposal powerful means of coercion. But it was weak in that it failedto cement its institutions of cohesion into the class structure.31Subsequently, Ansari notes that while the Shah sought to suppress thetraditional elites they were not and could not be eliminated.32The weakconnection between the monarch and the bureaucracy, along with his over-reliance on the military as the predominant instrument of governanceeventually created an authoritarian dictatorship in Iran. In other words,although the monarchy was preserved, the country lacked a representative

counterpart. The Allies deposed the Shah in 1941 as he displayedincreased affinity for the German bloc in the early days of the Second

27Schulze.A Modern History of the Islamic World,p.85.28http://www.fouman.com/history/Iranian_History_1936.html.29Nikki Keddie, Women in the Middle East(Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 2006), p.87.30Ibid, p.84.31 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions. (New York: Princeton

University Press 1982), p.149.32Ibid, p.44.


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World War.33In his stead, the Allies promoted his young son, MohammadReza Pahlavi to the throne (r. 1941-79).

The Young Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi

Reza Shahs detached and dictatorial style of government is seen as themain reason for why the Allies took control of Iran on August 15, 1941.The disposal of the Shah was not met with opposition because he was notable to maintain the loyalties of the three previously mentioned groups:bazaaris, ulama andMajlis. Schulze affirms that when Mohammad RezaPahlavi succeeded to the throne of Iranmajor landowners, businessmen

and constitutionalist ulama formed an energetic opposition to the imperialfamily, which was still dependent on the army.34Even though the newShah initially made efforts to reform the government, his image remainedtarnished, mainly as a result of the publics lingering distrust of hisfathers policies.

The period following the oil nationalization crisis marked a turningpoint in the development of the Iranian state. Throughout the Cold War,the Shah laid down the foundation for a centralized state. For the nextquarter of the century, the Shah consolidated his rule by suppressing theopposition, enlarging the army, and establishing a secret police. Keddiedescribes the Shah himself, who had earlier struck outsiders as anuncertain young man who had grown up fearing his harsh father, wasincreasingly prepared to engage in repressive and dictatorial acts.35 Incoming to power, the Shah initiated policies aimed at preventing anoppositionist movement like Mossadeqs from succeeding again.

In December 1953, the Iranian government restored diplomaticrelations with Britain, and the following year concluded a new oil programin the following year that reversed Mosaddeqs nationalization policy.From the 1950s onward, the Shah increasingly sought to expand statecontrol over the economic and social spheres. However, like his father, theShah did little to develop the political system and concentrated his reformson the armed forces, court patronage and state bureaucracy, which fosteredincreasing resistance to his dictatorial regime. The Shah attempted toconsolidate his power, strengthen his regime and institutionalize themonarchy by creating the Resurgence Party (1975).36 This move was

33Schulze,A Modern History of the Islamic World,p.85.34Ibid. p.141.

35Ibid, p.133.36Abrahamian,Iran Between Two Revolutions,p.442.


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Chapter One20

intended to create a single political party, which would serve as the onlychannel for political activity in the country. Abrahamian argues that the

overall goal of the Resurgence Party was to transform the somewhat oldfashioned military dictatorship into a totalitarian-style one-party state bymeans of mobilizing the public, monopolizing the links between theregime and the government, consolidating control over office employees,factory workers and the rural population, and the extension of state intotraditional bazaars.37The army was a critical focus for the Shahs efforts atmodernization; it allowed him to position himself above the state.

The authoritarian rule of the Shah prevented Iranian social groups fromparticipating in the Iranian government and also undermined the ulama.Ansari claims that the Shah pushed political Islam to the side-lines andrestricted religious festivals and other practices of public life, the judiciarywas entirely reconstructed, modern educated lawyers replaced traditional

judges, and French civil codes took the place of most Islamic laws.38ThePahlavi regime was continuously whittling away the ulamaspower andinfluence.39For example, the Shah cut government subsidies for the ulamaand secularized the education system.

In 1963 protests against the Shah gathered stream. Ansari writes,reformist intellectualshad been witness to an on-going struggle betweenthe dominance of the state-often personalized by an autocrat-and the rights

of the individual, with those rights inevitable becoming subjected to thewill of the autocrat.40 Those involved were met with repression (i.e.

jailing and torture) and the cooptation of oppositionists, which offeredgovernment jobs to individuals who resisted the government, contingenton an agreement preventing them from publicly opposing the regime.41It

became increasingly clear that an opposition movement could appeal tothe masses. In May 1964, a group of lawyers protested the rushed changesin the judicial system. Two months later they demanded an end to thespecial courts and strict encroachment in judiciary affairs by the executive

branch. By October, the protests turned directly against the regime.42Bythe end of 1977, numerous incidents of mysterious beatings and

bombings of oppositionist and protesters were attributed to the Shah.43

37Ibid, p.441.38Ibid.39Keddie,Modern Iran,p.333.40Ansari,Modern Iran Since 1921, p.251.41Keddie,Modern Iran,p.134.

42Ibid, p.216.43Ibid, p.217.


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Islam had emerged as the dominant representation of revolutionarythought in the early 1970s. Among the earliest was the Freedom

Movement, founded in 1961 and led by Mehdi Bazargan and AyatollahMahmud Talequani. Keddie argues that the movement intended to linkShiism to modern ideas.44The leaders altered the traditional interpretationof Shiism, deciding that true Shiism opposed not only despotism butalso capitalism, imperialism and conservative clericalism.45As suggested

by Keddie, parts of various opposition groups, predominantly middleclass, remnants of the National Front, students and workers, had ties tothe growing resistance who voiced their views and concerns in Islamicterms the religious opposition.46

Historians have made the case that the Shah underestimated thecountrys problems and overestimated his ability to solve them, eventuallyleading to the revolution of 1979.47For example, Keddie argues that theShah miscalculated the strength of the religious opposition, which would

be one of his most fatal missteps.48The revolutionary movement alignedwith the bazaaris,who also resisted the West and the spread of Westernways. Schulze posits that the critique of the West was no longerdefensive but offensive.49By using Islamic discourse in political rhetoric,he sought to make Persian society an object of its own history. In order forchange to occur, the Shahs injustice needed not only to be known but also

to be widespread. Schulze argues that the Islamic language used byreformers acquired radical forms in intellectual discussions in Iran, wherethe gap between a military dictatorship disguised as an empire on onehand, and a bourgeoisie society on the other, had steadily depended after1973.50

Throughout the 1970s, tension was personalized. On one side was theShah and his military, and on the other, Khomeini, the ulama and theMuslim community. Khomeini gained popularity as his refusal tonegotiate with the monarchy and his claim that the problems could be

solved by a return to Islam appealed to the masses. Other oppositionmovements lost momentum due to the uncompromising Khomeini in

44Ibid, p.220.45Ibid.46Ibid.47Ibid, p.135.48Ibid, p.225.

49Schulze,A Modern History of the Islamic World.p.222.50Ibid, p.222.


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Chapter One22

revolutionary circumstances.51 Keddie attributes Khomeinis success tohis remarkable familiarity with the political aspiration of the Iranian

populace, and not necessarily those of its elites.

52

At this juncture,Khomeini, who had been expelled to Iraq from France on October 6, 1978,called for the overthrow of the monarchy.53Even though he was in exile,his expulsion helped motivate the rebellion, and he was able to spreadmore rhetoric from outside the country than from inside.

From 1977 to 1978 Khomeinis popularity grew and his wordsdetermined revolutionary action. There were more demonstrations and anincreased number of protesters. After more attempts among urban nationaliststo reactivate the 1906 constitution and give the bourgeoisie a voice insociety, the Islamic opposition succeeded by the end of the year,exploiting the frustration of the population over the economy.54 BySeptember 1978, as a response to growing protests, the regime imposedmartial law. Irans military was placed in control of civil administrationand maintenance of the public peace. In the ensuing weeks, the army killedmore than 3,000 people.55 The protests grew into a popular rebellionagainst the regime.

As the symbol for revolutionary ideology, Islam had a vast mobilizingeffect in uniting the disparate elements of the Iranian opposition to theShah. Schulze explains, ideological thought or, the thought of Islam as

ideology, was essentially different from the classical religious experienceof the world. It aimed at the recognition of truisms and standards whichwere accepted as established indisputable principles of social development,which could respond to harsh societal conditions.56The Islamic discoursewas practical and not theoretical.57 Islam was no longer bound to theulama, but rather, Islamic ideology connected dispersed revolutionaryideologies. For intellectuals, ideas derived from the teaching of the Quranwere an affective force of unifying political action.

51Nikki Keddie,Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution.(New York: YaleUniversity Press, 2006),p.232.52Ibid, p.233.53Ibid, p.225.54Schulze,A Modern History of the Islamic World,p.224.55Ibid, p.224.

56Ibid, p.249.57Ansari,Modern Iran Since 1921,p.200.


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Secular Islamism

By the mid-1970s, the angered ulamaand their followers continuouslyreacted against the monarchys unpopular ideology and consolidation of

power. The ulama transmitted their ideological and political views to formthe essence of change that would reach its climax at the end of the 1970s.58It was in this context that Khomeini emerged as a leading member of theopposition, offering an ideological critique of the Pahlavi regime, anddrawing on his religious standing to mobilize popular support. Khomeinihad first entered the political life of Iran in the early 1960s, when he wassent into exile as a result of his sermons blaming the regime for itsunabashed espousal of Western values and its desire to sever Iran from itshistorical and cultural roots. His writings were by then widely available inIran through underground channels. Khomeini claimed it was the duty ofIslamic scholars to mobilize and communicate with the people. Since theShah had taken away the ulamas authority in the government, Khomeinisought to bridge the gap the Shah had created between the intellectuals andthe clergy. He viewed the clergy as the only part of society that did notgive way to foreign influence.59 As a collective authority, Islam lent avoice that could overcome other ideologies.60Islamic language acquiredradical forms in intellectual discussions in Iran, where the gap between

military dictatorship disguised an empire on one hand, and a bourgeoissociety on the other, had steadily depended after 1973, argues Schulze.61

Previously, the political elite had been divided, but Khomeini was ableto channel mass political action with a visibly uncompromising moralleadership.62Schulze claims that Islam contained the pivotal ideas of allWestern ideologies and in addition the solutions to their inherentcontradictions, which were due to their inadequacy, the different variantsof these ideologies were contained in Islam, which would neutralize themall.63Islam, therefore, was no longer bound to the ulamabut rather was

instituted to be the channel for liberation. This new interpretation of Islam,mainly supported by the intellectuals, overcame other revolutionary forms.

58Schulze,A Modern History of the Islamic World,p.221.59 Ruh Allah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, tr. & annotated Hamid Algar(Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), p.30.60Ibid.61Ibid.62 Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1994),p.274.63Schulze,A Modern History of the Islamic World.p.221.


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Chapter One24

Islamic language, therefore, served as the language for independence.64Because the Quran and Islam are not limited temporally, Khomeini used

Islamic language to validate and authenticate his political persuasions. Hepurposely integrated Quranic language to strengthen the oppositionsaspirations, and he used that vocabulary in innovative terms. For example,he used the word Caliph, when speaking about government rulers, whilethe term is most commonly used when speaking about the political head ofan Islamic community. In this manner, he highlighted the illegitimacy ofthe political elite, arguing with much acuity that it was impossible for aruler to head a veritable Islamic community unless the law of Islam isdominant and the ruling elite are the custodians of that law, namely, theulama. In other words, Khomeini cleverly attributed the political demise ofthe Islamic world and its subjugation by colonial powers, which hascharacterized Islamic societies since the mid-seventh century. Further, heeffectively painted this demise as poor by insinuating that it deviated fromIslamic norms, and was therefore secular. Khomeini reconfigured secularhere as not liberated from religious obligations but as a perversion of idealnorms of governance.

Islam was both organizationally and culturally decisive in the makingof the Iranian Revolution against the Shah dictatorship. Khomeini targetedthe government that favoured non-Iranian trade and industry, and carious

plans for modernization, which weakened political and economiccohesion.65He believed the only solution to combating corruption was toeliminate European influence, and urged the necessity of an Islamicgovernment.66In his work,Islam and Revolution,Khomeini speaks of thedisunity within the Islamic world as part of the objective of the imperialist

powers in the Middle East. In order for Iran to gain control over its ownauthority, reflective of the will of Iranian citizens, there could not be anycompromise. For Khomeini, any message that acted as welcoming toforeign powers was seen to undermine Iranian authority. In order to

eliminate foreign domination, Khomeini believed Iran needed to unify anentity political system essentially foreign to the West. For that reason,Khomeinis message of nativism overrides all other authorities foreign toIran.

Khomeini criticized the institution of monarchy itself. He referred backto the 1906-07 constitutional movement, when there was a popular questfor democratic principles; he argued that Islamic ordinances were added to

64Ibid, p.223.

65Keddie,Modern Iran,p.226.66Schulze,A Modern History of the Islamic World,p.175.


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what was in essence a Western code of law to deceive the people.67TheShahs regime took advantage of these cosmetic Islamic components to

mislead the people and to enhance its legitimacy. Foreign powersencouraged Muslims to deviate from their own culture, and denounced thecredibility of Islam as a method to further political and economic aims.68Khomeini endorsed a government by jurists, led by the ulama. Thisinstitution ran parallel to the civil order and assumed the character of anIslamic government.

Theda Skocpols Rentier State and Shia Islam in the IranianRevolution suggests that revolution was straightforwardly the product ofsocietal disruption, societal disorientation, and universal frustration withthe pace of change.69 Skocpol held the Pahlavi policy responsible forcurbing clerical influence in Iran, explaining that the success of Khomeiniwas that he was able to channel mass political action in a visiblyuncompromising moral leadership.70Therefore, the question of legitimate

political leadership was not a question that could be measured by aWestern or technical standard, but rather in a medium that would

possess or could attain the appropriate political resources.71 As such,Khomeinis message emphasized the need for Iranian nationalism to

position itself separate from the West and speak for itself. This influencedKhomeini to target the monarchy, who favoured nondomestic trade and

industry, and various plans for Westernization and modernization,which weakened the countrys political and economic cohesion in order togain more power.72

Islam became the actor of liberation, the liberating authority, to changethe revolutionary fight for society, rather than the state. It separated itselffrom other opposition groups and established its own political public thatwould surmount the ideas of the earlier generation. For this argument, it isimportant to emphasize that Islam is a bonding force, rather than a singularunit of authority, and not an all-encompassing unit. The discourse born out

of the Revolution of 1979 was not against contemporary, modernpolitics, but rather in opposition to the connection between Europeanimperial politics and the prior intellectual advocacy. Therefore, it is

67Ibid, p.32.68 Khumayni, Islam and Revolution 1: Writings and Declaration of ImamKhomeini, p.30.69Skocpol,Rentier State and Shia Islam in the Iranian Revolution, p.267.70Ibid, p.274.

71Ibid, p.77.72Keddie,Modern Iran,p.226.


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Chapter One26

inaccurate to represent Khomeini as a repressive figure seeking to return toa medieval past because he refused all things foreign to Iran.

Khomeinis government, summarized in the concept of theguardianship of the Islamic jurist, velayat-e faqih,was able to unify thenation because it was not an alien or foreign idea. Velayat-e faqihdrawsattention to the necessity of an authoritative government to deliver a justsystem. Velayat-e faqih represents a concept necessary to protect and

preserve Islam and deliver a just government reflective of the will of thepeople. The undisputed hegemony of Islamist political language inmobilizing popular support was recognized by Khomeinis political foes,who chose to align themselves with the Islamic groups in their attempt to

bring down the Pahlavi state. Keddie explains, even secularist liberal andleftist groups and parties were willing to ally with Islamists and greatlyunderestimated the possibility of their political ascendancy as the oldgovernment was overthrown. Some adopted the veil as a form of

protest.73Unlike the Shah, Khomeini put his personal authority behind the need

to establish a republic. The Islamic government is a governmentcontingent on law.74Khomeini sought to bind the idea of an Islamic stateand a republic, which would create an Islamic republic.75Concepts such asmajority rule, social contract, and representation were taken into account

and bound with Islamic principles. Khomeini expressed uncompromisingabruptness the restoration of the constitution. He writes that Islamicgovernment is constitutional, but not constitutional in the current orWestern sense of the word, i.e., based on the approval of laws inaccordance with the opinion of the majority. It is constitutional in thesense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governingand administering the country.76He further explains, the law of Islam,divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and theIslamic government.77Furthermore,

The body of Islamic laws that exist in the Quran and the Sunna has beenaccepted by the Muslims and recognized by them as worthy of obedience.This consent and acceptance facilitates the task of government and makes

73Keddie, 240.74 Khumayni, Islam and Revolution 1: Writings and Declaration of ImamKhomeinip.56.75Anasri,Modern Iran since 1921, p.13.76 Khumayni, Islam and Revolution 1: Writings and Declaration of Imam

Khomeini, p.56.77Ibid.


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it truly belong to the people. In contrast, in a republic or a constitutionalmonarchy, most of those claiming to be representatives of the majority ofthe people will approve anything they wish as law and then impose it on

the entire population.78

The principles for the Islamic republic were found in the Quran. Sinceit was based on laws in accordance with the opinion of the majority of theclerics it was able to rule over society.79 Islam, therefore, represents anestablished executive power in the same way that it has brought laws into

being.80In the past three decades, since the conclusion of the Revolution,there has been an urgent attempt by Iranian feminists to prove thatdemands for womens rights in Iran are not simply a foreign import. This

quest for authenticity by the womens movement developed as a result ofthe anti-West discourses by secular nationalists and also of the Islamistswho took power in 1979. The history and internal dynamism of Iraniansociety, particularly the social praxis of Iranian women, has led to anincreasingly harsh critique when it comes to questions of womensfreedom. In the vast constellation of issues that concern the legal andsocial standing of women in Iran, none has been more salient than debatesof wearing the chador.

The veil is without doubt the unprecedented allegory of the differences

between Western feminism and Islamic feminism, as well as betweenEurope/America and the Middle East/North Africa. Above any othersymbol of Muslim identity, the veil is viewed by Westerners as a dominantsymbol of oppression of women and the Muslim womans subservience tomen. Criticisms of the veil within the context of repressive measures bythe government and the importance and significance of the veil have beeninterpreted according to the social and political conditions of Europeansocieties. Many argue that the veil was a representation of power andvictory by the Islamic government, and a symbol of the subordination of

Iranian women. As noted in the previous chapter, to consolidate power, thegoverning elite used veiling and unveiling as an instrument of control.After the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Islamic governments political andcultural tendencies refuted Western influence. Mandatory wearing of thechador became obligatory, sparking revolts between 1979 and 1980against the dictum.

78Ibid.

79Ibid, p.55.80Ibid, p.41.


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Chapter One28

During the post-revolutionary decade of the 1980s, any resistance tothe mandates throughout the revolutionary decade (1970-80) were, for the

most part, ignored and branded as Westoxification by nationalists andIslamists. The ruling clerics under Khomeini prescribed and dictated auniform and exclusively Islamic identity for women, modelled after keynon-Iranian Islamic women (e.g. modelled after Fatima, the daughter ofThe Prophet Mohammed).81 Ali Shariati presented an activist, modernIslamic position, and supported this view in revolutionary Iran. Heconsidered the oppression of women a result of cultural imperialism,depriving Muslims of their values in order to exploit them. He encouragedwomen to veil and embrace Iranian indigenous culture rather than

becoming western dolls, distracting men from an opposition andencouraging a Western-style consumerist society.82

While it is true that during the first decade of the Islamic regimesecular women and feminists experienced brutal repression anddemoralization, resulting in passive resistance after the Iran-Iraq war andKhomeinis death in 1989, it is not accurate to assume that the Islamic veilis wholly oppressive. Secular activism, especially put forth by women,

began gradually in artistic films, literary, historical and journalisticwritings. This is a paradoxon the one hand the veil is reintroduced andfamily law is changed, women are barred from running for the presidency,

etc. However, there is a constant, reliable stream of highly-acclaimedfilms, and women novelists shock the market by producing one bestsellerafter another. Examples include films directed by Tahmineh Milani,Rakhshan Bani-Etemad, and novels by Shahrnush Parsipur, Zoya Pirzad,and Fattaneh Hajj Sayyid Javadi. In a society that seeks to bar women,they have found avenues of self-expression.83

Scholarly Representation of Muslim Women

The following chapter identifies the impacts of global contact,especially connections with international feminist discourse and womensmovements, in scholarship on the Islamic World. It is essential to note,however, that this model has remained contradictory and irrelevant to

81 Nikki Keddie, Iran and the Surrounding World. (New York: University ofWashington Press, 2002), p.20.82Keddie, Women in the Middle East.112.83Fiction: Post-Revolutionary Period,Encyclopaedia Iranica,

; Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad,Politic of Iranian Cinema; Film andSociety in the Islamic Republic(London: Routledge, 2010).


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contemporary realities across the Islamic world. In addition, there is noagreement among Islamist ideologies over the characteristics of this

model.

Section 2: Academic Feminism

In her Women and the Middle East,Nikki Keddie describes, the studyof women in the Middle East was almost dormant for the quarter centuryafter 1945. Since then, it has flowered, especially in the United States butalso elsewhere.84The following analysis will be limited to some of theimportant issues of the modern period. It is important to note that growing

Western domination has led more middle and upper class men and womento have ties to the West and to adopt many Western ways as a way tobuild up national, family and personal power.85This meant a growingdifferentiation in gender norms, Keddie describes, with the second groupincreasingly associated with traditional ways and the other associatedwith the West.86This separation, Keddie tells us, goes back to religiousand military confrontations including the Arabs and later Ottoman Empirein Europe. Keddie describes, the hostility was more toward Islam than tothe Orient, with Muslims seen as a dangerous group of unbelievers.87Moreover, specific negative attitudes toward Islam combined religious,racial, and colonial attitudes. Politicians, missionaries, and journalistsspread these attitudes during a growing period of Western domination inMuslim lands.88 Westerners frequently stressed the role of women inIslamic societies in terms of their inferiority. Keddie explains, Muslimwomen were widely seen as little better than slaves, either totallyrepressed or erotic objects, and as needing Western control or tutelage togain any rights.89Many viewed womens bad conditions as stemmingdirectly from Islam.

The following two claims represent, generally, views held in studies ofwomen in Iran. (1) Iranian women have been an object in the plans ofIslamists who intended to deconstruct womens subjectivity and constructthem according to their own fantasies and ideals for women in post-

84Keddie, Women in the Middle East.p.25185Ibid, p.252.86Ibid, p.252.87Ibid, p.253.

88Ibid, p.253.89Ibid, p.253.


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Chapter One30

revolutionary Iran.90 (2) Mandatory veiling causes Muslim women tooccupy a subordinate status. Disobedient women, according to Islamic

logic, are subject to various forms of oppression. In accordance with theunderlying theory of the veil, women should be invisible in order tomitigate their danger to Muslim society as they are assumed to be thesources of temptation.91

Views such as the above mentioned, are enabling inflexible viewpointswith regard to the Muslim world, creating a seemingly huge divide

between us and them based on the treatment or positions of women insociety. Consequently there has been a reaction to responding to thecriticisms of Middle Eastern society apologetically. The apologeticresponse tends to ignore other problems women faced in the Middle East,or as Keddie describes, that economic stagnation in the contemporaryMiddle East is importantly related to womens status (including lowlevels of education, health, labour-force participation).92

Such narrow perspectives misinterpret Islamic societies, assuming thatthey are homogenous, immutable, and forced women into a subordinatestatus. When transmitted into political contexts, the perceived discriminationemerges as an encompassing view, and Muslim women become symbolicof the war on terrorism, for example.93Furthermore, if the veil is viewedas the symbol of oppression and women as symbols of domination, it

reinforces an image that society at large should be sympathetic to theirexperience, thus legitimizing the position that Westerners have a moralobligation to interfere with the sovereignty of another nation in order toliberate a segment of the population from subjugation.

Unfortunately, however, there is a misunderstanding with regard to theveiling of women, and how it is oppressive and at the same time has not

barred Iranian women from participating in society. The act of coveringthe hair voluntarily has become controversial, as many feminists questionthe legitimacy of a womans decision to do so. Within the discussion there

arises a paradox between the religious and the secular, where examinationof either relies on a paradigm shift with regard to such social and

psychological issues as oppressive and helplessness ideas. This argumentholds true for many scholars and feminists, who have given much attention

90Shilandari, Farah, A Forum on Human Rights and Democracy in Iran.91Ibid.92Keddie, Women in the Middle East,p.273.93 Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Reflections on

Cultural Relativism and its Others: American Anthropologist, 104:3 (2002),pp.783-90.


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to the historical oppression of women focusing on the issue of veiling.Most prominent among these opponents of veiling are Islamic feminists.94

Many analyses oppose the veil and void of the experience of women whochoose to cover and feel reduced by Western women. Thus, much of theexisting body of research reduces the culture to a level of comparison tothe economic relations between developed and developing countries,the question of women is denied any specificity.

Symbolism of Veil

The hijab, chador, burqa, or veil is one of the few Islamic traditions

that Muslims share across multiple ethnic, cultural and social divides. Theveil symbolizes the resistance narrative and emphasizes the dignity andvalidity of native customs in particular those customs coming underfiercest colonial attack, the customs relating to women, and the need totenaciously affirm them as a means of resistance to western domination.95As the symbolic value of the veil became prominent in politicalmovements, it simultaneously was contested, and arguments formed two

poles: those who regard the Western woman as superior, and those whocriticize secular reforms. In Iran, Western women were also a symbol ofmilitary strength, participation in government [and] increased citizen andgender equality.96 Contrastingly the Islamic traditional positionsuggested that these symbols were often associated with old regimes andways of life, and only after these regimes were overthrown could a newversion of Islam and tradition become politically potent. The symbolism ofthe veil, Joan Wallach Scott explains, reduces differences of ethnicity, aculture that stands in opposition to another singular entity.97

The assumption, as presented in the above paragraph, assumes the veilcovers a womans true self, forming a kind of

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