Case Digests on Administrative Law

Malaga vs. Penachos Jr.Facts: Iloilo State College of Fisheries through its Pre-qualifiecation, Bids and Awards Committee caused the publication in the Nov. 25, 26 and 28 1988 issues of the Western Disayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was December 2, 1988 at 3o clock in the afternoon. Petitioners Maria Malaga and Josieeleen Najarro, respectively doing business under the name of B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their documents at two oclock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occena submitted on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as they were considered late as having been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 o clock in the morning of December 2, 1988On December 12, 1988 petitioner filed a complaint claiming that they have submitted their documents on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. On the same date Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. The plaintiffs argued the inapplicability of PD 1818 which state that no court shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order xxx, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government. On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order stating that ISCOF was within the coverage of PD 1818ISSUE: WON ISCOF is covered by PD 1818HELD: Yes, first, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development of the State; second, the Treasurer of the RP shall also be the ex-officio treasurer of the State College, third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the State College such apparatus, equipments etc. and lastly, an additional amount of P1.5 Million has been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury.Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree. There are two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding and awarding of the project. First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and then changed these deadlines without prior notice; second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for the project to bid 30 days before the date of the bidding if the estimated project cost was between P1M and 5M in order to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favouritism, collusion and fraud.Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered upholding the restraining order as not covered by the Prohibition of PD 1818De la Llana vs. Alba [GR 57883, 12 March 1982]En Banc, Fernando (J): 2 concur, 1 concurs with condition, 7 concur in separate opinions, 1 dissents in separate opinionFacts:: De la Llana, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition (considered by this Court as an action for prohibition), seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Ministerof Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. BP 129 mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.Issue: Whether the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbentJustices and judges Under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.Held: The Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process toabolish existing ones. The termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardlydistinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the Supreme Court. Removal is,of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant whowould thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, itwould be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judgesare concerned, the Supreme Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need beentertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that the Supreme Court does not render advisoryopinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly the Supreme Court could not have its say prior tothe action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where thematter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created bythe reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departuretherefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberalinterpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing theinferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. Thechallenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to thosepredisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that inthe choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to bepreferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act toavoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. Further, it is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from actingwithin the boundaries of its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutionalsystem we have adopted that the Supreme Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. It is acardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which agovernment is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certainpowers. Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in thelanguage of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. Thelaw may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill hisresponsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul BP 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution.TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential DecreeNo. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogramindustry.A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code providedthat:"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject tosales tax.""Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, theprovince shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price orrental rate, as the case may be, for every sale,lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shallaccrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be sharedequally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including,among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced theoperations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendanceby at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and othertaxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180Million in taxes each year.The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.Issues: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. Itwas imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographicvideo tapes. And while it was alsoan objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 asunconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there isno question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant filmpiracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified andunreviewedvideo tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in governmentrevenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments arevirtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage inbusiness."WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.US. vs. ANG TANG HODelegation of Power Admin Bodies On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court Facts: The case was about the constitutionality of EO 626-A which prohibits interprovincial movement of carabaos. The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.Held: The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.EO 626-A was declared unconstitutional.G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989Marcos v. ManglapusFACTS: It is a case of a dictator President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return to the Philippines to die.But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.Issue: 1 .Whether or not the ban of Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines has international precedents?2. Whether or not the President acted in grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the Marcoses?HELD: NO, The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).] The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).]On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own."[Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. 2.NO.The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.Petition is DismissedCARINO vs. CHRAdjudicatory Power of the CHR On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights. HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.Carino vs. CHR Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigateFACTS:Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involvedHELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.Power to InvestigateThe Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.Investigate vs. Adjudicate"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters.""Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.Who has Power to Adjudicate?These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.Manner of AppealNow, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court. LLDA vs. CAFacts: On March 8, 1981, the Task Force Camarin Dumsite of our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Caloocan City filed a complaint with the Laaguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in tala Estate due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents. On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate (liquid that has percolated through soil or other medium). The LLDA found that the city government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, as required under PD 1586 and clearance from LLDA.On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER. However, sometime in Aug. 1992, the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting among the city government of Caloocan and LLDA failed to settle the problem.ISSUE: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under RA No. 4850HELD: Yes, the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of RA no. 4850 and other relevant environmental laws cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of its injunctive powers. As an administrative agency, it has powers that are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.The issuance of the Cease and Desist Order by the LLDA is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amending law. The charter of LLDA as stated in RA 4850 Section 4(d) is the power to institute necessary legal proceedings against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program with the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDARIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/ OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners ,vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICOL.RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents. G.R. No. 73140May 29, 1987 Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitionersappeal on a technicality.Held: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides: SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.SECTION 6. No extension of period. No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1,1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded. WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSEDG.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERGOstrand, JTopic: Contingent regulation (page 50)FACTS: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court.ISSUE: Whether or not respondent as cause of actionHELD: Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power.The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.Araneta vs. GatmaitanGR Nos. L-8895, L-9191, April 30, 1957Felix, J.The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid. ISSUES: 1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 802.W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the PresidentHELD:1.YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority of law. YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the lawPEOPLE VS. MACEREN Administrative regulations adopted under egislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. FACTS: The respondents were charged withzh violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC. ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making powerPeople vs. MacerenG.R No. 32166, October 18, 1977Aquino J.Facts: On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.Issue: Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid.Held: No. The court held that the that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.BAUTISTA vs. JUINIOPolice PowerThe validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is put in issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. The use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from [12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day after the holiday. 2 Motor vehicles of the following classifications are exempted: (a) S (Service); (b) T (Truck); (c) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC (Tourist Cars This Court gave due course to the petition requiring respondent to answer. There was admission of the facts as substantially alleged except, as previously noted, that the ban starts at 12:00 a.m. rather than 1:00 a.m. of a Saturday or of a holiday and as to the mention of a Willys Kaiser jeep being registered in the name of a certain Teresita Urbina, about which respondents had no knowledge. There was a denial of the allegations that the classification of vehicles into heavy (H) and extra heavy (EH) on the other hand and light and bantam on the other hand was violative of equal protection and the regulation as to the use of the former cars on the dates specified a transgression of due process. The answer likewise denied that there was an undue delegation of legislative power, reference being made to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. There was also a procedural objection raised, namely, that what is sought amounts at most to an advisory opinion rather than an adjudication of a case or controversy.It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them. A recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear. Thus: [Whereas], developments in the international petroleum supply situation continue to follow a trend of limited production and spiralling prices thereby precluding the possibility of immediate relief in supplies within the foreseeable future; [Whereas], the uncertainty of fuel supply availability underscores a compelling need for the adoption of positive measures designed to insure the viability of the countrys economy and sustain its developmental growth; [Whereas], to cushion the effect of increasing oil prices and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is imperative to adopt a program directed towards the judicious use of our energy resources complemented with intensified conservation efforts and efficient utilization thereof; . . .. What is undeniable is that the action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution. It may not be the only alternative, but its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus, to repeat, substantive due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, much less infringed. In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of ones property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the cited Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo Juinio et alEqual Protection Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and OthersBautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category.ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the laws benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory BoardGR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990Sarmiento, J. The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing. ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretionHELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTSGancayco, J.Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the PhilippinesRespondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.FACTS: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for the SY 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the increases.Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued. In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees.Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school feesHELD: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

CIR vs. CA

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of TransportationGR No. L-59234, September 30, 1982Melencio-Herrera, J.Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum order provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police powerHELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health,safety and general welfare of the people. US VS. PANLILIO The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not a offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation. FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinderpest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaous to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture? HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, 2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. SECRETARY MOCHAEL DEFENSOR; GR. NO. 163980; AUGUST 3, 2006FACTS:Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents. Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.Sec.4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act.ISSUE:Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office may be reviewed by CourtsHELD:Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20][21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.Blas Ople vs Ruben Torres et al Executive Power Administrative Orders & The Administrative Code On 12 Dec 1996, Ramos issued AO 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System". The late Senator Ople averred that the said AO is unconstitutional because it infringes upon the peoples privacy and that the said AO is an encroachment of the Legislatures power to legislate laws. Blas opined that the said AO is not merely an AO because it partakes of the nature of a law hence it is beyond the presidents power to issue such. He filed a petition to enjoin Ruben Torres et al from carrying out such AO. Torres et al countered that the AO is not a law for it creates no office; confers no right; affords no protection and imposes no duty. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the president is an encroachment of the functions of the Legislature. HELD: As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. Upon these precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is: Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. An AO is not a law. In here, AO 308 partakes the nature of a law hence it is beyond executive power. Only the legislative can enact such a law of general effect.-PSDSA vs. De Jesus

Syquia vs. Board of Power and Waterworks FACTS: Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates.In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts.ISSUE: Whether or not the Board has jurisdictionHELD: Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service Commission Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. The message, however, was not delivered to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability but questioned PSCs jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine. ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon petitioner HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commissions jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitionerGlobe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service CommissionPrivate respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to Manila. The message, however, was not delivered to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a complaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability but questioned PSCs jurisdiction over the subject matter. After hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a fine. ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine upon petitionerHELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commissions jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner. Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to said circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified. Petitioners contend that one who has passed the bar exams and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said office. On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training. ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office is included in the practice of law HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles. Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi- judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the said office, without further examination or other qualification. GUEVARA vs. COMELEC Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending. The article pertained to the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground, among others, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings HELD: NO. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial RelationsDue Process Admin Bodies CIRTeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.CASE DIGEST ON SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION [322 SCRA 160 (2000)]November 10, 2010Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTCFacts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television4. False statement or entries5. Election contribution in name of anotherThe Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.Issues:1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearingYes. 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, theres an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 14(1) & (2), as well as A3 7the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documentsThe court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side.Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent isnt prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee)c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to