ADMIN Francisco vs. HOR

7/23/2019 ADMIN Francisco vs. HOR

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO VS. HOR

CARPIO MORALES, J.

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate andseemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, oer the determination by the independentbranches of goernment of the nature, scope and e!tent of their respectie constitutionalpowers where the Constitution itself proides for the means and bases for its resolution"

#ur nation$s history is replete with iid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent,dynamics of the relationship among these co%e&ual branches" This Court is confronted with onesuch today inoling the legislature and the 'udiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chartantipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to ent cacophonous sentiments thereon"

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characteri(ation that the present controersysub'ect of the instant petitions ) whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint againstChief *ustice +ilario " -aide, *r" with the +ouse of Representaties falls within the one yearbar proided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political &uestion ) hasresulted in a political crisis" Perhaps een more truth to the iew that it was brought upon by apolitical crisis of conscience"

.n any eent, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all theissues which this controersy spawns that this Court une&uiocally pronounces, at the firstinstance, that the feared resort to e!tra%constitutional methods of resoling it is neithernecessary nor legally permissible" Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie inadherence to, not departure from, the Constitution"

.n passing oer the comple! issues arising from the controersy, this Court is eer mindful of theessential truth that the iniolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislatie,e!ecutie or 'udicial branches of goernment by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy inthe discharge by each of that part of the goernmental power assigned to it by the soereignpeople"

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of chec/s and balances which has been carefullycalibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must begien effect without destroying their indispensable co%e&uality"

Ta/en together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican goernment, intended as theyare to insure that goernmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate arelationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate

functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmoni(ed to achiee a unity ofgoernance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well%being of the people"0erily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article 1. of our present 2345 Constitution proides6

ARTICLE !I

A""o#$%&b'('%) o* P#b('" O**'"er+

7ECT.#N 2" Public office is a public trust" Public officers and employees must at alltimes be accountable to the people, sere them with utmost responsibility, integrity,loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and 'ustice, and lead modest lies"

7ECT.#N 8" The President, the 0ice%President, the Members of the 7upreme Court,the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the #mbudsman may beremoed from office, on impeachment for, and coniction of, culpable iolation of theConstitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal ofpublic trust" All other public officers and employees may be remoed from office asproided by law, but not by impeachment"

7ECT.#N 9" :2; The +ouse of Representaties shall hae the e"(#+'ve powerto '$'%'&%e all cases of impeachment"

:8; A erified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the +ouse ofRepresentaties or by any citi(en upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member

thereof, which shall be included in the #rder of Business within ten session days, andreferred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter" The Committee,after hearing, and by a ma'ority ote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the+ouse within si!ty session days from such referral, together with the correspondingresolution" The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the +ouse withinten session days from receipt thereof"

:9; A ote of at least one%third of all the Members of the +ouse shall be necessaryeither to affirm a faorable resolution with the Articles of .mpeachment of theCommittee, or oerride its contrary resolution" The ote of each Member shall berecorded"

:<; .n case the erified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one%

third of all the Members of the +ouse, the same shall constitute the Articles of.mpeachment, and trial by the 7enate shall forthwith proceed"

:=; No impeachment proceedings +-&(( be '$'%'&%e against the same official morethan once within a period of one year"

:>; The 7enate shall hae the +o(e power to try and decide all cases of impeachment"?hen sitting for that purpose, the 7enators shall be on oath or affirmation" ?hen thePresident of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief *ustice of the 7upreme Court shallpreside, but shall not ote" No person shall be conicted without the concurrence oftwo%thirds of all the Members of the 7enate"

:5; *udgment in cases of impeachment shall not e!tend further than remoal from

office and dis&ualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, butthe party conicted shall neertheless be liable and sub'ect to prosecution, trial, andpunishment according to law"



:4; The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment %o e**e"%'ve() "&rr) o#%%-e /#r/o+e o* %-'+ +e"%'o$" :Emphasis and underscoring supplied;

@ollowing the aboe%&uoted 7ection 4 of Article 1. of the Constitution, the 28th Congress of the+ouse of Representaties adopted and approed the Rules of Procedure in .mpeachmentProceedings :+ouse .mpeachment Rules; on Noember 84, 82, superseding the preious+ouse .mpeachment Rules2 approed by the 22th Congress" The re(ev&$% distinctions betweenthese two Congresses$ +ouse .mpeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation6

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NE RULES

RULE II

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

Se"%'o$ 2. Mode of InitiatingImpeachment. ) .mpeachment shall beinitiated only by a erified complaint forimpeachment filed by any Member of the+ouse of Representaties or by any citi(enupon a resolution of endorsement by anyMember thereof or by a erified complaint orresolution of impeachment filed by at leastone%third :29; of all the Members of the+ouse"

RULE V

AR AGAINST INITIATION OFIMPEACHMENT PROCEEINGSAGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Se"%'o$ 16. Impeachment ProceedingsDeemed Initiated. ) .n cases where aMember of the +ouse files a erifiedcomplaint of impeachment or a citi(en filesa erified complaint that is endorsed by aMember of the +ouse through a resolutionof endorsement against an impeachableofficer, impeachment proceedings againstsuch official are deemed initiated on theday the Committee on *ustice finds that theerified complaint andor resolution againstsuch official, as the case may be, issufficient in substance, or on the date the+ouse otes to oerturn or affirm thefinding of the said Committee that theerified complaint andor resolution, as thecase may be, is not sufficient in substance"

.n cases where a erified complaint or aresolution of impeachment is filed orendorsed, as the case may be, by at leastone%third :29; of the Members of the+ouse, 'm/e&"-me$% /ro"ee'$4+ &reeeme '$'%'&%e &% %-e %'me o* %-e *'('$4o* +#"- ver'*'e "om/(&'$% or re+o(#%'o$o* 'm/e&"-me$% 5'%- %-e Se"re%&r)Ge$er&(.

RULE V Se"%'o$ 1. Bar Against Initiation Of

AR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Se"%'o$ 17. Scope of Bar. ) Noimpeachment proceedings shall be initiatedagainst the same official more than oncewithin the period of one :2; year"

Impeachment Proceedings. ) ?ithin aperiod of one :2; year from the dateimpeachment proceedings are deemedinitiated as proided in 7ection 2> hereof,no impeachment proceedings, as such,can be initiated against the same official":.talics in the original emphasis andunderscoring supplied;

#n *uly 88, 88, the +ouse of Representaties adopted a Resolution,8 sponsored byRepresentatie @eli! ?illiam -" @uentebella, which directed the Committee on *ustice Dtoconduct an inestigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and e!pendituresby the Chief *ustice of the 7upreme Court of the *udiciary -eelopment @und :*-@;"D9

#n *une 8, 89, former President *oseph E" Estrada filed an impeachment complaint< :firstimpeachment complaint; against Chief *ustice +ilario " -aide *r" and seen Associate*ustices= of this Court for Dculpable iolation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust andother high crimes"D> The complaint was endorsed by Representaties Role! T" 7uplico, RonaldoB" amora and -idagen Piang -ilangalen,5 and was referred to the +ouse Committee on*ustice on August =, 894 in accordance with 7ection 9:8; of Article 1. of the Constitution whichreads6

7ection 9:8; A erified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the+ouse of Representaties or by any citi(en upon a resolution of endorsement by anyMember thereof, which shall be included in the #rder of Business within ten sessiondays, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter" TheCommittee, after hearing, and by a ma'ority ote of all its Members, shall submit itsreport to the +ouse within si!ty session days from such referral, together with thecorresponding resolution" The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the+ouse within ten session days from receipt thereof"

The +ouse Committee on *ustice ruled on #ctober 29, 89 that the first impeachmentcomplaint was Dsufficient in form,D3 but oted to dismiss the same on #ctober 88, 89 for beinginsufficient in substance"2 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent tothe +ouse in plenary in accordance with the said 7ection 9:8; of Article 1. of the Constitution"

@our months and three wee/s since the filing on *une 8, 89 of the first complaint or on#ctober 89, 89, a day after the +ouse Committee on *ustice oted to dismiss it, the secondimpeachment complaint22 was filed with the 7ecretary eneral of the +ouse28 byRepresentaties ilberto C" Teodoro, *r" :@irst -istrict, Tarlac; and @eli! ?illiam B" @uentebella:Third -istrict, Camarines 7ur; against Chief *ustice +ilario " -aide, *r", founded on thealleged results of the legislatie in&uiry initiated by aboe%mentioned +ouse Resolution" Thissecond impeachment complaint was accompanied by a DResolution ofEndorsement.mpeachmentD signed by at least one%third :29; of all the Members of the +ouseof Representaties"29

Thus arose the instant petitions against the +ouse of Representaties, et. al., most of whichpetitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it

iolates the proision of 7ection = of Article 1. of the Constitution that DFnGo impeachmentproceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of oneyear"D



.n G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty" Ernesto B" @rancisco, *r", alleging that he has a duty as amember of the .ntegrated Bar of the Philippines to use all aailable legal remedies to stop anunconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition andMandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he Dhimself was a ictim of the capriciousand arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in .mpeachment Proceedings introduced by the28th Congress,D2< posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then#mbudsman Aniano -esierto had been iolated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes inthe +ouse .mpeachment Rules adopted and approed on Noember 84, 82 by the +ouse ofRepresentaties and prays that :2; Rule 0, 7ections 2> and 25 and Rule ..., 7ections =, >, 5, 4,and 3 thereof be declared unconstitutional :8; this Court issue a writ of mandamus directingrespondents +ouse of Representaties et. al. to comply with Article .1, 7ection 9 :8;, :9; and :=;of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint andor stri/e it off the records

of the +ouse of Representaties, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with theConstitution and :9; this Court permanently en'oin respondent +ouse of Representaties fromproceeding with the second impeachment complaint"

.n G.R. No. 160262, petitioners 7edfrey M" Candelaria, et. al., as citi(ens and ta!payers,alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition forCertiorariProhibition, the issuance of a writ DperpetuallyD prohibiting respondent +ouse ofRepresentaties from filing any Articles of .mpeachment against the Chief *ustice with the7enate and for the issuance of a writ DperpetuallyD prohibiting respondents 7enate and 7enatePresident @ran/lin -rilon from accepting any Articles of .mpeachment against the Chief *usticeor, in the eent that the 7enate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachmenttrial"

.n G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M" de Castro and 7oledad Cagampang, as citi(ens,ta!payers, lawyers and members of the .ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that theirpetition for Prohibition inoles public interest as it inoles the use of public funds necessary toconduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of awrit of prohibition en'oining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said secondimpeachment complaint"

.n G.R. No. 1602, petitioner @rancisco ." Chae(, alleging that this Court has recogni(ed thathe has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v.PCGG2= and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,2> prays in his petitionfor .n'unction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional"

.n G.R. No. 160282, petitioners Atty" +arry H" Ro&ue, et. al., as ta!payers and members of thelegal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent +ouseof Representaties from drafting, adopting, approing and transmitting to the 7enate the secondimpeachment complaint, and respondents -e 0enecia and Na(areno from transmitting the

Articles of .mpeachment to the 7enate"

.n G.R. No. 160289, petitioners Representaties 7alacnib @" Baterina and -eputy 7pea/er RaulM" on(ale(, alleging that, as members of the +ouse of Representaties, they hae a legalinterest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in theirpetition for CertiorariProhibition that the second impeachment complaint and any actproceeding therefrom be declared null and oid"

.n G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Heonilo R" Alfonso et al., claiming that they hae a right to beprotected against all forms of senseless spending of ta!payers$ money and that they hae anobligation to protect the 7upreme Court, the Chief *ustice, and the integrity of the *udiciary,

allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as Da class suitD and praythat :2; the +ouse Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as allissuances emanating therefrom be declared null and oid and :8; this Court en'oin the 7enateand the 7enate President from ta/ing cogni(ance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second

impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the 7enate, its prosecutorsand agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint"

.n G.R. No. 16031:, petitioner Public .nterest Center, .nc", whose members are citi(ens andta!payers, and its co%petitioner Crispin T" Reyes, a citi(en, ta!payer and a member of thePhilippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filingof the second impeachment complaint inoles paramount public interest and pray that 7ections2> and 25 of the +ouse .mpeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaintArticles of.mpeachment be declared null and oid"

.n G.R. No. 160372, petitioner Atty" @ernando P" R" Perito, as a c iti(en and a member of the

Philippine Bar Association and of the .ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr"Ma!imo N" Mene(, *r", as a ta!payer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a TemporaryRestraining #rder and Permanent .n'unction to en'oin the +ouse of Representaties fromproceeding with the second impeachment complaint"

.n G.R. No. 160373, petitioner .ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated bythe Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition forCertiorari and Prohibition that 7ections 2> and 25 of Rule 0 and 7ections =, >, 5, 4, 3 of Rule ...of the +ouse .mpeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the +ouse ofRepresentaties be permanently en'oined from proceeding with the second impeachmentcomplaint"

.n G.R. No. 160360, petitioner%ta!payer Atty" Claro @lores prays in his petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition that the +ouse .mpeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional"

.n G.R. No. 160369, petitioners I"P" Haw Alumni Cebu @oundation .nc", et" al", in their petitionfor Prohibition and .n'unction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citi(ens,citing Oposa v. actoran25 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of @ilipinos, prayfor the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents +ouse of Representaties and the 7enatefrom conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Courtdeclare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent+ouse of Representaties in interfering with the fiscal matters of the *udiciary"

.n G.R. No. 16030, petitioner%ta!payer @ather Ranhilio Callangan A&uino, alleging that theissues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that asan official of the Philippine *udicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in theunhampered operation of the 7upreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in

accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the +ouse ofRepresentaties from transmitting the Articles of .mpeachment to the 7enate and the 7enatefrom receiing the same or giing the impeachment complaint due course"

.n G.R. No. 16036, petitioner Nilo A" Malanyaon, as a ta!payer, alleges in his petition forProhibition that respondents @uentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the secondimpeachment complaint, were Dabsolutely without any legal power to do so, as they actedwithout 'urisdiction as far as the Articles of .mpeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers ofthe Chief *ustice to disburse the :*-@;"D

.n G.R. No. 160382, petitioners Attorneys 0enicio 7" @lores and +ector H" +ofileJa, alleging thatas professors of law they hae an abiding interest in the sub'ect matter of their petition forCertiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue Dwhich they are trying to

inculcate in the minds of their students,D pray that the +ouse of Representaties be en'oinedfrom endorsing and the 7enate from trying the Articles of .mpeachment and that the secondimpeachment complaint be declared null and oid"



.n G.R. No. 16038, petitioner Atty" -ioscoro 0alle'os, *r", without alleging his locus standi , butalleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the*udicial -eelopment @und :*-@; was spent in accordance with law and that the +ouse ofRepresentaties does not hae e!clusie 'urisdiction in the e!amination and audit thereof, praysin his petition DTo -eclare Complaint Null and 0oid for Hac/ of Cause of Action and *urisdictionDthat the second impeachment complaint be declared null and oid"

.n G.R. No. 160703, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in thefiling of the second impeachment complaint inole matters of transcendental importance, praysin its petition for CertiorariProhibition that :2; the second impeachment complaint and allproceedings arising therefrom be declared null and oid :8; respondent +ouse ofRepresentaties be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of .mpeachment to the 7enate and:9; respondent 7enate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of .mpeachment and fromconducting any proceedings thereon"

.n G.R. No. 160709, petitioners -emocrit C" Barcenas et. al., as citi(ens and ta!payers, pray intheir petition for CertiorariProhibition that :2; the second impeachment complaint as well as theresolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent +ouse of Representaties bedeclared null and oid and :8; respondents 7enate and 7enate President @ran/lin -rilon beprohibited from accepting any Articles of .mpeachment against the Chief *ustice or, in the eentthat they hae accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with theimpeachment trial"

Petitions bearing doc/et numbers "R" Nos" 2>8>2, 2>8>8 and 2>8>9, the first three of theeighteen which were filed before this Court,24 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary

Restraining #rder andor preliminary in'unction to preent the +ouse of Representaties fromtransmitting the Articles of .mpeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the7enate" Petition bearing doc/et number "R" No" 2>8>2 li/ewise prayed for the declaration ofthe Noember 84, 82 +ouse .mpeachment Rules as null and oid for being unconstitutional"

Petitions bearing doc/et numbers "R" Nos" 2>855, 2>838 and 2>83=, which were filed on#ctober 84, 89, sought similar relief" .n addition, petition bearing doc/et number "R" No"2>838 alleged that +ouse Resolution No" 8> :calling for a legislatie in&uiry into theadministration by the Chief *ustice of the *-@; infringes on the constitutional doctrine ofseparation of powers and is a direct iolation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy ofthe 'udiciary"

#n #ctober 84, 89, during the plenary session of the +ouse of Representaties, a motion was

put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the 7enate, but itwas not carried because the +ouse of Representaties ad'ourned for lac/ of &uorum,23 and asreflected aboe, to date, the Articles of .mpeachment hae yet to be forwarded to the 7enate"

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order andor writ ofpreliminary in'unction which were filed on or before #ctober 84, 89, *ustices Puno and 0itugoffered to recuse themseles, but the Court re'ected their offer" *ustice Panganiban inhibitedhimself, but the Court directed him to participate"

?ithout necessarily giing the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of #ctober 84,89, resoled to :a; consolidate the petitions :b; re&uire respondent +ouse of Representatiesand the 7enate, as well as the 7olicitor eneral, to comment on the petitions not later than <69p"m" of Noember 9, 89 :c; set the petitions for oral arguments on Noember =, 89, at26 a"m" and :d; appointed distinguished legal e!perts as amici curiae.8 .n addition, thisCourt called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status &uo, en'oining all the partiesand others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render thepetitions moot"

Also on #ctober 84, 89, when respondent +ouse of Representaties through 7pea/er *oseC" -e 0enecia, *r" andor its co%respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted aManifestation asserting that this Court has no 'urisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or en'ointhe +ouse of Representaties, which is an independent and co%e&ual branch of goernmentunder the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiateimpeachment cases" #n een date, 7enator A&uilino K" Pimentel, *r", in his own behalf, filed aMotion to .nterene :Ex A!udante Cautela;82 and Comment, praying that Dthe consolidatedpetitions be dismissed for lac/ of 'urisdiction of the Court oer the issues affecting theimpeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and 'urisdiction of the 7enate asthe impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief *ustice is the respondent, be recogni(ed and upheld pursuant to the proisions of Article 1. ofthe Constitution"D88

Acting on the other petitions which were subse&uently filed, this Court resoled to :a;consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions :b; re&uire respondents to file theircomment not later than <69 p"m" of Noember 9, 89 and :c; include them for oral argumentson Noember =, 89"

#n #ctober 83, 89, the 7enate of the Philippines, through 7enate President @ran/lin M"-rilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainlypremature and hae no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of thepetitions, no 'usticiable issue was presented before it since :2; its constitutional duty toconstitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of.mpeachment, which it had not, and :8; the principal issues raised by the petitions pertaine!clusiely to the proceedings in the +ouse of Representaties"

#n #ctober 9, 89, Atty" *aime 7oriano filed a DPetition for Heae to .ntereneD in "R" Nos"2>8>2, 2>8>8, 2>8>9, 2>855, 2>838, and 2>83=, &uestioning the status "uo Resolutionissued by this Court on #ctober 84, 89 on the ground that it would unnecessarily putCongress and this Court in a Dconstitutional deadloc/D and praying for the dismissal of all thepetitions as the matter in &uestion is not yet ripe for 'udicial determination"

#n Noember 9, 89, Attorneys Romulo B" Macalintal and Pete Kuirino Kuadra filed in "R"No" 2>8>8 a DMotion for Heae of Court to .nterene and to Admit the +erein .ncorporatedPetition in .nterention"D

#n Noember <, 89, #a$mamalasa%it na m$a &ananan$$ol n$ m$a &an$$a$a'an$Pilipino, (nc. filed a Motion for .nterention in "R" No" 2>8>2" #n Noember =, 89, ?orld

?ar .. 0eterans Hegionnaires of the Philippines, .nc" also filed a DPetition%in%.nterention withHeae to .ntereneD in "R" Nos" 2>8>2, 2>8>8, 2>8>9, 2>855, 2>838, 2>83=, and2>92"

The motions for interention were granted and both 7enator Pimentel$s Comment and AttorneysMacalintal and Kuadra$s Petition in .nterention were admitted"

#n Noember =%>, 89, this Court heard the iews of the amici curiae and the arguments ofpetitioners, interenors 7enator Pimentel and Attorney Ma/alintal, and 7olicitor eneral AlfredoBenipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Adisory issued by this Court on Noember 9,89, to wit6

?hether the certiorari 'urisdiction of the 7upreme Court may be ino/ed who can

ino/e it on what issues and at what time and whether it should be e!ercised by thisCourt at this time"

.n discussing these issues, the following may be ta/en up6



a; locus standi of petitioners

b; ripeness:prematurity mootness;

c; political &uestion'usticiability

d; +ouse$s De!clusieD power to initiate all cases of impeachment

e; 7enate$s DsoleD power to try and decide all cases of impeachment

f; constitutionality of the +ouse Rules on .mpeachment vis-a-vis 7ection 9:=;of Article 1. of the Constitution and

g; 'udicial restraint :.talics in the original;

.n resoling the intricate conflu! of preliminary and substantie issues arising from the instantpetitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant ofthe reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows6 :2; thethreshold and noel issue of whether or not the power of 'udicial reiew e!tends to those arisingfrom impeachment proceedings :8; whether or not the essential pre%re&uisites for the e!erciseof the power of 'udicial reiew hae been fulfilled and :9; the substantie issues yet remaining"These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim"

Judicial Review

As reflected aboe, petitioners plead for this Court to e!ercise the power of 'udicial reiew todetermine the alidity of the second impeachment complaint"

This Court$s power of 'udicial reiew is conferred on the 'udicial branch of the goernment in7ection 2, Article 0... of our present 2345 Constitution6

7ECT.#N 2" The 'udicial power shall be ested in one 7upreme Court and in suchlower courts as may be established by law"

;#'"'&( /o5er '$"(#e+ %-e #%) of the courts of 'ustice to settle actual

controersies inoling rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and %oe%erm'$e 5-e%-er or $o% %-ere -&+ bee$ & 4r&ve &b#+e o* '+"re%'o$ &mo#$%'$4%o (&"< or e"e++ o* =#r'+'"%'o$ o$ %-e /&r% o* &$) br&$"- or '$+%r#me$%&('%) o*%-e 4over$me$%" :Emphasis supplied;

7uch power of 'udicial reiew was earl y on e!haustiely e!pounded upon by *ustice *ose P"Haurel in the definitie 239> case of An$ara v. Electoral Commission89 after the effectiity of the239= Constitution whose proisions, unli/e the present Constitution, did not contain the presentproision in Article 0..., 7ection 2, par" 8 on what 'udicial power includes" Thus, *ustice Haureldiscoursed6

! ! ! .n times of social dis&uietude or political e!citement, the great landmar/s of theConstitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. I$ "&+e+ o*"o$*('"%, %-e =#'"'&( e/&r%me$% '+ %-e o$() "o$+%'%#%'o$&( or4&$ 5-'"- "&$ be"&((e #/o$ %o e%erm'$e %-e /ro/er &((o"&%'o$ o* /o5er+ be%5ee$ %-e +ever&(e/&r%me$%+ &$ &mo$4 %-e '$%e4r&( or "o$+%'%#e$% #$'%+ %-ereo* .

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lac/ing perfection andperfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so proide, that instrument which is the e!pression of their soereigntyhoweer limited, has established a republican goernment intended to operate andfunction as a harmonious whole, under a system of chec/s and balances, and sub'ectto specific limitations and restrictions proided in the said instrument" T-eCo$+%'%#%'o$ +e%+ *or%- '$ $o #$"er%&'$ (&$4#&4e %-e re+%r'"%'o$+ &$ ('m'%&%'o$+#/o$ 4over$me$%&( /o5er+ &$ &4e$"'e+. I* %-e+e re+%r'"%'o$+ &$ ('m'%&%'o$+&re %r&$+"e$e '% 5o#( be '$"o$"e'v&b(e '* %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$ -& $o% /rov'e*or & me"-&$'+m b) 5-'"- %o 're"% %-e "o#r+e o* 4over$me$% &(o$4"o$+%'%#%'o$&( "-&$$e(+, for then the distribution of powers would be mere erbiage,the bill of rights mere e!pressions of sentiment, and the principles of good goernment

mere political apothegms" Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in ourConstitution are real as they should be in any liing constitution" .n the Inited 7tateswhere no e!press constitutional grant is found in their constitution, %-e /o++e++'o$ o*%-'+ moer&%'$4 /o5er o* %-e "o#r%+, not to spea/ of its historical origin anddeelopment there, has been set at rest by popular ac&uiescence for a period of morethan one and a half centuries" .n our case, this moderating power '+ 4r&$%e, '* $o%e/re++(), b) "(e&r 'm/('"&%'o$ *rom +e"%'o$ 2 o* &r%'"(e VIII o* o#r Co$+%'%#%'o$"

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of goernment" -o '+ %o e%erm'$e %-e$&%#re, +"o/e &$ e%e$% o* +#"- /o5er+> T-e Co$+%'%#%'o$ '%+e(* -&+ /rov'e*or %-e '$+%r#me$%&('%) o* %-e =#'"'&r) &+ %-e r&%'o$&( 5&). A$ 5-e$ %-e

=#'"'&r) me'&%e+ %o &((o"&%e "o$+%'%#%'o$&( bo#$&r'e+, '% does not assert anysuperiority oer the other departments it does not in reality nullify or inalidate an actof the legislature, but o$() &++er%+ %-e +o(em$ &$ +&"re ob('4&%'o$ &++'4$e %o '%

b) %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$ %o e%erm'$e "o$*('"%'$4 "(&'m+ o* &#%-or'%) #$er %-eCo$+%'%#%'o$ &$ %o e+%&b('+- *or %-e /&r%'e+ '$ &$ &"%#&( "o$%rover+) %-e r'4-%+5-'"- %-&% '$+%r#me$% +e"#re+ &$ 4#&r&$%ee+ %o %-em. T-'+ '+ '$ %r#%- &(( %-&% '+'$vo(ve '$ what is termed D'udicial supremacyD which properly '+ %-e /o5er o*

=#'"'&( rev'e5 #$er %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$" Een then, this power of 'udicial reiew islimited to actual cases and controersies to be e!ercised after full opportunity ofargument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional &uestion raised or theery lis mota presented" Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics andbarren legal &uestions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities" Narrowed asits function is in this manner, the 'udiciary does not pass upon &uestions of wisdom,

'ustice or e!pediency of legislation" More than that, courts accord the presumption ofconstitutionality to legislatie enactments, not only because the legislature ispresumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the 'udiciary in thedetermination of actual cases and controersies must reflect the wisdom and 'ustice of

the people as e!pressed through their representaties in the e!ecutie and legislatiedepartments of the goernment"8< :.talics in the original emphasis and underscoringsupplied;

As pointed out by *ustice Haurel, this Dmoderating powerD to Ddetermine the proper allocation ofpowersD of the different branches of goernment and Dto direct the course of goernment alongconstitutional channelsD is inherent in all courts8= as a necessary conse&uence of the 'udicialpower itself, which is Dthe power of the court to settle actual controersies inoling rights whichare legally demandable and enforceable"D8>

Thus, een in the Inited 7tates where the power of 'udicial reiew is not e!plicitly conferredupon the courts by its Constitution, such power has Dbeen set at rest by popular ac&uiescencefor a period of more than one and a half centuries"D To be sure, it was in the 249 leading case

of &ar!ury v. &adison

85

that the power of 'udicial reiew was first articulated by Chief *usticeMarshall, to wit6



.t is also not entirely unworthy of obseration, that in declaring what shall be thesupreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned and not the laws ofthe Inited 7tates generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of theconstitution, hae that ran/"

T-#+, %-e /&r%'"#(&r /-r&+eo(o4) o* %-e "o$+%'%#%'o$ of the Inited 7tates confirmsand strengthens %-e /r'$"'/(e, +#//o+e %o be e++e$%'&( %o &(( 5r'%%e$"o$+%'%#%'o$+, %-&% & (&5 re/#4$&$% %o %-e "o$+%'%#%'o$ '+ vo'? &$ %-&% courts,&+ 5e(( &+ o%-er e/&r%me$%+, &re bo#$ b) %-&% '$+%r#me$%.84 :.talics in theoriginal emphasis supplied;

.n our own 'urisdiction, as early as 238, decades before its e!press grant in the 239=Constitution, the power of 'udicial reiew was e!ercised by our courts to inalidateconstitutionally infirm acts"83 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former7upreme Court *ustice 0icente 0" Mendo(a,9 the e!ecutie and legislatie branches of ourgoernment in fact effectiely ac/nowledged this power of 'udicial reiew in Article 5 of the CiilCode, to wit6

Article 5" Haws are repealed only by subse&uent ones, and their iolation or non%obserance shall not be e!cused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary"

-e$ %-e "o#r%+ e"(&re & (&5 %o be '$"o$+'+%e$% 5'%- %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$, %-e*ormer +-&(( be vo' &$ %-e (&%%er +-&(( 4over$.

Am'$'+%r&%'ve or ee"#%'ve &"%+, orer+ &$ re4#(&%'o$+ +-&(( be v&(' o$()5-e$ %-e) &re $o% "o$%r&r) %o %-e (&5+ or %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$. :Emphasis supplied;

As indicated in An$ara v. Electoral Commission,92 'udicial reiew is indeed an integralcomponent of the delicate system of chec/s and balances which, together with the corollaryprinciple of separation of powers, forms the bedroc/ of our republican form of goernment andinsures that its ast powers are utili(ed only for the benefit of the people for which it seres"

T-e +e/&r&%'o$ o* /o5er+ '+ & *#$&me$%&( /r'$"'/(e '$ o#r +)+%em o*4over$me$%" .t obtains not through e!press proision but by actual diision in ourConstitution" Each department of the goernment has e!clusie cogni(ance of matterswithin its 'urisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere" But it does not follow fromthe fact that the three powers are to be /ept separate and distinct that the Constitution

intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other" T-eCo$+%'%#%'o$ -&+ /rov'e *or &$ e(&bor&%e +)+%em o* "-e"<+ &$ b&(&$"e+ %o+e"#re "oor'$&%'o$ '$ %-e 5or<'$4+ o* %-e v&r'o#+ e/&r%me$%+ o* %-e4over$me$%. ! ! ! A$ %-e =#'"'&r) '$ %#r$, 5'%- %-e S#/reme Co#r% &+ %-e *'$&(&rb'%er, e**e"%'ve() "-e"<+ %-e o%-er e/&r%me$%+ '$ %-e eer"'+e o* '%+ /o5er %oe%erm'$e %-e (&5, &$ -e$"e %o e"(&re ee"#%'ve &$ (e4'+(&%'ve &"%+ vo' '*v'o(&%'ve o* %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$.98 :Emphasis and underscoring supplied;

.n the scholarly estimation of former 7upreme Court *ustice @lorentino @eliciano, D! ! ! 'udicialreiew is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and thebalancing of powers among the three great departments of goernment through the definitionand maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them"D99 To him, DF'Gudicialreiew is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation ) or instrument of interention ) ofthe 'udiciary in that balancing operation"D9<

To ensure the potency of the power of 'udicial reiew to curb grae abuse of discretion by D&$)br&$"- or '$+%r#me$%&('%'e+ o* 4over$me$%,D the afore%&uoted 7ection 2, Article 0... of theConstitution engraes, for the first time into its history, into bloc/ letter law the so%called

De!panded certiorari 'urisdictionD of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirroredin the following e!cerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief *usticeConstitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion6

! ! !

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions" .t says6

The 'udicial power shall be ested in one 7upreme Court and in such lower courts asmay be established by law"

. suppose nobody can &uestion it"

The ne!t proision is new in our constitutional law" . will read it first and e!plain"

*udicial power includes the duty of courts of 'ustice to settle actual controersiesinoling rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determinewhether or not there has been a grae abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ or e!cessof 'urisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the goernment"

@ellow Members of this Commission, %-'+ '+ &"%#&(() & /ro#"% o* o#r e/er'e$"e#r'$4 m&r%'&( (&5" As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but %-ero(e o* %-e =#'"'&r) #r'$4 %-e e/o+e re4'me 5&+ m&rre "o$+'er&b() b) %-e

"'r"#m+%&$"e %-&% '$ & $#mber o* "&+e+ &4&'$+% %-e 4over$me$%, 5-'"- %-e$ -&$o (e4&( e*e$+e &% &((, %-e +o('"'%or 4e$er&( +e% #/ %-e e*e$+e o* /o('%'"&(@#e+%'o$+ &$ 4o% &5&) 5'%- '%" As a conse&uence, certain principles concerningparticularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order therelease of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect ofmartial law failed because the goernment set up the defense of political &uestion" Andthe 7upreme Court said6 D?ell, since it is political, we hae no authority to pass uponit"D T-e Comm'%%ee o$ %-e ;#'"'&r) *ee(+ %-&% %-'+ 5&+ $o% & /ro/er +o(#%'o$ o*%-e @#e+%'o$+ '$vo(ve. I% ' $o% mere() re@#e+% &$ e$"ro&"-me$% #/o$ %-er'4-%+ o* %-e /eo/(e, b#% '%, '$ e**e"%, e$"o#r&4e *#r%-er v'o(&%'o$+ %-ereo*#r'$4 %-e m&r%'&( (&5 re4'me. ! ! !

! ! !

r'e*() +%&%e, "o#r%+ o* =#+%'"e e%erm'$e %-e ('m'%+ o* /o5er o* %-e &4e$"'e+&$ o**'"e+ o* %-e 4over$me$% &+ 5e(( &+ %-o+e o* '%+ o**'"er+. I$ o%-er 5or+, %-e

=#'"'&r) '+ %-e *'$&( &rb'%er o$ %-e @#e+%'o$ 5-e%-er or $o% & br&$"- o*4over$me$% or &$) o* '%+ o**'"'&(+ -&+ &"%e 5'%-o#% =#r'+'"%'o$ or '$ e"e++ o*

=#r'+'"%'o$, or +o "&/r'"'o#+() &+ %o "o$+%'%#%e &$ &b#+e o* '+"re%'o$&mo#$%'$4 %o e"e++ o* =#r'+'"%'o$ or (&"< o* =#r'+'"%'o$. T-'+ '+ $o% o$() &

=#'"'&( /o5er b#% & #%) %o /&++ =#4me$% o$ m&%%er+ o* %-'+ $&%#re.

This is the bac/ground of paragraph 8 of 7ection 2, which means that %-e "o#r%+"&$$o% -ere&*%er ev&e %-e #%) %o +e%%(e m&%%er+ o* %-'+ $&%#re, b) "(&'m'$4 %-&%+#"- m&%%er+ "o$+%'%#%e & /o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$"9= :.talics in the original emphasis andunderscoring supplied;

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarilyturn to the Constitution itself which employs the well%settled principles of constitutionalconstruction"



@irst, ver!a le$is, that is, whereer possible, the words used in the Constitution must be gientheir ordinary meaning e!cept where technical terms are employed" Thus, in ).&. *uason + Co.,(nc. v. and *enure Administration,9> this Court, spea/ing through Chief *ustice Enri&ue@ernando, declared6

e (oo< %o %-e (&$4#&4e o* %-e o"#me$% '%+e(* '$ o#r +e&r"- *or '%+ me&$'$4. eo $o% o* "o#r+e +%o/ %-ere, b#% %-&% '+ 5-ere 5e be4'$. I% '+ %o be &++#me %-&%%-e 5or+ '$ 5-'"- "o$+%'%#%'o$&( /rov'+'o$+ &re "o#"-e e/re++ %-e ob=e"%'ve+o#4-% %o be &%%&'$e. T-e) &re %o be 4've$ %-e'r or'$&r) me&$'$4 e"e/% 5-ere%e"-$'"&( %erm+ &re em/(o)e '$ 5-'"- "&+e %-e +'4$'*'"&$"e %-#+ &%%&"-e %o%-em /rev&'(+. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer$s document, it beingessential for the rule of law to obtain that it should eer be present in the people$sconsciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sensethey hae in common use" -&% '% +&)+ &""or'$4 %o %-e %e% o* %-e /rov'+'o$ %o be"o$+%r#e "om/e(+ &""e/%&$"e and negates the power of the courts to alter it,based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say" Thusthese are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to aminimum"95 :Emphasis and underscoring supplied;

7econd, where there is ambiguity, ratio le$is est anima" The words of the Constitution should beinterpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers" And so did this Court apply this principlein Civil i!erties nion v. Executive ecretary 94 in this wise6

A foolproof yardstic/ in constitutional construction is the intention underlying theproision under consideration" Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a

Constitution should bear in mind the ob'ect sought to be accomplished by its adoption,and the eils, if any, sought to be preented or remedied" A doubtful proision will bee!amined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstancesunder which the Constitution was framed" T-e ob=e"% '+ %o &+"er%&'$ %-e re&+o$5-'"- '$#"e %-e *r&mer+ o* %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$ %o e$&"% %-e /&r%'"#(&r /rov'+'o$&$ %-e /#r/o+e +o#4-% %o be &""om/('+-e %-ereb), '$ orer %o "o$+%r#e %-e5-o(e &+ %o m&<e %-e 5or+ "o$+o$&$% %o %-&% re&+o$ &$ "&("#(&%e %o e**e"%%-&% /#r/o+e.93 :Emphasis and underscoring supplied;

As it did in #ita/an v. Commissioner on (nternal 0evenue< where, spea/ing through Madame*ustice Amuerfina A" Melencio%+errera, it declared6

! ! ! T-e &+"er%&'$me$% o* %-&% '$%e$% '+ b#% '$ <ee/'$4 5'%- %-e *#$&me$%&(

/r'$"'/(e o* "o$+%'%#%'o$&( "o$+%r#"%'o$ %-&% %-e '$%e$% o* %-e *r&mer+ o* %-eor4&$'" (&5 &$ o* %-e /eo/(e &o/%'$4 '% +-o#( be 4've$ e**e"%. The primary tas/in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the reali(ation of thepurpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution" I% m&)&(+o be +&*e() &++#me %-&% %-e /eo/(e '$ r&%'*)'$4 %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$ 5ere 4#'em&'$() b) %-e e/(&$&%'o$ o**ere b) %-e *r&mer+.<2 :Emphasis and underscoringsupplied;

@inally, ut ma$is valeat "uam pereat " The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole" Thus,in Chion$!ian v. De eon,<8 this Court, through Chief *ustice Manuel Moran declared6

TB-e member+ o* %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$&( Co$ve$%'o$ "o#( $o% -&ve e'"&%e& /rov'+'o$ o* o#r Co$+%'%#%'o$ mere() *or %-e be$e*'% o* o$e /er+o$ 5'%-o#%"o$+'er'$4 %-&% '% "o#( &(+o &**e"% o%-er+. -e$ %-e) &o/%e +#b+e"%'o$ 2,

%-e) /erm'%%e, '* $o% 5'((e, %-&% +&' /rov'+'o$ +-o#( *#$"%'o$ %o %-e *#(( e%e$%o* '%+ +#b+%&$"e &$ '%+ %erm+, $o% b) '%+e(* &(o$e, b#% '$ "o$=#$"%'o$ 5'%- &((o%-er /rov'+'o$+ o* %-&% 4re&% o"#me$%.<9 :Emphasis and underscoring supplied;

Hi/ewise, still in Civil i!erties nion v. Executive ecretary ,<< this Court affirmed that6

I% '+ & 5e((e+%&b('+-e r#(e '$ "o$+%'%#%'o$&( "o$+%r#"%'o$ %-&% $o o$e /rov'+'o$o* %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$ '+ %o be +e/&r&%e *rom &(( %-e o%-er+, %o be "o$+'ere&(o$e, b#% %-&% &(( %-e /rov'+'o$+ be&r'$4 #/o$ & /&r%'"#(&r +#b=e"% &re %o bebro#4-% '$%o v'e5 &$ %o be +o '$%er/re%e &+ %o e**e"%#&%e %-e 4re&% /#r/o+e+ o* %-e '$+%r#me$%. Se"%'o$+ be&r'$4 o$ & /&r%'"#(&r +#b=e"% +-o#( be "o$+'ere&$ '$%er/re%e %o4e%-er &+ %o e**e"%#&%e %-e 5-o(e /#r/o+e o* %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$&$ o$e +e"%'o$ '+ $o% %o be &((o5e %o e*e&% &$o%-er, '* b) &$) re&+o$&b(e"o$+%r#"%'o$, %-e %5o "&$ be m&e %o +%&$ %o4e%-er.

.n other words, the court must harmoni(e them, if practicable, and must lean in faorof a construction which will render eery word operatie, rather than one which mayma/e the words idle and nugatory"<= :Emphasis supplied;

.f, howeer, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be c lear, resort to other aids isaailable" .n still the same case of Civil i!erties nion v. Executive ecretary, this Courte!pounded6

?hile it is permissible in this 'urisdiction to consult the eb&%e+ &$ /ro"ee'$4+ ofthe constitutional conention in order to arrie at the reason and purpose of theresulting Constitution, re+or% %-ere%o m&) be -& o$() 5-e$ o%-er 4#'e+ *&'( &++&' /ro"ee'$4+ &re /o5er(e++ %o v&r) %-e %erm+ o* %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$ 5-e$ %-eme&$'$4 '+ "(e&r " -ebates in the constitutional conention Dare of alue as showingthe iews of the indiidual members, and as indicating the reasons for their otes, butthey gie us no light as to the iews of the large ma'ority who did not tal/, much less of the mass of our fellow citi(ens whose otes at the polls gae that instrument the forceof fundamental law" e %-'$< '% +&*er %o "o$+%r#e %-e "o$+%'%#%'o$ *rom 5-&%&//e&r+ #/o$ '%+ *&"e.D T-e /ro/er '$%er/re%&%'o$ %-ere*ore e/e$+ more o$-o5 '% 5&+ #$er+%oo b) %-e /eo/(e &o/%'$4 '% %-&$ '$ %-e *r&mer++#$er+%&$'$4 %-ereo*.<> :Emphasis and underscoring supplied;

.t is in the conte!t of the foregoing bac/drop of constitutional refinement and 'urisprudentialapplication of the power of 'udicial reiew that respondents 7pea/er -e 0enecia, et. al. andinterenor 7enator Pimentel raise the noel argument that the Constitution has e!cludedimpeachment proceedings from the coerage of 'udicial reiew"

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents 7pea/er -e 0enecia et. al. that impeachment is a

political action which cannot assume a 'udicial character" +ence, any &uestion, issue or incidentarising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of 'udicial reiew"<5

@or his part, interenor 7enator Pimentel contends that the 7enate$s Dsole power totryD impeachment cases<4 :2; entirely e!cludes the application of 'udicial re iew oer it and :8;necessarily includes the 7enate$s power to determine constitutional &uestions relatie toimpeachment proceedings"<3

.n furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside thescope of 'udicial re iew, respondents 7pea/er -e 0enecia, et. al. and interenor 7enatorPimentel rely heaily on American authorities, principally the ma'ority opinion in the caseof #ixon v. nited tates"= Thus, they contend that the e!ercise of 'udicial reiew oerimpeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers$ decision to

allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes it disturbs the systemof chec/s and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislatie chec/ on the 'udiciaryand it would create a lac/ of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief"=2 Respondents li/ewise



point to deliberations on the I7 Constitution to show the intent to isolate 'udicial power of reiewin cases of impeachment"

Respondents$ and interenors$ reliance upon American 'urisprudence, the American Constitutionand American authorities "&$$o% be credited to support the proposition that the 7enate$s Dsolepower to try and decide impeachment cases,D as proided for under Art" 1., 7ec" 9:>; of theConstitution, is a te!tually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining toimpeachment to the legislature, to the total e!clusion of the power of 'udicial reiew to chec/and restrain any grae abuse of the impeachment process" Nor can it reasonably support theinterpretation that it necessarily confers upon the 7enate the inherently 'udicial power todetermine constitutional &uestions incident to impeachment proceedings"

7aid American 'urisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are ofdubious application for these are no longer controlling within our 'urisdiction and hae onlylimited persuasie merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned" As held in the caseof Garcia vs. CO&EEC ,=8 DFiGn resoling constitutional disputes, Fthis CourtG should not bebeguiled by foreign 'urisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they hae beendictated by different constitutional settings and needs"D=9 .ndeed, although the PhilippineConstitution can trace its origins to that of the Inited 7tates, their paths of deelopment haelong since dierged" .n the colorful words of @ather Bernas, DFwGe hae cut the umbilical cord"D

The ma'or difference between the 'udicial power of the Philippine 7upreme Court and that of theI"7" 7upreme Court is that while the power of 'udicial reiew is only impliedly granted to theI"7" 7upreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine 7upreme Courtand lower courts, as expressly provided /or in the Constitution, is not 'ust a power but also

a #%), and it was 4've$ &$ e/&$e e*'$'%'o$ to include the power to correct any graeabuse of discretion on the part of any goernment branch or instrumentality"

There are also glaring distinctions between the I"7" Constitution and the Philippine Constitutionwith respect to the power of the +ouse of Representaties oer impeachment proceedings"?hile the I"7" Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the +ouse ofRepresentaties without limitation,=< our Constitution, though esting in the +ouse ofRepresentaties the e!clusie power to initiate impeachment cases,== proides for seerallimitations to the e!ercise of such power as embodied in 7ection 9:8;, :9;, :<; and :=;, Article 1.thereof" These limitations include the manner of filing, re&uired ote to impeach, and the oneyear bar on the impeachment of one and the same official"

Respondents are also of the iew that 'udicial reiew of impeachments undermines their finality

and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the 'udiciary" Thus, they call upon thisCourt to e!ercise 'udicial statesmanship on the principle that Dwheneer possible, the Courtshould defer to the 'udgment of the people e!pressed legislatiely, recogni(ing full well the perilsof 'udicial willfulness and pride"D=>

But did not the people also e!press their will when they instituted the aboe%mentionedsafeguards in the ConstitutionL This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leae thematter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress" .nstead, it proided for certain well%defined limits, or in the language of Ba%er v. Carr ,=5D'udicially discoerable standardsD fordetermining the alidity of the e!ercise of such discretion, through the power of 'udicial reiew"

The cases of 0omulo v. 1ni$uez =4 and Ale2andrino v. 3uezon,=3 cited by respondents in supportof the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of 'udicial reiew, are not inpoint" These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the

legislature to perform non%ministerial acts, and do not concern the e!ercise of the power of 'udicial reiew"

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court e!ercised the power of 'udicial reiewoer congressional action" Thus, in antia$o v. Guin$ona, )r.,> this Court ruled that it is wellwithin the power and 'urisdiction of the Court to in&uire whether the 7enate or its officialscommitted a iolation of the Constitution or grae abuse of discretion in the e!ercise of theirfunctions and prerogaties" .n *anada v. An$ara,>2 in see/ing to nullify an act of the Philippine7enate on the ground that it contraened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a

'usticiable controersy and that when an action of the legislatie branch is seriously alleged tohae infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the 'udiciaryto settle the dispute" .n Bondoc v. Pineda,>8 this Court declared null and oid a resolution of the+ouse of Representaties withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of acongressman as a member of the +ouse Electoral Tribunal for being iolatie of 7ection 25,

Article 0. of the Constitution" .n Coseten$ v. &itra,>9 it held that the resolution of whether the

+ouse representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportionalrepresentation of the political parties as proided in 7ection 24, Article 0. of the Constitution issub'ect to 'udicial reiew" .n Daza v. in$son,>< it held that the act of the +ouse ofRepresentaties in remoing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is sub'ect to

'udicial reiew" .n *anada v. Cuenco,>= it held that although under the Constitution, the legislatiepower is ested e!clusiely in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts topass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress" .n An$ara v. Electoral Commission,>> it ruledthat confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespectie ofwhether his election is contested, is not essential before such member%elect may discharge theduties and en'oy the priileges of a member of the National Assembly"

@inally, there e!ists no constitutional basis for the contention that the e!ercise of 'udicial reiewoer impeachment proceedings would upset the system of chec/s and balances" 0erily, theConstitution is to be interpreted as a whole and Done section is not to be allowed to defeat

another"D>5 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence andinterdependence that insures that no branch of goernment act beyond the powers assigned toit by the Constitution"

ssential Re!uisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in An$ara v. Electoral Commission, the courts$ power of 'udicial reiew, li/ealmost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is sub'ect to seeral limitations, namely6 :2; anactual case or controersy calling for the e!ercise of 'udicial power :8; the person challengingthe act must hae DstandingD to challenge he must hae a personal and substantial interest inthe case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct in'ury as a result of its enforcement:9; the &uestion of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and :<;the issue of constitutionality must be the ery lis mota of the case"

! ! ! Een then, this power of 'udicial reiew is limited to actual cases andcontroersies to be e!ercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, andlimited further to the constitutional &uestion raised or the ery lis mota presented" Anyattempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal &uestions and tosterile conclusions unrelated to actualities" Narrowed as its function is in this manner,the 'udiciary does not pass upon &uestions of wisdom, 'ustice or e!pediency oflegislation" More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality tolegislatie enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by theConstitution but also because the 'udiciary in the determination of actual cases andcontroersies must reflect the wisdom and 'ustice of the people as e!pressed throughtheir representaties in the e!ecutie and legislatie departments of thegoernment">4 :.talics in the original;

Standing



ocus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in thecase such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct in'ury as a result of thegoernmental act that is being challenged" The gist of the &uestion of standing is whether aparty alleges such personal sta/e in the outcome of the controersy as to assure that concreteaderseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends forillumination of difficult constitutional &uestions">3

(ntervenor 7oriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do nothae standing since only the Chief *ustice has sustained and will sustain direct personalin'ury" Amicus curiae former *ustice Minister and 7olicitor eneral Estelito Mendo(a similarlycontends"

Ipon the other hand, the 7olicitor eneral asserts that petitioners hae standing since thisCourt had, in the past, accorded standing to ta!payers, oters, concerned citi(ens, legislators incases inoling paramount public interest5 and transcendental importance,52 and thatprocedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branchesof the goernment hae /ept themseles within the limits of the Constitution and the laws andthat they hae not abused the discretion gien to them"58 Amicus curiae -ean RaulPangalangan of the I"P" College of Haw is of the same opinion, c iting transcendentalimportance and the well%entrenched rule e!ception that, when the real party in interest is unableto indicate his rights by see/ing the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief *ustice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself ino/e the 'urisdiction of this Court, the courts will grantpetitioners standing"

There is, howeer, a difference between the rule on real%party%in%interest and the rule on

standing, for the former is a concept of ciil procedure59 while the latter has constitutionalunderpinnings"5< .n iew of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooes the Court toreiterate the ruling in 4ilos!ayan, (nc. v. &orato5= to clarify what is meant by locus standi and todistinguish it from real party%in%interest"

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been notedby authorities thus6 D.t is important to note " " " that standing because of itsconstitutional and public policy underpinnings, is ery different from &uestions relatingto whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue"

Although all three re&uirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain partiescan maintain an action, standing restrictions re&uire a partial consideration of themerits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the 'udiciary incertain areas"

7tanding is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits arebrought not by parties who hae been personally in'ured by the operation of a law orby official action ta/en, but by concerned citi(ens, ta!payers or oters who actuallysue in the public interest" +ence the &uestion in standing is whether such parties haeDalleged such a personal sta/e in the outcome of the controersy as to assure thatconcrete aderseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the courtso largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional &uestions"D

! ! !

#n the other hand, the &uestion as to Dreal party in interestD is whether he is Dthe partywho would be benefited or in'ured by the 'udgment, or the $party entitled to the aailsof the suit"$D5> :Citations omitted;

?hile rights personal to the Chief *ustice may hae been in'ured by the alleged unconstitutionalacts of the +ouse of Representaties, none of the petitioners before us asserts a iolation of the

personal rights of the Chief *ustice" #n the contrary, they inariably ino/e the indication oftheir own rights ) as ta!payers members of Congress citi(ens, indiidually or in a class suitand members of the bar and of the legal profession ) which were supposedly iolated by thealleged unconstitutional acts of the +ouse of Representaties"

.n a long line of cases, howeer, concerned citi(ens, ta!payers and legislators when specificre&uirements hae been met hae been gien s tanding by this Court"

?hen suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statutemust be direct and personal" +e must be able to show, not only that the law or any goernmentact is inalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct in'ury

as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way" .tmust appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right orpriilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be sub'ected to some burdens orpenalties by reason of the statute or act complained of"55 .n fine, when the proceeding inolesthe assertion of a public right,54 the mere fact that he is a citi(en satisfies the re&uirement ofpersonal interest"

.n the case of a taxpayer , he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds areillegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or thatthere is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an inalid or unconstitutionallaw"53 Before he can ino/e the power of 'udicial reiew, howeer, he must specifically proe thathe has sufficient interest in preenting the illegal e!penditure of money raised by ta!ation andthat he would sustain a direct in'ury as a result of the enforcement of the &uestioned statute orcontract" .t is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the

public"4

At all eents, courts are ested with discretion as to whether or not a ta!payer$s suit should beentertained"42 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, gien their allegationthat any impending transmittal to the 7enate of the Articles of .mpeachment and the ensuingtrial of the Chief *ustice will necessarily inole the e!penditure of public funds"

As for a le$islator , he is allowed to sue to &uestion the alidity of any official action which heclaims infringes his prerogaties as a legislator"48 .ndeed, a member of the +ouse ofRepresentaties has standing to maintain iniolate the prerogaties, powers and priilegesested by the Constitution in his office"49

?hile an association has legal personality to represent its members,4< especially when it is

composed of substantial ta!payers and the outcome will affect their ital interests,4= the mereinocation by the (nte$rated Bar o/ the Philippines or any mem!er o/ the le$al pro/ession of theduty to presere the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice toclothe it with standing" .ts interest is too general" .t is shared by other groups and the wholeciti(enry" +oweer, a reading of the petitions shows that it has adanced constitutional issueswhich desere the attention of this Court in iew of their seriousness, noelty and weight asprecedents"4>.t, therefore, behooes this Court to rela! the rules on standing and to resole theissues presented by it"

.n the same ein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citi(ens, persons intereningmust be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned45 to enable the courtto deal properly with all interests inoled in the suit,44 for a 'udgment in a class suit, whetherfaorable or unfaorable to the class, is, under theres 2udicata principle, binding on all membersof the class whether or not they were before the court"43 ?here it clearly appears that not all

interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the diergent issues raised in thenumerous petitions before this Court, "R" No" 2>9>= as a class suit ought to fail" 7incepetitioners additionallyallege standing as citi(ens and ta!payers, howeer, their petition willstand"



The Philippine Bar Association, in "R" No" 2><9, ino/es the sole ground of transcendentalimportance, while Atty" -ioscoro I" 0alle'os, in "R" No" 2>935, is mum on his standing"

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructiedeterminants formulated by former 7upreme Court *ustice @lorentino P" @eliciano areinstructie6 :2; the character of the funds or other assets inoled in the case :8; the presenceof a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondentagency or instrumentality of the goernment and :9; the lac/ of any other party with a moredirect and specific interest in raising the &uestions being raised"3 Applying these determinants,this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance"

.n not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of apetitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to thepeople, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public"32 7uch liberalitydoes not, howeer, mean that the re&uirement that a party should hae an interest in the matteris totally eliminated" A party must, at the ery least, still plead the e!istence of such interest, itnot being one of which courts can ta/e 'udicial notice" .n petitioner 0alle'os$ case, he failed toallege any interest in the case" +e does not thus hae standing"

?ith respect to the motions for interention, Rule 23, 7ection 8 of the Rules of Court re&uires aninterenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of theparties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adersely affected by a distributionor other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof" ?hileinterention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant showsfacts which satisfy the re&uirements of the law authori(ing interention"38

.n .nterenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Kuirino Kuadra$s case, they see/ to 'oinpetitioners Candelaria, et. al. in "R" No" 2>8>8" 7ince, sae for one additional issue, theyraise the same issues and the same standing, and no ob'ection on the part of petitionersCandelaria, et" al" has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion forHeae of Court to .nterene and Petition%in%.nterention"

Nagmamalasa/it na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, .nc", et. al. sought to 'oin petitioner @rancisco in "R" No" 2>8>2" .no/ing their right as citi(ens to interene,alleging that Dthey will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the +ouse ofRepresentaties is successful,D this Court found the re&uisites for interention had beencomplied with"

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in "R" Nos" 2>8>2, 2>8>8, 2>8>9, 2>855,2>838, 2>83=, and 2>92 were of transcendental importance, ?orld ?ar .. 0eteransHegionnaires of the Philippines, .nc" filed a DPetition%in%.nterention with Heae to .ntereneD toraise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against theChief *ustice is alid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution"

@inding that Nagmamalasa/it na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, .nc", etal. and ?orld ?ar .. 0eterans Hegionnaires of the Philippines, .nc" possess a legal interest in thematter in litigation the respectie motions to interene were hereby granted"

7enator A&uilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to interene for the limited purpose ofma/ing of record and arguing a point of iew that differs with 7enate President -rilon$s" +ealleges that submitting to this Court$s 'urisdiction as the 7enate President does will undermine

the independence of the 7enate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of.mpeachment are transmitted to it from the +ouse of Representaties" Clearly, 7enator Pimentelpossesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress againstwhich the herein petitions are directed" @or this reason, and to fully entilate all substantial

issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to .nterene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue"

Hastly, as to *aime N" 7oriano$s motion to interene, the same must be denied for, while heasserts an interest as a ta!payer, he failed to meet the standing re&uirement for bringingta!payer$s suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec ,39 to 'it 6

! ! ! ?hile, concededly, the elections to be held inole the e!penditure of publicmoneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their ta! money isDbeing e!tracted and spent in iolation of specific constitutional protection againstabuses of legislatie power,D or that there is a misapplication of such funds by

respondent C#MEHEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improperpurpose" Neither do petitioners see/ to restrain respondent from wasting public fundsthrough the enforcement of an inalid or unconstitutional law"3< :Citations omitted;

.n praying for the dismissal of the petitions, 7oriano failed een to allege that the act ofpetitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected toany improper purpose" Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice toclothe him with standing"

Ripeness and Prematurit"

.n *an v. &acapa$al ,3= this Court, through Chief *ustice @ernando, held that for a case to beconsidered ripe for ad'udication, Dit is a prere&uisite that something had by then been

accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture"D3>

#nlythen may the courts pass on the alidity of what was done, if and when the latter is challengedin an appropriate legal proceeding"

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the alidity of the filing of the secondimpeachment complaint against the Chief *ustice in accordance with the +ouse .mpeachmentRules adopted by the 28th Congress, the constitutionality of which is &uestioned" The&uestioned acts haing been carried out, i"e", the second impeachment complaint had been filedwith the +ouse of Representaties and the 82 Rules hae already been already promulgatedand enforced, the prere&uisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished andperformed before suit, as *an v. &acapa$al holds, has been complied with"

Related to the issue of ripeness is the &uestion of whether the instant petitions arepremature" Amicus curiaeformer 7enate President *oito R" 7alonga opines that there may beno urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on&uestions of constitutionality anyway" +e thus recommends that all remedies in the +ouse and7enate should first be e!hausted"

Ta/ing a s imilar stand is -ean Raul Pangalangan of the I"P" College of Haw who suggests tothis Court to ta/e 'udicial notice of on%going attempts to encourage signatories to the secondimpeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the +ouse .mpeachmentRules proide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional &uestions themseles whenthe Articles of .mpeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the 7enate"The dean maintains that een assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the 7enate, theChief *ustice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss"

The dean$s position does not persuade" @irst, the withdrawal by the Representaties of their

signatures would not, by itself, cure the +ouse .mpeachment Rules of their constitutionalinfirmity" Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the &uestioned secondimpeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of 7ections 9:8; and :9; of

Article 1. of the Constitution35 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their in'uries"



7econd and most importantly, the futility of see/ing remedies from either or both +ouses ofCongress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as preiously discussed, neitherthe +ouse of Representaties nor the 7enate is c lothed with the power to rule withdefinitieness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is e!clusiely ested in the 'udiciary by the earlier &uoted 7ection .,

Article 0... of the Constitution" Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power togrant it"

Justicia#ilit"

.n the leading case of *anada v. Cuenco,34 Chief *ustice Roberto Concepcion defined the term

Dpolitical &uestion,D viz 6

FTGhe term Dpolitical &uestionD connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinaryparlance, namely, a &uestion of policy" .n other words, in the language of Corpus *uris7ecundum, it refers to Dthose &uestions which, under the Constitution, are tobe decided !y the people in their soereign capacity, or in regard to which /ulldiscretionary authority has been delegated to the Hegislature or e!ecutie branch ofthe oernment"D .t is concerned with issues dependent upon the 'isdom, not legality,of a particular measure"33 :.talics in the original;

Prior to the 2359 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason,this Court acillated on its stance of ta/ing cogni(ance of cases which inoled political&uestions" .n some cases, this Court hid behind the coer of the political &uestion doctrine andrefused to e!ercise its power of 'udicial reiew"2 .n other cases, howeer, despite the seemingpolitical nature of the therein issues inoled, this Court assumed 'urisdiction wheneer it foundconstitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies"22 Een inthe landmar/ 2344 case of )avellana v. Executive ecretary 28 which raised the issue of whether the 2359 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political &uestiondoctrine and too/ cogni(ance thereof" Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political&uestion, it being a &uestion decided by the people in their soereign capacity"

The fre&uency with which this Court ino/ed the political &uestion doctrine to refuse to ta/e 'urisdiction oer certain cases during the Marcos regime motiated Chief *ustice Concepcion,when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court$s power of 'udicial reiewand its application on issues inoling political &uestions, viz 6

MR" C#NCEPC.#N" Than/ you, Mr" Presiding #fficer"

. will spea/ on the 'udiciary" Practically, eerybody has made, . suppose, the usual comment thatthe 'udiciary is the wea/est among the three ma'or branches of the serice" 7ince the legislatureholds the purse and the e!ecutie the sword, the 'udiciary has nothing with which to enforce itsdecisions or commands e!cept the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all,reflects the will of od, and is the most powerful of all other powers without e!ception" ! ! ! Andso, with the body$s indulgence, . will proceed to read the proisions drafted by the Committee onthe *udiciary"

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions" .t says6

The 'udicial power shall be ested in one 7upreme Court and in such lower courts asmay be established by law"

. suppose nobody can &uestion it"

The ne!t proision is new in our constitutional law" . will read it first and e!plain"

*udicial power includes the duty of courts of 'ustice to settle actual controersiesinoling rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determinewhether or not there has been a grae abuse of discretion amounting to lac/ or e!cessof 'urisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the goernment"

@ellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our e!perienceduring martial law" As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, butthe ro(e o* %-e =#'"'&r) #r'$4 %-e e/o+e re4'me 5&+ m&rre "o$+'er&b() b)%-e "'r"#m+%&$"e %-&% '$ & $#mber o* "&+e+ &4&'$+% %-e 4over$me$%, 5-'"- %-e$

-& $o (e4&( e*e$+e &% &((, %-e +o('"'%or 4e$er&( +e% #/ %-e e*e$+e o* /o('%'"&(@#e+%'o$+ &$ 4o% &5&) 5'%- '%. A+ & "o$+e@#e$"e, "er%&'$ /r'$"'/(e+ "o$"er$'$4/&r%'"#(&r() %-e 5r'% o* ha#eas corpus, %-&% '+, %-e &#%-or'%) o* "o#r%+ %o orer %-ere(e&+e o* /o('%'"&( e%&'$ee+, &$ o%-er m&%%er+ re(&%e %o %-e o/er&%'o$ &$e**e"% o* m&r%'&( (&5 *&'(e be"&#+e %-e 4over$me$% +e% #/ %-e e*e$+e o*/o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$. And the 7upreme Court said6 D?ell, since it is political, we hae noauthority to pass upon it"D T-e Comm'%%ee o$ %-e ;#'"'&r) *ee(+ %-&% %-'+ 5&+ $o% &/ro/er +o(#%'o$ o* %-e @#e+%'o$+ '$vo(ve. I% ' $o% mere() re@#e+% &$e$"ro&"-me$% #/o$ %-e r'4-%+ o* %-e /eo/(e, b#% '%, '$ e**e"%, e$"o#r&4e *#r%-erv'o(&%'o$+ %-ereo* #r'$4 %-e m&r%'&( (&5 re4'me. . am sure the members of the Barare familiar with this situation" But for the benefit of the Members of the Commissionwho are not lawyers, allow me to e!plain" . will start with a decision of the 7upremeCourt in 2359 on the case of )avellana vs. the ecretary o/ )ustice, if . am notmista/en" Martial law was announced on 7eptember 88, although the proclamation

was dated 7eptember 82" The obious reason for the delay in its publication was thatthe administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on 7eptember82" 7o that when martial law was announced on 7eptember 88, the media hardlypublished anything about it" .n fact, the media could not publish any story not onlybecause our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those whosucceeded them in their 'obs were under mortal threat of being the ob'ect of wrath ofthe ruling party" The 2352 Constitutional Conention had begun on *une 2, 2352 andby 7eptember 82 or 88 had not finished the Constitution it had barely agreed in thefundamentals of the Constitution" . forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martiallaw, some delegates to that 2352 Constitutional Conention, do(ens of them, werepic/ed up" #ne of them was our ery own colleague, Commissioner Calderon" 7o, theunfinished draft of the Constitution was ta/en oer by representaties of MalacaJang".n 25 days, they finished what the delegates to the 2352 Constitutional Conentionhad been unable to accomplish for about 2< months" The draft of the 2359Constitution was presented to the President around -ecember 2, 2358, whereupon

the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation ofsome proisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much lesspublic discussions of certain matters of public concern" The purpose was presumablyto allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was tobe held sometime in *anuary 2359" .f . may use a word famous by our colleague,Commissioner #ple, during the interregnum, howeer, the draft of the Constitution wasanaly(ed and critici(ed with such a telling effect that MalacaJang felt the danger of itsapproal" 7o, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite andannounced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from *anuary2 to *anuary 2=" But the &uestions to be submitted in the referendum were notannounced until the ee of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed superisionnot of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as Dciti(ensassemblies or barangays"D Thus the barangays came into e!istence" The &uestions tobe propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was

unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers gien in the referendum shouldbe regarded as the otes cast in the plebiscite" Thereupon, a motion was filed with the7upreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended" ?hen themotion was being heard before the 7upreme Court, the Minister of *ustice deliered to



the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution wasalready in force because the oerwhelming ma'ority of the otes cast in thereferendum faored the Constitution" .mmediately after the departure of the Minister of *ustice, . proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard" . theninformed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the2359 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force"

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null andoid" The main defense put up by the goernment was that the issue was a political&uestion and that the court had no 'urisdiction to entertain the case"

! ! !

The goernment said that in a referendum held from *anuary 2 to *anuary 2=, theast ma'ority ratified the draft of the Constitution" Note that all members of the7upreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of anyreferendum in their respectie places of residence, much less did they participate inthe alleged referendum" None of them saw any referendum proceeding"

.n the Philippines, een local gossips spread li/e wild fire" 7o, a ma'ority of themembers of the Court felt that there had been no referendum"

7econd, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite" T-ere '+ & b'4 '**ere$"ebe%5ee$ & re*ere$#m &$ & /(eb'+"'%e. #% &$o%-er 4ro#/ o* =#+%'"e+ #/-e( %-e

e*e$+e %-&% %-e '++#e 5&+ & /o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$. -ere#/o$, %-e) '+m'++e %-e"&+e. T-'+ '+ $o% %-e o$() m&=or "&+e '$ 5-'"- %-e /(e& o* D/o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$D5&+ +e% #/. T-ere -&ve bee$ & $#mber o* o%-er "&+e+ '$ %-e /&+%.

! ! ! T-e e*e$+e o* %-e /o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$ 5&+ re=e"%e be"&#+e %-e '++#e 5&+"(e&r() =#+%'"'&b(e.

! ! !

! ! ! ?hen your Committee on the *udiciary began to perform its functions, it facedthe following &uestions6 ?hat is 'udicial powerL ?hat is a political &uestionL

The 7upreme Court, li/e all other courts, has one main function6 to settle actualcontroersies inoling conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable"There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a 'udiciaryparty" .n a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to performher duties as a wife" The Court said6 D?e can tell your wife what her duties as such areand that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically todischarge her main marital duty to her husband" There are some rights guaranteed bylaw, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would behighly derogatory to human dignity"D

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of 7ection . proides that6

*udicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controersies inoling rightswhich are legally demandable or enforceable " " "

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical &uestions" I$ &/re+'e$%'&( +)+%em o* 4over$me$%, %-e S#/reme Co#r% -&+, &(+o &$o%-er

'm/or%&$% *#$"%'o$. T-e /o5er+ o* 4over$me$% &re 4e$er&(() "o$+'ere 'v'e'$%o %-ree br&$"-e+ %-e Le4'+(&%'ve, %-e Ee"#%'ve &$ %-e ;#'"'&r). E&"- o$e'+ +#/reme 5'%-'$ '%+ o5$ +/-ere &$ '$e/e$e$% o* %-e o%-er+. e"&#+e o* %-&%+#/rem&") /o5er %o e%erm'$e 5-e%-er & 4've$ (&5 '+ v&(' or $o% '+ ve+%e '$"o#r%+ o* =#+%'"e.

r'e*() +%&%e, "o#r%+ o* =#+%'"e e%erm'$e %-e ('m'%+ o* /o5er o* %-e &4e$"'e+&$ o**'"e+ o* %-e 4over$me$% &+ 5e(( &+ %-o+e o* '%+ o**'"er+. I$ o%-er 5or+, %-e

=#'"'&r) '+ %-e *'$&( &rb'%er o$ %-e @#e+%'o$ 5-e%-er or $o% & br&$"- o*4over$me$% or &$) o* '%+ o**'"'&(+ -&+ &"%e 5'%-o#% =#r'+'"%'o$ or '$ e"e++ o*

=#r'+'"%'o$, or +o "&/r'"'o#+() &+ %o "o$+%'%#%e &$ &b#+e o* '+"re%'o$&mo#$%'$4 %o e"e++ o* =#r'+'"%'o$ or (&"< o* =#r'+'"%'o$. T-'+ '+ $o% o$() &

=#'"'&( /o5er b#% & #%) %o /&++ =#4me$% o$ m&%%er+ o* %-'+ $&%#re.

T-'+ '+ %-e b&"<4ro#$ o* /&r&4r&/- 2 o* Se"%'o$ 1, 5-'"- me&$+ %-&% %-e "o#r%+"&$$o% -ere&*%er ev&e %-e #%) %o +e%%(e m&%%er+ o* %-'+ $&%#re, b) "(&'m'$4 %-&%+#"- m&%%er+ "o$+%'%#%e & /o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$.

. hae made these e!tended remar/s to the end that the Commissioners may hae aninitial food for thought on the sub'ect of the 'udiciary"29 :.talics in the original emphasissupplied;

-uring the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief *ustice Concepcion furtherclarified the concept of 'udicial power, thus6

MR. NOLLEO. T-e Ge$%(em&$ #+e %-e %erm D=#'"'&( /o5erD b#% =#'"'&( /o5er '+ $o% ve+%e '$ %-e S#/reme Co#r% &(o$e b#% &(+o '$ o%-er (o5er "o#r%+ &+ m&)be "re&%e b) (&5.

MR. CONCEPCION. e+.

MR. NOLLEO. A$ +o, '+ %-'+ o$() &$ e&m/(e>

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I <$o5 %-'+ '+ $o%. T-e Ge$%(em&$ +eem+ %o 'e$%'*)/o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$+ 5'%- =#r'+'"%'o$&( @#e+%'o$+. #% %-ere '+ & '**ere$"e.

MR. NOLLEO. e"&#+e o* %-e e/re++'o$ D=#'"'&( /o5erD>

MR. CONCEPCION. No. ;#'"'&( /o5er, &+ I +&', re*er+ %o or'$&r) "&+e+ b#%5-ere %-ere '+ & @#e+%'o$ &+ %o 5-e%-er %-e 4over$me$% -& &#%-or'%) or -&&b#+e '%+ &#%-or'%) %o %-e e%e$% o* (&"<'$4 =#r'+'"%'o$ or e"e++ o*

=#r'+'"%'o$, %-&% '+ $o% & /o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$. T-ere*ore, %-e "o#r% -&+ %-e #%) %oe"'e.

! ! !

@R" BERNA7" Iltimately, therefore, it will always hae to be decided by the 7upremeCourt according to the new numerical need for otes"

#n another point, '+ '% %-e '$%e$%'o$ o* Se"%'o$ 1 %o o &5&) 5'%- %-e /o('%'"&(@#e+%'o$ o"%r'$e>



MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. ERNAS. I% '+ $o%.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, be"&#+e 5-e$ever %-ere '+ &$ &b#+e o* '+"re%'o$,&mo#$%'$4 %o & (&"< o* =#r'+'"%'o$. . .

FR. ERNAS. So, I &m +&%'+*'e 5'%- %-e &$+5er %-&% '% '+ $o% '$%e$e %o o&5&) 5'%- %-e /o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$ o"%r'$e.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, "er%&'$() $o%.

-e$ %-'+ /rov'+'o$ 5&+ or'4'$&(() r&*%e, '% +o#4-% %o e*'$e 5-&% '+ =#'"'&(/o5er. #% %-e Ge$%(em&$ 5'(( $o%'"e '% +&)+, D =#'"'&( /o5er '$"(#e+D &$ %-ere&+o$ be'$4 %-&% %-e e*'$'%'o$ %-&% 5e m'4-% m&<e m&) $o% "over &(( /o++'b(e&re&+.

FR. ERNAS. So, %-'+ '+ $o% &$ &%%em/% %o +o(ve %-e /rob(em+ &r'+'$4 *rom %-e/o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$ o"%r'$e.

MR. CONCEPCION. I% e*'$'%e() oe+ $o% e('m'$&%e %-e *&"% %-&% %r#() /o('%'"&(@#e+%'o$+ &re be)o$ %-e /&(e o* =#'"'&( /o5er.2< :Emphasis supplied;

@rom the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 234> Constitutional Commission, it is clearthat 'udicial power is not only a power it is also a duty, a #%) which cannot be abdicated by themere specter of this creature called the political &uestion doctrine" Chief *ustice Concepcionhastened to clarify, howeer, that 7ection 2, Article 0... was not intended to do away with Dtrulypolitical &uestions"D @rom this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political&uestions6 :2; Dtruly political &uestionsD and :8; those which Dare not truly political &uestions"D

Truly political &uestions are thus beyond 'udicial reiew, the reason for respect of the doctrine ofseparation of powers to be maintained" #n the other hand, by irtue of 7ection 2, Article 0... ofthe Constitution, courts can reiew &uestions which are not truly political in nature"

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the IP College of Haw, thisCourt has in fact in a number of cases ta/en 'urisdiction oer &uestions which are not truly

political following the effectiity of the present Constitution"

.n &arcos v. &an$lapus,2= this Court, spea/ing through Madame *ustice .rene Cortes, held6

The present Constitution limits resort to the political &uestion doctrine and broadensthe scope of 'udicial in&uiry into areas which the Court, under preious constitutions,would hae normally left to the political departments to decide"2> ! ! !

.n Ben$zon v. enate Blue 0i!!on Committee,25 through *ustice Teodoro Padilla, this Courtdeclared6

The Dallocation of constitutional boundariesD is a tas/ that this Court must performunder the Constitution" Moreoer, as held in a recent case, D%-e /o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$

o"%r'$e $e'%-er '$%er/o+e+ &$ ob+%&"(e %o =#'"'&( e%erm'$&%'o$ o* %-e r'v&("(&'m+. T-e =#r'+'"%'o$ %o e('m'% "o$+%'%#%'o$&( bo#$&r'e+ -&+ bee$ 4've$ %o%-'+ Co#r%. I% "&$$o% &b'"&%e %-&% ob('4&%'o$ m&$&%e b) %-e 18: Co$+%'%#%'o$,

&(%-o#4- +&' /rov'+'o$ b) $o me&$+ oe+ &5&) 5'%- %-e &//('"&b'('%) o* %-e/r'$"'/(e '$ &//ro/r'&%e "&+e+.D24 :Emphasis and underscoring supplied;

And in Daza v. in$son,23 spea/ing through *ustice .sagani Cru(, this Court ruled6

.n the case now before us, the 'urisdictional ob'ection becomes een less tenable anddecisie" The reason is that, een if we were to assume that the issue presentedbefore us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resoling itunder the e/&$e 'urisdiction conferred upon us that now coers, in proper cases,een the political &uestion"22 ! ! ! :Emphasis and underscoring supplied";

7ection 2, Article 0..., of the Court does not define what are 'usticiable political &uestions andnon%'usticiable political &uestions, howeer" .dentification of these two species of political&uestions may be problematic" There has been no clear standard" The American case of Ba%erv. Carr 222 attempts to proide some6

! ! ! Prominent on the surface of any case held to inole a political &uestion is founda te!tually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinatepolitical department or a lac/ of 'udicially discoerable and manageable standards forresoling it or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a/ind clearly for non%'udicial discretion or the impossibility of a court$s underta/ingindependent resolution without e!pressing lac/ of the respect due coordinatebranches of goernment or an unusual need for &uestioning adherence to a politicaldecision already made or thepotentiality of embarrassment from multifariouspronouncements by arious departments on one &uestion"228 :Inderscoring supplied;

#f these standards, the more reliable hae been the first three6 :2; a te!tually demonstrableconstitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department :8; the lac/ of

'udicially discoerable and manageable standards for resoling it and :9; the impossibility ofdeciding without an initial policy determination of a /ind clearly for non%'udicial discretion" Thesestandards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that thepresence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present"

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of 'udicial reiewis radically different from our current concept, for 7ection 2, Article 0... of the Constitutionproides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon aconstitutional issue"

.n our 'urisdiction, the determination of a truly political &uestion from a non%'usticiable political&uestion lies in the answer to the &uestion of whether there are constitutionally imposed limitson powers or functions conferred upon political bodies" .f there are, then our courts are duty%bound to e!amine whether the branch or instrumentality of the goernment properly acted withinsuch limits" This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controersy"

These petitions raise fie substantial issues6

." ?hether the offenses alleged in the 7econd impeachment complaint constitute alidimpeachable offenses under the Constitution"

.." ?hether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with 7ection9:<;, Article 1. of the Constitution"



..." ?hether the legislatie in&uiry by the +ouse Committee on *ustice into the *udicial-eelopment @und is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandatedfiscal autonomy of the 'udiciary"

.0" ?hether 7ections 2= and 2> of Rule 0 of the Rules on .mpeachment adopted bythe 28th Congress are unconstitutional for iolating the proisions of 7ection 9, Article1. of the Constitution"

0" ?hether the second impeachment complaint is barred under 7ection 9:=; of Article1. of the Constitution"

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint oer whichthis Court has no 'urisdiction" More importantly, any discussion of this issue wouldre&uire this Court to ma/e a determination of what constitutes an impeachableoffense" 7uch a determination is a purely political &uestion which the Constitution hasleft to the sound discretion of the legislation" 7uch an intent is clear from thedeliberations of the Constitutional Commission"229

Although 7ection 8 of Article 1. of the Constitution enumerates si! grounds for impeachment,two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition" .nfact, an e!amination of the records of the 234> Constitutional Commission shows that theframers could find no better way to appro!imate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust andother high crimes than by alluding to both positie and negatie e!amples of both, withoutarriing at their clear cut definition or een a standard therefor"22< Clearly, the issue calls uponthis court to decide a non%'usticiable political &uestion which is beyond the scope of its 'udicialpower under 7ection 2, Article 0..."

$is Mota

.t is a well%settled ma!im of ad'udication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of agoernmental act should be aoided wheneer possible" Thus, in the case of otto v.Commission on Elections,22= this Court held6

! ! ! .t is a well%established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional&uestion and decide a law to be unconstitutional or inalid, unless such &uestion israised by the parties and that when it is raised, '* %-e re"or &(+o /re+e$%+ +omeo%-er 4ro#$ #/o$ 5-'"- %-e "o#r% m&) re+% '%+ =#4me$%, %-&% "o#r+e 5'(( be&o/%e &$ %-e "o$+%'%#%'o$&( @#e+%'o$ 5'(( be (e*% *or "o$+'er&%'o$ #$%'( & "&+e&r'+e+ '$ 5-'"- & e"'+'o$ #/o$ +#"- @#e+%'o$ 5'(( be #$&vo'&b(e"22> FEmphasisand underscoring suppliedG

The same principle was applied in uz arms v. ecretary o/ A$rarian 0e/orm,225 where thisCourt inalidated 7ections 29 and 98 of Republic Act No" >>=5 for being confiscatory andiolatie of due process, to wit6

.t has been established that %-'+ Co#r% 5'(( &++#me =#r'+'"%'o$ over &"o$+%'%#%'o$&( @#e+%'o$ o$() '* '% '+ +-o5$ %-&% %-e e++e$%'&( re@#'+'%e+ o* &

=#'"'&( '$@#'r) '$%o +#"- & @#e+%'o$ &re *'r+% +&%'+*'e" Thus, there must be anactual case or controersy inoling a conflict of legal rights susceptible of 'udicialdetermination, the constitutional &uestion must hae been opportunely raised by theproper party, and %-e re+o(#%'o$ o* %-e @#e+%'o$ '+ #$&vo'&b() $e"e++&r) %o %-e

e"'+'o$ o* %-e "&+e '%+e(* "224FEmphasis suppliedG

7uccinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unaoidableand is the ery lis mota or crux of the controersy"

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all see/ing the inalidity of the secondimpeachment complaint, collectiely raise seeral constitutional issues upon which the outcomeof this controersy could possibly be made to rest" .n determining whether one, some or all ofthe remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the relatedcannon of ad'udication that Dthe court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than isre&uired by the precise facts to which it is applied"D223

.n "R" No" 2>92, petitioners Heonilo R" Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the

second impeachment complaint is inalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution28

calling for a legislatie in&uiry into the *-@, which Resolution and legislatie in&uiry petitioners claim toli/ewise be unconstitutional for being6 :a; a iolation of the rules and 'urisprudence oninestigations in aid of legislation :b; an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers :c;a iolation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the 'udiciary and :d; an assaulton the independence of the 'udiciary"282

?ithout going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.$s claims, it is the studied opinion ofthis Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislatiein&uiry is too far remoed from the issue of the alidity of the second impeachment complaint"Moreoer, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court$s opinion, re&uire it to form a rule ofconstitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislatie in&uiries in general,which would thus be broader than is re&uired by the facts of these consolidated cases" Thisopinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners hae raised other grounds in

support of their petition which would not be adersely affected by the Court$s ruling"

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislatie in&uiries has alreadybeen enunciated by this Court in Ben$zon, )r. v. enate Blue 0i!!on Commttee,288 i(6

The 2345 Constitution e!pressly recogni(es the power of both houses of Congress toconduct in&uiries in aid of legislation" Thus, 7ection 82, Article 0. thereof proides6

The 7enate or the +ouse of Representaties or any of its respectie committees mayconduct in&uiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules ofprocedure" The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such in&uiries shall berespected"

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct in&uiries in aid of legislation is not,therefore absolute or unlimited" .ts e!ercise is circumscribed by the afore%&uotedproision of the Constitution" Thus, as proided therein, the inestigation must be Dinaid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedureD and that Dtherights of persons appearing in or affected by such in&uiries shall be respected"D .tfollows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify againstone$s self"289

.n "R" No" 2>8>8, interenors Romulo B" Macalintal and Pete Kuirino Kuadra, while 'oiningthe original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since thesecond impeachment complaint was erified and filed only by Representaties ilberto Teodoro,*r" and @eli! ?illiam @uentebella, the same does not fall under the proisions of 7ection 9 :<;,

Article 1. of the Constitution which reads6



7ection 9:<; .n case the erified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by atleast one%third of all the Members of the +ouse, the same shall constitute the Articlesof .mpeachment, and trial by the 7enate shall forthwith proceed"

They assert that while at least 42 members of the +ouse of Representaties signed aResolution of Endorsement.mpeachment, the same did not satisfy the re&uisites for theapplication of the afore%mentioned section in that the Derified complaint or resolution ofimpeachmentD was not filed Dby at least one%third of all the Members of the +ouse"D ?ith thee!ception of Representaties Teodoro and @uentebella, the signatories to said Resolution arealleged to hae erified the same merely as a DResolution of Endorsement"D .nterenors point tothe D0erificationD of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that6

D?e are the proponentssponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of theaboementioned Complaint of Representaties ilberto Teodoro and @eli! ?illiam B"@uentebella ! ! !D28<

.nterenors Macalintal and Kuadra further claim that what the Constitution re&uires in order forsaid second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of .mpeachment andfor trial in the 7enate to begin Dforthwith,D is that the erified complaint be Dfiled,D not merelyendorsed, by at least one%third of the Members of the +ouse of Representaties" Not haingcomplied with this re&uirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint shouldhae been calendared and referred to the +ouse Committee on *ustice under 7ection 9:8;,

Article 1. of the Constitution, viz 6

7ection 9:8; A erified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the+ouse of Representaties or by any citi(en upon a resolution of endorsement by anyMember thereof, which shall be included in the #rder of Business within ten sessiondays, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter" TheCommittee, after hearing, and by a ma'ority ote of all its Members, shall submit itsreport to the +ouse within si!ty session days from such referral, together with thecorresponding resolution" The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the+ouse within ten session days from receipt thereof"

.nterenors$ foregoing position is echoed by *ustice Maambong who opined that for 7ection 9:<;, Article 1. of the Constitution to apply, there should be 5> or more representaties whosigned and erified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and erified thesignatories to a resolution of impeachment" *ustice Maambong li/ewise asserted that theResolution of Endorsement.mpeachment signed by at least one%third of the members of the

+ouse of Representaties as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated bythe Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least oneMember wheneer a citi(en files a erified impeachment complaint"

?hile the foregoing issue, as argued by interenors Macalintal and Kuadra, does indeed limitthe scope of the constitutional issues to the proisions on impeachment, more compellingconsiderations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controersy"Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Kuadra, interenors in "R" No"2>8>8, hae raised this issue as a ground for inalidating the second impeachment complaint"Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitionswould not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in "R" No" 2>8>8, butthe efforts presented by the other petitioners as well"

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination

of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said interenors Macalintal and Kuadra hae 'oined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter$s arguments and issues as theirown" Conse&uently, they are not unduly pre'udiced by this Court$s decision"

.n sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, ine!tricably lin/ed as they are, constitutethe ery lis mota of the instant controersy6 :2; whether 7ections 2= and 2> of Rule 0 of the+ouse .mpeachment Rules adopted by the 28th Congress are unconstitutional for iolating theproisions of 7ection 9, Article 1. of the Constitution and :8; whether, as a result thereof, thesecond impeachment complaint is barred under 7ection 9:=; of Article 1. of the Constitution"

Judicial Restraint

7enator Pimentel urges this Court to e!ercise 'udicial restraint on the ground that the 7enate,sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases ofimpeachment" Again, this Court reiterates that the power of 'udicial reiew includes the power of

reiew oer 'usticiable issues in impeachment proceedings"

#n the other hand, respondents 7pea/er -e 0enecia et" al" argue that DFtGhere is a moralcompulsion for the Court to not assume 'urisdiction oer the impeachment because all theMembers thereof are sub'ect to impeachment"D28= But this argument is ery much li/e saying theHegislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members ofthe +ouse of Representaties are sub'ect to them"

The e!ercise of 'udicial restraint oer 'usticiable issues is not an option before this Court" Ad'udication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally dis&ualified" Nor can 'urisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controersy may bereferred"D28> #therwise, this Court would be shir/ing from its duty ested under Art" 0..., 7ec"2:8; of the Constitution" More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty%bound tota/e cogni(ance of the instant petitions"285 .n the august words of amicus curiae @ather Bernas,D'urisdiction is not 'ust a power it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced" To renounce it,een if it is e!atious, would be a dereliction of duty"D

Een in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of goernment cannotinhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to doso"284 #n the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controersy before it, ithas acted upon the matter Dnot with officiousness but in the discharge of an unaoidable dutyand, as always, with detachment and fairness"D283 After all, Dby FhisG appointment to the office,the public has laid on Fa member of the 'udiciaryG their confidence that FheG is mentally andmorally fit to pass upon the merits of their aried contentions" @or this reason, they e!pect FhimGto be fearless in FhisG pursuit to render 'ustice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be e&uipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lur/ing inFhisG office"D29

The duty to e!ercise the power of ad'udication regardless of interest had already been settled inthe case of A!!as v. enate Electoral *ri!unal "292 .n that case, the petitioners filed with therespondent 7enate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for -is&ualification or .nhibition of the 7enators%Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of 7ET Case No" 8%45 on the ground that allof them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein" This would hae reducedthe Tribunal$s membership to only its three *ustices%Members whose dis&ualification was notsought, leaing them to decide the matter" This Court held6

?here, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any 7enatorsitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the 7enate without initing thesame ob'ections to the substitute$s competence, the proposed mass dis&ualification, ifsanctioned and ordered, would leae the Tribunal no alternatie but to abandon a dutythat no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn

of the participation of its entire membership of 7enators"



To our mind, this is the oerriding consideration that the Tribunal be not preentedfrom discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance ofwhich is in the highest public interest as eidenced by its being e!pressly imposed byno less than the fundamental law"

.t is aptly noted in the first of the &uestioned Resolutions that the framers of theConstitution could not hae been unaware of the possibility of an election contest thatwould inole all 7enatorselect, si! of whom would ineitably hae to sit in 'udgmentthereon" .ndeed, such possibility might surface again in the wa/e of the 2338 electionswhen once more, but for the last time, all 8< seats in the 7enate will be at sta/e" etthe Constitution proides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of 7enators designated to the Tribunal whose dis&ualification may be

sought" Hitigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes ofindication in the fairness and sense of 'ustice of the Members of the Tribunal"*ustices and 7enators, singly and collectiely"

Het us not be misunderstood as saying that no 7enator%Member of the 7enateElectoral Tribunal may inhibit or dis&ualify himself from sitting in 'udgment on any casebefore said Tribunal" Eery &em!er of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that hispersonal interests or biases would stand in the way of an ob'ectie and impartial

'udgment" ?hat we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the 7enateElectoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of7enators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three *ustices%Members alone the power of alid ad'udication of a senatorial election contest"

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,298 it was held that6

Moreoer, to dis&ualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a ma'ority ofthem, is nothing short of pro tanto depriing the Court itself of its 'urisdiction asestablished by the fundamental law" -is&ualification of a 'udge is a depriation of his

'udicial power" And if that 'udge is the one designated by the Constitution to e!ercisethe 'urisdiction of his court, as is the case with the *ustices of this Court, thedepriation of his or their 'udicial power is e&uialent to the depriation of the 'udicialpower of the court itself" .t affects the ery heart of 'udicial independence" Theproposed mass dis&ualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leae the Court noalternatie but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of theparticipation of its entire membership of *ustices"299 :.talics in the original;

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it e!ercises itspower of 'udicial reiew"

.n Demetria v. Al!a,29< this Court, through *ustice Marcelo @ernan cited the Dseen pillarsD oflimitations of the power of 'udicial reiew, enunciated by I7 7upreme Court *ustice Brandeisin Ash'ander v. *5A29= as follows6

2" The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non%adersary proceeding, declining because to decide such &uestions $is legitimate onlyin the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and italcontroersy between indiiduals" .t neer was the thought that, by means of a friendlysuit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an in&uiry as to theconstitutionality of the legislatie act"$

8" The Court will not $anticipate a &uestion of constitutional law in adance of thenecessity of deciding it"$ " " " $.t is not the habit of the Court to decide &uestions of aconstitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case"$

9" The Court will not $formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is re&uired bythe precise facts to which it is to be applied"$

<" The Court will not pass upon a constitutional &uestion although properly presentedby the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may bedisposed of" This rule has found most aried application" Thus, if a case can bedecided on either of two grounds, one inoling a constitutional &uestion, the other a

&uestion of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter" Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a &uestion underthe @ederal Constitution are fre&uently dismissed because the 'udgment can besustained on an independent state ground"

=" The Court will not pass upon the alidity of a statute upon complaint of one who failsto show that he is in'ured by its operation" Among the many applications of this rule,none is more stri/ing than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lac/s apersonal or property right" Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in theperformance of his official duty will not be entertained " " " .n airchild v. 6u$hes, theCourt affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citi(en who sought to hae theNineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional" .n &assachusetts v. &ellon, thechallenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by theCommonwealth on behalf of all its citi(ens"

>" The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of onewho has aailed himself of its benefits"

5" ?hen the alidity of an act of the Congress is drawn in &uestion, and een if aserious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court willfirst ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the&uestion may be aoided :citations omitted;"

The foregoing DpillarsD of limitation of 'udicial reiew, summari(ed in Ash'ander v. *5A fromdifferent decisions of the Inited 7tates 7upreme Court, can be encapsulated into the followingcategories6

2" that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

8" that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as re&uired by the facts ofthe case

9" that 'udgment may not be sustained on some other ground

<" that there be actual in'ury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of thestatute

=" that the parties are not in estoppel

>" that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality"



As stated preiously, parallel guidelines hae been adopted by this Court in the e!ercise of 'udicial reiew6

2" actual case or controersy calling for the e!ercise of 'udicial power

8" the person challenging the act must hae DstandingD to challenge he must hae apersonal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or willsustain, direct in'ury as a result of its enforcement

9" the &uestion of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

<" the issue of constitutionality must be the ery lis mota of the case"29>

Respondents 7pea/er de 0enecia, et. al. raise another argument for 'udicial restraint thepossibility that D'udicial reiew of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflictsbetween the Congress and the F*Gudiciary"D They stress the need to aoid the appearance ofimpropriety or conflicts of interest in 'udicial hearings, and the scenario that it would beconfusing and humiliating and ris/ serious political instability at home and abroad if the 'udiciarycountermanded the ote of Congress to remoe an impeachable official"295 .nterenor 7orianoechoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution againstCongress would result in the diminution of its 'udicial authority and erode public confidence andfaith in the 'udiciary"

7uch an argument, howeer, is specious, to say the least" As correctly stated by the 7olicitor

eneral, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Courtto refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases" *ustices cannot abandontheir constitutional duties 'ust because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis"

*ustice @eliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act"

! ! ! @re&uently, the fight oer a controersial legislatie or e!ecutie act is notregarded as settled until the 7upreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality ofthe act inoled, the 'udgment has not only 'uridical effects but also politicalconse&uences" Those political conse&uences may follow een where the Court fails togrant the petitioner$s prayer to nullify an act for lac/ of the necessary number of otes"@re&uently, failure to act e!plicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and alidation, or at least &uasi%alidation, follows"D 294

Thus, in )avellana v. Executive ecretary 293 where this Court was split and Din the end therewere not enough otes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent$s claims,D2< thepre%e!isting constitutional order was disrupted which paed the way for the establishment of themartial law regime"

7uch an argument by respondents and interenor also presumes that the coordinate branchesof the goernment would behae in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law touphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land" et there is no reason to beliee that anyof the branches of goernment will behae in a precipitate manner and ris/ social upheaal,iolence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land"

7ubstituting the word public officers for 'udges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine

in People v. 5eneracion, to'it 62<2

#bedience to the rule of law forms the bedroc/ of our system of 'ustice" .f FpublicofficersG, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roamunrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are re&uired by law to e!ercise theduties of their office, then law becomes meaningless" A goernment of laws, not ofmen e!cludes the e!ercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under itsauthority" Inder this system, Fpublic officersG are guided by the Rule of Haw, and oughtDto protect and enforce it without fear or faor,D resist encroachments by goernments,political parties, or een the interference of their own personal beliefs"2<8

%onstitutionalit" of the Rules of Procedurefor Impeachment Proceedingsadopted #" the &'th %ongress

Respondent +ouse of Representaties, through 7pea/er -e 0enecia, argues that 7ections 2>and 25 of Rule 0 of the +ouse .mpeachment Rules do not iolate 7ection 9 :=; of Article 1. ofour present Constitution, contending that the term DinitiateD does not mean Dto fileD that 7ection9 :2; is clear in that it is the +ouse of Representaties, as a collectie body, which has thee!clusie power to initiate all cases of impeachment that initiate could not possibly mean DtofileD because filing can, as 7ection 9 :8;, Article 1. of the Constitution proides, only beaccomplished in 9 ways, to wit6 :2; by a erified complaint for impeachment by any member ofthe +ouse of Representaties or :8; by any citi(en upon a resolution of endorsement by anymember or :9; by at least 29 of all the members of the +ouse" Respondent +ouse ofRepresentaties concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachmentproceedings against the same officials could not hae been iolated as the impeachmentcomplaint against Chief *ustice -aide and seen Associate *ustices had not been initiated asthe +ouse of Representaties, acting as the collectie body, has yet to act on it"

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term Dinitiate"D Resort tostatutory construction is, therefore, in order"

That the sponsor of the proision of 7ection 9:=; of the Constitution, Commissioner @loren(Regalado, who eentually became an Associate *ustice of this Court, agreed on the meaning ofDinitiateD as Dto file,D as proffered and e!plained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambongduring the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he :Commissioner Regalado;as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on Noember=, 89 at which he added that the act of DinitiatingD included the act of ta/ing initial action onthe complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word DinitiateD as it twice appears in Article1. :9; and :=; of the Constitution means to file the complaint and ta/e initial action on it"

D.nitiateD of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, tocommence, or set going" As ?ebster$s Third New .nternational -ictionary of the EnglishHanguage concisely puts it, it means Dto perform or facilitate the first action,D which 'ibes with*ustice Regalado$s position, and that of @ather Bernas, who elucidated during the oralarguments of the instant petitions on Noember =, 89 in this wise6

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act" .t is a comle!us of actsconsisting of a beginning, a middle and an end" The end is the transmittal of thearticles of impeachment to the 7enate" The middle consists of those deliberatiemoments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment" The beginning orthe initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on *ustice"

@inally, it should be noted that the +ouse Rule relied upon by Representaties

Co'uangco and @uentebella says that impeachment is Deeme '$'%'&%eD when the*ustice Committee otes in faor of impeachment or when the +ouse reerses acontrary ote of the Committee" Note that the Rule does not say DimpeachmentproceedingsD are initiated but rather are Ddeemed initiated"D The language is



recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt topostpone it to a time after actual initiation" :Emphasis and underscoring supplied;

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is loo/ing into the intent of thelaw" @ortunately, the intent of the framers of the 2345 Constitution can be pried from its records6

MR" MAAMB#N" ?ith reference to 7ection 9, regarding the procedure and thesubstantie proisions on impeachment, . understand there hae been manyproposals and, . thin/, these would need some time for Committee action"

+oweer, . would 'ust li/e to indicate that . submitted to the Committee a resolution on

impeachment proceedings, copies of which hae been furnished the Members of thisbody" This is borne out of my e!perience as a member of the Committee on *ustice,+uman Rights and ood oernment which too/ charge of the last impeachmentresolution filed before the @irst Batasang Pambansa" For %-e '$*orm&%'o$ o* %-eComm'%%ee, %-e re+o(#%'o$ "over+ +ever&( +%e/+ '$ %-e 'm/e&"-me$%/ro"ee'$4+ +%&r%'$4 5'%- '$'%'&%'o$, &"%'o$ o* %-e S/e&<er "omm'%%ee &"%'o$,"&(e$&r'$4 o* re/or%, vo%'$4 o$ %-e re/or%, %r&$+m'%%&( re*err&( %o %-e Se$&%e, %r'&(&$ =#4me$% b) %-e Se$&%e.

! ! !

MR" MAAMB#N" Mr" Presiding #fficer, . am not moing for a reconsideration of theapproal of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but . will 'ust ma/e

of record my thin/ing that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of.mpeachment on the floor" T-e /ro"e#re, &+ I -&ve /o'$%e o#% e&r('er, 5&+ %-&%%-e '$'%'&%'o$ +%&r%+ 5'%- %-e *'('$4 o* %-e "om/(&'$%. A$ 5-&% '+ &"%#&(() o$e o$%-e *(oor '+ %-&% %-e "omm'%%ee re+o(#%'o$ "o$%&'$'$4 %-e Ar%'"(e+ o*Im/e&"-me$% '+ %-e o$e &//rove b) %-e bo).

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on 7tyle, itappears that the initiation starts on the floor" .f we only hae time, . could c itee!amples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Ni!onwherein the Committee on the *udiciary submitted the recommendation, theresolution, and the Articles of .mpeachment to the body, and it was the body whoapproed the resolution" I% '+ $o% %-e bo) 5-'"- '$'%'&%e+ '%. I% o$() &//rove+ or'+&//rove+ %-e re+o(#%'o$. 7o, on that score, probably the Committee on 7tylecould help in rearranging these words because we hae to be ery technical about

this" . hae been bringing with me *he 0ules o/ the 6ouse o/ 0epresentatives of theI"7" Congress" The 7enate Rules are with me" The proceedings on the case ofRichard Ni!on are with me" . hae submitted my proposal, but the Committee hasalready decided" Neertheless, . 'ust want to indicate this on record"

! ! !

MR" MAAMB#N" . would 'ust li/e to moe for a reconsideration of the approal of7ection 9 :9;" My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in/eeping with the e!act formulation of the Rules of the +ouse of Representaties of theInited 7tates regarding impeachment"

. am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this proision, that

on page 8, 7ection 9 :9;, from lines 25 to 24, 5e e(e%e %-e 5or+ 5-'"- re& D%o'$'%'&%e 'm/e&"-me$% /ro"ee'$4+Dand the comma :,; and insert on line 23 after theword DresolutionD the phrase ?.T+ T+E ART.CHE7, and then capitali(e the letter DiD inDimpeachmentD and replace the word DbyD with #@, so that the whole section will now

read6 DA ote of at least one%third of all the Members of the +ouse shall be necessaryeither to affirm a resolution ?.T+ T+E ART.CHE7 of .mpeachment #@ the Committeeor to oerride its contrary resolution" The ote of each Member shall be recorded"D

I &(re&) me$%'o$e e&r('er )e+%er&) %-&% %-e '$'%'&%'o$, as far as the +ouse ofRepresentaties of the Inited 7tates is concerned, re&(() +%&r%+ *rom %-e *'('$4 o*%-e ver'*'e "om/(&'$% and eery resolution to impeach always carries with it the

Articles of .mpeachment" As a matter of fact, the words DArticles of .mpeachmentD arementioned on line 8= in the case of the direct filing of a erified compliant of one%thirdof all the Members of the +ouse" . will mention again, Madam President, that myamendment will not ary the substance in any way" .t is only in /eeping with theuniform procedure of the +ouse of Representaties of the Inited 7tates Congress"

Than/ you, Madam President"2<9 :.talics in the original emphasis and udnerscoringsupplied;

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by theCommittee on the Accountability of Public #fficers"2<<

.t is thus clear that the framers intended DinitiationD to start with the filing of the complaint" .nhis amicus curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong e!plained that Dthe obious reason in deletingthe phrase D%o '$'%'&%e 'm/e&"-me$% /ro"ee'$4+D as contained in the te!t of the proision of7ection 9 :9; was %o +e%%(e &$ m&<e '% #$er+%oo o$"e &$ *or &(( %-&% %-e '$'%'&%'o$ o*'m/e&"-me$% /ro"ee'$4+ +%&r%+ 5'%- %-e *'('$4 o* %-e "om/(&'$%, and the ote of one%thirdof the +ouse in a resolution of impeachment oe+ $o% '$'%'&%e the impeachmentproceedings 5-'"- 5&+ &(re&) '$'%'&%e b) %-e *'('$4 o* & ver'*'e "om/(&'$% #$er Se"%'o$

3, /&r&4r&/- 2, Ar%'"(e !I o* %-e Co$+%'%#%'o$"D2<=

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same iew as is @ather Bernas,who was also a member of the 234> Constitutional Commission, that the word DinitiateD as usedin Article 1., 7ection 9:=; means to file, both adding, howeer, that the filing must beaccompanied by an action to set the complaint moing"

-uring the oral arguments before this Court, @ather Bernas clarified that the word Dinitiate,Dappearing in the constitutional proision on impeachment, viz 6

7ection 9 :2; The +ouse of Representaties shall hae the e!clusie power to initiateall cases of impeachment"

! ! !

:=; No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more thanonce within a period of one year, :Emphasis supplied;

refers to two ob'ects, Dimpeachment caseD and Dimpeachment proceeding"D

@ather Bernas e!plains that in these two proisions, the common erb is Dto initiate"D The ob'ectin the first sentence is Dimpeachment case"D The ob'ect in the second sentence is Dimpeachmentproceeding"D @ollowing the principle of reddendo sin$uala sinuilis, the term DcasesD must bedistinguished from the term Dproceedings"D An impeachment case is the legal controersy thatmust be decided by the 7enate" Aboe%&uoted first proision proides that the +ouse, by a oteof one%third of all its members, can bring a case to the 7enate" .t is in that sense that the +ousehas De!clusie powerD to initiate all cases of impeachment" No other body can do it" +oweer,before a decision is made to initiate a case in the 7enate, a DproceedingD must be followed toarrie at a conclusion" A proceeding must be Dinitiated"D To initiate, which comes from the Hatin



word initium, means to begin" #n the other hand, proceeding is a progressie noun" .t has abeginning, a middle, and an end" .t ta/es place not in the 7enate but in the +ouse and consistsof seeral steps6 :2; there is the filing of a erified complaint either by a Member of the +ouse ofRepresentaties or by a priate citi(en endorsed by a Member of the +ouse of theRepresentaties :8; there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee whichmay either re'ect the complaint or uphold it :9; whether the resolution of the Committee re'ectsor upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the +ouse for further processingand :<; there is the process ing of the same complaint by the +ouse of Representaties whicheither affirms a faorable resolution of the Committee or oerrides a contrary resolution by aote of one%third of all the members" .f at least one third of all the Members upholds thecomplaint, Articles of .mpeachment are prepared and transmitted to the 7enate" .t is at this pointthat the +ouse Dinitiates an impeachment "&+e"D .t is at this point that an impeachable public

official is successfully impeached" That is, he or she is successfully charged with animpeachment DcaseD before the 7enate as impeachment court"

@ather Bernas further e!plains6 The Dimpeachment proceedingD is not initiated when thecomplaint is transmitted to the 7enate for trial because that is the end of the +ouse proceedingand the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial" Neither is the DimpeachmentproceedingD initiated when the +ouse deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by theCommittee, because something prior to that has already been done" The action of the +ouse isalready a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning" Rather, the proceeding isinitiated or begins, when a erified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on *usticefor action" This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow"

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning" Thus when aproposal reached the floor proposing that DA ote of at least one%third of all the Members of the+ouse shall be necessaryO toinitiate impeachment proceedin$s,D this was met by a proposal todelete the line on the ground that the ote of the +ouse does not initiate impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does"2<> Thus the line was deleted and is notfound in the present Constitution"

@ather Bernas concludes that when 7ection 9 :=; says, DNo impeachment proceeding shall beinitiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year,D it means that nosecond erified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on *ustice for action"By his e!planation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaningof Dto initiateD which means to begin" +e reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people,both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it and that ordinary people read ordinarymeaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand itand not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it"

To the argument that only the +ouse of Representaties as a body can initiate impeachmentproceedings because 7ection 9 :2; says DThe +ouse of Representaties shall hae thee!clusie power to initiate all cases of impeachment,D This is a misreading of said proision andis contrary to the principle of reddendo sin$ula sin$ulisby e&uating Dimpeachment casesD withDimpeachment proceeding"D

@rom the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two formerConstitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term Dto initiateD refers to the filing ofthe impeachment complaint coupled with Congress$ ta/ing initial action of said complaint"

+aing concluded that the initiation ta/es place by the act of filing and referral or endorsementof the impeachment complaint to the +ouse Committee on *ustice or, by the filing by at least

one%third of the members of the +ouse of Representaties with the 7ecretary eneral of the+ouse, the meaning of 7ection 9 :=; of Article 1. becomes clear" #nce an impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the sameofficial within a one year period"

Inder 7ections 2> and 25 of Rule 0 of the +ouse .mpeachment Rules, impeachmentproceedings are deemed initiated :2; if there is a finding by the +ouse Committee on *usticethat the erified complaint andor resolution is sufficient in substance, or :8; once the +ouseitself affirms or oerturns the finding of the Committee on *ustice that the erified complaintandor resolution is not sufficient in substance or :9; by the filing or endorsement before the7ecretary%eneral of the +ouse of Representaties of a erified complaint or a resolution ofimpeachment by at least 29 of the members of the +ouse" These rules clearly contraene7ection 9 :=; of Article 1. since the rules gie the term DinitiateD a meaning different meaningfrom filing and referral"

.n his amicus curiae brief, *ustice +ugo utierre( posits that this Court could not usecontemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of 7ec"9 :=; of Article 1.,

citing 5era v. Avelino2<5 wherein this Court stated that Dtheir personal opinions :referring to*ustices who were delegates to the Constitution Conention; on the matter at issue e!pressedduring this Court$s our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recordedutterances of debates and proceedings"D @urther citing said case, he states that this Courtli/ened the former members of the Constitutional Conention to actors who are so absorbed intheir emotional roles that intelligent spectators may /now more about the real meaning becauseof the latter$s balanced perspecties and disinterestedness"2<4

*ustice utierre($s statements hae no application in the present petitions" There are at presentonly two members of this Court who participated in the 234> Constitutional Commission ) Chief*ustice -aide and *ustice Adolf A(cuna" Chief *ustice -aide has not ta/en part in theseproceedings for obious reasons" Moreoer, this Court has not simply relied on the personalopinions now gien by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has e!amined therecords of the deliberations and proceedings thereof"

Respondent +ouse of Representaties counters that under 7ection 9 :4; of Article 1., it is clearand une&uiocal that it and only it has the power to ma/e and interpret its rules goerningimpeachment" .ts argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power topromulgate its rules" This assumption, howeer, is misplaced"

7ection 9 :4; of Article 1. proides that DThe Congress shall promulgate its rules onimpeachment to effectiely carry out the purpose of this section"D Clearly, its power topromulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase D to effectiely carry out thepurpose of this section"D +ence, these rules cannot contraene the ery purpose of theConstitution which said rules were intended to effectiely carry out" Moreoer, 7ection 9 of

Article 1. clearly proides for other specific limitations on its power to ma/e rules, viz 6

7ection 9" :2; ! ! !

:8; A erified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the +ouse ofRepresentaties or by any citi(en upon a resolution of endorsement by any Memberthereof, which shall be included in the #rder of Business within ten session days, andreferred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter" The Committee,after hearing, and by a ma'ority ote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the+ouse within si!ty session days from such referral, together with the correspondingresolution" The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the +ouse withinten session days from receipt thereof"

:9; A ote of at least one%third of all the Members of the +ouse shall be necessary toeither affirm a faorable resolution with the Articles of .mpeachment of the Committee,

or oerride its contrary resolution" The ote of each Member shall be recorded"



:<; .n case the erified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one%third of all the Members of the +ouse, the same shall constitute the Articles of.mpeachment, and trial by the 7enate shall forthwith proceed"

:=; No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more thanonce within a period of one year"

.t is basic that all rules must not contraene the Constitution which is the fundamental law" .f asalleged Congress had absolute rule ma/ing power, then it would by necessary implication haethe power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum"

.n Osme7a v. Pendatun,2<3 this Court held that it is within the proince of either +ouse ofCongress to interpret its rules and that it was the best 'udge of what constituted DdisorderlybehaiorD of its members" +oweer, in Paceta v. ecretary o/ the Commission on

Appointments,2= *ustice :later Chief *ustice; Enri&ue @ernando, spea/ing for this Court and&uoting *ustice Brandeis in nited tates v. mith,2=2 declared that where the construction to begien to a rule affects persons other than members of the Hegislature, the &uestion becomes

'udicial in nature" .n Arroyo v. De 5enecia,2=8 &uoting nited tates v. Ballin, )oseph +Co.,2=9 *ustice 0icente Mendo(a, spea/ing for this Court, held that while the Constitutionempowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignoreconstitutional restraints or iolate fundamental rights, and further that there should be areasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and theresult which is sought to be attained" .t is only within these limitations that all matters of methodare open to the determination of the Hegislature" .n the same case of Arroyo v. De 5enecia,*ustice Reynato 7" Puno, in his Concurring and -issenting #pinion, was een more emphatic

as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is een more reason for courts to in&uire intothe alidity of the Rules of Congress, viz 6

'%- #e re+/e"%, I o $o% &4ree %-&% %-e '++#e+ /o+e b) %-e /e%'%'o$er &re $o$ =#+%'"'&b(e. Nor o I &4ree %-&% 5e 5'(( %r'v'&('e %-e /r'$"'/(e o* +e/&r&%'o$ o*/o5er '* 5e &++#me =#r'+'"%'o$ over -e "&+e &% b&r. Een in the Inited 7tates, theprinciple of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against theinterposition of 'udicial power on cases inoling breach of rules of procedure bylegislators"

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 2432 case of v Ballin :2<< I7 2; as a window toiew the issues before the Court" .t is in Ballin where the I7 7upreme Court firstdefined the boundaries of the power of the 'udiciary to reiew congressional rules" .theld6

D! ! !

DThe Constitution, in the same section, proides, that each house may determine therules of its proceedings"D .t appears that in pursuance of this authority the +ouse had,prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules6

R#(e !V

9" #n the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the 7pea/er, the names ofmembers sufficient to ma/e a &uorum in the hall of the +ouse who do not ote shall benoted by the cler/ and recorded in the 'ournal, and reported to the 7pea/er with the

names of the members oting, and be counted and announced in determining thepresence of a &uorum to do business" :+ouse *ournal, 89, @eb" 2<, 243;

The action ta/en was in direct compliance with this rule" T-e @#e+%'o$, %-ere*ore, '+&+ %o %-e validit" of this rule, and not what methods the 7pea/er may of his ownmotion resort to for determining the presence of a &uorum, nor what matters the7pea/er or cler/ may of their own olition place upon the 'ournal" Neither do theadantages or disadantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any mattersfor 'udicial consideration" 8ith the courts the "uestion is only one o/ po'er. (he%onstitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It ma" not #" its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights)and there should #e a reasona#le relation #etween the mode or method of

proceedings esta#lished #" the rule and the result which is sought to #eattained. But within these limitations all matters o/ method are open to thedetermination of the +ouse, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some

other way would be better, more accurate, or een more 'ust" .t is no ob'ection to thealidity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length oftime" The power to ma/e rules is not one which once e!ercised is e!hausted" .t is acontinuous power, always sub'ect to be e!ercised by the +ouse, and within thelimitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body ortribunal"D

Ballin) "(e&r() "o$*'rme %-e =#r'+'"%'o$ o* "o#r%+ %o /&++ #/o$ %-e v&(''%) o*"o$4re++'o$&( r#(e+, '.e, 5-e%-er %-e) &re "o$+%'%#%'o$&(. Rule 10 was e!aminedby the Court and it was found to satisfy the test6 :2; that it did not ignore anyconstitutional restraint :8; it did not iolate any fundamental right and :9; its methodhad a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained" By e!amining Rule10, the Court did not allow its 'urisdiction to be defeated by the mere inocation of theprinciple of separation of powers"2=<

! ! !

I$ %-e Philippine setting) %-ere '+ & more compelling reason *or "o#r%+ %o"&%e4or'"&(() re=e"% %-e /o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$ e*e$+e 5-e$ '%+ '$%er/o+'%'o$ 5'(("over #/ &b#+e o* /o5er. For +e"%'o$ 1, Ar%'"(e VIII o* o#r Co$+%'%#%'o$5&+ intentionall" "obb(e %o em/o5er "o#r%+ D %o e%erm'$e 5-e%-er or $o%%-ere -&+ bee$ & 4r&ve &b#+e o* '+"re%'o$ &mo#$%'$4 %o (&"< or e"e++ o*

=#r'+'"%'o$ o$ %-e /&r% o* &$) br&$"- or '$+%r#me$%&('%) o* %-e 4over$me$%.D Thispower is new and was not granted to our courts in the 239= and 2358 Constitutions" I%5&+ $o% &(+o eroe *rom %-e US Co$+%'%#%'o$ or &$) *ore'4$ +%&%e "o$+%'%#%'o$.T-e CONCOM 4r&$%e %-'+ e$ormo#+ /o5er %o o#r "o#r%+ '$ v'e5 o* o#re/er'e$"e #$er m&r%'&( (&5 5-ere &b#+'ve eer"'+e+ o* +%&%e /o5er 5ere

+-'e(e *rom =#'"'&( +"r#%'$) b) %-e m'+#+e o* %-e /o('%'"&( @#e+%'o$o"%r'$e. Hed by the eminent former Chief *ustice Roberto Concepcion, theC#NC#M e!panded and sharpened the chec/ing powers of the 'udiciary is%%is theE!ecutie and the Hegislatie departments of goernment"2==

! ! !

*he Constitution cannot !e any clearer. *hat it granted to this %ourt is not a mere power which it can decline to e+ercise. Precisel" to deter this disinclination) the%onstitution imposed it as a dut" of this %ourt to stri,e down an" act of a#ranch or instrumentalit" of government or an" of its officials done with gravea#use of discretion amounting to lac, or e+cess of -urisdiction. 0i$htly or'ron$ly, the Constitution has elon$ated the chec%in$ po'ers o/ this Court a$ainst theother !ranches o/ $overnment despite their more democratic character, the President

and the le$islators !ein$ elected !y the people.2=>

! ! !



The proision defining 'udicial power as including the $duty of the courts of 'ustice" " " todetermine whether or not there has been a grae abuse of discretion amounting tolac/ or e!cess of ' urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of theoernment$ constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commissionto upgrade the powers of this court is%%is the other branches of goernment" Thisproision was dictated by our e!perience under martial law which taught us that astronger and more independent 'udiciary is needed to abort abuses in goernment" ! !!

! ! !

.n sum, . submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of goernmentcommitted with grae abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Courtfrom passiity to actiism" This transformation, dictated by our distinct e!perience asnation, is not merely eolutionary but reolutionary"nder the 9:;< and the 9:=;Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations !y initially determinin$'hat it cannot do> under the &/0 %onstitution) there is a shift in stress 1 this%ourt is mandated to approach constitutional violations not #" finding out whatit should not do #ut what itmust do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty bynot resuscitating a past that petrifies the present"

. urge my brethren in the Court to gie due and serious consideration to this newconstitutional proision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parametersof our power to reiew iolations of the rules of the +ouse" e 5'(( $o% be %r#e %o o#r%r#+% &+ %-e (&+% b#(5&r< &4&'$+% 4over$me$% &b#+e+ '* 5e re*#+e %o eer"'+e %-'+

$e5 /o5er or '* 5e 5'e( '% 5'%- %'m''%). To be +#re, '% '+ %-'+ e"ee'$4 %'m''%)%o #$+-e&%-e %-e =#'"'&( +5or %-&% -&+ '$"re&+'$4() embo(e$e o%-erbr&$"-e+ o* 4over$me$% %o e$'4r&%e, '* $o% e*), orer+ o* o#r"o#r%+. .n *olentino, . endorsed the iew of former 7enator 7alonga that this noelproision stretching the latitude of 'udicial power is distinctly @ilipino and itsinterpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign

'urisprudence" .n resoling the case at bar, the lessons of our own history shouldproide us the light and not the e!perience of foreigners"2=5 :.talics in the originalemphasis and underscoring supplied;

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions" +ere, the thirdparties alleging the iolation of priate rights and the Constitution are inoled"

Neither may respondent +ouse of Representaties$ rely on #ixon v. 2=4 as basis for arguingthat this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of 7ections 2> and 25 of the +ouse.mpeachment Rules" As already obsered, the I"7" @ederal Constitution simply proides thatDthe +ouse of Representaties shall hae the sole power of impeachment"D .t adds nothingmore" .t gies no clue whatsoeer as to how this Dsole powerD is to be e!ercised" No limitationwhatsoeer is gien" Thus, the I7 7upreme Court concluded that there was a te!tuallydemonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the +ouse ofRepresentaties" This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of thePhilippine +ouse of Representaties since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishesseeral proisions articulating how that De!clusie powerD is to be e!ercised"

The proisions of 7ections 2> and 25 of Rule 0 of the +ouse .mpeachment Rules which statethat impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated :2; if there is a finding by the +ouseCommittee on *ustice that the erified complaint andor resolution is sufficient in substance, or

:8; once the +ouse itself affirms or oerturns the finding of the Committee on *ustice that theerified complaint andor resolution is not sufficient in substance or :9; by the filing orendorsement before the 7ecretary%eneral of the +ouse of Representaties of a erifiedcomplaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 29 of the members of the +ouse thus

clearly contraene 7ection 9 :=; of Article 1. as they gie the term DinitiateD a meaning differentfrom Dfiling"D

2alidit" of the Second Impeachment %omplaint

+aing concluded that the initiation ta/es place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaintand referral to the +ouse Committee on *ustice, the initial action ta/en thereon, the meaning of7ection 9 :=; of Article 1. becomes clear" #nce an impeachment complaint has been initiated inthe foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one yearperiod following Article 1., 7ection 9:=; of the Constitution"

.n fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estradaagainst Chief *ustice +ilario " -aide, *r", along with seen associate 'ustices of this Court, on*une 8, 89 and referred to the +ouse Committee on *ustice on August =, 89, the secondimpeachment complaint filed by Representaties ilberto C" Teodoro, *r" and @eli! ?illiam@uentebella against the Chief *ustice on #ctober 89, 89 iolates the constitutional prohibitionagainst the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within aone%year period"

%onclusion

.f there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon thatta/es the center stage of our indiidual and collectie consciousness as a people with ourcharacteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy" #f course this is not to demean the

seriousness of the controersy oer the -aide impeachment" @or many of us, the past twowee/s hae proen to be an e!asperating, mentally and emotionally e!hausting e!perience"Both sides hae fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectiely belieeto be the correct position or iew on the issues inoled" Passions had ran high asdemonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief *ustice, too/ to the streetsarmed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their oice on the matter" 0arious sectors ofsociety % from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith ) offeredsuggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the goernmentalbranches affected to obiate any perceied resulting instability upon areas of national life"

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of .mpeachment had beenconstituted, this Court was specifically as/ed, told, urged and argued to ta/e no action of any/ind and form with respect to the prosecution by the +ouse of Representaties of theimpeachment complaint against the sub'ect respondent public official" ?hen the present

petitions were /noc/ing so to spea/ at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non%interference was made through what are now the arguments of Dlac/ of 'urisdiction,D Dnon%

'usticiability,D and D'udicial self%restraintD aimed at halting the Court from any moe that may haea bearing on the impeachment proceedings"

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands%off stance as far as the &uestion of theconstitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief *ustice -aide isconcerned" To reiterate what has been already e!plained, the Court found the e!istence in full of all the re&uisite conditions for its e!ercise of its constitutionally ested power and duty of 'udicialreiew oer an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of aproision of the fundamental law of the land" ?hat lies in here is an issue of a genuineconstitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address andad'udicate in accordance with the clear%cut allocation of powers under our system ofgoernment" @ace%to%face thus with a matter or problem that s&uarely falls under the Court$s

'urisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on"



The claim, therefore, that this Court by 'udicially entangling itself with the process ofimpeachment has effectiely set up a regime of 'udicial supremacy, is patently without basis infact and in law"

This Court in the present petitions sub'ected to 'udicial scrutiny and resoled on the merits onlythe main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief *usticetransgressed the constitutionally imposed one%year time bar rule" Beyond this, it did not goabout assuming 'urisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn 'usticiable issues out ofdecidedly political &uestions" Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert 'udicialdominance oer the other two great branches of the goernment" Rather, the raison d$etre of the

'udiciary is to complement the discharge by the e!ecutie and legislatie of their own powers tobring about ultimately the beneficent effects of haing founded and ordered our society upon the

rule of law"

.t is suggested that by our ta/ing cogni(ance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachmentproceedings against the Chief *ustice, the members of this Court hae actually closed ran/s toprotect a brethren" That the members$ interests in ruling on said issue is as much at sta/e as isthat of the Chief *ustice" Nothing could be farther from the truth"

The institution that is the 7upreme Court together with all other courts has long held and beenentrusted with the 'udicial power to resole conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalitiesinoled in the suits or actions" This Court has dispensed 'ustice oer the course of time,unaffected by whomsoeer stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whateer imputationsor speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered 'udgment according to the law andthe facts" ?hy can it not now be trusted to wield 'udicial power in these petitions 'ust because it

is the highest ran/ing magistrate who is inoled when it is an incontroertible fact that thefundamental issue is not him but the alidity of a goernment branch$s official act as tested bythe limits set by the ConstitutionL #f course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member ofthe 'udiciary from ta/ing part in a case in specified instances" But to dis&ualify this entireinstitution now from the suit at bar is to regard the 7upreme Court as li/ely incapable ofimpartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non se"uitur "

No one is aboe the law or the Constitution" This is a basic precept in any legal system whichrecogni(es e&uality of all men before the law as essential to the law$s moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands" Perhaps, there is no othergoernment branch or instrumentality that is most (ealous in protecting that principle of legale&uality other than the 7upreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramificationsthrough its application to numerous cases especially of the high%profile /ind in the annals of

'urisprudence" The Chief *ustice is not aboe the law and neither is any other member of thisCourt" But 'ust because he is the Chief *ustice does not imply that he gets to hae less in lawthan anybody else" The law is solicitous of eery indiidual$s rights irrespectie of his station inlife"

The @ilipino nation and its democratic institutions hae no doubt been put to test once again by

this impeachment case against Chief *ustice +ilario -aide" Accordingly, this Court has resortedto no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to acrisis in goernment" But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to hae foundanswers in our bedroc/ of legal principles, it is e&ually important that it went through thiscrucible of a democratic process, if only to discoer that it can resole differences without theuse of force and aggression upon each other"

HEREFORE, 7ections 2> and 25 of Rule 0 of the Rules of Procedure in .mpeachmentProceedings which were approed by the +ouse of Representaties on Noember 84, 82 areunconstitutional" Conse&uently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief *ustice +ilario" -aide, *r" which was filed by Representaties ilberto C" Teodoro, *r" and @eli! ?illiam B"@uentebella with the #ffice of the 7ecretary eneral of the +ouse of Representaties on#ctober 89, 89 is barred under paragraph =, section 9 of Article 1. of the Constitution"

SO ORERE.

Documents

ADMIN Francisco vs. HOR