Administrative Nationalism

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Administration & Society

DOI: 10.1177/0095399707303638 2007; 39; 631 Administration & Society

Daniel Bourgeois Administrative Nationalism

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Administrative NationalismDaniel BourgeoisCanadian Institute for Research onPublic Policy and Public Administration,Moncton, New Brunswick

Substate administrative institutions such as municipalities, hospital boards,and school districts may help resolve conflicts between minority and majoritygroups, particularly where a minority forms a majority in a substate territory.Minorities can use substate institutions to counter majority rule exercisedthrough statewide political institutions. Minorities seek control over substateinstitutions to legitimize nationalist claims over crucial public functions andspace and to support identity projects. The present case study, in a Canadianurban area, explains the rise of administrative nationalism and raises theoret-ical, practical, and empirical questions that summon scholars of nationalismand public administration.

Keywords: administrative nationalism; majority rule; minority rule;decentralization; substate

There are more nations than nation-states (Hutchinson & Smith,1994). Many nations are too small, too poor, too weak, or too disorga-

nized to seek or achieve statehood, yet their leaders seek full political sov-ereignty. For their part, many states oppose multinationalism within theirjurisdiction. Consequently, conflicts between minority nations and encom-passing states have proven deadlier than wars since the end of World War II(Gurr, 1994). Is there a compromise between the minority nation’s quest forstatehood and the state’s quest for uniform nationalism?

In this article, I show how public institutions can resolve cultural con-flicts between minority and majority groups. I focus on substate institutionssuch as school boards, health authorities, and municipalities as adequatesubstitutes to statehood and pacifiers of nationalism. I propose the concept

Administration & SocietyVolume 39 Number 5

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Author’s Note: I thank both Yves Bourgeois for his significant contribution to the researchand the anonymous peers who reviewed and improved the initial manuscript. Please addresscorrespondence to Daniel Bourgeois, Canadian Institute for Research on Public Policy andPublic Administration, 410 Taillon, Université de Moncton, Moncton, NB, E1A 3E9; e-mail:[email protected].



of administrative nationalism—the pursuit of collective identity and self-determination through administrative means—to describe how substatepublic institutions can accommodate and promote the collective aspira-tions, vitality, and distinct identity of minority groups.1

To explain the concept of administrative nationalism, I review the litera-ture on nationalism, political geography, and administrative decentralizationas they pertain to sociolinguistic conflicts and accommodations. My reviewsuggests that substate administrative institutions can play a pivotal role inresolving majority–minority conflicts and that the traditional focus on polit-ical nationalism (the pursuit of state sovereignty) leaves not only minoritygroups with fewer strategies but also scholars with inadequate means tounderstand the phenomenon. Focusing on the struggles and accommoda-tions between majority and minority groups in controlling substate institu-tions provides a wider array of means to pursue political identity projectsand more bountiful spaces of scholarly inquiry. Substate administrative insti-tutions offer ample opportunities of effecting political decisions of immedi-ate impact to numerous minority groups, that is, in the communities whereidentity and values collide with those of the majority, because the nation-state may be too big to deal effectively with such local particularities(Yacoub, 2000). Moreover, there may be more local administrative accom-modations to choose from than political options, and the latter often seem toplay out as zero-sum games whereas the former present win–win scenarios.

Administrative Nationalism

Nationalism is a “doctrine which holds that national identity ought to beaccorded political recognition, that nations have rights (to autonomy, self-determination, and/or sovereignty), and that the members of the nationought to band together in defence of those rights” (quoted in Honderich,1995, p. 605). The doctrine poses many problems for an encompassingstate, within which the members of a minority nation pursue sovereignty orother autonomy projects. For instance, how does the state define citizensthat belong to the minority nation (Margalit & Raz, 1990) and chooseamong policies that range from genocide to federalism (McGarry &O’Leary, 1994), according to the salience and type of conflict involved(Rokkan & Urwin, 1983)? Also, how does it determine whether suchaccommodations warrant constitutional or political rights or merely ad hocpractical arrangements (Kymlicka, 1995)? More important, what accom-modations can satisfy both the state and its minorities?

632 Administration & Society



Since the Second World War, many states have granted negative rights toprotect minority groups against discrimination (Campbell, 1994), and somehave provided positive rights such as public services to promote the minor-ity’s values (Capotorti, 1979). States that have implemented administrativeaccommodations have been better able to reduce minority–majority con-flicts than have states that have not (Capotorti, 1979). Although most ofthese accommodating states are among the wealthiest, thereby implying animportant caveat, most states need assistance in adopting and implementingadequate accommodations, as Capotorti’s survey suggests. Capotorti alsosuggested that administrative accommodations may be better able toresolve minority–majority conflicts than political accommodations, such asfederalism and consociationalism (Lijphart, 1968).

These findings should not come as a surprise. Minorities have for yearscreated their own social institutions and relied on them for survival and pros-perity, both as self-help institutions and counterstate institutions (Bauer,1987; Breton, 1964). There is an implicit acknowledgment that minority-controlled institutions are necessary in the absence of political power at thestate level. But the quest for administrative decentralization to municipalitiesand local agencies, boards, and commissions for nationalist purposes is arecent phenomenon. Some minority groups want to obtain self-government,even if limited, through state-sanctioned institutions that they can control andthrough which they can pursue national projects. Some use substate institu-tions to thwart the state’s standardization efforts. The difference lies in thefact that, since the welfare state became omnipotent and omnipresent, manyof the minority’s civil, voluntary institutions (notably, schools) have become“public.” The relative retreat of the nation-state has changed little.

Administrative nationalism implies nationalist projects pursued by soci-etal minority groups that seek greater self-determination through adminis-trative means.2 Given that these minority groups do not seek full politicalsovereignty (i.e., their own state), they accept that self-determination willbe relative. They may not be able to adopt legislation and regulations, butthey will look to affect the management of public resources and the alloca-tion of public services to reflect their values and meet their collective needs.At the lowest end of the scale of self-determination, minority languagegroups seek public services in their native language: correspondence andinformation, translation of legislative proceedings, the use of the minoritylanguage in courts, toponymy, public media, public education, and so on(Capotorti, 1979). I call this administrative consociationalism. In the fieldof education, this involves public schools in the minority language. At theother end of the scale, minority language groups seek control over substate

Bourgeois / Administrative Nationalism 633



institutions that allocate important public services. I call this minority rule(as the opposite of majority rule). In education, this involves the controlover school boards, schools, and curriculum. In between the two ends of thescale of self-determination, minority groups seek to influence public policyin matters related to their survival and vitality. I call this minority gover-nance. In education, this can involve affirmative-action hiring policies,advisory committees on minority curriculum, and administrative duality(two half-departments—one responsible for majority schools, the other forminority schools—under the same deputy minister) within the Departmentof Education.

Administrative nationalism thus differs from political nationalism,where societal minority groups pursue nationalist projects that seek self-determination through a sovereign state. Political nationalism (or “state”nationalism) is by far the most popular subject of political philosophy(Beiner & Norman, 2001) and political science (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994),yet the literature includes many more cases of relative self-determinationwithin existing states (Revue d’aménagement linguistique, 2003). Politicalnationalism seems to be the exception to the rule. I do not espouse thepolitics–administration dichotomy, but it serves as a useful reference.

Some research distinguishes between the different goals of modernnationalism, but it confuses their eventual outcome. For instance, Hutchinson(1994) was right to assert that Kohn’s distinction (1946) between political andcultural nationalism implies different goals and techniques, something my dis-tinction between political and administrative nationalisms can also be accusedof implying, but he was wrong to argue that both types are complementary,because, as my distinction shows, they can pursue the same national projectsyet be exclusive. Also, Hutchinson’s conclusion that cultural nationalism is “atransient phenomenon, regularly giving way to a political nationalism” (p. 55),as my case study shows, lacks an important nuance. Cultural and politicalnationalisms can be iterative. The same can be said for Smith’s assertion(1991): “Autonomy is the goal of every nationalist” (p. 77). Nuances areappropriate here because Acadian nationalists seek partial autonomy andaccept integration within the New Brunswick State and because nationalismis both cultural and political (as well as administrative, I argue).

Recent distinctions between state and substate nationalism (Herb &Kaplan, 1999; Maìz, 2000; Murphy & Harty, 2003; Safran, 2000) are morepromising, but they do not adequately distinguish between municipalitiesand federated states. The former are administrative institutions that rarelyseek political sovereignty (and have little legitimacy to do so), whereas thelatter is a frequent host of secessionist movements (Québec within Canada,Catalunya within Spain).




I argue that distinctions about nationalism should be based on empiricaldata rather than on normative stances (the assumption that minorities auto-matically seek political sovereignty) and should be made on a continuum ofmeans where one pole involves full sovereignty and the other involves fullintegration of the minority group within the state (see Figure 1).3 The con-tinuum can include a large number of means, but I limit the number to sixfor the purposes of this article:

1. full integration of the minority within the state;2. the quest for services in the minority’s language (administrative consoci-

ationalism);3. participation of the minority group in the state’s policy making (minor-

ity governance);4. administrative autonomy through the control of substate institutions

(minority rule);5. partial political autonomy through political accommodations, such as

proportional representation in legislative assemblies and federalism(political consociationalism); and

6. full political sovereignty (statehood).

Administrative consociationalism (Point 2), minority governance (Point 3),and minority rule (Point 4) are subtypes of administrative nationalism.

In this article, I focus on minority rule, which I define as the pursuit ofnationalist projects by minority groups through the establishment or controlof substate institutions, that is, institutions to which some of the state’sauthority is decentralized. Municipalities, school boards, and health author-ities are examples of substate institutions over which minorities could exertcontrol. Such institutions may be established specifically for minority groups.


Figure 1Continuum of Means to Achieve Nationalist Goals

Continuum of means to achieve nationalist goals

\/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/

full administrative minority minority political full political

integration consociationalism governance rule consociationalism sovereignty



This is the case in Canada, where distinct school boards exist for Francophonesand Anglophones. However, such institutions can also be established by thestate for the population in general yet be controlled by the minority andused for its nationalist purposes where it represents the majority of the sub-state electorate or clientele.4

Minorities, Territory, and Identity

Linguistic minorities, as most linguistic groups, have a tendency toregroup, whether within cities (Roseman, Laux, & Thieme, 1996) orregions (Williams, 1987). Minorities gather for many reasons, includingthose neuropsychological (Laponce, 1991) and political (Bell & Tepperman,1979; Laponce, 1985). Minority concentration offers greater influencewithin a representative democratic system based on electoral ridings. Othersinvoke socioeconomic reasons. For instance, minorities seek a critical massto ensure their survival (Peach, 1996), increase their ability to purchaseproducts and services respecting their values, and establish protective socialinstitutions (Horowitz, 1985). Critical mass is thus crucial, combining terri-tory and demography in the typical administrative formula “where numberswarrant” for the allocation of political and administrative benefits.

For homogeneous linguistic minorities feeling threatened by the major-ity, space becomes an icon (Pourtier, 1991). It is elevated to the status ofprimordial symbol of collective identity (Horowitz, 1985). In many cases,space is sacralized as “holy ground” (Herb, 1999, p. 19). Territory createsand maintains collective identity in a minority situation (Herb & Kaplan,1999). Thus, discursive landscape becomes an agent of socialization(Burghardt, 1973; Häkli, 1999; Knight, 1982; Paasi, 1996; Sack, 1986).Herb (1999) summarized this thesis as follows:

As the territory becomes reified, individual members of the nation becomesocialized within the territorial unit that exists. The space itself helps to weldtogether fragmented individual and group experiences into a common nationstory. The territory creates a collective consciousness by reinventing itself asa homeland. (p. 17)

The dynamic link between territory and identity has long beenneglected, but recent scholarship in political geography is bringing it to thefore (Beckouche, 2004). Specifically, the cultural approach states that spaceshapes social relations (Gomes, 2004). Some authors even make space acausal dimension (Herb, 1999). Space is simultaneously the product and




reproducer of social interactions (Harvey, 1996; Soja, 1996). It is con-structed by social actors, but it frames and reinforces their identities (Ley,1981). This is often the case when frequent interactions produce mentalmaps (Claval, 2004; Gould & White, 1974) and cognitive spaces (King &Golledge, 1978). Thus, we should no longer reduce the state to the politicalterritory of nation-states; we should henceforth see the state as the host atnumerous scales (local, regional, national, international) of minority andmajority identity clashes and accommodations.

Minority identity and territory interact (Herb & Kaplan, 1999). It is thusnecessary to study the institutionalization strategies over territory (Paasi,1997), given that minority-controlled institutions will seek to reinforce thedistinct characteristics that justify their creation (Maìz, 2000). But it is alsonecessary to study the territorial strategies over institutions (Bourgeois &Bourgeois, 2005). Both strategies are interesting because they can reinforceeach other (Moreno, 2000): The more a state institution is bestowed withfunctional and territorial autonomy, the more the minority will seek to con-trol it to reinforce its identity; furthermore, the stronger the minority’s iden-tity, the more it will seek to control state institutions to which is bestowedfunctional and territorial autonomy.

Territorial Administrative Decentralizationand Substate Institutions

Many states that accommodate minority nationalist movements favor theterritorial principle over the personality principle:5 Instead of allocating allpublic services in all offices of the state in all official languages to every-one whose language is official, states limit the number of multilingualservices to those in the offices located in areas where the minority repre-sents a significant proportion of the population (McRae, 1979). Costs andthe dearth of multilingual employees available to service all officesthroughout the state are the two main arguments against the personalityprinciple, although digital information technologies reduce the limits ofspace (Goldbloom, 1998). But a third argument can be referred to as thecritical mass hypothesis:6 Minorities that represent a higher number ofmembers or a higher percentage of the population justify a higher numberof public services.7 The hypothesis contains three assumptions. First, con-tacts and conflicts between majority and minority language groups occurfirst and foremost within a limited territorial space called communities,whether local or regional (Ninyoles, 1969). Therefore, solutions to such




conflicts must be found where the minority represents a significant propor-tion of the population to avoid the escalation of conflicts. Second, it is insuch communities that the minority’s presence is known and the imple-mentation of accommodation measures can be “acceptable” to the majority.And third, it is mostly in such communities that the minority can takeadvantage of the symbolic and practical measures to become “viable.”Scattered minority members cannot easily sustain their language and cul-ture in isolation. The geolinguistic formula often used to specify minorityrights throughout the world—“where numbers warrant”8—involves signif-icantly more than convenient administrative criteria.

The territorial principle requires administrative deconcentration or decen-tralization. The former maintains the implementation of public policy withindepartments, whereas the latter allocates that function to a relatively inde-pendent institution (Lemieux, 1986). Both can involve functional and/or ter-ritorial considerations (Lemieux, 2001). To handle linguistic conflicts, NewBrunswick’s Department of Education implemented a functional deconcen-tration, without resorting to territorial considerations, when it establishedadministrative duality from the deputy minister on down, in 1981: There isa Francophone division and an Anglophone division under respective deputyministers within the same Department of Education. Nine of the 13Canadian provinces and territories have a single minority school board tomanage all minority schools throughout the province or territory (Behiels,2004). Other functional deconcentration mechanisms also ensure that thestate’s institutions are well versed in the minority groups’ needs and values.

The territorial principle, however, usually requires territorial administra-tive decentralization: the delegation of ministerial authority to geographi-cally delineated substate agencies, boards, and commissions (ABCs). SomeABCs play a bigger role than others in minority rights and survival. Schoolboards are crucial because schools are the most important public institutionto help minority families transmit their language and culture (Landry &Rousselle, 2003), whereas municipal councils are less important becauseinfrastructure, its main function, plays only a small role in minority iden-tity (Sancton, 2004). However, municipalities also manage so-called softservices such as culture, and many are involved in education and socialservices. The naming of streets (toponymy) can also be an importantnationalist quest. Thus, any substate institution can become a target.

In important public sectors, it seems inadequate to merely be well versedin minority needs; it also seems necessary to let the minority manage itsown affairs. Section 23 of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms is an exemplary case: It guarantees that linguistic minorities will




obtain their own schools and that these will be managed by the minority’sschool boards, thereby providing a minimal form of “educational self-government” (Magnet, 1983, p. 211). The Supreme Court of Canada has sincestrengthened minority educational self-government (Behiels, 2004). Inother fields, the minority has limited recourse, although its critical mass inmany areas provides an opportunity to control additional substate institu-tions, notably municipal councils, but such institutions are rarely estab-lished to serve the minority’s particular needs and values. In this case,political consociationalism can be a viable alternative. This can involveminority municipal committees and equitable representation on council(Bieber, 2006).

One of the main reasons why local ABCs play a pivotal role in a minor-ity’s identity and projects is their relation to minority homelands. This issignificant because most states award rights to historical minorities andbecause such minorities are generally concentrated in their ancestral com-munities (Capotorti, 1979). Territorially decentralized substate institutionsthat allocate public services deemed significant for the minority’s linguisticand cultural survival have service areas. Thus, the more these institutions’service areas coincide with a minority’s ancestral homeland, howeverdefined, the more the overlap of history, territory, function, and public insti-tutions instigates and legitimizes administrative decentralization andnationalism.

The decentralization of state functions deemed critical to a minority’ssurvival to substate institutions with service areas that overlap the minority’shomeland is a significant mechanism to resolve sociolinguistic conflicts inthe communities where they are most salient because such institutionsenable the minority, especially where it represents the majority of the servicearea’s electorate and clients, to exercise relative autonomy over these signif-icant functions. Such administrative accommodations give the minority thelegitimacy, monopoly of coercion, and taxation authority that the statebestows its institutions, thereby transforming local and regional ABCs intonationalist tools for a minority group that controls them. The minority groupcan use such substate institutions to pursue nationalist ends, whether sym-bolic or material (Herb, 1999; Moreno, 2000). It accepts relative institutionalautonomy as a substitute to full self-government.

My conclusions nevertheless need empirical verification. My prelimi-nary case study shows how such dynamics exist and evolve within an urbancommunity. Specifically, given that substate institutions with service areasthat overlap minority homelands can combine their functionally decentralizedautonomy with territory and its symbolic, historical, and cultural foundations




to shape a minority’s projects of identity and vitality, my case study veri-fies the following hypothesis deduced from the literature (Herb & Kaplan,1999; Maìz, 2000; Murphy, 1991; Murphy & Harty, 2003; Sack, 1986;Safran, 2000): Conflicts between majority and minority societal groupswithin a state can be resolved through substate administrative institutions.My case study is based on governmental and media document analysis andinterviews conducted with 20 public officials and minority leaders involvedin the issues at stake.

The Case Study: One Urban Community,Three Municipalities, Two Societies, Three Projects

My research uses a case study of New Brunswick Acadians’ recentnationalist efforts vis-à-vis health, education, and local services in theGreater Moncton urban area to determine if and how substate administra-tive institutions and nationalism play a role in minority identity, projects,and vitality.9 A few paragraphs describe the context of Acadians in Monctonand New Brunswick.

Acadians came from France in 1604 to settle what is now known as theMaritime Provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island).They cohabitated peacefully with First Nations until the 1755-1763 depor-tation by British forces, before most of them returned in the 19th century assquatters and rebuilt a dynamic and self-reliant society (Faragher, 2005;Griffiths, 2005; Laxer, 2006). In New Brunswick, the only province saveQuebec where French is an official language, Acadians represent a third ofthe population. They have significant constitutional and legal rights, includ-ing a constitutional right to their own schools and “cultural institutions.”10

Greater Moncton was chosen as the case study because it has been at thecenter of Acadian nationalist projects since the 1960s (LeBlanc, 1996) andit continues to be a nationalist hotbed. To reduce the linguistic conflictsfueled by the secessionist Parti Acadien (Ouellette, 1992) that peaked in the1970s, the province established distinct substate institutions for Acadians:They have their own regional school board and health authority. The con-cessions worked: Acadian nationalists deliberately abandoned the quest fora sovereign provincial state in 1979 in favor of administrative duality anddecentralization (Thériault, 1982). But most important, Greater Monctonwas chosen because in 2002, the 36,000 Acadians living in the area weregrappling with three important administrative issues involving their lan-guage, culture, and identity. In many regards, nationalist projects in education,




health, and municipal services opposed the interests of the 21,000 Acadiansof Moncton, where they form a significant minority (34%), to those of the14,000 Acadians of Dieppe, where they form a significant majority (79%).11

First, the provincial threat of amalgamating the three municipalities in1993, abandoned in favor of greater regionalization of municipal servicesbetween 1994 and 1999, pushed some of Dieppe’s Acadians to look to theirmunicipality as a linguistic guardian and convince its elected council to ini-tiate six important autonomist projects in 2002. That autumn, the DieppeCouncil adopted policy decisions to secede from the regional water systemand the regional land-use planning commission, establish its own economicdevelopment commission, and build its own downtown. A few weeks later,the council adopted a policy that identified Dieppe as a Francophone city.And a few weeks after that, the council sought to extricate the city from theexisting urban federal electoral riding and insert it into the neighboringrural Francophone riding. The six declarations of autonomy indicated thatthe city’s boundaries would become markers of its distinct identity.According to some members of the council, the policies were either initi-ated or accelerated following Moncton City Council’s resolution of August6, 2002, making Moncton the first officially bilingual city in Canada.Moncton’s symbolic resolution eliminated the outstanding argumentagainst amalgamation since 1993: Amalgamation would assimilate DieppeAcadians, in many Acadians’ view. Dieppe’s six autonomous projects thusintended to distinguish it further from Moncton to avoid amalgamation inthe future.

Second, the threat of consolidating the management of the Acadian andAnglophone hospitals in Moncton pushed many Acadians of the entireurban area, even of the entire province, to request administrative duality inhealth care. Administrative duality has de facto existed in the area since1952, following the construction of the Anglophone hospital less than 2 kmfrom the Acadian hospital built in 1928. Nevertheless, duality had beenthreatened on many occasions: in 1967, when the Equal OpportunitiesProgram centralized the management of health services from municipalitiesand counties to the provincial health department (Young, 2001); in 1992,when the department consolidated the 51 local health boards into 8 regionalhealth boards (Bourgeois, 1995); and in 1998, when the health department’squest to rationalize expenses launched a turf war between the hospitalsintent on maintaining their respective laboratories, a dispute that rapidlytook an Acadian nationalist turn. Administrative duality was once againthreatened in 2002 when a consultant’s report commissioned by theprovince recommended greater collaboration between the two regional




health boards to ensure greater efficiency in the allocation of specializedservices and when the provincial government decided to reduce the decision-making autonomy of all eight regional health boards in the province. Toappease Acadian nationalists who claimed that the legislative modificationwould threaten their language and culture, the provincial cabinet modifiedthe new Official Languages Act to force the eight regional health author-ities to allocate their services in both French and English and to promote the equality of both official languages. But Acadian nationalists insistedthat cabinet amend its legislation on the new regional health authorities to officially designate Moncton’s Acadian hospital as a provincial andFrancophone unit. Regional administrative duality in health, the only one inCanada, was maintained, and the Acadian health authority officially desig-nated its hospital as a Francophone institution in June 2002. However, itwas not designated as a “provincial” Francophone institution, as requestedby some Acadian nationalists.

Third, following 30 years of lobbying and Moncton Acadian parents’threats to sue, the provincial government accepted to build a French-language high school in the city. The new school, built less than 2 km fromthe existing regional French-language high school in Dieppe, removed halfof the 1,700 students that attended the existing high school and enabledthem to study in a new high school located in their hometown of Moncton.Since 2001, the Acadian school board serving the entire Greater Monctonarea had requested the construction of a second French-language highschool in the area, but the provincial government did not respond until theForum des parents francophones de Moncton initiated a lawsuit in May2002. The parents argued that their Acadian community was distinct fromDieppe’s and thus justified their own high school. The school opened itsdoors in September 2005. Dieppe City Council has since supported the ideaof a private French-language high school in the city.

Analysis

My findings largely confirm the hypothesis drawn from my review of theliterature in political geography, nationalism, and public administration,according to which conflicts between majority and minority languagegroups within a state can be resolved by administrative means. In otherwords, minority-controlled substate institutions and the authority delegatedto them can play a significant role in minority identity and vitality. Acadiannationalists believe this, but so do many majority officials. Administrative




nationalism thus reveals more numerous, more viable, and richer alterna-tives than does political nationalism in defining and pursuing nationalistobjectives. This suggests that a broad conception of the state—one that notonly considers central institutions such as legislative assemblies and depart-ments but also substate institutions such as municipalities and local ABCs—can give minorities who form a critical mass leverage over such institutionsto exercise self-determination and enhance their identity and vitality.

Distinctly Acadian school boards, health authorities, and municipal coun-cils in the urban area enable the minority to adapt standard provincial servicesto its particular needs and values and provide the minority with valuable insti-tutions through which it can foster its national identity and projects.Moreover, the fact that these institutions are officially sanctioned by the stateprovides legitimacy to the minority policy makers governing these institu-tions. Also, these institutions have access to public funds through taxation orpublic grants to fund nationalist projects that the state would not otherwisepay for. Finally, the fact that some Acadians threaten to use section 16.1(1) ofthe Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to protect their particular insti-tutions (City of Dieppe, Acadian hospital) from state intervention indicatesthat administrative nationalism has set in and will be a difficult, if not impos-sible, hurdle to overcome. Ironically, the Acadian minority used substate(provincial) institutions to resist state (provincial) intervention.

Acadian leaders in education, health, and municipal sectors have oftenasserted the importance of minority-controlled institutions. Most of themprefer minority rule over minority governance and administrative consocia-tionalism because, they argue, only the first mean can achieve three criticalobjectives: first, to thwart perceived threats from the majority (the localAnglophone ABCs or, increasingly, the province); second, to ensure servicesin French; and, third and more important, to promote the minority languageand culture. In their opinion, majority institutions are unable or unwilling togo beyond the allocation of bilingual services; majority ABCs do not investin the added task of ensuring that public services are only one means toensure individual and collective equality. It seems that only minority-controlled institutions can accomplish this important third objective.

However, these institutions and the regionalism that ensues cause con-flicts. The laboratory turf wars between the Anglophone and Acadian healthboards in 1998 showed that the majority and some members of the minor-ity believe that a single board would be more effective and efficient.Acadian nationalists did not tackle the latter argument, but they argued thata single hospital could not accommodate the number of patients and bedsin the area in any case and so proposed that effectiveness be measured as




much by the quality of service, including the allocation of bilingual services,as by the quality of democratic decision making. This is their trump card:Bilingual administrative institutions tend to favor the majority language andassimilate the minority; majority decisions do not always take into consid-eration minority needs and values; and the majority can always control stateinstitutions, whereas the minority cannot. The 2002 reforms did not opposethe two overlapping health authorities (the Anglophone authority alsoopposed the centralization of its powers to the health department), but theypitted the Acadian minority against the Anglophone-dominated provincialgovernment. Also, Dieppe’s autonomous projects may exacerbate existingconflicts and even generate further intermunicipal conflicts.

The 2002 reforms also pitted Acadians against themselves. The Acadianschool board and most Acadian nationalists supported the construction of ahigh school in Moncton, but some Acadian leaders did not. Most opponentslived in Dieppe and feared a reduction in the quality of education for theirchildren within a smaller school. Their municipal leaders also opposed theidea, fearing a loss of Francophone in-migrants. Furthermore, the efforts todesignate the Acadian hospital as the provincial Acadian hospital created abacklash from the Acadian-dominated health authorities serving northernNew Brunswick; they feared that such a designation would reduce servicesin their areas. Finally, Acadians in Dieppe discarded Moncton’s bilingual-ism as “artificial” and diminished the importance of the Acadian fact inMoncton by minimizing their numbers and exaggerating Dieppe’s. Pushedto the extreme, this distinction motivated one Acadian leader to redraw, dur-ing an interview, the municipal boundary separating Dieppe and Monctonto include within an expanded Dieppe the important Francophone institu-tions located in Moncton (media, hospital, university, business). No con-sideration was given to the Acadians living in Moncton; only theinstitutions located in that “assimilationist” city were of concern. Such con-flicts between Acadians do not contradict my findings that administrativedecentralization can resolve sociolinguistic conflicts between minority andmajority groups, but they do suggest that members within the minority maydisagree on nationalist goals and means and that some nationalists are will-ing to sacrifice some members for the sake of the institution. This is mostapparent when Acadian nationalists erect unequivocal boundaries betweenthe “Acadian” city of Dieppe and the “Anglophone” city of Moncton, evenif the former contains numerous Anglophones and, more important, the lat-ter contains more Acadians than Dieppe.

The tensions between Acadian segregationists and integrationists,notably at the municipal level where it is the lowest common institutionaldenominator,12 is worthy of further study. Why did municipalities—local




institutions that have a relatively unimportant role to play in regard to lan-guage, culture, and identity because they deal with streets, sidewalks, watersystems, sewers, solid waste disposal, and fire and police protection—become the repository of relatively stronger nationalist sentiments and noteducation and health institutions, which manage sectors more important tothe intergenerational transmission of language and culture? The security pro-vided by official bilingualism and administrative duality in health and educa-tion may explain why the previously neglected municipal sector is becominga target of Acadian nationalist interest. But this suggests that administrativeduality—difficult, if not impossible, in a municipality or an urban area wherethe minority is dispersed—may be of limited use. Should an urban area bedivided according to language? Should bilingual cities such as Monctonestablish two elected councils—one for the majority, one for the minority?Alternatively, should they establish a joint council for “hard” services anddistinct subcouncils for “soft” services? Can such accommodations enablethe majority and the minority to identify with the municipality in a way thatcan alleviate conflicts and enable the minority to pursue nationalist projects?If not, is segregation (Dieppe = French; Moncton = English) the most effec-tive solution? Establishing distinct substate institutions to manage localschools and hospitals within the same city seems a relatively easier task.

In addition to confirming my hypothesis, my findings suggest threeadditional conclusions. First, minorities that form a majority of the elec-torate and clients of a substate institution will erect strategic boundaries toenhance segregation through their control of such institutions (minorityrule), but when it is a minority at the substate level, it will adopt territorialstrategies to facilitate integration through state administrative arrangements(minority governance or administrative consociationalism). Acadianserected strategic boundaries to enhance segregation through their control ofsubstate institutions (minority rule) when they were a majority within aservice area (municipalities), but they did not adopt territorial strategies tofacilitate integration through state administrative arrangements (minoritygovernance or minority consociationalism) when they were a minority atthe substate level (school boards, health boards). Acadians want to havetheir cake and eat it, too; there is discernment between strategies, but in theend, the strategy that gets the most autonomy is chosen irrespective of con-sequences. An empirical verification is nevertheless needed to confirmwhether the minority’s demographic status makes a difference.

Second, administrative duality adds a critical caveat in health and education.Because Acadians formed the majority of the electorate and clientele—indeed, the entire electorate and clientele—of both the Acadian schoolboard and the Acadian health authority,13 Acadians did not need to seek




territorial segregation, because functional segregation in health and educa-tion already protected their language and culture. Overlapping service areasmake it difficult to speak of territorial strategies in the fields of educationand health care in the Greater Moncton area. Elsewhere in the province, ter-ritorial strategies would be unnecessary in education because of the distinctand overlapping school boards, but they would be possible in health care,where the six other regional health authorities are not defined by linguisticcriteria. Yet, it would be improbable to see distinct hospitals in each regionestablished on a linguistic basis, as has been the case in Moncton since1952. The alternative is to establish subboards within each regional healthauthority to deal with linguistic and cultural issues. From a minority-ruleperspective, however, it seems odd that Acadians would seek such arrange-ments instead of taking control of the three health authorities in the north-ern areas where they form the majority of the electorate.

It is only practically possible to speak of territorial segregation in themunicipal sector. Indeed, Dieppe Acadians have endeavored, since thethreat of amalgamation in 1993 and Moncton’s resolution on official bilin-gualism in 2002, to initiate or amplify its distinct status based mostly onlanguage. Dieppe Acadians, a majority within that “edge city” (Garreau,1991) but a minority within the urban area, erected strategic boundariesbased on language and culture that, according to some interviewees, maycreate a “ghetto” in Dieppe, or at least a sociolinguistic segregation in theurban area. Dieppe’s autonomy projects of 2002 are thus the logical prod-uct of a “strategy of distinction” based ultimately on language and culture.Moncton Acadians, minorities within their city and the urban area, did notresort to such territorial strategies, because they are scattered throughoutthe city. Had they been concentrated, Acadians could have sought the cre-ation of an Acadian ward or taken control of the existing wards whereinthey form the majority of voters.

I nevertheless noticed some elements of territorial differentiation in thehealth and education sectors as well. Minority Acadian parents of Monctondeclared themselves “distinct” from the Acadians of Dieppe, a majority inthat city. But this strategy was not intended to oppose their Acadian col-leagues who share the same school district and school board; it served tooppose the provincial government’s blocking their request. Also, minorityAcadians in the Greater Moncton area share the same health board and hos-pital and were united in their common fight, but the project to designate thelocal Acadian hospital as a “provincial” Acadian hospital created a distinc-tion between Acadians of the south and those of the north. However, thesenuances are not crucial and should not put in doubt my conclusion that




administrative duality and parallel institutions in health and educationreduce the minority’s preference for territorial segregation.

Third, my findings suggest that (a) the more a minority institution isbestowed with functional and territorial autonomy, the more it will seek toreinforce minority identity and (b) the stronger the minority identity, themore the minority will seek to obtain control over institutions on which isbestowed functional and territorial autonomy. But this is not automatic; theminority must steer the institution to that end. Substate institutions playeda key role in the explanation of territorial strategies used by Acadian elitesin Greater Moncton in relation to recent developments in the municipal,health, and education services. Their combination of territorial service areaand administrative functions determined the issues and shaped the Acadianelites’ consequential strategies. Indeed, these strategies depended in greatpart on the facts that the minority institution bestowed with the most func-tional and territorial autonomy (the municipality of Dieppe) aggressivelysought to reinforce its minority identity. Again, the existing regional admin-istrative duality in health and education in the area may explain why admin-istrative nationalism in those fields focused on functional rather thanterritorial decentralization. It is worth noting that Dieppe is one of a fewAcadian municipalities that pursue nationalist projects.

There are many other caveats that warrant further study. The issues, theadministrative context, the minority’s official status and critical mass, theinstitutions in place, the degree of functional autonomy that is decentralizedby the state, and the role of elites seem important intermediary variables.Whether these variables put my hypothesis in jeopardy remains to be seen,but my case study suggests that they play a significant role in administra-tive decentralization and nationalism. It would seem wise to further explorethe relation between these variables.

My preliminary study raises numerous other practical, theoretical, andempirical questions. A first set is presented here, in no particular order, asa prolegomenon on administrative nationalism.

Among others, five practical or administrative questions seem mostimportant. First, under what circumstances can administrative duality beapplied to all functions as it is applied in education and health in south-eastern New Brunswick? Second, how can a municipal institution protectits minorities? Minority rule and administrative duality can hardly beapplied to core hard services such as water and sewers. Is the alternativepolitical consociationalism, such as reserved seats on council? Third, whatis the optimal functional and territorial scale of decentralized substate insti-tutions for minority rule? In other words, does self-determination increase




or improve if a minority manages multiple local school boards or a singlestatewide school board? And does a minority increase or improve its self-determination with (a) a multitude of decentralized substate institutionsresponsible for a single function within a specific area, (b) a multitude ofstatewide single-function institutions, (c) a multitude of regional multi-functional institutions, or (d) a single statewide multifunctional institution?Fourth, up to what point can a minority justify a public function as beingcrucial to its identity and vitality? Dieppe’s quest for a separate water sys-tem is a case in point, especially when one considers that its councilaccepted to forego its municipal police force, a public service arguablymore worthy of identity pursuits than water. Finally, and conversely, up towhat point can a minority abandon salient institutional functions yet justifyminority rule? Dieppe abandoned its police force, like other servicesregionalized before, thereby creating a distinct Acadian city that is pro-gressively becoming an empty shell (or shelling its core functions in favorof others). The same could be said of the Acadian health authority as it pro-gressively loses its decision-making authority to the health department.

On the theoretical side, six basic questions can be asked. Can adminis-trative nationalism and decentralization resolve the dilemma between a lib-eral state and communitarian administration? Why do some minoritiesabandon (or never seek) full political sovereignty in favor of a more limitedform of “administrative” sovereignty? What is the link between minority“homelands” and administrative service areas? Do the autonomy of minor-ity institutions and administrative decentralization feed off each other tocreate a “cult of distinctiveness” in spite of similarities between groups?Does territorial contiguity determine relations between the minority andthe majority? Are the elites in charge of minority institutions representativeof the entire group, whether they are named or elected to office, or are theyco-opted by the majority? If so, why?

Finally, numerous empirical questions warrant attention. Are GreaterMoncton Acadians too particular, or do minorities elsewhere also seek con-trol over substate institutions? If so, how do their strategies compare? Donationalist quests target some institutions rather than others? If so, whatfunctions are most salient to the minority’s survival and prosperity? Why dominority groups that seek such control perceive substate institutions, ratherthan the state through other administrative means, as being more effectivein ensuring their vitality and identity? Do minority groups that exercisesuch control seek greater participation in the state’s policy-making process,or are these strategies exclusive? Do minority groups prefer minority ruleover minority governance and administrative consociationalism? Is there a




correlation between the critical mass of minority groups that seek minorityrule over substate institutions versus those that seek minority governance?If so, what is the correlation? Do minority groups seek more substate insti-tutions than the majority does? Do they seek greater decentralization ofstate functions, authority, and decisions for municipalities and ABCs wherethey form the majority of the electorate? Do minority-controlled substateinstitutions adopt different policies or implement them differently than dotheir majoritarian counterparts? Do these institutions invest more funds insociocultural activities than majority institutions do? Do they intervene inmore functions? Do minority groups use the substate institutions to pro-mote their vitality? If so, how? What are the consequences?

It is only after such research is conducted that we will be able to betterunderstand how substate administrative institutions and processes helpresolve or fuel sociolinguistic conflicts. My case study shows that minoritygroups seek minority rule over legitimate substate institutions where theyform the majority of the citizens and clients served, to check and balancemajority rule exercised through statewide legislative and executive institu-tions. The minorities seek such control to legitimize their nationalist claimsand contribute to their nationalist struggles.

Conclusion

Minority rule may not resolve all sociolinguistic conflicts. There areproblems associated with territorial administrative decentralization, includ-ing scale diseconomies and public accountability (Vié, 1986). In addition,administrative decentralization of authority to local ABCs adds the risk ofregionalism (Chevallier, 1985; Rangeon, 1982). In other words, structuresstructure: By creating a local institution to adapt the state’s policies andapparatus to local particularities, the state adds a relatively autonomouslayer that will develop its own culture, processes, functions, and identity(Mintzberg, 1979). This seems particularly the case when territorial admin-istrative decentralization in the hands of minority-controlled substate insti-tutions engenders a “cult of distinction”: The minority seems constantlyobliged to establish or reaffirm its institutional distinctions to justify itsexistence or status (Bourgeois & Bourgeois, 2005). Territorial administra-tive decentralization may thus be a double-edged sword for both the minor-ity groups pursuing minority rule and the state that is considering suchaccommodations. My preliminary study shows that sociolinguistic conflictscontinue between the state and its local institutions, between minority andmajority ABCs, and even within the minority community.




But it also shows that such conflicts are less numerous and volatile thanthose that occurred previously and that the difference is in great part due tothe Acadian minority’s having its own school board and hospital and con-trolling a municipal institution that has no inherent nationalist purpose butcan be used in such a manner. Administrative duality in education and healthhas reduced sociolinguistic conflicts in the Greater Moncton area because ithas enabled the Acadian minority to use such institutions as tools to ensuretheir survival, contribute to their vitality, and promote their identity andnationalist projects in opposition to provincial state uniformity. ManyAcadian leaders stated the importance that these institutions “belong to”their minority group, even though many also acknowledged that centraliza-tion had reduced their decisional autonomy.

The administrative nationalism pursued by Acadians does not give wayto political nationalism, as Hutchinson (1994) suggested. They seek admin-istrative means and deem them adequate substitutes to legislative and regu-latory tools to accomplish cultural and political goals. Also, Acadiannationalism does not seek full autonomy as Smith (1991) defined it. It seekspartial (administrative) autonomy. Statehood is rejected, albeit begrudg-ingly, as being utopian. But the Acadian “nation” and nationalism continuethrough different means. Studies on nationalism must therefore broaden thedefinition of their subject to reflect these nuances. Minority rule over sub-state institutions can be a means to further nationalist goals, but it can alsobe a nationalist goal unto itself. In other words, the process of the pursuitmay be just as important as its end product.

Substate administrative nationalism may be in its initial phase. Acadiansin New Brunswick started their version in 1979, and the momentumincreased in 2002. A recent amendment to Canada’s Official Languages Actforces federal institutions to take “positive measures” to enhance theminorities’ vitality; this requires consulting the minorities and taking intoaccount their particular values when making institutional decisions. Thiswill lead to enhanced minority governance. The 1992 European Charter forRegional and Linguistic Minorities proposes substate institutional arrange-ments to resolve sociolinguistic conflicts, thereby opening the door tominority groups’ eventual quest for control over such substate institutions.A similar conclusion could be reached for numerous other countries (Eide,2003; Pentassuglia, 2002). Acadian administrative nationalism in theGreater Moncton area may not be exceptional.

Administrative means and concepts seem to be fundamental elements inaccommodating postmodern nationalist movements. This conclusion mayseem out of place in the context of the increasingly reduced role of the state




(Castells, 1997), but it fits nicely in the era of governance (Peters, 1993)and the era of the facilitating state (Fox & Miller, 1995; Racine, 1995). Ifpublic administrators and institutions are at the service of the public and ifdiversity (minority groups) is considered a virtue and deemed worthy ofprotection, public administration has an important contribution to make tothe study and practice of nationalism and sociolinguistic accommodations.Public administrators would be wise to learn more about minorities andtheir nationalist movements.

Notes

1. Our case study deals with linguistic minorities, but some of the lessons may apply toethnic, racial, religious, or sexual minorities who seek their own schools or family law tri-bunals, for example. There is, however, a difference between language and other minority cul-tural values (Dinstein, 1976; Van Dyke, 1974). As Kymlicka (1995) best explained it, a statecan have no established church, but it must have one or more established languages, in law orin practice.

2. By societal minority group, I am referring to an organized group of individuals whoshare “a heritage of custom, ritual, and way of life that is in some real or imagined senseimmemorial, being referred back to a shared history and shared provenance or homeland”(Waldron, 1992, p. 754) and do not form the numerical majority of the population within asociety. The basic characteristics of such groups include shared and pervasive character andculture, socialization mechanisms, mutual recognition, self-identification, and belonging(Margalit & Raz, 1990).

3. Full integration (or assimilation) of the minority within the state may seem nonnation-alist because it involves a minority’s mobilizing to lose its distinct values and identity, but sucha situation is theoretically possible and should therefore not be discarded a priori.

4. I assume that decentralized institutions are governed by directors elected by local citizens.5. Most states that apply the territorial principle also apply the personality principle in

matters of justice (trials) and correspondence with national headquarters (Brett, 1991;Capotorti, 1979; McDonald, 1986; Réaume, 1988). See my recent work (Bourgeois, 2006) fora detailed study of the administrative consequences of both principles and the variations of theterritorial principle within states.

6. I deduce the critical mass hypothesis and its three assumptions from the first report ofthe Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1967) and Capotorti’s report(1979) on minority rights to the United Nations.

7. The exact number and percentage will vary according to the social and political cir-cumstances within each state. For example, in Canada since 1982, education rights areawarded where the number of minority students is sufficient. The Supreme Court has sinceadopted a sliding scale (Mahé v. Alberta): The extent of the rights is proportional to the minor-ity’s critical mass. An Aristotelian argument could be made that it is the smallest minority thatneeds greater support, but this is beyond the immediate concern—the territorial principle.

8. The criterion was first identified by Capotorti (1979) and is the paradigm in the alloca-tion of public services to minority groups (Eide, 1993, 2003). The 1992 European Charter forRegional or Minority Languages uses a similar formula: Minorities must represent “a number




of people” living in a defined area in which the said language is a significant mode of expres-sion to justify the adoption of the various protective and promotional measures provided for inthis charter.

9. To reduce the volume of endnotes, the reader is invited to read Bourgeois and Bourgeois(2005) for details and references of the initial case study.

10. Section 16.1 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states the following:“The English linguistic community and the French linguistic community in New Brunswickhave equality of status and equal rights and privileges, including the right to distinct educa-tional institutions and such distinct cultural institutions as are necessary for the preservationand promotion of those communities.”

11. These numbers are estimates for the 2006 census. The 2001 census indicated that20,425 (34%) of the 60,075 Monctonians and 11,340 (77%) of the 14,750 Dieppois haveFrench as their native language. Our estimates reflect the demographic boom since 2001, espe-cially in Dieppe.

12. The “arrondissements” created in numerous Québec municipalities since the 1999 merg-ers are an interesting exception to the smallest common denominator, in a minority linguistic con-text. The municipalities designated “bilingual” under the 1977 Charter of the French Languagethat were amalgamated in 1999 maintained their linguistic status. Arrondissements have a legalstatus, a separate council, taxation revenues, and autonomous functional responsibilities.

13. Exogamous and Anglophone parents can send their children to Acadian schools, andthe two regional health authorities must provide their services in both official languages.Voters must decide for which of the overlapping health authorities and school boards theyintend to vote.

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Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 25, 751-793.Williams, C. (1987). Language in geographic context. Philadelphia: Clevedon.Yacoub, J. (2000). Au-delà des minorités. Paris: Les éditions ouvrières.Young, R. (2001). The programme of equal opportunity: An overview. In R. Ouellette (Ed.),

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Daniel Bourgeois holds a doctorate in public policy analysis and public administration. He isthe executive director of the Canadian Institute for Research on Public Policy and PublicAdministration. He has published one peer-reviewed book (The Canadian Bilingual Districts:From Cornerstone to Tombstone, 2006) and several peer-reviewed articles on administrativedecentralization, substate institutional governance, and administrative accommodations betweenminority and majority groups.




Documents

Administrative Nationalism