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Presentation given at the New York County Bar Association on April 5, 2005
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Advanced Issues Advanced Issues for the IP for the IP PractionerPractioner
Ronald D. Coleman
COLEMAN LAW FIRM A Professional Corporation
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
The First Amendment “Congress shall make no law…”
Axiom: Trademark rights are a limitation on “speech” (expression)
First Principles
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)
First Principles
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
THE ANCIENT TEST FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT vel non
LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY
Courts are not to stake out new territory in the trademark domain
at the expense of curtailing the ability of a speaker to communicate
his message.
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
WEIGH EFFECT ON SPEECH
In determining the outer limits of trademark protection the weight of the risks of confusion and suppression of
expression may tip the scales against trademark protection.
Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 1989)
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
BE RELUCTANT TO USE FORCE
Courts are to be particularly reluctant to issue an injunction, even in a Lanham Act case, where there are delicate questions implicating First Amendment rights.
Stop Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
TRADEMARK NOT A DEVICE TO SILENCE DISSENT
A trademark may frequently be the most effective means of focusing attention on the trademark owner or its product, the recognition of exclusive rights encompassing such use would permit the stifling of unwelcome discussion, and is forbidden.
United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92, n.3 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1521 (1998)
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31-33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987)
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402-03 n.8 (8th Cir 1987)
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION
THE TEST FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
As of 1998, it could fairly be said that:Initial interest confusion has been applied only where a potential purchaser is initially confused such that the senior seller may be precluded from further consideration by the buyer. Weiss Assoc., Inc. v. HRL Assoc., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(emphasis added).
“INITIAL INTEREST” CONFUSION
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
The consumer as idiotThe consumer as idiot
Minimum level of discernment and intelligence on the part of consumers was presumed.
Consumers were expected to distinguish between the use of a mark to draw attention, and the use of a mark to indicate source. Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States
Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Girl Scouts v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
Gets less constitutional protection: ‘It’s “hardy” because it’s motivated by $$.’
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
Communication of information, expression of opinion, recitation of grievances are all deserving of constitutional protection, and are not commerce.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
COMMERCIAL SPEECHCOMMERCIAL SPEECH
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
COMMERCIAL SPEECHCOMMERCIAL SPEECH
The test of whether speech is “commercial speech” is whether or not “proposal
of a commercial transaction” is the sole
purpose of the expression.
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410 (1993)
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
Ninth Circuit - Yesterday
“The Second Circuit held in United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1997), that the “use in connection with the sale of goods and services” requirement of the Lanham Act does not require any actual sale of goods and services. Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether Kremer offers competi services to the public. Kremer is not Bosley’s competitor; he is their critic. His use of the Bosley mark is not in connection with a sale of goods or services — it is in connection with the expression of his opinion about Bosley’s goods and services.”
To find a Lanham Act violation without finding commercial use may contradict Congress’ intent.
BOSLEY MEDICAL INSTITUTE v. KREMER April 4, 2005
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com
Ronald D. Coleman www.coleman-firm.com