Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects · Pakistan, Russia and China managed to strike a peace agreement with the Taliban in Doha (Doha agreement), to bring an end to the decades

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Afghan Endgame: Challenges and Prospects

Kashif Hussain

Introduction

The announcement of the United States’ (US)

Afghanistan-centric South Asia Strategy in August 2017

led to an increase in the magnitude of war in

Afghanistan allowing the Taliban to gain greater

influence and more ground across the country.1

Consequently, Washington directly approached the

insurgent group for negotiations that commenced in

October 2018. The dialogue continued for more than a

year and a half up until February 2020. On February 29,

2020, the US with the help of regional powers especially

Pakistan, Russia and China managed to strike a peace

agreement with the Taliban in Doha (Doha agreement),

to bring an end to the decades long war in Afghanistan.

Under the Doha agreement, the US announced a timeline

for the complete withdrawal of foreign troops, while the

Taliban pledged to ensure that no terrorist organisation

including al-Qaeda and Daesh would conduct attacks

against the US and its allies using Afghan soil.

Ironically, the timing of the agreement coincided with an

unprecedented leadership crisis and establishment of

parallel governments by Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah

Abdullah, following the announcement of presidential

election results on February 18, 2020.2 The leadership

crisis led to a slowing down of the peace process. While

efforts of the Afghan leadership remained focused on

power consolidation and not peace, the US State

Department had to shift its endeavours from the peace

process to resolve the leadership crisis.3

At the same time, President Ghani disagreed with the

terms of the Doha agreement.4 Ultimately, Ghani’s


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approach caused a delay in the opening of the intra-

Afghan talks and also outraged the Taliban. This in turn

increased violence across the country.5 As the Taliban

and government forces remain engaged with each other,

the situation has provided leverage to Daesh and al-

Qaeda-led terrorists to strengthen, ultimately impacting

the Taliban’s ability to fulfil their commitments made

under the Doha agreement in the medium run.6 As per

the agreement, the insurgent group needs to ensure that

no terrorist operates from the Afghan soil against the US

and its allies in order for the former to reduce the

number of its forces to zero. This can only happen if the

Afghans manage to forgo all the immediate challenges

attached to the opening of all-Afghan talks and reach a

permanent cease fire.7

Moreover, delivering on terror related commitments is

not going to be an easy task as there are controversies

surrounding the measures taken against terrorist

organisations especially the Islamic State Khorasan

Province (ISKP) – Daesh’s Afghanistan wing. Since its

sudden rise in 2015, the notorious terror group has

remained a strategic rival of the Taliban. The Taliban

have not only been inflicting heavy damage on the

terrorists but have also blamed the Afghan government

for rescuing ISKP fighters under their siege.8 Given the

Taliban’s ongoing tussle against both Afghan

government forces and ISKP, the interests of the two

have naturally converged against the Taliban. Moreover,

Russia remains suspicious about the US support for the

ISKP.9 Being a direct security threat for Russia,

Pakistan, Iran and China, these countries have taken

serious anti-terror measures specifically directed against

the ISKP.10

However, they remain unable to develop a

proposal to establish a joint regional mechanism against

the ISKP related threats in Afghanistan. This can be

attributed, in part, to the fact that the US and Afghan

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governments are not on good terms and there is also a

lack of trust vis-à-vis the aforementioned regional

powers.

On the other hand, Washington is open to India’s

involvement in Afghanistan which neither perceives a

direct terror threat nor has direct access to the country.

Washington’s encouragement has led India to forge

strong political and military ties with the Afghan

government and maintain full support in its conflict

against the Taliban. Given India’s historical animosity

towards the Taliban, it can go to any length to reduce the

prospects of the group holding legitimate power in

Afghanistan.11

The United States’ partiality towards New-Delhi vis-à-

vis Afghanistan can be attributed to Washington’s

changing policies in the wider Asia Pacific region. Since

2008, the US has been supporting India to raise its great

power status and bring it at par with China. At the same

time, the US has identified ‘revisionist’ China and

Russia as threats and has been working to develop new

strategic alliances.12

Both Moscow and Beijing remain

critical to the changing US’ India-centric policies in the

Asia Pacific including the renaming of the region and

the making of the “Quad,” four nation strategic

alliance.13

Meanwhile China and Russia have also

launched mega geo-economic plans covering the entire

Eurasian region and intend to eventually merge their

projects.14

Given its geostrategic position, the economic

spill over of the mega projects to Afghanistan and rising

Russian and Chinese influence in the landlocked country

is inevitable. The materialisation of these mega

economic plans is also, in part, dependent on the

stability of Afghanistan. Keeping the situation in view,

it can be argued that a complete US withdrawal from


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Afghanistan does not correspond well with its overall

changing policies in the Asia Pacific.

This research navigates through the imminent, medium-

and long-term challenges to a viable peace in

Afghanistan and addresses several pertinent questions

as well as offering recommendations that could help

overcome the numerous challenges and improve the

prospects for a viable peace.

● How does the lack of will on part of the Afghan

leadership to share power with the Taliban give

rise to further conflict and delay the intra-Afghan

talks?

● How the absence of a proposal to establish a

regional mechanism to deal with Daesh and the

natural alignment of interest of the latter with the

US, India and Afghan government creates greater

confusion and also adds to the apprehensions of

the Taliban and regional powers including Russia,

China, Pakistan and Iran?

● How does the US decision to drawdown troops

from Afghanistan not correspond with its overall

policies in the wider Asia Pacific region and

consequently become a long-term challenge for

Afghanistan’s reconstruction?

Background

During his election campaign, US President Donald

Trump pledged an end to America’s longest war and the

withdrawal of the US-led International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan. In August

2017, President Trump outlined his “conditions-based”

Afghanistan-centric South Asia Strategy.15

The strategy

was aimed at putting military pressure on the Taliban

along with using diplomatic and economic tools to make

the Taliban accept a political solution that would appear

as an “American victory.”16

The strategy, while


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continuing its commitment to train and support Afghan

government forces and institutions, and encouraging and

praising India’s role in Afghanistan, severely criticised

Pakistan for providing safe havens to the Taliban and

other terrorist organisations.

As expected, the new strategy remained unsuccessful

especially in terms of exerting military pressure on the

insurgency; in October 2017 alone, hundreds of Afghans

were killed in various attacks, mostly on security

installations, and the insurgent group was also able to

expand its influence over some strategic areas across the

country.17

The Taliban’s growing strength ultimately led

them to reject the Afghan President’s offer of peace

“without any pre-condition” in early 2018.18

In August

2018, the insurgent group once again rejected President

Ghani’s three-month ceasefire offer.19

According to

reports published in western media in September 2018,

the Taliban were in control of more territory than at any

point since the removal of their regime in 2001.20

Under pressure from the growing Taliban influence, the

US initiated direct talks with the Taliban in October

2018.21

The talks continued for almost a year and a half,

amid rising violence and terror incidents. Even during

the course of peace talks, there appeared clear

disagreements over troop withdrawal between the US

State Department and the Pentagon,22

and between the

White House and the Afghan government, and also

between President Trump and his European partners.23

Whilst the White House was pushing for a swift

withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the Pentagon

and NATO adopted a more cautious and conservative

strategy as they considered it unwise to abandon

Afghanistan without establishing a permanent base after

almost two decades of hard-fought battles. The

Europeans perceive the growing Russia-Taliban ties as a


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direct threat to their interests in the region. Germany, the

second largest contributor to the ISAF, extended the

duration of its mission while the US-Taliban talks were

underway.24

Nonetheless, after rigorous efforts and

continuous assistance from regional powers, especially

Pakistan, as well as Russia and China, the US managed

to finalise and sign an agreement with the Taliban to

initiate a political settlement of the conflict in

Afghanistan.

The US-Taliban Peace Agreement

Under the Doha agreement, the US committed to

withdrawing all its military forces, allies, and coalition

partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel,

private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and

supporting services personnel from Afghanistan within

fourteen months following the announcement of the

agreement.25

The US’ commitment is contingent on the

Taliban’s obligations and guarantees to prevent the use

of Afghan soil by any group or individual against the

security of the US and its allies. The US will bring the

number of its forces to 8600 within the first 135 days

following the announcement of the agreement, and the

remaining forces will be withdrawn in the remaining

nine and a half months if the Taliban are able to fulfil

their obligations.26

The agreement also encouraged the Taliban to initiate

direct talks with the Afghan leadership. In order to

initiate all-Afghan talks, it was noted in the agreement

that the insurgent group and the Afghan government

would undertake a prisoner exchange as a confidence

building measure under which 5,000 Taliban prisoners

would be released against 1,000 government forces

captives.27

According to the signed document, this

confidence building measure had to take place before the

commencement of the intra-Afghan talks on March 10,


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2020. Talks between the Taliban and other Afghan

representatives are essential in order to reach a ceasefire

deal and discuss other significant issues including the

mainstreaming of the Taliban and the nature of the future

government in Afghanistan.28

With the initiation of the intra-Afghan talks, the US also

committed to undertake an administrative review of

current US sanctions and the rewards list against

members of the Taliban with the goal of removing these

sanctions by August 27, 2020. Washington also plans to

initiate the process of removing members of the Taliban

from a second list i.e. the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) sanctions list with the commencement

of intra-Afghan talks. Ironically, many terms of the US-

Taliban deal are conditioned on the initiation of intra-

Afghan negotiations.29

Simultaneously, the US and Afghan government also

released a document titled: “Joint Declaration between

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United

States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan”.30

The 4-point “declaration of commitment” proclaims to

work together “to reach a comprehensive and sustainable

peace agreement” that ends the war in Afghanistan. Such

an agreement will include: guarantees to prevent the use

of Afghan soil by any international terrorist groups or

individuals against the security of the US and its allies; a

timeline for the withdrawal of all US and Coalition

forces from Afghanistan; a political settlement resulting

from intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations between

the Taliban and an inclusive negotiating team of

Afghans; and a permanent and comprehensive

ceasefire.31

The 3-page declaration outlines the commitments taken

by the US and Afghan governments. The first part refers

to the existence of al-Qaeda and Daesh related terror


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threat and the Afghan government’s commitment to not

support and cooperate with the terrorists. It also outlines

the US reaffirmation to support Afghan government

forces and institutions against internal and external

threats and its readiness to continue conducting counter-

terrorism operations in Afghanistan. The second part

calls out the US commitment to withdraw its forces on

conditions fixed in its agreement with the Taliban.

Additionally, the US commits to annually seek funds to

support Afghan forces’ sustenance against internal and

external threats. Washington has also committed to

facilitate both the Taliban and Afghan government to

build confidence by exchanging prisoners and create

conditions for a permanent ceasefire and a political

settlement of all outstanding issues through intra-Afghan

talks; and upon the inception of all-Afghan negotiations,

the US will start the procedure to remove sanctions

imposed on the Taliban. The third part discusses the

recognition of “this agreement” and related agreements

from the UNSC and the future of Afghanistan.

The text of the joint declaration is no less complex than

Washington’s overall Afghanistan strategy. It is

important to note that the US and Afghan government

are yet to “reach an agreement” on the 4-points

discussed above which provide the Afghan government

leverage to allow a longer stay of foreign forces in

Afghanistan. Additionally, the longer stay may also be

justified under the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA)

signed between the US and Afghan government in

September 2014. The BSA, under which some 10,000

US troops can remain in Afghanistan, went into force on

January 1, 2015 and will remain in force until the end of

2024 and beyond unless it is terminated by either side

with two years’ notice.32

In its reaffirmation of

commitments to support Afghan security forces and

readiness to carry out counter-terrorism operations in the


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“declaration of commitment”, the US seems to be

making room and create justifications for some kind of

future presence in Afghanistan.

The Existing Challenges to the “Pursuit of Peace”

The current state of Afghan affairs and the overall

geopolitics in the region pose several challenges to the

pursuit of peace in the country and would be difficult to

accomplish in the absence of combined efforts of

regional and global actors.

Short Term Challenges: Internal Rifts and obstacles

for a Ceasefire

The signing of the Doha agreement coincided with the

announcement of the Afghan presidential election result

and the leadership conundrum in its aftermath.33

An

unprecedented creation of parallel government’s

occurred after Abdullah Abdullah rejected election

commission results declaring Ghani the victor.

Abdullah’s claims were based on allegations of

corruption, election meddling and fraudulent votes.34

This lack of agreement between the two sides, presents

both the US and Taliban with greater difficulties in

dealing with Afghan authorities on matters related to the

peace process. The situation deteriorated further when

both the Afghan strongmen refused to establish an

inclusive government, during US Secretary of State,

Mike Pompeo’s Kabul visit on March 23, 2020.35

Their

refusal led the US State Department to express great

disappointment as it threatened to cut $1 billion in

assistance to Afghanistan if the situation persists.

According to some reports, Pompeo also threatened the

Afghan leadership that President Trump would sanction

a complete troop pull-out if the Afghans fail to reach an

agreement on establishing an inclusive government.36


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Due to the efforts made by some prominent Afghan

figures,37

and on account of the penalties imposed by the

US, Afghan leaders began to sort out their differences

and strike a power sharing deal. However, the charged

internal environment might continue to affect the

Afghan government’s ability to maintain inclusivity in

decision making. The power sharing agreement between

Ghani and Abdullah has yet to materialise38

and there are

serious reservations from prominent Afghan parties

regarding the establishment of an all-inclusive

negotiating team for expected all-Afghan talks.39

The

issues which are yet to be resolved, comprise the

inclusion of the Taliban into the national fold, which in

turn depends on greater cohesiveness among Afghans. In

other words, improved internal harmony is required for

Afghans to be able to deal with the Taliban

constructively. At the moment, however, their lack of

internal harmony has caused a significant delay in the

initiation of intra-Afghan talks. It might also affect all-

Afghan negotiations in the longer run, and delay a

comprehensive ceasefire. A permanent ceasefire is

critical for the materialisation of the Doha agreement

and achieving a negotiated and long lasting peace.

Without a comprehensive ceasefire, it is impossible for

Afghans to deliver their commitments and obligations

made in the “Doha Agreement” and the “Declaration of

Commitment”.

However, the uneven relations between the US and

Afghan government coupled with a lack of internal

harmony magnify the challenges to the peace process.

Initially, after the signing of the February 29, 2020,

agreement, President Ghani refused to release prisoners

and asked the Taliban to cut their ties with Pakistan.40

Interestingly, Ghani also remained critical to the US-

Taliban talks.41

However, due to increased Afghan

forces’ casualties and pressure from the international


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community, Ghani later on issued a decree for prisoners’

release.42

The “conditions-based” decree asked the

released Taliban inmates to commit that they would not

return to the war. It also stipulated a timeline for the

swap process contingent upon the Taliban conduct.

According to Ghani’s given plan, the government would

have released 1,500 inmates (100 per day) before the

commencement of the intra-Afghan talks. The Taliban

right away rejected Ghani’s plan saying that 5,000

prisoners should be released as a trust-building measure

before the commencement of intra-Afghan talks.43

The

insurgent group also rejected the condition that was

limiting released prisoners from participating in the fight

against the Afghan government in future.44

Although both the Afghan government and the Taliban

were able to initiate the prisoner swap with the

assistance of the US-facilitated discussions, the slow and

bumpy process has already affected the dates set for the

opening of all- inclusive Afghan negotiations. Before the

commencement of the prisoner release, a Taliban team

tasked with overseeing the process and verifying the

prisoner list had reportedly left Kabul over

disagreements with the Afghan government about the

process.45

The delay in the prisoner swap resulting from

Washington-Kabul disharmony outraged the Taliban,

aggravating the already volatile situation. The clashes

between the warring parties have serious repercussions

for the signed agreement, as up till now Washington has

been leading Afghan forces against the insurgents

especially by providing them with aerial support. Both

the US and the Taliban have recently been blaming each

other for violating the signed agreement but the US’ top

general in Afghanistan threatened the insurgent group of

retaliation and serious consequences if fighting

persists.46

The intensification and prolongation of

fighting between the Taliban and US-led Afghan


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government forces will only give more space and time to

terrorist organisations in Afghanistan and make the

situation more difficult for Afghans to adhere to the

post-ceasefire obligations.

Medium Term Challenge: Rising Terror Threat and an

Ambiguous US Policy

According to the latest reports, the ISKP and al-Qaeda

have been making efforts to establish a caliphate in

Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan province.47

In

late April 2020, the province’s governor informed the

media that the ISKP has joined al-Qaeda and is trying to

establish bases across many districts with an aim to

establish the Islamic Caliphate there. Meanwhile, a

Commander of the Afghan Army’s brigade in

Badakhshan communicated that many other terrorist

organisations including, the East Turkestan, and the

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have direct

links with the ISKP. The location of Badakhshan

province is a strategic one as it borders Pakistan, China

and Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan, hence making

it an easy access point for the outlawed extremist

organisations and individuals, and posing a threat to the

surrounding countries.

Since its inception in 2014-15, the ISKP has been

expanding in size receiving a direct influx of fighters and

patronage from Syria.48

The later inflow of defectors

from outlawed organisations of regional countries,

especially Central Asia and Pakistan, has further

strengthened the ISKP.49

Additionally, many hardcore

Afghan Taliban who opposed the idea of negotiations

with the US, have also joined the ISKP.50

With this

growing strength, the terrorist group has not only been

able to conduct large scale attacks in the heart of Kabul51

but is also able to maintain its strategic rivalry with the

Taliban across Afghanistan.52

Hence, with its direct


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confrontation with the Taliban inside Afghanistan and

being a national security threat for Pakistan, Russia,

China and Iran, the ISKP remains a key concern for

them.

Keeping this in view, all the regional powers have been

taking serious anti-terror measures. Moscow had not

only offered its services to the US-led Afghan forces53

but also established a growing anti-terror cooperation

with Pakistan, Iran and China.54

Since the recognition of

the Taliban insurgency, Russia has also played a crucial

part on the diplomatic front. These include the Moscow

Process, the significant quadrilateral grouping with the

US, China and Pakistan55

and hosting direct Taliban

meetings.56

Interestingly, Moscow’s recognition of the

Taliban and increased cooperation with regional powers

coincides with its fierce rivalry with Daesh in Syria,

signalling the presence of ISKP related terror threat

being the country’s core national security interest in

Afghanistan.

In the same manner, Daesh’s use of barbaric tactics

against minority religious groups especially Shia

Muslims and the terror group’s humiliation at the hands

of Iran in Iraq and Syria make the ISKP a proximate

threat for Iran. More importantly, Tehran’s participation

could be instrumental in dismantling the ISKP keeping

in view Iranian successes against the terrorist group in

the Middle East.

Similarly, Pakistan has also been successful in

dismantling the extremist organisations especially along

the country’s northwestern border with Afghanistan.

This became possible following the launch of the

National Action Plan and a revitalisation of its strategic

ties with Russia in 2014.57

By getting hold of much of

the militancy, Islamabad has been able to mainstream the

former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)


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and fenced majority of its 2430-kms-long border with

Afghanistan.58

However, the presence of the ISKP along

with the outlawed members of extremist organisations

like Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Jandullah,

and the existence of a small number of Daesh’s presence

in its own territory,59

make the ISKP a formidable threat

for Pakistan. Many of the defectors considered outlawed

in Pakistan managed to acquire top positions in the

ISKP60

and have planned and executed attacks inside

Pakistan.61

These outlawed terrorists under the shadow

of the ISKP also attacked Pakistani security forces and

labourers working on the border fencing.

Similarly, after recent reports about the East Turkestan,

and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan having crucial

links with the ISKP and al-Qaeda, China’s threat

perception regarding Afghanistan has increased.

Therefore, Beijing has recently increased security check

posts along the mountainous border with Afghanistan,62

with the realisation that the threat could only diminish

and cease with efforts to hunt the ISKP and al-Qaeda

inside Afghanistan.63

Notwithstanding these developments, the US and the

Afghan government are yet to discuss a regional

mechanism to collectively treat this al-Qaeda-ISKP-led

terror threat in Afghanistan. Both Washington and Kabul

have been underestimating and downplaying the threat.

When Russia’s Special Presidential Envoy for

Afghanistan cautioned the US and Afghan officials

about the presence of at least ten thousand ISKP

terrorists in Afghanistan,64

the US and Afghan top

generals were certain that the numbers were not more

than three thousand.65

The presence of larger numbers of

ISKP fighters was confirmed later on when thousands of

terrorists were killed by the US-led Afghan government

forces and the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.66


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Additionally, many managed to flee and hundreds were

believed to have surrendered to Afghan authorities. The

claims about hundreds of ISKP terrorists surrendering to

Afghan authorities were repudiated by the Taliban with

serious charges that the government forces rescued ISKP

fighters who were under the Taliban siege.67

With the exception of India, the US continues to

discourage the role of regional countries in Afghanistan.

Ironically, New-Delhi does not perceive a direct threat

from terrorists in Afghanistan and has no direct access to

the country either. The US’ encouragement for India

assuming a greater role in Afghan affairs became

obvious once again during President Trump’s visit to the

country in February 2020.68

Earlier, in August 2017

Washington’s South Asia Strategy had emphasised a

greater role for India in Afghanistan.69

More recently, in

May 2020, Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Special

Representative to Afghanistan also reiterated the need

for a greater Indian engagement in Afghan affairs.70

Interestingly, there are claims that the US and Afghan

authorities have asked India to deploy its troops in

Afghanistan.71

Whether such a development would

exacerbate the problem further or become part of a

solution is not known. However, there is confusion

regarding the natural alignments of interests between

Daesh and other powers.

Although India has also declared Daesh a terror group,

keeping in view the prospects and the ability of the ISKP

to become a security threat to Pakistan and the Taliban,72

the group could become a strategic asset for New-

Delhi.73

Likewise, Daesh being a persistent threat to

Russia, Iran and China naturally becomes a shared

interest for both India and the US especially in

Afghanistan,74

even though Washington has also

outlawed the terrorist group. In the same manner, if the


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Administration in Kabul remains unable to settle its

issues with the Taliban and the confrontation between

the two continues then the ISKP’s strategic rivalry with

the Taliban could also become an asset for the Afghan

government.75

Above all, New-Delhi’s uninterrupted strategic

engagement with Kabul and significant military

assistance against the Taliban creates hurdles in reaching

a ceasefire by prolonging the ongoing war and giving

terrorists time and space. Hence the US’ complicity with

India and its unwillingness to accept the involvement of

other regional powers in Afghanistan leaves little

prospects for a combined anti-terror endeavour in the

future. Such an arrangement could ultimately influence

the ability of Afghans to deliver on their key obligations

required for a complete withdrawal of foreign troops.

Great Power Competition: A Long-Term Challenge to

Afghanistan’s Economic Reconstruction

The complexities arising out of Washington’s

Afghanistan strategy and its biased approach towards

regional powers involved in the Afghan peace process

makes sense when we look at changing US policies in

the overall Asia Pacific region. Since 2005, the US has

been making serious efforts to increase its strategic

engagement with India. Washington has been assisting

New-Delhi in modernising its conventional forces and

has also bestowed special waivers to augment the

country’s nuclear programme with an aim to bring it at

par with China. Beijing’s containment does not seem to

be restricted to the strategic sphere alone. In fact, the

Indo-US alliance has been a threat for China’s geo-

economic plans.76

Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI) intends to extend a number of mega infrastructure

projects to Afghanistan.77

However, the lack of

cooperation from both the US and India for China’s


84

regional economic plans and non-recognition of its main

corridor could severely impact Afghanistan’s economic

reconstruction.78

In order to raise India to a ‘great power’ status, and in

order to reward the country for supporting its policies,

the US has not only renamed ‘Asia Pacific’ but also

given New-Delhi a leading role in its newly formed

‘Quad’.79

It is alarming as Russia has rejected the

renaming of Asia Pacific and formation of the Quad, and

pushes for a broad-based policy with other regional

powers.80

Such narrow US’ policies, by downplaying the

role and status of two of the largest Eurasian land

powers (Russia and China), increases the prospect for

confrontation. The overall confrontational great power

politics in the region present a major challenge for

Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction.

Interestingly, Moscow’s intention to connect its geo-

economic initiative of the Eurasian Economic Union

(EEU) with the BRI has implications for Afghanistan as

well.81

Being at the crossroad, the potential economic

spill over of the merger would certainly contribute to

Afghanistan’s prosperity. Additionally, Russia possesses

plans to extend mega infrastructure projects connecting

central and south Asia via Afghanistan.82

Hence, a stable

Afghanistan improves the prospects of a smooth

implementation of the mega geo-economic regional

plans which, in turn, hold implications for the country’s

economic reconstruction.

By and large, China and Russia have laid down their

comprehensive economic plans for the region. Being at

the crossroad, the full implementation and optimisation

of those mega projects are, in part, dependent on a stable

Afghanistan. The execution of regional economic plans

by spilling over its benefits to Afghanistan would allow

China and Russia to enhance its influence in the ‘heart of


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Asia’. Looking at the recent US policies (National

Defence Strategy) and trends directed against Beijing

and Moscow, it seems very difficult that the US

establishment would leave any kind of vacuum in

Afghanistan to be filled by the former two.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that Washington’s general policy in the

wider Asia Pacific region is not compatible with its

decision to undertake a complete withdrawal from

Afghanistan, there has been a serious effort by the

Trump Administration towards bringing an end to the

US’ longest war. That, in part, is the result of the pledges

President Trump had made to get elected in his first

term. The White House and the US establishment have

been struggling to adjust their policies in the region

mainly because a complete drawdown of troops from

Afghanistan might ensure a second term for President

Trump. However it does not correspond with the overall

US’ policies in the region. Coupled with a bumpy

Washington-Kabul relationship, these policies have

further complicated the ongoing peace process.

The delay in all-Afghan talks and increased clashes

provide more leverage to several terrorist outfits. This

adds to the apprehension of regional powers and also

makes things difficult for Afghans to deliver their post-

ceasefire commitments i.e. eliminating terrorists

operating from Afghanistan. India seems to be the only

regional player enjoying the trust of both Washington

and Kabul. Also, the White House and Pentagon seem to

be on the same page along with the European partners

when it comes to India’s greater role in Afghanistan.

This also aligns with their general policy which

envisages New-Delhi’s central role in the “Indo-Pacific”

region. Regardless of the fact that such a narrow regional

approach does not resonate well with Russia, China and


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Pakistan, all the involved players for the sake of their

strategic and economic interests must continue their

efforts to grab this historical opportunity provided by the

Doha agreement to reach a politically settled peace in

Afghanistan.

Finally, Pakistan’s full support and assistance to the US-

led peace process and its ability to maintain smooth

relations and communication with both the US and the

Taliban remain instrumental to keeping the prospects of

a negotiated peace alive. Pakistan must use its good

relations with the US and the Taliban and also with

Russia, China and Iran to devise a mechanism acceptable

to all the players. Such a mechanism must ensure and

address “valid interests” of all players involved in the

Afghan endgame, including India.

Pakistan must also convince the US to allow Iran to play

a greater role in Afghanistan as the country maintains

good ties with all main Afghan players including

Abdullah, Ghani and the Taliban. Pakistan and Iran

could also play a crucial role in undoing the existing

bottlenecks and play a mediatory role during intra-

Afghan talks. On its part, Washington must also accept

and encourage the establishment of a joint Iran-Pakistan

mechanism to simultaneously work on the systematic

transfer of Afghan refugees and countering terrorism.

In conclusion, Islamabad must clearly communicate its

revised Afghanistan policy which seeks to reduce and

completely cut its dependence on Afghanistan, both on

the Taliban or in terms of geostrategic vulnerabilities.

This is evident in Islamabad’s efforts to fence the Pak-

Afghan border and neutralise militant religious

organisations on its soil. Based on evidence, the US

must also refrain from tagging Islamabad with India’s

“state sponsor of terror narrative”. More importantly,

Islamabad needs to demand the US to take note of


87

India’s claims of adjacent borders with Afghanistan.

Pakistan is also in a position to convince the US to

utilise the existing regional platform of Shanghai

Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to deal with future

challenges to Afghanistan especially in countering the

terror threat and reconstruction of the country. This

would enable all regional powers to communicate and

overcome the trust deficit in order to save Afghanistan

from another disastrous withdrawal scenario.

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90

27.

Ibid. 28.

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40.

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92

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