African Philos 2

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Humanitas 121Tradition & Modernity in Postcolonial Arican Philosophy

Tradition and Modernity inPostcolonial African Philosophy

Jay A. CiaffaGonzaga University

The relationship between tradition and modernity has been a

central theme o postcolonial Arican philosophy. While Arican

philosophers have examined this theme rom many angles, sev-

eral basic questions have become the ocus o ongoing debate and

discussion: What is the relevance o indigenous Arican traditions

to the challenges o contemporary lie? Do traditional modes othought and behavior constitute resources or impediments to the

projects o development and modernization in Arica? What, pre-

cisely, is meant by the terms development and modernization

when they are used in reerence to Arican countries?

Discussion o such questions reveals a conict between two

broad perspectives. The frst perspective, which Kwame Gyekye

calls cultural revivalism (Gyekye 1997b, 233), assumes a basi-

cally reverential attitude toward the Arican cultural heritage.According to this view, the key to eectively addressing contem-

porary problems lies in reclaiming and revitalizing indigenous

traditions that have been degraded and suppressed in the wake o

colonialism. Colonialism violently disrupted Arican cultural tra-

ditions and imposed, with varying degrees o success, European

orms o thought and social organization upon colonized peoples.

Having achieved political independence, postcolonial Aricans

must now pursue a more decisive liberation, a decolonizationo Arican minds and societies. While revivalists are oten skepti-

Jay a. Ciaffa is Associate Proessor o Philosophy at Gonzaga University.

Culturalrevivalismavors

revitalizationo Aricanculturalnorms.


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122 Volume XXI, Nos. 1 and 2, 2008 Jay A. Ciaa

cal o calls or development and modernization, viewing them as

thinly veiled calls or the continued imposition o European cultur-

al norms, it is important to realize that they do not typically view

their own project as antimodern. For revivalists, the key point is that

genuine modernization in Arica can only be realized through therevitalization o Arican cultural norms.

The second perspective assumes a more critical attitude toward

the indigenous heritage. Adherents to this perspective argue that

the revivalist project is undamentally misguided and ill-suited to

the challenges o contemporary Arica. According to critics, the call

or a nostalgic return to the past is not merely nave and romantic,

but positively dangerous. In their view, cultural revivalism diverts

attention rom pressing political issues, such as authoritarian op-pression and class exploitation, and endorses orms o thought that

interere with the important goals o scientifc and technological

advancement. The most extreme orm o this view, hinted at by

some thinkers but seldom explicitly endorsed, suggests that Ari-

cans must make a clean break with the premodern past in order

to address the most urgent demands o the present (Hountondji

1996, 48). Modernization, or them, requires a mental orientation

commensurate with the problems o the present, not an attempt toresurrect ideas rom societies o the distant past.

It should come as no surprise that the debate between cultural

revivalists and their critics hinges in large part on contrasting in-

terpretations o modernity and modernization. Modernity

is a much discussed term in philosophy, and I will not engage

the numerous arguments about the meaning o modernity, or the

debates about whether modernity itsel should be eclipsed by a

postmodern sensibility. In order to understand the debate within

Arican philosophy, it will sufce to identiy two distinct aspects

o modernization. The frst and most conspicuous aspect involves

scientifc and technological developmentthat is, the emergence

o science-based technologies that can be used to improve the basic

conditions o human lie. The second element is broadly political

in nature. This aspect, described by one scholar as the modernity

o liberation (Wallerstein 1995, 472), involves the development o

political institutions that move away rom authoritarian rule, to-

ward orms o government that enhance the liberty and welare oall citizens, rather than the select ew. We can think o this political

project as the modernity o democratization.

Critics orevivalism callor a cleanbreak withthe premodernpast.


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It is worth emphasizing that, in the context o Arican philoso-

phy, both aspects o modernization unction as normative concepts

rather than merely descriptive concepts. In other words, the con-

cepts do not merely describe changes that have occurred or that

might occur; they identiy changes that should occur. O course, noteverything that travels under the banner o modernity, science,

or democracy is desirable, but there are obvious ways in which

science-based technologies and democratic political systems are

conducive to peace and prosperity in Arican societies. For these

reasons, modernization is typically viewed as a sign o progress

and an ideal to be pursued.

In examining the debate between cultural revivalism and its

critics, the key question thus becomes: Do indigenous traditionstend to enhance or impede the processes o scientifc and political

modernization?

In what ollows, I will examine the main arguments in the

debate about tradition and modernity, beginning with the case

or cultural revivalism. I will then outline some key criticisms o

the revivalist project, ocusing initially on the inuential work o

Paulin Hountondji o Benin. As we will see, Hountondji argues

that revivalism rests on mistaken assumptions about Aricanculture and about the nature o philosophy. Hountondji exposes

some serious aws in the revivalist project but, unortunately, he

proceeds to suggest that traditional thought is largely irrelevant

to the challenges o contemporary lie. I think this conclusion is

unjustifed. Drawing on work o two prominent Ghanaian philoso-

phers, Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu, I will argue that certain

aspects o indigenous thought may well be inimical to scientifc

modernization, but other aspects provide valuable resources or

thinking aboutpolitical modernization.

As we will see, this assessment has interesting implications not

only or the trajectory o development in Arica, but or our under-

standing o development in the West.

Colonial Discourse and the Emergence of Cultural Revivalism

Cultural revivalism has its historical roots in the colonial era,

and in act emerged as a response to European discourse about

Arican culture and identity. In order to understand the revivalist

project, it is necessary to begin with some brie remarks on this

European discourse.


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Colonialism in Arica was supported by a broad range o popu-

lar and scholarly literature which highlighted undamental di-

erences between Europeans and Aricans, and which reinorced

ideas o European superiority. One o the most notorious examples

o this literature was the work o the French anthropologist Lu-cien Levy-Bruhl. In a series o works bearing titles such as The

Primitive Mentality and The Mental Functions o Inerior Civilizations,

Levy-Bruhl distinguished between two undamentally dierent

mentalities: the mentality o the civilized European and that o the

primitive non-European. According to Levy-Bruhl, the civilized

mentality is regulated by reason, and interacts with the world

through careully organized conceptual schemes. In contrast, the

primitive mentality is hardly capable o abstract thought, and isregulated by the orces o myth and superstition (see Levy-Bruhl

1995, 54.). The racism expressed in Levy-Bruhls work under the

guise o scientifc objectivity was echoed not only in popular Eu-

ropean writings, but in remarks o esteemed philosophers, such as

Hume, Kant, and Hegel. Although this discourse ulflled several

unctions in the context o European culture, or our purposes its

most important unction was the role it played in the European un-

derstanding o colonialism. The images o the civilized Europeanand the primitive Arican helped sustain the idea that colonialism

was a undamentally benevolent enterprisethat is, an enterprise

in which Europeans were attempting to bring civilization to the

dark continent. In short, European domination, exploitation,

and cultural devastation were rationalized under the guise o a so-

called civilizing mission.

For purposes o Arican philosophy, the most important devel-

opment in European discourse about Arica came in the orm o a

text produced by the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels. While

studying and living amongst the Luo in the Congo in the 1940s,

Tempels produced a text entitled Bantu Philosophy. In this book he

argued that the so-called primitive mind was considerably more

sophisticated than had been suggested by Levy-Bruhl and others.

More precisely, he argued that Bantu peoples possessed a compre-

hensive philosophy o lie, a complex system o concepts regard-

ing the nature o the world and persons, which provided a basis

or their codes o conduct and social organization. The key elemento this philosophy was the belie that the universe is comprised o

vital orces that exist in a dynamic and hierarchical relation with

Distinctionbetweencivilized and

primitivementalitieshelpedrationalizecolonialism.


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each other, beginning with God, the supreme vital orce, ranging

downward through an array o intelligent spirits, including those

o the ancestors, into the world o living humans (Tempels 1995,

63., 77.). For our purposes, the details o Tempelss account are

less important than his claim that the Bantu understanding o real-ity was dierent rom that o Europeans, but not necessarily less

rational or less worthy o the honorifc name philosophy.

It must o course be noted that Tempelss study o the Bantu

had colonial motiveshe wanted to understand the Bantu primar-

ily in order to acilitate conversion to Christianity, and his studies

were not entirely devoid o notions about European superiority.

Yet, despite his colonial agenda and biases, Tempelss work chal-

lenged prevailing ideas about the primitive mind. For this reason,it was not well received by colonial authorities. In contrast, Bantu

Philosophy was eagerly received by a number o Arican intellectu-

als, who seized the opportunity to explore and revitalize tradition-

al Arican thought as a basis or their struggle against colonialism.

In short, Tempelss work provided a key stimulus and touchstone

or Arican cultural revivalism.

Perhaps the most notable early eort in this direction was the

philosophy o ngritude developed by Leopold Senghor. Seng-hor accepted the idea o undamental dierences between black

Aricans and white Europeans, and his account o the black and

white mentalities echoed at least some o the ideas that had long

been part o colonial discourse. For example, Senghor argued that

the negro is a man o nature (Senghor 1995, 117), more sensuous

and responsive to the rhythms o the environment than his white

counterpart. In contrast, whites approach the world in the manner

o a scientist or an engineer, dierentiating themselves rom the

natural world, placing nature at a distance, so to speak. Through

this objective stance, the natural world can be surveyed, measured

and, ultimately, manipulated or human purposes. O course, in

distinguishing these two mentalities, Senghor directly challenged

claims o white superiority, almost to the point o inverting the

colonial racial hierarchy. In his view, Aricans did not lack reason,

but displayed a dierent orm o reason, a more undamental way

o apprehending the world, one that allowed objects to shine orth

in their primordial reality (Senghor 1995, 121). In contrast, Sen-ghor argued that the objectiying reason o classical Europe slays

the object and eeds o the natural world. Citing the words o


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an elder rom his own country, Senghor writes: the whites are

cannibals, and i their attitude toward nature continues to domi-

nate, things are likely to turn out badly or all o us (Senghor 1995,

118). Ngritude was thus articulated as something to be valued

and drawn upon as a resource in the struggle or independence.This concept o black identity became the basis or a cultural na-

tionalism that carried over to Senghors tenure as the frst presi-

dent o Senegal.

A brie survey o anthologies in Arican philosophy shows that

this revivalist project remains inuential. For example, in his con-

tribution to one collection o essays, Innocent Onyewuenyi argues

that The Arican has an unwritten timeless code o behavior and

attitudes which have persisted or centuries (Onyewuenyi 1991,39). Ater oering an account o these behavioral codes that draws

heavily on Tempels, he concludes that Aricans emphatically must

not yield to laws and institutions that are divorced rom our

philosophy, rom the nature o beings as we understand them, . . .

rom our view o the world (Onyewuenyi 1991, 45). As we can see

rom these remarks, the goal or Onyewuenyi and other revivalist

thinkers is to mobilize Arican cultural norms to address contem-

porary problems. These thinkers by no means absolve Aricans oresponsibility or the numerous problems that beset the continent,

but they ultimately attribute these problems to the cultural and

spiritual corruption initiated during the colonial era. The problem,

as they see it, is that indigenous belies and practices have been

swallowed up by systems o thought and social organization that

are impediments to Arican wellbeing. The solution, as stated by

another revivalist thinker, is to rediscover and resume our proper

selves through a study o Arican civilizations (Owomoyela 1991,

181). Until this is done, spiritual and social subservience will per-

sist, despite the de acto end o colonial rule.1

For revivalists, questions about modernization must thereore

be addressed within the ramework o a careul examination o

Arican culture, with due attentiveness to the ongoing task o

decolonization. With regard to the scientifc aspect o modern-

ization, revivalists typically challenge the idea that indigenous

Arican cultures lacked scientifc knowledge, citing the medicinal

1 In the United States, an inuential strain o the revivalist approach can be

ound in the work o Arocentrist writers such as Molef Asante. See, e.g., Asante

1987.

Aricasproblemsattributed tospiritual

corruptioninitiatedduringcolonial era.


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use o herbs, advanced agricultural techniques, and methods o

ood preservation as evidence o such knowledge (see Owomoyela

1991, 173-75). There is, in addition, a burgeoning literature on

the accomplishments o ancient Egyptian civilization, including

evidence o developed metallurgy, astronomy, and mathematics.For revivalists, the call or Arica to become more scientifc over-

looks these accomplishments, and amounts to a call or Aricans to

duplicate European models o scientifc development, which is just

one more version o the so-called civilizing mission at the heart

o colonial ideology.

Cultural revivalists take a similar approach to the political

aspect o modernization, arguing that indigenous Arican societ-

ies displayed a humanistic ethical orientation and a communalistpolitical philosophy that can be mobilized in the contemporary

setting, serving as powerul antidotes to political authoritarianism

and the growing inuence o Western individualism and consum-

erism. These ideas must be reclaimed and revitalized, not ignored

in avor o European ideas about political organization.

Responses to Cultural Revivalism:

Toward a Critical Assessment of TraditionIn the 1960s, a new generation o Arican intellectuals began

raising serious questions about the revivalist project. One o the

most prominent fgures in this critical trend was Paulin Houn-

tondji. In a series o articles and addresses, Hountondji oered

a multiaceted critique o what he called ethnophilosophy: the

idea that Arican philosophy exists in the orm o a collective

worldview and that the task o contemporary Arican intellectu-

als is careully to document this worldview so that it might bepressed into the service o practical aims. Hountondji argues that

this project, which is basically synonymous with what we have

been calling cultural revivalism, rests on mistaken assumptions

about Arican peoples and about the nature o philosophy. In the

end, he believes this project impedes rather than acilitates eorts

eectively to address the challenges o the present. Let me briey

describe the key elements o Hountondjis critique, which has ex-

erted a strong inuence on contemporary Arican philosophy.

First, Hountondji argues that ethnophilosophy perpetuates

a alse and ultimately insulting view o Arican peoples. When

Arican intellectuals speak o ngritude, timeless codes o be-


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havior, or theArican worldview, they perpetuate what Houn-

tondji calls the myth o primitive unanimity (Hountondji 1996,

60)i.e., the myth that black persons are undamentally united

in their views about the most important matters in lie. This idea

originated in colonial discourse about Arica, and Hountondjiargues that it is not enough simply to put a positive spin on the

traits that defne Arican identity. The very idea o a global Arican

mentality or worldview distorts the richness and cultural diversity

o Arican peoples. Revivalists might see such uniying concepts

as a basis or needed solidarity, but Hountondji and other critics

see them as a distinct liability, since they ail to take into account

real dierences among Aricans in addressing the complex prob-

lems that beset the continent. In a recent discussion o unanimism,Kwame Appiah highlights precisely this point when he remarks:

Aricans share too many problems and projects to be distracted

by a bogus basis or solidarity (Appiah 1992, 26).

Hountondji himsel emphasizes a more ominous side o the

distraction noted by Appiah. Specifcally, he argues that cultural

revivalism serves as a powerul tool or authoritarian governments

who wish to divert the populations attention away rom the reali-

ties o exploitation and oppression. In a characteristically acerbicpassage, Hountondji writes:

At a time when the gap between oppressor and oppressed is widen-ing throughout our continent and political dierences are becomingmore radical, the ethnophilosopher claims that we have always

been . . . and always will be unanimous. On every side we see ter-ror tightening its stranglehold on us . . . ; every word spoken spellsdanger and exposes us to untold brutality . . . ; insolent neocolonialstate apparatuses parade in triumph, leaving a trail o intimidation,arbitrary arrest, torture and legal assassination and poisoning genu-

ine thought at its source. And the ofcial ideologue smiles, content,and declares: Alleluia, our ancestors have thought! (Hountondji1996, 170)

As Hountondji sees it, in authoritarian states, slogans about

Arican authenticity and attendant celebrations o Arican cultural

traditions unction as a powerul opiate, which serves to mys-

tiy the masses and deaden them to the bleak realities o everyday

lie (Hountondji 1996, 170).2 And when Arican intellectuals, espe-

2 Mobutu Sese Sekos reign in Zaire was notable or its use o the discourse oauthenticity. Despite Hountondjis concerns about the ideological unction o such

discourse, some scholars have commented avorably on Sese-Sekos writings on

authenticity. See, e.g., Adelman 1975.

Ethno-philosophyperpetuates

myth oprimitiveunanimity.


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cially would-be philosophers, are content to document traditional

belie systems instead o asking hard questions about existing

social and political conditions, he thinks they become complicit in

this very process.

This last point brings us to one o Hountondjis most conspicu-ous criticisms o cultural revivalismhis claim that it perpetu-

ates a mistaken understanding o philosophy. As we have seen,

revivalists assume that Arican philosophy exists in the orm o a

collective, unconscious worldview shared by indigenous Arican

peoples, and that the task o the contemporary Arican philosopher

is to document the core eatures o this worldview. Hountondji,

along with many other Arican philosophers, strenuously objects to

this defnition. The problem with this use o the term philosophycan be seen when it is contrasted with the way the term is used in

reerence to the Western tradition. For example, when we speak o

Greek philosophy, we are not reerring to the collective belies o

ethnic Greeks about the gods, nature, society, and so on. Rather, we

are reerring to the work o individual thinkers such as Socrates,

Plato, and Aristotle. While these thinkers oten considered popular

and traditional views about key matters in lie, they did so rom a

critical perspective, and usually concluded that such views wereawed or at least in need o improvement. To cite the most amous

case, ater careully examining popular Athenian belies about

justice, piety, and education, Socrates concluded that these belies

were rie with errors, and were not conducive to the wellbeing o

individual Athenians or society as a whole. As any frst-year phi-

losophy student can tell you, this kind o critical reection is the

hallmark o philosophical thinking.

The problems with the revivalist understanding o philosophy

should be clear in light o these remarks. To defne philosophy as

a collective worldview is to obscure the proper meaning o the

term: Philosophy is a critical activity, not a passive holding o be-

lies by either individuals or social groups. More importantly, to

suggest that Aricas fnest minds should be content to document

and revere traditional belies does not lead to the articulation o

a genuine Arican philosophy. Instead, it amounts to an evasion

o the kind o critical thinking that is urgently needed to address

the problems that exist within Arican societies. What is neededis a careul analysis o the ways in which traditional belies might

impede modernization, and the ways in which they might provide

Authoritariangovernmentsuse slogans

about Aricanauthenticityto divertattention romoppression.

Genuinephilosophyis a criticalactivity, nota passiveholding obelies.


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useul resources.

Arican philosophers who have embarked on this process o

critical analysis have concluded that there are some serious con-

icts between traditional modes o thought and the scientifc as-

pect o modernization. Despite revivalist claims about the existenceo scientifc knowledge in Arican societies, we cannot ignore the

glaring gap between scientifc development in the West and Arica,

and this gap is due in part to traditional ways o thinking about the

natural world. Gyekye provides a lucid account o this problem in

his discussion o science and technology in traditional Arican cul-

tures (see Gyekye 1997a, 26.; 1997b, 244.). Although traditional

cultures developed many useul technologies pertaining to herbal

therapeutics, ood preservation, and the like, Gyekye argues thatthey did not develop a deep scientifc understanding o nature.

Scientifc inquiry involves systematic observation, disciplined by

experiment, in the quest or explanatory theories regarding the

causes o natural phenomena. In regard to medicinal therapeutics,

or example, such a quest would involve inquiry into the causes

o disease and the chemical properties that render certain herbal

treatments efcacious. Yet, there is little evidence that such inqui-

ries occurred in traditional Arican cultures, and Gyekye arguesthat this was due in large part to religious beliesmore precisely,

to the prevalence o spiritistic understandings o the natural world.

To return to the case o medicine, in traditional cultures the onset

o disease was typically attributed to supernatural entities who

were responding to social transgressions or some other inappropri-

ate behavior. Likewise, the eectiveness o herbal remedies was at-

tributed to the benevolent intervention o spirits. The threat posed

by this kind o thinking to the development o science is obvious

to Gyekye: Science, he writes, is based on a proound under-

standing and exploitation o the important notion o causality: that

is, a deep appreciation o the causal interactions between natural

phenomena. But where this is enmeshed with supernaturalistic

orientations [toward nature], science . . . hardly makes progress

(Gyekye 1997a, 29).

In light o this assessment, Gyekye argues that scientifc de-

velopment in Arica will require a signifcant restriction on the

scope o traditional religious belies. Gyekye does not claim thattraditional religion must be completely abandoned, but he does

insist that religious belies must yield where they interere with a

Gap betweenscientifc

developmentin the Westand in Aricashould not beignored.


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scientifc understanding o nature. The task, he says, is to achieve

a proper demarcation between the realms o science and religion,

and to cultivate a new intellectual attitude to the external world

uncluttered by superstition, mysticism, and other orms o irra-

tionality (Gyekye 1997a, 36). While Gyekye ocuses on restrict-ing the scope o belies in spiritual agency, Wiredu oers a more

encompassing critique, arguing that superstitiondefned as

rationally unsupported belie in entities o any sort(Wiredu 1995,

163)must be eradicated rom all spheres o thought. Wiredus

less conciliatory view is based on his belie that, so long as super-

stition endures on a broad scale, the task o developing scientifc

thought habits in Arica will be hindered. In this regard, Wiredu

chastises Arican leaders who simultaneously call or scientifc andtechnological development, while pouring libations to the ancestral

spirits who, as he puts it, are supposed to be hovering about and

sipping ceremonial schnapps (Wiredu, 1995, 162).

Despite dierences in the tenor o their respective critiques,

Gyekye and Wiredu both argue that traditional belies in spiri-

tual agency must be signifcantly altered to accommodate scientifc

development. It is important to recognize, however, that others

have been less willing to accept this claim. Albert Mosley oers anoteworthy response to Gyekye and Wiredu, arguing that the con-

ict they perceive between science and religion is based on both

theoretical and practical misunderstandings. Drawing on Robin

Hortons much discussed comparative work on Arican religion

and Western science, Mosley suggests that the ostensible conict

between religion and science recedes once we recognize that the

two enterprises are complementary attempts to create order in a

puzzling and sometimes chaotic world. Whereas science attempts

to impose order on the natural environment in accordance with our

interests in prediction and control, religion, says Mosley, is largely

concerned with the social world and addresses our need to en-

gender personal participation in orms o moral agency (Mosley

2000, 28). In light o these observations, Mosley argues that reli-

gious accounts o the world should be viewed not as an obstacle

to the development o scientifc thought, but as a parallel exercise

o theoretical abilities answering to dierent needs and interests

(Mosley 2000, 26). On a practical level, the history o scientifc andtechnological development in the West provides additional evi-

dence that Aricans need not jettison their religious belies in order


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to develop a scientifc outlook. For Mosley, the Arican belies that

Wiredu characterizes as superstitious are no more incompatible

with scientifc development than religious belies that were widely

held in the West at the onset o the scientifc age.

Belie in saints was not incompatible with technological develop-ment in the West, and belie in witches need not be incompatiblewith technological development in Arica. . . . Nor was the devel-opment o a scientifc world view contingent on the rejection oreligious belies. Neither Galileo nor Newton questioned the super-natural agency o Christ. Jesus walked on water and witches y, asSogolo wryly put it, and neither belie is necessarily an impedimentto technological development. (Mosley 2000, 29)

Mosleys emphasis on the dierent yet complementary unc-

tions o science and religion must surely be taken into accountin assessing the question o whether a conict exists between

Arican religion and the quest or scientifc development. Indeed,

Mosleys argument echoes Gyekyes own requently used meta-

phor o rendering unto Caesar what is Caesars and God what is

Gods, which suggests the possibility not only o conict but o

reconciliation between the two enterprises (see Gyekye 1997a, 37).

It should be noted, however, that the potential or accommoda-

tion envisioned by Gyekye is between science and spiritual lie,broadly construed, not between science and orms o religious

belie that center on what he calls agentive causation (Gyekye

1997a, 28, 37). On the contrary, Gyekye repeatedly laments the

ubiquitous role o agentive causality in Arican lie, precisely be-

cause it impedes the development o scientifc explanations that

acilitate the goals o prediction and control. The problem is that

these particular and prominent religious belies are frmly enmeshed in

Caesars domain. In this regard, I would suggest that Mosleys

use o Hortons work to criticize Gyekye is somewhat misplaced.

While Horton attempts to dispel some common misconceptions

by highlighting the parallel theoretical unctions o religion and

science, he emphasizes the role that Arican religion plays in un-

derstanding the natural rather than the social world and argues

that spiritual orces play the same role in religious explanations that

material causes play in scientifc explanations o the same phenomena

(see Horton 1995, 304, 306).

For these reasons, I believe Mosleys response to Gyekye andWiredu has limited value. He is surely correct to point out that be-

lie in supernatural beings is compatible with a scientifc outlook,


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and to this extent I would agree that Wiredus concern about the

deleterious eects o pouring libations to ancestral spirits is over-

stated. But when belie in supernatural beings plays a robust role

in ones causal explanations o the natural world, it is hard to avoid

the conclusion that religion is interering with the development oscientifc understanding.3

The development o scientifc thought habits in Arica would

thus appear to require revising at least some prominent religious

belies regarding spiritual agency. And, contrary to the claims

o cultural revivalists, this does not constitute a call or Aricans

to abandon their indigenous traditions in avor o European or

Western cultural norms. Two points must be emphasized here.

First, there is nothing specifcally Western about the scientifc un-derstanding o nature. While science may be more developed in

the West, this should be viewed as a matter o historical circum-

stances, not a sign o some deep dierence between the Western

and Arican minds (see Wiredu 1995). Scientifc thinking is a basic

human capacity, one which holds important benefts or persons

regardless o their cultural setting. As Gyekye indicates, the lack

o systematic scientifc inquiry stunted the growth o important

technologies in Arican societies. To cite the most obvious example,the lack o science-based medicine led to serious problems or the

accurate diagnosis o diseases and the administration o proper

medicinal dosages. Unortunately, in contemporary Arica this is

still a problem that needs to be addressed. In some locales, persons

are suering and dying rom treatable diseases because so-called

Western medicinal methods are rejected in avor o traditional

methods, such as the use o a diviner to identiy malicious spirits.

In Gyekyes view, such attitudes and practices are simply tragic,

and should not be viewed as signs o Arican authenticity. In re-

ality, he says, they contradict the humanistic essence o Arican

culture (Gyekye 1997a, 42).

The second point about science and Westernization is this:

When thinkers like Gyekye and Wiredu call or scientifc develop-

ment in Arica, they are not suggesting that Aricans should sim-

ply mimic Western orms o science and technology. Aricans can

3 It should be noted that belies in agentive causality by no means constitute the

whole or even the core o traditional Arican religion. Wiredu argues that amongstthe Akan and the Yoruba the core o religion is belie in the power and perection o

a single divine being, and that the belie in lesser spirits is not even properly classi-

fed as religious. See Wiredu 1998, 191-92.

There isnothingspecifcallyWestern aboutthe scientifcunderstanding

o nature.


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surely learn rom scientifc developments in Europe and elsewhere,

but their own scientifc work should be geared to the specifc needs

o Arican societies. Thus, Gyekye argues that an emphasis on re-

search and technologies related to ood and agriculture, health and

housing, and the like would be more appropriate than investingin advanced military technologies or space exploration (Gyekye

1997a, 41). Despite a preponderance o rhetoric about the need or

globalization, the pursuit o inormation and media technologies

would also seem to be less urgent than technologies that address

basic human needs.

Let me turn now to the question o political modernization.

Democracy has clearly not ourished in much o postcolonial A-

rica, and there is considerable debate about both the causes o thisproblem and the range o viable solutions. For our purposes, the

most important ocus o debate is the extent to which precolonial

Arican societies included democratic eatures, and the extent to

which traditional political ideas are relevant to the challenge o de-

mocratization. O particular concern is the relevance o traditional

communalism, a mode o social organization which emphasizes

solidarity based on shared interests, and the idea that individual

activities should be geared toward the common good. The ensuingdiscussion will ocus on the question o whether traditional com-

munalism provides a viable basis or thinking about democracy in

the contemporary context.

Although Gyekye is perhaps a bit ippant when he declares that

defning the concept o democracy is not difcult, I would agree

with his claim that democracy, at its most basic level, involves two

related principles (Gyekye 1997b, 124). First, democratic gover-

nance must be representativethat is, it must include institutions

that allow or the will o the people to be expressed in political

decision-making. Second, genuine democracy must include insti-

tutions that ensure basic rights and justice or all members o a

society, so that popular rule does not degenerate into a tyranny

o the majority. In Western countries, the representative aspect o

democracy is expressed through practices such as periodic elec-

tions, whereas the moral aspect is addressed by constitutional and

legal protections. In contrast, precolonial Arican societies were

oten ruled by hereditary chies, and lacked ormal constitutionsensuring things such as the rights to lie, liberty and the pursuit

o happiness. But they, too, had democratic eatures, which were

Scientifcdevelopmentin Arica need

not simplymimic Westernorms.


15/25


expressed through a variety o institutions governing political au-

thority and political decision-making. For example, in Akan societ-

ies chies were not selected through simple hereditary succession,

but through an electoral process in which clan leaders examined

the leadership qualities o candidates and consulted with theirrespective constituencies. Once the chie ascended to the throne,

he did not rule by dictatorial fat, but through close consultation

with a council o advisers, again comprising clan leaders. I the

chie became too autocratic, the people had the power to depose or

destool him through their advisory councils. Thus, contrary to

a popular misconception, rule by chies did not imply that preco-

lonial societies were undamentally undemocratic (Gyekye 1997b,

116.).It is also important to recognize that these societies included

institutions that allowed members o the community to speak and

air grievances beore the chie and his councilors. Perhaps the most

noteworthy institution was the palaver, a discussion orum that

was used to resolve disagreements. It is oten noted that once a

palaver was convened the participants talked until they agreed,

which oten took a considerable amount o time. This is because

the goal o the palaver was not simply to reach a majority decision,but to reach a consensusthat is, a decision that reected the views

o all participants. As Gyekye points out, the pursuit o this kind

o agreement required patience, mutual tolerance, and an attitude

o compromise (Gyekye 1997b, 130). Participants had to be willing

to modiy and perhaps even abandon their positions in the ace o

more persuasive arguments. In precolonial societies the quest or

consensus did not always result in unanimous agreement, but it

did give everyone a thorough and air hearing and, as ar as pos-

sible, it allowed everyones view to be reected in decisions o the

group.

O course, it is one matter to cite the existence o democratic

institutions in precolonial Arica, and another to show how these

institutions might be relevant or contemporary Arican societies.

Some aspects o precolonial governance, such as rule by hereditary

chies, would surely not be acceptable in the current context. But

other ideas appear to be more promising. For example, Gyekye

argues that the emphasis on shared needs in traditional communalsocieties provides the basis or a more comprehensive understand-

ing o democracy, which emphasizes not just political rights but a

PrecolonialArican gov-ernments had

democraticeatures.


16/25


broader range o social and economic rights than one fnds guar-

anteed in Western societies. Along similar lines, Wiredu argues

that traditional ideas about consensus and political organization

provide the basis or developing what he calls consensual democ-

racies. These democracies would be characterized by localizeddecision-making bodies, national advisory councils, and delib-

erative processes geared toward achieving consensus rather than

simple majority decisions. Although Wiredu recognizes that there

are signifcant disagreements between groups in todays Arican

societies, he argues that such disagreements need not evolve into

a multiparty political system, which enshrines permanent opposi-

tions and, all too oten, ensures a minority whose voice is not ad-

equately heard. Instead, he argues or the creation o a nonpartypolity, based on a sense o shared interests and solidarity, and

committed to the consensual ideal o granting serious consider-

ation to the perspectives o all persons when disagreements arise

(Wiredu 1997, 308.).

While the project o developing a communalist understanding

o democracy has been avidly pursued by a signifcant group o

Arican philosophers,4 this project has also been subject to some

serious criticisms. The most signifcant objection highlights glaringdierences between precolonial and contemporary Arica, which

seem to undermine the possibility o a present-day democracy

based on communalist principles. As Peter Bodunrin points out,

precolonial communalism prevailed in small societies with non-

money economies, in which members were bound together by

common blood and eelings o extended amilyhood. Such societies

were also characterized by substantial agreement regarding cus-

toms, morality, and religious belies, which combined to provide a

sense o solidarity and, indeed, shared destiny amongst the people.

In contrast, todays much larger Arican societies are characterized

by increasing urbanization, and by signifcant ethnic, religious, and

class dierences within their populations. And, o course, they ea-

ture money economies tied in varying degrees to world markets.

These conditions oment divisions rather than solidarity, and lead

Bodunrin to question whether the principles o traditional commu-

nalism are workable in todays Arica (Bodunrin 1991, 69-70).

Emmanuel Eze puts a fner point on Bodunrins concerns aboutthe unctionality o traditional communalism by arguing that the

4 See, e.g., the essays in chapter 6 o Wiredus edited volume (2004).

Ethnic,religious, andclass dier-

ences rendertraditionalcommunalismdifcult.


17/25


call or communalist or consensual democracies in act rests on a

misunderstanding o the purpose o democracy in contemporary

Arica. When persons enter political discourse with a sense o

shared destiny and substantial agreement regarding the common

good, the quest or consensus is a viable enterprise that containssome hope o success. On the other hand, in a pluralistic society, in

which people lack this sense o solidarity and oten operate with

sharply contrasting views o the good lie, the quest or consensus

is not only implausible but wrongheaded. Ezes argument, which is

directed principally at Wiredu, ocuses on the core issues o political

interests and the common good. The basic premise o communalism

is that we have a primary obligation to pursue the common good

precisely because this good is defned by interests that are com-mon to all members o society (see Gyekye 1997b, 45-56). Wiredu

and Gyekye repeatedly cite the Akan image o the two-headed

crocodile fghting over a piece o ood to express this undamental

insight: It is irrational, in their view, or the heads to fght over the

ood when the nutritional beneft is destined or their common

stomach. The consensual approach to political decision-making is

directly tied to this claim about the primacy o shared interests. In

precolonial societies, says Wiredu, adherence to the principle oconsensus . . . was based on the belie that ultimately the interests o

all members o society are the same, although their immediate per-

ceptions o those interests may be dierent (Wiredu 1997, 306).

According to Eze, this communalist argument not only ails to

appreciate the depth o conict that exists in contemporary Arican

societies, but underestimates the importance o particular interests

versus shared interests. To acknowledge that human beings share

certain undamental interestse.g., those in lie, liberty, and secu-

ritydoes not imply that our interests are ultimately identical,

or that the particular interests that divide us along amiliar lines o

class, ethnicity, and religion are somehow illusory or unimport-

ant. Individual and group-specifc interests are oten crucial to our

identities and our lie projects and, in Ezes view, to suggest that

these interests should be set aside in order to pursue a common

good defned by shared interests is undamentally undemocratic.

The purpose o democracy, Eze argues, is to provide a ormal rame-

work or the mediation o competing interests; such a rameworkcannot require substantive decisional outcomes on contested issues,

and it certainly cannot require the kind o unanimity suggested by

Particularinterests alonggroup linesnot illusoryor unimport-ant.


18/25


the idea o consensus. The only consensus primary to democ-

racy, says Eze, is the initial, ormal agreement to play by a set o

rules (Eze 1997, 321). Ideally, these rules will manage discussion

in a way that protects the rights o all participants, including the

right to dissent and pursue ones own lie projects, to the extentthat such projects are consistent with the rights o others.

I am inclined to agree with Ezes claim that Wiredu and Gyekye

underestimate the importance o particular interests versus shared

interests, and overestimate the ability o rational dialogue to dis-

solve political conicts. One neednt be a cynical advocate o power

politics to be skeptical o Wiredus assertion that there is no prob-

lem o human relations that cannot be resolved through rational

dialogue (Wiredu 1997, 307), or o Gyekyes parallel claim that allsocial conict stems rom a misperception either o the common

good, o the individual good, or o the relationship between the

two (Gyekye 1987, 160). On a strictly practical level, I would also

agree that erosion o the traditional bases or solidarity undermines

the viability o a consensual, nonparty approach to democracy in

contemporary Arica. Requiring persons to set aside deeply held

interests in the pursuit o consensus is not only impractical, but

seems to violate basic democratic precepts concerning liberty andequality. The idea o prohibiting political parties is problematic on

similar grounds. While Wiredu concedes the legitimacy o po-

litical associations to propagate preerred ideologies, he suggests

that, unlike parties, such associations would not be relentlessly

dedicated to wresting or retaining [power] (Wiredu 1997, 310).

This claim seems highly dubiouspolitical associations, though

presumably smaller than parties as defned by Wiredu, could cer-

tainly exhibit the same Hobbesian proclivities that he ears. More

importantly, there is nothing inherent in the defnition o a political

party that requires it to pursue power indiscriminately or or its

own sake, or that precludes it rom eectively cooperating with

other parties. Ironically, Wiredu himsel calls attention to histori-

cal examples o cooperation amongst ethnic groups in Arica, but

proceeds to argue against ethnic-based parties in the contemporary

context (Wiredu 1997, 310). It is surely lamentable when political

groups ocus primarily on gaining and maintaining power while

ailing to consider the legitimate interests o other groups. Butthere is no reason to think that a party as opposed to an associa-

tion will exhibit such tendencies, and there are good reasons to


19/25


think that preventing persons rom orming parties along chosen

lines would be both impractical and inconsistent with the aore-

mentioned principles o liberty and equality.

While I share Ezes concerns about the viability o a consensual,

nonparty democracy, his critical response to Wiredu and Gyekyeis by no means an unqualifed success. In act, there are signifcant

shortcomings in Ezes analysis that are highly relevant or the

point in questionnamely, whether democracy as practiced in

the past has any relevance in the contemporary context. In mak-

ing his case against consensual democracy, Eze rightly emphasizes

the role o particular and sometimes irreconcilable interests in the

political arena, and challenges the idea that our interests are ulti-

mately the same. At the same time, however, he portrays democ-racy as a purely ormal ramework or agreement or disagree-

ment that cannot prejudge substantive decisional outcomes (Eze

1997, 321). The problem with this view is that our acceptance o a

democratic ramework involves undamental moral commitments

that clearly do require a certain range o substantive decisional

outcomes. While Eze illustrates the irreconcilability o competing

interests through the example o a dictator whose sheer interest in

power and domination conicts with the interests o an oppressedcitizenry, it is precisely this kind o example which undermines his

purely ormal view o democracy: The rules o genuine democratic

decision-making, however conceived, would clearly exclude deci-

sions that sanction dictatorial interests, just as they would exclude

decisions in avor o slavery or other actions that involve egregious

violations o rights.

I highlight this point because it is relevant to the question o

whether traditional communalism provides a viable basis or de-

mocracy in the contemporary world. As I understand it, the core

argument or a communalist approach to democracystripped o

its problematic calls or consensus and a nonparty polityis that

social responsibilities and the common good should be accentu-

ated in the ground rules or political decision-making. While this

orientation recognizes the importance o individual rights, it insists

that these rights must be tempered by our responsibilities to oth-

ers and, more precisely, by our duty to promote shared interests.

A detailed account o this position is not necessary to rame mykey conclusions regarding the viability o a democracy based on

Acceptance oa democraticrameworkinvolvesundamentalmoral commit-ments.


20/25


communalist principles. 5 First, there is nothing undemocratic about

ounding a political order on the kind o altruistically reighted

morality endorsed by Gyekye and others (Gyekye 1997b, 67).

Indeed, Gyekye suggests that such an approach provides a more

comprehensive understanding o democracy than what is oundin societies that proceed rom a minimalist account o individual

rights, which thereby renders many important social responsibili-

ties morally optional. Second, in my view, political discourse in a

communal democracy need not require the impractical ideal o

consensus or a prohibition on political parties. Nor would it rule

out serious and sometimes irreconcilable dierences between

competing parties on many issues. But it would require a dier-

ent range o substantive decisional outcomes than one fnds in ademocracy that is ounded on individualist assumptions. For ex-

ample, it would rule out an interpretation o property rights that

allows individuals to accumulate great wealth while signifcant

portions o the population suer rom lack o ood, shelter, and

healthcare. Finally, and most importantly, I see no insurmountable

practical or theoretical obstacles to a current-day Arican democ-

racy appropriating and adapting these core ideas o traditional

communalism.O course, a democracy organized along such lines would look

rather dierent rom democracy as practiced in many Western

countries. While this runs contrary to a common assumption that

political modernization in Arica requires implementing Western

models o democracy, Gyekye and Wiredu repeatedly challenge

this assumption, and I believe they are correct to do so. Despite

long-standing democratic traditions, the ideals o justice and equal-

ity have not yet been adequately realized in many Western coun-

tries, and this problem may be attributed in part to their prevail-

ing systems o political organization. Multiparty systems in some

countries have institutionalized not just discussion and debate, but

antagonisms and partisan fxations on power that oten compro-

mise the eective pursuit o important social goals, including the

need to care or those who are least advantaged. A democracy or-

ganized along communalist lines would still have to contend with

the ignoble human instincts that creep into the political arena, but

its baseline commitment to social responsibilities would position it

5 For a detailed account, see Gyekyes careully argued deense o what he calls

moderate communalism (1997b, ch. 2).


21/25


to ameliorate some o these problems.

Wiredu oers a more pointed criticism o those who would

rush to adopt Western approaches to social and political lie when

he argues that the West is in act underdeveloped with respect to

the central issues o political modernization. In his important es-say entitled, How Not to Compare Arican Thought with West-

ern Thought, Wiredu suggests that development, in its most

undamental sense, is measured by the degree to which rational

methods have penetrated thought habits (Wiredu 1995, 163). I

we think about development in these terms, he says, it becomes

clear that the West remains underdeveloped in many key areas o

thought, despite its advanced state with respect to knowledge o

the natural world. Wiredu summarizes his position as ollows:The Western world is developed, but only relatively. Technologi-cal sophistication is only one aspect, and that not the core, o devel-opment. The conquest o the religious, moral and political spheres

by the spirit o rational inquiry remains . . . a thing o the utureeven in the West. From this point o view the West may be said to

be still underdeveloped. (Wiredu 1995, 163)

Wiredu leaves it to his readers to ponder the ull meaning o this

provocative remark, but we neednt look ar or examples o the

underdevelopment he might have in mind. In my own country,the United States, we can readily identiy a number o prevailing

thought habits that are symptomatic o the underdevelopment

to which Wiredu alludes. With regard to the political sphere, it

seems clear that the central ideals o democracy are not well served

when political discourse becomes so mired in inammatory rheto-

ric and partisan posturing that substantive discussion becomes

virtually impossible. Yet, sadly, this is what political discourse

has become in the popular American media and, to a signifcantextent, in the deliberations o our governing bodies. With regard

to morality, it should be clear that our highest ideals concerning

justice, equality, and human dignity are not best served by an ethi-

cal relativism that would reduce moral judgments to nothing more

than expressions o individual eeling or cultural preerence. Yet

many people in the enlightened West tend to think about moral-

ity in precisely these terms, oten based on the mistaken assumption

that such relativism expresses a commitment to tolerance, respector diversity, and the like, when in act it just as readily legitimates

oppression, intolerance, and all manner o heinous behavior. At

the juncture o the moral and political domains, we might also

Technologicalprowess does

not precludemoral andpoliticalunderdevel-opment.


22/25


take note o staggering levels o poverty, hunger, and lack o ac-

cess to adequate health care in the United States, blights that could

surely be reduced given sufcient political will. This, too, can

be viewed as a sign o underdevelopment since, in the context o

political modernization, rational thought habits must encompassnot just instrumental rationality and heightened technological e-

fciency, but considered commitment to the ideals o justice and

equality. Finally, it hardly needs to be mentioned that our most

loty religious principles are not well served when persons attempt

to justiy narrow and sometimes hateul political agendas through

acile appeals to the will o God or the commands o unimpeach-

able religious authority. Such tactics, however, are depressingly

amiliar.Thus, when Wiredu suggests that the realms o religion, mor-

als and politics remain strongholds o irrationality even in the

West (Wiredu, 1995, 163), I believe there is plenty o evidence to

support his claim. Like Wiredu, I think we can and must do better

beore we hold ourselves up as examples or social and political

development in Arica or elsewhere. Indeed, Aricans would do

well to recognize the aorementioned attitudes in the political,

moral, and religious spheres as insidious impediments to the high-est ideals o modernity.

Concluding Remarks:

Traditional Life and the Challenges of Modernization

I will conclude with a very brie assessment o the dispute

about tradition and modernization in Arican philosophy. In my

view, Hountondji and others expose serious aws in the position

we have been calling cultural revivalism. In a continent charac-terized by signifcant diversity, the romantic quest or a generic

Arican mentality or worldview is unlikely to provide a basis or

eective social and political action. Likewise, documenting and

celebrating traditional belies without any critical analysis seems

at best unhelpul and, at worst, an impediment to the challenges

o the present. Progress in any society requires adapting, changing,

and in some cases abandoning traditional ideas and behaviors. It

also involves borrowing and adapting ideas rom other cultural

contexts. I ear these points are lost upon many cultural revival-

ists.

Unortunately, while making the case against cultural revival-


23/25


ism, some critics have veered too ar in the opposite direction,

toward what Gyekye calls cultural rejectionism. As Atieno

Odhiambo has noted, or some critics the problem is not this or

that Arican tradition or custom but rather the general idea that

custom and tradition are some kind o heavy burden that Aricamust carry (Odhiambo 2002, 11). Hountondji himsel exhibits this

tendency when he calls or a clean break with the past (Houn-

tondji 1996, 48), and suggests that Arican philosophy and culture

lie beore us, rather than behind us. The problem with this rejec-

tionist stance is twoold. First, as I have just argued, in the moral

and political spheres traditional lie has much to oer as Aricans

grapple with the challenges o political modernization. Second,

thinkers who view the Arican past with varying levels o disdainand skepticism are oten guilty o overemphasizing the scientifc

aspect o modernization at the expense o the political aspect. The

problem, as I see it, is that they irt with the idea that scientifc

development should be viewed as the gold standard or judg-

ing human progress and success. Lansana Keita, or one, explicitly

endorses this view when he declares: Any analysis o the con-

temporary world shows that the most successul civilizations are

those which are the most technologically advanced (Keita 1991,147). This scientifc barometer o success is also evident in the oten

repeated observation that it was science, ater all, that allowed a

relatively small number o Europeans to colonize a much larger

number o Aricans (see Owomoyela 1991, 162-63).

The problems with this view should be evident in light o the

preceding discussion. When science is used to subjugate other hu-

man beings and appropriate their natural resources, this should

certainly not be regarded as a sign o social success. It should, on

the contrary, be viewed as a sign o precisely the political, moral,

and religious underdevelopment mentioned by Wiredu. An obvious

but important corollary o this insight is that the success that

comes with science is more the product o extrascientifc values

than o experimental and theoretical breakthroughs. Scientifc and

technological development, unconstrained by moral and political

vision, clearly harbors the potential to compromise rather than pro-

mote human welare. Gyekye has aptly emphasized this point in

his discussion o technology in postcolonial Arica, and I will closewith his remarks on this important matter:

I support the view that the humanist essence o Arican culture . . .

Scientifcdevelopmentunconstrained

by moralvision ispotentiallyharmul.


24/25


ought to be maintained and cherished in the attempt to create apostcolonial modernity. It must be realized that technology alonecannot solve . . . deep-rooted problems such as poverty, exploitation,economic inequalities and oppression in human societies unless it isunderpinned and guided by some basic moral values; in the absenceo the strict application o such values, technology can in act createother problems, including environmental problems. Social transor-mation, which is an outstanding goal o the comprehensive use otechnology, cannot be achieved unless technology moves under theaegis o basic human values. (Gyekye 1997a, 42)

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