After the Fall; The End of the European Dream and the Decline of a Continent

8/3/2019 After the Fall; The End of the European Dream and the Decline of a Continent

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.

An imprint of St. Martins Press.

. Copyright 2011 by Walter Laqueur. All rights re-

served. Printed in the United States of America. For information, ad-dress St. Martins Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010.

www.thomasdunnebooks.com

www.stmartins.com

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Laqueur, Walter, 1921

After the fall : the end of the European dream and the decline

of a continent / Walter Laqueur. 1st ed.

p. cm.

ISBN 978-1-250-00008-8 (hardcover)

ISBN 978-1-4299-5256-9 (e-book)

1. EuropeEconomic conditions21st century. 2. Europe

Social conditions21st century. 3. EuropeForeign relations

21st century. 4. EuropePolitics and government21st century.

5. EuropeHistory21st century. I. Title.

D2020.L37 2012

940.56dc23

2011033140

First Edition: January 2012

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1


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THE EUROPEAN DREAM:

THE DAY WILL COME . . .

O the only news in the media

about Ireland on the brink of the abyss, America diminished

and paralyzed, Britain facing years of austerity, Greece in de-

spair, Portugal beyond despair, Italy and Spain in grave dan-

ger, chronically weak demand, debilitating cycle, collision

course in Europe, killing the euro, pernicious consequences,

towards the precipice, perhaps the only comfort was offered

by looking back six or seven years to the inspiring literature

on the European dream, a postnationalist model of peace,

prosperity, social justice, and ecological virtue. It is certainly

encouraging to know that the homicide rate in Europe is one

quarter that of the United States, that the literacy rate is higheras well as the life span and the amount of humanitarian aid

dispensed. A revolution had taken place in Europe during the

last sixty years, which most Americans had simply not noticed.

It had achieved a new balance between individual property

rights and the common good, between government regula-

tion and the free market, between liberty and equalitywhich

America with its naive belief in the all-curative power of thefree market had never achieved. The excesses of consumer

capitalism had been tempered. Then one would proceed to


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another book predicting in convincing detail that the future

belonged to the European model, that it would be emulated

all over the world, a shining beacon to all mankind. It had pio-neered a new approach to a humanitarian foreign policy. At

long last it had come to live in peace with itself and the rest of

the world. Europe was healthy and sustainable; it was stress-

free in contrast to feverish, unbalanced America. The future

belonged to it.

There are still a few voices maintaining that Europe is a

rising superpower in a bipolar world, and it is probably wel-

come to have such uplifting messages in a time of doom and

gloom. Europes inuence in the world (it is announced) is ris-

ing for a variety of reasons, among them the fact that the ma-

terial and ideological conicts between Europe and the other

powers are decreasing. The European continent has been

pacied. Elsewhere all major governments want to adapt

European societal norms, moving toward democracy and coop-

erative international relations. Great are the powers of human

self-deception. One apocryphal story stands out, that of the se-

nior member of the British foreign offi ce, who, complaining

about the constant warnings of his junior colleagues on the dan-

ger of a war, declared that he had been in offi ce for forty years

from 1910 to 1950, and it had been a calm period but for tworelatively short unpleasant interruptionsin 1914 and in 1939.

It is easy, far too easy, to ridicule now the illusions of yes-

teryear. The postwar generation of European elites aimed to

create more-democratic societies. They wanted to reduce the

extremes of wealth and poverty and provide essential social

services in a way that prewar government had not. They wanted

to do all this not just because they believed that it was morallyright but because they saw social equity as a way to temper the

anger and frustrations that had led to war. They had quite


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THE EUROPEAN DREAM: THE DAY WILL COME . . . 5

enough of unrest and war. For several decades, many European

societies more or less achieved these aims, and they had every

reason to be proud of this fact. Europe was quiet and civilized,no sounds of war, no threat of civil war either. The welfare-

state concept was admirable. Its political economy was based

on the assumption of permanent substantial economic growth,

a Ponzi scheme of sorts but not an unreasonable or dishonor-

able one.

On what was Europes success based? Partly on recent pain-

ful historical experience, the horrors of two world wars, on

the lessons of dictatorship, on fascism and communism that

should never happen again. But above all it was based on a feel-

ing of European identity and common values. What was this

identity and how to dene the common values? Or was it sim-

ply a community of material interests? It began after all as an

iron, steel, and coal union. True, Jean Monnet, the father of the

European Union, later said that he would put the emphasis on

culture rather than the economy if he had to start all over

again. But he did begin with the economy, and this approach

was probably not without reason.

Among the European values and fundamental rights most

often mentioned were the respect for human dignity, the rule

of law, peace, respect for the environment, perhaps, above all,tolerancethe great diversity of European culture and the

willingness to accept it. But were these values specically

European? Sixty-seven percent of Europeans thought they were

specically European in comparison with other continents.

But such an answer was possibly misleadingmore than half

of Europeans doubted whether there was a shared European

culture.Why was European integration so diffi cult? It had to over-

come what some called the articial concept of nation statehood.


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But nation statehood had developed over the centuries; per-

haps the world and Europe would have been better without it,

but it was certainly not articial. On the contrary, it could beargued that a community of communities was articial. All

investigations have shown that 90 percent of Europeans feel

an attachment to the place and the country in which they

were born, but much less so to a wider institution involving

a different way of life and a different language. According to a

1996 Eurobarometer survey, only 51 percent of Europeans felt

European, and this seems not to have increased since. Vari-

ous attempts have been made since to strengthen the feeling

of a common cultural heritage, including a European anthem

and a European ag, but they have not had a great impact so

far. Some common cultural events have been slightly more

successful, including the Eurovision Song Contests (which

also generated a considerable amount of ill will as the result of

political maneuvering) or the Vienna New Years Day Johann

Strauss concert, although this was also listened to by many

millions in China and Japan.

Lessons of the past gradually fade away. True, the lesson

that there should be no wars in Europe had sunk in, for the

price that had been paid had been too high, and, in any case,

Europe was now too weak to wage war. It had been at longlast realized in this postheroic age that Europe, and a fortiori a

shrinking Europe, had all the lebensraum it needed.

But these were negative lessons, teaching Europe what

not to do. The feeling of European solidarity and of common

values had not made great progress, after some uncertain

beginningsif it made progress at all. There was not even agree-

ment about the borders of Europe. Was the United Kingdomcloser to the United States or to Bulgaria or Turkey? Nor was it

realistic to expect such progresshow could it compete with

national feelings, which had developed over many centuries?


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If common values were few or weak, what of common in-

terests and common threats as a glue? These certainly existed,

and not only in the economic eld, but such a union resembleda nancial company with limited responsibility; people might

feel solidarity with their compatriots and be willing to make

sacrices for their homeland, but why do so for a community

of economic interests? There were common political interests

but also conicts of interest; differences of opinion existed be-

tween countries and within countries.

When was it rst realized that all was not well as far as the

European Union was concerned? There had been a European

crisis in the 1970s and the feeling that Europe was running out

of steam after a promising beginning. There had been major

crises elsewherein Russia in the 1990s and also in Asia (1997

98), Latin America (19992002), and even in the United States,

and the countries affected had all recovered. As for global

prospects in the 1980s there were wide divergences of opinion.

The Cassandras (not many at the time) saw mostly doom and

gloom, and it is of course true that sooner or later disasters do

happen somewhere. But the majority view as expressed at the

time in the leading works of political scientists on the rise and

fall of great powers was that America was overextended and

therefore bound to fall; stagnating Russia was also not in goodshape, though hardly anyone foresaw how close the collapse

was. China and India were more or less ignored, which is un-

derstandable because the great jump forward was just about to

begin.

If there was mild optimism among the prophets, it con-

cerned Japan and Europe. These powers were not overextended

but made steady, gradual progressin the case of Europe, ac-cepting new members and moving toward a common currency.

Some enthusiasts went further, describing how the European

way was the best hope in an insecure world and how the


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European dream was quietly replacing the American dream,

the term quietlybeing very often used in this context.

These were wrong assumptions and predictions, but theyseemed not that far-fetched at the time. The Soviet Union dis-

appeared, and the United States for a while became the only

superpower, much to the chagrin of some who predicted fur-

ther overextension and consequently even greater decline.

Others took a more sanguine view. In the meantime, Europe

was also expanding. By now, its population was greater than

that of the United States and its GNP was also greater. But its

growth was very much slowing down, and individual coun-

tries faced major problems. In 2005 the CIA published a report

in which it predicted that, by 2020, the EU (and NATO) would

disappear unless they carried out the most far-reaching re-

forms.

The reasons given were interesting but not wholly convinc-

ing: the European welfare state had become too expensive,

virtually unaffordable, and made it impossible for Europe to

compete on the world markets. This was quite correct

people lived longer, and medical treatment became more and

more expensive. But the American authors of these reports

seem to have ignored that the same applied to the United

States, which had no welfare state (or merely a very limitedone) but spent on health twice as much per capita as the Euro-

peans. In the meantime some European countries, notably

Sweden but also Germany, had proved that abuses of the wel-

fare state could be put right and a great deal of money saved.

Some of these cuts were painful, but many of the essentials of

the welfare state were preserved.

In the 2005 forecast, yet another main reason was given forthe coming collapse of the EUthe fact that Germanys slug-

gish growth was negatively affecting the European economic


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performance, Germany being the strongest economic power.

This was the perspective of 2005, but ve years later the Euro-

pean situation looked very different indeed, with Germany asthe undisputed leader and everybody compelled to dance to its

tune. This showed again the pitfalls and diffi culties of predic-

tion. Some of the factors were a priori unpredictable, others

were mainly psychological or had to do with the effi cacy of

government confronting a crisis. It was clear, for example, that

if major banks engaged in foolish and imprudent activities, a

price would have to be paid sooner or later. But it still de-

pended on how the authorities and the public coped with such

a situation. A collapse could be prevented, unless the foolish-

ness and the damage had been monumental. Or there could be

a panic, a mass run on the banks with equally foolish counter-

measures taken, in which case the consequences could be far

reaching and disastrous.

American global overextension with insuffi cient resources

may indeed have been very damaging, and the European wel-

fare state may have become a very heavy burden. But these

were not the main factors that caused the great crisis of 2008.

Mainly responsible were the enormous debts incurred by both

America and Europe and the lack of nancial oversight that

led to the great instability on the markets caused by banks,governments, and individual debtors.

But the causes were not only economic in character

perhaps not even mainly so. As far as Europe is concerned it

was the mistaken idea that there could be an economic union

without a political union. There was little enthusiasm on the

part of the richer European countries to help get the weaker

economies out of trouble, especially if these weaker ones hadbehaved irresponsibly, or even fraudulently. Why should

Germans retire at sixty-seven so that Greeks could retire at


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10 CRISIS

fty-three? In other words, with all the talk about European

identity and common values, there was little solidarity. Per-

haps there could not be.This should not have come as a great surprise. Looking at

world history of the last hundred years, there are few cases of

countries uniting and more of splitting. The Soviet Union split

into a dozen constituent parts, Yugoslavia into nearly half a

dozen, and Czechs and Slovaks reached the conclusion that

they would be better off if they parted ways. Even in countries

that had been united for a long time, separatist tendencies

ran strong. When the United Nations was founded, it had 51

members; today there are 193.

The European dream had not come suddenly. In 1849 a

peace congress took place in Paris. The opening address was

given by Victor Hugo, in which he said,

A day wil l come when you France, you Russia, you Italy, you

England, you Germany, you all nations of the continent with-

out losing your distinct qualities and your glorious individual-

ity will be merged closely within a superior unit and you will

form the European Brotherhood. . . . A day will come when

the bullets and the bombs will be replaced, by votes by the

universal suffrage by the peoples, by the venerable arbitrationof a great sovereign senate which will be to Europe what the

parliament is to England, what this diet is to Germany what

this legislative assembly is to France.

Victor Hugo went on for a long time. It was a stirring speech,

but the day, alas, has not come yet.

Documents

After the Fall; The End of the European Dream and the Decline of a Continent