Albarracin y Milanese

8/12/2019 Albarracin y Milanese

1/17

1

The impact of the Colombian electoral reform in Congressional and

sub-national elections

Juan AlbarracnPhD Student

University of Notre Dame

Notre Dame, [email protected]

Associate ResearcherCenter for Interdisciplinary Research

(CIES)

Universidad Icesi

Cali, [email protected]

Juan Pablo MilaneseDirector of the Political Science Program

Universidad Icesi

Cali, [email protected]

Prepared for delivery at the 2012 Congress of the Latin American StudiesAssociation, San Francisco, California May 23-26, 2012.

DRAFT: Please do not quote without permission from the authors


2/17

2

1. Introduction1In 2003 Colombian legislators introduced sweeping changes to the countrys electoral rules

with the intent to rationalize party competition, i.e. reduce fragmentation and incentives

to cultivate a personal vote. Evidence provided by two national after the enactment of the

new rules indicates that reform was successful in reducing the level of party systemfragmentation in the Senate and to some extent in the House of Representatives (Cmara de

Representantes). However, the impact of reform on regional and local elections has

received far less attention.

In this paper, we analyze the effects of reform in House elections, as well as evaluate the

impact of new rules in elections for 21 city councils. Did electoral reform reduce

fragmentation in these elections? Is electoral competition at the local level less candidate-

centered after reform? The study of these elections can provide new insights to debates

about electoral reform in Colombia. Firstly, most electoral rules remain constant across

levels while an important component of the electoral system varies, namely districtmagnitude. Secondly, the greater number of electoral districts and the number of local

elections conducted after the passage of electoral reform supplies a considerable amount of

data that is not available for Senate elections.

We begin the paper with a brief discussion of the Colombian party system and electoral

rules. We concentrate on the institutional incentives of pre-reform electoral rules and how

these enabled party system fragmentation and the cultivation of a personal vote, as well as

on the expected impact of post-reform electoral reform. After presenting results of previous

research evaluating the impact of electoral reform, we undertake our analysis of House and

city council elections. Our results are quite puzzling: While the impact of electoral reformin House elections follows theoretical expectations, city council elections do not.

Furthermore, the personalization of electoral competition remains quite high at the local

level. Therefore, our results indicate a need to further study the effects of electoral reform

at the regional and local levels.

2. The Colombian party systemColombias party system transformed considerably during the 1990s. Since the mid 19

th

century, two political parties (the Liberal and Conservative Parties) dominated Colombian

politics. These parties, however, were not highly centralized and lacked a strong national

1This paper presents some preliminary results of an ongoing research project directed by the authors on the

effect of electoral reform in House of Representatives (Cmara de Representantes), provincial assemblies

(Asambleas Departamentales) and city councils (Concejos Municipales) in Colombia. The authors thank

Adolfo Abada, Karen Girn and Xiomara Suescn for superb research assistance. We would also like to

express our gratitude to the members of the Electoral Systems and Electoral Behavior course (2011-1

semester) at Universidad Icesi for helping gather data on House elections. The authors gratefully acknowledge

Univesidad Icesissupport in conducting this project.


3/17

3

party organization. Factions within the parties were, in fact, very institutionalized and

controlled important processes, for example candidate nominations (Pizarro 2006)2.

Nonetheless, since the l970s the level of factional electoral fragmentation increased

(Gutierrez Sanin 2007). In the 1990s factional fragmentation within parties exacerbated:

Parties or even instutionalizedfactionswithin parties could no longer control candidatenominations and the number of party lists skyrocketed. In addition, politicians from both

traditional parties and newcomers increasingly started making use of new party labels3,

which were basically candidate-orientated electoral mini parties4, and could successfully

win seats in Congress (Pizarro 2006). Thus, the effective number of electoral of

parliamentary parties increased considerably by 2002.

Graph 1: Effective number of parliamentary parties House and Senate

Source: Taylor (2009: 93)

It is not surprising that this high level of party system fragmentation and the

personalization of electoral competition were accompanied by an inability of political

parties to structure legislative processes. Evidence offered by Milanese (2011) points out

that during the 2002-2006 legislature, parties in Congress and, consequently were incapable

effectively organizing legislative activity.

2Pizarro (2006) highlights that, given the strength of party factions, the Liberal and Conservative parties weremore party subcultures than political parties.3 Many of the labels formed in the late 1990s in Colombia used the word movimiento. In Colombia, a

distinction is usually made between political parties and political movements. The latter usually refer to

temporary, citizen-based electoral movements (Moreno 2005). However, most political movements that were

constituted after the 1991 Constitution were more electoral vehicles of a politician rather than the electoral

expression of a citizen movement. 4These mini-parties were small electoral organizations whose sole purpose was to elect one candidate for

public office. They were created by the candidate himself and were usually only active during elections. The

termed coined in Colombia to refer to them was micro-empresas electorales(Pizarro 2006)

2,24

3,1 2,9

3,56

9,19

2,23,03

2,82 3,27

7,39

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

78

9

10

1990 1991 1994 1998 2002

Effective number of parliamentary parties (Senate)

Effective number of parliamentary parties (House)


4/17

4

Additionally, there was an erosion of partisan attachment in the electorate. Traditional

parties are said to have been an important source of political identity during the 20th

century

and a strong determinant of vote behavior5. However, in the past decade, the percentage of

respondents of who have expressed sympathies for any party has been quite low, ranging

from 23% to 37% in LAPOP surveys since 2006. Partisan attachments for the previously

dominant Liberal and Conservative parties have diminished considerably and support for

new parties has been very volatile (Rodriguez Raga and Seligson 2008, 2011).

3. Electoral rules in ColombiaCharacteristics of the electoral system before 2003 have generally been identified as the

main culprits for the extreme fragmentation of the party system and personalization of

electoral competition (Pizarro 2006; Shugart et al. 2007, among many others). Colombia

had a proportional representation (PR) system which used the Hare (or simple) quota and

largest remainders to distribute votes6 and had no election threshold. Parties were also

allowed to present multiple closed lists in each electoral district, although votes betweenthese lists could not be pooled. District magnitude varied depending on the size of the

population. Elections for the House of Representatives (lower house) were held in districts7

whose magnitude varied from two (in the smallest departamentos) to 18 (in Bogot). In

1991, the Constitutional Assembly introduced a nationwide electoral district to elect the

members of the upper house (Senate) and thus abolished the (formal) regional election

senators8.

Moreover, party registration laws placed very low thresholds to gain legal recognition as a

political party or political movement. Only 50,000 votes (or citizen signatures) or a

representative in Congress guaranteed a party legal recognition and even permittedoverlapping membership between parties and political movements (Moreno 2005).

5Reliable survey data documenting the importance of partisanship during the 20 thcentury is not available.

Claims about the importance of partisan identities are usually supported by historical evidence. Only until

recently do we have access to reliable Colombian public opinion data about, particularly through the surveys

conducted by LAPOPs Americas Barometer and Latinobarometro.6A seat is awarded when each party reaches the Hare quota (

). If party has

double the amount of votes as the quota, the party is assigned two seats and so on. If all seats are not assigned

using the quota, seats are distributed to parties with the largest remainders of votes, i.e. the votes that were notused to assign seats with the quota procedure.7Electoral districts for House elections are the departamentos (provinces) and the capital (Bogot). Special

(nationwide) electoral districts exist for Indigenous (1 seat) and Afro-Colombian (2 seats) minorities. In this

paper we will not analyze the latter type of electoral districts, although the extreme fragmentation of the

electoral district for Afro-Colombian minorities warrants further study.8The members of the Constitutional assembly thought that the introduction of the nationwide district to elect

senators would favor candidates moved by national and programmatic concerns (over clientelistic and narrow

regional concerns). This reform did not have the intended effects, although the average senator still captures

support more widely than prior to reform (Crisp and Ingall 2002: 746, see also Shugart et al. 2007).


5/17

5

The existence of multiple lists per party, the absence of vote pooling across lists of a same

party combined with a (predominant) distribution of seat through largest remainders

yielded a system that incentivized the cultivation of personal votes (Shugart et al. 2007) and

made it resemble, in its workings, the single non transferable vote (Cox and Shugart 1995,

Shugart et al. 2007)9. The extremely low effective threshold to obtain a seat in the Senate

and the high magnitude districts in the House also made party system fragmentation

possible. In the 2002 elections, a list could win a seat in the Senate with 40,460 votes (or

0.42% of valid votes) and a seat as a representative for Bogot with 18,805 votes (or 1.14%

of valid votes).

After failures in attempts to reform Colombias electoral rules (see Shugart et al. 2007), the

extraordinary fragmentation of the party system after the 2002 legislative elections

prompted the need for reform in order to rationalize electoral competition, i.e. reduce

party system fragmentation and personalization and, hence strengthen political parties

(Botero and Rodriguez Raga 2008). In 2003 a Congressional initiative resulted in a

complete overhaul of the electoral system and other rules. Firstly, the Hare quota was

changed for the DHondt10

electoral formula. Secondly, an electoral threshold was

introduced which requires parties to obtain at least 2% of valid votes in the elections for the

Senate or a percentage of the simple quota in House elections11

to participate in the

distribution of seats (although reaching this threshold does not guarantee obtaining a seat).

Thirdly, single-party lists were introduced. Fourthly, parties were given the possibility to

choose between closed or open lists. Furthermore, parties are now required to obtain at least

2% of votes in the Senate election (or 2% of votes casted in House elections nationwide) in

order to maintain legal recognition as a party. Requirements to register independent

candidates and the magnitudes of electoral districts remained unchanged.

Thus, the 2003 electoral reform contained a set of mutually reinforcing incentives to reduce

party system fragmentation, particularly in districts with high magnitude (the Senate, as

well as the House districts of Bogot, Antioquia, and Valle del Cauca). By introducing vote

pooling though single party lists and rewarding vote accumulation with the DHondt

electoral formula, the reform also included mechanisms to foster intra-party cooperation

(Botero 2009; Shugart et al. 2007). However, open lists bring in an element that can

9Liberal and Conservative parties benefited for a long time from this system throught he so-called operacin

avispa: By placing several lists in a district, Liberals and Conservatives would get more seats through largest

remainders than they should get awarded given their proportion of votes (see Moreno 2005; Shugart et al.

2007).10 The exception to this rule are districts with were the magnitude equals two. In these districts, seats are

distributed according to the Hare quota and largest remainder for parties which pass the electoral threshold.11 Electoral reform foresees a differentiated treatment of the threshold depending on district magnitude: In

electoral districts with magnitude greater than two, 50% of the simple quota of votes (Hare quota) is needed to

participate in the distribution of votes. In district with a magnitude of two, 30% of the quota is needed.


6/17

6

exacerbate intra-party competition by distributing party seats to the candidates with the

highest preference votes (Shugart 2005)12

.

4. Research on the effects of electoral reformMost of the analyses evaluating the impact electoral reform in Colombia have focused on

its effects on senatorial elections. They show that, indeed, electoral reform contributed to a

reduction in party system fragmentation in the Senate as measured by the effective number

of parties (Rodriguez Raga and Botero 2006; Botero and Rodriguez Raga 2008), see graph

2.

Graph 2: Reduction of the nominal and effective number of parties in the Senate

Source: Taylor (2009: 93) for 1990-2006 and own calculations using data from the Registradura Nacional

del Estado Civil for 2010 elections

Whereas the effects of reform on fragmentation in the Senate are quite clear, its effects on

House elections have garnered considerably less attention. This is surprising since the study

of House elections can be particularly appealing since there is variation in district

magnitude but electoral reform did not alter this feature of the electoral system (Shugart

and Pachn 2010). In fact, one could argue that the only (substantive) change for districts

with very low magnitude (M=2) was the introduction of single party lists13

.

In one of the few articles discussing the impact of reform in the House, Shugart and Pachn

(2010) present evidence showing its differential effects according to district magnitude.

12 Literature on the Brazilian electoral system has highlighted how OLPR (open list proportional

representation) creates incentives to cultivate a personal vote (see Nicolau and Stadler 2012, among others).13In districts where the magnitude equals 2, seats are still distributed according to the Hare quota and largest

remainders. Although and electoral threshold was introduced, this threshold is not significant since the

effective threshold (amount of votes to obtain one seat) is usually higher than the formal electoral threshold.

See the appendix for supporting data.

2,24 3,1 2,9 3,56

9,197,1 5,6

11

2023

27

47

1210

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1990 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010

Effective number of parliamentary parties (Senate)

Nominal number of party holding seats (Senate)


7/17

7

Analyzing the 2006 election, they propose that in high magnitude districts there should be a

reduction in the number of parties while an increase in the number of parties should be

expected is low magnitude districts. Shugart and Pachn argue that whereas politicians in

larger districts have an incentive to pool votes (in order to pass the threshold and gain

seats), politicians in smaller districts might help rivals get elected by pooling votes.

Therefore, in small districts there is an incentive to use different party labels14after reform.

Unlike research on party system fragmentation, there is less conclusive evidence, in our

opinion, on the effects of reform on the incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Although

electoral thresholds, the DHondt electoral formula and single party lists in Senate elections

and House districts with high magnitude foster some level of cooperation between

candidates (Botero 2009; Shugart et al. 2007; Shugart and Pachn 2010), open lists also

foster intra-party competition between candidates. Thus electoral reform may have reduced

fragmentation (particularly in the Senate) but did not necessarily foster the creation of

disciplined and/or cohesive parties with stronger party organizations (Botero and Rodriguez

Raga 2008).

Moreover, little work has focused on the effects of reform at the sub-national level; even

though, electoral rules in the provincial and municipal level are essentially identical as in

the House, with the exception of district magnitude. Botero (2006) and Garca 2006

analyzed the effects of reform in some City Councils (Concejos Municipales) in the 2003

regional elections, i.e. the first elections in the country under new electoral rules, and found

a reduction in the number of party lists competing for seats. In order to make a contribution

to this gap in the literature, we will undertake an analysis of the effects of electoral reform

in the elections for House seats (section 5) and 21 city councils (section 4).

5. Effects of electoral reform in the House of Representatives at the district levelWe can detect a slight reduction in the overall level of fragmentation in the House of

Representatives after the 2010 elections and a considerable reduction in the nominal

number of party labels competing for a seat in any house district after electoral reform (see

graph 3)15

. Thus, as in the Senate, electoral reform had the envisioned effect in the House: a

reduction of the fragmentation.

Graph 3: Number of party labels and effective number of electoral parties (House National)

14Shugart and Pachn (2010) argue that politicians in low magnitude districts use different party labels in

order to differentiate themselves. We do not completely agree with this argument, since the source of a

candidates electoral support need not be (possible) programmatic differences (or other cues) derived from

different party labels. Using different party labels just helps them avoid vote pooling.15This analysis excludes the special electoral districts for Afro-Colombians and Indigenous communities.


8/17

8

Source: Calculations by the authors using data from theRegistradura Nacional del Estado Civil

However, as Shugart and Pachn (2010) point out, the impact of electoral reform in the

House should be differentiated. In high magnitude districts we should expect a

reduction in the effective number of parties, as candidates will need to pool votes in

order to pass electoral and effective thresholds. In low magnitude districts, the effective

number of parties should tend to increase, since politicians who previously could run

under a same party banner without fearing that vote pooling would benefit their

opponents will now have to use a different party label.

Besides analyzing the effective number of parties in high and low magnitude districts,

we also look at the effective number of lists. The effective number of lists shouldconsiderably reduce in high magnitude districts and equal the effective number of

parties after electoral reform. Nonetheless, in low magnitude districts the effective

number of lists should remain about the same after electoral reform. By looking at the

effective number of lists, we can test if the level of fragmentation in low magnitude

districts remained substantively unchanged after reform. We are, thus, assuming that

before electoral reform, each list (regardless if it shared a party label with another one)

worked functionally as a separate party. This assumption seems reasonable since parties

in the late 1990s and 2002 had almost no control over nominations, candidates

effectively ran their own personalized campaigns without being held accountable to the

party (if the used and established label), and there was no vote pooling and little

coordination between party lists. In essence, the appearance of new party labels after

2003 would be the formalization of preexisting fragmentation in low magnitude

districts.

5.1.High magnitude districts

67

73

41

21

4,037,65 8,77

6,11

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1998 2002 2006 2010

Number of labels Effective number of electoral parties


9/17

9

The following section analyses the patterns of electoral fragmentation in the electoral

districts with the highest magnitudes: Bogot (M=18), Antioquia (M=17) and Valle del

Cauca (M=13). As expected, there is a reduction in the effective number of parties in

the three districts after reform (see graph 4).

Graph 4: Effective number of parties

districts with highest magnitudes


The same effects can be detected when one looks at the nominal and effective number

of lists in these districts (see graphs 5 and 6).

Graph 5: Nominal number of lists indistricts with the highest magnitude

Graph 6: Effective number of lists indistricts with the highest magnitude


7,58

9,44

8,75

5,91

3,39

7,75

6,64

4,20

3,35

8,65

7,24

5,90

0,00

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

6,00

7,00

8,00

9,00

10,00

1998 2002 2006 2010

Bogota

Antioquia

Valle

172

286

27

1361

6714 11

51

62

16 110

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1998 2002 2006 2010

Bogota Antioquia Valle

37,24

52,12

8,75 5,91

37,04

28,75

6,64

4,20

25,81

24,67

7,245,90

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1998 2002 2006 2010

Bogota Antioquia Valle


10/17

10

Our data, which includes an additional election, confirms Shugart and Pachns(2010)

analysis based on the 2006 elections. In high magnitude districts there is a considerable

reduction of fragmentation (as measured by the effective number of parties and lists).

5.2.Low magnitude districtsPatterns of electoral fragmentation in low magnitude districts (M=2)

16also tend to

follow Shugart and Pachons (2010) expectations.

Graph 7: Effective number of parties selected districts with M=2


Although there is more variation in the levels of fragmentation across the districts, the average

tendency shows an increase in the effective number of (electoral) parties after reform. Unlike

high magnitude districts and in line with expectations, the average effective number of lists in

all twelve districts remains more or less constant after electoral reform (see graph 8). There is,

therefore, evidence that suggests that the level of fragmentation in small magnitude districts

remains more or less stable over time: Before elections competitors ran with common party

labels but different lists. After reform, competitors ran with different labels (to avoid pooling)

but vote fragmentation remained very similar.

Graph 8: Effective number of lists selected districts with M=2

16There are 12 districts whose magnitude equals 2: Amazonas, Arauca, Caquet, Casanare, Choc, Guaina,

Guaviare, La Guajira, Putumayo, San Andrs, Vaupes and Vichada.

2,24

2,544,11 3,89

0,00

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

6,00

7,00

1998 2002 2006 2010

Arauca Caqueta Casanare Choco

La Guajira Putumayo Average


11/17

11


6. Effects of electoral reform in City Councils (Concejos Municipales)As we mentioned before, it is quite surprising that research on the impact of reform has not

taken a closer look at its effect in subnational elections, either for provincial assemblies

(asambleas departamentales) or city councils (concejos municipales). Firstly, elections for

these legislative bodies are conducted using the same rules as those used in elections for the

House of Representatives. Secondly, there is considerably greater number of electoral

districts in which elections are being held and there have been more elections after reform.

In this sense, regional and local elections promise to be a great source of data to evaluate

the effects of reform across districts with different magnitudes and in different regions.

In this section, we will analyze elections in 21 Colombian cities whose district magnitude is

very similar (M=19 or 21)17

. Analogously to House elections in districts with high

magnitude, it should be expected that electoral reform would foster a reduction of the

effective number of parties, since candidates would need to pool votes in order to pass

electoral thresholds. Nevertheless, our analysis presents quite a different picture. The

average effective number of parties in the 21 cities actually increased. Although there is

variation between elections and districts (see appendix), only in 1 of the 21 city councils is

there a reduction in the effective number of parties after 2003. This finding, documented in

graph 9 and the appendix, indeed runs completely counter to theoretical expectations.

Graph 9: Average electoral and parliamentary effective number of parties of 21 cities

17For detailed data on each city, see appendix.

4,4 4,2 4,13,9

0,00

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

5,00

6,00

7,00

1998 2002 2006 2010

Arauca Caqueta Casanare Choco

La Guajira Putumayo Average


12/17

12


We also analyzed the effective number of lists (1997-2000 elections) and the effective

number of candidates (2003-2011 elections). Given that lists in the 1997-2000 elections

basically were candidate-based, the effective number of lists is a (slightly imperfect)

indicator of the effective number of candidates before reform. We can thus evaluate if there

is a reduction in the effective number of candidates who are now running under fewer party

lists. Graph 10 shows how the effective number of candidates increases on average in the

21 municipalities after electoral reform.

This increase in the effective number of candidates could imply that votes within party lists

are more fragmented after reform and, to some extent, that party lists are less dependent on

one or few candidates as vote getters18

. However, higher fragmentation could also indicate

that there is higher competition within party for votes and possibly greater personalization

of campaign by candidates19

.

Graph 10: Average effective number of lists (1997-2009 and effective number of

candidates (2003-2011)

18Less dependence from few vote getters could increase the autonomy of the party vis--vis candidates thus

contributing to a strengthening of the parties.19 In this regard, we would need to analyze the patterns of fragmentation within each party list for each

municipality to provide definitive evidence about the patterns of competition within party lists.

2,9

4,6

7,4 7,67,9

2,6

3,6

4,6

5,96,3

0,0

1,0

2,0

3,0

4,0

5,0

6,0

7,0

8,0

9,0

1997 2000 2003 2007 2011

Average Electoral Average Parliamentary


13/17

13


Moreover, it plausible that there are greater incentives to cultivate personal votes in local

elections since candidates compete for votes in smaller geographical districts and,

therefore, there is a smaller potential pool of voters20

. To further explore the personalization

of votes in local elections, we introduce in graph 11 an indicator of personalization: the

percentage of votes cast only for party labels. A low number of votes for the party could

imply that electors vote largely for a person, disregarding party label. Graph 11 shows how

the average percentage of party label votes has decreased since 2003.

Graph 11: Average percentage of votes only for party lists

20Although intra-party competition at the Senate level in open-list is considerable, candidates have a wider

potential pool of votes (a nationwide district) than open-list candidate for a city council election.

71,7

65,670,1

86,5

90,1

0,0

10,0

20,0

30,0

40,0

50,0

60,0

70,0

80,0

90,0

100,0

1997 2000 2003 2007 2011

16,4

9,78,6

0,02,0

4,0

6,0

8,0

10,0

12,0

14,0

16,0

18,0

2003 2007 2011

% votes only for party list from total party vote


14/17

14


The results of our analysis of local electoral results present a completely different picture

than the view of the level of party system fragmentation showed by nation-wide elections

(Senate) and House elections. After electoral reform, there is greater fragmentation and thedegree of personalization remained high. At least in the local level, electoral reform did not

have the intended impact.

7. Conclusion and future researchThe results presented in this paper are quite puzzling and provide new insights to the

discussion of electoral reform in Colombia: While the impact of electoral reform in House

elections follows theoretical expectations, city council elections do not. Even under

identical electoral institutions and almost the same district magnitude, city council elections

report counterintuitive results: fragmentation increased after changes in electoral rules that

intended the contrary. Furthermore, the personalization of electoral competition remains

very high at the local level. Why?

In order to provide answers to questions raised in this paper, our research project continues

to systematize data of more local elections and will also include electoral results for

provincial assemblies. Furthermore, to unravel the dynamics of electoral competition at the

local level (and find answers to the surprising rise in fragmentation) we plan to conduct

interviews we local politicians. Additionally, we believe that more research should be

conducted about the nature of electoral in House and Senate races. More conclusive

evidence is needed to determine if reform managed to reduce incentives to cultivate

personal votes in these elections.

If anything, our results indicate that research on the effects of electoral reform in Colombia

should more systematically include the regional and local levels. Particularly in times in

which new proposals for reform of electoral rules are being discussed, evidence from the

regional and local levels could be elucidating.21

21In the past year, some politicians have discussed a reintroduction of closed lists or a complete overhaul of

the electoral system with the introduction of a mixed system.


15/17

15

8. Appendix8.1.Electoral thresholds

Table 1: Electoral and effective thresholds (number of votes) in selected house districts

Electoral Threshold Effective Threshold

Magnitude District 2006 2010 2006 2010

18 Bogot 36255 37638 51898 57513

17 Antioquia 28584 31746 45240 51144

13 Valle 28954 34470 41945 53581

2 Amazonas 2073 2475 3558 4270

2 Arauca 5214,3 6192 5604 13900

2 Caqueta 7981 10550 13590 14389

2 Casanare 10820 11502 20331 16785

2 Choco 11194 12321 20444 25093

2 Guainia 1.041 1.232 1.445 2.2522 Guaviare 2104 2978 3204 4986

2 La Guajira 16243 17898 31675 51840

2 Putumayo 6567 9644 15776 19612

2 San Andrs 2453 2374 5220 5093

2 Vaupes 1071 1178 1184 2077

2 Vichada 1410 2040 1818 3454Source: Calculations by the authors using data from theRegistradura Nacional del Estado Civil

8.2.DataCity councilsEffective number of parties

Eff. number

of lists

Effective number

of candidates

% of votes only

for party label

City Year 1997 2000 2003 2007 2011 1997 2000 2003 2007 2011 2003 2007 2011

ArmeniaElectoral 3,0 3,7 5,2 7,6 9,6 67,5 76,8 62,8 90,9 107,2 22,0 10,7 4,3

Parliamentary 2,6 2,8 3,8 6,6 8,0

BarranquillaElectoral 3,5 10,2 8,3 4,9 6,3 49,3 54,4 68,8 58,8 76,0 20,0 9,1 11,1

Parliamentary 2,5 6,0 4,6 3,9 5,2

BelloElectoral 2,9 3,2 9,5 6,9 6,3 66,5 54,9 82,7 85,3 88,2 22,3 11,4 7,9

Parliamentary 2,7 2,8 5,9 5,2 5,4

Bucaramanga Electoral 2,2 3,4 8,7 8,6 6,5 77,4 65,6 77,9 112,9 75,2 10,9 5,6 6,8Parliamentary 1,8 4,2 5,6 5,4 4,9

BuenaventuraElectoral 1,9 3,8 6,3 7,7 8,2 77,8 56,3 57,9 75,6 84,2 15,8 6,6 8,6

Parliamentary 1,9 4,1 4,1 6,0 7,1

CaliElectoral 2,7 5,3 7,2 7,7 8,4 60,8 53,1 67,2 81,6 80,4 20,7 13,9 11,6

Parliamentary 2,2 3,3 4,0 5,7 5,7

CartagenaElectoral 2,5 3,5 7,7 8,2 8,8 62,3 48,2 53,2 58,0 77,3 9,3 8,9 10,5

Parliamentary 2,6 4,2 5,2 7,4 6,8


16/17

16

CcutaElectoral 3,7 3,1 4,9 5,1 6,4 64,6 59,5 47,7 52,1 62,9 11,2 9,4 10,5

Parliamentary 2,3 2,4 3,3 3,9 4,9

IbaguElectoral 2,5 4,7 9,7 8,3 9,6 96,6 104,8 107,0 117,3 135,5 17,3 11,6 9,5

Parliamentary 2,8 3,9 4,8 6,8 7,7

ManizalesElectoral 3,9 7,6 8,6 7,8 6,4 55,2 53,3 85,4 100,8 69,0 24,3 11,5 9,7

Parliamentary 2,6 4,1 4,6 6,3 4,9

MedellnElectoral 5,1 6,2 8,7 8,9 6,7 66,9 79,2 91,2 102,1 83,2 22,6 16,7 13,8

Parliamentary 4,8 4,0 5,1 7,2 5,3

MonteraElectoral 1,9 3,4 4,8 4,6 5,8 67,2 45,2 54,1 65,2 77,7 13,3 11,4 8,1

Parliamentary 1,6 2,2 3,2 3,6 4,7

NeivaElectoral 3,0 5,9 7,7 7,3 7,5 77,0 77,0 88,3 102,7 91,0 11,5 5,7 10,2

Parliamentary 2,1 6,6 4,8 6,3 6,3

PalmiraElectoral 1,6 2,3 2,9 7,5 5,4 41,5 49,1 37,8 60,8 65,6 15,2 8,7 4,9

Parliamentary 1,2 1,5 1,8 4,8 3,4

Pasto

Electoral 6,5 8,0 11,5 8,1 10,4 68,2 54,1 63,8 83,0 93,4 19,1 10,9 4,9

Parliamentary 6,1 4,9 8,0 6,6 8,8

PereiraElectoral 1,5 1,8 6,5 7,5 7,3 65,4 63,8 62,5 88,2 78,6 23,6 10,8 8,2

Parliamentary 1,2 1,4 3,6 5,9 5,9

Santa MartaElectoral 1,7 2,5 5,7 8,7 11,1 73,0 68,7 60,2 83,5 100,7 8,4 5,8 6,4

Parliamentary 1,5 1,9 4,1 7,4 7,8

SoachaElectoral 1,7 4,3 8,6 9,5 9,5 81,4 83,5 84,0 101,1 112,9 22,9 13,6 10,0

Parliamentary 1,4 4,1 4,5 7,4 8,4

SoledadElectoral 2,9 6,4 5,0 5,2 6,9 79,9 51,6 48,3 60,8 71,9 12,0 7,2 9,6

Parliamentary 3,5 4,7 3,5 4,2 5,1

ValleduparElectoral 2,5 3,2 8,0 7,5 9,1 108,0 99,6 76,5 102,0 123,0 10,5 4,7 8,2

Parliamentary 2,9 4,3 5,6 5,7 6,6

VillavicencioElectoral 3,0 3,8 9,2 11,0 9,8 99,6 80,0 96,0 133,5 138,6 12,0 9,0 6,7

Parliamentary 3,7 2,4 6,3 8,4 8,4

AverageElectoral 2,9 4,6 7,4 7,6 7,9 71,7 65,6 70,1 86,5 90,1 16,4 9,7 8,6

Parliamentary 2,6 3,6 4,6 5,9 6,3



17/17

17

9. References

Documents

Albarracin y Milanese