Albritton R on Moore s Paradox 1994 Copy

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ROGERS ALBRITrON

C O M M E N T S O N M O O R E ' S PAR A D O X A N D

S E L F - K N O W L E D G E

(Received 16 Augu st 1994)

I wi l l t ake it that we kn ow w el l enough h ow to co nst ruc t what Professor

Sho ema ker usefu l ly ca l ls 'Moore-paradoxica l sen tences ' : sen tences tha tlook as i f they were s t ra igh t forward ly ap t on ly for the b izarre (or impos-s ib le) perform ance o f jo in t ly asser t ing a th ingand deny ing in the f irs tperson that one bel ieves i t ; or assert ing both i tand in the first person,that one bel ieves o therwise; or the l ike.

Now, what i s 'Moo re 's parado x '? A ccord ing to Professor Rosentha l ,we ow e tha t t e rm to Wit tgenste in . What d idhe mean by i t?

I t h i n k h e may so me t i mes h av e mean t o n l y t h e p a rad o x t h a t wo u l dbe p resen ted by a so lem nly Moore-paradoxica l u t te rance i t se l f; bu t as aru le , I be l ieve , he mean t someth in g e lse : namely, the paradox tha t suchan u t te rance would benonsensical. He tho ught ( I th ink) tha t a Moore-paradoxica l u t te rance would no t mean anyth ing , t rue or fal se , and eve n

tha t a Moore-paradoxica lsentence does no t , as a whole , mean anyth ing .So me t h i n g v e ry like that , at least . Wh ich is a paradox, h e though t, sincei t would be p erfec t ly meaning fu l no t on ly to say o f someo ne e l se tha the or she d idn ' t th ink i t was ra in ing a l though i t was , bu t even to usethe very words of a M oore-paradoxica l sen tence , in the same order, tosay such a th ing as I f , hypothe t ica l ly, i t 's ra in ing and I don ' t be l ieveit 's raining, then a thing I don't bel ieve is nevertheless t rue, for once.Or Sup pos e i t 's raining and I do n't bel ieve i t 's raining. Will I be alaughingstock , in tha t case? Given a l l th i s surrounding sense , and g iven(as Wi t tgenste in would agree) tha t a M oore-paradoxica l sen tence i s no tself-contradictory, ho w can i t be an Uns atz, in the first person, thati t 's ra in ing and I don ' t be l ieve i t 's ra in ing , o r the like? Does be l ieve

not mean the same in I don ' t be l ieve i t 's ra in ing . as in He doesn ' tbe l ieve i t' s ra in ing . , o r what?

Philosophical Studies 77: 229-239, 1995.© 1995RogersAlbritton. Printed in The Netherlands.



230 ROGERS LBRITTON

I t ake the word Unsatz f rom the d iscuss ion of 'Moore 's paradox ' insec t ion x o f par t II o f theInvestigations. In a sort of coda to that discus-s ion , Wi t tgenste in inv i tes us to consider what he ca l l s den Unsatz : 'Esd i i rf te regnen; aber es regnet n ich t ' , which Ansco mb e t ransla tes themisbego t ten sen tence 'I t ma y be ra in ing , bu t i t i sn ' t ' . Andthat sen tenceis indeed so m isbeg otten that , as far as I can see, there is nothing intel l i -g ib le to be sa id by i t. That i t ma y be ra in ing bu t i sn ' t ra in ing i s no Satzin the other sense of Sa tz : no s ta tement , no proposit ion . Wh ich mightseem paradoxica l , s ince there 's no th ing surface-grammat ica l ly doo me dabout the corresponding sen tence. Som e reso lu t ion of th i s apparen t para-

dox m ight seem ca l led for, and no doub t could be suppl ied . But no t , Ith ink , by argu ing that no on e canbelieve tha t i t may be ra in ing bu t i sn ' t .The na tura l rep ly to som eone who says , f i rmly, I be l ieve tha t it may bera in ing bu t i sn ' t . i s no t No you don ' t . You can ' t . I t 's You be l ievewhat? Run tha t by me again . o r someth ing of the sort . What does i tm e a n to be l ieve tha t i t ma y be ra in ing bu t i sn ' t ? Noth ing , tha t 's what .Or so i t seems to me. And the au tob iographical Unsatz I be l ieve i t ma ybe ra in ing bu t i sn ' t . i s no t improved by any such tes ty supplements as

Wh at I mean i s : Inm y j u d g men t , i tm a y wel l be ra in ing bu t i snot ra ining. Don ' t you unders tand Engl i sh? I do , I do , and tha t ' s m y problem.To be sure , the fe l low hasn ' t con t rad ic ted h imsel f . But a l l the same, i ts t r ikes me as an Unsatz tha t i t may be ra in ing bu t i sn ' t. In such a case ,

i t i sn ' t tha t what one can be l ieve const ra ins what one can assert , asProfessor Shoemak er says about the l ikes of I t ' s ra in ing and I don ' tbel ieve i t 's raining. On the contrary, wha t one can assert constrainswhat on e can be l ieve . There 's no be l iev ing an Unsatz . An d I t ake i t tha tin Wittgens tein 's view, i t is acomparab le Unsatz, in the first person, thati t 's ra in ing and one doesn ' t be l ieve i t is . I am inc l ined to th ink so m ysel f ,I confess , as I con templa te the misbegot ten sen tence I t ' s ra in ing and Ido n't bel iev e i t is . and the rest of i ts i lk . For Wittgen stein, at any rate,the problem these sen tences presen t i s to see how i t can make n osenseto say such a thing as It 's raining and I don 't bel ieve it is . unless, forex amp l e , I b e l iev e . . . d o esn ' tsay the same about onese l f as Sheb e l i ev es . . . wo u l d say ab o u t so meo n e el se (o r ab o u t so meo n e wh o m

o n e took to be so meo ne e l se) .



COMMENTS ON MOORE 'S PARADOX AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE 231

It seems absurd to suspect tha t the verb be l ieve i s thus ambiguous.Or to suspect , al ternat ively, that by the 'T ' o f declarat ive I bel ieve ,and the l ike, one do esn ' trefer to on ese l f (wi th the resu l t tha t one i sn ' tsay ing anyth ingabout oneself). But i f there wereno seman t ic a sy mm et rybetween I t ' s ra in ing , bu t she does n ' t be lieve i t i s . and I t ' s ra in ing ,bu t I don ' t be l ieve i t is . , how could the la t te r l ack sense? Not tha t anysuch semant ic asym metry, whatever i t was , would suffice to expla inthe absurd i ty of I t ' s ra in ing and I don ' t be l ieve i t i s . ( I t migh t evenseem to erase tha t absurd i ty by depriv ing I don ' t be l ieve i t i s . o fproposi t ional conten t even on i ts own.) But wi thout accep t ing any suchasymm etry, how are we to accep t , peacefu lly, tha t a Mo ore-paradoxica lsentence is useless in the sense tha t a Moore-paradoxer wouldn ' t besay ing anyth ing? That he w ould n ' t i s paradoxica l , i f t rue, and s eems inthe Investigations and e l sewhere to be what W i t tgenstein main ly mean tb y M o o re ' s p a rad o x.

Now, I don ' t know who e lse of consequence has taken qu i te sograve a v iew o f Moore-paradoxica l sen tences. Moore h imse l f d idn ' t , fo rexample , in a passage of h i s Rep ly to h is c r i ti cs to which ProfessorRosenthal refers us. Moore 's view, there, is explici t ly that one couldperfect ly well assert, by ut tering a senten ce of the form in quest io n, animpeccable conjunct ion . The od di ty of th is asser t ion would l ie on ly insay ing that one d idn ' t be l ieve a th ing and in the same brea th imp ly ing

tha t one d id believe i t , by the act of saying the thing i tself, whatever i twas . Moo re doesn ' t go on about th i s spec ies o f imply ing , o r about theprobable fo l ly of assert ing one of these odd conjunct ions . What ' s c learis only that he thinks they are true or false, andcan be asserted, andis therefore far from thinking that they are senseless Unsli tze. As areShoemaker and Rosentha l , a l though they don ' t o therwise much agreewith each other.

Accord ing to Shoemaker, i t i s impossib le in p r inc ip le tobelievethe th ing tha t would be asser ted by an asser t ive Moore-paradoxica lut terance. And this is what explains tha t such an u t te rance wou ldinvolve some sort o f p ragmat ic cont rad ic tion , he says . But would th i s

pragmat ic cont rad ic t ion ge t in the way ofasser t ing an y t h i n g b y su ch

an u t te rance? Wel l, I don ' t see why i t would , on Shoe make r ' s account . Tobe sure, he says, early on in his paper, that one can notasser t a Moore-



232 ROGERS ALBRIT DN

paradoxica l sen tence , because what one can be l ieve const ra ins whatone can asser t . But I wond er i f he qu i te be l ieves tha t . He g ives no reasonwhy one can ' t asser t what one can ' t be l ieve , even i f i t were obv ious tha tone co uldn ' t and d idn ' t be l ieve i t . There ' s ly ing , a f te r a ll . There ' s evenobvious ly ing . And unl ike Rosentha l , who takes ly ing to be mere shamassert ion , as in d ramat ic performances and rec i ta t ions , Shoem aker takesi t that no t al l assert ion is sincere. He says so explici t ly (p. 211). Sowh y co u l d n ' t o n e g o i n fo runtruthful asser tion of Moore-paradoxica lsen tences , in hopes of ge t t ing in terv iewed on te lev is ion? Is i t, perhaps ,that what is conceptually (a priori provably) impossib le to be l ieve can ' t

be asser ted , even d ishonest ly or in u t te r confusion? If so , S hoem akerdoesn ' t say so . Nor do I see wh y even tha t should be so . Whynot s ly lyasser t such a th ing , hoping tha t no one e l se wi l l no t ice how rad ica llyunbel ievable by onese l f i t i s , o r fa i lingoneself to no t ice tha t one no ton ly doe sn ' t be l ieve i t , bu t could n ' t conceivably be l ieve i t? In a Moore-paradoxica l case , indeed , the th ing a paradoxer seems to say may bequi te easy for others to be l ieve . What as ton ishes them, i f any th ing ,might be on ly tha t the paradoxer h imsel f has tumbled to i t , somehow.Th e o n l y p ro o f t h a t h ecan t have tum bled to i t migh t be as sub t le asShoe make r ' s paper, and wel l beyo nd them.

But m aybe i t would jus t in tu i tive lystrike them tha t even th is wide-eyed paradoxer, gu i le less as he looks and sounds, can ' t poss ib ly be l ieve

what he seems to be say ing , as an in tac t con junct ion . Let ' s suppose so .Must w e therefore deny tha t he has asser ted it , on the groun d tha t hecan hard ly have in tended i t to bebelieved tha t he be l ieved the th ingin quest ion, an intention essential to assert ing i t? Isthat a rg u men t an ygood? No. Jay A t las te ll s me tha t Grice h imsel f d idn ' t ho ld tha t in tendinganyon e to be l ieve you be l ieve a th ing i s essen t ia l toasserting the thing.And i t isn ' t , surely. One can assert things in diaries one plans to burn.Or does tha t verge on pre tende d asser tion? If so , what about th is : whyshouldn ' t I, fo r once in a way, te ll someo ne an awful t ru th in the unusualhope tha t he wi l l th ink I 'm ly ing? Orlie, as ordered , in tha t same hope ,perhaps over the te lephone , a t gun-poin t in case m y fu lsom e praise oft h e NRA sh o u l d so u n d u n co n v i n c in g ?

What I 'm ge t t ing a t is tha t the paradox to which S hoem aker ac tua llyaddresses h imsel f seems considerab lyweaker than the one W it tgenstein



COMMENTS ON MOORE' S PARADOX AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE 233

cal l s 'Moore 's paradox ' . I t seems, fo r be t te r o r worse , to be on ly theparadox (or apparent paradox), i f i t 's t rue, that one can 't in principlesincerely asser t by a Moore-paradoxica l sen tence , wi th a c lear head ,what the sen tence seems so admirab ly const ruc ted to express . At anyra te , I don ' t see in Shoemaker ' s in t r ica te psychologica l a rgument forthat thes is , any grou nd for the m ore genera l thes is tha t there can be noMoore-paradoxica l asser tion , how ever brazen or confused or o therwisedeplorab le. Does Shoem aker actua l ly ho ld tha t what one can be l ieveconst ra ins what one can asser t in any bu t a p rac t ica l sense? If you ca n ' tbe l ieve a th ing , and no one i s l ike ly to th ink you do even i f you saythe th ing very f i rmly, then yo u can ' t assert i t wi th m uch ra t ional hopeof accompl ish ing any s tandard purpose of asser t ion . That seems t rueenou gh. But i t's a far cry from You can 't assert i t .

What o f Shoemaker ' s a rgument to show tha t a t any ra te nocandidasser tion of a Moore-paradoxica l con ju nct ion i s poss ib le , because n osuch conjunct ive be l ie f i s poss ib le , o r because no such be l ie f cou ld besufficiently av ailable to getasserted an y way ? Th a t a rg u men t mi g h ta lmost convince me (cont rary to my susp ic ion that Moore-paradoxica lconjunct ions are Unsatze) i f I cou ld qu i te see why, accord ing to Shoe-maker, i t i s conceptua l ly impossib le tha t anyone a t a l l , whatever i swrong wi th h is b ra in~ should s imply th ink (and say) tha t he doesn ' tth ink a th ing wh en the fac t i s tha t he no t on ly does th ink tha t very th ing

but th inks i t ava i lab ly : ava i lab ly enoug h tosay i t sincerely, at anyra te , i f perhaps n o t ava i lab ly enough to com e in ou t o f the ra in .

Accord in g to Shoemaker, i f a be l ie f i s ava i lab le (as i t i s i f oneassents to i ts conten t , as one does if one sincerely asserts i t ), the

bel iever whos e be l ie f i s thus ava i lab le has a second-order be l ie f tha th e has that bel ief, and this second-order bel ief isalso available. Thispr inc ip le wou ld exclude avai lab ly th ink ing a th ing andnot avail-ably thinking that one does think i t . And that , with a l i t t le help aboutwhich I am confused , would exclude any qu i te candid asser t ion of aMoore-paradoxica l sen tence . But the requi red pr inc ip le impl ies tha t i fI availably bel ieve a thing, I not only availably bel ieve that I do, butavai lab ly be l ievethat too , and so on up , wi th no end of these h igher-and-

h igher-order be l ie fs about m yse l f in s igh t. A nd in sp i te o f Shoem aker ' s



234 ROGERSALBRITION

argum ent tha t I must , I don ' t f ind tha t I have any such amazing s tack ofavailable bel iefs. Nor do I wish I did.

To be sure , as Shoemaker remarks la te r, they needn ' t beexplicitbel ie fs . They might b e o n ly tac it , a t every leve l . But I t ake i t tha t theyhad better be available on demand, one after another, unti l I t i re ofexpress ing them or d ie . An d I don ' t f ind tha t they are. Indeed , I wond erif i t means anyth ing to "supp ose" tha t I must be l ieve tha t I be l ieve tha tI bel ieve that I bel iev e that I bel ieve i t 's Frida y (or any thing else).

Again , Shoemaker remarks eventua l ly tha t " in some cases i t maybe w rong to th ink of . . . [a] se cond-order be l ie f [ that one be l ieves athing] as a dist inct state that is caused b y the available first-order bel i ef"(p. 225). I take him to mean that i t may be, instead, thes ame state asthe first-order bel ief, and be, i tself,both a bel ief that i t 's raining, forins tance, and a be l ie f tha t one so b e l ieves .

This th r i f ty hypothesis has i t s a tt rac tions . Genera l ized to h ighe r andhigher-order be l ie fs , i t m ight serve to co l lapse the in f in i te s tack tha tso distresses me into just acouple of doxast ic pancakes , o r even jus tone with as ma ny a l te rna t ive h igher-order conten ts as ra t ional psy-chology m ay requi re . But s t il l, wh y a l l thesecontents? I want to sendthis confect io n back to the ki tchen , frankly. I don't l ike the looks o f i t.

Why not ge t r id o f i t , indeed , by re jec t ing the idea tha t a candidremark tha t one be l ieves i t ' s ra in ing , say, must p roceed from a second-

order be l ie f tha t one so be l ieves? Why must i t? Even i f it were a sear ingconfess ion , ra ther than an id le remark , wh y should i t be thou ght unman -ageable in the absence of anybeli ef that one bel ieves i t 's raining? To besure, the semant ic conten t o f the confess ion would no t be m ere ly tha ti t 's raining, but that one s o bel ieves. Bu t whe re is it wri t ten that i t takestwo be l ie fs , o r even one w i th two conten ts , to confess tha t one b e l ievesi t 's ra in ing? Wh y ca n ' t I jus t bare my soul , in such a mat te r?

If i t came to me noninferen t ia l ly tha t I had an ingrown toenai l, Imight tu rn ou t to be qu i te righ t: "I do n ' t kn ow w hy I th ink so", I say tothe podia t r is t as he s t ruggles to remove m y shoes , which haven ' t com eoff fo r years , "bu t I hav e an ingrown toenai l . I jus t kn ow i t ." An d loI 'm r igh t. Is tha t how i t is wi th say ing w e be l ieve th ings , except tha t

we ' r e so used to these myster ious se izures o f second-order know ledgetha t we aren ' t surpr i sed by them ? Rosentha l, un l ike S hoemaker, t akes i t



COMMENTS ON MOORE'S PARADOX AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE 235

that we aren ' t surpr ised by them becau se the second-order thoughts thatenable us to regale our intimates with the news that we think this andthat (at ground level) are normallyunconscious thoughts that we thinkthis and th ink that . Which would explain wh yw e don ' t not ice any suchtorrent of second-order thoughts , ever. I prefer the hypothesis that wehaven ' t got them, and don ' t ne ed them in order to te l l people what w ethink in the usual way. And if that seeme d to entail that we aren' t usuallyconscious of th inking what we th ink, avai lable as i t may tedious ly bethat we do think it , or were just thinking it , I don' t think I would mind.All that consciousness might get on m y nerves .

I mus t say, however, that I very much admire Shoem aker ' s determi-nation to show that i t is no merefamiliar fac t about us that we have solitt le occasion to wonder what on earth we think, and are so unlikelyto be mistaken too, as to whether or not we think it 's raining, or thelike (to say nothing of whether or not we are closet Scientologists) . Ishare that intuition, and do n' t intend to give it up. I also doub t that i t canbe squared with Shoemaker ' s assumption (which does not seem to metrivial) that believing a thing must be some sort ofstate one is in. Butthe startling ingenuity of Sho ema ker 's effort to effect that reconciliationshould g ive unregenerate , vaguely W it tgens te in ian types l ike me pause,a t a minimum.

Well , that brings me to Professor Rosenthal ' s very in terest ing, m ore

defiant paper:

Rosenthal ' s d iscuss ion of Moore-paradoxical sentences seems at fi rs tto s tress, as Shoemaker 's does not, that they arelinguistically deviantsentences. No t senseless, to be sure, s ince he says that they can readilybe true and have unpro blematic truth cond itions (p. 195), but l inguis-tically anomalous nevertheless, in that there's some trouble about theirconditio ns of assertibili ty (p. 195): that is , about the perfor manc e

cond itions (p. 196) of successfully using such a sentence to assert itsunproblematic content. (As I 've admit ted , I don ' t mys elf see that i tscontent - what it means, or what proposition it expresses -is unprob-lematic. Is i t so clear what the truth conditions are, if any, of an English

sentence that is school-grammatically a conjunction of independentlyunexcept ionable c lauses? And should we cheerful ly credi t Engl ishsen-



236 ROGERS LBRITION

tences with truth, and truth condit ion s? I bet not . But never mind.) Wh atis the t rouble accord ing to Rosentha l about the performance condi -t ions on Moore-paradoxica l asser t ion? Whatare they anyway? Godknows what they would be i flying assert ion were possible, but (again)Rosenthal doesn 't count l ies as assert ions; so the quest ion is only whatthe performance condi t ions oncandid Moore-paradoxical assert ionare, and how they rule out any such assert ion, i f they do. What arethey? I rea l ly don ' t know: bu t one can guess tha t they preeminent lyinclude bel ieving - and not just in any old way o f bel ievin g i t, butfirst personally, Moore-paradox ical ly - the content of one's projectedMoore-paradoxical assert ion. So what 's the problem aboutthat, if any,g iven the perfec t in temal consis tency and poss ib le t ru th of what wou ldbe thus bel iev ed? It arises, I take i t , from the invariable fact, al leged byRosentha l , that no one can asser t a th ing he be l ieves wi thout be l iev ingthat he bel ieves i t. A sincere, bel ieving, Moo re-paradoxical asserter thati t was ra in ing bu t he d id n ' t be l ieve i t , fo r example , would sure ly be l ievethat i t was raining, ful l stop. How not? But i f so, he would inexorablybelieve that he bel ieved i t was raining, contrary to his sincere disclaimerof any s uch bel ief. Isn ' t that an im possi ble state of affairs?

There 's som e difficulty in seeing that i t is, actual ly, whi ch is exacer-bated by the fact that on Rosenth al 's theory, this hypo thetical bel iever'sbe l ie f tha t he be l ieves i t ' s ra in ing needn ' t i t se lf be consc ious . He needn ' t

have the sl ightest idea that he 'sgot i t (a point on which Rosenthal dis-agrees with Shoemaker). The bel iever ne edn 't be troubled, therefore, bythe clash between his quite possibly u ncon sciou s bel ief that he bel ievesi t 's raining and his bel ief that hedoesn t believe i t 's raining, consciousas the lat ter bel ief wil l be if he go es in for the conju nctive assert ion thati t 's raining and he doesn 't bel ieve i t . He wil l be stuck with a couple ofincompat ib le be lie fs about h imsel f , i f Rosentha l i s r igh t. But he nee dn ' tface that fact, since on e of these bel iefs (namely, his bel ief that hedoesbel ieve i t 's ra in ing) may wel l be abso lu te ly unconsc iou s . So what s tandsin the way of his Moore-paradoxical assert ion?

Wel l , someth ing does , one might th ink , and perhaps th i s i s whatRosenth al is get t ing at : not the incoheren ce of the fel low'sbelieJi, but the

f ac t that he bel ieves i t 's raining, contrary to the assertion on w hich he isreck less ly engaged . Accord ing to Rosentha l ' s theory of consc iousness ,



COMMENTS ON MOORE' S PARADOX AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE 237

our Mo ore-paradoxe r need no t be consc ious of be l iev ing tha t he be l ievesi t 's raining; but he wil l , invariably, in virtue o f that sec ond -ord er bel ief,be consc ious tha t hedoes believe i ts raining. That he does wil l seemto stare him in the face, so to speak, w heth er he l ike:~ i t or not . But hispro jec ted Moore-paradoxica l asser tion wou lddeny this fact . And that swhy i t would be ins incere and therefore (accord ing to Rosentha l ) no t anassert ion . I t ' s a performance condi t ion on s incere assert ion , one mightsay, not only that one assert nothing contrary to one's sincere bel iefs(except insofar as they are curren t ly unconsc ious) bu t a l so tha t oneassert no th ing cont rary to any fac t o f wh ich one i s perfec tly consc ious .An d i t ' s the second o f these condi t ions , no t the f irst , tha t a would-beMo ore-p arad oxe r is in no posi t ion to sat isfy, i f Rose nthal is right . So i tseems to me.

Is he r igh t? And i f so , do we have an account on which Moore-paradox ical sentenc es are l inguist ical ly anomalou s: devian t , at least , i fno t nonsensica l? (Devian t , I mean , in a s t ronger sense than tha t they areunl ike ly to be of much use , l ike the sen tence You consis t la rge ly ofglue. ) I 'm afraid not . In the first place, I don't see at al l that assert ions,properly so cal led, can 't be barefaced l ies. And second, what is thestatus of the crucial prem ise that verbally expres sed intentional statesare invariab ly con sciou s (p. 200 etc.)? Rose nthal l ikes to put this pointin what sound l ike te rms of speech ac t theory, by a l leg ing a perfor-

man ce condi t ional equiva lence be tween say ing tha t p and say ing oneth inks or be l ieves tha t p . But i s th is so-ca l led equiva len ce a mat te r o fl inguist ic rule o r convention? No, I don ' t th ink so . It is second na tureto us , in Rosentha l ' s v iew, to assume (he even says we kno w th isau tom at ica l ly (p. 201)) tha t no on e can be in a posi t ion to express , by

saying that p, his tho ugh t or bel ief, or whatever, that p,and be so uncon-scious of his state as to deny that he thoug ht that p when h e said i t (oreven w ond er i f he d id , I suppose) . N ot in a l l s incer ity. (He m ight havean incred ib ly bad m em ory for h i s in ten t ional s ta tes, bu t tha t 's bes ide thepoint .) Now nothing of this sort is a l inguist ic convention or rule, onRose nthal 's account . At best , i t 's a matte r of entrench ed l inguist ic habit .Th a t y o u can ' t express a bel ief you d on 't have is trivial, in Rosenthal 's

usage of expre ss. But i t isn ' t t rivial that assert ions express corre-spon ding bel iefs (p. 203). He thinks (mistaken ly, I bel ieve) that i fthis



238 ROGERS ALBRITTON

were t r iv ial , then Moore-paradoxica l asser t ion or p re tended asser tionwo uld be self-contradictory. Wh ich i t isn ' t . So i t mu st be (what else?)only a b i t o f en t renched fo lk-psychologica llore that assert ions (that isto say, I take it, sincere assert ions) express corresponding bel iefs. Andthere goes m y hope tha t Moore-paradox ing wi ll tu rn ou t to be a k ind o flinguistic malprac t ice , on Rosentha l ' s account . To be sure hesays it is,in effect , but I don 't see ho w i t can be.

Suppose , however, a Moore-parado xer who i s suff ic ien tlY one of usto believe that i t 's raining if he earnest ly says i t is . Why can 't he alsobel ieve tha t he doesn t believe i t 's raining and say that , too? Well thath igher-order thought wo uld beirrational, Rosen thal rem arks. 1 But i f i t 'sunconscious, as i t may well be, why should i ts i rrat ionali ty disturb i tsth inker? What we need , to ru le ou t h i s say ing s incere ly tha t he does n ' tbel ieve i t 's raining, with his wits about him, is for his bel ief that i tisraining to be conscious, as Rosenthal holds that i t wil l be. Andw hywill i t be? Well again, as far as I can tel l , i t 's only folk psychologythat i t wil l . As Rosenthal says at one point , "For creaturesrelevantlylike us, all verbally expressed intentional states are conscious." It is' second na ture ' fo r us to suppose so , anyway. And why should wesuppose tha t a Mo ore-paradoxer, i f we ever run in to one ,is "re levant lyl ike us"? Well perhaps that too wil l be 'second nature ' , in spi te of hisMoore-paradoxica l assurances . Unless he looks rea l lyweird.

Yo u may b e wo n d e r i n gi f I m conscio us that I mu st stop talking. Yes,yes . Any m inute now. But look ,is i t only hard to credit , as Rosenthalseems to me to th ink , tha t a th ink ing crea ture, say a male hu man be ingrelevantly unlike us, should hon est ly insist that al though i t 's raining, hedoesn ' t be l ieve any such th ing? He w ishes he d id . He th inks he mus t begoing m ad. But there i t is . Look at him, he says. He's drench ed. It iso fcourse ra in ing . An d ye t he doesn t think so. He jus t doesn ' t . No t fo r aminute. Isn ' t that strange? Perhaps he should drop in on Oliver Sacks

Well , perhaps he should. Bu t what he has to offer, i f he talks l ike thatand obviously isn ' t kidding, is al inguistic disorder, to begin w ith. Isn ' ti t ? Is i t rea l ly a quest ion wh ether o r no t he be l ieves what h e 's say ing?Or i s he on ref lec tion , no t say ing anyth ing , except a round the edges ,

interest ing as that phenomenon should prove to neuro log ica l connois-seurs? I am incl ined to think, as I 've confessed, that he is not making



Documents

Albritton R on Moore s Paradox 1994 Copy