J. Social BioL Struct. 1980 3, 87 -94

'Altruism and the internal reward system o r

The opium of the people' James F. Danielli

Department of Life Sciences, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, t¢orcester, MA 01609, USA

The Center for Theoretical Biology, School o f Advanced Technology, State University o f New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NIT 13901, USA

and The Institute for Higher Studies, Post Office Box 704, Carpinteria, CA 93013,

USA

A set of hypotheses is advanced to explain altruistic behavior in human societies. It is postulated (1) that all human beings have an internal reward system, which is activated by prior social conditioning, especially by conditioning in youth ; and (2) that, where there has been prior conditioning or evolutionary preparation, the performance of altruistic acts activates the internal reward system, so that the performer is in fact rewarded. It is suggested that the mechanisms of the internal reward system include the release of mood-controlling substances in the brain, and perhaps elsewhere in the body, such as the opioid peptides.

Introduction

Apparent altruism can be seen in the behavior o f a wide variety o f animal species. Over a period of some years, sociobiologists have proposed that this appearance of altruism arises primarily from the attitudes of the observer. Thus, in a case where an adult organism risks its life to protect its young, the act can be said to be altruistic only if the primary concern o f an individual is thought to be personal survival. But if the primary concern of the individual is preservation and propagation of its genes, then the act is not altruistic (in the colloquial sense), for by the protection o f its young the individual is pursuing its primary (selfish) interest. Since, if other things are equal, species in which the young are protected are more likely to survive than those where there is no protective behavior, in the time scale o f evolution such apparently altruistic behavior results in survival, not of the individual, but o f the individual's genes, which survive in its descendants (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1964; Wilson, 1975;Dawkins, 1976).

At tempts have also been made to account for altruism in t tomo sapiens in the same manner. These at tempts are unconvincing. The problem arises from the fact tha.t, in describing the behaviors o f most species, the term altruism can be limited to a set o f behaviors which are primarily or largely o f genetic origin, whereas with humans the term has a much more diffuse usage, extending even

0140-1750/020087+08 $02.00/0 01980 Academic Press Inc. (London) Limited

88 ,l. F. Daniefli

to behaviors which are counterproductive from the point of view of protection of the life or the genes of the altruistic individual. Let us list some forms of human behavior which are commonly considered altruistic.

(1) Risking, or giving, one's own life to attempt to secure the lives of others, or of a social group, or of a clan or state.

(2) Donation of resources (e.g. land, money) to institutions such as churches, art galleries, museums, or cats' homes.

(3) Enrollment of children in celibate monastic orders. (4) Gifts to the poor, the sick, widows and the elderly. (5) Payment of taxes for use as charity, foreign aid, and social welfare

systems. (6) Caring for and bringing up children, who may be genetically related or

unrelated adopted children. (7) Donation of assets, or of one's life, to promote an ideology or religion.

Very few of these items directly affect preservation and propagation of the altruist's life or genes, and some are ~early counter-productive. For example, in some cultures to adhere steadfastly to a doctrine or ideology held to be heretical not only leads to a diminished probability of personal survival, but may even lead to a massacre of one's family and all closely related persons. Anthropological data indicate that the range of altruistic actions actually perfomed in a culture depends upon the mores of that culture, and varies widely between cultures. Preservation of one's in-group (or group selfishness) seems frequently to have replaced genetic selfishness. From the genetic point of view, to die for an ideology or religion or nation-state is incredibly foolish, whereas from the point of view of the in-group it may be wise. It thus appears that in an individual there must frequently be a direct conflict between the requirements of the genetic program and the group or social program. How then does the social program become established in an individual and for what reasons does it become effective?

The internal reward system

Three hypotheses are now relevant: The first is familiar to all of us, and the second and third are new.

Ilypothesis I. Children, at a relatively early age, learn from their social environ- ment which behaviors are acceptable or encouraged.

llypothesis 2. All individuals contain an internal reward system, which in children is activated and conditioned by the social environment, but which in later life may be activated when the individual acts in accordance with the early conditioning. Thus, altruistic acts of the individual when performed result in an internal reward, provided early conditioning (indoctrination, programming) has established the mechanisms for activating the reward system.

IIypothesis 3. The activation of the internal reward system releases substances in appropriate centers of the brain which produce some degree of euphoria. As a model of such substances we may take the opioid peptides which have recently been discovered in {he brain. These have many actions in the brain including the induction of euphoria and the reduction of pain (analgesia).

Altruism: the opium of the people 89

In commentary on these notes, it must first be said that Hypothesis 1, though very widely accepted, perhaps in all societies, has not been the subject of rigorous studies which firmly establish its truth. In particular it has not been established how much of the individual's social program arises from genetic sources, and how much from environmental sources. It must, therefore, be considered as hypothesis, not fact, and it is reasonable to think that this hypothesis will eventually be seen to have genetic constraints. For example, it may well be that genetics provides the possibility of a finite number o f modes o f behavior, and that the social environment does no more than activate a set of behaviors drawn from that finite number. We must ask such questions as: can a human being behave in a mode for which there is no genetic foundation or preparation in the evolution of the species?

Hypothesis 2 postulates an internal reward system. I was initially driven to this hypothesis by my curiosity (and dismay) about my own attempts to be altruistic. From time to time a situation has arisen in which I have a choice between helping or not helping an individual. There often appears to be no possible advantage to me in giving the help, and there may be perceptible disadvantages. I have thought to myself, why not for once do something for which the only motive l can perceive is that it is a 'good action' for another individual's benefit, not for mine. And then, the decision taken, I find there is, as a minimum, not just the 'purely' intellectual satisfaction of the decision but also a warm glow of satisfaction, a very physical feeling. Generalizing on this, and on the similar experiences of others, it becomes evident that there is an internal reward system, and that many of our apparently altruistic acts are not neutral, but are rewarded by this system. Once this hypothesis is stated one sees immediately that, in a human society, composed of individuals with capacities for learning, memorization, judgement and choice, the viability o f the social system will be increased by the existence of a conditionable internal reward system, and indeed may be critically dependent upon it. Alienation, which now threatens to destroy our civilization, probably in part arises from failure in our society to establish, early in life, activating processes for this reward system which will be valid in adolescence and maturity (Danielli & Danielli, 1974).

Hypothesis 2 becomes much more plausible, and its nature much more approachable, in the light of Hypothesis 3, which arises from work on the brain which began to gather momentum about ten years ago, but only became clearly relevant to the purposes of this paper in 1974, when Terenius & Wahlstrom showed that the brain contained receptors. Subsequently Hughes, two substances Of this nature, simple, consisting of a chain subsequently pointed out that

at least one substance which activated opiate Smith, Kosterlitz et al. (1975) showed that which they called enkephalins, were quite of five aminoacids. Hughes & Kosterlitz the aminoacid sequence of one of these

enkephalins occurs in a hormone, lipotropin, derived from the pituitary gland. Guillemin and his colleagues found additional substances consisting o f aminoacid chains, which they call endorphins, which contain the enkephalin sequence and have opioid action. These discoveries open up fascinating fields of study of the function of such compounds in normal and aberrant activities of the brain (see e.g. Snyder, 1975, 1979; Schally, 1978; Guillemin, 1978). This work is at too early a stage to warrant further comment here. The

90 J.F. Danielli

discoveries outlined above are important in providing a basic model for the generation of euphoria (and the relief o f pain), and so establish the outline of an internal reward system (IRS).

It may well be that many other substances will ultimately be discovered, possibly a considerable variety of families o f substances, which contribute to the functioning of the IRS. But for present purposes it is sufficient to note that the brain naturally contains these substances which act as opiates.

The existence in the brain of 'pleasure centers' was discovered by Olds & Milner (1954), by using electrical stimulation of very specific locations in the brain. Subsequent research showed that when rats are placed in an apparatus which gives them a choice between either delivering an electrical impulse direct to a pleasure center, or obtaining food, the rats will ignore food procurement, and continue to stimulate the pleasure center until exhaustion intervenes (Olds, 1977). Thus, the presence of pleasure centers is not of trivial significance. One of the actions of the internal opiates is likely to be, directly or indirectly, the activation of pleasure centers. Thus, we now have some understanding of two physiological components of an IRS; namely, internal opiates and the pleasure centers, thereby seeing the rudiments of a physiological basis for some aspects of motivation and attention. A major component of which we have at present no knowledge is the mechanism of social conditioning of the IRS, so that rewards are provided which relate to the necessary or desirable roles of an individual in a specific society.

The evolution of an internal reward system

We need to consider two questions: What was the origin of the IRS? And how did the functional IRS become dependent on a social conditioning process?

Let us now list some of the euphoria-producing activities which are not produced by exogenous drugs:

(1) mountain climbing; (2) long-distance running; (3) heavy physical work; (4) appeasement of hunger; (5) sexual activity, (6) grooming of one individual by another; (7) play in small groups, e.g., of a litter of offpsring; (8) dancing for prolonged periods; (9) religious rituals;

(10) exposure to some forms of oratory and poetry; (11) sensitivity group activities; (12) spectator participation in such mob activities as football matches,

athletic meetings and horse race meetings; (13) successful public performance, e.g. by politicians, actors, singers; (14) altruistic actions, as illustrated by examples given in the second page of

this article; (15) experience of pain, as in religious flagellation and perhaps other

sadomasochistic experiences.

This list is by no means exhaustive, but is sufficient for us to see that euphoria-producing activities can be divided into at least three categories. The

Altruism: the opium of the people 91

first category includes items (1) to (4), which have the common feature that the euphoria can be experienced as a result of the activity of the indivdual; it does not require a social component. This category I believe is the most primitive, in that one can see that, if the survival of an animal depends upon such activities, the production of euphoria as a consequence of the activity is likely to raise the motivation level and aid survival. Similarly, prokinged and arduous activity tends to result in pain which is inhibitory to continuation of the activity, so that the release of endogenous opiates, by reducing pain, will favor continuing an activity to its success point. The presence of the IRS, the operation of which is a consequence of the performance of vital activities, increases the chances of survival.

The second category contains (6) and (7). These are activities which involve a small group of animals. They are activities which can be considered to favor the formation of small social groups. Consider grooming of one individual by another: this binds together individuals in small groups: continuity is assured because young animals learn to groom from the adults of the group, particularly through the mother. If such an activity activates the IRS, such learned behavior is reinforced. We know, from studies of primates brought up without contact with their mothers or other members of their species, that such deprivation produces animals which are behavioral cripples (see, e.g., H. Harlow, 1959; Harlow, Harlow, Dodsworth & Arling, 1966). We can infer that, somewhere in the evolutionary pathway which produced the primates, two developments occurred involving non-solitary activation of the IRS. One of these involved linking activation of the IRS to group behavior; the other linked the development of normal adult behavior to early learning, probably to early conditioning for activation of the IRS.

The third category, items (9) to (13), involves substantially larger social groups. These euphorias tend to bind together larger groups of individuals into a social unit, and create the situation in which group priorities and group survival can override individual priorities and individual survival. In so far as conditioning the activation of the IRS, so that activation of the IRS follows from these experiences, behavior of the individual in the group becomes more social and less individual. For a social species such as Itomo sapiens, the value of an IRS activated by behavior favoring the group is a concept of compulsive quality. As was indicated by the hypotheses advanced earlier in this paper, item (14) i.e. altruistic behavior, becomes understandable in terms of social dynamics, and no longer finds its sole justification in terms of genetics.

An interesting example of the effects o f the IRS occurs in connection with behavior related to religion and ideologies. There are potent reasons for thinking that the validity of a religion depends upon the success with which religious practices activate the IRS, and so procure euphoria. The use of these practices is archaic in origin, and may well have been of major importance in producing group cohesion in the transition from small food-gathering communities, to tribal communities. Indeed, human happiness may well arise primarily from social and other experiences which activate the IRS. When Marx said that 'religion is the opium of the people', he spoke with greater accuracy than he realized! The propagation of his ideas and the decline of religion have tended to transform society so that we could now say that 'Ideology is the opium of the people'.What none of us has known, until the last few years, is

92 J. E Danielli

that the people need their opium; that, unless society provides mechanisms for the release of endogenous opiates and the like, i.e. for activating the IRS, the individual is deprived, social cohesion is lost and collapse of the social system may be imminent.

It is interesting from a technical viewpoint, and probably also from a social viewpoint, to consider item (15). It is implicit in what has been said above that human beings will seek euphoria. We now believe that pain releases endogenous opiates, and that these substances not only diminish pain but also produce euphoria. In consequence, by seeking pain, euphoria may be procured We may then speculate that this is the basis for such behaviors as religious flagellation, and. for physical masochistic behavior.

The IRS and the stability of social altruism

Where the requirement for survival of the social group is dominant, the importance of survival of the specific gene set o f an individual is bypassed. This is a successful strategy if altruistic behavior occurs as a result of a learning process, i.e. if the behavior arises, riot from the inheritance of genes for altruism, but from inheritance of memes (as Dawkins, 1976, puts it). If altruism directed at group survival is based upon gene-determined behavior, then it will die out, or at least be minimized, by the fact that selection will tend to act against survival of those individuals who most strongly exhibit group altruistic behavior. But if group altruism is based upon learning, its continuity can be secured by the learning process. Elimination of altruistic behavior would then only occur if the individuals concerned are not only indoctrinated for altruism, but are a segment of the population which is not protected by the group. Protection against this latter possibility is provided if the social group has a set of memes which give high status to altruistic individuals, and hence, gives group protection to those individuals. If the whole population possesses the IRS, and if all individuals have a general competence to be conditioned for activation of the IRS by learning, all individuals will provide group protection which compensates for what would otherwise be self-destructive behavior on the part o f the altruists.

The possibility still exists that some individuals may become genetically defective, either with respect to having a fully functional IRS, or with respect to the capacity for channeling the activation of the IRS by conditioning. However, individuals with these defects are likely to be eliminated by group action, and so do not normally become part of the group breeding pool. The conclusion is clear: the development o f an IRS which can be channeled by social experience can be the primary mechanism by which group altruism becomes a dominant chacacteristic, and is, therefore, a primary mechanism by which the social group is protected.

Conversely, it follows that i f social evolution o f the group occurs in such a manner that the IRS becomes ineffective, alienation results and the stability o f the group (or social system) may be destroyed.

Reservations

This paper is a statement outlining three hypotheses concerning altruism in human beings. It claims to be no more than an outline. It is intended

Altruism: the opium of the people 93

particularly to present a process whereby behavior which is altruistic from the point of view of a social group can be stabilized by an internal reward system. This IRS, since it depends upon biochemical and neurological factors, arises from the evolutionary process, but is activated by a social process. Since there is a risk that what is said here may be interpreted incorrectly, and beyond my intention, I shall make some reservations, as follows.

1. It is not my intention to say that, under no circumstances, can altruistic behavior occur which does not have either a genetic function or activate the internal reward system. It is my intention to say that altruistic actions which are rewarded by the IRS are likely to be easier to perform, and to result in more reliable and stable altruistic behavior, than are actions which are not so rewarded.

2. The neurological mechanisms which are concerned in, relate to, or can activate the IRS, are certainly much more complex, and may be vastly more complex than is described here. To emphasize this point, let me refer to the extraordinary phenomenon of religious or political conversion. In such conversions there may be a dramatic reversal of morality and ethics. After conversion, an individual who was gentle, kind and tolerant, may rob, murder, persecute and torture. In this new behavior the converted individual will not only adduce intellectual justifications for horrific behavior, but appears to be in a state of euphoria. In such individuals the behavior appears to involve a massive reversal of the previously established conditioning for activation of the IRS. It is not difficult to suggest possible mechanisms for this, but I refrain from doing so, for we need a more rigorous study of the hypotheses advanced here, before further speculation would be justified.

3. Albert Somit has asked me, 'How would you account for those situations in which altruistic acts (i.e. acts taken in dictates with social conditioning) leave the individual quite unhappy?' If we pursue the line of argument of this paper, the unhappiness would arise from lack of release of opiates, or the like. Such lack may arise from such factors as, e.g., the altruistic act is imposed by social pressure in a situation which does not activate 'the IRS; o r may arise from a clash between genetic programming and social programming.

4. Peter Mitchell questioned whether all the phenomena classifed as euphorias really have the same neurological and pharmacological basis. It is, of course, by no means certain that all euphorias involve release of endogenous opiates: a necessary reservation at this stage is that we may discover other families of substances which act upon other (or identical) pleasure centers. The assumption that all the euphorias listed above are similar in nature was made for simplicity, i.e. it arose from the principle of Ocams' razor. However, even if euphorias prove to be diverse in nature, the principle of the above argument will remain valid, but will now involve the co-evolution of a group of neurological mechanisms affecting mood. This is analogous to the way in which many mechanisms affecting the rate of flow of blood through a tissue have co-evolved as a group of homeostatic processes.

94 J. F. Danielli

. John Maynard Smith has commented that 'it is quite possible (indeed likely) that a particular act be rewarded by the IRS, and also that the act occurs because genes making its performance more likely have been favored by natural selection.' A reservation we must make is that different altruistic behaviors will depend, to different degrees, on genetic predis- position on the one hand, and on social conditioning on the other hand: and we must note that social conditioning itself can only occur if the foundation (i.e. necessary neurological mechanisms) have been established by the evolution o f the human genome.

Acknowledgements

My warmest thanks for advice are due to Mary Danielli, Joan I. Lorch, Peter Mitchell, Sharona Nelson, Carolyn and Douglas Pike, Candace B. Pert, Rober t Rosen, J. Maynard Smith, Solomon H. Snyder, Albert Somit and Harvey Wheeler.

References

Danielli, M. & Danielli, J. F. (1974). Bull. cent.theor.Biol. 7 (1), 19. Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Guillemin, R. (1978). Science 202,390. Hamilton, W. D. (1964). J. theor. Biol. 7, 1, 17. Harlow, H. F. (1959). Am. Scient. 47,459. Harlow, H. F. Harlow, M. K. Dodsworth, R. O. & Arling, G. L. (1966). Proc. Am. phil.

Soc. 110,58. Hughes, J. Smith, T. W. Kosterlitz, H. W. FothergiU, L. A. Morgan, B. A. & Morris, H. R.

(1975). Nature 258,577. Olds, J. & Milner, P (1954). J. comp. physiol. Psychol. 47, 419. Olds, J. (1977). Drives and Reinforcements. New York: Raven Press. Schally, A. (1978). Science 202, 18. Snyder, S. H. Pasternak, G. W. & Pert, C. B. (1975). In Handbook o f Psychopharmacology

5,329. New York: Plenum Press. Snyder, S. H. (1979). Harvey Lecturers 73,291. New York: Academic Press. Terenius, L. & Whalstrom, A. (1974). A cta pharmac, tox. 35, Suppl. 1,55. Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard

University Press.