American Committee on Africa -- NATO and Southern Africa

8/11/2019 American Committee on Africa -- NATO and Southern Africa

1/7


2/7

-2 -

for the Council

meeting, will

no doubt renew i ts

past requests

that TO

recognition

of

the

Portuguese

role

as friend

and

natural

ally

in

Europe be extended to provide

greater pol i t ical and military support for

the

African operation.

In

1970 Portugal

Defense

Minister

Rebelo

offered

TO

defense

chie fs the

terri tories

and

bases

out

side

the TO zone Wllich he said

could

help control

the

vast

area

of the whole

Atlantic. t is

significant that

the new

Secretary General of N TO

former

Dutch

Minister of Foreign

Affairs

Joseph Luns, who will assume

his

position

at

this Lisbon

meeting , has always

been

sympathetic to the Portuguese position in

Africa

and was

recently

reported

as

conwenting

that in

the

colonial

wars n

portugal sacrifices

i ts blood for our freedom. Emphasis ours.) Clearly Luns

will

be a

strong conserva

t ive force in

favor of

continuing

TO

support to Portugal without

any

criticism

of

th e colonia l war

in Arica.

For

those v o

think

in terms of

TO as necessary prote

tion

aga in st the

Sovie t g loba l threat

U

,

Portugal s vicious colonia lism

is

secondary

to i ts

convinced

anti-communism.

South

Africa and

th e

Portuguese already have a close working

alliance

- South

Africa

has

active troops and equipment in Angola and Mozambique and regular

meetings

are held between Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese security chiefs.

SOtJrH FRIC

TO

P RrNER

There has also

been increasing reference in

the international

press to discussio

about

the

future l inks between TO and the Republic of South Arica.

TIle

so-called

Soviet

build-up in

the

Indian

Ocean has

provided

a basis for

far

reaching projection

of future

European

defense

needs from many sources. A revealing exmnple was

the pre

election

British

Conservative

Party

blue-print

on

defense

which

outlined the

impor

tance

of the Cape route

in

a situation of increasing Russian naval

activity,

and pro

posed that i the

Conservatives

were re-elected

they re-activate

the Simonstown Agre

ment between Britain and South Africa.

This

document warned

that the

most

serious

threat to

the security of the Cape

route

l ies

in

the Western

African-Atlantic

0 ean

area

of

Portuguese Guinea and

the

Cape Verde Islands. Not surpris ingly the main

argument put forward the

Conservative British

Foreign Secretary now in power,

in


3/7

-3-

justifying the

sale

of he licop te rs to

South

Africa and his revised attitude towards

the U arms embargo for South Africa, was that

Britain

needs to arm South Africa for

the

defesne of

the vi t l Cape sea route. Tl is argument was raised

y

the

British

t

the

TO

meeting

in

December

1970.

The

French

Defense

Minister

similarly

announce

plans to intensifY the French presence

in

the Mozambique channel and

th e

Indian Ocean

The need to defend the se a routes is one of the

justifications

most often

heard among

French military circles for huge French sales

to South

Africa.

Other

voices

have

recently been

raised in

support

of

the

contention that

South Africa is

essential

for the control of

the

South Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the South

Africans

have

been quick to exploit this increasing concern.

In February, 1971

the South

African Navy

mounted a dramatic

publicity

campaign

in

which South African newspapers were

inundated with s tories and

photographs of

Soviet

naval activity in

the

Indian Ocean The campaign culminated in

eight

journal

i s t s being t ~ { n on a lO-hour

reconnaissance

f l ight

so

that they could personally re

port

on the value of watch-dog functions which South Africa performs for the West y

w y

of her

24-hour survei llance of shipping

in

the

southern seas. t1

Wllat South

Afric

wants is not jus t to be able to purchase arms from Britain and other TO countries,

but to

involve

these count ries in a

defense

alliance of some kind. f there seems

l i t t l e l ikelihood tha t th is would take the form

of

an official TO alliance, there

are

certainLy

several TO nations,

including

the

U.S., Br it ain

and France who might

be interested

in SOHle forr l l

of

agreement

\1 i

t t le South African Governme t that would

make

her

a

backdoor meJ.uber of

the

alliance.

e inf luent ia l journal IfATO

s

Fifteen

Nations

comments

th t

because

of

the

overt

pol i t ic l

implications

any

extension

of

rATO responsibility

must

be conside red

unrealis t ic,

Lbu (

the

only poss ib le solut ion

would

be

the

set t ing

up

of

a regional

maritime alliance consisting

o f S ta te s inter

ested in

the

security

of the vast

area extending

from the

shores of

the Indian and :

South

Atlantic Ocem1S to

Antartica.

These ould be the

U.S.,

Great Britain, Portugal

South

Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Brazil .


4/7

-4-

SOUTH

AFRICA'S

MILITARY

ALLIES

In fact such an

alliance would serve

to formalize

t ies

of cooperation that the

past few years have a lr eady seen

well established.

South Africa

' :.lrcady

derives the

bull{

of

i t s

ilnported

military

equipment

from

NATO

countries.

France

has

supplied

je t

f ighters fo r ground attack

operations,

crucia l he l icopters, submarines and

submarine

warfare

training;

has

developed

the surface-to-air cactus missle

in

close collabora

t ion

with

the

South

Africans, and allo1tTS armored

cars

to

be supplied

and

Inanufactured

under lic en se in

South

Africa.

The

I t a l j ~ a n

arms

firm o to

Malara is

planning to

supply

the South African

Navy

vlith surface-to-surface missiles.

Macchi

326 je t trainers,

known in

South

Africa

as Impala

trainers

are bui l t locally with r ~ t i s Bristol

Viper

je t

engines

imported

from ta ly where

they are manufactured under

l icense

the

Piaggi

aircraft concern. Belgi an au tomat ic r i f les

are

manufactured under l icense. Britain

supplying

the Wasp helicopters and

will no

doubt move

on

into other

f ie lds . The U.S.

which

has

consistently

so ld s ever al m il li on dol la rs

a

year worth of

equipment to

South

Africa has recen tly l icensed

the sale

of l ight

je t

aircraft

which

are technically

classified as

non-lnilitary

but

which form a

basic

component

of

an

a n t i g u e r ~ l l a

force

N TO 11POOR M N

PORTUGAL I S

DEPENDENCE

f

the

role

that NATO

wil l play

in the futu re in

relation

to formal

alliances

in

volving

S o u t h e l ~ Africa is s t i l l somewhat

specu la t ive , there

is no doubt

at a l l

about th

invaluable support that

has flowed

from

individual

NATO members to Portugal in i t s figh

to

hold

on

to i t s African

Empire

in

the

face of

a

decade of determined

armed

struggle

the

people

of

Angola,

Mozambique

and G u i n e a i s s a u ~

Poverty

stricken

Portugal

has

the

second

lowest

annual

per capita

income

of

a l l

th e

NATO

members -

539

as

against 346

for Turkey and 4,279 for

the

U.S.

Yet

i t spends

more on defense

as

a

per

centage

of

Gross National Product G.N.P.) (7.8 )

than a ll the

other

members

except the

U

S. (9.6 ). In fact , almost 5 of annual

Government

expendi

ture now goes to

fight

the

wars

in Africa.

Further, Portugal

has l i t t l e industry

and

is

certainly not capable

of

producing complex

ai r naval and

military equipment within i t s

own borders. TllUS has relied

heavily on economic ,

pol i t ical

and

military aid

from


5/7

-5-

i t s a l l i e s to enable i t to continue i t s fight.

The terms of

the

NATO alliance

are

such

t h a t

ll a id g iv en s ho ul d be used only

within the TO area

but i t is quite

clear t h a t th e Portuguese who

choose

to regard

their

v a s t

land

holdings

in

Africa

as

p a r t

of Portugal

do

not

consider

themselves

r e s t r i c t e d y t h i s technicality.

U. S MILITARY

AID

TO PORTUGAL

In April 1971

a Washington

Post reporter

comrnented

t h a t

ftFrench made

helicopters

are

becoming more

vi t l to the P or tu gu es e a s they switch to

more

aggressive

and

mobile

t a c t i c s. Airplanes manufactured in

West Germany drop napalm

an d crop-killing herbicide

over

some

contested areas.

And

American

je t liners

are

used r o u t n ~ for Portuguese

troop

movements

to an d

wit11in the embattled

provinces.

tt u

involvement

in ~ r t u g a l

t

s

colonial

war

serves as

a

u s e fu l

example

o f the inevitable

c o n s e ~ u e n c e s

of maintaining

an y

kind of

all iance

with a country fighting

a

war o f n atio na l oppression.

The

U.S.

continues to give

some

military aid to Portugal directly

and

openly.

Reported military

aid

in the years 1946

to

1967 amounted

to 326 m il li on j t he figures

reported

for

recent

years

are small

.6

millio n

in 1968,

1

million

in

1969.

But

r ec en t r e ve la t io n s in Co ng re ss a nd the

Senate make

i t clear t h a t

published

figures

do

not

t e l l

the

whole

trut11.

Congressman

Coughlin

ha s

pointed

out t11at

the

unclassified

arms sales

f ig ur es r el ea se d y the Department of Defense fo r

arms

supplied t o Africa

gave

no

indication a t l l

o f

the

huge volunle

of

weaponry

supplied t o Ethiopia

a

quant

ty

actually

valued in excess o f l l U.S. m i li ta ry a id to the

other

independent African

st tes

combined. Sirnilarly n

the Senate testimony Has recently given t a t

uore

th n

one

b i l l i o n

dollars

a l l o c a t e d

fo r th e

Food

for

Peace

program

ha d been used

f or m il it ar y

purposes. Testimony before Senator r o ~ l i r e indicated t h a t in fact

no one knows

in how

many

different

ways

th e U.S. gives military

aid

nor how

much

i t

adds up to . The

only

item c le ar ly l ab e ll ed m i li ta ry assistance in

the

current udget

t o t a l s

409

million

but

2

Pentagon o f f i c i a l s pressed fo r

a more

r e li st ic t ot l a t the hearings finally

came up

with

a

figure

o f

4.9 b i l l i o n .

So in

fact i t

is

impossible

to b10W

how

much

m il it ar y a id

the

Portuguese

actually get

from

th e U.S.


6/7

-6-

There

is

also a

great deal of mystification about

the

nature of

the

aid

that the

U.S. acknowledges

tha t i t gives to

the Portuguese. The

U.S.

Government had

said that

since

1961

i t

has been

our policy

that military equipment

provided

to

the

Portuguese

under

either

t he Mil it ary

Assistance

Program

(M.A.P.)

or

through

U

S.

Government

or

commercial

sales

shal l

be used

only

in

the NATO area - which does not include any

part

of Africa.

Yet

over

the

l s t

few

years

the

U.S.

Goverrunent has allowed T.A.P.,

the

Portuguese

s ta te a ir li ne

to

purchase

seven

707s tl1Tee

727s and

two

727 Cs

(converted

to passen

ger use) from Boeing, many of the

purchases

having been financed y the U.S. Governmen

backed Export-IrI1port Banl\: The Portuguese

have

openly admitted tha t tIle Military

charters T.A.P. planes for transporting

ruen

and material in and to Africa. Recently,

extending

U.S.

complicity

vdth the o r t ~ l e s e

colonialists yet further,

i t

was revealed

that the

U.S. Government had approved the sale of two Boeing 707s direct

to

the

Lisbon

government - placing no restr ict ions at l l on their use. Lisbon observers a t the time

commented One purpose of

the

aircraft will be to

ferry

soldiers ne on leave quickly

thus

improving

morale among the 150,000 me in

Africa.

Official

sources say

that

U.S.

military

aid

to

Portugal

concerned only

with en

hancing Portugal s NATO role? consists almost entirely

of

ir defense and anti-submarin

warfare training

and

material. As

the

Portuguese

have

concentrated

increasingly on

developing aer ia l techniques as t h y lose

connnand of the

land

Africa

to

the l ibera

tion movements this claim i t se l f

says

more

than i t

is

intended

to .

Recently

the

Textron

subsidialJT, Bell Company sold five h e l i ~ p t e r s to the

Portuguese

in Mozambique

to

used

for

logis t ical

tf

support

in

tIle Cabora Bassa

Dam area

w11ich

has been

under

heavy attack y

the forces

of

the

Mozanfuique Liberat ion Front. Kaiser

has sold

jeeps

to

the

Portuguese

L ~ r r l Y in Mozambique througll a South

African

subsidiary. In

fact ,

Portuguese deserters have frequently stated that army

persol1nel

and particularly

U.S.

guerilla warfare experts operat ing

in

COill1tries such as West Germany have

been

involved i n t ra in ing programs for

men

of

the

Portuguese

army.

Portuguese officers

were

being trained a t

the

University

of Monterey in

1970, and General

Kaulza de Arriaga,


7/7

-7 -

currently in charge of l l military o p e r t ~ o n s in Mozambique, was

an honored

guest of

the

state

Department in

the

U.S. in 1969.

There

are

innumerable

other

ind icat ions of

the existence of a working

Portuguese-U.S. alliance.

U.S. equipment such as the G

r i f les are

made

in Portugal under

l icense. The

Information Bureau for

West Germany

of

the Republic

of

Zambia has

published

a long l i s t

of

U.S.

and

other

NATO

country) weapo

now being

used

y the Portuguese in

Africa,

including r i f les l ight machine guns, morta

rocket launchers, mines, grenades

and ammunition.

In 1970 the

Portuguese added

defoli

ants to the

napabn

and other v ic ious weapons

they

were using against the people of

Angola - a quick check of U.S. export f igures r evea ls

that

in the f i rs t

11

months

of

1970

the export of herbicides (Code

5120629)

to

Portugal

was

four tlines

greater than

th

tot l

exported in 1969.

The

fact th at

the

U.S. maintains

a

base on Portuguese

terr i tor

in

the

Azores

can only reinforce the U.S. desire to maintain

a

stable Portugal y

l

means necessary.

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

OPPOSITION -

CALL FOR ACTION

The Liberation movements

within the

Portuguese colonies have again called on l l

who support th e s tr uggl e of

the

people

for freedom and

self-determination

to act to end

the

NATO

alliance

and

U.S.

support

for

Portuguese

imperialism.

Amilcar

Cabral, Secretary General of

the African Party for the

Independence

of

Guinea and Cape Verde

(PAIGe)

has cited.

the NATO

meeting in

Lisbon

as Tfconcrete proof o

NATO complicity

in

the Portuguese colonial wars aga inst Africa ,

and

the Mozambique

Liberation

Front

FRELIMO) cites

in

a

statement

that

Portugal

will probably

receive

mor

NATO power sympathy than

before

because i t s

need

for outside

assistance is

more obvious

after

the f i lure of

th.e

Portuguese offensives in Mozamb :que FRELIMO

also

states, tha

many

of

the

NATO s more vocal spokesme11

are

constantly pointing

out,

Portugal is

defending the i r interests as well as

her

Wil f

T11ese

mounting alliances aga inst t he

l iberation of Guinea, Angola and o z m b i ~ u e require that we more

ful ly

extend our

suppo

to the African movements y heightening

our opposition to

NATO, and by

emphatically

protesting U.S.

complicity

with repression

in

Southern Africa.

Documents

American Committee on Africa -- NATO and Southern Africa