South Africa and the Future: Illusion and NecessityAuthor(s): Christian P. Potholm, IISource: Africa Today, Vol. 14, No. 5, American Policy in Southern Africa (Oct., 1967), pp. 18-22Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184828 .

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South Africa and the Future:

Illusion and Necessity Christian P. Potholm II

The Complexity Despite all that has been written about South

Africa, one is never quite prepared for the com- plexity inherent in the South African situation. The many historical, economic and racial strands joining to form this country which is at once something more than a state, something less than a nation, are intricate and interconnect- ed. In addition, South Africa is a difficult subject to write about with detachment. It generally evokes passionate attachment or inveterate anti- pathy even though its problems are neither as simple nor as soluable as both its critics and its proponents maintain. Most importantly, the racial groups which are involved in the entire complex of conflicting attitudes and ideologies are all guilty to a certain extent of living in a pseudo environment; an environment or role into which each has cast itself. There is hence a definite divorce between dream and reality, self image and real image, and this more than any other single factor militates against any comprehensive, objective and equitable solution to the continuing social and psychological problems of South Africa. The African South African tends to view the situation with either leaden resignation or ex- tremely wishful thinking. The Asian and Colored communities constantly emphasize non-political solutions with a detached sort of apathy, while the white South African takes a kind of ethno- centric pride in ignoring existing evidence and shows an intense preoccupation with living in a world of myth and stereotype.

Unreality and the White South African While these attitudes are to a certain extent

explicable and understandable, they do prevent the participants from coming to grips with the underlying realities in South Africa today. These erroneous thought patterns are most critical in the white community because in the present South African context, it is the white community which makes the basic political and economic decisions affecting all South Africans regardless of race. In a very real sense, to be a white South African in the world of the 1960's is to be relieved of the necessity of studying the world north of the Zam- bezi for, by and large, the most strenuous excuse given for the implementation of apartheid is the rather fragile notion that black Africa stands poised north of the Zambezi ever ready to over- whelm the sturdy white encampments to the south. This is the Africa of violence, hatred, an- archy and reverse racialism. It is, of course, also the Africa which exists primarily in the minds of the whites, an Africa taken out of context, a fragmentary and half-real world tailored to suit the demands of the moment, a world view in

which the past replaces the future and the present in terms of causal efficacy.

The Congo savagery and Mau Mau terror are remembered, expanded and vocalized although the actual casualty figures in both of these in- stances are seldom known and never mentioned. The fact that tens of thousands of Africans were killed in these uprisings, and in their suppression, is forgotten. What is remembered is the manner in which a particular white settler or missionary was killed or how much cruelty the Africans showed toward livestock. Because these incidents and pseudo incidents reinforce justification for apartheid they are allowed to overwhelm the peaceful transition to statehood of the former French colonies, the general acceptance of black government by the whites who remained after independence all over Africa and the emergence of moderate racial elements in most of the African nations.

Very little information of how the Africa of 1967 operates ever filters into the thought patterns of the white South African. To a certain extent, the Nationalist government has been very clever in portraying the options open to the white com- munity in very harsh terms: baaskap or chaos. At the same time, the government could not have been so enormously successful in perpetuating this thesis had it not struck a resonant cord in most of the white community. Few white South Africans care to know that the white settler popu- lation has greatly expanded in the Ivory Coast since independence, or that the remaining whites in Kenya were satisfied enough with their lot in multiracial Kenya to send a delegation to Rho- desia prior to UDI. These facts are not important to most South Africans. In fact, they are disre- garded. What is important, even crucial, is the publication of incidents which seem to justify the continuance of apartheid. It is a curious fact that most white South Africans who pride them- selves on being such perspicacious realists where the African is concerned, should so cavalierly ignore any empirical evidence from the north.

Whenever the white South African is con- fronted with the charge that apartheid flies in the face of reality, and is nothing more than a rationalization for white supremacy, he invariably retreats into the antiseptic world of theory. Here, he places a good deal of store in the mythology of his role as a protector of the African. Apartheid, you are told, really means separate development. Bantustans are, or soon will be, truly independent. Pass laws exist for the benefit of the African. Segregation prevents racial atavism. Sterile hous- ing really constitutes a "homeland." This kind of double thought may be demonstrably false to the foreign observer, but it has become a way of life

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-in South Africa, for theory is bright and pure and clean, undimmed by tears, frustration or hatred.

The Afrikaans and English-Spealdng Whites Whenever apartheid is discussed, one often

hears of the intense dichotomy between the Eng- lish speaking white and the Afrikaans speaking white, and the contention that there is a substan- tial difference between these groups with regard to apartheid. This may have been true in the past. In recent years, however, the political and racial differences between these two linguistic groups have largely evaporated. Despite existing dis- agreement between the United Party and the Nationalist Party with regard to the techniques necessary to preserve the status of the white man in South Africa, they do not differ with regard to that goal. As much as the Afrikaans speaking community may dislike the English speaking com- munity, and as much as the English speaking community is fond of blaming the Afrikaans com- munity for world wide opposition to apartheid, both groups overwhelmingly support the present policy of the government.

When de Villiers Graaff stated at the United Party conference in Bloemfontein this past year, "Let there be no misunderstanding on this point. We, of the United Party, want to uphold white leadership-white political control of South Africa at all costs," there could be no doubt that this was no longer the party of Hofmeyr. There are a variety of reasons why the English speaking com- munity has tended to accept the basic premises of the Nationalist government: the infusion during the 1950's and 1960's of less liberal elements from Great Britain and the colonies, the alarm over the rising tide of black nationalism and most importantly, the success of the Nationalist govern- ment in doing what it said in 1958 it would do, namely, preserve the privileged position of the white in South Africa. There are, of course, some whites who still bitterly oppose apartheid; both English and Afrikaans speaking communities have their dissenting elements, but these are currently so small in numbers as to have little practical effect on policy.

The coalescence of intent between the Na- tionalist and United parties and the devolution of the Liberal Party has left only two other political choices open to the whites of South Africa. The ultraright Republican Party of Professor C. T. van de Merwe feels that the present government has already done too much for the non-European, already made too many compromises. The Re- publican Party would not disrupt baaskap, it would merely eliminate the elaborate web of ra- tionalization which currently accompanies it. Thus the Progressive Party alone offers a firm alter- native to the existing system but judging from its recent lack of success at the polls, its emphasis on a multiracial society does not, in the minds of white South Africans, represent a credible option. The very existence of these "radical" parties has had the result of making the Nationalist Party more acceptable to white modera-tes who find th-emselves increasingly isolated from meaning- ful political power. --

The Case for the Nationalist Government There is, of course, a case for the present

South African regime, although that case is quickly given. Thanks partly to the immense natural resources of the country, and the intense dynamism of its entrepreneurs and the massive infusion of foreign capital, South Africa is the richest, most highly developed, most industrialized country in Africa. Its Africans, at least those who have become urbanized, probably enjoy the high- est standard of living on the continent in terms of per capita income and medical care. Nearly 100,000 Africans in South Africa for example, own their own cars and this figure approximates the number of cars privately owned in the Soviet Union. So powerful is the allure of this richness of material life that at the present time perhaps 800,000 Africans from Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and Southern Rho- desia are present in South Africa by their own volition. In reality, keeping Africans out of the Republic is currently a more pressing concern than restraining those who wish to flee.

The present government has also spent over $500 million to eradicate the mass of slums and shanty towns which were such an integral part of Alan Paton's Cry the Beloved Country. It is true that these economic and medical advances accrued to the Africans and other non-Europeans because the whites feared for their own health and safety if advances were not forthcoming. At the same time, the material standard of the Afri- can in certain categories has risen in recent years, and the present Nationalist government has contributed to this even though the gap be- tween the whites and the Africans is not closing.

Irrespective of why the material lot of the non-European has been improved or even that his medical and economic status has improved, a more crucial question remains. At what point does a class, a people or a race cease to accept some material benefits in place of respect, health in place of political prominence, safety in place of dignity?

The Rationalizations For it seems pointless to belabor the issue of

the inherent injustices in the South African situa- tion. That apartheid is wrong: morally, ethically, psychologically and socially, seems beyond con- tention. Even the most vociferous defender of apartheid recoils at the prospect of changing places with any African within the system. And one finds it extremely difficult to accept the no- tion that white South Africans really believe that the African "likes" the present system or "en- joys" being fitted into a process which only mar- ginally benefits him. To maintain, as do many South Africans, that the form of address required of non-Europeans, "master" or "baas", is merely recognition of the respect which all Africans feel for Europeans, or that the bowed head and cupped hands of the African servant getting his reward is an old and venerable Zulu custom which the African enjoys, is to strain the imagination of even the most gullible. To declare that South Af- rica represent a "'bastion" against conmmunism or

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to maintain that the Japanese are "honorary Europeans", while the Chinese are "non-Euro- peans" is not only to ignore the realities of the situation but to insult the intelligence of the foreign observer as well.

There are, of course, white South Africans who admit that these explanations are foolish just as there are men of good will in South Africa who oppose apartheid as being immoral. But to be a white of this persuasion and to continue to live in South Africa is to face an unpalatable choice (although not as unpalatable perhaps as being an African and holding these views). One must either accept the iron priorities of the situa- tion (i.e. apartheid is a fact of life, and likely to remain so for many years) and submerge one's conscience, or one must resign oneself to continual frustration, daily aggravation and eventual loss of personal liberty if one expresses these views publicly and vocally. A person of this bent is thus left without any recourse to changing the present situation except in the negative sense of being able to romove oneself from what has be- come, for all its difficulties, home.

Yet, if the white South African is guilty of living in a pseudo environment, content with shaky rationalization and a faulty view of the world beyond the Zambezi, so too, some Africans in South Africa and many of their contemporaries in Lagos, Cairo and Accra, are guilty of wishful thinking. There has been a tendency particularly among South African exiles (African and Euro- pean) and more importantly perhaps, among many of their contemporaries in the other African states, to overlook the realities which enable the white minority to perpetuate apartheid. This writer wishes that the position of the white settler in South Africa were not so secure, that a well conceived military action or- internal revolt had some chance of success in the foreseeable future. But since this does not seem to be the case, facts are preferable to dreams.

External and Internal Security For it is indeed the supreme irony of the

South African problem that at the very time when the government and general population are call- ing for stronger measures of internal suppression, and greater expenditures for military preparded- ness, South Africa's position has never been so secure. Militarily, the South African armed forces are second to none on the African continent. The embargo of the United States and Great Britain with regard to military equipment has not pre- vented the South Africans from procuring the latest aircraft and weapons from a variety of sources, notably France. The 250,000 man South African Security Force seems capable of dealing severely with any African launched operation. In all of Africa perhaps only the Algerian army is better trained, and in any case, no nation in Africa possesses the sinews of transport necessary to maintain an army in southern Africa. As the events of UDI have underscored, there is in real- ity no military threat to the white regimes in southern Africa.

Likewise, the South African government has complete control of the internal situation. By and

large, it has checked the precipitous rush of Afri- can rural to city migration which threatened to inundate the white population centers, and at the present time the prospects for an internal re- volt seem negligible. As the recent Poqo trials at Port Elizabeth indicated, the dissatisfied Africans and other non-Europeans lack any type of politi- cal organization. With the Pan African Congress and African National Congress in shambles, the present government seems determined to prevent the formation of any subsequent African political organizations. By widespread use of such repres- sive measures as the Suppression of Communism Act, the 180 Day Detention Act, the tighter en- forcement of the pass laws and more drastic re- location schemes, the South African government seems able to prevent African political forma- tions. And the recent Strachan trials and the har- rassment of Lawrence Gandar of the Rand Daily Mail, indicate that the government will not broach any interference in the implementation of these measures.

The matter of African political organization seems crucial to the success of any internal up- rising and its current absence from the South African scene is one of the fundamental realities which most foreign observers choose to ignore. The failure of the guerilla uprising in the Congo in 1964 showed how critical the element of organization is in any revolutionary movement. Regardless of outside help, modern weapons, and strong motivation, a mass revolt without trained organizational cadres seems doomed to failure, particularly against a regime which knows what it wants and is prepared to implement any meas- ures necessary to preserve itself.

Little Possibility of Revolt Even were there an organization capable of

sustaining a massive internal revolt operative in South Africa, there would be additional, formid- able obstacles to the overthrow of the South Afri- can government. Too often Africans from other parts of Africa have been willing to overlook these obstacles, and many have been content to offer solutions which are not at all probable. In this regard it would be well to compare the sanguine proposals of some of the exiles with the far more restrained hopes of the Africans still living in South Africa. Even scholars have been reluctant to face the a priori handicaps faced by many would-be revolutionaries in South Africa. A recent book by Colin and Maqaret Legum, South Africa, Crisis for the West, is indicative of the difficulties inherent in analyzing the South African political future in terms of hopes. It is well and good to hope for an internal revolution which would dislodge the ruling white minority and redress the wrongs of preceding generations, but the translation of these hopes into fact de- pends upon the existence of several ingredients not currently operative in South Africa.

In addition to the depressing lack of an organizational impetus to revolution, there are sheer numerical handicaps to internal revolt. In attempting to analyze the South African situation in terms of other decolonizing experiences, one is often tempted to maintain that the same tech-

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niques and methods which proved successful in other parts of Africa will likewise prove effica- cious in South Africa. To this observer the present ratio of Africans to Europeans is not sufficient for the kind of mass movement which succeeded so well in West Africa. Even if one accepts the rather dubious premise that Asian and Colored communities would follow African leadership in such an event, this only creates a ratio of five non-Europeans for every European and is a far cry from the 3000 to 1 ratio which proved so ir- resistible in Nigeria, for example.

But even more critical than the lack of over- whelming numbers, is the absence of a dichotomy between the white settler in Africa and a metro- politan government in Europe. By and large, the French and English settlers lost their political hold precisely because the mother country came to a certain historical point in time when, for various economic, military, political and moral reasons, it was willing to write off the white sett- lers at least to the extent of turning the colony over to majority rule. This element of ambiguity, so crucial to the decolonization of Algeria and Kenya, is not present in South Africa. Since there is no mother country which holds the destiny of the colony in its parliamentary hands, the white settler in South Africa can afford to react in cer- tain ways which were not possible for previous settler regimes. The white settler in South Africa is perhaps not significantly more ruthless than was his counterpart in Algeria or Kenya, but he has no sufficiently powerful overseas group to curtail the implementation of that ruthlessness.

Lacking sufficient organizational strength to promote economic or passive resistance, with- out a focal point for what international pressure exists, and unable to count on massive military support from other African countries, those who would alter the status quo often advocate a gue- rilla campaign to wear down the present regime. But even in this regard, the lack of geography and topography conducive to guerilla warfare militates against a successful uprising. Those exiles who would pin their hopes on a guerilla campaign would be well advised to consider the lack of a contiguous sanctuary and suitable ter- rain. The Kalahari, the Karoo and the barren areas of the northern Transvaal not only serve as a hindrance to economic development, they also present currently insuperable barriers to a successful campaign. There are no rain forests, no impenetrable areas, no common boundaries with governments friendly to an African-led uprising. In addition, the well developed infrastructure of South Africa aids the defense. Road, rail and air mobility give the South African armed forces a substantial advantage in choking off any incipient uprising and isolating it before it becomes wide- spead (as in the so called "Peasants Revolt" of 1960).

Thus, without proper organization, under in- crensing surveillance, lacking adequate logistic support from the countries north of the Zambezi and without the kind of topography necessary to sustain a guerilla uprising, the non-European in South Afrca seems clearly on the defensive. It seems extremely unlikely that any African up-

rising could succeed in the foreseeable future. It may well be that eventually the non-Europeans will alter the system of apartheid by a combina- tion of numbers, economic pressure, and greater political awareness, but that is like saying that in the long run we are all dead-neither proposi- tion does much to alleviate the pain and frustra- tion of the moment. At the present time the Afri- can can objectively have little hope that his social and psychological lot will improve.

The Outlook What then remains? What hope is there that

the pernicious system currently operative in South Africa will change? What faith can the African have, save in his own ability to endure?

To this observer there are only two interna- tional developments of significant magnitude to offer any hope for a change in the present system. One would be a change in the power structure in the nearby Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. Although the Portuguese seem to have the simmering revolts in these two areas under control, it does not take a great deal of imagination to envision a situaton after Salazar departs from the scene, when more moderate ele- ments might well come to power who would be willing to write off the African territories. If the tempo of the revolts increases (as the one in Portuguese Guinea seems to be doing) and be- comes increasingly costly to repress, future Portu- guese governments may well decide that these areas are not worth the price necessary to main- tain them. If, and when, that happens, and an African government arises which is sympathetic to the political aspirations of the African major- ity in South Africa some of the currently critical barriers to revolution would be eliminated.

At the same time, even should a revolt occur, it is by no means certain that it would succeed, although its chances of success would seem to be much greater with contiguous African support. The only enduring hope for a meaningful change in the status quo with a minimum of bloodshed would be international pressure of significant magnitude and that can only come from the di- rect intervention of the United States and Great Britain. These two countries, acting in concert, could convince South Africa's whites that their present system could not endure. Great Britain is economically and psychologically unable to em- bark on this course of action, and would be un- willing to do so in any case unless the United States took the lead. Unfortunately, to date the United States has turned the other cheek to South Africa's actions, and while verbally deploring apartheid, has done little to check its entrench- ment. The two billion dollars worth of Anglo- American investment, the strategic importance of the Simonstown naval base, and the Pretoria tracking station, have undoubtedly influenced American thinking on the subject. Then too, the present high level of American involvement in other areas of the world, such as Vietnam, Europe and Latin America, argues against pre- cipitous United States involvement in the destruc- tion of apartheid.

Yet, were the American Negro and the liberal

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community to espouse the cause of the South African non-European as cogently and militantly as they have expressed their concern in the area of civil rights and the war in Vietnam, there might be significant pressure for United States action. This would be particularly true if the American Negro, with his 15% of the American population, should become emotionally involved in the South African situation, and sufficently enfranchised to translate this concern into poli- tical pressure. However, it must be said that for the foreseeable future this is not likely to take place and the only value to be derived from this course of speculation is the emphasis it places on the need to confront South Africa with over- whelming pressure and force for piecemeal, spora- tic pressure, and abortive internal resistance, will do more than fail, they will merely increase the arrogance of the white South African.

For the tragedy of the South African situation is not only the denial of basic human rights for

three quarters of a nation but the needlessness of the denial. At the very time when the white- South Africans are most firmly entrenched and in the best position to liberalize some of their more odious social and political policies, the government is moving inexorably toward tighter control over the non-European population and a more intractable position with regard to the opinions of the rest of the world. The South Afri- can ruling elite, both English and Africaans speak- ing, could change the structure and substance of apartheid far more easily and far more peacefully than either the non-Europeans from within or international pressure from without. These pres- ent ruling groups will not, and therein lies the real tragedy. For, if South Africa is doomed to futile chaos and needless bloodshed, or even the continued security of a well-ordered prison, it is a doom not found in time or space but in the eye and heart and mind of the beholder.

Rethinking the Rail Link

The long-mooted railway linking Zambia with the East African coast at Dar es Salaam might be called the Holy Grail of development in the region. For Zambia it offers a shimmering vision of complete transport independence from the south, while for the region as a whole it symbolizes dreams of economic cooperation and integrated progress. It has political sex-appeal surpassing that of any other development scheme in either Zambia or East Africa.

Yet the drive to turn the dream into reality can hardly be said to have been unfalter- ing. Both sides have maintain- ed that the rail link will be built, but they have not al- ways shown much practical readiness to get on with the job. There have been longish periods when not all that much seemed to be happening. The first half of 1967 has been one such period. The British- Canadian feasibility st u d y (the Maxwell Stamp report) was completed and handed in to the governments towards the end of last year, since when it has been a question of talks between officials. But these have tended to get post- poned for rather insignificant reasons, giving an impression of no great urgency. Fresh impetus

Now, however, the activists seem to be in the ascendant once more. The rail link leapt back into the news with President Kaunda's announce- ment on his. return from Peking that the Chinese were ready to finance it. Since then there has

been the visit to Dar of the Zambian Finance and Transport Ministers, Mr. Arthur Wina and Mr. Kalulu, which resulted in the setting up of a project planning company, with three directors each from Zambia and Tanzania including a Zam- bian chairman, a head office in Dar and a regional office in Lusaka.

The company has apparently not been regis- tered yet, but the directors are likely to be the relevant Permanent Secretaries from the two countries. Mr. Wina, speaking in Dar, saw the company as the project's "task force" which would lend fresh impetus to planning. Its initial jobs would include investigation of how to solve the problem of the different gauges in Zambia (3 ft. 6 in.) and East Africa (one metre), together with the filling in of vital gaps in available data. After that would come the design of the railway, which would involve a full-scale engineering and economic survey. (This stage alone is likely to take something like a year and three-quarters). So the rail link is on the move again. And the speed of its progress will depend on the new com- pany and its yet-to-be-recruited staff.

The first question that arises is whether the railway makes sense in economic and financial terms, notwithstanding its political attractions- and it is a pity that there has been so little public discussion of this. The Maxwell Stamp report, for some obscure reason, is still classified as secret. However, the official Tanzanian economic survey for 1967-68, issued as background to the Budget in June, discloses that the report calls for the expenditure of about ?125 million which would cover construction and rolling stock. It also esti- mates that the line would be profitable from its first year if it is able to'carry two million tons a year of copper and general goods combined. (One can assume that this estimate is based on rates equivalent to those on Rhodesia Railways, which

in economic terms is the chief competitor.)

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