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American Policy towards Southern Africa in the 1980sAuthor(s): Ben L. MartinSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar., 1989), pp. 23-46Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/161353 .
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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 27, I (1989), pp. 23-46
American Policy Towards Southern Africa in the 1980s
by BEN L. MARTIN*
THE APPROACH of the Reagan Administration towards the Third World was criticised as too simply anti-communist: a growing 'predisposition toward globalism ,1 so it was claimed, led to a 'Soviet- centric orientation',2 an 'obsession with the Soviet Union',3 which obscured regional complexities.4 But American decisions about what actions to take in Southern Africa during the ig8os were part of a
surprisingly effective strategy that often ignored Reagan's doctrine of aid to anti-communist resistance. That strategy was shaped by several
hands, and the President's were not even the most important. The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker,
convinced Reagan and the Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, that
although Congress would not repeal the I976 ban on aid to anti- communist guerrillas in Angola, the United States might be able to
negotiate the removal of the 25,000 Cuban troops protecting the
regime there in exchange for a parallel South African withdrawal from
Namibia, the territory administered by Pretoria since World War I from which it helped Angolan anti-government rebels. The President and Haig understood that an independent Namibia might be controlled
by the South West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo), the Soviet-
* Associate Professor of Political Science, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Missouri, Kansas City.
1 Donald Rothchild and John Ravenhill, 'From Carter to Reagan: the global perspective on Africa becomes ascendant', in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Eagle Defiant: United States foreign policy in the g98os (Boston, 1983), p. 346.
2 Donald Rothchild and John Ravenhill, 'Subordinating African Issues to Global Logic: Reagan confronts political complexity', in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy (Boston, 1987), p. 425.
3 Richard H. Ullman, 'Paths to Reconciliation: the United States in the international system of the late I980S', in SanfordJ. Ungar (ed.), Estrangement: America and the world (New York, 1985), p. 303.
4 James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and American Values (Itasca, Ill., 1985), p. 131; John G. Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists: movers of modern American foreign policy (New York, I985 edn.), pp. 285ff; Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies: the making of an unfriendly world (New York, 1986), p. 391; and Robert M. Price, 'Foreword: U.S.-Soviet relations in regional environments', in Michael Clough (ed.), Reassessing the Soviet Challenge in Africa (Berkeley, 1986), p. viii.
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backed national liberation movement based in Angola; but getting Cuban troops out of Angola seemed the most important goal.1
Crocker's policy of'constructive engagement' in Southern Africa
provided continuity from the Carter years, particularly in what the new Administration chose not to do. It could have cut off aid to a
regime in Zimbabwe that claimed to be committed to Marxism-
Leninism, abandoned Namibian negotiations, and tried to drop all restrictions on U.S. ties with South Africa. It could have refused to talk with the Marxist-Leninist leaders of Angola and immediately embraced the anti-government forces, but it did not.2 However, the emphasis on the strategic importance of the Cape route, and of South African
minerals, gave way to the premise that no vital American interests were at stake in Southern Africa. This meant limiting costs and risks, and since no direct U.S. armed intervention would be considered, providing and withholding economic and military assistance were left as the main levers of policy.
AIMS OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION
Through the eight-year Reagan era, U.S. policy towards Southern Africa was shaped by Crocker and his colleagues in the State
Department, headed by Haig and George Shultz (who replaced Haig in 1982), as well as by a congressional coalition led by liberal Democrats for sanctions against South Africa after I984, and by a
pressure group led by conservative Republicans for aid to anti- communist rebels in Angola, Mozambique, and elsewhere. But the
policy 'resultant' they produced became surprisingly consistent and effective, with some exceptions, despite its complexity.
I. Peaceful Coexistence and Change
Most of the governments of Southern Africa are authoritarian by nature, socialist by inclination (at least in rhetoric if not in reality), and more or less pledged to help overthrow the system of apartheid in South Africa. The regime in Pretoria is generally willing to leave alone those
neighbouring states which leave it alone, but has not hesitated to strike at alleged bases of the African National Congress (A.N.C.) in Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique.
The United States has consistently condemned the use of violence
1 Michael Clough, 'Beyond Constructive Engagement', in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), Winter, 1985-6, p. 5. 2 Ibid. pp. 6-7.
24 BEN L. MARTIN
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
both inside and outside the apartheid state, and supported the policy of
non-aggression. But since South Africa generally accepts the regional political status quo, the American decision to remain politically (albeit not morally) neutral, while endorsing peaceful coexistence for all, has been rejected by the Frontline states as support for Pretoria.
The Reagan Administration encouraged the peaceful change of
apartheid in South Africa and the liberalisation of excessively state- controlled economies throughout the continent. It urged ruling one-
party governments to negotiate coalitions where the rebel opposition was considered to be successful and popular - as, for example, the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (Unita) in its fight against the Movimento Popular de Libertafao de Angola (M.P.L.A.) - but
accepted Marxist-Leninist regimes elsewhere, including that led by the Frente de Libertafao de Mofambique (Frelimo).
2. Political Neutrality
If anything, American policy tilted towards the Frontline states, especially after I985, but not enough to satisfy them. Most of the members of the O.A.U. insist they are non-aligned in the East-West
conflict, but they reject any attempts by the Americans to take that stance in Southern Africa. In 1981 Crocker began an even-handed 'constructive engagement' of the main protagonists in the region that was designed, inter alia, to avoid unnecessary offence being taken
anywhere as a result of American partisanship, and to require others to set themselves against Washington only if they insisted.
The civil-rights revolution in domestic values reinforced the traditional American affinity for the imagery of self-determination, anti-colonialism, and democracy, and hence the endorsement of the moral superiority of'majority' rule by blacks in Africa. So the Reagan Administration accepted the premise that although some authoritarian or dictatorial regimes may be more friendly than others to the United
States, the worst in the region is the one in South Africa because it is based on race rather than tribe or class. Especially after I984, U.S.
spokesmen condemned apartheid unequivocally, declaring it to be the most important source of trouble in the continent, and pronounced white rule to be doomed. These official expressions of faith in the ultimate triumph of the black masses were gestures of moral solidarity with other African regimes more than hard assessments of regional realities. Yet this American tilt towards the moral claims of the black rulers was neither acknowledged openly nor reciprocated. Indeed,
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Washington's attempt to be politically neutral in the face of what is
widely regarded as a racial struggle for power in Southern Africa continues to be resented by most O.A.U. members, including the Frontline states, not least by those advocates of non-alignment who consider the United States and the Soviet Union to be 'as bad as each
other', or even that Leninist socialism is morally superior to multi-
party capitalism.1
3. Cuban Withdrawal
The M.P.L.A. leaders have allowed areas of Angola to be used as a
sanctuary not only for Swapo guerrillas, some of whom have declared themselves committed to the establishment of Marxist rule in Namibia, but also for A.N.C. activists who are committed to 'armed struggle' in South Africa. In 1986 the Reagan Administration began to provide modest aid to the Unita rebels in southern Angola partly because it felt that Jonas Savimbi had a strong case against the M.P.L.A., but also to encourage the latter's acceptance of peaceful coexistence and
change by giving it more pressing domestic worries. In addition, diverting the energies and weakening the strengths of the Marxist- Leninist regime also helped to correct the impression that Cuban troops and Soviet arms guarantee their client's success, despite being allowed to use Angolan air and naval bases.
It must be noted that although Reagan's concern about Soviet/ Cuban activism in Southern Africa marked a change from the previous Administration, even Carter had complained to Senators about the
1976 Clark amendment banning aid to anti-communist forces in
Angola when the Shaba province of Zaire was invaded from Angolan territory in I979.2
THE ACCEPTANCE OF FRELIMO S RULE IN MOZAMBIQUE
The left-wing military officers who seized power in Lisbon in I974 quickly handed over control of the Portuguese colonies in Africa to the local liberation movements. Though Frelimo was able to assume power in Mozambique without relying on Soviet assistance, President Samora Machel announced in I977 its transformation into a Marxist-Leninist
1 William J. Foltz, Jr., 'African Opinions of United States Policy', in CSIS Africa Notes
(Washington, D.C.), 69, o1 February 1987, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
2 Garrick Utley, 'Globalism or Regionalism? United States Policy Towards Southern Africa', in Robert Jaster (ed.), Southern Africa: regional security problems and prospects (New York, 1985), p. 29.
26 BEN L. MARTIN
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
vanguard party committed to 'scientific socialism' in the Soviet mould, and concurrently attempted to establish centralised economic controls and collective agriculture. Moscow provided military aid and East- bloc advisors for internal security, but denied Machel's 1978 application for full membership in the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon), because of the primitive condition of Mozambique's economy,l which meant that Frelimo had to look to the West for socio- economic support.
Outside Maputo, the Movimento Jacional da Resistencia de Mofambique (M.N.R.) established loose control over a great deal of the country. Backed mainly by South Africa until I984, the M.N.R. guerrillas destroyed many of the physical facilities left by the Portuguese, notably bridges, railways, pipelines, power stations, schools, and clinics. Increasingly isolated in the cities and without peasant support, facing economic chaos and food shortages as a result of widespread sabotage, Marxist centralisation, and prolonged drought, Machel was forced to an 'opening to the West'. When this weak and unpopular ally of the Soviet Union (at least in many American eyes) approached Washington in 1982 for improved relations and mediation with
Pretoria, the Reagan Administration responded positively. Like other states in the area, Mozambique's trade and transport depend heavily upon South Africa's productive economy and efficient network of
railways and ports, so it was not really surprising that Pretoria was able to persuade Machel to sign a mutual 'non-aggression and good neighbourliness' accord at Nkomati in I984, whereby he and Prime Minister P. W. Botha agreed not to support each other's guerrilla opposition.
Rewarding this precedent in peaceful coexistence, Reagan waived a
1970s ban on U.S. bilateral non-emergency aid to Mozambique, and
Congress approved an $8 million programme of aid in September I984, though pressure from right-wing Republicans blocked help for the
military and focused economic aid on non-governmental enterprises.2 Mozambique was the world's largest recipient of U.S. food assistance in the fiscal years 1983 and I984, and by 1987 the total American aid had reached $85 million.3 Meanwhile, the Frelimo regime had shifted economic policy away from centralised management and collective
1 Kurt M. Campbell, Soviet Policy Towards South Africa (New York, I986), p. 143. 2 Gillian Gunn, 'Mozambique After Machel', in Helen Kitchen (ed.), Angola, Mozambique, and
the West (New York, 1987), p. I37. 3 Gillian Gunn, 'Post-Nkomati Mozambique', in ibid. p. IOI; also Martin Lowenkopf,
'Mozambique: the Nkomati Accord', in Clough (ed.), op. cit. p. 59, and The New York Times, 7 October I987.
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farms, joined the International Monetary Fund, and offered new incentives for foreign investment. Haig and then Shultz, supported by the so-called 'Africanists' in the State Department, was ready from the beginning to consider the possibility that 'radical' African
governments could be malleable, but Reagan joined personally in
welcoming Machel to the White House in September I985 and also his
successor, Joaquim Chissano, two years later.1 In return, Mozambique muted its pro-Soviet voting pattern in the
United Nations, mainly by abstentions and absences rather than by siding with America,2 and Crocker was helped in his talks with Angola about the withdrawal of Cuban troops. President Chissano, like
Machel, might be described as a Marxist-Leninist pragmatist, brought by desperation to moderate his hostility towards South Africa, but he is not inherently pro-western. Frelimo's non-alignment resembles that of Cuba's, being set in the belief that communist governments are the natural allies of the Third World. Unlike Castro, though, the leaders of
Mozambique have insisted that 'socialist orientation' does not require military co-operation with the Soviet bloc, and they have refused the latter's requests for military bases.3 Moscow remains the country's largest supplier of arms, although the volume has declined in contrast to the escalation of deliveries to Angola.4
The Felimo regime had to break with the other Frontline states in
signing the I984 Nkomati non-aggression pact and by refusing to join sanctions against South Africa. Pretoria agreed to stop aiding the M.N.R. in Mozambique as part of a minimalist regional strategy that
accepted Marxist regimes in the former Portuguese colonies and
Rhodesia, as long as they did not provide the A.N.C. with sanctuaries and infiltration routes into South Africa.5 But if it had to be surrounded
by hostile black regimes, Pretoria tried to ensure that they remained weak, dependent, and distracted from anti-apartheid activism. It
organised commando raids on A.N.C. facilities in neighbouring states, and shut down oil-pipe and railway lines in order to remind them of their vulnerability. Swaziland had quietly signed a security agreement in 1982, and Botswana and Lesotho later made similar promises but
managed to avoid formal pacts.
1 David A. Dickson, United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa (Lanham, Md.,
1985), p. I37- 2 Lowenkopf, loc. cit. p. 67; and Roger Thurow, 'Impoverished Mozambique Rolls Out Red
Carpet For Both East and West', in The Wall Street Journal (New York), 20 April 1987. 3 Gunn, 'Mozambique After Machel', p. I20, and 'Post-Nkomati Mozambique', p. io2. 4 Chester A. Crocker, Statement before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 24June I987. 5 Clough, 'Beyond Constructive Engagement', p. 9.
BEN L. MARTIN 28
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
American officials encouraged South Africa's peaceful coexistence with its hostile neighbours, and protests were made against Pretoria's
military raids and the residual South African aid to guerrillas (though the military establishment may have acted without direction from either President Botha or the Department of Foreign Affairs, which
negotiated the Nkomati accord).1 As much as $1,300 million of aid was
provided by 1987 to the nine member-states of the Southern African
Development Co-ordination Conference (S.A.D.C.C.),2 designed as a conduit for western aid to help lessen their economic dependence on South Africa.
ENCOURAGING PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA
Crocker's strategy was based on the conviction that the United States could not topple the white minority regime in South Africa, and that 'constructive engagement' was likely to hold out more promise for
eroding apartheid than the openly abrasive confrontation of the Andrew
Young/Cyrus Vance/Carter years. The State Department revived the
premise of the earlier Kissinger/Nixon era that the controls exercised
by whites could not be 'wished away' and that constructive change could come only with their co-operation. It was clear, however, that America's policy of detente no more implied approval of racist repression in South Africa than of communist repression in the Soviet Union.
The Reagan Administration encouraged Botha's slowly maturing reforms, especially the new constitution in I984 that extended the franchise to Asian and mixed-race citizens and created two new houses of Parliament. But September protests in Sharpeville over increases in rents, as well as the costs of utilities, led to the spread of rioting that was
provoked if not organised by left-wing 'comrades'. Their urban
insurgency - killing black policemen and officials, enforcing strikes and
boycotts - answered the call of the exiled A.N.C. to make the townships 'ungovernable' and 'liberated zones'.3 The unrest that flared
sporadically through 1986 was the worst in several years but never became a revolutionary situation.4 For a while, however, white rule seemed vulnerable, and opponents in South Africa and the Frontline states looked to Washington to bring down the Pretoria regime.
1 John Battersby, 'Mozambique and Pretoria Revive Nonaggression Pact', in The New York
Times, 7 August 1987. 2 'South Africa: US policy', Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
November i987. 3 Michael Hornsby, 'Township Death Toll Rises to 22', in The Times (London), 8 November
I984. 4 Leslie Gelb, "'New Stage" Seen for South Africa', in The New York Times, 29 July I985.
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After Reagan's landslide re-election in November I984, the two dozen or so members of the House of Representatives in the Black
Congressional Caucus led a movement for divestment and sanctions
against South Africa that eventually included not only liberal Democrats but also moderate and even conservative Republicans.1 That coalition treated the U.S. policy on apartheid as a symbolic American civil-rights issue, thereby forcing Reagan in September 1985 to order what was, in effect, the light punishment of Pretoria (called 'active constructive engagement'), and then the following year overrode the President's veto so that restrictions were enacted on American relations with South Africa that were more stringent than those on almost any other country in the world.
In addition, the State Department, being naturally sensitive to its continent-wide constituency of African governments, led the White House towards increasingly blunt, public criticisms of the Pretoria
regime. A long list of specific demands was urged by a virtual international liberation movement that included the United Demo- cratic Front, churches and unions in South Africa, the A.N.C. and the Frontline states, the Organisation of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement, the U.N. General Assembly, European socialists, and the American left. By 1986 the Reagan Administration agreed with most of the demands, including (i) an end to the state of emergency, under which the police and the armed forces were free ofjudicial restraint and
press coverage, (ii) the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, (iii) the removal of the ban on black political movements, including the A.N.C., (iv) a time-table for ending apartheid, (v) a
dialogue between the regime and its opponents in order to create a
political system that rested on the consent of the governed, and
(vi) respect for the fundamental rights of all South Africans.2 American spokesmen joined in criticising Pretoria in the United
Nations and elsewhere in unequivocal terms. They condemned attacks on alleged A.N.C. bases in neighbouring countries, accepted the
inevitability of the end of apartheid, and emphasised the need for 'power sharing'. By September 1987 Shultz was calling for measures that would make South Africa unique on the continent: namely, a multi-
party democracy, with constitutionally guaranteed equality, the
1 Ben L. Martin, 'Attacking Reagan by Way of Pretoria', in Orbis (Philadelphia), Fall, 1987, pp. 293ff.
2 Ronald Reagan, 'Ending Apartheid in South Africa', Address before the World Affairs Council and Foreign Policy Association, White House, 22 July 1986; Department of State, Current Policy (Washington, D.C.), 853.
30 BEN L. MARTIN
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
adoption and implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the enforcement of the rule of law by an independent judiciary, a federal system of government and administration, and economic freedom.1
But the Reagan Administration was not inclined to dismiss the
majority of white South Africans or middle-class blacks as 'col- laborators' with Pretoria, and refused to accept the allegation that American businesses in South Africa were friends of apartheid. In
addition, the President neither accepted the inevitability or desirability of A.N.C. rule as the coded reality of'majority' rule, nor the necessity of'armed struggle', though the State Department favoured A.N.C.
participation in a national dialogue.2 The South African Government reacted to the threat of American
sanctions by accelerating the introduction of a number of reforms, notably the abolition of the racial 'pass laws'. But as it became clear that A.N.C. rule was the minimum requirement of most opponents of
apartheid in the United States as well as in Southern Africa, the leaders of the National Party reacted with bewildered defiance. By i986 'constructive engagement' was gone in name as well as in fact, and
Washington was left with little influence in Pretoria. Despite an
agreement by Botha in I988 to withdraw forces from Angola and to abandon control of Namibia, the anti-apartheid coalition in the U.S.
Congress pushed a new and comprehensive sanctions bill through the House of Representatives in August. It did not, however, pass the Senate.
Advocating both peaceful coexistence and change, Washington opposed Pretoria's military operations abroad, as well as guerrilla violence against and within South Africa. Such a display of evenhandedness by the Americans, coupled with their anti-apartheid measures and the flow of aid even to critical non-aligned regimes, led some African leaders to reassess their view of the United States as an
automatically staunch defender of South Africa.3 Those further to the left, however, continued to maintain that responsibility for the Pretoria
regime lay with the leading governments in the West- the U.S.
especially - in the belief that white minority rule could be ended if they had the will.
'South Africa: US policy'. 2 David B. Ottaway, 'U.S. Favors Black Rule in South Africa', in The Washington Post,
13 March 1986, and 'The President, As Amended', in The New York Times, 31 August I985. 3 Kent Hughes Butts and Paul R. Thomas, The Geopolitics of Southern Africa: South Africa as
regional superpower (Boulder, 1986), p. Io.
MOA 27
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BEN L. MARTIN
TESTING ZIMBABWEAN HOSTILITY
The Carter Administration had welcomed the election in 1 980 of the leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front), Robert Mugabe, as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, successor to Ian Smith's white rebel regime in Rhodesia. Crocker was careful to continue the policy of friendliness, and by 1983 Zimbabwe was the
recipient of the largest U.S. aid programme in sub-Saharan Africa -
indeed, the Reagan Administration provided some $350 million in all between 1981 and i986.1
Since Z.A.N.U.(P.F.) had been bitterly opposed for many years by Joshua Nkomo's Russian-backed Zimbabwe African People's Union, the new leaders of Zimbabwe were slow to warm to Moscow until sure that the Soviet Union would not be a threat to their Government. But
Mugabe visited Eastern Europe in May 1983 and, two years later, went to Moscow, where Z.A.N.U. was represented at the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress in I985. It should be noted that Zimbabwe, like Mozambique, has resisted Soviet requests for a military base.
There seems little doubt that Mugabe has profited from the earlier
experiences of other African leaders, and that he has avoided Machel's mistakes in expropriating industry and commerce, and in seizing
private farms too rapidly before securing political control. Although a
dejure single-party state cannot be created until I990, according to the
provisions of the 1979 Lancaster House constitution, this long-standing objective of Z.A.N.U. was achieved defacto by the formation of the so- called unity Government (that included Nkomo) in January 1988, headed by Mugabe, now the executive President of Zimbabwe. In other words, he has moved cautiously, not only in seizing control of the
economy, partly to avoid scaring away the remaining Ioo,ooo white-S, with their scarce skills,2 but also in dismantling some of the institutions inherited at independence.
Although Mugabe has prohibited ministerial contacts with Pretoria, Zimbabwe continues to be very dependent on South Africa for
transport and trade, and inevitably lower-level negotiations have taken
place between the two countries - indeed, it is known that military and
police officials have held secret meetings to discuss security.3 Mugabe is
1 Pauline Baker, 'United States Policy in Southern Africa', in Current History (Philadelphia), May 1987, p. 225.
2 Roger Thurow, 'Zimbabwe's Whites Discover Life Goes On After Black Liberation', in The Wall Street Journal, 14 August 1987.
3 Glenn Frankel, 'South Africa's Raids Shattered a "Gentlemen's Agreement"', in The Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, 2 June I986.
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 33
a leader in the public campaign of the Frontline states for sanctions against Pretoria, and the latter has manipulated oil deliveries and
railway access to temper his hostility. The first South African military raid into Zimbabwe came only in May 1986; until then, Pretoria was satisfied with Mugabe's care in denying the A.N.C. the use of any bases in Zimbabwe.1 South Africa has continued to be frustrated at not
winning diplomatic recognition from Harare, despite extensive trade relationships, but has not tried to topple the authorities there, just as it has left in place, if near collapse, the Frelimo regime in Mozambique.
Mugabe is currently the chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, and has not hesitated to criticise openly the United States, despite the latter's aid from the beginning. Inter alia, Zimbabwe co-sponsored a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning American intervention in Grenada, but abstained from the vote to condemn the Soviet downing of the South Korean airliner 007. The Reagan Administration became so irked by what it considered to be Zimbabwe's outright hostility that it suspended its $20 million aid programme in July 1986 after Mugabe refused to apologise for the stinging attack made by his Minister of Foreign Affairs at an American Independence Day reception in Harare attended by ex-President Carter (who had walked out in protest). But then two years later, without any noticeable lessening of Mugabe's antipathy, American aid to Zimbabwe resumed with the signing of a $17 million grant.
PULLING AND PUSHING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
Three rival parties with nationalist credentials, each enjoying outside support for their armies, vied for the authority left dangling in
Angola by the I974 military coup in Portugal. Despite the likelihood that a nation-wide election might have been won by Unita, strongest in the south among the Ovimbundu who make up more than one-third of the population, the M.P.L.A. was installed in power with the help of Soviet military aid and Cuban troops - the arrival of the latter having probably been planned before the armed intervention of the South Africans.
After the assistance given to Unita (and the Frente Nacional de Libertafao de Angola (F.N.L.A.) led by Holden Roberto) by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had proved to be ineffective, the liberal Democrats in Congress banned further help for anti-government forces
1 Ibid.
2-2
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in I976 as the M.P.L.A. proclaimed the People's Republic of Angola and received international (but not American) recognition. A treaty of
friendship and co-operation was signed with the Soviet Union that
year, and ratified in I977, when the M.P.L.A. declared itself to be a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party committed to scientific socialism. The U.S.S.R. classifies Angola as 'socialist oriented', an apprentice status in the Soviet bloc, and is allowed to use its ports and airfields for South Atlantic operations.l
Unita is a multi-ethnic political organisation that claims to have established general control over half the country.2 Certainly, Savimbi's forces have expanded their operations far beyond their southern
headquarters, and even with the backing of 40,ooo Cuban troops there seemed to be some doubt if the Government in Luanda headed by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos really controlled more than the
capital and a dozen other urban areas.3 Until 1988 the Cuban forces were not used in full-time combat roles but rather in logistics, air defence, and protection of towns, military bases, and the Cabinda oil field operated by Chevron. The latter provides 75 per cent of Angola's revenues, but more than half the oil money has gone to pay for weapons and the maintenance of foreign troops, as well as 'another Io,ooo Cuban, Soviet and East European technicians who protect the Government and keep it functioning'.' It has been estimated that Cuban protection costs $700 million annually, and that in its first decade the M.P.L.A. regime paid the Soviet Union $4,000 million for arms.5
Notwithstanding the chaotic state of the Angolan economy caused
by the continuing civil war against Unita and a series of droughts, as well as by Marxist-style over-centralisation and bureaucratic in-
competence, Moscow has refused to offer large-scale economic assistance. Indeed, despite the fact that the regime bought $i,ooo million worth of military equipment from the Soviet Union in 1987, it had to turn to the West for emergency food aid.6 Although the M.P.L.A. has announced an experiment in less-rigidly centralised
management, this is more a reluctant (and ineffectual) resort to a
1 John A. Marcum, 'A Quarter Century of War', in Kitchen (ed.), op. cit. p. 31. 2 Butts and Thomas, op. cit. p. 88. 3 Graham Leach, South Africa: no easy path to peace (London, I986), p. 209. 4 Marcum, 'A Quarter Century of War', in Kitchen (ed.), op. cit. p. 20. 5 William Claiborne, 'Cuban, Soviet Advisers Key to Angolan Regime', in The Washington Post,
9 July 1987. 6 James Brooke, 'Angola Turning to the West to Equip Its Military', in The New York Times,
23 December 1987.
34 BEN L. MARTIN
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
Lenin-style 'new economic policy' than a repudiation of statist controls.1
Despite internal political challenges and economic disasters, the Luanda regime has persisted in providing sanctuary and training bases for guerrillas of both the A.N.C. and, especially, Swapo, the national liberation movement committed to wresting control of Namibia from South Africa. The cost to Angola of doing its progressive inter- nationalist duty by supporting these twin challenges to the apartheid state has been high. Each year after I98I, South African military incursions into southern Angola not only wiped out Swapo raiders and
bases, as well as destroying communications and economic infra-
structure, but also provided hauls of Soviet weapons that allowed Unita to expand the range of its support and operations.2 Since I985, South African interventions have thwarted each of the massive annual
Soviet/Cuban-backed M.P.L.A. military operations against the Unita- held areas along the Namibian border.
After the collapse of Portuguese power in Southern Africa, Pretoria concluded reluctantly that authority must be relinquished eventually in South West Africa, although some members of the armed forces may have hoped that a Unita victory in Angola could avoid the loss.
Opposed to a future Swapo regime that would harbour A.N.C.
guerrillas, South Africa tried to build a multi-ethnic coalition of parties for an internal settlement that would be acceptable to both the West and the rest of Africa. In 1978 Pretoria co-operated in drawing up the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 calling for South African and Swapo withdrawal from Namibia, followed by elections for a constituent assembly in Windhoek. But Pretoria always suspected the U.N. (from which it had been expelled in 1974) of partiality to Swapo (recognised by the General Assembly as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people), and arguing over specifics led neither to withdrawal nor independence for a decade.
Crocker was eager that the United States should enter into a 'constructive engagement' with Angola, along with other Marxist
regimes in Southern Africa, and offered normal relations and economic
1 James Brooke, 'For Angolans, Ambivalence on Economy', in ibid. 12 June 1988; William Claiborne, 'In Angola, It's Getting Harder to Tell the Good Guys from the Bad', in The Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, 26 October 1987; Lee Lescaze, 'Angola's Inept, Indifferent, Marxist Elite Run a Nation Where "
Nothing Gets Done" ', in The Wall Street Journal, 19 February I987; and Donald Rothchild and Michael Foley, 'Ideology and Public Policy in Afro-Marxist Regimes: the effort to cope with domestic and international constraints', in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Afro-Marxist Regimes: ideology and public policy (Boulder and London, I987), p. 315. 2 Marcum, 'A Quarter Century of War', in Kitchen (ed.), op. cit. p. 26.
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36 BEN L. MARTIN
aid. The Reagan Administration allowed the Export-Import Bank to extend an $85-million loan to Angola and began a quiet dialogue with M.P.L.A. officials.1 Crocker prepared a plan-linking Namibian
independence, South African withdrawal, and Angolan agreement to remove the Cubans - which he urged all concerned to accept. He was
willing to treat Swapo as an 'authentic' movement, rather than a Soviet client, and met with its representative at the United Nations in what was America's first official contact with a senior Swapo spokesman.2
Crocker encouraged South Africa to approach Angola, as well as
Mozambique, with offers of non-aggression. This led to a February I984 agreement between Pretoria and Luanda for the withdrawal of South African forces and Swapo guerrillas from southern Angola. When Pretoria hesitated, 'it was probably American pressure that compelled South Africa to complete the withdrawal'.3 And in 1985, amid
gathering disagreements between the United States and South Africa, the Reagan Administration criticised Pretoria's decision to establish another 'interim administration' for local government in Namibia without the participation of Swapo.
Reagan's re-election in 1984 seemed to validate for many members of Congress the Administration's active opposition to what they considered to be adventurist leftist regimes, especially alleged Soviet 'clients'. The invasion of Grenada in 1983 had showed that communist rule could be reversed, and the legitimacy of aid to the Afghan resistance forces was widely accepted. In his 1985 State of the Union Address the President called for help to be given to those risking their lives to defy Soviet-supported aggression.4 That July, the Democrat- controlled House approved aid to anti-communist forces in Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, and repealed the 1976 ban on aid to Savimbi's forces in Angola. The Administration did not lobby hard for this reversal, and an inter-agency policy dispute emerged because covert military aid was favoured by the C.I.A. and the Pentagon, albeit
opposed by the State Department which had insisted, since Savimbi's visit to Washington in December 1981, that Unita should not be considered as an alternative to the M.P.L.A. regime, only a legitimate political force.5
1 Rothchild and Ravenhill, 'From Carter to Reagan', in Oye, Lieber, and Rothchild (eds.), op. cit. p. 352.
2 Christopher Coker, The United States and South Africa, I968-I985 (Durham, I986), p. 263. 3 Leach, op. cit. p. 2I5. 4
Stephen S. Rosenfeld, 'The Guns ofJuly', in Foreign Affairs (New York), Spring 1986, p. 705. 5 David B. Ottaway, 'U.S. Aid for Angolan Rebels?', in The Washington Post, National Weekly
Edition, 28 October I985, and Christopher Coker, 'South Africa: a new military role in Southern Africa, I969-82', in Jaster (ed.), op. cit. p. 145.
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
By November I985 the President agreed with the anti-communist conservatives in Washington who wanted to help Unita in Angola (although continuing to refuse their call for similar aid to the M.N.R. in Mozambique). When Savimbi came to Washington again inJanuary I986, he was warmly received at the White House, and Shultz escorted him to lunch at the conservative Heritage Foundation.1 The Admin- istration soon informed Congress that it intended to supply military aid worth $15 million to Savimbi's forces, and that annual level of
support - including Stinger missiles vital for air defence - has continued.
Opponents warned that aiding South Africa-backed Unita would
identify the United States with Pretoria in African eyes and destroy the
fragile dialogue with Luanda developed by the State Department. Although weaning Mozambique away from Moscow seemed in- consistent with driving Angola closer to the Cubans and the Russians, the purpose in each case was the same - to force a Soviet ally to leave its neighbours alone. The regime in Mozambique not only denied
military bases to the Soviet Union and strayed from the latter's line on
major international issues, but was also driven by hard necessity to make peace with Pretoria and to help Crocker persuade the M.P.L.A. to shed its Cuban protectors as part of a Namibian settlement. Unlike Savimbi's organisation in south-central Angola, the M.N.R. insurgents have destroyed the central regime's authority throughout much of
Mozambique but failed to create a system of administration in their so-called 'liberated zones' and win popular support.
Marxist-Leninist rulers, especially in Africa, pursue ideological goals when they can, but do what they must to stay in power, even if this means making deals with the devils of racism and imperialism. Pretoria has used its economic and military strength consistently to instil
prudence in its hostile neighbours. But the People's Republic of Angola is not as near to, or dependent upon, South Africa as Mozambique. The nearly $2,000 million annual income from Chevron has allowed the M.P.L.A. regime to pay for the external arms and troops that have
kept it in power, thereby enabling it to feel safe to make its territory available to the Soviet Union and its regional clients, the A.N.C. and
Swapo, for armed struggle abroad.
Although the M.P.L.A. in Angola may be as insecure and
incompetent as Frelimo in Mozambique, the advantages of the former in geography and geology made 'sticks' as important as 'carrots' for
Washington and Pretoria. The latter's support of Unita was intended to weaken and distract the regime in Luanda, but it also gave Crocker
1 The New York Times, 6 February I986.
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BEN L. MARTIN
something to suggest to dos Santos in exchange for a Cuban with- drawal - especially if Pretoria could be persuaded to leave Namibia. So the United States tried both to push and pull Angola towards prag- matism and peaceful coexistence: it was offered recognition, normal
relations, and economic aid, on the one hand, and on the other, it was faced with the prospect of continuing aid being given to Savimbi -
$15 million in 1988 being added to his other support of some $70 million
annually from Arab sources and South Africa.1 For 15 months after the Reagan Administration's decision to aid
Savimbi, Angola refused Crocker's overtures to discuss a regional settlement. But the I987-8 Soviet-directed M.P.L.A.-Cuban military offensive against Unita was defeated with South African help, and Crocker was again received in Luanda. In February 1988 Angolan and Cuban officials agreed for the first time that all Cuban troops would leave in exchange for Namibian independence and the end of aid to
Unita,2 a package deal that became increasingly plausible because of a
growing South African sense of vulnerability. Though the I988 communist offensive again failed to wipe out
Unita, it left the Cuban forces in newly threatening positions in southern Angola. Castro had sent an additional 5,00oo soldiers to reinforce the 35,ooo-strong army already shielding the Angolan regime in the north, and they were sent into combat for the first time along the Namibian border. It was here that white units of the South African Defence Force suffered unusually heavy casualties, public sensitivity to which was high in an army of conscripts and reservists.3 The Cubans built new bomber and fighter bases in southern Angola, shielded by the most advanced radar and anti-aircraft defences in the region,4 and they were able to deploy as many as 400 tanks, protected by Mig-23s that were superior to the less advanced fighters which South Africa has been unable to replace because of the western arms embargo.5 In short, Pretoria's eagerness to secure the withdrawal of the Cubans was now
heightened considerably, along with the readiness of the military establishment to accept the loss of Namibia, if necessary, as seemed
increasingly likely. The converging interests of Luanda, Pretoria, and Havana brought
1 John Marcum, 'Bipolar Dependency: the People's Republic of Angola', in Clough (ed.), op. cit. p. 24.
2 'Angola Agrees to Cuban Troop Withdrawal', in The Washington Post, 14 February i988.
3 Bernard Trainor, 'South Africans Lose a Reputation for Invincibility', in The New fork
Times, 24 August 1988. 4 Michael Hornsby, 'False Hopes on Namibia', in The Times, 22 July I988. 5 Joseph Treaster, 'Castro Faults Soviet Tactics in War in Angola', in The New York Times,
28 July 1988.
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 39 them together for a series of direct talks under the mediation of Crocker. The basic outlines of the agreements negotiated in 1988 were those that had been urged by Crocker for years: South African withdrawal from Angola and Namibia (and so an end to aid to Unita) in exchange for Cuban withdrawal from Angola. It was agreed that there should be an August cease-fire, and that all 2,000 or so South African soldiers would leave Angola by I September I988. In addition, Pretoria promised to remove its troops from Namibia in seven months in I989, before U.N.-supervised elections on I November for a new constitution and an independent government there, while Castro
agreed to move the Cuban armed forces to the north before the Namibia elections, and to withdraw two-thirds of them from Angola by I April I990 and the rest by I July I991.
CROCKER'S TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT
Although the South Africans had been successfully challenged by the Cubans in southern Angola in 1988, the Swapo insurgency was no real threat to South African control, nor to the economic life of Namibia.' President Botha was eventually persuaded that in all the circumstances he should accept the probability of a Swapo-controlled regime being installed in Windhoek. Pretoria would no longer have to subsidise the administration of the territory, and like other neighbouring states, an
independent Namibia would remain economically reliant upon South Africa. In addition, South African commandoes will obviously stay ready to help Sam Nujoma keep his promise that the A.N.C. would be denied bases in Namibia.2 In any case, after the Cubans have left
Angola, the military power of South Africa will again be unmatched by any other in the region.
Botha's critics on the right warned of a Marxist Namibia, and South African negotiators delayed before the municipal elections in October 1988 left his National Party still strong enough to make concessions.
Concurrently, the Angolans and Cubans also 'stalled' in the hope that the U.S. presidential election would be won by the Democrats, because Michael Dukakis had promised quick recognition of the M.P.L.A. regime, an end to American aid to Unita, and harsher sanctions against South Africa.3 The planned mutual withdrawals were only agreed in
1 Robert S. Jaster, South Africa in Namibia: the Botha strategy (Lanham, Md., 1985), p. 22. 2 John Battersby, 'With Peace Near, Namibia Softens', in The New York Times, 19 August 1988. 3 E. A. Wayne, 'Bush Victory Might Spark Peace Talks on Namibia, Angola', in The Christian
Science Monitor (Boston), Io November 1988.
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November I988, after George Bush's election promised continuity in American policy.
Crocker implicitly encouraged Botha's diplomatic campaign in the third quarter of I988 to lessen the regional isolation that had deepened since anti-apartheid agitation began anew in South Africa and the West four years earlier. Mozambique and South Africa renewed their non-
aggression pact prohibiting support for each other's guerrillas, and after agreeing to give up Namibia, Botha was received publicly in
Mozambique, Malawi, Zaire, and C6te d'Ivoire. Indeed, it was claimed that nearly half the member-states of the O.A.U. felt that Pretoria's decision to leave Namibia was reason enough to accept diplomatic contacts.' Despite the refusal of Mugabe to consider a
regional summit meeting that would include South Africa, it seemed that the American strategy of encouraging peaceful coexistence along with peaceful change was helping to dampen regional conflict.
But conflict continues in Angola, where Unita claims to govern more than a third of the country, and where its guerrillas roam far and wide. Savimbi's call for direct talks with the Government in Luanda in order to reach agreement about free elections and a multi-party democracy have been. to no avail, at least so far, because President dos Santos refuses to negotiate with him on an equal basis, let alone consider the establishment of a coalition regime. Several African states, including Zambia, Gabon, Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, and C6te d'Ivoire have
urged dos Santos to negotiate with Unita, and it is possible that others
may become increasingly willing to treat the Angola conflict as a civil war and not just caused by South African aggression.2
The Luanda regime has held all along that the Unita 'puppet gangsters in the pay of imperialism and racist South Africans' would
collapse quickly without the support of Pretoria.3 Although dos Santos counts on his lavishly-armed forces - even without Cuban help - being able to push back and marginalise the Unita forces if denied help from Pretoria for several years,4 he will find it hard to compete politically with their charismatic, dynamic leader. Even Soviet officials have estimated that Savimbi has the support of about 40 per cent of the
population.5 The Angolan President's version of 'national reconcili-
1 John Battersby, 'Botha's Black Africa Diplomacy is Rebuffed by Zambian President', in The New York Times, 5 October 1988.
2 Robert Pear, 'Namibia Talks Fail to End Cuban Troop Impasse', in ibid. 9 October I988. 3 James Brooke, 'Angolans Strive for Military Victory', in ibid. 9 September I988. 4 Lynda Schuster, 'Angola Rebels Decry US Peace Plan', in The Christian Science Monitor,
22 August 1988; and Marcum, 'A Quarter Century of War', in Kitchen (ed.), op. cit. p. 29. 5 E. A. Wayne, 'Angolan Rivals Vie for US Ear', in The Christian Science Monitor, I July 1988.
40 BEN L. MARTIN
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
ation' has so far been only a promise of clemency for those Unita members who surrender, and he has cited the resolution of the civil war in Chad as a possible precedent for Angola. In Chad, President Hissene Habre eventually agreed to negotiate with armed opposition groups and gave some cabinet posts to their leaders, but only after the military defeat of his main opponents.1
Unless dos Santos can split Unita politically and slip some factions
away from Savimbi, the Luanda regime is likely to lose any initial offensive momentum quickly without Cuban help. Savimbi claims to have enough supplies - and aid from 'friends' who probably include Morocco - to fight for years, even without South African logistical support across the Namibian border.2 The modest flow of American aid to Unita comes through Zaire, and those border areas are likely to become the central front in Angola, as well as the major political battleground over U.S. policy. If the M.P.L.A. military offensives do
falter, dos Santos will claim that Unita survives only because of
imperialist support, abetted by President Mobutu Sese Seko. Indeed, Angola already provides a training base for armed, uniformed Zairian dissidents at Mawa.3
In his mediation of the Angola-Cuba-South Africa talks, Crocker was not allowed by the White House to offer Luanda an end to all American aid to Savimbi, even although that assistance was opposed by Africanists in and outside the State Department, along with liberal Democrats in the U.S. Congress and the leaders of most black lobbies.
They helped to organise protests when Savimbi came to Washington to ask for continued assistance in I988,4 and they work with Angolan officials visiting the United States to lobby against any further support for Unita. It is not just $15 million in annual aid that is at stake, of course, but also the legitimacy of the Marxist-Leninist regime compared to that of Unita. Both retain consultants in Washington to give themselves the maximum favourable publicity.
Much of the American 'left' which calls for power sharing in South Africa rejects the equivalent in Angola. On the other side, a bipartisan group of moderate and conservative Congressmen, whose number varies from a third to one-half of the Senate, sent letters to the White
1 David Ottaway, 'Nov. I Target on Southern Africa to be Missed', in The Washington Post, 30 October 1988.
2 Roger Thurow, 'After 27 Years of War, Angolans Find "Peace" has Lost its Meaning', in The Wall Street Journal, 12 September 1988.
3 James Brooke, 'Why Botha and Mobutu Might Find Friendship Expedient', in The New York Times, 9 October 1988.
4 James Brooke, 'Blacks in U.S. are Lobbied by Angolans', in ibid. 3 October 1988.
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House and introduced resolutions warning against ending aid to Unita
prematurely, before the M.P.L.A. agreed to political negotiations or free elections or a halt to Soviet aid.1 They worried that Crocker would
bargain away aid to Unita, despite his willingness demonstrated over
nearly eight years in office to defend vigorously even positions which he once opposed (such as insisting on a Cuban withdrawal from Angola to
get the South Africans to leave Namibia).2 George Bush's election in November I988 assured continuity in American policy. The President has promised that aid to Savimbi will continue, at least until the massive volume of Soviet military deliveries to Luanda diminishes. Crocker's designated successor, Ambassador Herman J. Cohen, was
fully involved in the tripartite negotiations during 1988 when he was assigned to the staff of the National Security Council in the White House.
Until President Botha pledged repeatedly to leave Namibia, many observers did not believe it. South Africa's concession was the first, most difficult part of Crocker's deal, which could always fall apart- especially if Swapo and the M.P.L.A. cannot curb their revolutionary enthusiasm. For example, Botha has made his withdrawal conditional not only on a Cuban pullout, but also on the dismantling of seven A.N.C. bases in Angola as required by the Angola-Cuba-South Africa
agreement of 20 July i988, since this included the principle of non- interference in each other's domestic affairs: namely, that the
signatories shall 'not allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states'. But Angola and Cuba then claimed that provision bans South African aid to Unita but not their aid to the A.N.C., because it is a 'recognised liberation movement'.3
Pretoria has wanted to be sure that a newly independent Namibia does not appear to represent a clear victory for the U.S.S.R.-Cuba-
Angola axis (another 'socialist oriented' regime run by a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party), even if it promised not to host A.N.C.
guerrillas. An obviously hostile Swapo-controlled Namibia would not
only embolden black opposition in South Africa, but also leave Botha's successor vulnerable to criticism from the right-wing in the Conserva- tive Party and dissatisfaction within the South African Defence Force.
1 Robert Pear, 'U.S. Aide Hopeful on Angola Talks', in ibid. 20 May 1988; and E. A. Wayne, 'New Talks to Zero in on Pullout of Cuban Troops from Angola', in The Christian Science Monitor, 26 September 1988.
2 Elaine Sciolino, 'U.S. Official Nears Elusive Triumph: an intricate peace in Southern Africa', in The New York Times, 28 August I988.
3 Michael Hornsby,' Pretoria Police Kill Grenade Gang Four', in The Times, 25July I988. Also James Markham, 'Pretoria Proposes Angola Truce Soon', in The New York Times, 3 August 1988.
42 BEN L. MARTIN
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
Avoiding a clear victory for Soviet allies in a regional settlement is also important, though not vital, for the United States, because of what
might be called 'the ripple effect' of reputation, even if neither places an extremely high strategic value on Southern Africa. Mikhail Gorbachev has sometimes seemed to de-emphasise the Third World, implying disillusionment with the Soviet activism of the late I970s. The U.S.S.R. was unwilling to aid its Marxist-Leninist treaty ally in
Mozambique enough to let Machel avoid the embarrassment of the Nkomati accord with South Africa, probably because his country (unlike Angola) lacked hard currency to pay for more deliveries of
weapons, not to mention the risk of them being captured as a result of cross-border raids by nearby units of the S.A.D.F.1
But, in practice, during Gorbachev's first three years, there was a renewed willingness to back other important clients, notably Angola, where the prestige of the Soviet Union was clearly at stake.2- Cuba's
1975 intervention on the side of the M.P.L.A. was the first time in the
post-colonial era that thousands of non-African troops had been
brought into the continent to install a political movement in power.3 It
displayed Moscow's 'vvillingness to assist militarily a local client in a
region where the Soviet Union had no compelling strategic interest and no history of significant military involvement. In this, the operation was unprecedented. 4 In the M.P.L.A., the Soviets may have thought 'they have finally found an African political organization whose Marxist roots and experience of armed insurgency, along with Soviet
mentoring, have caused it to make a serious commitment to "scientific socialism "'.5
President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev agreed at their May 1988 summit in Moscow to strive for a speedy accord in Southern
Africa, and there is little doubt the U.S.S.R. urged the leaders of
Angola and Cuba to be 'flexible' in the following months, not least because of the series of meetings that were taking place between Crocker and his Soviet counterpart. The U.S.S.R. has advocated national reconciliation in Angola - not as yet including Savimbi himself, but certainly his forces - and acknowledged that Unita has substantial popular support. Soviet officials have said they are trying to
1 Winrich Ktihne, 'What Does the Case of Mozambique Tell Us About Soviet Ambivalence Toward Africa?', in Kitchen (ed.), op. cit. p. II4.
2 Francis Fukuyama, 'Gorbachev and the Third World', in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.), At Issue: politics in the world arena (New York, I988 edn.), p. 46.
3 Christopher Coker, Nato, the Warsaw Pact and Africa (London, I985), p. 239. 4 Campbell, op. cit. p. 141.
5 Marcum, 'Bipolar Dependency', in Clough (ed.), op. cit. p. 26.
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reduce involvement in third-world conflicts as part of Gorbachev's 'new
thinking' in foreign policy. Still, if the leaders of the M.P.L.A. have to compromise with Unita
after the withdrawal of the Cubans, this would represent a setback for the Soviets in Africa and beyond, even if they do not consider their
strategy to have ended in defeat. The easy opportunities for Soviet
gains offered by the collapse of Portuguese colonialism were exhausted
by 1978, and no allies have been added in the continent since then. The U.S.S.R. is clearly on the defensive in Southern Africa, and its
reputation as a military patron diminishes with every Unita victory.1 One purpose of American policy has been to discourage a repetition of Soviet-Cuban adventurism by making everyone see, as soon as
possible, that Moscow's military patronage of the M.P.L.A. regime has been a failure.
Explaining his pragmatic attitude towards Pretoria, Savimbi is fond of observing that you can choose your friends but not your neighbours, and also that South Africa does not aim to expand the rule of apartheid, although it is the predominant regional power, and intends to stay so.2 But although the M.P.L.A. decided in I975 to bring in its own friends, the Cubans, and make them neighbours, it must be recalled that it was
they who had urged Moscow to intervene then, and that within two
years both ambassadors had been withdrawn by President Agostinho Neto because they had failed to warn him of an attempted coup.3 Castro is most interested in his international image and influence, and so anxious that the withdrawal of his troops should appear to be a
'victory' that he painted the emerging deal with South Africa as a
triumph of Cuban tactics and valour, and left responsibility for defeats with the Soviets and Angolans.4 Cuban officials met with the Unita chief of intelligence in August I988 in Cote d'Ivoire, and Savimbi said
they assured him that there would be no further attacks on his forces.5 When the Russians, Cubans, and Angolans began pointing fingers at each other as they waved goodbye, the success of American policy began to be apparent.
1 Michael Clough, 'Conclusion: coming to terms with radical socialism', in ibid. pp. 7I-8. 2 William Claiborne, 'In Angola, It's Getting Harder to Tell the Good Guys from the Bad',
in The Washington Post, 26 October I987. 3 Gerald J. Bender, 'The Eagle and the Bear in Angola', in The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia), January I987, p. 128. 4 Joseph Treaster, 'Castro Foresees Accord Ending War in Angola', in The New York Times,
27 July I988. 5 Christopher Wren, 'Token Cuban Force Can Stay, Angolan Rebel Says', in ibid. 17 October
1988.
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AMERICAN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
CONCLUSION
The continuing efforts of the United States at guiding Marxist- Leninist regimes to pragmatism and peaceful coexistence requires imposing unwelcome realities and then offering welcome respites. It seems as if a careful mix of military 'sticks' and economic and political 'carrots' would be required in a U.S. policy confident of its definition of the situation and committed to its own purposes. But American
policy in Southern Africa after I984 was anything but focused, and yet the outcome promised reasonable success, given regional (and U.S.
political) realities. Perhaps inevitably, American relations with several
governments in Southern Africa were strained. This is not surprising when an outsider tries to remain politically neutral in a regional conflict, not least when the imperatives of geo-politics and domestic
ideo-politics clash, as they did in shaping U.S. policy in Southern Africa.
South Africa is a self-proclaimed and also, in some ways, a natural
ally of the United States against ideological adversaries in Southern Africa. But anti-apartheid Washington coalitions in 1985 and 1986 accepted the views of the leaders of the Frontline states concerning regional racial bipolarity, defined the primary U.S. goal as destroying the Pretoria regime, and made Africa policy into American civil-rights symbolism. Even Reagan officials had to pretend publically that white rule in South Africa was doomed, when it obviously was not, at least not in the foreseeable future. The sanctions imposed by the United States bewildered and alienated the supporters of Botha's reforms, but earned America (if not the President) minimal anti-apartheid bona fides in Africa.
The United States sought to contain Angolan revolutionary zeal, but not by means of an over-arching cold-war crusade. Reagan's call for aid to anti-communist guerrillas was never applied indiscriminately, and the Administration resisted conservative pressures to help the M.N.R. rebels in Mozambique. It was the strength, self-sufficiency, and ruthlessness of the Pretoria regime in exposing the inherent weaknesses of the Frontline states that left them receptive to American overtures urging peaceful coexistence and peaceful change. Chester Crocker's slow movement towards easing out the Cubans from Angola and the South Africans from Namibia in the last of the Reagan years seemed to reward at last even the aid to Savimbi's Unita that the Assistant Secretary of State had at first opposed. The many authors of American policy towards Southern Africa in the I 980s - from President
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46 BEN L. MARTIN
Reagan to Crocker and the Africanists in the State Department, from
anti-apartheid liberals to anti-communist conservatives in the Congress - combined finally to produce a surprisingly effective mix of incentives for guerrillas and governments in the region.
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