America’s Grand Strategy inthe 21 st Century

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    Saving the World for Democracy

    An Historical Analysis of Americas Grand Strategy in the 21stCentury

    by

    Colonel JoeBassani

    United States Army

    A paper submitted to the faculty of the Joint AdvancedWarfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of

    a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning andStrategy.

    The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and

    are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff Collegeor the Department of Defense.

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    Abstract

    This study examines Americas new grand strategy that hasemerged in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th,2001.

    Grand strategy is an overarching concept that guides hownations employ all of the instruments of national power to shape worldevents and achieve specific national security objectives. Grandstrategy provides the linkage between national goals and actions byestablishing a deliberately ambiguous vision of the world as we wouldlike it to be (ends) and the methods (ways) and resources (means) wewill employ in pursuit of that vision. Effective grand strategies providea unifying purpose and direction to national leaders, public policymakers, allies and influential citizens in the furtherance of mutualinterests.

    This study looks at three separate and distinct historicalexamples of grand strategy: The post-Republican Era of the RomanEmpire, the rise of the Mongol Empire under Genghis Kahn, and GreatBritain after the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the wars of SpanishSuccession. From these examples, we see the common threads thatrun through all grand strategies and the different approaches thatnations take in pursuing their national interests.

    Next, it examines the American experience with the emergenceof the so-called Monroe Doctrine (Americas first grand strategy), themove toward multilateralism as a result of the Second World War, andAmericas 21stCentury grand strategy that emerged post-9/11.

    Lastly, I discuss the conflict between Americas values and hernational interests and the implications for Americas future at the endof the Century.

    Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this

    world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect orall-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of

    Government except all those other forms that have been tried fromtime to time -Sir Winston Churchill in a speech before the House of

    Commons on 11 November 1947

    Few Americans will be surprised to discover in the decades to comethat the United States went to war in Iraq in the spring of 2003 tosecure strategic resources that are critical to our economic well-being.They will, however, be quite surprised to learn that we were successful

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    in securing these resources not for ourselves but for the PeoplesRepublic of China.

    Unfettered access to oil is critical to the economic well-being of ournation. According to the Committee on Resources for the US House of

    Representatives, oil is essential to our economy, our national securityand our way of life (U.S. Congress, 2005). Oil is a key enabler ofmodern life: from the cars we drive, the goods we buy, the trucks,trains and airplanes that bring our goods to market, virtually everysector of our economy is dependent on oil in one form or another.Given the importance of oil as a strategic resource, one could easilyassume that Americas dependence on Middle Eastern oil played amajor role in the decision to invade Iraq (setting aside, of course, thedebate over weapons of mass destruction).

    The data, however, do not support that assumption. According to theUS Department of Energy, the percentage of oil coming from thePersian Gulf as a share of total US oil imports was just 20% in 2003(the latest year that data was available). As a percentage of total USconsumption, Persian Gulf oil accounts for only 12% of Americas totalannual oil consumption for 2003. Canada, it turns out, is the primarysupplier of foreign oil to the United States, with Saudi Arabia rankingsecond and Venezuela third; curiously enough, Iraq produces less than4% of US oil imports.

    According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the

    areas and countries the US imports from and the normal day-to-daydestination of MENA [Middle East and North African] oil exports, isstrategically irrelevant (Cordesman, p.33). Conceding the point thatthe United States is not directlydependent on oil imports from theMiddle East, one must still acknowledge the enormous impact thatMENA oil has on the worlds economy.

    The United States, as part of the global economy of the 21stCentury,must be concerned with economic health of the other industrializednations of the world. Americans are voracious consumers of imported

    goods, and we export more than any other nation on earth. Trade isthe engine of our prosperity, and all of our major trading partners(outside of North and South America) are heavily dependent on MENAoil. In 2002, MENA oil accounted for 42% of Europes imports, 72% ofJapans, 76% of the Asian/Pacific Rim states (excluding China) and39% (and growing steadily) of Chinas oil imports.

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    Clearly the United States went to war in Iraq in 2003, in part, tosecure the worlds access to oil and we were absolutely right to doso. In todays global economy, Americas economic well-being isinexorably linked to the fortunes of our Asian and European tradingpartners.

    But access to oil is not the only reason the United States went to warin Iraq; were it so, we could have tolerated the status quo. Thesanctions and no-fly zones, while not perfect, were sustainable. Afterall, the United States contained the Soviet Union for more than fortyyears; certainly we could have marshaled the political will to containSaddam Hussein.

    If oil was not the major reason that the United States chose to go towar, why, then, did the United States commit its blood, treasure andinternational reputation by invading Iraq? In a speech on the SouthLawn of the White House, in October of 2004, President Bush defendedthe war as necessary to protect America and the world from the threatof terrorist use of WMD:

    Based on the information we have today, Ibelieve we were right to take action, andAmerica is safer today with Saddam Hussein inprison. He retained the knowledge thematerials, the means and the intent to produceweapons of mass destruction. And he could

    have passed that knowledge on to our terroristenemies, Saddam Hussein was a uniquethreat, a sworn enemy of our country, a statesponsor of terror, operating in the worlds mostvolatile region. In a world after September the11th, he was a threat we had to confront. AndAmerica and the world are safer for our actions(Bush, 2004).

    Five months later the President elaborated on the Iraqi situation in a

    speech on the War on Terror, delivered at the National DefenseUniversity. In that speech, the President stated that [o]ur immediatestrategy is to eliminate terrorist threats abroad, so we do not have toface them here at homeOur strategy to keep the peace in the longerterm is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism andterror, especially in the broader Middle East (Bush, 2005).

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    On several occasions the President has articulated his belief that thesecurity of the United States is directly linked to political freedom andstability in the Middle East. If relieved from the oppression and tyrannyof dictatorship, the logic suggests, the people of the Middle East will befree to pursue their own unique version of life, liberty and the pursuit

    of happiness. This philosophy raises several interesting questions: Howdid the president come to his conclusion regarding the link betweenthe spread of democracy and peace? How will his belief be translatedinto tangible US policy? Finally, are we willing to bet the futuresecurity of the United States on the Presidents assumption?

    The United States of America has one of the most sophisticatednational security bureaucracies of any nation in history. The NationalSecurity Council, created in 1947 to coordinate foreign and defensepolicy, assists the President in the formulation and execution ofAmericas national security policy. The organization of the NSC hasevolved over the course of the eleven administrations it has served,but its primary function remains unchanged: assist the President informulating national security policy and help him coordinate theagencies of the Executive Branch that control some of the elements ofAmericas national power.

    The Congress, like the President, has its own national securityapparatus to assist lawmakers in executing their national securityresponsibilities. An informal survey of the House and Senatecommittee websites reveals at least a dozen standing committees

    dedicated to oversight of national security issues. Our government isawash in directors, analysts, advisors and panels of experts who arededicated to helping our elected officials craft and implement effectivenational security policies.

    The National Security Act of 1947 mandates that the Presidenttransmit to Congress, annually, a report on the national securitystrategy of the United States. The Act stipulates that the annualreport include proposed short-term and long-term uses of thepolitical, economic, military, and other elements of the national power

    of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achievethe goals and objectives that are vital to our national security (SEC108, 50 USC, 404a). This requirement was reiterated in 1986 as partof the Goldwater-Nichols Act (USC Public Law 99-433.Sec.104,b 3).The National Security Strategy attempts to codify what had previouslybeen a fluid, undefined process that involved a wide variety ofinterested parties formal and informal, foreign and domestic working to build a long term strategy for enhancing the security of the

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    nation. This strategy was (and still is in academic circles) regularlyreferred to as grand strategy.

    Some of the most important and difficult decisions that our politicaland military leaders face involve grand strategy. These decisions are

    important because they very often have a profound impact on thelong-term security and economic vitality of our nation. Moreover, theyusually involve long-term investments of political and economicresources, as well as the support and commitment of the Americanpeople.

    Grand-strategic decisions are difficult because they deal withintangibles; they require leaders to think conceptually and to visualizethe effects of a series of seemingly unrelated actions. Crafting andimplementing effective grand-strategic decisions requires vision,foresight, and the ability to read-between-the-lines to discern theintentions of foreign leaders both friend and foe alike.

    This is why political leaders routinely struggle with the question ofmotivations: Why do men do what they do, or perhaps moreimportantly, why do nations act as they do? Why does a nationpursue one particular course of action over another? Why, forexample, did the Romans destroy Carthage in the spring of 146 BC?Why did Union forces fight a bloody war of attrition against theConfederates during the American Civil War, rather than acceptsecession? Why did America adopt a Germany first strategy during

    the Second World War, rather than make the Pacific Theater ofOperations (PTO) the main effort from the outset? Or, more recently,why did the United States preemptively attack Iraq in 2003 whilepursuing quite a different approach with Iran and North Korea? In thesearch for an answer to these questions, one must first come to gripswith the concept of grand strategy what it is and why we need one.

    Grand Strategy Defined

    Nailing down a commonly accepted definition of grand strategy can bedifficult. Many respected pundits use the terms strategy and grand

    strategy interchangeably. Quite often, there is not even a commonunderstanding among academics and defense analysts of whatconstitutes a grand strategy. In the following pages, I will review thework of selected authors regarding grand strategy and offer my own,humble definition as a starting point toward a greater understanding ofgrand strategy, in general, and American grand strategy, in particular.

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    Early writings on military art, while dealing primarily with militarytactics and strategy, make no distinction between strategy and grandstrategy. Over twenty five hundred years ago, Sun Tzu wrote The Artof War, as a treatise on military tactics and strategy. In it, headdresses the tactical application of military forces when, for example,

    when he advises the tactic of using the extraordinary and the normalforces (Griffith, p.91) and the strategy of combining tactics intooffensive maneuvers like the direct and the indirect (Griffith, p. 102).

    More than two thousand years later, one of the western worlds mostfamous and influential military theorists, Carl von Clausewitz, wrotethat tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement;strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war(Clausewitz, p. 146). Here, Clausewitz offers us a clear and succinct,albeit a bit sterile, description of strategy and its relationship totactics. Clausewitz limits his discussion, however, to military forcesand functions a surprisingly narrow view from a man who assertedthat war is an act of policy [where] the political aim remains the firstconsideration (Clasuewitz, p. 98). Though narrow as his focus maybe, Clausewitz opens the door to political and other non-militaryconsiderations in the study of strategy.

    In his seminal work, Strategy, one of the Twentieth Centurys mostgifted writers on the subject of strategic thought, Sir Basil HenryLiddell Hart, amplified and extended the meaning of grand strategy.Hart contends that the roles of grand strategy is to co-ordinate and

    direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards theattainment of the political object of the war (Hart, p.322).

    Hart goes on to argue that the scope of grand strategy transcends themilitary plane and extends into the fabric of a nations social life:

    Grand strategy should both calculate anddevelop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain thefighting services. Also the moral resources

    for to foster the peoples willing spirit is oftenas important as to possess the more concreteforms of power. Grand strategy, too, shouldregulate the distribution of power between theseveral services, and between the services andindustry. Moreover, fighting power is but oneof the instruments of grand strategywhichshould take account of and apply the power of

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    financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, ofcommercial pressure, and, not the least ofethical pressure, to weaken the opponentswill. A good cause if a sword as well as armour.Likewise, chivalry in war can be a most

    effective weapon in weakening the opponentswill to resist, as well as augmenting moralstrength. (Hart, p.322)

    According to Hart, grand strategy harnesses all of the elements ofnational power in the pursuit of wartime objectives. Harts descriptionof grand strategy, while more expansive than Clausewitzs, is stillrather limited in its application. Hart reveals a rather linearperspective on the relationship between war, peace, and grandstrategy. He seems to view war and peace in a binary sense as twoseparate and distinct states of being, rather than alternating conditionsin a recurring cycle of international relations. Harts model depicts aworld where nations are either at war or peace with each other.

    Harts approach forces him to confine his discussion of grand strategyto its role in the conduct of war. He does, however, address the impactof wartime grand strategy on the ensuing peace. According to Hart,while the horizon of strategy is bounded by war, grand strategy looksbeyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combinethe various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damageto the future state of the peace for its security and prosperity (Hart,

    p.322). Clearly Hart understands that the type of grand strategy anation adopts will have significant consequences for securing thepeace, but he describes grand strategy as the political object of war,rather than war as an element of a larger grand strategy.

    In his excellent work, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience,noted Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis provides a fascinating review ofAmerican grand strategy from the earliest days of the Republicthrough the Post-9/11 era. His view is broad and encompasses avariety of political, military, and economic considerations.

    Unfortunately, Gaddis limits his discussion to the evolution of Americangrand strategy; he does not attempt to provide a working definition ofgrand strategy itself.

    Gaddiss colleague Paul Kennedy, however, takes grand strategy headon. Kennedy makes, in my view, the best attempt to define grandstrategy when he asserts that the crux of grand strategy liestherefore inpolicy, that is, in the capacity of the nations leaders to

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    bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, forthe preservation and enhancement of the nations long-term (that is,in wartime and peacetime) best interests (Kennedy, p.5). Finally, itseems, we are addressing the essence of grand strategy why it isimportant and what separates it from simple strategy. According to

    Kennedy, grand strategy has to do with somehow bringing together allthe elements, in peace and war, in pursuit of the nations bestinterests. Now were getting somewhere.

    When Kennedy refers to all the elements, one assumes he means allthe elements of national power. So in Kennedys view, grand strategyis about directing the elements of national power, in both peacetimeand wartime, to achieve national goals and objectives (interests)related to national security. So far, so good, but Kennedy seems tobacktrack, later, when he makes a differentiation between a wartimeand peacetime grand strategy:

    This is not to say that grand strategy in peace isidentical to grand strategy in war. Clearly, the lattercondition calls for blood, sweat, toil and tears to adegree that simply does not exist in peacetime. Likethe amateur athlete, the nation-state in times ofpeace (that is, while not engaged in outright physicalcompetition) has to balance many desiderata earning its keep, enjoying its pleasures, andkeepingfit and strong; but when the race (or a conflict)

    occurs, a far larger amount of energies and effort isgiven to winning and fighting, and the otherelements are left to later. After the event, one canalways return to normal. (Kennedy, p.169)

    In my own view, a true grand strategy must transcend periods ofarmed conflict or war. If grand strategy truly does, as Kennedysuggests, bring together all of the elements, then it must have anenduring quality that transcends (or perhaps even bridges) periods ofrelative peace and war. Kennedys definition, while certainly an

    improvement in terms of clarity, lacks the necessary descriptors whichallow one to distinguish grand strategy from any other kind ofstrategy.

    Finally, former Senator Gary Hart describes grand strategy as theapplication of power and resources to achieve large national purposes(Hart, p.3). Putting aside the imprecise nature of the phrase largenational purposes, Senator Hart goes on to further explain that his

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    idea of grand strategy is meant to be a coherent framework ofpurpose and direction in which random, and not so random, eventscan be interpreted, given meaning, and then responded to as required(Hart, p.33). Senator Harts definition, while succinct, is simply toovague to provide the necessary traction for the purpose of this project.

    As these examples show, the accepted understandingof grandstrategy has evolved over many centuries from a framework for theproper application of military force, in time of war, to achieve nationalobjectives, to one that embraces all of the instruments of nationalpower, in both war and peace, for the same purpose. Still, the searchfor the elusive definitionof grand strategy, its essential qualities if youwill, is reminiscent of Socrates dialogue with Meno regarding theessence of virtue, or as Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart notedabout pornography: I may not be able to define it, but I know it whenI see it.

    In full recognition of the intellectual giants, heretofore mentioned, Ioffer my own definition of grand strategy as an overarching conceptthat guides how nations employ all of the instruments ofnational power to shape world events and achieve specific

    national security objectives. Grand strategy provides thelinkage between national goals and actions by establishing a

    deliberately ambiguous vision of the world as we would like itto be (ends) and the methods (ways) and resources (means)

    we will employ in pursuit of that vision.

    Grand strategy, unlike a particular military strategy (The WWII Pacificisland hopping strategy, for example) or economic strategy (e.g. theMarshall Plan) is both comprehensive and long term. It provides broaddirection for all of the elements of national power toward achieving amore secure and prosperous future for the nation. It results in policieswhich are long-range to be pursued over the course of decades,rather than years.

    The particular grand strategy that a nation embraces will influence

    national decision making and will be reflected in how it answers thebasic, 5-W questions: who, what, where, when and why.

    Who (or whom for the grammatically doctrinaire) do we consider ouradversaries or potential adversaries? Who will we ally ourselves with(or against) in pursuit of our national interests? What specific actionswill we take in pursuit of our national interests? What issues are wewilling to go to war over (Vital versus important national interests)?

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    Where will we focus our diplomatic, economic and military efforts insupport of our national interests? When will we pursue rapprochementwith one adversary or standoff with another? Finally, why does anation take seemingly opposing positions on the same issue withdifferent nations? These are but a few of the questions that can be

    answered by understanding grand strategy.

    A coherent grand strategy is not, in itself, a prescription for nationalsecurity and prosperity. Obviously, some grand strategies are moresuccessful than others. A successful a grand strategy must meet thefollowing criteria: First, it must be sufficiently ambiguous to allow forbroad interpretation. Secondly, it must be resource informed. Andfinally, when implemented, it must ultimately leave the nation morerather than less secure.

    Ambiguity is the oil that lubricates a successful grand strategy. Itallows the nations political leaders the freedom of maneuver to buildcoalitions, promote domestic acceptance, or keep an adversary off-balance. Bumper sticker phrases like containment, Cold War, andManifest Destiny often evoke understanding in one listener that issufficiently different in another to allow for unified action in the face ofconflicting interests. How else can one explain how a diverseorganization like NATO, with its wide diversity in national interests andinternational perspectives, maintained such a cohesive stance duringits first fifty years?

    No grand strategy can reasonably expect to succeed if it ignoresnational limitations. Leaders of small nations (Great Britain being thenotable exception) cannot reasonably expect to operate unilaterally forextended periods of time and still achieve their national objectives.Most nations employ grand strategies that rely on building coalitionsand leveraging their own unique, national capabilities to achieve theirends. Very few nations in history possessed the resources to actalone, all the time. Leaders must continually take stock of theirnational assets and balance them against the grand strategy.

    Lastly, and most importantly, a successful grand strategy mustenhance the long-term well being of the nation it serves. For as SaintMatthew admonished in the Gospel, For what is a man profited, if heshall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?(Matthew,16:26).National leaders must take care to ensure that operational victories donot result in strategic defeats. In other words, the price of victoryshould not be so dear as to bankrupt the physical and moral reservesof the nation.

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    Determining Factors

    A successful grand strategy has, at its core, a set of basic principleswhich provide the intellectual framework for its development andimplementation. These principles are nationally unique and derivefrom geography, natural resources, political institutions, demographics

    and historical precedent. It is within the unique context of particularcircumstance that each nation derives its grand strategy. Great Britainprovides an excellent example.

    From the time of the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, throughthe end of the Second World War, naval power was the centerpiece ofBritish military power and a driving force behind her grand strategy. Acasual observer might consider this development a no brainer. Onecould even reasonably argue that the rise of the British Navy as thedominant military arm and instrument in service of British Imperial

    power was preordained. One wonders, then, why Imperial Japan, alsoan island nation, saw her army as the decisive force around which shepursued the military objectives of her grand strategy.

    The answer to that question has more to do with the motivationsbehind imperial aspirations Great Britain being concerned primarilywith economics while Imperial Japan sought to secure both strategicresources and international status. In any event, the evolution ofgrand strategy involves a complex set of relationships with factorsthat, at first look, may not seem to be directly related to nationalsecurity.

    Interestingly enough, while national values tend weigh heavily in theformulation of grand strategy, quite often they play a much smallerrole in the execution of grand strategy than most politicians or policymakers would care to admit. During the Cold War, for example, asuccession of US administrations, both Republican and Democrat,maintained close ties with un-democratic foreign leaders (FerdinandMarcos and the Shaw of Iran are two that come immediately to mind)because it was in our national interest at the time.

    With a better understanding of what grand strategy is, let us now lookat how grand strategies evolve and come to gain popular acceptance.

    So how does a nation actually decide upon a particular grand strategy?Do governments actually make a conscious effort to develop a grandstrategy, or does it simply evolve over time? And if, in fact, grandstrategies are arrived at in a logical and deliberate way, how do the

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    processes that produce them differ in open, democratic societies viceclosed, totalitarian ones?

    To present a functioning grand strategy, the national political processmust achieve consensus amongst the polity that will implement it. Of

    course polities differ greatly across the various forms of government,but still, those individuals, groups and institutions with equities atstake in the nations political life must buy in to the strategy, if it willhave any real chance of success.

    Grand Strategy Through the Ages: The Roman EmpireFrom the earliest days of the Republic, the citizens of Rome, asreflected in the actions of the Roman Senate, were obsessed with thesecurity and defense of Rome. Enduring memories of the humiliationat the capture of Rome in 390 BC by northern barbarians fueled theRoman quest for security behind frontier lands and borders. In thefirst two centuries of the Republic, Roman Legions rebounded from aseries of defeats as they subdued the Italian peninsula, conqueredSicily, and defeated their most potent regional rival, the Carthaginians.

    The destruction of Carthage in 146 BC is illustrative of how theRomans used their scarce military resources to achieve lasting effect especially in the eastern lands. The Roman Senate believed thatCarthage, with her enormous wealth and history of military success,posed an unacceptable risk to Roman security. For more than acentury, Rome waged a series of costly wars against her North African

    rival for domination over the Mediterranean region. Finally, in 149B.C., Rome issued an ultimatum to the citizens of Carthage: abandonthe city or fight; to the delight of the Senate, the Carthaginians choseto fight.

    After three years of savage combat, Carthage fell to the Romanlegions. The men who refused to surrender were slaughtered, thewomen and children taken as slaves, and the city razed to the ground.So complete was the destruction of the city that it is still widelybelieved today that the Romans ploughed up the ground and sowed it

    with salt to prevent anything from ever growing there again. Whilethere is no historical evidence to support the salting tactic, thedurability of the story itself serves as a testament to the ruthlessnessof the Roman legion and the willingness of Rome to use examples ofthe power of her military might for deterrent effect.

    British historian Tom Holland describes the Roman use of armed forceas a means of spreading fear and intimidation:

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    The legions combination of efficiency andruthlessness was something for which fewopponents found themselves prepared. Whenthe Romans were compelled by defiance to

    take a city by storm, it was their practice toslaughter every living creature they found.Rubble left behind by the legionaries couldalways be distinguished by the way in whichsevered dogs heads or the dismembered limbsof cattle would lie strewn among the humancorpses. The Romans killed to inspire terror,not in a savage frenzy but as the disciplinedcomponents of a fighting machine. (Holland,p.5)

    In large measure, the Roman Republic was built on acquiescencerather than outright military domination. Rome tempered the threat ofviolence with liberal inducements aimed at creating client states thatwould accept long-distance rule from Rome. To states that humblyacknowledged their superiority, the Romans would grant such favorsas a patron condescends to grant his clients, but to those who defiedthem, only ceaseless combat. No Roman could tolerate the prospectof his city losing face. Rather than endure it, he would put up with anyamount of suffering, go to any lengths (Holland, p.6).

    Eventually the imperial success of the Republic would lead to itsdownfall, as generals succumbed to the temptations of power, and theexcess of newfound wealth corrupted the body politic. What began asa policy of national security through conquest, led to internal revoltand, ultimately, to dictatorship.

    In The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire, Edward Luttwak outlinesthe evolution of Roman grand strategy through three distinct systemsof imperial rule over the course of more than three centuries. Luttwak

    describes these systems as the Julio-Claudian System of expandingclient states, the Antonine system of stability and consolidation, andDefense-in-Depth. These examples offer an excellent opportunity toreview the history of Roman grand strategy and will aid in deepeningour own understanding of the application of grand strategy.According to Luttwak, [f]or the Romans, as for ourselves, the twoessential requirements of an evolving civilization were a soundmaterial base and adequate security. For the Romans, as for

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    ourselves, the elusive goal of strategic statecraft was to providesecurity for the civilization without prejudicing the vitality of itseconomic base and without compromising the stability of an evolvingpolitical order (Luttwak, p.1).

    If Luttwaks assessment is correct and I believe that it is we canonly regard the grand strategy of the Republic era as a failure. Theoutbreak of civil war and the eventual rise of Julius Caesardemonstrated that the power of an empire will not rest peacefully inthe hands of a governing body of equals, committed to consensus rule.By pursuing a grand strategy that sought to expand the empire, theRoman Senate embarked on a course that created instability in thevery political institutions they were trying to preserve. Thus, the well-being of the Republic was not enhanced by this strategy.

    The Julio-Claudian grand strategy that evolved after the reign of JuliusCaesar differed from its predecessor in the means it employed ratherthan the ends it hoped to achieve. For while both strategies sought toenhance Roman security and economic vitality, and both embraced theexpansion of the Roman Empire, the new strategy actually succeededin its goal of securing the wealth and stability of successive post-Republican governments.

    From the time of Augustus, in 27 BC, through the reign of Nero, whichended with his death in 68 AD, the Romans pursued a grand strategyof global hegemony that leveraged client states and tribes to serve as

    the bulwark against foreign invasion. All the elements of Romanpower the diplomatic, military, and economic were employed withthe goal of leveraging the power of others to secure Rome and herprovinces.

    Much is made and rightfully so of the military might of the RomanEmpire. But military might alone stood little chance of dominating andsubduing such a large and diverse empire. At its most powerful, Romecould field only twenty eight legions (approximately 175,000 men).Even counting the auxiliary forces provided by her client states, the

    number of men under arms for Rome totaled only about three hundredand fifty thousand. There is simply no way that a force that smallcould maintain a presence throughout an Empire that spanned fromNorth Africa in the south, to Germany in the north, and from Spain inthe west, to Syria in the east and beyond.The strategy that the Romans employed, distributed Roman Legions tostrategic locations across the empire that enabled them to reinforce

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    trouble spots or to move quickly to check an invasion or quell anuprising.

    Thus, in A.D. 6, out of a total of twenty-eightlegions, four were in Spain, five on the Rhine

    or beyond, two in Raetia, five in Illyricum,three in Moesia, and nine in the whole of NorthAfrica, Egypt, and Syria. After the ambush ofVaruss legion in A.D. 9, the Spanish garrisonwas reduced to three, the German increased toeight, the Raetian eliminated, and Illyricun leftunchanged, and the Moeshian reduced to two.One legion remained in North Africa, two inEgypt, and four in Syria. This distribution wasmaintained until the invasion of Britain in A.D.43. (Luttwak, p. 47)

    Given the uneven and selective distribution of Roman forces, how arewe to account for the remarkable stability of the empire? Tocompensate for their relative paucity of military forces, the Romansemployed a variety of diplomatic measures aimed at securing thesupport of their client states and tribes. Vassal kings and tribal chiefswere offered inducements to secure their loyalty to Rome. Everythingwas on the table: from subsidy payments to land grants even offersof Roman citizenship. In fact, the most cherished honorific that aclient head of state could hope to achieve was the title amicus populi

    Romani (friend of the Roman people). And shouldpromiseoftreasure, land or title fail to secure the support of a reluctant king, thethreatof Roman military action usually produced the intended effect.

    It is the absence of a perimeter defense that isthe key to the entire system of Roman imperialsecurity of this period. There were neitherborder defenses nor local forces to guard theimperial territories against low-intensitythreats of petty infiltration, transborder

    incursion, or localized attacksuch protectionwas provided, but by indirect and nonmilitarymeans. By virtually eliminating the burden ofmaintaining continuous frontier defenses, thenet, disposable military power generated bythe imperial forces was maximized. Hence, thetotal military power that others could perceiveas being available to Rome for offensive use

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    lesser, unassimilated barbarian tribes were segregated from their morecivilized (Romanized) kin. Moreover, the resources of Rome werestretched thin and continued expansion of the Empire was simply notpractical. The time for governing rather than expanding the empirehad arrived.

    Under the Antonine system, Roman grand strategy no longer relied onclient states and tribes to provide frontier security. During theAntonine period, Roman priorities shifted from expanding andexploiting frontier client states, to securing a tranquil peacethroughout the empire in order to promote growth, commerce, tradeand, above all, political stability (or what Luttwak callsRomanization). As the frontier regions become increasingly pacifiedand prosperous, they also become more accepting of Roman rule, andmuch like the relationship of American Colonies to England, they beginto see themselves as Romans, with all the rights and privilegestherein.

    The decline of the client state system began around 70 A.D., whenVespasian assumed the throne after the civil war which followed Nerosdeath. Vespasian saw the client state system as burdensome,derisively referring to the political maneuvering required to secureclient state support as the leisurely processes of diplomacy. Underthe Julio-Claudian system, Rome had an interest in maintaining abalance of power amongst her client states adjudicating disputes andpunishing unsanctioned military actions, such as Herods move against

    neighboring Nabatean Arabia during the rule of Augustus Caesar.Under the Antonine system, Rome began to annex her client statesand take on the responsibility for their border defense as provincialentities of the empire.

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    Roman Grand Strategy

    Rome

    Provinces

    Clients

    Legions

    Tribal Clients

    Why, one might ask, did Rome decide to change a grand strategy thathad worked so well for so long? The answer, while paradoxical, isactually quite logical: Strong client states were useful to Rome, onlyso long as she herself could maintain overwhelming military (andultimately political) power over them. Strong client states enjoyed ameasure of autonomy within the empire, so long as they employedtheir own military forces in the defense of the frontier and, mostimportantly, did not challenge the authority of Rome.

    From the founding of the Republic to the end of the Julio-Claudia era,

    Rome wielded unprecedented power. During this period of imperialexpansion, Roman client states understood the power of the legionsand the willingness of the emperor to use those legions to assertRoman authority. Usually Romes clients weighed their options andchose to accept their role as semi-autonomous clients. Any king whowished to keep his throne would have to lead his military forces inservice to the empire.

    By the time of Vespasian, however, Rome had neither the inclinationnor the resources for continued conquest. The civil war that followedNeros death left the political will of the empire exhausted.

    Furthermore, Vespasian certainly understood the danger that apowerful military commander left to his own devices on the frontier,posed to the established order in Rome.

    Under the Julio-Claudians, the stronger a clientstate was, the better it could fulfill its diversesecurity functions. An empire that was

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    perceived as capable of further expansion wasalso an empire that could keep its powerfulclients in subjection. Not so under the newsystem, in which the only satisfactory clientswere those weak enough to be kept in awe by

    the forces deployed in direct proximity tothem. In the absence of the ultimate sanctionof annexation, only weak clients were safeclients. But their very weakness rendered themunsatisfactory as providers of free militaryservices. Strong client states, on the otherhand, had now become dangerous, since thebonds of dependence had been weakened.(Luttwak, p.114)

    The evolution in Roman grand strategy that occurred under theAntonine system was the result of economic concerns, as well asmilitary factors, and it affected more than just the disposition ofRoman military forces. Diminishing economic opportunity, as well asthe need for security, drove the abandonment of expansion andestablishment of rigid borders. By 70 A.D. the Empire had envelopednearly all of the economically developed regions within reach. At theclose of the 1stCentury A.D., Rome held dominion over an empire thatreached the ocean in the west, the Parthian empire in the East, andbarbarian tribes with little to offer in the way of goods or valuableresources in the north. Since there was no profit in extending the

    empire further, Rome turned inward.

    The death of Marcus Aurelius in 180 AD marks the beginning of theend for the Antonine period. With the murder if his son and heir to thethrone, Commodus, in 192 AD, a disgraceful period of internecine war,bribery, and treachery ensued. Between the natural death ofSeptimus Severus in 211 and the accession of Diocletian in 284, therewere twenty-four more-or-less legitimate emperors and many moreusurpers. (Luttwak, p.128) It was Diocletion, finally, who broughtorder to the chaos through political and military innovations that would

    preserve the Roman Empire for another century.

    Diocletians political reforms centered on the introduction of thetetrarchy as the new form of imperial authority in Rome. By cleavingthe empire in two and establishing an Augustus of the East and anAugustus of the West, he returned political stability to the body politicand ended the bloody wars of succession that had plagued the Empirefor decades.

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    Militarily, Diocletion established the strategy of Defense-in-depth,based on a combination of static fortresses and mobile field armies.When frontier fortifications were overrun, the Legions would resort toan open, mobile form of warfare. The preferred method during thisperiod, however, was to tie armies into existing, fortified positions

    along the frontier:

    Meeting only static guard posts and weakpatrol forces on the frontier, the enemy couldfrequently cross the line virtually unopposed,but in the context of defense-in-depth, this nolonger meant that the defense system hadbeen turned and overrun. Instead, theenemy would find itself in a peripheral combatzone of varying depth, within whichstrongholds large and small as well as walledcities, fortified farmhouses, fortified granaries,and fortified refuges would remain, eachcapable of sustained resistance againstenemies unequipped with siege-machines.Within and beyond this zone were the mobileforces of the defense, deployed to fight in theopen but with the support of the fortifiedplaces. (Luttwak, p.132)

    From the earliest days of the Republic, to the eventual sack of Rome in

    410 A.D. by the Goths, the Senate and emperors of Rome had a grandstrategy for securing the physical and economic well-being of theempire. And as the geo-political situation evolved over decades ofconquest and rule, so too, did Roman grand strategy.

    Genghis Kahn and the Mongol Empire

    For centuries the name Genghis Kahn has evoked images of unbridledbarbarism and chaos. Its probably a pretty safe bet to assume thatvery few people today would use words like diplomacy, commerce,international law, and grand strategy when discussing the ruler of the

    ancient Mongol nation. It is actually quite remarkable, really, thathistory should portray the man who built the largest empire in thehistory of the world as more warlord than geopolitical strategist.

    While Genghis Kahn had none of the organs of a modern, sophisticatednational security system at his disposal, he did, nonetheless, have agrand strategy or vision for the Mongol nation. Although unwritten,Genghis Kahns grand strategy for the Mongol nation was remarkably

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    successful in harnessing the military power of the Mongol tribe,integrating diplomatic efforts, and creating a system of economicrelationships that joined the traders of the east with the markets ofthe west. For [a]lthough he arose out of the ancient tribal past,Genghis Kahn shaped the modern world of commerce, communication,

    and large secular states more than any other individual. He was thethoroughly modern man in his mobilized and professional warfare andin his commitment to global commerce and the rule of internationalsecular law. (Weatherford, p.267)

    Temujin, the boy who would one day be known as Genghis Kahn, wasborn in the spring of 1162 A.D., to the Black Bone or lower caste ofthe Asian Steppe people. By the accepted standard of the day, theboy was completely unremarkable: He was not particularly large orphysically gifted, and his temperament suggested nothing especiallyuseful to a warrior culture. Nonetheless, this young boy was destinedto one day remake the world in his own image and forge the greatestempire in the history of the world.

    As a member of the lower caste, Temujin was forced to defer to hisbetters those White Bones who achieved their positions in theestablished order by right of birth. His personal frustrations forcedhim by 1181 A.D. to set out on his own and establish his own clan.Taking a novel approach to the task of building his court, Temujinappointed his followers to positions of responsibility based on merit,rather than caste or family connections. So effective was his system

    that he quickly established himself as a beloved leader amongst theMongol people. In fact, by the age of nineteen, Temujin seems tohave determined to become a warrior leader of his own, to attract hisown followers and build a base of power, eventually aiming to becomea khan, the leader and unifier of the unruly Mongol tribe.(Weatherford, p,39)

    As he continued to expand his influence over his own tribe, Temujinbegan to see himself as a unifying force for all of the Steppe people.Historically the balance of power in the region shifted from Kahn to

    Kahn in a series of continuous battles. But as he continued toconsolidate his power, Temujin grew determined to bring all of thetribes under one rule. Once he consolidated rule over his own tribe,Temujin began his conquest over all of the Eurasian Steppe, and by1206, he had united all of the nomadic tribes of Eurasia the Tartars,the Keyrid, and the Naiman -- under his rule as Mongols.

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    prowess. Leading a nation-tribe of less than one million souls, with anarmy of approximately one hundred thousand warriors, Genghis Khanconquered an area of approximately 12 million square miles. Intwenty five years, the Mongol army subjugated more lands and peoplethan the Romans had conquered in four hundred years. (Weatherford,

    p.xviii)

    The strategy that the Mongols employed against an enemy involved asophisticated combination of diplomacy backed by the force. As heconsolidated his power amongst the tribes of the Asian Steppe,Genghis Kahn cultivated his reputation as a fierce warrior. His militarystrategy was remarkably fluid and asymmetric.

    All Mongolian warriors were mounted, and without armor, they werefast and agile. If his opponent possessed a large infantry force,Genghis Kahns armies waged a mobile campaign that employed hit-and-run tactics designed to spread the opposing army out. If hedefended behind great city walls, the Great Kahns warriors laid siegeto them, employing their engineers to build siege engines to reducetheir defenses. If the enemy possessed a large peasant population,the Mongol armies drove them like cattle ahead of their advance,straight into the defending enemy army:

    The Mongol army divided into small unitsthat attacked undefended villages, set themafire, and chased out the residents. The

    frightened peasants fled in all directions. Theyclogged the highways and made it difficult forthe Jurched supply convoys to move. In theJurched campaign, more than a millionrefugees fled the countryside in desperationand poured into the cities; they ate up hugestores of food, and caused chaos whereverthey went. (Weatherford, p.92)

    The Mongols brutal military tactics supported Genghis Kahns

    preferred diplomatic approach to conquest: as the Mongol armiesapproached the capitol city of a kingdom, the general in charge sent amessenger with a surrender demand. If the prince surrendered hiscity, offered tribute and pledged his loyalty to the Mongol empire, thecity was spared and the monarch kept his throne as a vassal ofGenghis Kahn; if not, the city was razed, the prince publicly beheaded,and his wives distributed to deserving Mongol generals.

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    This approach supported Genghis Khans grand strategy of expandinghis empire to establish hegemony over large parts of Europe, China,the Middle East and India in order to connect them in trade and,ultimately, enrich his own people. Certainly the Mongols would takewhat they wanted by force, but if they could coerce a ruler to submit

    to Mongol rule through fear, enlightened self-interest, or acombination of both, so much the better. In the end, all that reallymattered to Genghis Kahn was that Mongol rule remained secure andsupreme.

    Mongolian Grand Strategy

    MILITARY FORCE

    DIPLOMACY

    Engage Expand Exploit

    Economic

    Prosperity

    Physical

    Security

    Conquer Compel Deter

    Trade Tribute

    Above all else, economic considerations drove Mongolian grandstrategy. By 1260 A.D., the Mongol Empire stretched over twocontinents, connecting the major cites of Zhongdu (Beijing), Moscow,Kiev, and Baghdad. Mongolian officers engaged in lucrative tradingwith merchants as far away as Venice and Geona. More importantly,the Mongols controlled the trade routes that joined east with west.Understanding the value of trade and commerce to their empire, theMongols introduced a sophisticated finance system to support their

    global trade:

    Genghis Khan had authorized the use of papermoney backed by precious metals and silkshortly before his death in 1227. The practicegrew erratically in the coming years, but bythe time of Mongke Khans reign, it became

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    necessary to limit the paper money supply inways that it was not necessary to do with goldand silver coins. Mongke recognized thedangers incurred by earlier administrationsthat issued paper money and debt on an ad

    hoc basis, and in 1253 he created aDepartment of Monetary Affairs to control andstandardize the issuance of paper money. Thesuperintendent of the agency centralizedcontrol to prevent the overissue of papermoney and the erosion of its value throughinflation. (Weatherford, p.176)

    Mongke Khan, like his grandfather before him, understood that thereal value of money resided in dependence. By creating a stable andeffective monetary system, Mongke deepened economic ties andtightened his grip on the vassal states of the empire.

    Like the Romans before them, the Mongols employed their own uniquegrand strategy that leveraged their national strengths and provideddirection to their subordinate military, diplomatic and economicstrategies.

    Great Britain and the European Balance of Power

    With the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, England emerged asan important world power. Her immediate reaction to this newfound

    status was to take to the seas in pursuit of economic rewards.According to Winston Churchill, in his acclaimed History of the EnglishSpeaking Peoples, England had emerged from the Armada year as afirst-class powerThe success of the seamen pointed the way to wideopportunities of winning wealth and fame in daring expeditions(Churchill, p.155). As she continued her global conflict with Spain, aBritish grand strategy began to emerge that blended the militaryinstrument, provided by her naval power, with economic expansion.While British merchants struck out across the globe in search ofwealth, the Royal Navy continued its harassment of the Spanish at

    every chance:

    The coming years resound with attacks uponthe forces and allies of Spain throughout theworldexpeditions to Cadiz, to the Azores, intothe Caribbean Sea, to the Low Countries, and,in support of the Huguenots, to the northerncoasts of France. The story is one of confused

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    fights, conducted with slender resources andculminating in a few great moments. The

    policy of the English government was todistract the enemy in every quarter of the

    world. The island was at last secure.

    (Churchill, p.155)

    Beginning in the Eighteenth Century, during the Wars of SpanishSuccession, British grand strategy evolved to include a secondenduring objective: the balance of power on the European Continent.According to John Hattendorf, Professor of maritime History at theNaval War College, English statesmen believed that there must be abalance of power in Europe which would hinder anyone [sic] nationfrom interfering with the normal development of another nation(Kennedy, p. 19).

    To achieve a balance of power on the Continent, the Britishgovernment engaged in a series of diplomatic maneuvers aimed atsecuring a Grand Alliance against France. Britain secured the activesupport of the Dutch and the Portuguese, as well as lesser supportfrom the Austrians and the Germans, in a bid to encircle France andher allies with the goal of dividing and weakening her superior militarystrength. After more than a decade of global war, the treaty of Utrechtsecured a favorable peace for the British one that created a balanceof power in Europe, split the Spanish throne between the Habsburgsand Bourbons, secured the Protestant succession and secured

    significant trade and territorial advantages.

    The grand strategy that emerged during the Eighteenth Centurycapitalized on three British strengths-- naval dominance, grandalliances, and colonial interests to achieve a balance of power inEurope, thereby securing Great Britains physical and economic well-being. Time and again, when Britain saw her security threatened, sheturned to this strategy to secure her long-term interests.

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    British Grand Strategy

    Physical

    Security

    Economic

    Security

    GRAND STRATEGY

    Naval

    Dominanc

    e

    Colonial

    Interests

    Alliances

    Naval

    Dominanc

    e

    Colonial

    Interests

    Alliances

    National Security

    Balance of Power in Europe

    In one form or another, this grand strategy demonstrated its utilitythroughout both the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century. For it wasNelsons victory at Trafalgar, even more than Wellingtons at Waterloo,that secured England from invasion and preserved the British Empire.Whenever Britain chose to ignore her successful naval strategy aseconomy of force in Europe (waterloo being the notable exception) shepaid dearly.

    One could trace the decline of the Empire to the British entry intoWorld War One and their refusal to embrace this time-tested grandstrategy, resulting in four years of horrific carnage, the loss of anentire generation and the erosion of confidence for the mass of Britishin their national government. Liddell Harts dislike of Britainsovercommitment (as he viewed it) to the western front led him to putthe case for the British way of warfare: that is to say, for the

    historical strategy of an island-state chiefly reliant upon sea power,and contributing the instruments of the maritime blockade, financialsubsidies, and peripheral operations but not large scale continentalarmy to the coalition assembled to defeat any power which sought todominate Europe by force (Kennedy, p. 3).

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    The Evolution of American Grand strategy

    National security is the 800 pound gorilla of American politics.Providing for the common defense is one of the fundamentaljustifications for our very form of government. The image of the

    citizen-soldier, the minuteman, ready to take up arms in defense of hiscommunity is seared into the American consciousness. As a nation ofimmigrants (excepting, of course, the American Indians), mostAmericans have a sense that securing the American Dream is anobligation that comes with their birthright as Americans.

    Since the earliest days of the Republic, American statesmen havestruggled to achieve a balance between national security and Americanvalues. During the debates over ratification of the Constitution,Alexander Hamilton addressed Americas security interests in TheFederalist Papers. Prior to ratification of the federal Constitution,Pennsylvania and North Carolina adopted constitutions which declared,[a]s standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEYOUGHT NOT to be kept up (Hamilton, federalist No.24). Hamilton,however, advanced the argument for a standing federal army asessential to the security of the nation:

    Though a wide ocean separates the UnitedStates from Europe, yet there are variousconsiderations that warn us against an excessof confidence or security. On one side of us,

    and stretching far into our rear, are growingsettlements subject to the dominion of Britain.On the other side, and extending to meet theBritish settlements, are the colonies andestablishments subject to dominion of Spain.This situation and the vicinity of the West IndiaIslands, belonging to these two powers, createbetween them, in respect to their Americanpossessions and in relation to us, a commoninterest. (Hamilton, Federalist no.24)

    Hamilton further explained that the federal government, rather thanthe individual states, had an obligation to provide for the defense ofthe nation. In an early hint at preemption, Hamilton dismissed theargument against maintaining a standing army in peacetime as aninvitation to attack by a hostile foreign power. Should those opposedto a peacetime standing army prevail, Hamilton reasoned, [w]e mustreceive the blow before we could even prepare to return it. All that

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    kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet thegathering storm, [italics added for emphasis] must be abstained from,as contrary to the general maxims of a free government (Hamilton,Federalist no.25).

    This early argument over the need for a standing army is illustrative ofthe struggle to decide just what kind of nation the people of the UnitedStates of America wished to build. The election of George Washingtonas our first president would establish precedent for American nationalsecurity policy for over a century.

    As a military commander, Washington understood that military poweris an essential component of national security. As a pragmatist,however, he also understood that American military power waslimited, and that America, as a second-rate power compared to GreatBritain, France and Spain, could easily find herself in the position of apawn in the European balance-of-power game. Neutrality, Washingtonreasoned, was the only way that America could protect herindependence.

    Throughout his presidency, George Washington spoke frequently andeloquently in favor of neutrality in European affairs, in particular, anddetachment from foreign intrigue, in general. Washingtons numerouswritings and speeches on the subject revealed a deeply-held sentimentthat would resonate throughout our government for over a century. Inhis farewell address to Congress, Mr. Washington declared,

    If we remain one People, under an efficientgovernment, the period is not far off, when wemay defy material injury from externalannoyance; when we may take such anattitude as will cause the neutrality we may atany time resolve upon to be scrupulouslyrespected; when belligerent nations, under theimpossibility of making acquisitions upon us,will not lightly hazard the giving us

    provocation; when we may choose peace orwar, as our interest guided by our justice shallCounselTis our true policy to steer clear ofpermanent Alliances, with any portion of theforeign world (Washington, p.975).

    Washingtons impact on future American policymakers cannot beoverstated. His isolationist sentiments served as the bedrock of an

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    embryonic American foreign policy that continued to evolve throughoutthe Nineteenth Century. So strong is the isolationist strain in theAmerican body politic that, even today, in an America that is the mostengaged and important nation in the world, Americans are reminded ofWashingtons famous admonishment to avoid foreign entanglements.

    The Monroe Doctrine

    In the decade following the end of the Revolutionary War, however,Americans enjoyed a period of relative peace and prosperity, especiallywhen compared to the people of Europe who continued to be plaguedby tumult of war and revolution. Eminent American statesman andfuture President, John Quincy Adams noted upon his return fromEurope in 1801 the contrast in the quality of life between the commonpeople of Europe and the United States. According to his biographer,Samuel Bemis, Adams observes that [t]he standard of living hadsteadily improved for the average man. Luxurious new mansions orpalaces, had sprung up for the more wealthy. The general well-beingwas testimony to the success of the foreign policy of GeorgeWashington and John Adams, which Thomas Jefferson took over andcontinued in all essentials: peace, commerce, and honest friendshipwith all nations, entangling alliances with none (Bemis, p111).

    Adamss observations are important because he, perhaps more thanany other American statesman before or since, played a significant rolein shaping the future of American foreign policy. For John QuincyAdams, the most influential American grand strategist of the

    nineteenth century, was the principal architect of Americas first andmost enduring, national grand strategy (Gaddis, p.15).

    John Quincy Adams was the most skilled and experienced diplomat ofhis day. He received his first exposure to the affairs of state at theage of ten when he accompanied his father during the elder Adamssdiplomatic mission to the courts of Europe in 1778. From hisexperiences as a teenager in the courts of Europe, to his one term as aSenator from Massachusetts, his assignment as Ambassador to Russiaand as Secretary of State in the Monroe administration, Adams

    developed remarkable skill as a diplomat as well as a keen sense ofAmerican independence.

    Adams believed strongly in Manifest Destiny -- though that term hadyet to be coined. During his time as Ambassador to Russia, Adamsexplained his position in a letter to his father:

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    The whole continent of North America, he toldhis father, appears to be destined by DevineProvidence to be peopled by one nation,speaking one language, professing one generalsystem of religious and political principles, and

    accustomed to one general tenor of socialusages and customs. For the commonhappiness of them all, for their peace andprosperity, I believe it is indispensable thatthey should be associated in one federal union.(Remini, p.44)

    During his one term as a United States Senator, Adams demonstratedhis understanding that American security depended on expansionacross the North American continent. At great risk to his future as aFederalist politician, Adams publicly supported Jeffersons LouisianaPurchase, even though he voted against on legal-technical grounds:

    John Quincy Adams believed with John Adamsand Thomas Jefferson, as well as with the HighFederalists Rufus King and Alexander Hamilton,in the annexation of Louisiana, if only as ameans of keeping Napoleon Bonaparte out ofthat region for the peace and safety of theUnited States. He was further convinced thatthe loss of power and influence of his section

    would be more than compensated by theextension of national power and security.(Bemis, p.119)

    As Secretary of State during the Monroe Administration, Adamsdemonstrated his genius as a diplomat by turning a potentiallyembarrassing and dangerous situation into a stunning victory forAmerican interests in North America. Moreover, his handling of thecrisis brought on by the First Seminole War provided the intellectualframework for Americas first true grand strategy that would ultimately

    result in the Monroe Doctrine.

    In 1818 President Monroe authorized General Andrew Jackson toconduct a punitive expedition into Florida to punish Seminole warriorsfor their raids into US territory and attacks on US citizens. Jacksonsmission, while certainly a military success, was a potential diplomaticdisaster. In the process of punishing the Seminole warriors anddestroying their villages, Jackson greatly exceeded his mandate by

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    capturing the cities of Pensacola and St. Marks and executing twoBritish nationals who he suspected of arming the Seminoles.This incident, with its potential to become a diplomatic crisis for theUnited States, split the Presidents Cabinet. Several members of theAdministration called on the President to censure Jackson in order to

    avoid British and Spanish reprisal; only Adams rose to the Generalsdefense. He prevailed upon the President to provide post hoc sanctionof Jacksons actions in Florida. Adams argued that everything he[Jackson] did was defensive; that as such it was neither war againstSpain nor violation of the Constitution (Remini, p. 55). Monroe sidedwith Adams, and he gave his Secretary of State the mandate to set inmotion a brilliant series of diplomatic maneuvers that signaled thebeginning of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

    The settlement that Adams engineered with the Adams-Onis Treaty of1821 was a landmark event that won for the United States more thanjust title to Florida. Ever the visionary, Adams worked a generalsettlement of disputes over the southern border with Mexico that,combined with his earlier settlements with Great Britain over thenorthern border with Canada, opened the way to western expansionand established American claims on the Pacific coast.

    Just as importantly, Adamss defense of Jacksons actions in Floridaestablished the intellectual argument for preemption. By giving theSpanish the ultimatum to adequately garrison the territory or cede itto the United States, Adams signaled, not just the willingness, but the

    right of the United States to defend itself against imminent threats.His belief in Americas divine mission to establish dominion over NorthAmerica (Manifest Destiny) would ultimately find its expression in theMonroe Doctrine.

    Adams diplomatic coup in Florida inspired Monroe to publicly embracehis vision of American hegemony. In his annual message to Congresson 2 December 1823, Monroe formally put the European powers onnotice that the United States (with the tacit approval of Great Britain)would not condone attempts to revive their colonial authority in the

    Americas:

    [t]he American continents, by the free andindependent condition which they haveassumed and maintain, are henceforth not tobe considered as subjects for futurecolonization by any European powers.... Weowe it, therefore, to candor and to the

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    amicable relations existing between the UnitedStates and those powers to declare that weshould consider any attempt on their part toextend their system to any portion of thishemisphere as dangerous to our peace and

    safety. (Monroe, 1823)

    Thus, the so-called Monroe Doctrine became the unifying theme ofJohn Quincy Adamss grand strategic vision for American security:Preemptive military action, in the face of emerging threats;unilateralism, expressed by American neutrality and isolationism; andhegemony, initially over North America but eventually extending overthe entire western hemisphere, as American power allowed.

    Like all successful grand strategies, the strategy that Adams crafted inthe early Nineteenth Century was neither codified in a document norpublicly debated as such. It was, however, popularly understood bymost Americans and expressed in common references to the issues ofthe day, such as 54-40 or fight over Alaska; the battle cry ofremember the Alamo during the war with Mexico, Horace Greeleyschallenge to go west young man and complete the Americansettlement of the continent. These phrases, along with ManifestDestiny, Remember the Maine, and others, reflect a nationalconsensus over Americas role and mission in the world. In fact,Adamss grand strategic vision was so successful that it served twenty-seven presidential administrations (excluding the first two terms of

    FDR) and prevailed as the philosophical underpinning for Americannational security for nearly a century and a half.

    WW I and Wilsonian DemocracyAt the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the United States stoodunchallenged as the preeminent power in the Western Hemisphere.The annexation of Cuba and the Philippine Islands at the end of theSpanish American War, coupled with the development of a two-oceannavy enabled by the Panama Canal, solidified her status as anemerging world power and master of the Americas. Despite her

    growing international stature (it was Theodore Roosevelt, after all,who received the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the end of theRusso-Japanese War) American policy makers were determined toprotect Americas neutrality.

    To characterize Americas entry into the First World War as reluctant isan understatement. From the very outset of the war, President Wilsonwent to great lengths to keep America out of the fight. In a message

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    to the 63rdCongress, dated 19 August 1914, barely three weeks afterthe war began, Wilson declared Americas neutrality, in fact, as wellas in name (Wilson, 1914). Even the German sinking of the Lusitaniain 1915 did not break American neutrality. In fact, Wilsons Secretaryof State, William Jennings Bryan, resigned in protest over Wilsons

    harsh rebuke of the Germans over the incident.

    While he would go on to win reelection in 1916 under the slogan hekept us out of the war, Wilson could not keep America on thesidelines indefinitely. Ironically, it would take a German diplomaticinitiative to ally herself with Mexico, against the United States, to pushAmerica into the war. Even as America joined the Allies to defeat theGermans in 1917, she balked at the prospect of full partnership in theGrand Alliance, preferring instead to retain a vestige of unilateralismas an associate member.

    It is clear that Americas entry into World War One represented adetour, rather than a departure, from Americas grand strategy ofneutrality, unilateralism, preemption and hegemony over the WesternHemisphere. It is interesting to note the conversion that Wilsonappears to have undergone during the war: He stood for reelection ona platform of neutrality, yet in his Fourteen Points speech to Congress,he proposed a general association of nationsaffording mutualguarantees (Wilson, 1918). Later in the speech, Wilson revealed hisnewfound internationalist sentiments when he explained, we fellourselves to be intimate partners of all governments and peoples

    associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separatedin interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end(Wilson, 1918). Unfortunately for Wilson, the Congress did not sharehis new world view. Unwilling to involve the United States in futureEuropean wars, the Congress failed to ratify the Treaty of Versaillesand America returned to her pre-war grand strategy and pursueddisarmament with reckless abandon.

    WWII and the Rise of MultilateralismIn 1945 America was on the verge of being overwhelmed by her own

    success. With the emergence of the United States as a globalSuperpower after the Second World War, American statesmen facedan entirely new set of challenges. What could or should the UnitedStates do to rebuild Europe, and what would become of her formercolonies? Would the alliance with the Soviet Union remain intact, orwould pre-war tensions prevail? What impact would atomic weaponsand long-range aircraft have on American national security? Theseissues reflected a new, post-war reality, forcing American policy

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    makers to devise a new grand strategy that reflected Americasexpanding range of interests and concerns.In the age of the atom, American diplomats reasoned, the UnitedStates could no longer depend on natures gift of three vast bodies ofwater to provide the free security to which Americans had grown

    accustomed (Gaddis, p.8). Most American statesmen, in the late1940s, believed that Americas atomic monopoly would not lastforever, and with advances in technology coming at an unprecedentedrate, the United States could no longer afford to follow Adamss modelof neutrality, preemption and unilateralism. Engagement in the worldthrough multilateral cooperation, they reasoned, was the surest was tosecure Americas future in a smaller, more dangerous world.

    While Roosevelt rejected Adamss neutrality, he embraced evenexpanded Adamss hegemonic design as the second tier of his visionof Americas post-war grand strategy. Roosevelt envisioned a globalAmerica, engaged in the world and shaping events. He understood, asdid many of our allies, that America must remain engaged if Europeand the United States were to have any chance at a free andprosperous future. Roosevelt also understood that America wouldemerge from the war stronger and in a better position to lead, and theallies knew that they would need a strong America to help themrebuild and secure the post-war world. Roosevelts vision of post warAmerica, therefore, was of globally hegemonicAmerica, leading theworld in a consensual arrangement (Gaddis, p.54).

    The final tier of Roosevelts new American grand strategy was hisrejection of unilateralism. Roosevelt understood that, as withdemocracy, the cost of multilateralism is consent. While the SovietUnion might use force to keep its allies in line, the United Stateswould not. From a moral perspective, the United States was unwillingto use force to compel other free nations to accept her authority. Asthe worlds great liberal democracy, American values simply would notallow the kind of heavy-handedness that Stalin would employ. Thephilosophy of Americas intellectual founding fathers men like Locke,Rousseau, and Jefferson still resonated with Americans in 1945.

    America could not (and would not) maintain a standing army of thesize necessary to dominate Western Europe by force. Sincedemobilization was inevitable, American would have to rely on the ruleof law and the consent of free nations to keep the peace. Thus theterm free world would come into vogue.

    The seeds of Americas new global security strategy were sewn on 14August 1941 by Roosevelt and Churchill aboard HMS Prince of Wales.

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    The men who headed the Anglo-American Alliance proposed a set ofprinciples for international collaboration in maintaining peace andsecurity called the Atlantic Charter. Their meeting, the first in a seriesof conferences which later included Stalin in Moscow, Teheran andYalta, would lead to the formation of the United Nations on 26 April

    1945.

    In retrospect, it seems almost inevitable that Roosevelts new grandstrategy would lead to the Cold War.

    Stalin had made it clear, by the time of FDRsdeath in April of 1945, that he would notaccept multilateralism: that he planned toimpose a unilaterally controlled sphere ofinfluence in eastern and central Europe, as hehimself once put it, as far as his armies couldreach (Gaddis, p. 55).

    Stalin, himself a visionary, albeit a dark one, could see the growingpower and influence of the United States; he was determined that theSoviet Union would emerge from the war as the dominant power inEurope.

    Certainly it was clear to American and British military and diplomaticleaders that the wartime alliance between the Grand Alliance betweenthe United States, Britain and the Soviet Union was beginning to

    unravel as early as 1945. Several American and British wartimeleaders, to include Churchill himself, argued for an Allied push to takeBerlin, despite an agreement with Stalin that the Red Army would takethe German capitol. To his credit, Roosevelt, ever the pragmatist, heldfirm to his commitment to the Soviets. What tends to get lost in thediscussion over this point is that, by 1945, the Soviets had the largest,most powerful army in the world. With interior lines and a battle-hardened population, they clearly had the advantage over the west.Moreover, western leaders had spent the past several yearsrehabilitating Stalins image as Uncle Joe. How could they now

    explain that our Russian friends, who were allies in our fight againstfascism, were now the enemy?

    Herein lies an example of the brilliance of Roosevelt as a grandstrategist. Despite enormous political pressure to press the militaryadvantage against the Soviets in the closing days of the war,Roosevelt understood that the United States was in a unique positionat the end of the warstronger, richer and more respected than any

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    nation on earth. What advantage could be gained by protracting theconflict and wasting lives and treasure in direct combat against theRed Army? Roosevelts refusal to take Berlin was, in my view, thesingle greatest grand strategic maneuver of his presidency.

    Shortly after the war, however, Stalins blatant power grabs began toalarm western leaders. At Yalta, the United States and the SovietUnion had presumably reached an understanding on how the powervacuum in Eastern Europe was to be filled. Roosevelt felt he hadreceived Stalins agreement to free elections in which all democraticparties could participate. The systematic exclusion of pro-Westernparties from the electoral process in Poland and throughout EasternEurope struck many in the West as a doublecross (Hastedt: 48). Thefailure to allow elections, coupled with a series of aggressive Sovietmoves pressure on Turkey over naval bases and access to theMediterranean Sea, combined with Stalins refusal to remove RedArmy troops from Iran in accordance with the schedule agreed to atthe Tehran Conference, and Soviet support of the communistinsurgents in the Greek Civil War pushed Truman to adopt a moreaggressive stance toward the Soviet Union.

    George Kennans famous cable where he warned that the Soviets werecommitted fanatically to the belief that there can be no permanentmodus vivendithat our traditional way of life must be destroyed, theinternational authority of our state be broken if Soviet power is to besecure sent shock waves through the American government. In one

    of the most inspired periods in the history of American foreign policy,Truman saw Kennans later call for containment as an opportunity forAmerica to halt the Soviet expansion at a cost that America couldafford:

    In these circumstances it is clear that the mainelement of any United States policy toward theSoviet Union must be that of a long-term,patient but firm and vigilant containment ofRussian expansive tendencies it will be

    clearly seen that the Soviet pressure againstfree institutions of the Western world issomething that can be contained by the adroitand vigilant application of counterforce at aseries of constantly shifting geographical andpolitical points, corresponding to the shifts andmaneuvers of Soviet policy. (Kennan, 1947)

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    Truman outlined his policy, the so-called Truman Doctrine, on March12, 1947, in a speech before a Joint session of Congress requestingfunding and material support of the Greek and Turkish governments:

    We shall not realize our objectives, however,

    unless we are willing to help free peoples tomaintain their free institutions and theirnational integrity against aggressivemovements that seek to impose upon themtotalitarian regimes. This is no more than afrank recognition that totalitarian regimesimposed upon free peoples, by direct orindirect aggression, undermine the foundationsof international peace and hence the securityof the United StatesI believe it must be thepolicy of the United States to support freepeoples who are resisting attemptedsubjugation by armed minorities or outsidepressures. (Truman, 1947)

    In the face of a growing Soviet threat, Truman was able to adaptRoosevelts grand strategy of multilateralism to suit Americas post-war national security needs. In fact, the very existence of the Sovietthreat to Western Europe gave multilateralism its power, for whenforced to choose between American hegemony and Soviet domination,most western leaders quite reasonably lined up behind the Americans.

    The National Security BureaucracyAnother important foreign policy achievement of the TrumanAdministration was the creation of the Americas modern nationalsecurity apparatus. During the war, American diplomats, militaryleaders and members of Congress began to realize that theresponsibilities of 20thCentury foreign and military policymaking werebecoming too complex for one man alone. The United States, with itslegal and cultural checks and balances designed to thwart the designsof would-be tyrants, excels at crisis management, but is rather inept

    at deliberate planning. By 1945, however, it was generally recognizedthat the competitive chaos of FDRs approach to foreign affairs was illsuited to the responsibilities of a first-rate world power (Inderfurth &Johnson, p.2).

    In an attempt to bring order and cohesion to the process of craftingand implementing Americas grand strategy, Congress passed theNational Security Act of 1947. The Act established the National

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    Security Council as an advisory body to the President with respect tothe integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to thenational security so as to enable the military services and the otherdepartments and agencies of the Government to cooperate moreeffectively in maters involving the national security (NSA of 1947).

    Over the course of its fifty-eight year history, presidents have used theNSC to help shape American foreign policy in different ways eachwith a different view as to the role of the NSC as an advisory body:From the highly institutionalized and procedural models under Trumanand Eisenhower, to the personal, ad hoc approach under Kennedy andJohnson, and in the extreme case under President Regan, to the pointwhere the NSC staff ceased to function as either a policy-making orpolicy-coordinating body (Hastedt, p.121). Certainly, the NSC hasadapted to meet the unique needs of each of the elevenadministrations which it has served, yet its essential responsibilityremains to advise the President and to coordinate policy between thedepartments of State, Defense and other governmental agencies asrequired.

    The NSCs track record of helping the President shape and implementAmericas grand strategy is mixed. On one hand, the National SecurityAct of 1947 established a permanent forum for dialogue between theAmericas military and diplomatic communities; on the other hand, ithas institutionalized departmental parochialism that is often reflectedin a process that appears to value consensus above all else. Policy by

    consensus, while certainly concordant with our democratic values,does not always produce the most effective policy. According toformer Carter Administration National Security Advisor, ZbigniewBrzezinski,

    In the making of national security policy, wehave, in effect, a chaotic nonsystem. And thatnonsystem, I think, reflects some of thepersistent institutional problems that haveeluded solution in recent yearsIn searching

    for a remedy to the problem in all its aspects,we must recognize that the elimination ofconflict is an idle dream. Conflict is bound toexist whenever a number of individuals areengaged in a decision-making process,whenever a number of institutions projectdifferent institutional perspectives. So someconflict is unavoidable and is bound to be with

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    us, enlivening and, one hopes, enlighteningour lives. (Brzezinski, p. 328)

    While imperfect, the National Security Council does provide a forum forstudying issues and presenting expert advice to assist the President in

    formulating, integrating and executing Americas grand strategy fornational security.

    American Grand Strategy After 9/11

    From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous andslippery; the demon Socrates affords a memorable instance

    how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man maydeceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixedand middle state between self-illusion and fraud-- Edward Gibbonfrom The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire

    In the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11th, 2001,American foreign policy makers experienced what can only bedescribed as a collective cognitive dissonance. As the death toll fromthe attacks continued to rise, it became clear to many that the oldparadigm had been broken. If, as Thomas Kuhn asserts, [p]aradigmsgain their status because they are more successful than theircompetitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitionershas come to recognize as acute (Kuhn, p. 23), one can imagine thatthe emotion that the members of the Bush cabinet experienced on that

    day was not unlike that which their predecessors experienced in theMadison or Roosevelt administrations in 1814 and 1941.

    Former National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, expressed thissentiment in a speech at the Reagan Presidential Library on 26February 2004:

    The attacks of September 11th, 2001, were thegreatest strategic shock that the United Stateshas experienced sinc