Analytic thinking: do you feel like it?

Analytic thinking: do you feel like it?

Valerie Thompson • Kinga Morsanyi

Received: 12 April 2011 / Accepted: 20 September 2011 / Published online: 12 February 2012

� Springer-Verlag 2012

Abstract A major challenge for Dual Process Theories of reasoning is to predict the

circumstances under which intuitive answers reached on the basis of Type 1 pro-

cessing are kept or discarded in favour of analytic, Type 2 processing (Thompson

2009). We propose that a key determinant of the probability that Type 2 processes

intervene is the affective response that accompanies Type 1 processing. This affective

response arises from the fluency with which the initial answer is produced, such that

fluently produced answers give rise to a strong feeling of rightness. This feeling of

rightness, in turn, determines the extent and probability with which Type 2 processes

will be engaged. Because many of the intuitions produced by Type 1 processes are

fluent, it is common for them to be accompanied by a strong sense of rightness.

However, because fluency is poorly calibrated to objective difficulty, confidently held

intuitions may form the basis of poor quality decisions.

Keywords Fluency heuristic � Affect � Dual process theories � Intuition � Analytic

thinking � Reasoning � Decision making � Feeling of rightness

Judgments and decisions are assumed to arise from processes that vary along a

continuum from relatively fast and effortless (intuitive) to deliberate and capacity-

demanding (analytic) (Epstein 2010; Evans 2010; Hogarth 2010). In addition to being

slower and more capacity dependent, intuitions are assumed to be accompanied by an

V. Thompson (&)

Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan,

9 Campus Drive, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A5, Canada

e-mail: [email protected]

K. Morsanyi

School of Psychology, University of Plymouth,

Drake Circus, Plymouth, Devon PL4 8AA, UK

e-mail: [email protected]

123

Mind Soc (2012) 11:93–105

DOI 10.1007/s11299-012-0100-6

affective experience of confirmation or sense of confidence (Sinclair 2010; Hogarth

2010). In dual process theories, these sets of processes are subsumed under the labels

‘‘Type 1’’ and ‘‘Type 2’’ respectively (e.g., Evans 2010; Kahneman 2003; Stanovich

2011). On this view, the faster Type 1 processes often hold sway because Type 2

processes do not intervene to overturn an initial decision based on their output in

favour of a more reasoned one (Kahneman 2003; Stanovich 2011; Thompson 2009).

Consequently, compelling intuitions may be retained in contradiction to basic rules of

probability or logic (see Plessner et al. 2008 for a recent review).

As has been argued elsewhere (Thompson 2009), a crucial task for dual process

theories (and, by extension, all theories of intuitive reasoning) is to explain why and

when intuitions are sometimes kept as the basis of an answer and why, at other

times, they are discarded. The solution, we propose, lies in disentangling the

component dimensions of intuitive thinking. In particular, we will argue that it is

necessary to distinguish the content of intuitive thoughts, the ease with which they

are processed, and the sense of rightness they entail. In this paper, we will present

evidence to substantiate the following:

1. Type 1 processes give rise to two outputs: the content of a judgment or decision, as

well as a feeling of rightness (FOR) about that decision (Thompson 2009, 2010).

This FOR is the experience of confirmation or confidence referred to above, and

serves as the basis for the inference that the initial intuition was correct.

2. This FOR is an inference derived from the experiences associated with

producing that answer, such the ease with which it comes to mind (see Koriat

2007; Topolinski and Reber 2010 for recent reviews). The reliance on fluency

as a cue to confidence we will term the fluency heuristic (as per Hertwig et al.

2008). Because fluency may not be well calibrated with objective difficulty, it

may lead to a misplaced sense of confidence (Benjamin et al. 1998).

3. The experience of FOR is an affective one that arises from the fluency with

which items are processed, that is, fluent processing gives rise to positive affect

(Winkielman et al. 2003).

4. Because the relationship between fluency and FOR is an inferential one, it can

be moderated by the attributions people make about the context in which the

judgment took place.

5. The probability and extent to which Type 2 processes are engaged depends on

the strength of the FOR that accompanies the answer generated by Type 1

processes (Thompson et al. 2011). When there is a strong feeling of rightness

associated with the initial answer, the probability and extent of Type 2

engagement is reduced relative to when the FOR is weak.

1 The fluency heuristic

1.1 Fluency of retrieval versus content of the answer

Under this proposal, Type 1 processes generate two distinct outputs: the content of

the initial answer and an accompanying sense of the correctness of that answer

94 V. Thompson, K. Morsanyi

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(Simmons and Nelson 2006; Thompson 2009). An item from Frederick’s (2005)

Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) illustrates the point:

If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100

machines to make 100 widgets?

____ minutes.

The answer ‘‘100’’ is accompanied by a strong sense that it is the correct one, and

is given in error by about two-thirds of participants.

This sense of correctness is a metacognitive judgment, one of several that are

routinely used to assess the workings of our cognitive processes, and in particular,

the degree to which such processes have functioned or will function correctly (see

Dunlosky and Bjork 2008 for a review). As illustrated by the widget example,

however, metacognitive processes function imperfectly. This is because the origins

of the sense of confidence are derived from experiences associated with producing

the answer, rather than the content of the answer itself (e.g., Benjamin et al. 1998;

Jacoby et al. 1989; Koriat 2007; Schwartz et al. 1997). Thus, it is possible for people

to express high degrees of confidence in completely false or inaccurate memories

(Roediger and McDermott 1995; Sporer et al. 1995).

1.2 The fluency heuristic as a guide to confidence

We propose that the answer ‘‘100’’ feels right for similar reasons. As is the case in

other cognitive domains, we propose that judgments of confidence on reasoning

tasks are, in fact, inferences based on experiences associated with generating an

answer, such as the fluency with which the answer comes to mind (see Koriat 2007

for a review). For example, the fact that an item is remembered quickly and easily is

sufficient to create a strong, and sometimes misleading, sense that it has been or will

be correctly recalled (e.g., Benjamin et al. 1998; Costermans et al. 1992; Jacoby

et al. 1989; Kelley and Lindsay, 1993; Robinson et al. 1997; Whittlesea and Leboe

2003). Similarly, the FOR that accompanies the answer ‘‘100’’ is strong because the

answer was generated fluently.

1.3 Fluency and accuracy

Given that the fluency heuristic can be misleading, why do we rely on it? The reason

is that when people retrieve facts from memory, fluency is very often a valid cue to

difficulty (Koriat 2007). For example, repeated encounters with an item increases

speed of recognition, so that the names, concepts, and words that are encountered

most often are recognized most quickly. Thus, objects that come to mind quickly are

those that have been encountered frequently (Hertwig et al. 2008), so that relying on

the fluency of retrieval will often give accurate feedback about the contents of

memory. Consequently, despite knowing very little about tennis, one might be

relatively confident that Roger Federer is a top player, based on the fact that one can

quickly recognize his name (Hertwig et al. 2008).

The fluency heuristic 95

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2 The affective basis of the fluency heuristic

As we noted above, many theorists posit that intuitions are accompanied by a

positive affective experience of confidence or confirmation. In the sections that

follow, we argue that this affective experience arises from the fluency with which

items are processed.

The experience of fluency can be derived from a large number of sources:

Information may be retrieved more or less fluently, perceptual processing may also

be more or less fluent, as some items or scenes may be relatively more difficult to

perceive, and conceptual fluency may be enhanced when the item under

consideration is semantically related to previously presented stimuli. However,

regardless of how it is induced, fluent processing is accompanied by positive affect

(Pronin and Wegner 2006; Topolinski and Reber 2010; Winkielman, et al. 2003).

That is, the fact that something has been processed fluently gives rise to a positive

feeling about that stimulus, which, in turn, creates a sense of rightness about it (see

Koriat 2007 for an extensive review). This sense of rightness may then serve as a

basis for confidence that an answer is correct (e.g., Koriat 2007; Topolinski and

Reber 2010), or form the basis of a judgment of beauty (Reber et al. 2004), truth

(Reber and Schwarz 1999), or typicality (Oppenheimer and Frank 2008).

Evidence for the relationship between fluency and affect comes from a number of

sources. First, there is evidence of a global relationship between speed and affect,

such that rapidly occurring events induce positive affect. For example, music with a

quick tempo is perceived as being happy, and is more likely to induce positive mood

and arousal than music with a slower tempo (e.g., Gagnon and Peretz 2003).

Performing rapid movements (i.e., aerobics) creates positive mood states and

reduces depressive symptomatology (e.g., Emery and Blumenthal 1991). In clinical

cases of mania, fast thinking is experienced together with feelings of elated mood,

increased energy, creativity and inspiration (American Psychiatric Association

1994, p. 328). Such attributions can also be induced experimentally. Pronin and

Wegner (2006) created the illusion of rapid/slow thinking by presenting sentences at

either at half or double the speed of their participants’ normal reading pace. The

statements were designed to induce positive or negative mood in the participants.

Presentation speed was reliably linked to participants’ reported mood, and its impact

was at least as great as that of the content manipulation.

There is also more direct evidence that fast cognitive processing elicits positive

feelings, as indicated both by self-report and by the activation of the zygomaticus

major (‘‘smiling’’) muscle (Topolinski et al. 2009; Winkielman and Cacioppo

2001). For example, Topolinski et al. (2009) asked participants to read word triads

which either had or did not have a remote word associate (e.g., SALTY, DEEP,

FOAM are associated with SEA; DREAM, BALL, BOOK do not have a remote

associate). The coherent triads are read more fluently than the non-coherent ones,

presumably because the third word is semantically primed by the first two (e.g.,

Topolinski and Strack 2009b). Reading coherent word triads activated the smiling

muscle, which was accompanied by the relaxation of the frowning muscle

(corrugator supercilii; which is associated with negative affect and high mental

effort), and a relaxation of the forehead muscle frontalis (indicating increased


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familiarity). Conversely, non-fluent processing activates the frowning muscle (e.g.,

Cacioppo et al. 1986; Scherer and Ellgring 2007). Finally, stimuli which are

processed fluently are preferred to less fluently processed items as reflected by

consumer choices (e.g., Alter and Oppenheimer 2006) and liking ratings (e.g.,

Morsanyi and Handley 2012; Topolinski and Strack 2009a).

3 The fluency heuristic as inference

The experience of fluency produces a positive affect that may form the basis of a

variety of judgments, including confidence. This occurs because people are usually

not privy to the origin of their feelings, and they assume that their feelings have

been elicited by whatever stimuli are in the focus of their attention (Higgins 1998).

Thus, in most contexts, the use of one’s feelings as a source of information does not

require a conscious attribution (cf., Schwarz in press). As a result, the impact of

feelings on judgments generally increases when people are under low processing

capacity (e.g., Greifeneder and Bless 2007), time pressure (e.g., Siemer and

Reisenzein 1998) or have low motivation (e.g., Rotliman and Schwarz 1998).

However, if there is a salient or plausible explanation for the feelings, they may

either be discounted or attributed to another source. Thus, the positive affect that is

engendered by fluent processing will only contribute to a metacognitive judgment of

rightness or confidence if there is not a compelling alternative explanation for that

positive affect (cf. Schwarz in press). For example, a task that is presented in a

difficult to read font may be judged more difficult than a task presented in an easy to

read font, based on the inference that if a text takes longer to process the content

must be more complicated (Song and Schwarz 2008). However, if participants are

aware of the source of reduced fluency (e.g., they notice that the text had been

printed with an almost empty toner cartridge), they discount the effect of fluency, as

they judge it to be unrelated to the difficulty of the task that is being described

(Oppenheimer 2004). Thus, the attributions people make about the positive affect

engendered by fluent processing is mediated by people’s domain-specific theories

(cf. Schwarz 2004).

Explicit task demands, and the individual’s goals can also override the influence

of feelings (e.g., Bless et al. 1990). When, for example, the goal is to make an

important, self-relevant decision, people are more likely to rely on the content of the

information that is brought to mind, rather than the ease of retrieving those

examples (Rotliman and Schwarz 1998). Similarly, if feelings are considered

irrelevant to the task, they may be discounted, as when people make decisions for

others (Raghunathan and Pham 1999).

Finally, the context in which a fluent experience occurs may moderate its impact

on judgment. That is, fluent processing makes a larger contribution to metacognitive

judgments when it occurs in the context of less fluent processing than when it occurs

in the context of similar experiences (Hansen et al. 2008; Whittlesea and Leboe

2003). Participants in the Hansen et al. study were asked to judge the truth of

statements with ambiguous truth value (e.g., ‘‘Nut bread is healthier than potato

bread’’). Fluent processing of the statements (as determined by the contrast between


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font and background) increased the probability that a statement was judged to be

true, but only when the preceding statements were difficult to process. When the

preceding statement was also in an easy to read contrast, the effect of fluency

disappeared. Thus, reliance on the fluency heuristic tends to be greater when fluency

is unexpected, making it salient (Topolinski and Strack 2009a). Indeed, Topolinski

and Reber (2010) suggested that an unexpected increase in processing fluency might

be the basis of the ‘‘aha’’ experience associated with moments of insight (which is

characterized by suddenness, ease, positive affect and confidence). That is, at the

moment of insight, the answer suddenly comes to mind with unexpected ease, which

triggers both positive affect and confidence in the judgment.

4 The fluency heuristic, FOR, and Type 2 thinking

Thus far, we have presented evidence to show that fluent processing creates positive

affect, which, in turn, can create a sense of rightness or confidence in an answer.

However, because the experience of fluency and the resultant attribution of

confidence arise from experiences associated with processing an answer, rather than

the content of that answer, confidence in many domains may be only weakly

correlated with measures of objective accuracy. Thompson (2009, 2010) has

proposed that similar principles underlie judgments of confidence in the domain of

reasoning, and can be further used to explain a) why some intuitive answers are kept

with little additional processing, whereas others are subject to re-analysis, and b) the

compelling nature of many so-called reasoning biases.

4.1 Fluency, FOR, and control of Type 2 thinking

Thompson (2009, 2010) proposed that Type 1 outputs are produced on a continuum

of fluency, such that some initial answers are generated more fluently than others1

The experience of fluency, in turn, gives rise to a FOR, such that fluently generated

items produce stronger FORs than their less fluent counterparts. In turn, it is this

sense of rightness or confidence that determines the extent of subsequent analysis. In

other words, the initial answers suggested by Type 1 processes vary along a

continuum of compellingness, such that some are accompanied by a strong sense of

rightness, whilst others invite additional analysis. The more compelling the initial

answer, the lower the probability of subsequent analysis. In this way, the FOR is

akin to other metacognitive judgments, which are causally relevant in the decision

to stay with the current output or seek another (e.g., Mazzoni and Cornoldi 1993;

Son and Metcalfe 2000; Nelson 1993; Son 2004).

1 For this reason, we suggest that Stanovich’s (2011) definition of Type 1 processes may be most useful.

This definition relies on autonomy as the central characteristic of Type 1 processes; that is, Type 1

processing is mandatory when the relevant triggering stimuli have been encountered. The other elements

described above, namely rapid execution, low cognitive load, parallel processing, are correlated with

mandatory processing, but are not defining characteristics of Type 1 processing. Consequently, Type 1

processes may vary in terms of the speed with which they are produced, with concomitant variance in the

strength of their FOR.


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Thompson et al. (2011) tested this hypothesis using a novel reasoning paradigm.

In these studies, reasoners were asked to generate two responses to a series of

reasoning problems: For the first, they were told to answer intuitively with the first

answer that comes to mind. They were then asked to rate their feeling of rightness

and were then allowed all the time required to generate their final answer. As

predicted, variability in the speed or fluency with which the initial answer is

produced predicted the strength of the FOR, such that fluently generated responses

yielded strong FOR’s. During the rethinking period, people changed their answers

between 10 and 30% of the time, depending on the task; however, regardless of the

rate of change, the probability that the answer changed was determined by the FOR

judgments, such that strong FOR judgments were accompanied by low probabilities

of change and weaker ones by higher probabilities of change. Similarly, the amount

of time spent reconsidering the initial answer varied as a function of FOR, such that

long rethinking periods were preceded by weak FOR’s and short rethinking periods

by strong ones. Thus, FOR predicted both the extent and outcome of analytic

engagement.

4.2 Fluency and reasoning biases

The relationship between fluency, FOR, and Type 2 thinking may explain many of

the well-documented ‘‘biases’’ in which judgments and decisions appear to flout

basic rules of logic or probability. The fluency heuristic, on this view, is a form of

attribute substitution (Kahneman 2003), in which an inference about a target

construct, such as confidence, is based on a salient, but technically irrelevant cue,

such as affect or ease of processing. Thus, relying on fluency as a cue to confidence

can be misleading. This is particularly true in the reasoning domain, where objective

difficulty and psychological difficulty are often dissociated, for example, when Type

1 processes fluently cue an answer that contradicts a basic principle of logic or

probability, as in the case of the widget answer above. Specifically, because Type 1

outputs tend to be produced fluently (Kahneman 2003; Stanovich 2004), and they

are often accompanied by positive affect (e.g., Epstein 2010) they engender strong

FORs, which reduces the probability that reasoners engage in the type of analytic

thinking necessary to forgo the initial response in favour of another. Not

surprisingly, therefore, the correlation between FOR and accuracy is not robust.

In some studies, we have observed a modest correlation between FOR and the

probability of selecting the logically valid answer (Thompson et al. 2011), but in

other cases, the relationship has been effectively zero (Shynkaruk and Thompson

2006). Such dissociations are also more marked when people have less relevant

experience with a particular task (Kruger and Dunning 1999; Prowse Turner and

Thompson 2009).

Because a sense of confidence may be created by processes that are essentially

uncorrelated with those that produce normatively or objectively good decisions,

there is a real possibility for confidently held, but erroneous decisions to subvert

decision-making in a wide number of contexts. A possible response to this

conclusion is to criticise studies on reasoning for presenting participants with an

artificial conflict between rule-based reasoning and people’s relevant real-life


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experiences (Hertwig and Gigerenzer 1999), which then create opportunities for a

misplaced sense of confidence. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that

misplaced confidence undermines decisions outside of the laboratory also (Burton

2008). For example, people who give the intuitive answer to problems such as the

bat and ball problem also score highly on measures of impulsive decision making

and risky preferences (Frederick 2005). Similarly, an analysis of financial decision-

making reveals that many of the heuristics and biases studied in the laboratory may

contribute to decisions by traders and stock brokers (Garling et al. 2009) as well as

to other real-world contexts (Lehrer 2009). Moreover, overconfidence in erroneous

decisions is a challenge among even well-educated and well-trained professionals,

such as physicians (Podbregar et al. 2001). Thus, although we do not yet have

evidence that directly links fluency, confidence, and errors in real-world settings, it

seems probable that these decisions will be guided by the same processes as studied

in laboratories.

5 Fluency and beyond: next steps and unanswered questions

5.1 Beyond the fluency heuristic: multiple determinants of the FOR

Thus far, we have focussed on the role of fluency as a contributor to the FOR.

However, we do not mean to imply that the FOR is a unidemensional construct with

fluency as its sole determinant. Instead, it is probable that FOR is multiply

determined, as are many of the other metacognitive experiences discussed in the

metamemory literature (see Koriat 2007 for a review). Here, we speculate on other

variables that might contribute to a sense of rightness about a judgment or decision.

As is the case for memory retrievals (Costermans et al. 1992; Reder and Ritter

1992), familiarity with the materials being reasoned about might create a sense of

confidence in the reasoning process, even though familiarity per se does not affect

accuracy (Manktelow and Evans 1979). In support of this hypothesis, we have found

that reasoners are more confident in conclusions that can be judged on the basis of

belief (either positively or negatively) relative to those that are neutral with respect

to belief (Shynkaruk and Thompson 2006).

In addition, feelings of rightness may be enhanced by a sense of coherence and

diminished by ambiguity or conflict. For example, when a reasoning problem cues

two alternative answers, e.g., when a description of an individual suggests

membership in a group (such as being an engineer) that is at odds with the base rate

probability of membership, both FOR and final confidence judgments are lowered

relative to when the two sources point to the same answer (Thompson et al. 2011;

De Neys et al. 2011).

In addition to implicit experiential cues, such as familiarity and fluency, it is

probable that FOR and confidence judgments will be affected by explicit beliefs, as

is the case for metamemory judgments (Koriat 2007). In support of this hypothesis,

Prowse Turner and Thompson (2009) observed that those who believed themselves

to be good reasoners (i.e., with high rationality scores on the Rational Experiential

Inventory; Pacini and Epstein 1999) were more confident in their syllogistic


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reasoning performance than those with lower scores, although they were not more

accurate reasoners. Similarly, in several studies (Shynkaruk and Thompson 2006;

Thompson et al. 2011), we have observed that final judgments of confidence for the

second of two answers are higher than FOR judgments for the first answer,

regardless of whether there has been an intervening increase in accuracy. Thus, it

appears that people believe that extra time will produce better answers, regardless of

whether it actually does.

5.2 Attributions of fluency and the FOR

As we outlined above, the contribution of affect to judgment is a two-stage process.

First, the fluent experience of processing an item gives rise to a positive affective

state; this affective state may, in turn give rise to a judgment such as confidence, or

it may be discounted. Similarly, it is likely that people’s attributions of the fluency

experience will affect how it impacts FOR judgments. For example, participants

who are forced to respond under a deadline would not necessarily give higher FOR

judgments than those allowed to respond freely, even though they have responded

more quickly. In this case, the experience of fluency would be attributed to the

deadline, rather than to ease of processing. Similarly, if people’s attention is drawn

to the potential consequences of FOR (i.e., if they are aware that confidence can

often be misleading, or that quick, self-evident responses might be incorrect) they

may be less inclined to rely on the fluency heuristic to signal the need for Type 2

thinking.

5.3 The development of the fluency heuristic

The fluency heuristic is derived from experience, such that frequency of encounter

promotes fluency of retrieval (Hertwig et al. 2008). That is, the fluency heuristic is

based on the experience associated with learning and remembering. As such, it

appears to develop as children gain experience with memory retrievals. Koriat and

Ackerman (2010) asked children in grades 2, 3, and 5 to answer general knowledge

questions. The speed with which they provided the answers was correlated with

their confidence in those answers, such that answers that were generated quickly

were also provided more confidently. Moreover, both the reliance on the fluency

heuristic and its predictive validity increased with age. That is, for older children,

speed of responding was a better discriminator of right and wrong answers than for

the younger children, and their confidence judgments were also more sensitive to

speed than their younger counterparts. These findings are consistent with those

suggesting general increase in the use of contextual cues and heuristics during

childhood (e.g., Davidson 1995; Jacobs and Potenza 1991; Morsanyi and Handley

2008; Reyna and Ellis 1994).

Although similar evidence in the reasoning domain is sparse, it appears that

reliance on conflict as a cue to confidence does develop with age (De Neys et al.

2011). These researchers found that whereas 13-year olds were equally confident in

their responses whether or not there were conflicting cues present in a task, 16-year

olds showed sensitivity to conflict. This finding concurs with other research showing


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that the tendency to consider different possibilities increases during adolescence

(see e.g., Klaczynski 2009 for a review).

5.4 Feelings of wrongness

Finally, although we have focussed on the consequences of positive affect and the

resultant feeling of rightness, it is almost certain that negative emotional states will

also contribute to judgments of confidence. For example, feelings of disgust have

powerful consequences for moral judgments, even when the actions being judged do

not cause actual harm (e.g., eating the family pet that has died from natural causes;

Haidt 2001, 2008). This intuition of wrongness is compelling and often defies

attempts to be remedied by rational argument. Thus, feelings of wrongness, as well

as feelings of rightness, may play a role in mediating the extent and quality of Type

2 thinking.

6 Concluding comments

When we think about the relationship between emotion and decision-making, the

examples that come to mind are those where powerful emotional states, such as fear,

greed, or optimism lead one to overlook, discount, or fail to seek relevant

alternatives. In the current paper, we have argued that subtler emotional states may

exert equally profound effects on decision-making. That is, experiences associated

with the making of a judgment or decision, such as the fluency with which the idea

comes to mind, give rise to an affective state. This affective state creates a sense of

rightness that, in turn, constrains the probability of subsequent analysis. Thus, our

intuitions may be difficult to discount or ignore, even though the reasons for our

confidence in them may bear little relation to the quality of decision that results.

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Analytic thinking: do you feel like it?