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Automated Gate and Traffic Barrier Safety Diploma Republic of Ireland & Northern Ireland

DHF Automated Gate Safety Diploma Training Notes IE&NI

Scope This course covers automated gates and automated traffic barriers, primarily for the use of vehicles but which may be accessed by pedestrians. For convenience, the text commonly refers to either type as an automated system.

The course covers installation and maintenance of complete new systems, systems created by combining components from various sources and systems created by automating an existing manual gate or barrier.

Contents 1. Law - new and extensively modified systems 1

2. Standards – all systems 4

3. Risk Assessment – all systems 27

4. Inspection and Test – all systems 32

5. Repair and maintenance – existing systems 41

6. Documentation – all systems 48

Annex A - Essential Health and Safety Requirements 52

Revision Description Date

V4-1 First edition Jan 2016

V4-2 Punctuation and grammar edits May 2016

V4-3 Edit to re order standards module and condense into a single book. Aug 2016

V5 Re brand and new repair and maintenance module Apr 2017

1

MODULE 1 - LAW INSTALLATION OF NEW AND EXTENSIVELY MODIFIED

AUTOMATED GATES AND BARRIERS

The laws affecting the manufacture and installation of new and extensively modified automated gates and traffic barriers come from three differing sources:

1. European Law – CE marking and fair trade legislation 2. National statutes – health and safety laws 3. Common Law – negligence.

Other areas of health, safety and environmental law do of course apply, site risk assessment, manual handling, safe lifting, COSH, asbestos, work at height, avoiding underground services and waste management to name but a few. This course does not attempt to cover these aspects and specialist training providers are widely available for these subject areas.

Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC

The European Communities (Machinery) Regulations 2008[Republic] and Supply of Machinery (Safety) Regulations 2008 [Northern Ireland] bring the European Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC into National law and place a criminal responsibility for compliance on the manufacturer. The system must be safe when first supplied or put into service taking into account the current state of the art. The manufacturer must issue a Declaration of Conformity, apply the CE Mark and retain a Technical File. Compliance with the Directive has been mandatory since 1995 with no significant change to its Essential Health and Safety Requirements. New automated systems must satisfy the Essential Health & Safety Requirements set out in Annex 1 of the directive. A risk assessment must be conducted to identify all potential hazards present, which of the Essential Health and Safety Requirements are applicable and how they are to be satisfied. Essential Health & Safety Requirement 1.1.2. requires that identified hazards are dealt with in the following order:

1. Alter the design to remove the hazard

2. Apply hazard control systems to any hazards that cannot be designed out

3. Issue warnings of any minor residual hazards present.

Account must be taken of the current “state of the art”, as described in current product specific standards and other freely available guidance documents.

Essential Health and Safety Requirements

Below is a list of Essential Health and Safety Requirements most likely to be applicable:

1. Foreseeable misuse 1.1.2. Principles of safety integration 1.1.3. Materials & products 1.1.5. Design of systems to facilitate handling 1.2.1. Safety & reliability of control systems 1.2.2. Control devices 1.2.3. Starting 1.2.4. Stopping 1.2.5. Mode selection 1.2.6. Failure of power supply 1.3.1. Stability of foundations 1.3.2. Risks of break up during operation 1.3.4. Risks due to surfaces, edges or angles 1.3.5. Risks related to combined machinery 1.3.6. Risks related to variations in operating conditions 1.3.7. Risks related to moving parts 1.3.8. Choice of protection against risks from moving parts

1.3.9. Risks of uncontrolled movements 1.4.1. General requirements of guards 1.4.2.1. Special requirements for fixed guards 1.4.3. Special requirements for protective devices 1.5.1. Electricity supply 1.5.4. Errors of installation 1.5.14. Risk of being trapped 1.5.15. Risk of slipping, tripping or falling 1.6.1. Machinery maintenance 1.6.2. Access to servicing points 1.6.3. Isolation of energy sources 1.7.1. Information 1.7.1.2. Warning devices 1.7.2. Warnings 1.7.3. Markings 1.7.4. Instructions

A list of these essential health and safety requirements together with what steps are likely to have been taken to address them can be found in Annex A.


There is no requirement for existing automated systems to be retrospectively CE marked, unless they have been so extensively modified that they are effectively new systems. Examples of modifications so extensive that retrospective CE marking would apply are:

– Changing the means of movement e.g. i. Swing to slide ii. Ram to underground

– Changing the number of leaves

– Increasing or reducing the opening width.

Partly Completed Machinery

The Machinery Directive covers partly completed machinery, defined as an assembly which is almost machinery but which cannot yet itself perform a specific application. A drive unit and control board is Partly Completed Machinery. A partly completed machine must be supplied with a Declaration of Incorporation but no CE marking under the Machinery Directive. The declaration of incorporation must list the applicable Essential Health and Safety Requirements it has complied with. CE marking of a partly completed machine is required under all other applicable directives e.g.:

2014/35/EC – Low Voltage Directive

2014/30/EC – Electro Magnetic Compatibility Directive

2014/53/EC – Radio Equipment Directive [as applicable].

The instructions must specify and explain in detail how the Partly Completed Machine is to be installed or incorporated into the finished machine to give a safe result and contain a warning to the user not to put the finished machine into service until it is in conformity with the Machinery Directive. It is not possible to supply a machine, and claim it is a partly completed machine by leaving off the safety devices. A machine is still a machine even when the client has to supply the foundations.

Safety Devices

These devices are given special status under the Machinery Directive which requires that the device manufacturer either follows a Harmonised standard [where available] or must use the services of an MD approved notified body to prove compliance:

Safe edge [EN 12978]

Light curtain or photo scanner [EN 12978}

Movement/inertial sensor [Notified Body – TUV etc.]

The device manufacturer must issue a Declaration of Conformity with 2006/42/EC, retain a technical file and CE mark the device.

Technical File

A detailed documentary record of the entire design, build and compliance verification process must be compiled and made available on request from the appropriate national authority for at least 10 years. It must contain DOI and DOC documents provided by component manufacturers amongst the many other documents that will be needed [more detail in module 6].

The client has no legal right to the Technical File, it is the “manufacturers’” intellectual property. Clients can and do request information from the technical file, which can be passed on at the manufacturers’ discretion. It would be wise to edit or limit what information is shared with clients to protect the intellectual property rights of the manufacturer.

User and Maintenance Instructions

Detailed instructions for use and maintenance must be passed to the client together with user warnings and the Declaration of Conformity.

Note: Regardless of compliance with the Machinery Directive, any repair, maintenance work or modification, regardless of how extensive must result in a completely safe system.

3

Responsibility for Machinery Directive Compliance

Scenario System Manufacturer Installer responsibilities

Installer purchased a fully automated gate or barrier system kit or assembly from a single manufacturer

1. Product risk assessment

2. Installation instructions

3. User instructions

4. Maintenance instructions

5. Declaration of Conformity

6. Technical file

7. CE Marking

1. Installing as per instructions

2. As installed risk assessment

3. Passing on user

documentation

Installer made the gate but purchased the drive system

N/A

1. Product risk assessment

2. Installation instructions

3. User instructions

4. Maintenance instructions

5. Declaration of Conformity

6. Technical file

7. CE Marking

Installer purchased the gate & drive system from separate suppliers and combined them

Installer automated an existing gate

Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005

This is Republic of Ireland statutory legislation that places a criminal responsibility on the installer whilst installing the system and the manufacturer of the system, who may be the same person, to ensure that the finished system will be safe for users and others.

The Health and Safety at Work Order 1978

This is Northern Ireland statutory legislation that places a criminal responsibility on the installer whilst installing the system and the manufacturer of the system, who may be the same person:

Article 5 requires work to be carried out so as to ensure the safety of anyone who is not an employee.

Article 7 requires that manufacturers of products for use at work ensure their products are safe for users.

Article 8 & 9 requires employees to take reasonable care for the health and safety of themselves or other persons

who may be affected by their acts or omissions at work.

Other articles of the order apply to employers etc. but these are the elements most applicable to the manufacture and installation process. The overall outcome is that any work undertaken must result in a safe system for users and others who may be affected by it.

Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (General Applications) Regulations 2007 [Republic] The Electricity at Work Regulations 1991 [NI]

These pieces of statutory legislation place a criminal responsibility on the installer to ensure that electrical installation and maintenance work is conducted so as to prevent danger from electric shock, fire, etc. both during and on completion of the work. Installation of electrical equipment should only be executed by electrically skilled persons and be safe for users and others who may be affected on completion. This will generally mean making sure that relevant standards are followed e.g. ET 101 [Republic] BS 7671 [NI] Wiring Regulations for the supply and EN 60204-1 for the rest of the installation.

The regulations do not allow routine live working, hence whenever possible systems should be electrically isolated when being worked on. When absolutely necessary, live working is permissible but only with comprehensive safeguards and control measures in place.

Negligence

This is common law and means that any person who by their action or inaction causes injury to persons or damage to property may be sued in a civil action for damages. Hence an installer or a manufacturer of an automated system could face civil action for damages in the event of an incident involving the system.


MODULE 2 STANDARDS NEW AND EXISTING AUTOMATED GATES AND BARRIERS

Standards are written by people from within an industry, to guide companies that work in that industry. Once written, standards are used by people such as manufacturers, distributors, buyers, customers, trade associations, users and regulators.

Compliance with a standard is rarely a legal requirement but relevant standards do represent the State of the Art and hence what is Reasonable and Practicable to achieve because they have been developed by the industry they cover. Regulatory bodies [e.g. HSA, HSE or Trading Standards] will refer to relevant standards when investigating incidents to establish a referenceable performance. If you do not follow relevant standards you will need to be able to demonstrate how you have matched or exceeded the performance they offer.

The standards we use are generated from one of three differing sources:

1. EN (European Norm) standards have their origins in Europe and will have been compiled by one of three European standards bodies; CEN (general), CENELEC (electrical) or ETSI (telecoms and radio). European standards committees are populated by representatives from member country standards bodies e.g.:

– BSI British Standards Institution [Northern Ireland]

– NSAI National Standards Authority Ireland [Republic of Ireland]

– DIN [Germany].

Standards generated by a European committee will have EN before the number, e.g. EN 12453.

By being a member of CEN, CENELEC or ETSI, NSAI and BSI agree to implement all EN standards and withdraw any conflicting national standards. When a European standard is implemented in Ireland it is given either an IS [Republic] or BS [NI] prefix e.g. IS EN 12453/BS EN 12453.

The International Organisation for Standardisation and International Electrotechnical Commission generate international standards and their standards have either an ISO or IEC prefix, e.g. ISO 13849.

When an international standard is adopted in Europe EN is added to the number and then when it gets implemented in Ireland, IS or BS is added, hence ISO 13849 becomes IS EN ISO 13849/BS EN ISO 13849.

Some purely national standards are generated by NSAI or BSI, e.g. ET 101 or BS 7671.

State of the Art

Standards do represent:

– The State of the Art [as required by the Machinery Directive]

And hence what can be considered:

– Reasonable and Practicable to achieve [as required by health and safety law]

Harmonised Standard

Some standards can grant compliance with a particular European Directive when they have been specifically written to achieve compliance. These standards are referred to as Harmonised Standards and there is one that covers automated systems in respect of the Machinery Directive.

EN 13241-1 Gates, Barriers, Industrial Doors and Domestic Garage Doors.

At the present time there are two problems with this standard:

1. The standard requires that the system will gave undergone cyclic testing to determine the maintenance requirements, this is perfectly viable for series production products but unlikely for bespoke assembled on site systems.

2. The European commission issued a warning on 20th July 2015 that the standard is not considered adequate in respect of two critical Essential Health and Safety Requirements:

– 1.3.7 - Risks related to moving parts

– 1.4.3 - Special requirements for protective devices.

Manufacturers relying on the standard and its referenced standards are advised to conduct an additional risk assessment to make sure that their product will comply with these two Essential Health and Safety Requirements.

5

Structural Integrity

EN 12604 – Mechanical Aspects of gates, barriers, industrial doors and domestic garage doors.

This standard describes the structural integrity required of a system. The system must be constructed in such a way that falling down, collapsing or derailment is prevented in normal use or in the case of a failed suspension element. The structure should be designed to withstand at least:

2 x the actual loading [weight, dynamic and wind] without permanent distortion [bending]

3.5 x the actual loading without failure [fracture]

Failure of a hinge, guide, or roller or its fixing, should not cause the leaf to fall and that the overall structure can safely resist its expected environmental conditions and any foreseeable misuse. Either the supporting elements will need to be so strong that they cannot fail or there will need to be a backup device to catch the leaf if a support element does fail. The load should be equally distributed between supporting elements.

For a support element to be considered strong enough not to fail it will need to be able to safely withstand 3.5 times the actual load without structural failure and be prevented from unscrewing or becoming otherwise unattached, e.g. lock nuts or split pins etc.

Travel Stops

Swing gate travel stops should prevent contact between the leaf and the post at the hinge area, particularly when used in manual. Contact at this point stresses hinges and can lead to premature failure, often with catastrophic results. Any exposed stop should be at the leaf extremity where forces are least and only have a minimal contact area.

In general, any travel stop must be able to stop the gate in the worst-case scenario, commonly this is when the gate is used in manual.

Masonry Anchors

When using expanding or “torque set” anchors into masonry, care must be taken in selecting the correct anchor for the location, material and loading:

– Not all anchors are rated for cracked concrete [concrete that is not and will not crack] – Very few expanding anchors are rated for brick or block work

– Proximity to edges or other anchors depletes the strength by as much as 60%

Before using an anchor check the manufacturers’ data tables taking into account that the anchor only achieves the stated strength when in the rated material [see data tables], in the right place and tightened to the correct torque.

Getting it wrong can have disastrous effects.

Chemical anchors have the advantage of not placing an expanding force on masonry, but can only achieve their rated strength when installed as required by the manufacturer.

This fatal collapse occurred because expanding anchors [not rated for brickwork] had been installed in successive mortar layers which eventually forced the bricks apart with catastrophic effect.


Fixed Guards and Fences

Guards and fences that prevent access to hazards must be constructed such that reaching through, around and over the guard is prevented and that climbing is not encouraged.

In order to resist climbing fencing will need to be constructed with the vertical elements on the outside, horizontal elements and supports on the inside and horizontal gaps will need to be less that 40mm wide to resist footholds.

EN ISO 13857

This is a generic machinery guarding standard that provides horizontal safety distances based on aperture size and the relative height of gate and fence. The standard actually gives differing requirements for upper limbs or lower limbs and the age of person affected, as we cannot predict either of these we must use the safest dimensions based on either reach over or reach through, whichever is the greater.

BS 6180 Barriers in and About Buildings

This is not an automated gate or machinery standard and actually only addresses fixed barriers and balustrades but does contain some useful guidance.

“The construction should be such that a 100mm sphere cannot pass through any opening in the guarding, and that children cannot readily climb the structure”

This only has marginal relevance to a moving leaf as a gap of 100mm or less under a moving leaf is more likely than not to present a foot trapping hazard, it is though relevant to the distance between vertical elements. Gaps greater than 100mm are not necessarily wrong, they should however be risk assessed in situ and remember that any reducing gap is a hazard and must be controlled.

Standards to Control Moving Parts

EN 12453 – Safety in use of Powered gates, barriers, industrial doors and domestic garage doors.

Applies to power operated doors primarily intended for use by vehicles but may be accessible to pedestrians. Doors intended solely for pedestrian use are not covered by EN 12453, they are covered by a newer standard, EN16005. This course does not address doors covered by EN 16005.

Mesh size mm

Horizontal Safety Clearance

Smallest dimension

Slot Square Round

4-6 20 10 10

6-8 40 30 20

8-10 80 60 60

10-12 100 80 80

12-20 1900 120 120 1Where the length of the slot is less than 40mm the safety clearance can

be reduced to 120mm

20-30 900 550 120

0-100 900 900 900

Fence height

m

Height of gate

2 2.2 2.4

Horizontal Safety Clearance

2 600 600 600

2.2 400 400 400

2.4 0 300 300

2.5 0 0 100

This instruction set shows the hole being drilled, blown out twice, brushed out and then blown out again before the anchor is finally embedded. Without this care in installation the anchor will

not achieve anything like its stated strength.

Horizontal safety

clearance

Reach over

Reach through

Fen

ce h

eigh

t

Gat

e h

eigh

t

7

Common Hazardous Locations

The standard defines various locations at automated gates and barriers as potentially hazardous:

– At the main edge of the leaf – At secondary edges [any other edge] of hinged, folding and sliding gates

– At obstacles within the movement area of the leaf

– Between leaves passing each other

– Between leaves and the perimeter of openings

– At gaps and openings of the leaf which change in their size

– At parts of the leaf which project

– At moving parts of the drive which are capable of causing injury.

Common Hazard Types

Crush – Exists in all horizontal gaps reducing to below 500mm and all vertically reducing gaps. Impact – Contact with a horizontally moving leaf outside of a crushing zone. Shearing – Where a moving leaf crosses a fixed structure to create a guillotine effect. Draw-in – Where a moving leaf crosses a fixed structure and could draw a body part into the gap. Cutting – Risks caused by sharp protrusions. Hooking – Where clothing or body parts could snag on a moving leaf. Entrapment – Where movement or lack of movement closes off a means of escape.

Hydraulic/pneumatic Burst:

– Use of CE marked components

– Correct pressure withstand for hoses and fittings

– Correct mechanical protection and UV protection for hoses.

Wicket Gates – Where there is a minor leaf in a larger leaf:

– Use an interlock switch to prevent hazardous movement when the minor leaf is used.

Hazards Caused by Faults – where control systems or safety devices fail:

• Safe edge wiring faults • Light curtain wiring faults • Interlock switch and wiring faults • Limit switch and limit switch wiring faults.

All hazards must be protected and prevented, see also the section on EN 12978.

2.5m Safe Zone

All hazards must be eliminated or controlled up to 2.5m above ground level, or above any other fixed access point, above 2.5m hazards are considered safe by being out of reach.

2.5m safe zone vertical dimension


Moving Parts Control Measures

Various control measures are permitted for protection of hazards caused by moving parts:

– Guards and enclosures – Shaping

– Hold to run

– Inherent force limitation [not for use with draw in hazards]

– Safe edge force limitation

– Presence detection: i. Used without force limitation e.g. light or curtain, photo scanner etc. ii. Used in combination with force limitation e.g. photo electric beams.

Safety Distances to Prevent Crush

EN 12604 provides a safety distance of 500mm that can be used to prevent crush hazards.

Always remember that when the crush hazard is prevented by provision of a 500mm safety distance, an impact hazard remains throughout the swept area and must still be controlled, regardless of the crush hazard.

Hold-to-Run

Can only be used where:

– Only trained users will operate the system

– Un protected buttons are only allowed where no un trained person is present

– Key switch or similar must be used when un-trained persons present

– Sustained pressure on the switch or key must be required for the leaf to move

– The control device must be the only active control device

– The control device must be in the immediate vicinity of the system – The control device must only be usable in full view of all hazards, from a place of safety

– The leaf must stop within 100mm on release, and 50mm in the last 500mm of travel

– Maximum leaf speed must be 0.5m/s [0.25m/s each for converging leaves].

When these conditions are met crush, impact, shear and draw in hazards are considered to have been controlled. All other hazards must still be addressed e.g. structural, electrical, cutting and hooking.

Force Limitation

Can be provided by either of:

1. Safe edge:

– Must not fail to a dangerous condition and must conform to EN 12978.

– Can be mechanical, resistive, optical or pneumatic.

Can be used to control crush, impact, shear and draw-in hazards.

2. Inherent force limitation designed into the drive unit:

– Encoders, virtual encoders

– Current monitoring

– Slip clutches and Hydraulic pressure relief.

Can be used to control crush and impact hazards only.

Note: Inherent force limitation cannot be used to control draw-in hazards.

9

Maximum Values for Force Limitation

Type of System Maximum values

Reducing gaps less than 500mm Crush

Reducing gaps greater than 500mm Impact

Horizontal movement 400N 1400N

Vertical movement [traffic barrier] 400N 400N

Reducing Force

The maximum force figures can only exist for a very limited period, extended exposure to these figures would not be safe:

– 400N equates to roughly the dead weight of 40kg [1.6 bags of cement]

– 1400N equates to roughly the dead weight of 140kg [5.6 bags of cement].

This requirement for rapidly reducing force, in line with the table above, on contact will mean that the leaf must stop and retract if entrapment problems are to be prevented. Simply reducing force is not enough, the leaf must stop and reverse.

Safe Edge Specification

Choosing the correct safe edge is dependent on the speed and force that will be applied:

– The weight of the leaf

– The speed of the leaf

– The torque of the electric operator

– The reaction time of the control system from switch to reversal of the leaf

– The over travel of the leaf during the reaction time

– The available over travel in the safe edge before deformity generates a dangerous force.

For example, if the over travel of the leaf is 40mm after the switch point to reversal and the profile used has 20mm of deformity before 400N, the profile is not the correct profile for the application.

Due to the bespoke nature of most systems, on site testing will be required verify safety.

The stages of compression of a safe edge are shown below.

Permissible forces and times they can be exerted in

crush and impact areas

Fd ≤400/1400N Maximum dynamic force exerted

Td ≤ 0.75 s Maximum time dynamic force can

remain above 150N

Fs ≤150N Maximum static force that can

exist for up to 5 seconds

Tt ≤ 5 s Maximum time that force can exist

above 25N


If the end stage is reached, very high forces can result and one or more of the main factors must be altered:

– Reduce speed

– Reduce weight – 1Increase torque [when using a safe edge, increased torque often gives a better reversal] 1Note: this effect has no relevance for inherent force limitation systems, where reduced torque always reduces the resulting force.

– Improve reaction time

– Improve safe edge specification.

Every design, manufacturer, type and size of safe edge will have differing characteristics, changing a safe edge to a different manufacturer, model or size will alter the system performance, sometimes quite dramatically and hence re testing will be required.

Example of manufacturer safe edge data

Common Applications of Safe Edges

On swing gates, it may be possible to use smaller section safe edges at the hinge than at the outer extremity because the approach speed is so low at the hinge.

Please be aware that any swing gate that needs a safe edge to achieve safe force at the leading edge, will also need safe edges on both sides of both lower edges for impact and under gate crush protection. Folding gates will have similar requirements.

On sliding gates where slow-down is used to control crush force at the main edge, larger section safe edges will often be required at the supports because they will need to be able control the shear, draw-in and crush force to a safe level [<400N] at full speed, and during the slow down phase.

11

Use of a nose wheel and cup can be of great benefit to cantilever sliding gatess. It is not acceptable however to cut the safe edge short to accommodate the cup. In many cases the cup will need to be modified to accept the depth of the safe edge.

Presence Detection

Presence detection systems come in two types:

1. Used without effective force limitation; light curtains and photo scanners.

– Must meet the requirements of BS EN 12978.

Folding gate

4 x photo scanners & 1 light grid/photo scanner

Must eliminate all possible contact with hazardous movement. To achieve this the protection zone must have depth, shown above as the dimension “D” this dimension is:

200mm for leaves traveling at less than 0.5m/s

900mm for leaves traveling at more than 0.5m/s

Can be used to control crush, impact, shear and draw in hazards.

Where a phot beam can occupy the entire hazard area [prevent reaching under, over or around] and conform to EN12978, it could become a form of linear of light curtain.

1 x linear beam under a traffic barrier boom, used a light curtain.


1 x photo scanner under the boom extending 900mm on either side

2 x light grids or photo scanners, one each side.

2. Required to supplement effective force limitation; photo beams:

– Mandatory when un trained persons might be present and where auto close is used

– Provide protection of vehicles and property.

A photo beam should never be the sole means of providing safety!

Photo beam positioning

When used to supplement force limitation on horizontally moving gates they must be:

– No higher than 700mm above ground level

– No further than 200mm horizontally from the closed face of the leaf.

This does not exclude dual height applications; it just means that at least one set must be below 700mm. The minimum requirement is for one set on the outside face of the gate.

When used to supplement force limitation on traffic barriers they must be either:

– One beam no higher than 500mm above ground level, centred directly below the boom

– Two beams no higher than 500mm above ground level, no further than 200mm horizontally either side of the boom centre line.

Minimum Level of Protection at the Main Edge

Main edge safety is given special attention by EN 12453 because this is the area where persons are invited to enter through and are most likely to encounter the gate or barrier. Crush and impact hazards at the main edge must be controlled by one of the following four methods:

1. Hold to run [key switch or similar when un trained persons could access the controls].

2. Force limitation alone. Where automatic operation is not used and when un-trained persons will not encounter the system – very few systems.

3. Force limitation in combination with photo beams. Where automatic operation is used or where un-trained persons may encounter the system – virtually all systems.

4. Light curtain/photo scanner.

13

Swing and Folding Gate Main Edge Crush Hazards

Force limitation must be supplemented with photo beams wherever auto close is used or where untrained people might be present [see 3 above].

Swing Gate Impact Hazards

Swing and Folding Under Gate Crush Hazards

*The acceptable force depends on the size and shape of the gap under the leaf.

When the gap under the gate is greater than 120mm and constant though out the swept area, the chances of crush risk under the leaf are much reduced and the only remaining hazard is impact:

– Forces along the lower edge must be below 1400N.

– Forces in any remaining crush zones still need to be below 400N.

Swept area impact zone

Where the gap under the gate is less than 120mm, or the gap changes throughout movement [kerb crossings or sloping ground] the risk of crushing is increased and forces along the lower edge must be kept to below 400N.

Swept area crush zone

Swing and Folding Gate Hinge Area Hazards

A swing or folding gate hinge will generate extremely high forces wherever there is a changing gap as the gate moves. The force present at a hinge gap can be as much as 10 times the force present at the main edge of a swing or folding

Control with:

Hold-to-run

Force limitation [inherent or safe edge] 400N

Light curtain or photo scanner etc.

Control with:

Hold-to-run



Control with:

Hold-to-run

*Force limitation [inherent or safe edge]



gate. Although forces are high, speed of movement is conversely very slow in this area and hence controlling the force in this area can be easier than expected.

Note: More on testing forces in the inspection and test module.

Potential hinge area crush hazards

The best way to avoid these problems is to eliminate them completely with a safe design hinge area.

Safe design hinge area

Of course, this cannot be achieved with many existing gates and hence other methods of making the hazard safe must be considered.

Flexible guard Safe edge

Failed hinge guard Failed hinge are safe edge

Control measures do not always work however and a method of verification must be used to ensure that the applied control measure has worked.

Flexible Guards

Caution is required when considering using a flexible guard as there is no state of the art for flexible guards. This is because there are no standards published on the subject and hence you cannot buy a hinge guard that complies with an applicable standard [for example EN 12978 with a safe edge]. Machinery Directive conformity is by compliance assessment on site which means conforming to Essential Health and Safety Requirement 1.4.:

Minimum gap = 25mm. Maximum gap = 100mm. Maximum gap change from open to close = 20%.

Example calculation. Open gap = 80mm [OK, less than 100] Closed gap = 42mm [OK, greater than 25] 80 – 42 = 38mm [actual gap change] 80 ÷ 100 x 20 [20%] = 16mm [max. permissible change] 38mm is greater than the allowable 16mm and hence additional control measures are need in this example scenario.

15

– Must be of robust construction

– Must be securely held in place

– Must not be easy to by-pass or render non-operational.

Protecting Large Hinge Areas with Safe Edges

Suggested large hinge area crush hazard control.

Folding Gate Specific Hazards

Folding gates have all the problems of a swing gate, with additional hinge gap areas and a crush hazard between the leaves when they open. They also present more complex impact hazards.

Leaf to leaf crush. Opening and closing impact.

Some areas of a folding gates are not as hazardous as it first appears. For instance, the leaf to leaf crush hazard during opening is actually traveling away from a potential victim as the gate opens; although the outer extremity where the two leaves actually come together does present a significant crush hazard which must be protected.

Reach through crush hazard.

Reach through infill crush hazard.

In addition to the above it must also be noted that the main edge will turn through 90° as the gate moves from open to closed, most safe edges are only designed to function through a 45° approach angle. This means that the safe edge must be carefully angled to ensure that it never presents at more than 45° to the direction of travel.

Sliding Gate Entrance Area Hazards

Main edge crush. Main edge impact. Shear and draw-in.

Control with:

Hold-to-run.

Force limitation: i. Crush [400N] and impact [1400N] safe edge or inherent ii. Shear and draw-in [400N] safe edge only.


Control with:

Fine mesh over the infill in the crush area to

prevent reach through.

Inner and outer safe edge to cover both potential

access directions

Control with:

Hold-to-run

Fine mesh to both leaves

Light curtain/photo scanner.

Control with:

Hold-to-run

Force limitation [inherent or safe edge] Crush [400N] Impact [1400N]



A tracked sliding gate wheel to track interface presents a serious foot crush hazard, or any other body part in the event of a fall.

Foot crush hazard.

When using a guard, bring the guard to within 8mm of the guide rail such that feet, toes or fingers cannot reach into the hazard area. The application of brush strips at the nose of the gate, and sometimes at the sides can prevent debris ingress from causing the obstruction problems common with tracked gates.

Guards to protect tracked sliding gate wheel hazards.

Sliding Gate Run Back Area Hazards

Shear and draw in. Impact. Shear and draw-in. Finger crush.

The preferred control measure for all these hazards is a run back enclosure.

Otherwise, control can be:

Hold to run

Light curtain or photo scanner

Local guard – rollers

Safe edge – shear and draw-in [400N]

Safe edge or inherent force limitation – impact [1400N]

Safe Edge Position at Shear and Draw-in Locations

Serious injuries have been inflicted where a child has been drawn into the area between the supports and the moving leaf without contacting the safe edge because they were too far away from the moving leaf. Safe positioning of the safe edge can be verified by using a 120 x 120 x 500mm rigid rectangular test piece inserted into the least favourable position on the leaf [deepest possible insertion], the test piece must be capable of triggering the safe edge as the leaf moves towards the safe edge. In this way, the infill separation dictates a safe position for the safe edge.

The test must only be conducted with the system in manual mode.

The resulting safe edge positions are an absolute maximum separation, it does of course make sense to mount the safe edges as close as possible to the moving leaf [even closer where possible].

Traffic Barrier Hazards

Traffic barriers have particular hazards and where foreseeable misuse means they can be accessed by persons all the same rules will apply, e.g. use of hold-to-run, force limitation and light curtains.

Control with:

Hold-to-run

Guard


17

Closing crush hazard.

Entrapment Control

When a system suffers breakdown or power failure entrapment can be the result.

Clients must be informed of the effect of breakdown and power cut on access and egress through the system so that they can plan the building use risk assessment for emergency evacuation and access for emergency services.

Manual release:

Must move in manual mode by exerting no more than 390N

Using the manual release should not introduce any further risks

Reconnection of power should not introduce a hazardous situation.

Battery backup:

Might address power cut but not breakdown.

Protection of access to an entrapment area:

Photo beams etc.

Alternative route:

This is not the responsibility of the system manufacturer, but is an option for the client to consider.

Wind Effects on Gates and Barriers

Machinery Directive Essential Health and Safety Requirement 1.3.6. [Risks related to variations in operating conditions] requires that systems must be safe, even in windy conditions. Wind loading will have a major effect on performance and safety and so the risk assessment must take account of potential wind loadings.

Potential wind pressure is difficult to predict or calculate due to:

– Wind shadow from surrounding buildings

– Wind tunnelling from local surroundings

– Wind direction in relation to local topography

– Atmospheric pressure, high/low pressure

– Percentage infill, 30% +

– Nature of infill, palisade?

Clients will not usually accept a system that fails to operate on windy days and so a drive system must be selected that is powerful enough to move the leaf. Inherent force limitation will tend to see the wind as an obstacle, leading to false activation and cannot provide safe forces when subject to wind. Hence a wind affected gate must rely on safe edges for force limitation. Once the required torque is selected and matched with a compatible safe edge section safety and performance can be achieved as on activation of a safe edge the additional torque is available for a more powerful retraction against any wind pressure. Remember, any swing or folding gate that requires a safe edge to achieve safe force at the leading edge will also need safe edges on both sides of both lower edges.

Posts, hinges, brackets and foundations are subject to increased loadings and will dramatically affect force test results. Structural flexibility gives poor reaction to safe edge activation and increases danger:

– Hinges [flexing and wearing]

– Ram mountings [flexing]

– Posts [twisting]

– Leaf [flexing].

Control with:

Hold-to-run



Control finger trap hazards by: – Removing all sharp edges and protruding bolt

heads etc.


All elements of the design will require uprating as compared to the equivalent sized open design, potentially 4 x nominal dead weight and dynamic loadings, sometimes even more:

– Posts, larger section/thickness – Hinges, larger diameter pins, eyes and fixings

– Fixings, bolt through rather than screw in

– Foundations, deeper and wider

– Brackets, better braced with more triangulation

– System structure, more rigidity

– Drive system, more torque

– Safe edges, more over travel and shorter actuation distance.

When force testing a wind affected gate in still conditions, do not accept a marginal pass result.

– 200N max. with excellent reaction time.

EN 12978 Safety Devices for Power Operated Doors, Gates and Barriers

This standard describes the precautions necessary to ensure that safety devices, safe edges and light curtains, are of a high enough integrity. This is important because quite often these devices are quite literally life and death devices. The standard sets the performance to be achieved in terms of vibration, electrical safety, electro-magnetic influence resistance, climate, environment, fault resistance and performance.

The standard also requires that the device shall be monitored against faults to category 2 or 3 of EN 954-1. It also requires that photo beams used in combination with force limitation will either be monitored to category 2 or 3 or be subject to a 6 monthly functional check.

EN 954-1 requires that safety-related parts of control systems shall be designed, selected, assembled and combined so that they can withstand the expected influences. This requirement places as much responsibility on the installer as it does on the device manufacturer. The installer is required to take particular care over selection of a compatible device and the integrity of the wiring, cabling and setting of the system.

Category 2 Definition

A category 2 system utilises and responds to a test signal from the control board. The test sequence must happen at least once in every cycle but typically occurs at every start of movement and change of direction.

“The occurrence of a fault can lead to the loss of the safety function between the tests. The loss of safety function is always detected by the test. All faults will be found and dangerous movement prevented.”

Category 2 devices can only be used with control boards utilising a compatible test protocol. They do have the advantage of monitoring the link between the device and the control board.

Category 3 Definition

A category 3 system does not utilise or respond to a test signal from the control board. The control device monitors itself and the sensing elements but commonly not the link between the device and control board.

“If a single fault occurs in the monitored elements the safety function is always performed. Some but not all faults will be detected. An accumulation of undetected faults can lead to the loss of the safety function.”

19

Typical category 2 arrangements:

1. In this example the control panel de-activates the device by de-powering the test line when idle. The panel then monitors the common, safety and fault lines and when a test sequence is initiated prior to movement it expects to the device relay to change state in the correct sequence. This will only happen if all elements are working correctly. All faults, including those in the connecting lines are detected.

2. In this example the control panel sends a pulse of voltage to the device at the test interval and expects to see the device “blink” its output relay within 200 milliseconds. This sequence will detect all possible faults, including those in the connecting lines.

3. In this example the safe edge is squashed against the floor or closing post in the fully closed position. The control panel looks for the resulting open circuit as this happens and uses this as the test. If the test fails and the circuit does not go open circuit at fully closed, then the panel will respond by opening fully and or signalling a fault condition or reverting to hold-to-run. All faults, including those in the connecting lines are detected.

Note: All these examples work perfectly well but are not interchangeable. They are all equally vulnerable to short circuit faults between tests, but will all detect the fault at the next test and prevent further movement. If test lines are not connected correctly, or not connected at all, the test facility will be disabled and the result is a non-compliant and potentially dangerous system.

4. In this example a resistive safe edge is wired directly to resistive enabled terminals on the control board, negating the need for an external device. The lack of a separate device and its associated wiring makes this a particularly fault resistant arrangement. In truth, this could be category 2, 3 or 4 but typically category 2 technology is deployed.

5. In this example a resistive or optical safe edge is wired to a battery powered transmitter. This transmits to a receiver embedded in the control panel. Again, the simplicity reduces the fault liability. Radio transmission systems can suffer loss of signal due a variety of external influences, they should though fail to safe when this happens. This could lead to an element of unreliability but not to the loss of safety.

6. In this example a range of devices can be connected to

a digital 2 wire bus system. The bus and all connected devices are typically monitored to category 2.

Note: The example systems shown are probably the most common but not exhaustive and other methodologies do exist within the sphere of category

Typical Category 3 Arrangements

1. In this example the link between panel and device is not monitored at all and will be vulnerable to short circuit faults in the common/safety line. If this happens all safety will be lost and dangerous movement will occur. This applies equally to single and dual channel systems.


2. In this example a smarter device is employed that will monitor the control panel current flowing in common and safety, if this is lost due to a short in one circuit the other will go open circuit thus preventing movement in the opposite direction. Not all dual channel system have this facility. If both open and closing circuits are shorted by the same cable damage, all safety is again lost and dangerous movement will occur.

Category 3 systems that have no short circuit protection should be connected using:

– Large diameter conductors for increased physical strength and thicker insulation

– Armoured cables or cable in conduit – As short a cable run as is possible

– The device placed within the control panel enclosure wherever possible

– Ferruled ends to prevent stray strands causing shorts at the terminals.

Regular [weekly] functional user checks of all vulnerable devices should also be included in the user instructions. Category 3 devices can be used regardless of the presence of a control board test facility.

Systems that have no short circuit protection should be connected using:

– Large diameter conductors for increased physical strength and thicker insulation

– Armoured cables or cable in conduit

– As short a cable run as is possible

– The device placed within the control panel enclosure wherever possible

– Ferruled ends to prevent stray strands causing shorts at the terminals.

Regular [weekly] functional user checks of all vulnerable devices should also be included in the user instructions.

Compatibility of Category 2 Devices

Not all category 2 test systems are the same and hence not all category 2 devices are compatible with all category 2 enabled control boards.

Installers need to check with suppliers of control boards and safety devices to ascertain compatibility. Suppliers of category 2 devices should understand the requirements of the device to achieve a category 2 solution. If an incompatible device and control board combination is used the result will not achieve category 2 or 3 and will not provide a compliant system, the responsibility for this will lie with the installer.

Category 3 devices can be used regardless of the presence of a control board test facility.

EN 954-1 has actually now been replaced by a new standard, EN ISO 13849-1.

At present, under EN 12978 either standard can be used but devices that are built to EN ISO 130849-1 need to be monitored to Category 2 and achieve performance level C or D, or Category 3 performance level C or D.

EN 954-1 EN ISO 13849-1

Cat. 2 Cat. 2 PL = C or D

Cat. 3 Cat. 3 PL = C or D

Safety Circuit Reaction

Consideration must be given to what happens when a safety circuit is activated.

One common safe edge response is to have the leaf stop, retract slightly in either direction of travel and then wait for another command. This configuration has many advantages not least of which is that the leaf only travels far enough to release the problem rather than run a complete open or close cycle. This response is of particular benefit around multiple safe edges on sliding gate support frames and prevents the activation of one safe edge driving the person into the opposing safe edge.

There is however a downside; if this response is used to control a main closing edge safe edge and a pedestrian tries to squeeze through the gate in the early stages of opening and touches the safe edge, the gate can close and trap the pedestrian against the closing post with potentially fatal results.

Conversely light curtain circuits that cause a horizontally moving gate to retract can also cause a problem elsewhere on the gate. It is far safer to have the leaf stop and wait for the curtain to clear before continuing movement. Regardless of device or location the reaction to device activation cannot be allowed to cause another problem elsewhere on the system.

21

Electrical Standards ET 101 or BS 7671 and EN 60204-1

The law requires electrical systems to be safe and safe is described by the applicable standards.

The supply to fixed equipment provided and certified to ET 101 or BS 7671 Wiring Regulations. Existing supplies must be tested and certified to ET 101 or BS 7671 by a competent person.

Wiring beyond the supply terminals should be installed to EN 60204-1 Wiring of Machines which makes all the same requirements as ET 101 and BS 7671 for electrical safety.

The use of a plug/socket to connect fixed equipment does not remove the need for testing or certification.

Only use CE marked drives and control equipment and correctly IP rated accessories.

Electrical Knowledge

Work on electrical systems should only be conducted by an Electrically Skilled Person or by someone being instructed or supervised by one, this will mean having a current comprehensive understanding of:

– Electrical hazards and safe isolation

– Safe electrical working practices

– Earthing and equipotential zones

– Automatic disconnection of supply

– Isolating transformers and extra low voltages

– Insulation

– Voltage withstand and volts drop – Current, resistance and subsequent heating

– External influences and ingress protection

– Inspection, testing, verification, signage and documentation.

The minimum IP rating for enclosures outside is IP54, the minimum IP rating for drives and enclosure underground is IP67 and all exposed cabling protected against mechanical damage.

IP stands for ingress protection, the first numeric refers to resistance to solid objects of various sizes, and the second numeric refers to resistance to liquids.

Wherever 230v or greater is present all reachable metalwork must have continuity with the machine supply earth. Dangerous voltage labels should be applied to any enclosure containing hazardous voltage. All pole isolation must be provided either in view of the system or be lockable in the off position. Differing voltage bands should be segregated and where cables carrying differing voltage bands must share a conduit both cables should be rated to the higher voltage or the higher voltage cable must be surrounded by an earthed metallic screen. Cables should be rated to withstand the maximum fault current, the voltage present and prevent voltage drop in excess of 5%.


Control Systems

A control system must be supplied with a Declaration of Incorporation stating conformity with at the very least:

– 2014/30/EC – Electro Magnetic Compatibility Directive – 2014/53/EC – Radio Equipment Directive [where relevant]

– 2006/42/EC – Machinery Directive Essential Health and Safety Requirements 1.2, 1.4.3 and 1.5.1 or be in full compliance with EN 60335-1 and EN 60335-2-105.

This course does not set out to describe how to build control systems from first principles, but for those considering building a control system e.g. by combining relays and PLC’s it will be necessary to undertake type testing to achieve the above directive compliances.

For those building or altering control systems obtaining and understanding the contents of the following standards will be imperative in understanding and achieving the state of the art:

EN ISO 12100 - risk analysis

EN ISO 13849-1 - safety related parts

EN 60204-1 - wiring of machines

EN 60335-1 - drive systems [general]

EN 60335-2-105 - drive systems [specific]

EN 61000-6-1 – EMC

EN 6100-6-2 - EMC

EN 418 - stop devices

Records and results of the appropriate type tests and risk analysis must be retained in a technical file for the control system [see the relevant parts of 2006/42/EC].

Conclusion

Standards provide a wealth of guidance and also describe the state of the art for an industry and hence their contents will be seen as what is both reasonable and practicable to achieve:

– They do represent the State of the Art [as required by the Machinery Directive] – They do describe what is Reasonable and Practicable [as required by health and safety law]

– They do not guarantee a safe system

– There will always remain a need for overall risk assessment for legal compliance.

Overall risk management incorporating the use of relevant standards is the key to safe systems.

23

MODULE 3 RISK ASSESSMENT NEW AND EXISTING AUTOMATED GATES AND BARRIERS

Foreseeable Misuse

Foreseeable misuse must be considered and be reflected in the assessment:

– If people can go through a vehicle gate they will

– If people can go under a traffic barrier they will

Signage cannot be relied upon to provide safety.

The Seven Steps

The risk assessment process can be split into seven distinct steps:

1. Describe the system. 2. Identify and list all possible associated hazards. 3. Resolve as many hazards as possible by safe design. 4. Apply state of the art controls to the remaining hazards. 5. List any minor residual risks. 6. Issue user warnings and safe use instructions. 7. Issue maintenance instructions.

Step 1 – Describe the system.

Essentially, this part of the process is about setting boundaries to the risk analysis process, it must include both the intended use and reasonably foreseeable misuse of the system.

The description must include at least:

– Is the system new, a reactive maintenance or a planned preventative maintenance job?

– What type of system is it, swing, folding, sliding or barrier?

– How many leaves are there? – What is it made of?

– What size, weight and infill percentage does it possess?

– What duty cycle is it subject to?

– What environment does it operate in, wind rain, dust, sand etc.?

– What is the nature of the ground it moves over, paved, gravel, sloping etc.?

– What type and volume of traffic will use the system?

– Will the users be trained or un-trained? – Can passers bye encounter the system?

– Are there likely to be high numbers of vulnerable persons present? – What methods of activation will be used?

Step 2 - Hazard Identification.

This includes the systematic identification and listing of all reasonably foreseeable hazards which exist or could arise, for example:

– Structural failure of supports and foundations – Structural failure of the leaves, guides or

hinges

– Electrocution and fire from electrical faults

– Control system and safety device failure

– Crush at main closing edge

– Impact throughout movement across the entire swept area

– Crush hazards at various reducing gaps [list them individually]

– Shear and draw in at moving part interfaces [list them individually]

– Leaf impacting vehicles

– Vehicles impacting the leaf

– Trip hazards at photo cell posts, guide rails or centre stops

– Corrosion and wear or tear causing failure.

This list is not exhaustive many more hazards can and do occur.

Step 3 - Apply safe design principles to eliminate as many hazards as possible, this should include:

– Make supporting structures and foundations strong enough to withstand the leaf, any wind load and foreseeable misuse [2 x all expected loads]

– Make the leaf itself strong enough to withstand any wind load and foreseeable misuse [2 x all expected loads]


– Make hinges and attachments strong enough [3.5 x all expected loads]

– Make travel stops strong enough [3.5 x all expected loads]

– Make the hinge area constant gap wherever possible

– Enclose sliding gate run back areas – Guard exposed rollers and wheels

– Provide multiple guide roller supports

– Provide multiple support frames.

Again, this list is not exhaustive, many more hazard possibilities exist.

Step 4 - Control remaining hazards by state of the art means.

When all possible steps have been taken to design out as many hazards as possible, the remaining hazards must be reduced by state of the art means. As existing product specific standards are in existence the methods and performances the standards contain represent the state of the art. In many ways the standard writer has already conducted much of the risk analysis for us in arriving at safe forces and control measures e.g. 400N, safe edges, light curtains and where or when to apply them.

This mostly means that the risk assessment process is now a matter of identifying the hazard and applying the appropriate control measure from the standard. There will always be a need to take an overall look at the finished article to ensure that all hazards are identified, and controlled.

When the standards have not explicitly listed a particular hazard it does not mean that you are free to ignore it, you must still apply the ethic of the standard, e.g. reduce the force to safe levels at the particular location.

Controls for exposed moving parts hazards are as follows.

Crush and impact hazards:

– Hold to run

– Force limitation [inherent or safe edge] – Light curtain/photo scanner.

Shear and draw-in hazard controls:

– Hold to run

– Safe edge

– Light curtain/photo scanner.

Vehicle Hazards

Leaf impacting vehicle:

– Could a vehicle stop between photo beams safely?

– Photo beams – dual height?

– Ground loop

– Traffic light

– Flashing light [these also have benefits for warning pedestrians] – Road markings – KEEP CLEAR!

– Signage – DO NOT STOP IN THE SWEEP OF THE GATES!

Vehicle impacting leaf:

– Visibility

– Lighting and reflectors

– Traffic calming and fixed bollards

– Road markings and signage.

Step 5 - Identify and list all remaining minor residual hazards.

Any remaining minor residual hazards must be re-evaluated to see if they could be eliminated or the risk reduced to a lower level, and then if not they should be listed and used to form the content of the user warnings.

Step 6 - Warnings of minor residual hazards must form part of the user instructions

Draw up a set of user instructions and safe use warnings that reflect the minor residual hazards to enable the system to be used safely e.g.:

– Prevent children from playing on or near the system

– Do not stop in the sweep of the leaves

25

– Be aware of minor trip hazards

– Wait until the system is open before proceeding

– Keep remote controls away from children

– Do not operate remote controls out of sight of the system – Do not alter or modify the system

– Keep it maintained by a competent specialist.

Step 7 - Maintenance

Draw up a set of planned preventative maintenance instructions that will enable the system to remain in in a safe and reliable condition by describing what:

– Inspection

– Cleaning

– Lubrication

– Function checks

– Adjustments

– Replacements

– Performance tests

– How often, by who [training, experience and qualification].

Write it all down and provide a record log, more on this in the maintenance section.

Finally

The entire 7 step risk assessment process should be documented and must form part of:

– The technical file for new or extensively modified systems

– The maintenance file for existing systems.


EXAMPLE AUTOMATED GATE OR BARRIER RISK ASSESSMENT

Site address: Postcode: Reference: Assessment conducted by: Signature: Date:

Although, for convenience, this risk assessment makes reference to the Machinery Directive [2006/42/EC] Essential Health and Safety Requirements, you should be aware that the directive does not, strictly speaking, apply to existing systems unless they are being so extensively modified that the resulting system must be considered a new gate or barrier. The level of safety required is however the same in all cases.

☐ Machinery Directive applicable ☐ Machinery directive not applicable

☐ New ☐ Reactive repair ☐ Planned maintenance ☐ Modification

☐ Swing ☐ Sliding ☐ Folding ☐ Traffic Barrier

☐ Other …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Number of leaves ………………………….. Leaf 1 width ……………………….. Leaf 2 width………………………………………………………….

Material …………………………………………… Height …………………………………… Weight ……………………………………………………………….

Percentage infill …………………………………. Operations per day …………………………………………………………………………………………

Weather conditions:

What weather conditions will the system be exposed to?

☐ Outside location ☐ Sheltered ☐ Exposed ☐ Salt atmosphere ☐ Sand/dust

☐ Other …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Ground conditions:

☐ Paved ☐ Gravel/stone ☐ Level ☐ Sloping ☐ Kerb crossing

Users and others who may encounter the system:

☐ No un-trained persons present ☐ Un-trained persons could be present

☐ High numbers of vulnerable persons present [E.G. Young children, physical disabilities, sight impairment, frail, elderly] Nature of vulnerable persons …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Reason/location for vulnerable persons ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

27

List of potential hazards

No. Location Description Safe design

tick

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Use additional sheets as required.


Foreseeable misuse: [EHSR 1.1.2] ☐ Catered for

Principles of safety integration [EHSR 1.1.2]

Wherever possible safe design has been used over application of safety devices to eliminate hazards:

☐ Safe design hinge gaps

☐ Fixed guards and fences ☐ Anti-climb precautions taken with fences and guards

☐ *Other ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

*Provide specification/drawings.

Structural integrity [EHSR 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.6]

The following are adequate to support at least 2 x actual load and the forces applied by the automation and expected wind loadings without permanent distortion:

☐ Foundations ☐ Fixings ☐ Brackets ☐ Supporting structures

☐ Posts ☐ Supporting masonry ☐ Leaf structure

Provide relevant reports drawings and/or calculations.

Derailment prevented [EHSR 1.3.2, 1.3.9]

The following are adequate to support the leaf and the forces applied by the automation and expected wind loadings and protect it from singe component failure hazards:

☐ *Hinges ☐ Hinge backup device provided

☐ Guides ☐ Travel stops ☐ Rolling gear

Provide relevant drawings and calculations. * Hinges and hinge fixings need to be rated at 3.5 x actual load without failure and share equal loading to achieve this, where this is not the case a backup device may be required.

Electrical safety [EHSR 1.5.1 & 1.6.3.]

☐ Supply inspected tested and certified to ET 101 or BS 7671

☐ 30mA RCD present on supply

☐ Wiring beyond the supply inspected and tested

☐ Wiring beyond the supply rated for current, voltage and environment

☐ All conductive metalwork connected to earth

☐ Enclosures are of correct IP rating for location and contents

☐ Enclosures containing dangerous voltages only openable with key or tool

☐ All pole isolator provided and lockable “off” when not visible from the system

Provide relevant inspection & test results and certificates.

Control system reliability [EHSR 1.2]

☐ 1Control system manufacturer DOI present

☐ Control system manufacturer instructions followed

☐ Control system manufacturer cable specification followed ☐ Wiring and cabling tested

☐ Voltage bands segregated ☐ Cabling protected from damage ☐ Enclosures sealed

Provide relevant declarations and test results.

1Where a manufacturer Declaration of Incorporation is not provided a complete Machinery Directive conformity assessment process must be undertaken and documented for the control system; to include other relevant directives [LVD, EMCD and RED] The responsibility for this will fall to the installer/manufacturer.

29

Control devices [EHSR 1.2.2]

☐ Safely placed

☐ Activating the correct [safe] command

☐ Hold-to-run controls protected from unauthorized use

☐ System stops within safe over-travel limits under hold-to-run control [EHSR 1.3.8]

Provide drawings and/or specification.

Safety device integrity [EHSR 1.4.3]

☐ 2All safety device manufacturer Declaration of Conformity present

☐ Safety device manufacturer instructions followed

☐ Cabling protected from damage ☐ Enclosures sealed

☐ Category 2 device test protocol is compatible with control system test protocol

Provide relevant declarations.

2See note 1 above; the same conditions apply as for the lack of a control system DOI.

Cutting and hooking hazards [EHSR 1.3.4]

☐ Eliminated/protected

Vehicle being impacted by a moving leaf: [EHSR 1.3.7, 1.3.8]

☐ Outer photo beam ☐ Single height ☐ Dual height Height detail ………………………………….

☐ Inner photo beam ☐ Single height ☐ Dual height Height detail ………………………………….

☐ Ground loop[s] for safety

☐ Ground loop[s] for activation

☐ Signage ☐ Road markings


Vehicle and pedestrian control methods: [EHSR 1.7.1, 1.7.1.2, 1.7.3]

☐ Zone lighting in the hours of darkness

☐ Warning beacon[s]

☐ Warning sounder

☐ Signage

☐ Ground markings

☐ Gate or barrier mounted lights

☐ Gate or barrier mounted signage

☐ Reflective material

☐ Pedestrian separation railings provided

☐ Dedicated pedestrian access provided

☐ Traffic lights

☐ Traffic calming

☐ Access control

☐ Vehicle impact protection bollards

☐ Other …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………


Trip hazards [EHSR 1.5.15]

☐ Trip hazards reduced to a minimum

☐ Trip hazards made clearly visible



List of hazards that cannot be controlled by safe design and are hence controlled by state of the art control measures [use row number from page 2].

No. Applied Measure

Use additional sheets as required.

31

Residual hazards listed [EHSR 1.1.2]

1. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

2. .…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

3. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

4. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

5. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

6. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

☐ Residual hazards explained in the user warnings [EHSR 1.7.4]

Provide documentation.

Maintenance [EHSR 1.6]

☐ Planned maintenance instructions [schedule] provided

☐ Planned maintenance is possible in safety

☐ Planned maintenance instruction content and frequency adequate

☐ Planned maintenance completed

☐ Maintenance log present/available

☐ Maintenance log updated

Provide documentation.

☐ User instructions and warnings provided [EHSR 1.7.1, 1.7.4]

Applicable Machinery Directive Essential Health and Safety Requirements complied with.

Note: This section only applies where the machinery directive is applicable, see page 1.

☐ 1. Foreseeable misuse

☐ 1.1.2. Principles of safety integration

☐ 1.1.3. Materials & products

☐ 1.1.5. Design of systems to facilitate handling

☐ 1.2.1. Safety & reliability of control systems

☐ 1.2.2. Control devices

☐ 1.2.3. Starting

☐ 1.2.4. Stopping

☐ 1.2.5. Mode selection

☐ 1.2.6. Failure of power supply

☐ 1.3.1. Stability of foundations

☐ 1.3.2. Risks of break up during operation

☐ 1.3.4. Risks due to surfaces, edges or angles

☐ 1.3.5. Risks related to combined machinery

☐ 1.3.6. Risks related to variations in operating

conditions

☐ 1.3.7. Risks related to moving parts

☐ 1.3.8. Choice of protection against risks from

moving parts

☐ 1.3.9. Risks of uncontrolled movements

☐ 1.4.1. General requirements of guards

☐ 1.4.2. Special requirements for guards

☐ 1.4.3. Special requirements for protective

devices

☐ 1.5.1. Electricity supply

☐ 1.5.4. Errors of installation

☐ 1.5.14. Risk of being trapped

☐ 1.5.15. Risk of slipping, tripping or falling

☐ 1.6.1. Machinery maintenance

☐ 1.6.2. Access to operation position & servicing

points

☐ 1.6.3. Isolation of energy sources

☐ 1.7.1. Information

☐ 1.7.1.2. Warning devices

☐ 1.7.2. Warnings of residual hazards

☐ 1.7.3. Markings

☐ 1.7.4. Instructions


MODULE 4 - INSPECTION, TEST AND COMMISSIONING NEW AND EXISTING AUTOMATED GATES AND BARRIERS

This section will cover the steps that must be taken before a system is finally put into service. The inspection and test stage is the final “walk around” to ensure that all is well before putting into service.

Inspection and test should verify that:

– The system works as designed

– All elements are secure

– The electrical system is safe

– Safe clearances are achieved

– All safety devices work – That forces are safe

– The risk assessment was valid

– That hazard control measures have worked.

The first stage of the process should be a visual inspection to ensure that:

– All welding, nuts bolts, fixings and foundations are secure

– Travel stops are secure and resilient [even when used in manual]

– Guides, rollers and hinges are secure and resistant to single fault failure – Guards are secure and effective

– Safety distances are achieved

Electrical inspections:

– Cabling is secure and protected mechanically – Earth connections present and tight

– Wire terminations correct and secure

– All cable entries are sealed

– Enclosures are sealed and secured by key or tool

– Dangerous voltage labels in place.

Electrical tests by competent person:

– Supply is tested or has been certified by others

– Conductive metalwork continuity to earth tested

– Isolation is functional and securable where required

– Polarity, continuity, insulation, earth fault loop, RCD function etc.

Functional tests of all elements:

– Limit switches

– Photo cells – Loop detectors operating the correct command

– Intercoms, keypads, key switches, buttons, transmitters etc. operating the correct command

– Safety device function and response.

Performance tests where appropriate:

– Light curtain or photo scanner performance – test piece

– Force limitation effectiveness – force tester.

As automated systems are machinery they must comply with the Machinery Directive and key to compliance with the directive is risk assessment; identifying hazards and applying control measures. Testing allows evaluation of the applied measure and demonstrates effective control.

EN 12445 – Test methods

The describes methods to be used to verify compliance with EN 12453. There are however some problems with this standard in relation to testing automated gates.

The tests described in the standard are intended as a type test prior to series production of a product and hence are not always practical or completely necessary for one off bespoke gates. For those engaged in serial production, obtaining and following the standard [EN 12445] is the preferred course of action.

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For those producing one off bespoke designs some interpretation is required to arrive at a safe situation by the most appropriate means, this course describes the tests required for one off systems and maintenance.

The standard describes the specification of test pieces for light curtains and the force measuring instrument that should be used to test for safe forces.

Testing should be completed before the system is put into service and must be performed on a complete system.

Light Curtain or Photo Scanner Tests

Test piece must comprise:

Rigid material cylinder 300mm x 50mm half matt black half gloss white

Tests

The test piece is presented to the moving leaf at all hazardous locations and it must not be possible for it to come into contact with hazardous movement.

If dangerous movement is to be prevented the leaf must stop quickly enough to prevent dangerous contact and hence the device being tested must set up an effective exclusion zone of “D” width:

– For a leaf traveling at ≤0.5m/second D = 200mm

– For a leaf travelling at >0.5m/second D = 900mm

The reaction of the leaf to an activation of the device will be crucial because in many locations the resulting reversal could present a further risk. For this reason, either pause or stop will be required for many hazard locations. The test piece is designed to represent a human body and also correspond to the technical principles used in the protective device which is under test. Because of these demands it is recommended in some situations that comparison tests are carried out with a human being, whenever possible.

Repeat the tests on this side.

Sliding gate light curtain and photo scanner tests. Swing gate photo scanner tests.

Testing of folding gates is a combination of the methods used to test sliding and swing gates, make tests at all hazard locations, movement must cease before contact.

Force Testing Equipment

The tester must comprise:

– Two contact areas with a diameter of 80 mm +/- 1%

– The contact areas shall be made of suitable material and be of sufficient thickness to retain rigidity

– A spring which gives the contact area a spring ratio of 500 N/mm +/- 50 N/mm – Measuring range from 25N to 2000N

– Rising / falling time of the load cell amplifier not > 5ms.

The equipment shall be calibrated annually and therefore be able to give measured values with an accuracy of at least +/- 5 % or +/- 10 N, whichever is the maximum deviation.


Force tests

Any test location that indicates values of more than 90% of Fd or Td must be repeated three times and the average of all three tests taken as the result:

– Fd 400N = Take an average of three tests when the result is above 360N

– Fd 1400N = Take an average of three tests when the result is above 1260N

– Td 0.75 = Take an average of three tests where the result is above 0.68 seconds.

Traffic Barrier Force Tests

Traffic barriers are tested at a point 200mm from the tip of the boom at a height up to 2m above the ground with a long extension piece attached to the tester. Some tester manufacturers provide a specially adapted extension with a pivoting foot plate to facilitate this.

The maximum force is 400N, time to below 150N is 0.75 seconds and time to below 25N is 5 seconds.

Collapsible Skirt

Where a collapsible skirt is attached to the boom the testing has to be done in two stages, first test that the skirt collapses freely, this is best done with the barrier in manual by lowering the boom onto the tester which is mounted on a suitable structure. There is no reversal time for this test, it just has to be less than 50N.

1. Test skirt collapse force [50N] 2. Force limitation test [400N]

Then the skirt is temporarily secured to the boom in its collapsed state whilst the boom is tested. This means that the skirt must collapse to reveal any safe edge that might be required.

Fixed Skirt

Where a fixed skirt is operated by parallelogram linkage then the entire skirt presents multiple crush and shear points that will not usually be treatable with force limitation, some form of light curtain or photo scanner devices will be needed to protect the entire hazard area on both sides.

Main Horizontal Edge Crush Tests

Crush measurements are taken at the main edge of horizontally moving gates [sliding, swing and folding] initially with a 500mm extension fitted to the tester.

The maximum force is 400N, time to below 150N is 0.75 seconds and time to below 25N is 5 seconds.

This measurement is taken at 3 heights:

I. 50mm from the bottom of the gate II. Centre of the gate height III. 300mm from the top of the gate for gates ≤2500mm high

Or 2500mm from the ground for gates >2500mm high.

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Then test the point of highest reading is re-measured without the extension at 50mm.

This will apply equally to sliding and folding gate main edges.

Swing gate main edges can be tested in one of two ways:

1. With a leaf delay 2. Without a leaf delay

The gate must be tested in the orientation in which it is to be used.

Opening Crush Tests

1. Sliding gate trailing edge [opening] crush hazards are tested by simply repeating the main edge tests at the

trailing edge. If a sliding gate is of tapered tail design, or if the trailing edge does not close right up to the

obstruction that causes the crush hazard then only the testable areas are tested e.g. just the lower tests or just

the 500mm tests.

2. Swing and folding gate open crush hazards are tested using the 500mm extension [the 50mm tests are not

required]:

– At the most outstanding feature up to 2m height.

Or in the absence of protrusions on either surface area:

– 1m out from the hinge and 1m up from the base of the gate.

Sliding, swing and folding gate open crush test positions

The maximum force is 400N, time to below 150N is 0.75 seconds and the time to below 25N is 5 seconds.


Full Speed [Impact] Tests

Where slow-down is not in use, these tests will not be necessary. The results of the 500mm crush tests must be used in a similar way to that described below.

Impact force is tested mid height at the main edge, at any separation that results in the gate traveling at full speed. The maximum impact force at a leading edge is 1400N, reducing below 150N is 0.75 seconds and the time to below 25N is 5 seconds.

There is more to this test than simply the impact force at the leading edge, full speed tests at the main edge must also be used to determine safe force at other areas of the gate.

1. Swing and folding gate full speed testes – used to determine lower edge force.

a) When the gap under the gate is constant and

greater than 120mm the hazard is impact and

less than 1400N is acceptable when tested at

full speed at the main edge.

b) When the gap under the gate is variable or less

than 120mm the hazard is crush and less than

400N required acceptable when tested at full

speed at the main edge.

In all cases, a reduction to below 150N in 0.75 seconds and a further reduction to below 25n in 5 seconds applies. This assumes that the same means of providing force limitation is used at the main edge and the lower edges [e.g. inherent limitation of force or safe edge]. Where this is not the case an improvised test against a rigid static object must be used to verify safe force at the lower edge at full speed.

Note that testing at the main edge of a swing or folding gate can give a realistic indication of force along the lower edge because force is a product of speed weight and operator torque. From the outer extremity of the gate towards the hinge torque is increasing but speed is dramatically reducing. This equalising effect loses all credibility in the last 10% of leaf width hence the requirement to use a safe edge at hinge area crush hazards.

2. Sliding gate full speed tests – used to determine fixed support safe edge force

Where the main edge of a sliding gate achieves a safe force [400N] by employing slow-down in the crush zone, safe edges at fixed supports will have to be able to control force to below 400N at full speed.

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It is not safe or reliable to conduct tests at the support frames so tests at the main edge will have to be interpreted and the results applied to other areas, the test must be done at full speed.

Full speed tests at a sliding gate leading edge safe edge will also reveal the likely forces present at safe edges at the support frames of sliding gates as this area will have to control the hazard at full speed and during slow down.

Where safe edges are not used at the leading edge [inherent force limitation] or where differing safe edge specifications are used at leading edge and shear/draw-in points, a sample of the shear/draw-in safe edge must be tested at the leading edge.

Do the usual crush tests at 500mm and 50mm, then do another test at full speed at centre height, the distance is of less importance, the important point being that force is measured at full speed.

The full speed test provides 2 pieces of information:

i. The impact force present at the main edge. ii. The shear/draw-in force present at the support safe edges.

Forces at Hinge Gaps

As it will not be practical to use a force tester in many hinge gaps, another strategy must be found to verify safe forces when using safe edges to limit force. Off cuts of various sizes of plastic pipe have been shown to start distorting at around 150N/250N and can be used as a test probe in the hinge gap against a safe edge.

If the pipe can be seen to distort against the safe edge it indicates that a larger section safe edge is required.

Due to the extremely slow approach speed of the surfaces, some quite small safe edge sections can in fact be effective but where a larger section will fit it will be better to use it.

Force

Force is affected by a combination of:

– Weight

– Speed

– Torque

– Reaction time.

As weight is usually a fixed element by this stage, some modification or control of the others will be needed. Weight should however, have been taken into account at the design and initial risk assessment stage.


Speed

i. Many control boards have a range of speed settings ii. Some control boards have a “slow down” feature for the end of travel iii. A smaller pinion on a sliding gate drive reduces the speed iv. Ram mounting geometry affects leaf speed v. Operator selection is important

Torque

Many control boards allow you to set a maximum current to be delivered to the operator:

– Sliding gate drives often have a mechanical slip clutch

– Ram mounting geometry affects force

– Hydraulic systems can have adjustable bypass valves to control the maximum torque.

Increasingly an amalgamation of all these elements are combined to provide detection.

Sensitivity

Sensitivity to obstacles is very often adjustable:

– Some systems monitor current to determine if an obstacle has been encountered – Some systems use encoders to monitor speed to determine if an obstacle has been encountered

– Some systems use “virtual encoders” to monitor speed

– Increasingly an amalgamation of all these elements are combined to provide inherent force limitation

– Differing specification active safe edges are a form of sensitivity control

Force Test Results

If any test fails, additional adjustments or alterations will need to be made to the installation, all tests will then need to be repeated. In order to avoid this frustration it is better to test at the area most likely to fail first, this will generally be:

– Sliding gate = at 500mm in line with the drive rack

– Swing gate = at 500mm in line with the ram.

Force Test Result Analysis

The point on the graph where the test fails, will affect the likely cure.

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Dynamic force exceeded

The reaction time is excellent it just the initial force that is too high. [If this were an impact test it could have been a pass]

As this is in fact a crush test, it is a fail and the likely solutions could be:

– Slow the overall speed [some controls boards can do this]

– Use a smaller pinion on a sliding gate drive

– Re assess ram geometry

– Reduce the speed of the leaf at the point of measure [use slow down]

– Use a passive safe edge [with inherent force limitation only]

– Use an active safety edge

– Increase torque [with active safe edge only]

– Select a safe edge with a greater over travel distance.

Dynamic time exceeded

The system is not reacting quickly enough and is taking too long to get back to below 150N, likely solutions could be:

– Increase inherent sensitivity

– Use a faster acting control board – Reduce any free play in the drive mechanism:

o Rack/pinion clearance o Flexible mountings o Slack in hinges, motor mountings or splined

interfaces

– Use an active safety edge

– Use a safe edge with a shorter activation distance.

Static force exceeded Typical force curve for a system relying on inherent obstacle detection. The system is pushing with too much force, likely solutions could be:

– Reduce the torque of the operator o Hydraulic by-pass valves o Mechanical clutch settings o Obstacle detection sensitivity o Re assess ram geometry

– Fit a passive safe edge [with inherent force limitation only]

– Fit an active safe edge.

Residual force exceeded

The system is continuing to exert force beyond 5 seconds and has not retracted, typical solutions could be:

– Fit an active safe edge.

Or, where inherent force limitation is being used:

– Is it just during the 50mm tests that the system is not reversing?

– Review panel settings, is force limitation active in this last 50mm of travel?

– Double leaf gates often perform better when a centre stop is fitted [prevents flex in gates causing issues].


The limitation of Tt to 5 sec. can be disregarded if the force never exceeds 50N provided that the system can be pushed back at least 50mm with a force of less than 50N.

Test Report

The results of all tests, electrical, force or light curtain shall be recorded in test reports that include the serial number and calibration date of test devices. The test reports will form part of the technical file for new and substantially modified systems, or the maintenance file of existing systems. Some force test devices provide the facility to upload results and generate reports using their respective software, other less complex devices simply read out the results that have to be recorded manually, either method is perfectly acceptable.

The test report must include:

The points tested

The force and time measurements [force tests only]

The device serial number [force tests only]

The device calibration date [force testers only]

The ambient temperature [all tests]

The control panel settings used [all tests]

The person conducting the tests [all tests]

The date of the tests [all tests]

Conclusion

It should ultimately be safe for a child to place a body part in any of the reducing gaps on a system, if it is not the system should not be in service.

We are not proposing that anyone uses a child as a test probe!

The inspection and test process should have ensured that:

– The risk assessment was valid

– All hazards were identified

– All hazards are now adequately controlled

If so the system is now ready for compilation of handover documentation and putting into service.

Ongoing Testing

Ongoing testing of all elements must also form part of regular planned preventative maintenance to demonstrate and ensure the continuing safety of the system. The results should be retained in a maintenance file.

HSA Guidelines on the Safety of Powered Gates 2015:

“Maintenance should include a test of the safety features of the gate and a test of the closing forces”

HSE Bulletin No FOD 7-2010:

“Forces should be periodically re-measured and checked as part of the planned preventative maintenance schedule for gates”

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MODULE 5 – REPAIR MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION

EXISTING AUTOMATED GATES AND BARRIERS

Legal Responsibilities of the System Manufacturer

The Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC places a criminal responsibility on an automated gate or barrier manufacturer to ensure that the system can be maintained safely and provide detailed planned preventative maintenance instructions to enable the system to be kept in a safe condition.

Planned Preventative Maintenance

The maintenance instructions or schedule must contain detail of the inspections, adjustments, lubrication and testing that will be required keep the system in a safe condition. This will include specifying the required maintenance interval and provide a means for recording maintenance activity.

What follows is a planned preventative maintenance schedule for an example gate:

At 6 monthly intervals check/do the following.

Inspections:

– Condition of all cabling and junction box's

– Security and effectiveness of all earth connections

– Security of all wire terminations

– Torque setting on control unit [99%] – Condition of photo cells internally and externally

– Sealing of photo cell covers and cable entry

– Sealing of control unit cover and cable entries

– Overall system structure and plumb of hinges

– Overall condition of rams

– Condition of all safety edges.

Lubrication: – Grease hinges and ram unit pivots

– Top up ram oil level.

Electrical tests:

– RCD function [press test button]

– Earth fault loop resistance.

Functional tests:

– Function of all controls, transmitters, loop and intercom

– Ram manual release – Ram hydraulic pressure setting

– Ram slow down valve setting.

Performance tests:

– Force limitation [Measure forces].

Re-assess and check on-going validity of the risk assessment.

At 2 yearly intervals:

– All elements of the 6 monthly checks

– Complete hydraulic oil change of rams.

This is not intended as a definitive list but it does indicate the level of detail required. In most cases this must be accompanied by some specification detail for oils and greases and reference to any component specific manuals necessary to assist with the process. The instructions should also specify the required competency of the maintenance contractor, e.g. automated system specialist conversant with XYZ Co. automation products.

This information should then enable anyone maintaining the system to know what is required.

For systems where this information is not available, the maintenance contractor should contact the manufacturer to obtain it, or devise a maintenance schedule using his own skill, judgement, inquiry, experience and qualification to devise a schedule for the system that will keep it in a safe condition, this should include the required frequency.

Ongoing Legal Responsibilities

Any person conducting maintenance, repair or modification of a system is referred to as “maintenance contractor” in this section, the term maintenance includes planned preventative maintenance, repair or modification.

Those with responsibility for systems include owners, workplace managers, landlords, site occupiers on whose premises systems exist and managing agents and facilities managers with contractual responsibilities for such systems. In this section, the term “system manager” is used to describe anyone with the ongoing responsibility for the system.

Legislation Applicable in Northern Ireland

Regulation 5 and 18 of the Workplace [Health, Safety and Welfare] Regulations 1993 require that doors, gates and barriers at workplaces are safe and subject to a system of maintenance [system manager responsibility].

Article 5 requires work to be carried out so as to ensure the safety of anyone who is not an employee. Article 6 requires that those in charge of premises ensure the means of entry is safe. Articles 8 & 9 requires employees to take reasonable care for the health and safety of themselves or other persons who may be affected by their acts or omissions at work.


Legislation Applicable in the Republic of Ireland

If the premises are a workplace, there are specific duties to maintain the system in a safe condition under Safety, Health and Welfare [General Applications] Regulations 2007 [system manager responsibility].

If the system is part of an undertaking [such as at rented property], the person in control of it may have duties under Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005, Non-fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 and The Housing [Standards for Rented Houses] Regulations 2008 to keep the system maintained in a safe condition [e.g. landlords, workplace managers, owners, managing agents, facilities managers and maintenance contractors].

Note: The lists of applicable legislation are not exhaustive, other criminal legislation may well apply at any given location dependant on the precise details of the system and its location.

Electrical Safety

Safety, Health and Welfare at Work (General Applications) Regulations 2007 [Republic] The Electricity at Work Regulations 1991 [NI]

This criminal legislation places a criminal responsibility on the maintenance contractor to ensure that maintenance work is conducted so as to prevent danger from electric shock, fire, etc. both during and on completion of the work. Maintenance of electrical equipment should only be executed by electrically skilled persons and be safe for users and others who may be affected on completion. This will generally mean making sure that relevant standards are followed e.g. ET 101 or BS 7671 Wiring Regulations for the supply and BS EN 60204-1 for the rest of the installation.

National wiring regulations require that systems must be electrically isolated for electrical safety inspections prior to any maintenance activities.

Negligence

This is civil law and means that any person who by their action or inaction causes injury to persons or damage to property may be sued in a civil action for damages. Hence the maintenance contractor could face civil action for damages in the event of an incident involving the system.

Safe System

There will always be some discussion about just how unsafe a given system actually is and the conversation often gets steered towards the likelihood of occurrence of an incident. Where children or untrained persons are potentially affected, the emphasis of the risk assessment must be on degree of harm rather than likelihood of occurrence.

In many cases, it is foreseeable that children could play on or around these systems or that untrained persons might encounter them. The current range of standards and codes of practice covering industrial doors, garage doors, automated gates and traffic barriers have generally dealt with this element and therefore a system is either safe or not safe in accordance with the relevant standard or code. A safe system is one where all electrical, structural, crush, impact, shear, draw-in, cutting, hooking hazards are controlled by state of the art means [EN 12453:2001 and references]. As the state of the art for safety has not [yet] changed since 2001, there is currently only one definition of a safe system and that is the steps described in module two.

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Despite this, it is possible to discriminate to some degree and not all hazards will necessarily result in a system needing to be taken out of service:

Where a hazard is classified as “Safety Critical” it must not be returned to service by a maintenance contractor or, for that matter, by a system manager.

Where a hazard is classified as “Requiring Improvement” it could possibly be left in service at the discretion of the maintenance contractor and the system manager [both must agree].

Safety Critical - Do not return to service Requires Improvement - Could be left in service

Structural failure imminent Minor structural improvement necessary

Crush, shear, draw-in or impact hazard not protected below 2.3m above permanent access level

Crush, shear, draw-in or impact hazard not protected but between 2.3m and 2.5m above a permanent access level

Dynamic force [Fd 400/1400N] or Dynamic time [Td 0.75s] over maximum by more than 25%:

Dynamic force [Fd] or dynamic time [Td] over maximum by less than 25%:

Fd 400N [crush, shear and draw-in hazard] = 500N or more

Fd 400N [crush, shear and draw-in hazard] = up to 499N

Fd 1400N [impact hazard] = 1750N or more Fd 1400N [impact hazards] = up to 1749N

Td 0.75 [all hazards] = 1 second or more Td 0.75 = up to 0.99 second

Static force [Fs no more than 150N] exists in excess of 10s Static force [Fs no more than 150N] exists between 5 and 10 seconds

Hold-to-run in use but some hazards not visible Hold-to-run by radio fob

Hold-to-run with overtravel of 125mm or more Hold-to-run with overtravel up to 124mm

Sliding gate without adequate travel stops Swing or folding gate without travel stops

Structural failure due to wind probable Hinge strength unknown but judged to be safe currently

Safety fence provided but easily defeatable [reach over/through]

Safety fence mesh size/clearance not to ISO 13857 but only defeatable by extreme action

Wicket door without cut out switch wired to stop circuit Two hinge swing gate with inverted top hinge, but appears structurally sound

Safe edge fails test piece test and is more than 140mm from moving leaf at a sliding gate draw in hazard

Safe edge fails test piece test but less than 140mm from moving leaf at a sliding gate draw in hazard

System protected solely by horizontal photo beams [no force limitation, light curtain/photo scanner or hold to run]

Safe edge/light curtain installed, performance is correct but does not achieve category 2 or 3

Insufficient photo beams to supplement force limitation

Danger of vehicle impact or impact to vehicle

Insufficient visibility in darkness

Insufficient signage or ground markings

Electrical

Class 1 electrical equipment not earthed Class 1 electrical equipment, wiring, earthing and fuse all suitable, RCD required but not fitted

Exposed live conductors Unprotected cable in good condition

Damaged cabling - safety or power circuit IP rating incorrect but appears safe currently

Disconnection time at earth fault beyond safe limits

In either case, the system manager must be fully informed and an unsafe system notice issued. Where a hazard has been classified “requiring attention” and the system is left in service, the system manager remains potentially liable to criminal prosecution or civil legal action in the event of near miss or injury incident and hence must be given the opportunity to take the system out of service.

Unsafe System Notice

Upon encountering an unsafe system, it is crucial that the installer informs the owner that it is not considered to be safe, what is wrong with it, what will be needed to make it safe and what the legal situation is. The following text is an excerpt from a DHF member warning notice which has been designed satisfy this legal requirement.

In our opinion, the above system is currently not safe for operation.

Continued use of this system may result in damage to property or injury to users or members of the public generally. Overleaf is a list faults we consider necessary to be rectified before the system can be regarded as safe in operation.


We also attach an estimate of the cost of this work if undertaken by us; you may wish to obtain further estimates from others.

You are reminded that, as the system manager, you have a legal duty of care to users and to visitors to the premises (including trespassers). If the system is not maintained in a safe condition, any party whose property is damaged, or who is injured by the gate is likely to be able to sue for damages.

If you have insurance covering such risks, your insurance contract is likely to oblige you to disclose material facts to your insurer such as, in this case, the fact that the gate is not considered safe.

Depending on location and use, there may well also be responsibilities for the system manager under health and safety law [see over for details]. Failure to meet duties imposed by health and safety legislation could result in criminal proceedings.

Due to our own criminal responsibilities as a system maintainer, we are unable to leave a system with “safety critical” defects in service. Where a system has lesser safety issues that are rated as “requiring improvement”, we may leave the system in service at your discretion. Where a system with defects requiring improvement is left in service, there may well still be legal liabilities for the system manager in the event of an incident resulting in damage to property or injury. We strongly advise that all safety related defects are resolved with immediate effect to protect the interests of both the system manager and users of the system.

It might also be prudent to hang a warning sign on the system to inform potential users of the danger.

If you do provide a warning sign, make sure you have also put your contact details on it.

Management of the Maintenance Process

DHF recommends the following process to manage maintenance, repair and modification works:

Step 1

Before going to site, the maintenance contractor must explain to the system manager that, as a duty of care to themselves, the system must be taken out of service for initial electrical and structural safety checks prior to the actual work or assessment process. If, during maintenance or assessment work, the system proves to be below an acceptable standard of safety, it will not be put back into service by the maintenance contractor.

Step 2

i) Once on site, the maintenance contractor must assess the system for safety before starting work, in so far as is possible in its current condition.

ii) The maintenance contractor must also assess the extent of work requested to be done by the system manager in terms of its likely impact on the safety of the system.

If step 2 reveals that the system will be safe on completion of the proposed work, then the maintenance contractor

can continue with the contracted work. If it subsequently becomes obvious during the work that the system will not

after all be safe on completion, the maintenance contractor must not put the system back into service.

If step 2 reveals that the proposed work will not result in a safe system:

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i) The maintenance contractor must explain all the exposed hazards to the system manager, verbally and as soon as possible in writing.

ii) The maintenance contractor must also explain to the system manager what additional work (if any) might be necessary to properly diagnose the hazards; it may prove necessary to replace or adjust drive units, control boards, hinges or rolling gear, etc. before a complete assessment is possible.

iii) The maintenance contractor must inform the system manager in writing of the measures that will be necessary to make the system safe.

Step 3

The maintenance contractor must then request clearance to complete the contracted work and the required safety upgrade work from the system manager. If the system manager requests that the maintenance contractor completes only the contracted work (the system manager may wish to invite competitive tender for the safety upgrade work), the maintenance contractor must not put the system back into service [section 3 HSWA 1974] on completion but must explain to the system manager how service can be restored (e.g. explain where the switch is or how it has been secured against collapse) but also inform the system manager in writing that there could be legal consequences in the event of an incident involving the system if it is returned to service in its current state.

Step 4

If, on a subsequent visit, the maintenance contractor finds the system is still in service in an unsafe condition, the process must be repeated and the system manager re-informed in writing of the potential hazards and of the potential consequences present. The maintenance contractor must not be the person who puts the system back into service in an unsafe condition at any stage [section 3 HSWA 1974].

Mitigating Action

Although a maintenance contractor must never place a system with safety critical defects back into service [section 3 HSWA 1974], in many cases, a system could revert to manual use or be controlled in hold-to-run in order to maintain security at the site. This cannot of course be achieved where the problem is potential structural failure.

Conclusion

It must be understood that, in the event of an incident with a system, the ensuing investigation will assess the input and actions of all parties associated and no guarantee of the outcome can be given. The investigation will ask who did what? what did those involved know about the condition of the offending system? and then what action could they have reasonably taken or did they take to prevent the occurrence? Clearly, it will be very important that those with a responsibility to inform (primarily the maintenance contractor) have done so in a very clear and precise manner.

It is advised that, when informing about defects affecting a system, this information is not confused with a quote to improve it; hence, it will be better if these two functions are contained in two separate documents. The unsafe system warning document must be just that and not be ambiguous in any way. To this end, DHF offers its members a suggested document template to cover the informing of safety element of the process.

It must also be noted that, if a maintenance contractor continues to arrive at a given site repeatedly to find that the system is still in use in an unsafe condition, at some point it will begin to look as if the system manager and the maintenance contractor are colluding to maintain an unsafe condition. In order to avoid this, and in the overall pursuit of safe systems, we would advise that if, at the third visit to the site, the system manager is still resisting safety improvements, then the maintenance contractor will have to consider in greater detail the risks involved in their continued involvement. It will be advisable at this stage to request a formal meeting with the system manager to discuss their ongoing intentions for safety of the system and to explore the possibility of staged improvements or other hazard mitigation strategies. DHF can offer its members support and guidance at this stage on a case by case basis. Ultimately, if a system manager is clearly refusing to have a site made safe, then we would advise that the relationship may need to be ended and that the relevant authorities (e.g. HSE, HSA or Local Authority Environmental Health Department) be informed. DHF can again offer considerable support to members at this very final and ultimately undesirable stage.

Domestic Systems

Particular care must be taken when entering into maintenance of a domestic system because the criminal responsibility is all yours, your client will have no criminal responsibility. This rather unfortunate and arguably unfair situation causes considerable stress in our industry, the DHF are campaigning to have this anomaly rectified but in the meantime great care must be taken.


Explain to the owner that because of section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 you will be in breach of a criminal law if you return a system with safety critical defects to service.

Planned Preventative Maintenance Contracts

Before taking on a contract to maintain an existing system:

Warn the client that maintained means safe.

Explain that you cannot be held responsible until you have visited the site, explain to the client that you must

switch off for safety checks [Electricity at work laws] and cannot leave a system with safety critical defects in

service [Safety & Health laws].

Always follow steps 1 to 4.

Issue an unsafe system notice whenever necessary!

Never restore systems with safety critical defects to service yourself!!

On Completion of Maintenance

Always ensure the system is left in a safe condition.

Update the maintenance log book [or provide one if none exists]

File a risk assessment for any modifications

Provide revised user instructions if they have changed due to modifications

Provide revised maintenance instructions if modifications have altered the requirements.

Keep a detailed account of all works completed in a maintenance file.

Maintenance File

A maintenance file differs from a Technical File in that it is an ever changing record of works throughout the life of the system. The technical file is a static record of the system when it was first put into service.

Of course the two files could well be kept in the same location.

Survey Work

If you conduct survey work on a system you are not obliged to make it safe as part of the survey, your responsibility is to inform accurately on its condition and probable action required to make it safe.

If it is not safe it would be preferable to take it out of service, indeed you will usually have needed to be switched off to conduct your survey and hence you may well reasonably decline to put it back in service. Make sure the client knows how and where it has been isolated or secured against collapse.

Issue an unsafe system notice!

If the owner elects to keep it in service they will be doing so against the advice of a trained and qualified automated gate and barrier expert.

Disclaimers

A lot of time and expense has gone into obtaining good solid legal advice on this subject with the following outcome. There is no legal precedent for such a document in this environment. Even if the system manager agrees to take responsibility, there is no guarantee that your culpability will be assured. Such a document is attempting to transfer the criminal responsibilities of one party [the maintenance contractor] to another [the system manager] by means of a civil contract, this is not possible in UK law.

For these reasons, DHF cannot advise or endorse the use of disclaimer documents.

Strategies

There are serious commercial pitfalls involved with informing a client that their system is not safe, or refusing to work on an unsafe system which can lead to potential loss of contract. Where this happens and a competent and responsible contractor is threatened with being replaced by one working outside of the law something must be done to protect the competent contractor. The process outlined above should result in the situation where the only reason that a given system is not safe is that the system manager has not acted. The maintenance contractor should never be found wanting in regard to returning dangerous systems to service.

Remember, when a client demands or coerces you to return an unsafe system to service, they are attempting to pass the responsibility for any resulting negative outcome to you!

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The DHF offer the following advice:

– Issue an unsafe system notice!

– Inform the client accurately – Point out both your own and the client’s legal obligations

– Inform DHF [DHF members only]

– Inform HSE, HSA, Trading Standards or Local Authority Environmental Health Officer [non DHF members]

Refer the commercial and industrial clients in the Republic to HSA advice on the subject at:

http://www.hsa.ie/eng/Publications_and_Forms/Publications/Machinery_and_Work_Equipment/Guidelines_on_the_Safety_of_Powered_Gates.html

Refer the commercial and industrial clients in Northern Ireland to HSE advice on the subject at:

www.hse.gov.uk/work-equipment-machinery/powered-gates/responsibilities.htm

When dealing with domestic clients in Northern Ireland refer them to:

www.hse.gov.uk/work-equipment-machinery/faq-powered-gates.htm

“I am a domestic householder; do I need to do anything?”



http://www.hse.gov.uk/work-equipment-machinery/powered-gates/responsibilities.htm

http://www.hse.gov.uk/work-equipment-machinery/faq-powered-gates.htm


MODULE 6 – DOCUMENTATION NEW AND EXISTING AUTOMATED GATES AND BARRIERS

New System Technical File [Machinery Directive]

The Machinery Directive requires several key documents to be held in a Technical File.

This file is a complete evidence package to explain how the system has achieved conformity and must be retained by the organisation responsible for CE marking for a minimum of ten years.

The file need not exist in paper form but it should possible to assemble it in reasonable time on demand from the authorised national bodies with responsibilities for compliance [HSE, Trading Standards and Environmental Health etc.].

The following should be included in the file.

1. A complete description of the system that includes at least:

Technical drawings including safety critical elements:

o Hinges, rollers and supports

Electrical power and control system schematics

Design calculations including:

o Hinge loading

o Travel stop loading

o Rolling gear loadings.

2. Risk assessment documents that include:

Description of the system

All hazards present

Elements resolved by safe design

Implemented protective measures

Applicable Essential Health and Safety Requirements

3. Test results:

Electrical Installation Certificate for the supply

Electrical test results for the remainder of the system

Force, light curtain or photo scanner test results

Commissioning check lists

4. The Declarations of Incorporation from the manufacturers of drives and controllers. 5. The Declarations of Conformity from safety device manufacturers. 6. Copies of installation manuals provided by manufacturers of all components. 7. A copy of the maintenance instructions & maintenance log book supplied to the customer. 8. A copy of the operating instructions and user warnings supplied to the customer. 9. The Declaration of Conformity.

Declaration of Conformity for a New Automated System [Machinery Directive]

The declaration of conformity is a document that certifies conformity with the Machinery Directive and supports the CE marking and must contain the following details.

1. The business name, address of manufacturer/installer. 2. A unique identification for the system. 3. The name [and address if different from above] of the responsible person. 4. A sentence declaring that the system complies with

– 2006/42/EC Machinery Directive. 5. A sentence declaring that the system complies with all other relevant directives:

– 2014/30/EU Electro Magnetic Compatibility Directive [conduits and separation].

– 2014/53/EU Radio Equipment Directive [transmitters & intercoms]. 6. The place and date of declaration. 7. The signature of the responsible person.

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Manufacturers Declaration of Conformity for a Safety Device [Machinery Directive]

The declaration of conformity is a document that certifies conformity with the Machinery Directive and supports the CE marking and must contain the following details.

1. The business name, address of the device manufacturer. 2. A unique identification for the device. 3. The name and address of the responsible person. 4. A sentence declaring that the device complies with relevant parts 2006/42/EC Machinery Directive. 5. A sentence declaring that the device complies with other relevant directives:

– 2014/30/EC Electro Magnetic Compatibility [conduits and separation]. 6. A reference to any harmonised standards used e.g.:

– EN 12978. 7. A reference to any other standards used e.g.:

– EN 61000-6-1.

– EN 61000-6-2. 8. The place and date of declaration. 9. The signature of the responsible person.

Manufacturers Declaration of Incorporation for a Partly Completed Machine [Machinery Directive]

The declaration of incorporation must contain the following particulars:

1. Business name and full address of the manufacturer of the partly completed machinery. 2. Name and address of the responsible person who must be established in the European Community. 3. Description and identification of the partly completed machinery including generic denomination, function,

model, type, serial number and commercial name. 4. A sentence declaring which essential requirements of 2006/42/EC are applied and fulfilled:

– List of specific Essential Health and Safety Requirements. 5. A sentence declaring that a technical file exists in conformity with Annex viii of 2006/42/EC. 6. A sentence declaring which other relevant directives are complied with e.g.:

– 2014/30/EC Electro Magnetic Compatibility.

– 2014/53/EC Radio Equipment Directive. 7. An undertaking to transmit, in response to a reasoned request by the national authorities, relevant information

on the partly completed machinery. This shall include the method of transmission and shall be without prejudice to the intellectual property rights of the manufacturer of the partly completed machinery.

8. A statement that the partly completed machinery must not be put into service until the final machinery into which it is to be incorporated has been declared in conformity with the provisions of 2006/42/EC.

9. The place and date of the declaration. 10. The identity and signature of the responsible person.

CE Mark for a New System [Machinery Directive]

The mark should be in the proportions and format shown below.

It should also be mounted where it will be visible, be indelible and contain the following details:

1. Name and address of the manufacturer 2. 2006/42/EC 3. Serial number or designation

4. Year of manufacture.


New System Handover Documents [Machinery Directive]

The following should be handed over to the customer/user of the system together with any training or verbal explanations necessary:

1. The instructions for use of the system and any ancillary equipment

2. The user warnings

3. The maintenance instructions

4. A maintenance log to record service, repairs, etc.

5. Copy of the Declaration of Conformity.

Existing System Maintenance File

A maintenance file differs from a Technical File in that it is an ever changing record of works throughout the life of the door it should contain:

1. A copy of the current planned preventative maintenance schedule;

2. Copies of updated maintenance and repair logs;

3. Risk assessments associated with modifications and upgrades;

4. Manuals, DOI’s and DOC’s associated with replacements and upgrades;

5. Drawings of minor structural changes;

6. Copies of unsafe door warning notices issued;

7. Copies of compliance certificates;

8. Invoices.

Existing system Maintainer’s Certificate of Compliance

Clients understandably often request some form of compliance document following repairs, maintenance or upgrades and as a Declaration of Conformity is not always appropriate a certificate of compliance should be used instead e.g.:

1. Maintenance company:

2. Owner/responsible person:

3. Installation address:

4. System type: gate, barrier etc.

5. Reason for issue: Repair, Maintenance, Modification

6. Mode of operation: Hold-to-run, Automatic

7. Number of leaves:

8. Opening width (m):

9. Serial number:

10. Type of location: Domestic, Rented, Commercial, Industrial

On the date indicated below the company above (1) declares that the door indicated in (3) above to be safe and at that time satisfied the legal obligations of both the owner and the maintaining company.

11. Date: Issued by: Signature:

Existing System Handover Documents

Recommendations of what should be handed over to the client after maintenance:

1. Instructions for use of the system and any ancillary equipment. 2. User warnings showing residual risks and potential danger areas. 3. Maintenance instructions. 4. Maintenance log to record service, repairs, etc. 5. Certificate of compliance

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Example Maintenance Log [Machinery Directive]

Owner:

Address:

System serial number:

Date Work done Company

PPM Name

Reactive Signature

–


PPM Name

Reactive Signature


PPM Name

Reactive Signature


PPM Name

Reactive Signature


PPM Name

Reactive Signature


PPM Name

Reactive Signature


PPM Name

Reactive Signature


ANNEX A - Applicable Machinery Directive Essential Health and Safety Requirements

1. Foreseeable misuse 1.1.2. Principles of safety integration The system has been designed in the following order:

i. Safe design used wherever possible ii. Safety systems applied for elements that cannot be

designed out iii. Warnings given for minor residual hazards

1.1.3. Materials & products i. All materials suitable for use and environment ii. Oils and other hazardous substances are properly

contained 1.1.5. Design of machinery to facilitate handling Manufacturers’ of complete systems have provided for handling to, and on site by means of lifting plans and provision of lifting eyes etc. 1.2.1. Safety & reliability of control systems A declaration of incorporation is present from the control system manufacturer quoting EHSR 1.2. & 1.4.3, 1.5.1 and compliance with Electro Magnetic Compatibility Directive. All cabling is protected against damage, voltage bands are separated, cable size is appropriate for current and volts drop, IP ratings and cabling are appropriate for environment. 1.2.2. Control devices All safely placed and operating the required command. 1.2.3. Starting Not possible when a safety device is activated where that would result in dangerous. movement. 1.2.4. Stopping No automatic re-start after stop command, stop overrides all other commands. Note that in many cases an emergency stop on an automated gate or barrier can be negative to safety is it could lead to entrapment. 1.2.5. Mode selection Switching to hold to run will only give control to authorised users [e.g. key switch or similar]. 1.2.6. Failure of power supply Loss of power does not present danger to users, e.g. provision of manual release, battery backup, non-locking drives and that use of the system in manual is safe. The system is safe when power is restored e.g. needs command to re start. 1.3.1. Stability of foundations Supporting structures, leaves and foundations designed to withstand 2 x actual load without permanent distortion. 1.3.2. Risks of break up during operation Prevented by adequate fabrication, guides, rollers, stops and hinges. Suspension elements are designed to withstand 3.5 x actual loading without failure. No single component failure will cause a dangerous situation. 1.3.4. Risks due to surfaces, edges or angles Prevented by removal of, or protection of all sharp and hooking protrusions. 1.3.5. Risks related to combined machinery Prevented by considering how control system integrity is maintained when combining devices e.g. bollards and gate systems from differing manufactures’. When this is done by an installer he has become the manufacturer of a control system and must ensure compliance. 1.3.6. Risks related to variations in operating conditions

Prevented by making sure wind loading will not compromise safety. 1.3.7. Risks related to moving parts All moving parts hazards are identified in the risk assessment. 1.3.8. Choice of protection against risks arising from moving parts Controlled or eliminated in accordance with relevant standards e.g. EN 12453 and references. 1.3.9. Risks of uncontrolled movements Prevented by ensuring that no single component failure will cause dangerous movement e.g. sliding systems not installed on an incline. 1.4.1. General requirements of guards Achieved by building from tried and tested components, mesh size and horizontal clearances appropriate, securely fixed and made anti climb. 1.4.2.1. Special requirements for fixed guards, Achieved by only being removable by key or tool, where possible the fixings should be retained on the guard when it is removed. 1.4.3. Special requirements for protective devices Catered for by ensuring that all safety devices will only fail to safe by good wiring practice and using devices in conformity with EN 12978 or EN ISO 13849-1 category 2 or 3 PL C or D. 1.5.1. Electricity supply Supply provided, tested and certified to ET 101 or BS 7671 Wiring Regulations. All cabling wiring and earthing provided and tested by a competent person to the state of the art e.g. EN 60204-1. Component DOI’s list EHSR 1.5.1 and EMC directive compliance or the manufacturer has completed appropriate type tests. 1.5.4. Errors of installation Prevented by following instruction manuals and only using competent, trained skilled technicians. All work inspected and tested on completion. 1.5.14. Risk of being trapped Prevented by safe deign or controlled by safety devices and provision of a manual release as appropriate. 1.5.15. Risk of slipping, tripping or falling Considered, controlled and residual hazards highlighted in the user warnings. 1.6.1. Machinery maintenance Requirements for maintenance are specified in detail in the planned preventative maintenance instructions. 1.6.2. Access to operation position & servicing points Access provided safely and described in the maintenance instructions. 1.6.3. Isolation of energy sources Power isolator provided within sight of the system or made lockable on the off position. Isolators are “all pole” design switching line and neutral conductors. 1.7.1. Information and warnings Warning signs and provided where deemed necessary in the risk assessment. 1.7.1.2. Warning devices Provided where identified in the risk assessment e.g. flashing lights, traffic lights and sounders. 1.7.2. Warning of residual risks Explained in the user instructions and warnings. 1.7.3. Marking of machinery The system must be marked visibly, legibly and indelibly with the following minimum particulars:

• Business name and full address of the manufacturer • CE Mark and 2006/42/EC

• Serial number • Year of manufacture/installation 1.7.4. Instructions User warnings carefully compiled and passed to the client along with any required training and demonstration.

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Telephone: 01827 52337

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