ANSO Quarterly Data Report Q1 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for

the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.

-Not for copy or sale-

The Afghan i s tan NGO Sa fe t y Of f i c e

A acks against NGOs by armed opposi on have remained stable and low throughout the Q1 (p.3), although

the overall level of incidents, including criminal acts, has grown by 38%. The criminal sector saw an increase

of 50% (p.4) with a acks by AOG increasing by a lower rate of 29% (or just four actual a acks). A total of sev-

en persons have been killed, comparable to eight at Q1 2010, all by small arms fire either as a result of delib-

erate intent (mostly criminal), a personal dispute or collaterally in a acks on other targets (p.5). The per-

centage of total a acks occurring in the North East has jumped from 12% in 2010 to 22% this year with a

spike of incidents (mostly criminal) recently in Badakhshan; notably one of the provinces slated for early

’transi on’. The number of a acks occurring in the East has similarly jumped from 20% to 25%, mostly as a

result of a sharply deteriora ng Nangarhar province. Kine c a acks against NGOs have included improvised

explosive devices (5), rocket strikes (1), small arms fire (8) and armed robberies (6). In addi on there have

been four cases of abduc on, involving seven actual persons, all but one of which have been resolved to

date. Abduc on rates also remain consistent with 2010, which, coincidentally, also saw eight in the Q1.

The data at this stage con nues to support the conclusion that, despite an over all increase in the conflict

rate (p.8), NGOs are not rou nely targeted by the Taliban as a ma er of policy but are being impacted, as a

sta s cal inevitability, by an increase in ambient violence. ANSO currently ranks collateral damage and an

accidental strike with an IED as the highest risk factors facing the NGO community (p.6). Mi ga on strate-

gies for these specific risks would include reduced proximity to likely targets, adop on of a low visibility

movement profile and where possible, direct access nego a ons with opposi on forces to respect neutrality.

There have been no substan al changes in the strategic environment since the last report period. The IMF

remain engaged in establishing the condi ons for their exit, with data sugges ng that their regular force in-

terven ons have not significantly impacted AOG figh ng capacity at a strategic level. AOG a acks in Hel-

mand province have increased by 76% over the Q1 of 2010 (p.9). As an cipated, irregular armed forces con-

nue to develop (under the VSO/ALP rubric) well beyond the planned footprint (p.11) establishing poten al

obstacles to poli cal cohesion and state stability. Preliminary “transi on” areas have been announced, alt-

hough it remains too early to judge the impact of this in the Q1 data period.

Countrywide, the number of a acks by armed opposi on has already grown by 51% (p.8) on 2010, sug-

ges ng that AOG capacity was not significantly effected by last years IMF opera ons. We an cipate that

2011 will be the most violent year since we have been keeping records.

Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul, April 2011

SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT

J an 1s t—Mar 31s t 2011

ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.1 2011

The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily re-flect the views of ANSO donors or partners.

Page 2 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT

Part 1.Part 1.

NGO TRENDSNGO TRENDS


1 . 1 A O G A t t a c k s A g a i n s t N G O s

AOG a acks against NGOs remain within normally low ranges, seeing a moderate rise over the Q1 period

of 2010 (up from 14 to 18, see below right). Just 35% of the total are assessed as being deliberately in-

tended to cause harm or loss, although this count also includes many incidents which look more like

AOGs se ling personal scores than airing a grudge against the NGO. Accidents, most commonly with IED

or RPG strikes, and informa on gathering exercises, most commonly through temporary deten ons, con-

nue to make up a large part of AOG interac on with NGOs. The data con nues to provide no evidence

of systema c or rou ne targe ng of NGOs by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA).

6

1 1

6

3 3

10

4

7

2

6

4

6

3

87

3

12

20

17 17

8

65

1312

3

6

10

6

18

2

8

12

6 6

2 2

10

6

8

2

1211

15

98

3 3

9

6

0

5

10

15

20

25

JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC

JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC

JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC

JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC

JAN

FEB

MA

R

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to AOG per month, 2006 - 2011(Includes all types of event such as kinetic, non‐kinetic, threats and abductions)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Q1-2008 Q1-2009 Q1-2010 Q1-2011

17

28

14

18

ANSO: AOG attacks against NGOs, Q1 only, 2008-2011

Deliberate & Hostile35%

Info Gathering23%

Accidental

24%

Influencing Populations

18%

ANSO: Assessed cause/purpose of AOG attacks on NGOs, Q 1 2011


1 . 2 G e n e r a l N G O Tr e n d s – C r i m i n a l A t t a c k s

While s ll low in absolute terms, there has been a slight rela ve increase in the number of crimes

against the NGO community, rising from 10 to 15 over the Q1 (below right). The rate does not exceed

longer term norms however (above) and overall NGO exposure to crime appears to be dropping. The

majority of recent a acks have been armed robberies, both at the office and at home, with vehicles ,

cash and valuable electronics being stolen. That the majority of crimes (47%) occur in the North and

North Eastern regions is certainly reflec ve of NGO density there, but it could also suggest a general

growth in criminality invoked by the widespread forma on of irregular mili as. It is in these regions

par cularly that locals have claimed irregular forces to be nothing more than sanc oned criminals.

4

9 9

7 7

10

3

8

9 9

6

3 3

9

2

6

5

11

7

6

5

3

2

1

4

3

2

4

7

4

6

3

2

4

6

1 1

5

4

2 2

0

1

4

2

7 7

3

6

3

6

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC

JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC

JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC

JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC

JAN

FEB

MA

R

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to criminals per month, 2006-2011 (Includes all types of event kinetic and non‐kinetic)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Q1-2008 Q1-2009 Q1-2010 Q1-2011

14

9

10

15

ANSO: Criminal attacks against NGOs, Q1 only, 2008-2011

Armed Robbery

Intimidation by IED

Non-Fatal Assault

Abduction for Ransom (Persons)

Unarmed Robbery

Murder

5

3

3

1

1

2

ANSO: Types of crimes against NGO/NGO staff, Q1 2011 only


1 . 3 N G O I n c i d e n t M a p p i n g — Q 1 2 0 11

As usual, serious a acks have occurred in prov-inces assessed both as calm as well as insecure with no specific geographic concentra on. That IED strikes have not, so far, occurred in the South, reflects the lack of road movement in those areas. A larger propor on of incidents occurred in the East as a result of a growing in-stability in Nangarhar, this will definitely be a province to watch in 2011. Of the seven NGO deaths occurring so far this year, five have been as a result of the small arms fire incidents, a change from last year when most were from IEDs. Most of these deaths have been assessed as being criminally (or personally) mo vated. The percentage of all incidents occurring in the North and North East has risen from 40 to 44%.

IED

Rocket

Small Arms Fire

Abduction

Armed Robbery

HELMAND NIMROZ

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

PAKTIKA

GHAZNI

FARAH

HERAT

BADGHIS

GHOR

DAYKUNDI

BAMYAN

FARYAB

KHOST

BADAKSHAN

BALKH JAWZJAN

SAR‐E‐PUL

KUNDUZ

TAKHAR

SAMANGANBAGHLAN

WARDAKKABUL

PARWAN

NANGAHAR

LAGHMAN

KAPISA

ANSO: Province of serious NGO Incidents, Jan-Mar 2011

9%6%

16%

25%

22%

22%

ANSO: Regional distribution of NGO attacks, Q1 2011

West South Central East North North East


1 . 3 S e c u r i t y R i s k A s s e s s m e n t M a t r i x ( S R A M )

The Security Risk Assessment Matrix is a common tool to assist NGOs in visualizing and ranking risk. The below pre-

sents our current ranking of the primary risks to NGOs, per ANSO opera onal area, along with the recommended

mi ga on tac c. We currently consider collateral damage and accidental IED strikes to be the highest ranked risks

to NGOs countrywide. NGOs might use the charts to further develop regionally specific mi ga on.

Very Low Low Moderate High Very High

Very Low 1 1 2 3 3 1 Negligible Risk

Low 1 2 3 3 3 2 Mild Risk

Moderate 2 2 3 4 4 3 Moderate Risk

High 3 3 3 4 5 4 Serious Risk

Very High 3 3 4 5 5 5 Unacceptably High Risk

Risk RatingImpact

Likelih

ood

RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX (Likelihood x

Impact=Risk)

Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure

Collateral Damage Moderate High 4 Avoiding proximity to targets & hardening of facilities (protection)

Accidental IED Moderate High 4 Use a low profile vehilce (unless your logo is recognized) & travel off peak

Abduction for Interrogation High Low 3 Establish community legitimacy & deploy staff from local area only

Armed Robbery Moderate Moderate 3 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines


Collateral Damage Low High 3 Avoiding proximity to targets

Accidental IED Low V. High 3 Use a low profile vehilce & travel 'off peak'

Deliberate IED V. Low V.High 3 Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance

Armed Robbery on Road Moderate Moderate 3 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines

Deliberate AOG targeting V. Low V. High 3 Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance


Abduction at Illegal Checkpoint Low Moderate 3 Do not carry items linking you to an NGO (sanitized)

Direct Attack on Vehicle/Compound Low V. High 3 Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance

Accidental IED Low V. High 3 Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'


Armed Robbery on Road Low Moderate 2 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines


Targeted Abduction Low Moderate 3 Deploy staff from the local area only and establish community support

Armed Robbery on Road Low Moderate 3 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines


Accidental IED Low V. High 3 Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'

Deliberate AOG targeting Low V. High 3 Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance


Accidental IED High V.High 5 Reduce road movements, travel low profile & "off peak"

Collateral Damage High V.High 5 Avoiding proximity to targets

Deliberate AOG targeting Low V.High 3 Avoid association to IMF/GIRoA, maintain neutrality in projects

Deliberate IED Low V.High 3 Remain neutral & outreach to AOG to promote acceptance


Accidental IED Very Low V.High 3 Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak'

Accidental IDF strike Low Moderate 3 Avoiding proximity to targets

Collateral Damage Moderate V. High 4 Avoiding proximity to targets

Armed Robbery on Road Moderate Moderate 3 Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines

Home/Office Break‐In High Low 3 Guards, perimeter fence & lighting

EASTERN REGION

NORTHERN & NORTH EAST REGIONS

WESTERN REGION

SOUTHERN REGION

CENTRAL REGION

COUNTRY WIDE


Part 2.Part 2.

State of the ConflictState of the Conflict


2 . 1 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — C o u n t r y w i d e

AOG ini ated a acks have soared this quarter, up by 51% from last year. This ‘gain rate’ is also larger

than the 38% seen between the Q1 of 09-10. March 2011 saw 1,102 a acks, an average of 35 per day,

surpassing even the August 2009 summer peak during Presiden al elec ons. The data suggests that the

deep winter down turn (noted at Q4 2010) was simply an ordinary opera onal pause, and was not reflec-

ve of a permanently degraded capacity as some had suggested at the me. Considering the variety of

IMF tac cs and strengths that have been brought to

bear against the opposi on at different periods

throughout the 5.2 years recorded here, it is re-

markable how consistent the growth rate has been

and suggests that we need to think beyond the linear

logic that a stronger IMF equals a weaker AOG, as

this is clearly not the case. Instead, it is likely that a

more complex ‘co-evolu onary’ rela onship exists

within which the counter-insurgency actually

strengthens and exacerbates the insurgency,

through forced adapta on, rather than defea ng it.

The end result appears to be a perpetually esca‐

la ng stalemate which could sustain itself indefi-

nitely, or un l one side, or the other, transi ons out.

335

405

634

1093

657

1541

1102

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC JAN

FEB

MA

R

AP

R

MA

Y

JUN

JUL

AU

G

SEP

OC

T

NO

V

DEC JAN

FEB

MA

R

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

ANSO: Total AOG initiated attacks per month, 2006‐2011(Note: This is a clean count of AOG initiated kinetic attaks only, it does not include any criminal activity, kinetic or otherwise)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

Q1-2007 Q1-2008 Q1-2009 Q1-2010 Q1-2011

434

707

1301

1791

2700

ANSO: Total AOG attacks at Q1 stage only, 2007-2011


2 . 2 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — P e r P r o v i n c e

This table provides a comparison of raw AOG a ack rate data, per province, for the Q1 periods of 2010

and 2011. It shows the percentage change and the absolute figure. When using for independent analysis

readers are reminded that a low a ack volume can indicate AOG dominance and that a small absolute

change can be large when stated as a percentage. The ’average’ referred to is the 51% country rate. (p10)

PROVINCE

AOG Attacks

Q1 2010

AOG Attacks

Q1 2011 % Change

Absolute

Change PAKTYA 14 140 900% 126

NURISTAN 4 21 425% 17

JAWZJAN 12 33 175% 21

BADAKHSHAN 4 11 175% 7

FARAH 22 58 164% 36

PARWAN 6 15 150% 9

KHOST 147 326 122% 179

BALKH 14 31 121% 17

HERAT 27 58 115% 31

GHAZNI 71 152 114% 81

URUZGAN 49 93 90% 44

HELMAND 381 672 76% 291

NANGARHAR 76 128 68% 52

BADGHIS 65 97 49% 32

FARYAB 38 55 45% 17

LAGHMAN 26 32 23% 6

WARDAK 38 43 13% 5

PAKTIKA 43 48 12% 5

KANDAHAR 228 249 9% 21

KUNAR 312 338 8% 26

ZABUL 52 55 6% 3

SAMANGAN 0 2 0% 2

LOGAR 23 23 0% 0

GHOR 3 3 0% 0

KABUL 24 22 -8% -2

SAR-E PUL 21 19 -10% -2

DAYKUNDI 8 7 -13% -1

NIMROZ 21 14 -33% -7

KUNDUZ 79 46 -42% -33

KAPISA 37 19 -49% -18

BAGHLAN 35 16 -54% -19

TAKHAR 19 5 -74% -14

BAMYAN 1 0 -100% -1

NE

GA

TIV

E G

RO

WT

HA

BO

VE

AV

ER

AG

E G

RO

WT

HB

EL

OW

AV

ER

AG

E G

RO

WT

H


2 . 3 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — I n s e c u r i t y R a t i n g

The most vola le area, again, has been Loya Paktya (P2K) plus Ghazni - which corresponds to some of ISAF

RC-EAST and AOG Miramshah Shura - which has seen an averaged growth rate of 287% per province. All

four provinces in this area are ranked as “extremely insecure” and are likely to remain so throughout 2011.

The northern half of ISAF RC-EAST (Nuristan, Kunar) remains ranked as “extremely insecure”, with at least

one district (Waygal) en rely under AOG command. In the south, Uruzgan and Helmand are seeing above

average growth rates, as AOG counter ISAF offensives, while Kandahar and Zabul remain steady and Nimroz

sees decline. We con nue to rank four of the five as “highly insecure” or above, with just Nimroz being

slightly more accessible. The four provinces of the west have seen an averaged growth rate of 82% and we

rank Herat as “deteriora ng” as it is slated for early transi on while seeing a 115% increase in a acks. In

the north west, Faryab is ranked as “moderate” having the regional highest a ack rate in absolute terms.

Jawzjan and Balkh rank as “deteriora ng” due to them having the regions highest percentage growth rates

(175% & 121% respec vely). Sar-i-Pul’s Sayyad district causes it to also be ranked as “deteriora ng”. In the

north east all provinces but Badakhshan have seen lower a ack rates than Q1 last year but con nue to be

ranked as “moderate” and “deteriora ng” due to the very high likelihood of a fresh AOG campaign in Q2.

HELMAND 672NIMROZ 14

KANDAHAR 249

URUZGAN 93

ZABUL 55

PAKTIKA 48

GHAZNI 152

FARAH 58

HERAT 58

BADGHIS 97

GHOR 3

DAYKUNDI 7

BAMYAN 0

FARYAB 55

KHOST 326

BADAKSHAN 11

BALKH 31 JAWZJAN 33

SAR‐E‐PUL 19

KUNDUZ 46 TAKHAR

5

SAMANGAN 2 BAGHLAN 16

WARDAK 43KABUL 22

PARWAN 15

NANGAHAR 128

LAGHMAN 32

KAPISA 19

ANSO: Provincial Insecurity Rating, at Q1 2011(Rating based on analytical assessment and not just incident rate. Total AOG attacks for 2011

indicated in map. A lack of AOG attacks can indicate uncontested AOG presence)

Extremely Insecure

Highly Insecure

Moderately Insecure

Deteriorating

Low Insecurity

RC‐South West

RC‐South

RC‐East

RC‐North

RC‐West

RC‐Capital


2 . 5 I r r e g u l a r A r m e d F o r c e s ( I A F )

Irregular armed forces con nue to be developed, as a component of the IMF exit strategy. To deflect cri -

cism, all such forces are supposed to become enrolled in the MOI Afghan Local Police (ALP) program.

However, as the mapping exercise below shows, irregular armed forces are in fact mobilizing and oper-

a ng well beyond the reach of that program, mostly at the ini a ve of local poli cal and ethnic leaders

and generally with tacit knowledge and approval from IMF (US). The phenomenon presents only minor

immediate threats to NGOs, but may lead to sub-na onal conflicts as “transi on” progresses.

Tala Wa BarfTalaWaBarf

Khinjan

Qalay‐I‐ ZalArchi

Imam Sahib

Chahar Dara

Ali Abad

KunduzKhan Abad

WarsajWarsaj

RustaqRustaq

FarkharFarkharChalChal

TaluqanTaluqan

Bangi

KalafganKalafgan

Ab

Chah

Ab

Ishkamish

Khwaja Ghar

KhwajaGhar

Wakhan

JurmJurm

ShighnanShighnan

KishimKishim

Darwaz

BaharakBaharak

RaghRagh

ZebakZebak

Kuran Wa MunKuran Wa Mun

Fayz Abad

KhwahanKhwahan

Ishkashim

Shahri BuzurShahriBuzur

DushiDushi

AndarabAndarab

NahrinNahrinKhost Wa Fir

Burka

Baghlani JadBaghlani Jadid

Dahana‐I‐GhDahana‐I‐Ghori

BaghlanBaghlan

ANSO: Official ALP sites, North East, 2011

1. OFFICIALLY APPROVED AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE (ALP) DISTRICTS in NORTHEAST as of

JAN 2011

Tala Wa BarfTalaWaBarf

Khinjan

Qalay‐I‐ ZalArchi

Imam Sahib

Chahar Dara

Ali Abad

KunduzKhan Abad

WarsajWarsaj

RustaqRustaq

FarkharFarkharChalChal

TaluqanTaluqan

Bangi

KalafganKalafgan

Ab

Chah

Ab

Ishkamish

Khwaja Ghar

KhwajaGhar

Wakhan

JurmJurm

ShighnanShighnan

KishimKishim

Darwaz

BaharakBaharak

RaghRagh

ZebakZebak

Kuran Wa MunKuranWaMunjan

FayzAbad

KhwahanKhwahan

Ishkashim

Shahri BuzurShahriBuzur

DushiDushi

AndarabAndarab

NahrinNahrinKhost Wa Fir

Burka

Baghlani JadBaghlani Jad

Dahana‐I‐GhDahana‐I‐Ghori

BaghlanBaghlan

2. REPORTED ACTUAL PRESENCE of IRREGULAR ARMED FORCES in

NORTHEAST as of JAN 2011

ANSO: Irregular force activity, North East, 2011


REPORT ENDS

For fur ther informat ion [email protected]

© ANSO, January 2011

This document will be stored in the public domain at www.afgnso.org

It may be reproduced, stored or transmitted without permission for non-commercial purposes only and with

written credit to ANSO. Where it is transmitted elec-tronically a link should be provided to ANSO website

www.afgnso.org

Acronyms:

IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)

AOG- Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban); Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH)

IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)

ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)

IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)

IDF—Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)

CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike)

EOF - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop)

SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK47)

Documents

ANSO Quarterly Data Report Q1 2011