Aplicacao Heuristica Das Teorias Explanatorias Em RI

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DOI: 10.1177/1354066109344008published online 22 February 2010European Journal of International Relations

Adam R. C HumphreysThe heuristic application of explanatory theories in International Relations

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Article

Corresponding author:

Adam R.C. Humphreys, Department of Politics and IR, University of Oxford and Nuffield College, Manor

Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ, UK.

E-mail: [email protected]

The heuristic applicationof explanatory theories inInternational Relations

Adam R.C. HumphreysUniversity of Oxford and Nuffield College, UK

Abstract

Explanatory theorists increasingly insist that their theories are useful even though they cannotbe deductively applied. But if so, then how do such theories contribute to our understanding

of international relations? I argue that explanatory theories are typically heuristically applied:theorists accounts of specific empirical episodes are shaped by their theories thematiccontent, but are not inferred from putative causal generalizations or covering laws. These

accounts therefore gain no weight from their purely rhetorical association with theoriesquasi-deductive arguments: they must be judged on the plausibility of their empirical claims.

Moreover, the quasi-deductive form in which explanatory theories are typically presentedobscures their actual explanatory role, which is to indicate what sort of explanation may berequired, to provide conceptual categories, and to suggest an empirical focus. This account

of how theoretical explanations are constructed subverts the nomotheticidiographicdistinction that is often used to distinguish International Relations from History.

Keywords

explanation, explanatory theory, heuristic, International Relations theory, methodology

Introduction

Theoretical debates in International Relations are typically concerned with the scope and

content of general theoretical claims and with recurring questions of ontology, episte-

mology and method. There is comparatively little concern with how theories are applied.

Yet if theoretical ideas influence how we think about international relations, then it is

crucial to ask how they are translated into substantive claims about specific empirical

episodes.1 We cannot properly evaluate theories or the explanations associated with them

without a clear understanding of how those theories are applied and, therefore, of how

they contribute to our understanding of international relations.

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2 European Journal of International Relations XX(X)

This article examines how explanatory theories are applied. It begins with a puzzle:

although many explanatory theorists accept that their theories are not deductively

applied, they do not offer any alternative account of how those theories are drawn upon.

There has been little attempt to unpack what is involved in the non-deductive, or heuristic,application of such theories. I seek to fill this gap by arguing that explanatory theories in

International Relations are typically heuristically applied: theorists accounts of specific

empirical episodes are shaped by their theories thematic content but are not inferred

from putative causal generalizations. Rather than identifying covering laws, theories

indicate what sort of explanation is required, provide conceptual categories and suggest

an empirical focus. I illustrate this by re-examining Waltzs well-known explanation of

the lack of direct military conflict between the superpowers during the Cold War, showing

how recognizing that neorealism is heuristically applied influences our understanding of

Waltzs claims. I argue that despite explanatory theorists focus on developing abstract

arguments, good judgement is central to the construction and evaluation of substantive

explanatory claims.

For some, the idea that theories are, or could be, deductively applied is part of

what identifies them as explanatory theories. For others, it may seem self-evident

that such theories are heuristically applied. Thus Buzan (2004: 24) notes that while

some demand that a theory contains or is able to generate testable hypotheses

of a causal nature, others use the term for anything that organises a field systemati-

cally, structures questions and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated

concepts and categories. I show that the first view is descriptively false: theories do

not contribute to the development of substantive explanatory claims by providingtestable causal generalizations. I also argue that the implications of the second view

have not been well worked out. Hence this article aims both to reveal explanatory

theorists actual practices and to show how thinking of theories as heuristic resources

might influence our attempts to assess and improve theories and the explanations

that draw on them.

My argument carries three main implications. First, substantive explanatory claims

that draw on theories heuristically gain no additional weight from what is a purely

rhetorical association with the theories quasi-deductive arguments. What must be

assessed is the plausibility of the substantive empirical accounts, not abstract qualitiesof the theories. This suggests that explanatory claims should not be privileged just

because they are theoretically derived. Second, the heuristic functions that theories

perform may be rather limited: theories like neorealism offer little critical reflection

upon the different sorts of questions that might be asked about particular episodes, the

alternative conceptual categories that might be employed or the range of explanatory

factors that might be examined. Addressing such deficiencies offers a more promising

way of improving such theories than seeking to elaborate quasi-deductive arguments

that are not directly drawn upon. Third, my account of how theories are applied under-

mines the nomotheticidiographic distinction that is often used to distinguish socialscientific and historical approaches to international relations. This creates space for a

deeper appreciation of the kinds of judgements that we rely upon in developing and

assessing theoretical explanations.



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Humphreys 3

Theories and perspectives

According to Smith (2000), explanatory theory includes neorealism, neoliberalism and

much of mainstream constructivism. It is characterized, above all, by positivist premises:explanatory theorists are committed to the view that the social world is amenable to the

same kinds of analysis as the natural world, to a separation between facts and values,

to uncovering patterns and regularities and to empiricism as the arbiter of what counts

as knowledge (Smith, 2000: 380, 383). Thus explanatory theorists might be expected to

apply their theories in accordance with the covering law model of explanation, in which

an episode is explained by subsuming it under general laws, i.e. by showing that it

occurred in accordance with those laws, in virtue of the realization of certain specified

antecedent conditions (Hempel, 1965: 246). In other words, they might be expected,

first, to develop theories in which causal generalizations are inferred from properly specified

assumptions; second, under appropriate conditions, to deduce explanatory claims from those

generalizations; and, third, to test those claims against (what are said to be) the facts.2

Some explanatory theorists appear to endorse this model of theory application. For

example, Waltz (1979: 17) argues that the theorist must contrive explanations from which

hypotheses can then be inferred and tested, while Moravcsik (1997: 514) argues that any

nontautological social scientific theory must be grounded in a set of positive assumptions

from which arguments, explanations, and predictions can be derived. This model is also

implicit in the form in which most explanatory theories are presented. The centrepiece of

such theories is typically a sequence of quasi-deductive arguments culminating in a putative

causal generalization: the theorys findings are claimed to follow from a specified set ofassumptions that approximate real-world conditions. Thus neorealists seek to show how

balancing behaviour is driven by the anarchic structure of the international system (see Waltz,

1979), neoliberals seek to show how institutions facilitate cooperation under anarchy (see

Oye, 1986; Stein, 1990), and mainstream constructivists seek to show how states interests

and identities are socially constructed (see Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1992). If applied in

accordance with the covering law model, these theories would be used to show that an

outcome was to be expected because the specified antecedent conditions were fulfilled. In

such circumstances, the outcome could be deduced from the theorys putative covering laws.

Some theorists have attempted to apply explanatory theories deductively. For example,Posen (1984: 8) seeks to compare organization theory and neorealist balance of power

theory by deducing specific propositions about French, British and German military

doctrine during the interwar period. However, he is unable to make these deductions: in

order to construct neorealist hypotheses about military doctrine, he has to pull the theory

in the direction of political realism or Realpolitik with which it is closely identified,

but not synonymous. Thus he describes the two families of hypotheses that he tests not

as propositions deduced from theoretical assumptions but as representing two distinct

perspectives on state behaviour. In fact, he accepts that his use of the terms organization

theory and balance of power theory may be somewhat misleading, though he insiststhat they do indicate the general origins of his hypotheses (Posen, 1984: 345). His

problem is that neorealism does not specify balancing behaviour in sufficient detail that

it is possible to deduce what sorts of military doctrines are required.



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Under-specification is not the only problem. Explanatory theories are often represented

as deductive in form even though, when they are applied, no deductions are derived. For

example, Mearsheimer (1990) is said to have applied neorealism deductively in predicting

the demise of NATO and the EC after the end of the Cold War: this is cited, by critics, asevidence of neorealisms failings (see Keohane and Martin, 1995: 40). Mearsheimer

insists that theorists shouldoffer predictions and presents what he terms a deductive

case that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity. He is also pessimistic about the

prospects of continued institutional cooperation in Europe after the end of the Cold War.

However, nowhere does he explicitly show, or even attempt to show, that the demise of

NATO and the EC may be deduced from neorealist premises. He does surmise that

NATO may disintegrate and he is sceptical that a more powerful EC will ensure peace,

but these conclusions are derived from his reading of the Cold War, rather than from the

deductive application of neorealist theory (Mearsheimer, 1990: 9, 18, 52, 48).3 In such

cases, the rhetoric of deduction does not match the reality of how the theory is applied.

The idea that explanatory theories are not in fact deductively applied is quite common-

place. Katzenstein (1996: 26) argues that although neorealism holds forth the promise of a

tight, deductive theory, it cannot be directly applied to questions of national security: it is

therefore employed only as an orienting framework. Zacher and Matthew (cited in

Moravcsik, 1997: 515) argue that liberalisms propositions cannot be deduced from its

assumptions. Jervis (1999: 43) suggests that neorealism and neoliberalism are better labelled

schools of thought or approaches than theories: neither has the sort of integrity that would

enable them to be falsified. Adler (1997: 3289) observes that constructivists seek to explain

the social construction of reality, but argues that their reasoning cannot be assimilated tomodels of deductive proof or inductive generalization.4

The adequacy of the covering law model as a depiction of theorists explanatory prac-

tices has also been questioned.5 Kratochwil (1993: 66) argues that although most political

scientists pay lip service to nomothetic/deductive explanation schemes, no general

social science laws have been discovered. According to Ruggie (1998b: 861; see also

Smith, 2000: 383), [v]irtually no theoretical account in International Relations fulfils the

criteria of the covering law model and, moreover, when challenged most theorists readily

admit that fact. This suggests that explanatory theorists believe that their theories are use-

ful even though they cannot be deductively applied. A similar view is implicit in Waltsobservation that the social sciences are replete with inconsistent or incomplete but none-

theless highly useful theories (Walt, 1999: 17). The implication is that the utility of

explanatory theories does not reside solely in their ability to generate deductive explana-

tions. However, this idea has never been unpacked. It therefore creates a puzzle: if explan-

atory theories are not applied in accordance with the covering law model, then how are

they applied? This puzzle is expressed in, but not resolved by, the emerging preference for

terms such as perspective, approach and school of thought over the term theory.

Some scholars employ such terms in order to highlight the variety of claims that may

be categorized under a single theoretical heading. For example, Stein (1990: 4) termsrealism a perspective in order to emphasize that it is a large body of work that includes

quite different and disparate strands. Legro (1995: 8) describes realism, institutionalism

and organizational culture as broad perspectives (he also employs the terms school

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Humphreys 5

and approach), but avoids the term theory because of the plurality of views within

each. Nau (2007: 4) uses the term perspective because he is interested in what theories

emphasize, not with all the variations of each theory. However, the issue is not just

whether theorists wish to avoid getting bogged down in the detail of competing claims.A theory (or perspective) will encompass a variety of competing claims only if its terms

are not uniquely defined, if its assumptions are not clearly identified or if putative causal

generalizations are disputed. In such cases, the theory cannot possibly be deductively

applied: if it is, nevertheless, claimed to be useful, we need to establish how this is so.

Because under-specification is a common feature of explanatory theories in International

Relations, some scholars distinguish between theories and perspectives. For example,

Katzenstein (1996: 45) acknowledges that his theoretical perspective of sociological insti-

tutionalism does not constitute a theory of national security, but insists that no such theory

exists in the field of national security studies. His point is that his approach is no less valu-

able because it has not been developed into a determinate theory: other approaches, including

neorealism, are equally incapable of being deductively applied. This claim involves an

implicit distinction between theories and perspectives, where the former can and the latter

cannot be deductively applied. Katzenstein employs a variety of terms for approaches that are

not, in the required sense, theories, including perspectives, paradigms, orientations,

approaches and frameworks. However, none of these terms is clearly defined: they there-

fore provide no insight into how perspectives are drawn upon in substantive explanations.

Some explanatory theorists use terms such as perspective in recognition that their

theories cannot be deductively applied. For example, Keohane (1989: 2) accepts that

liberal institutionalism is a school of thought that provides a perspective on world poli-tics, rather than a logically connected deductive theory. Milner (1997: 4) acknowl-

edges that the notion of two-level games, on which she draws, may be promising as a

framework for analysis but does not constitute a theory with testable hypotheses. In

both cases, a highly significant claim remains implicit and thus unelaborated: that their

approaches offer explanatory value even though they cannot be deductively applied.

Katzenstein et al. (1998: 6467) differentiate two meanings of theory in International

Relations: general theoretical orientations and specific research programs. The former

provide heuristics they suggest relevant variables and causal patterns that provide

guidelines for developing specific research programs. The latter link explanatory vari-ables to a set of outcomes, or dependent variables. Katzenstein et al. describe realism,

liberalism and constructivism as general theoretical orientations but do not specify the

connection between generic orientations and specific research programs. The manner

in which these theories actually contribute to our understanding of international relations

therefore remains unelaborated.

The issue here is not just that some theories are well specified while others are not. To the

extent that distinctions between theories and perspectives provide this impression, they

obscure the deeper problem. This is, first, that existing explanatory theories are not deduc-

tively applied; second, that those theories are claimed to be nonetheless useful; and, third, thatwe lack any alternative account of how they contribute to our understanding of international

relations. Keohane (1989: 2) hints that perspectives provide a set of distinctive questions and

assumptions about the basic units and forces in world politics, while Nau (2007: xxiv)



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suggests that they serve as disciplinary lenses. However, there has been no attempt to ask

what is involved in the heuristic application of explanatory theories or to consider what it

implies for how the resulting explanatory claims should be evaluated.

Heuristic theory application

TheNew Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993: 1228) defines heuristic as

[s]erving to find out or discover something: a heuristic is a method for attempting the

solution of problems or a rule or item of information used in such a process. In this

sense, describing the application of an idea as heuristic implies only that the idea helps

us to understand that to which it is applied. Plya (1990: 113) goes further, explicitly

contrasting formal (deductive) and non-formal (heuristic) reasoning: he argues that

[h]euristic reasoning is not regarded as final and strict but as provisional and plausible

only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of the present problem. However,

Gigerenzer and Todd (1999: 25) argue that heuristic refers to useful, even indispensa-

ble cognitive processes for solving problems that cannotbe handled by logic and prob-

ability theory. This suggests that employing ideas heuristically is not just a prelude to

applying them formally but is itself a profitable means of investigating problems: it should

be understood as a significant alternative to the search for deductive solutions.

Such distinctions are used by scholars from a variety of traditions. Almond (1970: 4)

termed his work heuristic theory: its function was to facilitate research, to lay out variables

and hypotheses about their relations, to suggest why a particular approach or method might

be useful. He insisted that it should not be confused with scientific theory: its value washeuristic. Keohane (1989: 173) argues that rationalist approaches to international relations

may be heuristically powerful even though they omit important explanatory factors,

implying that explanatory power does not reside solely in a theorys deductive implications.

Kratochwil (1994: 250) distinguishes development of a heuristically fruitful research agenda

from pursuit of a mistaken ideal of parsimony. Abbott (2004) argues that methodological

debates in the social sciences should not be construed as demanding determinate choices

(between, say, positivism and interpretivism, or realism and constructionism) but as opening

up a body of heuristic resources. Lakatos (1970: 155, 176; emphasis in original) argues that a

research programme should be rejected only when it is superseded by a rival with greaterheuristic power. He focuses on heuristic power because empirical tests cannot be decisive,

noting that research programmes with no unifying idea, no heuristic power are, on the

whole, worthless.

The idea that explanatory theories in International Relations are better termed per-

spectives also implies a distinction between deductive reasoning and heuristic power.

However, the question of how such theories are applied is not reducible to whether they are

well specified. When explanatory theorists apply their theories heuristically, their accounts of

specific empirical episodes are shaped by those theories thematic content, but are not

inferred from any putative causal generalizations or covering laws. This captures how explan-atory theories in International Relations are typically applied: it is not just an occasional short

cut. Theories typically shape substantive explanatory claims without determining either their

content or form. Thus although heuristic theory application is, by definition, non-deductive,

this does not make it second best. Heuristic is not to be contrasted with explanatory: it

describes one of the ways in which explanation works (Kaplan, 1964: 3578).



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Humphreys 7

When a theory is employed as a heuristic resource, it performs three main functions.

First, it indicates what sort of explanation is required, for example by suggesting a

particular level of analysis or a causal rather than an interpretive approach. Second, it

provides the conceptual categories that are used to navigate through and to organizeempirical material. Third, it indicates what mechanisms, actors, chance factors and

background conditions are worth examining (see Suganami, 2008). Thus a theory tells us

what we are looking for and where to look for it. Just as importantly, it also tells us what

we are not looking for and where not to look for it. These functions strongly influence

the kind of explanation that will be constructed, but they are not sufficient, in and of

themselves, to determine its form or content: its form will depend largely on the nature

of the specific research question, while its content will depend largely on what is discovered

when the question is investigated. A theory that is heuristically applied is therefore a tool

that aids inquiry, not a substitute for empirical research.

This account of how theoretical explanations are generated is consistent with

Hoffmanns plea for theory to be understood as a set of interrelated questions capable of

guiding research: he argues that theory should concentrate research on the most

important problems, help us order the data we have accumulated and identify the

main factors or variables in the field (Hoffmann, 1960: v, 8). However, theory is more

intimately involved in our understanding of the world than Hoffmanns list implies. In

indicating what kinds of explanation are required to answer particular research ques-

tions, theories embody claims about what we already know and about what we still need

to learn. The organizing role of conceptual categories is not only classificatory, but also

constitutive: unless we can say what we are examining, we cannot relate anything toanything else. Because we cannot simply investigate everything, the role of theories in

prioritizing certain mechanisms, actors and conditions involves implicit claims about

what is (and is not) problematic. These issues, about what we already know, how it

should be categorized and what can be treated as unproblematic, lie at the heart of the

differences not only between competing interpretations of empirical episodes but also

between rival theoretical approaches, including positivist and post-positivist approaches.

Thus the thematic material that is drawn upon when a theory is heuristically applied

is related to but far from identical with the putative causal generalizations that would be

drawn on as covering laws if the theory were deductively applied. One key difference isthat when this thematic material is conceived of as a heuristic resource, rather than as a

determinate source of explanations, the theorys implicit assumptions about what is and

is not problematic are brought to the fore. This exposes the limits of debates about

whether explanatory theorists are really positivists (see Smith, 2000). It also reveals that

a theorys heuristic resources cannot be determinately stated: we cannot say exactly what

an individual researcher will draw from a theory in relation to a specific research question.6

This problem is particularly acute in relation to existing explanatory theories because

they typically adopt a quasi-deductive form in which putative causal generalizations are

presented as if they follow from a sequence of assumptions and arguments: the theoriesheuristic functions are thereby obscured.

The single most important characteristic of the explanations generated when theories

are heuristically applied is that the manner in which explanatory factors are combined is

particular to individual episodes: it is not inferred from the theory being applied. This is

apparent in applications of Keohanes functional theory of international regimes. Drawing



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upon [g]ame theory and discussions of collective action, which he describes as deductive

theories based on assumptions of rationality, Keohane develops a theory in which rational

self-interested actors value international regimes as a way of increasing their ability to

make mutually beneficial agreements and hegemons seek to institute international regimeson an intergovernmental basis as a way of helping to control the actions of other states.7

However, Keohane applies the theory heuristically: he does not pretend that it is deductively

adequate, maintaining only that we can improve our understanding of changes in regimes

by thinking about cooperation in ways suggested by the theory (Keohane, 2005: x, 65,

135, 140, 213).

Keohane accepts that [a]lthough regimes can facilitate cooperation among governments

that seek to make agreements, they do not automatically produce it. One reason for the

indeterminacy is that the theory treats states as units, without taking into account

variations in domestic politics or in the ideas prevailing within them. Yet Keohane

believes that domestic political concerns were critical to postwar US decisions about

whether and how to cooperate. He argues, for example, that the US government pursued

an oil regime, but that domestic politics got in the way. Moreover, although his theory

ignores domestic politics, when he turns to his empirical cases Keohane seeks to show

how domestic and systemic factors interacted to produce specific outcomes. Thus he

argues that the proposal for an Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement failed due to a

combination of the structure of American government, ideology, bureaucratic battles

and domestic oil interests. This account of how explanatory factors combine to produce

a specific outcome is particular to this case and cannot be inferred from Keohanes theory.

His theory provides a framework for the analysis of these issues (it performs heuristicfunctions), but it is not a testable theory (Keohane, 2005: 214, xiii, 141, xv).

The chief consequence of a theory being heuristically applied is that substantive

explanatory claims gain no additional weight from what is a purely rhetorical association

with the theorys quasi-deductive arguments. A theoretical explanation may be privileged

vis-a-vis a competing account if there is reason to believe that a particular episode is an

instance of a broader class that the theory is thought to be able to explain. This can only

be the case when a theory is deductively applied. If it is heuristically applied, there can

be no reason to privilege the theoretical explanation. In such cases, the question of

whether the theory is useful can only be answered in the particular: by assessing whetherit in fact helps to generate a persuasive answer to a specific research question. Such

evaluations rely on good judgement: on asking whether explanatory claims constitute

persuasive accounts of relevant episodes. This judgement turns on issues such as whether

the account coheres with what we think we already know, whether it makes sense of the

relevant empirical material, whether we are disposed to trust the author and whether her

characterization of situations, actors and outcomes seems plausible.

This contrasts with how explanations are assessed when a theory is deductively

applied: then it is necessary to compare the theorys predictions to (what are said to be)

the facts, or to evaluate the claim that the episode fulfils the theorys specified antecedentconditions, thereby justifying the claim that the outcome is explained by the putative

covering law. This may require good judgement, but what is being evaluated is the

correspondence between aspects of a particular episode and the theory. What is being

evaluated when a theory is heuristically applied is the substance of particular empirical



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Humphreys 9

and historical claims. Of course, it might be claimed that even here our judgement feeds

off putative covering laws.8 My contention, however, is that good judgement does not

rely on or refer to putative causal generalizations: the idea that theories are heuristically

applied not only depicts the relationship between theories and substantive explanatoryclaims, but also captures something of how our minds deal with an uncertain world

(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999: 5).

Waltz on the Cold War: A heuristic application of neorealism

Neorealism is often represented as generating covering law explanations (see Donnelly,

2000: 301; Mouritzen, 1997: 69; Ruggie, 1998a: 7). This reflects Waltzs account of how

to construct a theory of international politics: first, one must conceive of international

politics as a bounded realm or domain; second, one must discover some law-like regu-

larities within it; and third, one must develop a way of explaining the observed regularities.

However, Waltz also acknowledges the limits of explanatory approaches: he observes that

the first big difficulty lies in finding or stating theories with enough precision and plausibility

to make testing worthwhile (Waltz, 1979: 116, 14). He adds that when we have failed to

predict, theory still helps us to understand and explain some things about the behaviour of

states (Waltz, 1986: 332), implying that neorealism may be useful even without being

deductively applied.

Waltzs explanation of the absence of direct military confrontation between the super-

powers during the Cold War draws on his account of how balancing differs in multipolar

and bipolar systems. He distinguishes two balancing strategies: internal efforts (movesto increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies)

and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge ones own alliance or to weaken

and shrink an opposing one). He observes, however, that the second strategy is only

available in multipolar systems: Where two powers contend, imbalances can be righted

only by their internal efforts. With more than two, shifts in alignment provide an additional

means of adjustment, adding flexibility to the system (Waltz, 1979: 118, 163). Waltzs

contention that bipolar systems are relatively stable (that is, peaceful) rests on their lack

of flexibility: he overturned the conventional wisdom by arguing that the inflexibility of

a bipolar world may promote a greater stability than flexible balances of power amonga larger number of states (Waltz, 1964: 899900).

If flexibility is to contribute to stability, Waltz argues, it must enable states to change

sides in order to tilt the balance against the would-be aggressors: at least one powerful

state must overcome the pressure of ideological preference, the pull of previous ties, and

the conflict of present interests in order to add its weight to the side of the peaceful.

Waltz accepts that this may not reliably happen: in multipolar systems, states may pass

the buck, a dynamic he associates with the build-up to World War II. Even should states

refrain from free-riding, the timing and content of the actions required to balance

against would-be aggressors become more and more difficult to calculate as the numberof great powers increases. Further, flexibility of alignment may make allies appear unre-

liable: great powers that depend on their allies for survival may be dragged into

conflicts to defend those allies, a dynamic Waltz associates with the outbreak of World War I.

His point is that uncertainty, arising from flexibility of alignment, amplifies unsettling



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developments: Rather than making states properly cautious and forwarding the chances

of peace, uncertainty and miscalculation cause wars. Prior to the two world wars, he

argues, flexibility of alignment made for rigidity of strategy or the limitation of freedom

of decision. During the Cold War, rigidity of alignment made for flexibility of strategyand the enlargement of freedom of decision (Waltz, 1979: 16470).

This cannot plausibly be construed as a covering law account. Neorealisms main

candidate covering law, that states seeking to survive in anarchic systems engage in

balancing behaviour, is disproven by Waltzs discussion of the dynamics of multipolar

systems.9 Because he fails to specify the circumstances under which states in multipolar

systems pass the buck or get locked into chain gangs (see Christensen and Snyder,

1990), Waltz cannot be construed as applying a more specific covering law concerning

when states do or do not balance. Moreover, Bueno de Mesquita (2003: 1723) argues

that neorealist assumptions imply nothing at all about how uncertainty affects stability:

Waltz makes a logical leap from the association of uncertainty with multipolarity to the

association of multipolarity with instability and bipolarity with stability. If so, then Waltzs

claim that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems is not deductively derived.

Nevertheless, the argument is recognizably neorealist: the theory does perform

important heuristic functions. First, it indicates that an explanation should be systemic

in form: Waltz presents a structural argument even though this cannot, in the absence of

further arguments about the impact of flexibility, resolve the issue. Second, the theory

provides organizing concepts: Waltz treats categories like superpower and polarity as

unproblematic, despite the fact that during the early Cold War the USSR was not a

superpower and thus the international system was not bipolar (see Lebow, 1994). Third,the theory suggests a focus on alliance choices: Waltz emphasizes states strategic concerns,

downplaying the importance of domestic structure. When he considers factors such as

ideology, he represents them as working against strategic rationality. However, neorealisms

heuristic functions are limited: it offers no insight into alternative responses to the

research question, fails to problematize its central categories and ignores key mechanisms,

conditions and actors. Thus showing that neorealism is heuristically applied also

indicates how it might be improved: what is required is not refinement of its quasi-deductive

arguments, but the development of a more critical understanding of the variety of pos-

sible explanatory forms, concepts and foci.10Only when neorealism is conceived of as a heuristic resource is it possible to reconcile

Waltzs insistence that it explains a small number of big and important things with his

acceptance that its explanations are indeterminate because both unit-level and structural

causes are in play (Waltz, 1986: 329, 343). His implicit claim is that any good explanation

will refer to the structure of the system, but that the way in which structural and

non-structural factors interact cannot be determinately stated: it will vary according to

the specific problem being investigated. This makes it easier to understand why he

abstracts from non-structural factors in his theory but refers to them in substantive

explanatory claims, as in his acknowledgement that an apparently stable system canalways be disrupted by the actions of a Hitler and the reactions of a Chamberlain

(Waltz, 1979: 7980, 175). His account of the relationship between structural and

non-structural factors in his discussion of the Cold War international system is specific



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Humphreys 11

to that case and is not derived from or captured in neorealisms quasi-deductive

reasoning. Thus Waltz (1997: 916) observes that an explanation is not a theory: what

goes into an explanation is not identical with what goes into a theory. This is what we

would expect if a theory is employed as a tool that aids inquiry rather than as a sourceof deductive explanations.

The conceptual and descriptive inadequacies of Waltzs approach to this subject are

widely known (see Wagner, 1993). However, the idea that Waltz applies neorealism

heuristically generates distinctive implications for how Waltzs substantive explanatory

claims should be evaluated. It makes clear that his claims gain no weight from what is

their purely rhetorical association with neorealisms quasi-deductive arguments: they

stand or fall solely as interpretations of the nature of the Cold War system. This contrasts

with the approach adopted by those who contend that later emendations of neorealism

reveal it to be a degenerating research programme (see Legro and Moravcsik, 1999;

Vasquez, 1997). They assume that explanatory theories can and should be deductively

applied. Accepting that it is impossible to test theories definitively against the facts, they

focus on how the assumptions and quasi-deductive arguments of realist theories evolved

over time, asking if emendations were designed to explain away anomalies or if they also

generated new insights (see Lakatos, 1970). When a theory is heuristically applied, the

key question is whether it is in fact useful in relation to specific research questions. This

can be established only by evaluating the resulting explanations.

Because Waltzs substantive explanatory claims do not draw upon neorealism deduc-

tively, the validity of the theorys arguments cannot be cited as reason to accept those

claims. Instead, we must reach a judgement about whether the claims themselves arepersuasive. Waltzs contention that the bipolar structure of the Cold War system contrib-

uted to the absence of direct conflict between the superpowers rests on a sequence of

historical claims.11 First, he argues that great powers were dragged into war in 1914:

Because the defeat or the defection of a major ally would have shaken the balance, each

state was constrained to adjust its strategy and the use of its forces to the aims and fears

of its partners. Second, he argues that great powers passed the buck in the 1930s: British

and French leaders hoped that if their countries remained aloof, Russia and Germany

would balance each other off or fight each other to the finish. Third, he contends that

such problems were not present during the Cold War: the US could withstand the loss ofChina in 1949; could afford to dissociate itself from its allies over the Suez crisis in

1956; and could accommodate French withdrawal from NATOs integrated military

structure (Waltz, 1979: 16571).

These are all plausible historical claims: it is not unreasonable to suggest that the

dynamics of alliance politics contributed to the outbreak of World War I, that Britain and

France might successfully have opposed Hitler prior to 1939, and that US survival during

the Cold War did not depend upon allied support. However, they are also open to dispute:

as we might expect from claims that draw on neorealism heuristically, they downplay the

importance of domestic politics, international institutions and systemic norms. Despiteneorealisms status as one of the leading explanatory approaches to international relations,

the persuasiveness of Waltzs account of the lack of superpower conflict during the Cold

War rests firmly on which way these judgements fall.



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The role of judgement in History and International Relations

The idea that explanatory theories in International Relations are typically heuristically

applied subverts the idiographicnomothetic distinction that is often thought to distinguishHistory from International Relations. According to Levy, for example, historians describe,

explain, and interpret individual events whereas political scientists generalize about

the relationship between variables and construct lawlike statements about social behaviour

(Levy, 1997: 22). Such claims focus on the form in which theories are presented, rather

than on how they are actually drawn upon in substantive explanations. In International

Relations, an explanatory theorys putative causal generalizations are not typically

deductively applied. Such theories may be drawn upon as heuristic resources, but historians

also require a certain sense for how things work (Trachtenberg, 2006: 30). Moreover,

like historians, political scientists often draw on theories heuristic resources in order

to interpret individual events. What distinguishes historians from political scientists who

apply explanatory theories heuristically is not the explanatory activity each engages in,

but the form in which they present their sense of how things work.12 It is therefore ironic

that the form in which explanatory theories are typically presented (as quasi-deductive

arguments that generate covering laws) tends to obscure the explanatory functions that

those theories actually perform.

When a theory is deductively applied, an empirical episode is represented as an

instance of a class of such episodes. An explanation is generated by showing that the

empirical conditions specified in the theory are fulfilled, but explanatory power resides

in the causal generalization under which the episode is subsumed. In contrast, when atheory is heuristically applied, an explanation is generated through empirical or historical

inquiry, guided by the theorys heuristic resources. Explanatory power resides in the

ensuing account of the specific episode, not in the theorys quasi-deductive arguments.

There is no attempt to show that conditions specified prior to the inquiry are fulfilled: the

focus is on developing an account of the episode that provides a persuasive answer to the

research question. There are two prerequisites for developing such an account. The first

is a theory that provides a clear understanding of the sort of explanation required, useful

conceptual categories and an appropriate empirical focus. The second is good judgement

as to what constitutes a plausible account: judgement plays a key role not only in assessmentof competing explanatory claims, but also in their construction.

Some insight into the kind of judgement required is provided by historians understanding

of the role of judgement in History. Debates about the nature of historical explanation tend

to revolve around Hempels claim that it follows the covering law model: that historical

explanations demonstrate why events were to be expected in view of certain antecedent or

simultaneous conditions (Hempel, 1965: 235). Hempels contention is that although

historians tend to examine individual events rather than classes of events, their explanations

still draw on general laws (see also Levy, 1997: 25). However, his view is subject to numerous

objections (see Trachtenberg, 2006: 111), of which two are particularly pertinent. First,Trachtenbergs defence of historians reliance on judgement involves the contention that the

covering law model is unsatisfactory even as an account of scientific explanation. Second,

Mink (1987: 82) argues that historical understanding is achieved through a type of judgement

which cannot be replaced by any analytic technique.



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Humphreys 13

Trachtenberg argues that the historians goal is to make sense of the past and that in

order to do this she endeavours to see how things fit together, to understand the logic

underlying the course of events. In this sense, he suggests, a historical interpretation is

the analogue of a physical theory. However, Trachtenberg doubts whether the coveringlaw model provides an adequate account of how explanation proceeds in science. He

observes that, even in science, the facts never just speak for themselves: theory choice

is never fully determined by the facts. Moreover, in History, as in science, the fact that

the choice between competing interpretations is made by a scientific community the

fact that the decision is rooted in the mature judgement exercised by the members of that

community is the closest we can come to guaranteeing the rationality of the process.

Thus Trachtenberg argues that historical and scientific explanations are analogous not in

the sense that both rely on covering laws, but in the sense that both rely on good judgement:

Historians exercise judgement, but so do scientists. Moreover, the process of judgement

is not governed by logical rules, but draws on the mature sensibility of the trained scholar

(Trachtenberg, 2006: 6, 27, 17, 22, 44).

Trachtenberg accepts that all historical interpretations draw on a kind of theory.

However, he describes theory not as a sequence of quasi-deductive arguments but as an

engine of analysis. Theory does not provide ready-made answers, but instead serves

to generate a series of specific questions you can only answer by doing empirical

research. Theory is not a substitute for empirical analysis (especially, one might add,

if it consists of putative causal generalizations that are liable to be refuted if drawn upon

deductively). Trachtenberg also observes that when theories of international politics are

applied, it is really the spirit of a theory that is being assessed (Trachtenberg, 2006: 30,32, 43). The notion of a theorys heuristic usefulness is preferable to that of its spirit, but

what matters in each case is whether the theory contributes to persuasive accounts of

specific empirical episodes: this is a matter of judgement.

Mink (1987) distinguishes even more strongly between deductive explanation and the

kind of understanding generated in historical interpretations.13 He argues that historical

explanations do not consist of propositions that can be detached from specific episodes

(as covering laws can): historians do not first collect facts and later synthesize them into

historical interpretations. Rather, historical understanding consists of comprehending a

complex event by seeing things together in a total and synoptic judgement. Thissynoptic judgement, or the ability to comprehend an array of facts in a single act of

understanding, forms both the process of historical understanding and its outcome: the

historian relies on judgement in reaching understanding, but understanding also consists

in the ability to see things together. Mink accepts that theory may help us to see things

together, but he insists that success depends at least as much on the ability to make

synoptic judgements as on the correctness of the theory. He also warns that the role of

synoptic judgement may be obscured by the historians need to set forth in sequence a

narrative which he understands or tries to understand as a whole (Mink, 1987: 814

[emphasis on original]; see also Schroeder, 1997: 6870).These accounts of the role of judgement in historical explanation illuminate the heuristic

role of explanatory theories in International Relations in two ways. First, they suggest

that theory has a role to play in generating historical understanding, but that our ability

to understand consists in our ability to arrive at good judgements. Theory does not



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provide answers, but it can bring questions into focus (Trachtenberg, 2006: 33). The

test of such a theory is whether it helps to generate a plausible account of a particular

episode, but what is tested is the theorys heuristic usefulness in relation to that episode,

not its abstract arguments. Second, Mink warns that the form in which historians presenttheir interpretations may obscure the nature of their understanding. This illuminates the

disjunction between the covering law model of explanation and theorists actual explana-

tory practices, for, as Trachtenberg observes, in trying to explain something we try to

show how one thing led to another, how one thing followed from another as a matter

of course (Trachtenberg, 2006: 185). In other words, our attempts to communicate why

we understand a substantive episode in a particular way may obscure the manner in

which theory contributed to that understanding.

The central role of judgement when explanatory theories are heuristically applied is

revealed in Keohane and Nyes introduction to a collection of studies on the impact of

institutions in Europe immediately after the Cold War. Keohane and Nye (1993: 7)

acknowledge that institutionalist theory is not sufficiently precisely formulated to

permit rigorous testing of hypotheses. The contributors are therefore asked to examine

in detail processes of policy-making and bargaining, to determine the roles that interna-

tional institutions have played in affecting state strategies and the outcomes of interstate

negotiations. Explaining why they adopted this approach, Keohane and Nye argue that

institutionalist arguments have value only insofar as they facilitate more sophisticated

empirical investigations. In other words, they treat institutionalist theory as a heuristic

resource, placing the explanatory burden on the substance of the individual explanatory

accounts that are generated when it is heuristically applied, rather than on the theorysabstract qualities. The resulting accounts inevitably reflect their authors judgements

about the roles played by international institutions, judgements that cannot be reduced to

the application of covering laws. Any assessment of those accounts must also involve

judgements of their individual plausibility: abstract analysis of institutionalist arguments

will not suffice.

The importance of good judgement may be obscured by the rhetorical structure of

theorists arguments, which often imply that their theories are in fact deductively applied.

For example, Risse-Kappen (1996) seeks to explain NATOs origins and endurance after

the Cold War through a social constructivist interpretation of republican liberalismwhich emphasizes collective identities and norms of appropriate behaviour and links

domestic politics systematically to the foreign policy of states. He starts by criticizing

the realist conventional wisdom, arguing that realism is indeterminate with regard to

the origins of, the interaction patterns in, and the endurance of NATO almost every

single choice of states can be accommodated somehow by realist thinking (Risse-

Kappen, 1996: 3589, 364; emphasis in original). This critique implies that good theories

should be deductively applied: that realism is flawed because it fails to generate determi-

nate explanations. Risse-Kappens next moves are also consistent with the idea that theo-

ries should be deductively applied: he outlines the core assumptions of liberal theories ofinternational relations, specifies his constructivist interpretation of republican liberalism,

summarizes it in abstract terms and seeks to illustrate it in relation to key stages in

NATOs evolution (see Risse-Kappen, 1996: 36571).



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Humphreys 15

However, Risse-Kappen does not apply his approach deductively (see Dessler, 1999:

1345). His basic position is that NATOs origins and evolution are best understood if

we think of NATO as institutionalizing a community of states united by a collective

democratic identity. His substantive arguments do revolve around this theme, but theylargely consist of specific historical claims, which draw on his theoretical approach

heuristically. For example, he argues that NATO institutionalized the transatlantic security

community in response to the Soviet threat. His abstract presentation of his theory incor-

porates a general account of why democracies form pluralistic security communities of

shared values, but he does not attempt to show how that played out in this particular

case, instead satisfying himself with the interpretive judgement that the Soviet threat did

not create the community in the first place (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 3712). Similarly,

while outlining how US attitudes towards the USSR changed during the 1940s, he

acknowledges that NATO was only one of several possible US choices. Yet none of the

historical reasons he offers for why NATO was in fact chosen is prominent in his abstract

presentation of his theory (see Risse-Kappen, 1996: 3727). The only way of assessing

his substantive explanatory claims is therefore to reach a judgement about whether he

tells a persuasive story about his subject matter: this will turn on substantive interpretive

issues, such as whether a transatlantic security community already existed in 1949.

Risse-Kappens application of his constructivist approach to NATO shares important

characteristics with Waltzs application of neorealism to the Cold War and Keohanes

application of liberal institutionalism to the international oil regime. First, each of these

theories is employed as a heuristic resource: accounts of specific episodes are shaped by

the theories thematic content, but are not inferred from any putative causal generalizations.Second, the resulting accounts do not gain any weight from their purely rhetorical

association with their theories quasi-deductive arguments. They must be assessed on the

basis of their substantive empirical claims and this requires good judgement. Third, the

way in which the theories are drawn upon and the nature of the resulting accounts are

obscured by the quasi-deductive form in which these theories are presented. This makes

it difficult accurately to assess each theorys usefulness and to recognize how the heuristic

resources offered by each theory might be enhanced.

Conclusion

Bull (1969) described the classical approach to theorizing as being characterized

above all by explicit reliance on the exercise of judgement. He argued, moreover, that

when faced with complex problems advocates of scientific approaches resort suddenly

and without acknowledging that this is what they are doing to the methods of the classi-

cal approach (Bull, 1969: 20, 28). This holds some resonance for todays explanatory

theorists. They typically present their theories in a quasi-deductive form, even while

acknowledging that those theories (or perspectives) cannot in fact be deductively applied.

Moreover, they typically apply their theories heuristically and hence rely on the exerciseof judgement whatever the problems they face, complex or not. Thus the theories quasi-

deductive form obscures the manner in which they contribute to our understanding of

international relations, the particular heuristic resources offered by each individual



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theory and the extent to which we rely on a community of experts to judge what consti-

tutes a persuasive account of particular episodes.14

There is a consequent risk that quasi-deductive argument is inappropriately privileged

in International Relations. If it is presumed that good explanations draw on covering laws,then there is a risk that weight may be attributed to an explanation of some episode because

it draws on a theory that claims to identify causal generalizations, regardless of whether

those generalizations are actually applied to the episode in question. Lebow (2000: 106)

worries that theory may confer an aura of scientific legitimacy on subjective political

beliefs and prejudices. Such a problem will be particularly acute if explanatory claims are

granted credence simply because they are said to be deductively derived. An associated

risk is that intellectual energy is focused on developing quasi-deductive arguments at the

expense of, or even as a substitute for, empirical inquiry. This would be a mistake not only

because theories are typically heuristically, not deductively, applied, but also because

when they are heuristically applied their utility resides in their ability to guide empirical

inquiry: the resulting explanations cannot be detached from their empirical content.

Turner (1987: 158) argues that much apparently deductive reasoning in scientific theo-

ries is really folk-reasoning: theories are not applied according to a strict calculus, but

in conformity with what seems reasonable to a community of scholars. It is helpful to

think of the quasi-deductive arguments that underpin most explanatory theories in this

way: they are not really concerned with what follows deductively from certain assump-

tions, but with what sorts of behaviour are consistent with, or might constitute a reason-

able response to, the conditions specified in those assumptions. This provides further

reason to think that theory should be understood as an aid to empirical inquiry rather thanas a source of determinate explanations. It also suggests that even when constructing

abstract arguments theorists encounter questions of plausibility analogous to those that

arise when we attempt to evaluate substantive explanatory claims: here, too, theorists rely

on the judgement of an expert community.

A useful theory is one that provides a clear understanding of the sort of explanation

required, helpful conceptual categories and an appropriate empirical focus. Such a theory,

when allied to good judgement, facilitates the development of persuasive explanations.

However, the utility of a theory cannot be established in the abstract: if theories are heu-

ristically applied, then we can evaluate their utility only by applying them to specificempirical problems and asking whether they in fact help us to develop persuasive explana-

tions of those problems. Thus a theory can be said to be useful in general only if it is in fact

found to be useful across a range of cases or if it is shown to be particularly useful in certain

cases. This indicates that the traditional emphasis on subjecting theories to hard tests is still

relevant when theories are heuristically applied, but with the qualification that the theory is

tested not by comparing inferred predictions with reality, but by employing it heuristically.

Thus, for example, Schroeders aim is notto test neo-realist theory with historical evidence

but to establish whether it provides a sound model or paradigm for understanding the general

nature of international politics (Schroeder, 1994: 11112; emphasis in original).One advantage of thinking of theories as being heuristically applied is that it also

helps us to think about how they may be improved. Existing explanatory theories are

unlikely to be improved through refinement of their quasi-deductive arguments given

that those arguments are not actually drawn upon in a deductive fashion. However, the



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Humphreys 17

heuristic resources they provide are very limited. They offer little insight into the different

kinds of questions we may wish to ask about similar cases, are largely uncritical about

the conceptual categories they employ and offer a restricted empirical focus. This

indicates that theories could be improved if their authors adopted a more critical approachto these issues, something that would be facilitated by a reduced emphasis on the impor-

tance of defining terms in a manner that permits the construction of deductive arguments.

In particular, explanatory theorists should think more about the different kinds of questions

we might wish to have answered and about how explanatory narratives combine mecha-

nisms, actors, chance factors and background conditions (see Suganami, 1996).

This account of how explanatory theories are applied carries strong implications for

how theoretical explanations should be assessed, for how theories should be assessed

and for how existing theories might be improved. It also invites scepticism about the

nomotheticidiographic distinction as an account of the distinction between historical and

theoretical approaches to international relations. However, it is not anti-theory and does

not entail scepticism about the possibility of developing causal explanations.15 What it

does entail is scepticism about whether the ideal of deductive explanation is itself heuristi-

cally useful: about whether it identifies appropriate standards for theorists to aspire to.

My contention is that the idea that explanatory theories are deductively applied obscures

the actual contribution that they make to our understanding of international relations.

Moreover, the idea that they should be deductively applied points us in the wrong

direction when thinking about the qualities of good theories and of good explanations.

AcknowledgementThis research was partly funded by a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellowship,

PDF/2007/76, which is gratefully acknowledged. The author is also grateful to Andrew

Hurrell, Lucas Kello and participants at an International Relations Faculty Seminar in the

Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, for comments

on earlier drafts.

Notes

1 I use the term episode to encompass any event, action or state of affairs in international

relations, whether historical or contemporary, for which a theoretical explanation is sought.2 Covering laws may in fact be inductively derived, but when used in an explanatory capacity

they are deductively applied: outcomes may be deduced from the (inductively derived)

covering law when the specified antecedent conditions are fulfilled.

3 A similar case may be made in relation to Waltz (1993).

4 There is disagreement about whether constructivism should be treated as an explanatory theory.

Wendt (1999) seeks to develop a positivist constructivism, and Dessler (1999) treats constructivism

as a positivist approach, but Ruggie (1998b: 856) insists that it is a philosophically and theoretically

informed perspective on and approach to the empirical study of international relations rather than

a fully fledged theory.5 It is doubtful whether a covering law explanation in fact explains an episode, as distinct from

showing that it was to be expected because that is what always happens (see Scriven, 1959;

Suganami, 2008: 331). However, I am concerned only with whether the model accurately

captures explanatory theorists practices.



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6 This may partly explain why so many competing claims are sometimes categorized under a

single theoretical heading.

7 Keohane (2005: 69) also describes game theory and the theory of collective action as having

great heuristic value.8 Scriven (1959) suggests that judgement feeds off normic statements: claims about what is

normal and, as a corollary, what does and does not need explaining. This is more plausible than

the idea that judgement feeds off putative covering laws.

9 Waltz (2000: 38) acknowledges that neorealism does not lead one to expect that states will

always or even usually engage in balancing behaviour.

10 Nevertheless, later realists have focused on neorealisms deductive adequacy, most prominently

in the debate about what follows from anarchy (see, for example, Schweller, 1996).

11 These claims constitute evidence for the specific case Waltz is making, rather than for any

putative causal generalization that may lie at the heart of neorealist theory.

12 Historians and political scientists also have distinct disciplinary identities (see Levy, 1997:

23). For a fuller discussion of the relationship between History and International Relations see

Elman and Elman (2001).

13 This understanding is not to be contrasted with explanation, as in Drays claim that historians try

to understand actors reasons for their actions (see Dray, 1974), but is the kind of understanding

that enables one to explain something (see Suganami, 2008).

14 The claim that we rely on a community of experts is comparable to the critical realist contention

that although knowledge is a social product we are capable of adjudicating between rival

accounts (see Patomaki and Wight, 2000: 224).

15 It does imply that causal explanations do not derive from the development and application of

covering laws (see Kurki, 2006; Suganami, 1996).

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Biographical note

Adam R.C. Humphreys is a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Department of

Politics and International Relations, Oxford University and a Research Fellow at NuffieldCollege, Oxford. His research interests are in International Relations theory, the nature

of explanation, the work of Kenneth Waltz and the relationship between History and

International Relations.

Documents

Aplicacao Heuristica Das Teorias Explanatorias Em RI