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Office of Information Technologies
Christopher Misra Rick Tuthill
Network Architecture SIG Southbridge, MA 10 October 2008
Architecting Campus Network Security
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Session Abstract
Various compliance and data security requirements have pushed many campuses to offer managed firewall services to their campus communities. These service can be delivered in a variety of forms and designs with varying degrees of success and adoption. However, the fundamental goal that we are trying to reach is applying reasonable, but secure, controls to appropriate networks and hosts. As part of this deployment, many campus business practices are brought to light that have avoided scrutiny in the past.
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Outline
This session will review a campus-based approach to implement an opt-in managed firewall service, and specifically address the many business process challenges that require effort and education to make secure.
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Guiding Principles of Network Design
Open Network Bias – research needs, historical academic freedom, open standards and interoperability concerns, vendor lock, etc.
“Unrestricted” On-Campus Access Equitable Use of WAN Resources (expensive) Content-Agnostic Approaches Restrict Access to UMass Community Accountability Required (Virus, DMCA, etc.) Migrating Towards “Protecting” Sensitive Network
Resources – regulatory compliance, data holder responsibilities, legal exposure, etc.
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Current Network Design Overview
Tiered Design • Jack which is assigned to a • VLAN/IP Subnet which segments traffic at a • Noderoom Switch which is trunked to a • Lead/Building Switch which uplinked to a • Major Aggregation Site which connects to • Core Transport which delivers to • Destination (Service, WAN site, etc.)
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Motivation for change
Currently, the network works. It provides basic service in a friction-free, consistent, and scalable manner
Workflows and trouble ticketing are well-defined • User <-> Help Desk <-> Telcom <-> Networking
Security Requirements are not well defined (yet) • PCI-DSS is a reality • Data breaches are a ongoing challenge (MGL Ch 93H) • ISO 27000 is coming…
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Limitations of Current Network Design
These limitations are not necessarily security limits, but are manifested as changes needed for security and compliance
Point-to-point “non-routed” VLAN transport limited to core network sites • Therefore “overlay network” required for point-to-point
transport
Redundancy/complexity issues with overlay net • Troubleshooting issues becomes much more complex
Transport Speed Limitations • Currently 1xGigE backbone, 100FX to lead sw in bldg
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Our Changing Design Parameters
High count of “security-required” networks will be identified on campus • Regulatory compliance concerns will increase (PCI,
HIPAA, FERPA) • Network-level security perimeters will be required for
many networks LAN/WAN Bandwidth Requirements will increase
(video) • Wireless Network Adoption rates will increase (802.11n)
Real-time network-based applications will increase (security sys, video, VoIP?, etc.) • Application support requirements may drive changes in
network architecture Network and Application-level performance
monitoring will be required
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IP-as-Transport
Is already happening for multiple applications • Door Access Systems • Environmental Control • Electrical Power Monitoring • Elevator Control/Monitoring • Process Monitoring and Control
Deterministic network behavior required (failover time/path, latency/jitter/loss, etc.)
Application support needs may drive changes in network support requirements
Wired network jack utilization futures are unclear • Increase, Decrease, Steady state?
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Current Design Principles
The challenges lie in the business process, not the technology • Why is the health center connected the way it currently
is? • Why do we have a graduate student managing a
network? • What would audit have to say if they took a look at
this?
But, the technology is still complex • It requires an architectural perspective
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Network Architecture Principles
Flexibility and Extensibility • Ethernet is and will remain primary L2 transport
mechanism • Ability to carry non-Ethernet/non-IP traffic (Fiber
-channel, GENI, etc)
“Reasonable” migration mechanism to new core infrastructure • No flag-day if we can avoid it
Scalable Core Transport Speeds -- 10Gig through 100Gig+
Semi-independent of L2/L3 (switched/routed) network infrastructures
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Network Architecture Principles
Optical core is a likely, but not mandatory outcome
Where does the LAN end? Where does the WAN begin? • Distinctions blur with optical core
Requirements for building-level network unclear at this time. • We can guess and design for maximum flexibility, but
it’s only a guess… • Fortunately, we have generally guessed well in the past. • Past performance is no guarantee of future success
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What should and should not be…
What applications must be supported? • Life-safety: elevator control, alarm sys, voice • Regulations: Health Care, Police, Credit Cards • Process control: SCADA
What do those applications require? • Implications of failure (Health Care, Police, SCADA) • Resulting redundancy requirements
• dual core router, dual fiber, etc. • Run-time requirements
• power/generator/UPS, cooling, etc. • Security needs
• separate virtual network, encryption, etc.
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What should and should not be…
Appropriate System/Service-level • Security measures and protective perimeters • Load-balancing mechanisms for large services • Resources to support campus needs • Data/server backup services, off-site storage • Development and refinement of “community” services
What applications can we afford to support • What risk is incurred by not supporting these
applications vs. resources required for support? • “Can we ever get out of this business?”
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The world as it is
Decentralized system administration practices on campus
Varying levels of knowledge among existing departmental system administrators
Varying levels of electronic protection and detection/auditing capabilities on existing computer systems managed within different departments
Department-level implementation of appropriate business practices to safeguard sensitive data
Entities purchase solutions “in a vacuum” • Expect them to be fully supported on the campus
network
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The world as it is
Inconsistent security perimeters Scalability/maintenance issues with existing
network security perimeters Lack of detailed visibility into intrusion attempts
and successes Regulatory requirements lead to forensic needs
• Legal notification obligations Migration of security threats into “application
domain” (Web browser, etc.)
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Further design parameters
Must be supportable, scalable, layered • Single failure should not “fully expose” computer to
compromise Must be “simple”
• limited box count, limited staff resources to manage, etc.
Must support “enough” networks and throughput to provide for projected campus needs
Must work for networks geographically located anywhere on the campus • Traditional design poses limitations on function
Network Access Control (NAC) to provide access only to “authorized” systems • Where is the perimeter, inside or outside? (or both?)
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Making Progress
This is primarily a business process problem • Manifest as an enormous technology challenge
Network proposal would provide • Central traditional firewall (replaces protected network
ACLs) • Central Intrusion Detection/Prevention System • Central Web Application filtering capability to reduce
web-based application threats • Needless to say, this runs counter to tradition • But traditions sometimes need updating
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This is a campus problem
OIT must provide • A secure, resilient, reliable, and robust network
transport and security framework • Education of staff regarding sensitive/confidential data
handling requirements Departmental Practices must provide
• Appropriate business practices for use of computer with access to sensitive data
• Awareness of sensitive data usage Business Impact Analysis will be key in driving
changes • And there is a campus effort on that front
This is effectively a Risk Management exercise • Though IT folks don’t have a tradition of speaking in
terms of risk
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Crunchy on the outside chewy on the inside
Network security tools without endpoint security and configurations standards solves only half of the problem
We need to understand these in terms of controls • Operating system patches applied regularly • Application patches applied regularly • Endpoint agent software installed
• Host-based firewall/IDS (ISS) • Anti-virus with central reporting
• Disk encryption(?)
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How do we implement these controls?
Many of these are just good, common practices • Others are good practices that are not so common
(yet…)
We need a consistent set of information security guidelines that we adhere to as a campus • That both meet control objectives and accommodate
departmental business practices
We need to raise awareness of: • Current University policies • Appropriate sensitive data handling • Audit needs and requirements
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Example Security Control Guidelines
All accounts must have strong passwords in compliance with the Complex Password Policy. For systems with default passwords for network accessible devices, those passwords should be changed upon first use.
Networked devices shall run versions of operating system and application software for which security patches are made available, and these should be installed in a timely fashion.
When readily available and as appropriate for specific operating systems, software to detect viruses and other malware shall be running, up-to-date, and have current definition files installed as appropriate.
When readily available for specific operating systems, host-based firewall software shall be running and configured to limit network communications to only those services requiring to access to network devices
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From 201 CMR 17.00
“Standards for The Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth”
Regulations for MGL Ch. 93H While these regulate private industry, there is an
executive order that applies effectively the same rules to state agencies • Executive Order 504 ”Order Regarding the Security and
Confidentiality of Personal Information”
These are generally just good business practices Effective 1 January 2009
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17.04: Computer System Security Requirements
(1) Secure user authentication protocols (2) Secure access control measures (3) To the extent technically feasible, encryption of all
transmitted records and files containing personal information that will travel across public networks, and encryption of all data to be transmitted wirelessly.
(4) Reasonable monitoring of systems, for unauthorized use of or access to personal information;
(5) Encryption of all personal information stored on laptops or other portable devices;
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17.04: Computer System Security Requirements
(6) For files containing personal information on a system that is connected to the Internet, there must be reasonably up-to-date firewall protection and operating system security patches, reasonably designed to maintain the integrity of the personal information.
(7) Reasonably up-to-date versions of system security agent software which must include malware protection and reasonably up-to-date patches and virus definitions, or a version of such software that can still be supported with up-to-date patches and virus definitions, and is set to receive the most current security updates on a regular basis.
(8) Education and training of employees on the proper use of the computer security system and the importance of personal information security.
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This is not just an IT problem
“Policy complements what an Information technology organization can do to reduce risk by making security a part of every employee’s job description”
• Dennis Devlin, CISO Brandeis University
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Questions?
Thank you for your attention and time.
We would be happy to take any questions