Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1992

7/28/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Jul 1992

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FM 100-5, OPERATIONSTHE 1993 REVISION

A DoctrineFor

Peace, Crisis,and War


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AVIATION DIGESTPROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

1 -92 -4 JULY/AUGUST 1992

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Army Aviation's Role in Counterdrug Operations, MG Dave RobinsonViews From ReadersFM 100-5, Operations: A Paradigm for Adaptation , LTC Michael R.RampyOrganic Army Aviation in World War II , Part 2: 1944-1946, Dr. John W.KitchensCapabilities and Expectations, CPT Pete VozzoSimulation and Training , Mr. Herbert C. PateSimulators Make Me Sick, CPT Thomas WillmuthSudden Thunder, SGT Wayne V. HallDistributed Training Program, CPT Charles PaceThe Army Reprogramming Analysis Team, Mr . Norman H. SvarrerThose Doggone NOTAMs, CW3 Ron TothNBC Decontamination-Lessons LearnedFlying High-A Look at Alcohol and Aviation , SFC Timothy C. BrinkerhoffThe Aircrew Battle Dress Uniform-More Compatible for the Field,CPT Kenneth R. Ke-enerFriendly Fire-A Different Look, 1LT Kenneth B. MorenoClose Calls, CW4 John G. MillerTEXCOM: Test Community Celebrates Aviation Anniversary,Mr . Robert J. SzersynskiUSAASA Sez: Aircraft Call Signs, Mr . Richard T. JohnsonAVSCOM: Engineer Support Center of Excellence, Directorate ofMaintenance

63 Aviation Personnel Notes: Aviation Branch Insignia64 ATC Focus: Mystery or Magic?, Mr. Dave Fonda65 Soldiers' Spotlight: Are We Really Qualified?, SFC Lawrence F. DunnBack Cover. Preview of Upcoming Issues and Event

Cover. In 1993, the Army willrefocus its doctrine in its newkeystone manual, FM 100-5, Opera-tions. The author of the leadarticle addresses the critical role ofdoctrine in the new strategic era-keeping the peace; meeting thecrises of terrorism, insurgency,low-intensity conflict, andcounterdrug operations; andtraining and developing the Armyfor its primary missionwarfighting.

Major General Dave RobinsonCommander , U.S. Army Aviation CenterLieutenant Colonel Gerard HartExecutive Editor

Patricia S. KitchellEditor

By order of the Secretary of the Arm y:GORDON R. SULLIVAN

General , U.S. ArmyCh ief of StaffOfficial :~ (J/ ciJI;:;-

MILTON H. HAMILTONAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the ArmyI

The U.S. Army Aviation Digest s an official Department of the Army profeSSional bulletin(USPS 415-350) published bimonthly under the supervISion of the commander. U S ArmyAVlaliOn Center This publication presents profeSSional information. butthe views expressedherein are those of the author not the Department of Defense or its elements. The contentdoes not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army pOSition and does not change or supersedeany Information unless otherWise specified . Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwise specI fied . Use of the masculine pronoun IS Intended to Include both genders unless otherWisestated Material may be reprinted provided credit IS given to the Aviation Digest and to theauthor unless otherwise indicated. Publication uses recyclable paper.

U.S. Army Aviation Digest. AnN : ATZQ-PAO-AD. Fort Rucker. AL 36362 5042. or bycalling either DSN 558-3178 or commercial 205-255-3178 Manuscripts returned only uponrequest.

This medium IS approved for the dissemination of material designed to keep individualsWithin the AVlaliOn Branch knowledgeable of current and emerging developments Within theirareas of expertise to enhance their profeSSional development. Articles. photos. and Itemsof Interest on Army AViation are invited. Direct communication IS authOrized by writing Editor.

Second class postage paid at Daleville, AL, and additional mailing officesActive Army. Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve units receive distribution as

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Warfighter 6 Major General Dave Robinson

Army Aviation's Role In Counterdrug Operations

W hile the shakeout of the newmultipolar world continues, newsheadlines continue to alert us to thewidespread effects that illegal drugsare having on the political structure oflegitimate governments around theworld. After the Peruvian coup on 11April 1992, Peruvian PresidentFujimori dissolved the country's congress and its judiciary system,suspended the country's constitution,and placed dozens of its legislatorsunder arrest in a so-far-successful attempt to confront the challenges fromthe Maoist Shining Path narco-terrorists.For centuries Peru's Huallaga Valley has been a major source of cocaleaves and ultimately cocaine. Itproduces 60 percent of the cocaineused in the United States, and hasmore than 250,000 coca farmers. Cocafanning is popular in this region because the coca leaf brings three to fourtimes the cash price of any other crop.In Panama, high unemploymentand the continuing shrinkage of themiddle class endanger the more stableparts of that society. Manuel Noreiga,once a trusted friend of the UnitedStates, was convicted recently of drugtrafficking in a highly publicized trial.Today, Panama remains a major drugtransshipment point in the region.Columbia regularly suffers largescale, military-style attacks on wholesections of the government. InFebruary 1992, Venezuelan armyunits nearly overthrew PresidentCarlos Andres Perez. The full extentof the narcotics trade involvement in

this attempted coup has yet to bedetermined.So what do we, as professional soldiers, know of this threat? Do thesedrug traffickers have a doctrine fortheir activities? What "operating systems" are at work? More importantly,what can we do about it?Drug cartels, such as the Medellinan d Cali from Columbia, haveamassed huge sums of wealth andpower. The influence that the cartelsrepresent is a serious security risk tothe remainder of the western hemisphere. They infiltrate and corrupt thehearts and souls of the legitimategovernments, law enforcement agencies, and the military. They crossevery ethnic, social, and financialboundary with near impunity. Theyhire paramilitary experts to assistthem and buy state-of-the-art equipment.With the collapse of the formerSoviet Union, there is a justified concern over th e procurement ofhigh-technology weapons systems bythese cartels. Forbes magazinereported recently that front-lineequipment sells for pennies on the dollar-a MiG-21 Fishbed costs less than$20,000 cash. Soviet officials are selling their high-technology weapons toanyone with hard currency. Whoknows what weapons these cartelswill have in the future? Becausehuman life holds absolutely no valueto them, they kill without regard.When their money and violence cannot control a government, cartels mayform coalitions with other insurgent

u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1992

groups. International drug cartels,with their terrorist support structures,are clearly a threat to the nationalsecurity interests of source, transient,and using nations.

President Bush and the UnitedStates Congress intend to challengeand defeat this threat deep (in sourcenations), close (in-transit and alongthe U.S. borders), and in the rear(within our borders). The fiscal year1989 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Act gave the Departmentof Defense (DOD) three significantmissions in the war: lead agency fordetecting and monitoring drug smuggling across U.S. borders; planningresponsibility for a communicationsnetwork that integrates U.S. command, control, communications, andintelligence assets dedicated to druginterdiction; and an enhanced supportrole for the National Guard.Based upon the DOD's counterdrugrole, the Department of the Anny published its counterdrug plan in April1990 to help the State Department,U.S. Customs, the Drug EnforcementAgency, and other national and locallaw enforcement agencies. ArmyA viation has a significant role in thisassistance. To fight the deep battle,Anny Aviation is conducting aviationprograms, ranging from crop eradication to reconnaissance of traffickers,in five Latin American countriesBolivia, Belize, Columbia,Guatemala, and Peru. Our aviation officers are helping host nations byproviding maintenance, flight instruction, an d operational planning


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VIEWS FROM READERS

Editor:I read Colonel Tackaberry,Lieutenant Colonel Kelley, andCaptain Muir's article "Deep Attack and the Counterartillery Battle" in the January!February 1992issue of the U.S. Army AviationDigest. It was thought provokingand well received by other lightdivisions faced with the warfighting challenge.How the AH-IF Cobras flew tothe engagement area (night visiongoggles (NVG is obvious, buthow they engaged the targets isnot. "Cache UH-60 (Black Hawk)"rearming tactics, reloading 2.75-inch (70mm) mUltipurpose submunition (MPSM) rockets, andtube-launched , optically tracked,wire-guided (TOW) missiles werediscussed.While Training Circular (TC) 1-140, "Attack Helicopter Gunnery,"discusses conducting rocket fireunder NVG, it does not addresshow to conduct TOW fire withoutillumination. This begs the following questions: Was the 75 percentreduction of the enemy regimentalartillery groups (RAGs) anddivision artillery groups (DAGs)conducted primarily with rockets?If so, this virtue needs to bepraised. What part did TOW fireplay in the reduction of the RAGsand DAGs? Did the attack battalion take along their own illumination rockets to conductTOW fire, since the friendly artillery, except for the multiple launch

rocket system (MLRS), was out ofthe engagement area range? Wassome other technique of conducting TOW fire at night used?Over the years, there has beentalk of an unofficial (not in TC1-140) technique of firing TOWfrom the AH-IF, which involvesplacing NVG directly into the telescopic sight unit of the AH-IF. I fthis or some other technique isbeing used to overcome the inherent weakness of the AH-IF(night TOW fire without artificialillumination), then someone needsto discuss the procedure in theAviation Digest.

Of course, if there were a"glitch" in the computer programduring Warfighter 91 that allowedAH-IF TOW fire at night withoutillumination, and the 7th InfantryDivision (Light) (7ID[L]), Aviation Brigade, discovered and capitalized on this inherent weakness,it would make even more interesting reading.Major Loren D. Porr, Aviation29ID(L), Aviation Brigade,Unit Assistor

Aviation Readiness GroupBaltimore, MDResponse: Major Porr's comments concerning the effectiveness of the AU-IF to conductnight time deep attacks are wellfounded. Light divisions mustrely on what is essentially a dayweapons system to fight and winthe deep battle. This creates unique challenges for the lightu.s.Army Aviation Digest July/August 1992

division commander to synchronize all deep battle assets atthe right time and place. The7ID(L) relied on the cover ofdarkness and an extensive localized suppression of enemy airdefense program to ensure thesuccessful penetration of an extensive enemy air defense artillery (ADA) belt and th e safereturn of the attack helicopterbattalion. Although the cover ofdarkness assists the survivabilityof the AU-IF equipped attackhelicopter force, it negates theeffectiveness of the TOWweapons system.We relied on the synergisticlethality of battlefield ai r interdiction (BAI), MLRS fires, andattack helicopters to reduce theenemy artillery groups to 25 percent combat effective. The battledamage results of the attackhelicopter battalion alone werenot sufficient to meet thedestruction criteria. Uowever,the combined effects of all deepbattle systems effectivelyreduced the enemy's artilleryand created the conditions to ensure success for the 7ID(L) forces in the close battle.The commander directed thatour AU-IF aircraft conduct deepattacks using a basic load consisting primarily of Uydra-70MPSM. The attack helicoptersalso carried 2.75-inch illumination rockets to conduct self-illumination for the TOW missile


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as we were beyond the range ar tillery illumination. The effectiveness and lethality of theHydra-70 rockets combined withdeadly accurate MPSM firesforced the enemy artillerygroups to displace. SynchronizedBAI completed the destruction ofthe displaced artillery, effectively re d uced his artillery, andachieved the division commander's intent.Key to the success of the deepattacks was the integration of theOH-58D Kiowa Warrior. Thethermal imaging systems on theOH-58D enabled the aviationbrigade commander to keep hiseyes on the enemy at night froms tandoff distances. It alsoenabled the commander to directaccurate MPSM deep fires onenemy artillery and copperheadfires on enemy ADA systems inthe vicinity of the forward line ofown troops.

Although the simulation syste m employed by the BattleCommand Training Program(BCTP) replicates battlefieldresults as accurately as possible,there are still several "workarounds" concerning theemployment of Army Aviation,part icularly at night. Thesimulation does not accuratelyreplicate night or periods ofreduced visibility. I t also doesnot credit attack helicopters with2.75-inch rocket effects. Rocketfires are replicated as TOW firesfrom the appropriate ranges.Night or periods of reducedvisibility are replicated bydecreasing ranges for observation and direct fires as well asreducing weapons effectiveness.

Both attack and assaulthelicopters face the "hex" problem for holding areas, battlepositions, and deep landingzones. Aviation forces mustgenerate sufficient combatpower when landing in a "hex"4

(3km by 3km) occupied by anyenemy force and must have sufficient combat forces to engageenemy forces located in the sixadjacent" hexes." The computerwill return the aviation force toits original assembly area or forward area refuel ing point(F ARP) if insufficient combatpower exists or a high-risk option is not selected. In addition,"Jump" FARPs that are not occu pied are returned to theiroriginal locations.A light infantry division mustalways balance the effectivenessof the AH-IF at night versus therisks associated with day flying.Particularly in the 7ID(L), thereexists a definitive need for a truenight fighting attack helicopterto support light fighters in combat. We have recently fielded theAIM-I/EXL infrared laseraiming light for the 20mm system on ou r AH-IFs, enabling ou rattack helicopters to providedeadly accurate 20mm fires atnight. In fiscal year 1994, the7ID(L) will field 43 armed OH-58Ds to both the attack helicopter battalion and the cavalry,replacing al l AH-IF and OH-58C aircraft. This will completethe conversion of the AviationBrigade, 71D(L), to a night fighting unit, capable of deployingwithin a moment's notice, finding the enemy and destroyinghim, during day and night,anywhere in the world.

The Aviation Brigade, 71D(L),will gladly assist any light infantry unit preparing fo r theBCTP for warfighting. We willprovide unclassified copies ofbattle books, slides, and briefings used to prepare this divisionfor the warfighter exercise. Wealso can provide informationconcerning the recent fielding ofthe AIM-1 laser designator system to Fort Ord, CA, and it sproven effectiveness on the nightbattlefield.

Captain Thomas M. Muir7ID(L), Aviation Brigade, S-3Fort Ord, CA

Editor:The aviator paces, waiting forofficial confirmation of what shealready knows to be fact. She ispregnant. She wonders if it is theright time to start a family. Thenshe thinks, as an aviator, when is itever the right time? Several eventswill occur over the next 9 months.She will undergo changes in herbody, watch her peers fly, and experience disqualification fromaviation service. Presently, theseitems are unavoidable. However,the disqualification issue needs addressing. Pregnancy should notdisqualify aviators from aviationservice.Army Regulation (AR) 600-105,Aviation Service ofRatedArmyOf-ficers, paragraph 3-9, provides formedical disqualification fromaviation service. It states, "When amedical condition exists that willrequire more than 6 months toresolve and that renders an aviatorunfit, the United States ArmyAeromedical Center (USAAMC),(Fort Rucker, AL), must benotified." The commander,USAAMC, recommends to Headquarters, Department of the Army(HQDA), that they publish ordersdisqualifying the aviator fromaviation service.

This process occurs whenwomen aviators become pregnant.Once they are determined pregnant, initiation of the processbegins. The regulation focuses onillnesses or injuries that may notresolve themselves within aspecified period. Often, these individuals do not return to regularflight service.Pregnancy, however, is a predictable medical condition. Thepregnant aviator stands a 99.9 percent chance of returning to fullflight duty with no complications.



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Flight surgeons agree on thegrounding issue. They also agreethe disqualification is not necessary. In this case, the regulationfocuses on the exception, not thenorm. The aviator has two options.She may follow the rule and facedisqualification, or she may wait 4to 5 months before telling the flightsurgeon of her condition. Whilethe latter is more of an ethicalissue, both have negative results.Those women who choose todisregard the system do so for tworeasons. First, they are trying toavoid disqualification. This oftenbackfires because the flight surgeon can back date a date of incapacitation, which results in theaviator's disqualification. Therehave been exceptions. Someaviators who waited until thesecond trimester were not disqualified. Their aviation servicean d flight pay continuedthroughout the pregnancy.Second, many women feel nodifferent during the first months ofpregnancy. These normal feelingshelp justify to the aviator her disregard for the system. Flight surgeons maintain the first trimester iscritical to fetal development andthe woman's physical reactions topregnancy are unpredictable. M o s ~women, however, do not usuallysee an obstetrician for the first timeuntil 6 to 8 weeks. Some women donot realize they are pregnant untilthis time. At this point, they areone-half to two-thirds through thefirst trimester. Therefore, anothermonth is not such a long time towait to see the doctor.

Those women who bide by thesystem lose an additional 6 to 8weeks of flight time followingpregnancy. Once the aviator canreturn to full flight duty, she stillmust wait for requalification orders. These orders must be in hand,or verbal authorization receivedfrom HQDA, before she can actually fly. This process takes 6 to 8weeks because the paperwork must

go through USAAMC for reviewbefore it goes to HQDA for publication of orders. This lost time isimportant because the unit cannotuse a fully capable aviator becauseof the time lag involved with thepaperwork.

Possible solutions to the disqualification issue exist. An exception to policy to the regulation,when disqualification does notoccur, is one solution. Another alternative is to allow the aviator toperform limited flight duties untilthe second trimester. The simplesolution is the exception to policyas it only requires a change to theregulation. Thus, the issue becomes administrative rather thanmedical. A regulation changeeliminates the paperwork and lostflight time because there is no disqualification. It gives the approvalauthority for "fit to duty" to thelocal commander. The aviatorremains grounded until thepostpartum checkup, but does notlose the flight time afterward. Shecan become a flight asset to the unitmore quickly.The second solution contains morecomplications. The obvious concernsfor miscarriage and sudden incapacitation are important factors.These concerns are pertinent in anysituation, not just in flying. The samesudden incapacitation could occurwhile driving a car or riding a bicycle.The advantage of being in the aircraftwith flight limitations is that anotherpilot is in the other seat. Vibrationsand other aspects of the aviation environment may have adverse effectson the fetus. These conditions requiretesting and can impact on thefeasibility of this option. Women whohave waited to report their pregnancies have had successful pregnanciesand produced healthy babies. Whilethis is not adequate proof that babieswill have no detrimental effects, itdoes support the option for limitedflight duty during the fIrst trimester.

Disqualifying aviators fromaviation service during pregnancyu.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1992

is not necessary. Women havedemonstrated the ability to perform flight duties while in the earlystages of pregnancy. The simplersolution is to affect an exception topolicy to the regulation. Duringthe pregnancy, aviators still perform the aviation-related dutiesrequired of their positions. Theyfill operational flying slots andshould still receive credit for thistime. Disqualification from aviation service implies a permanentcondition. In cases of pregnancy,the aviator returns to full flightduty.Many questions remain regarding this issue, but with today'sreduction in forces, and theavailability of qualified aviators,the issue requires addressing.Captain Cynthia M. LambA viation Officer AdvancedCourse, Class 90-3U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, ALResponse: The author shouldreconsider stating the problemand her proposed solutions moreconcisely and update herknowledge of the problem.August 1990 was a long time agoon this issue.The term "disqualification" ismisused. Medical disqualification means you do not meet apublished standard; i.e., visionworse than 20/20 is disqualifying; pregnancy is disqualifying.The act of publishing orders fora medical disqualification is"medical termination from aviation service."Captain Lamb disregards thefact that the USAAMC; U.S.Army Aviation Center, AviationProponency, Fort Rucker, AL;and waiver authori ties have beenat work looking for solutions tothe pregnant aviator's ad-ministrative problems. Manyimprovements have been madein the last 3 years.An exception to policy cannotbe made because the flight pay

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issue is a federal law directed byDepartment of Defense PayManual, which can only bechanged by a change in thefederal law.Proposed solutions must notdiscriminate against men withmedical conditions that ar e likely to result in return to flyingduties in less than 9 months butmore than 6 months and face thesame administrative problems.Lieutenant Colonel Kevin T.Mason, MD, MC, SFSDirector, USAAMAFort Rucker, AL

Editor:As I read the January/February1992 issue of the U.S. AviationDigest, I saw the 1991 subjectindex and noticed something missing: nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) training. I sawnothing about Aviation and NBCduring Operation Desert Storm.I am a chemical operationsspecialist in a headquarters andservice company supporting an attack helicopter battalion. We, aschemical soldiers, know that wemust sell NBC. Most of the time,NBC training is swept off of atraining schedule to fulfill someother "important training."

When (then) the 3d ArmoredDivision was called to the war inthe Gulf, countless aviators andothers approached me and werebegging for NBC training, and information on the use of NBCequipment. Now that we have longsince returned, NBC is once againon the back burner. No one is interested in that priceless advice that Igave them before the war.

In 1991, the M43 protectivemask was introduced to AH-64Apache pilots Armywide. While itis strictly for aviator use, and a newpiece of equipment, pilots shouldbe informed of common problemsor new ideas in operating it. Wherebetter to inform aviators on equip-6

ment maintenance than in thepages of your professional bulletin, which is widely read by pilotsin our battalion? Support from youwould influence many aviators totake NBC seriously, and maybesave some lives in future battles.SPC Michael D. ModlinChemical Operations SpecialistHeadquarters and ServiceCompany2/227th Attack HelicopterBattalion, APO AE

Editor:The term "lessons learned" maybe new to you, but we learnthrough experiences everyday."Experience is the best teacher"and that's what our program is allabout. A lesson learned is simply arecorded experience of value inconducting future programs ormodifications.The U.S. Air Force (USAF) Lessons Learned Program is a corporate memory bank of past experiences' positive and negative,available to Department ofDefense employees and certifiedgovernment contractors throughon-line access. U.S. Army andNavy lessons also are screenedquarterly and appropriate lessonsare entered into the databank. TheCenter for Supportability andTechnology Insertion (CSTI),USAF Lessons Learned ProgramOffice, Wright-Patterson AirForce Base (AFB), OH, managesthe program. The program impartsexperiences from those who haveit to those who need it.

The lessons learned staff assistcustomers by providing packagesof lessons for a particular impactarea: configuration management,contract management, provisioning, etc. Our databank contains lessons grouped into 67 different impact areas. Impact areas can beadded or deleted as necessary. Thedatabank can be searched by impact area, keyword, or program

phase. Lessons learned can andshould be used in every phase of anacquisition program.The lessons learned staff is continuously receiving feedback fromusers and reviews the databank toupdate or delete lessons when appropriate. User feedback helps usmake improvements and ensureslessons in the databank are significant, valid, and applicable. Thedatabank undergoes an annualrevalidation to ensure that the lessons are current and up-to-date.We can get more from our limitedresources by accentuating positiveexperiences and eliminating negative ones. Using lessons learned isthe key to improved reliability,maintainability, lower costs, supportability, readiness of presentand future weapons systems, andimprove the way we do business.We welcome lessons submittersand validators. Guides on how towrite and validate lessons, andforms for submitting lessons areavailable upon request. You canenhance the lessons learned program through your participation.You may have discovered a newprocess, or innovative technique,or see where design improvementscan be made. The objective of theprogram is to improve the acquisition process by not repeating thesame mistakes again. While thebulk of lessons maintained in thedatabank are acquisition related,we are expanding our databank toinclude lessons in operationalareas: Blue Two, TechTIPS,TechTAPS, Operations DesertShield and Storm, and others.

For more information on theseprograms, contact the USAF Lessons Learned Program Office,ATTN: CSTI/PI, Wright-PattersonAFB, OH 45433, or phone DSN785-7900/1606 or commercial513-255-7900/1606.The lessons learned staff (Mr.Bob Kerr and Ms. Nancy Bach)stands ready to assist you in submitting lessons, retrieving lessons

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from the databank, providing online access, or providing the lessons learned briefing and trainingon how to write and validate lessons.You can take advantage of ourservices by writing to the USAFLessons Learned Program Office,ATTN: CSTI/AML, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-5000,phone DSN 785-3454 or commercial 513-255-3454. You also mayleave a message after duty hours bycalling DSN 785-5238 or commercial 513-255-5238.

Editor:The Seventh International Symposium on Aviation Psychologywill be held in Columbus, OH, 25through 29 April 1993. Ohio StateUniversity (OSU), Department ofAviation personnel, and the Association of Aviation Psychologists will host this biennialevent.The objective of the symposiumis to examine and improve the role,responsibility, and performance ofhuman operators who are in theaviation system. The theme for thissymposium has no t yet beendecided; however, it will reflect anemerging issue of importance inthe aviation field.This general call for papers isissued to anyone who wishes topresent a paper or conduct aworkshop on Cockpit Technology,Pilot Reliability, Pilot Workload,Pilot Judgement, Crew ResourceManagement, Air Traffic ControlHuman Factors, Simulation andTraining, Maintenance HumanFactors, Accident Investigation,and Physiological Factors. Thedeadline for submitting brief (300words) abstracts of proposedpapers or workshops is 30 September 1992. Author(s) should includea brief (1 page) biographicalsketch. A proceedings of all paperspresented will be published.

Submissions should be addressed to Dr. Richard S. Jensen,Department of Aviation, OSU Airport, 2160 West Case Road,Columbus, OH 43235.

Editor:The U.S. Army Officer Candidate Alumni Association(TUSAOCAA), Incorporated(Inc.) is soliciting voluntary donations. The donations are for a special fund dedicated to the maintenance of Wigle Hall, OfficerCandidate School (OCS) Hall ofFame, Fort Benning, GA. Reducedbudgets have left the 3d Battalion(Bn) (OCS), lIth Infantry, thepresent OCS training Bn, with insufficient funds to improve orproperly maintain Wigle Hall. Thealumni association has agreed toassist the commander in his effortsto improve the appearance of thebuilding.The OCS Hall of Fame recognizes those graduates of the OCS atFort Benning and the GroundGeneral School, Fort Riley, KS,who have distinguished themselves by attaining the rank ofcolonel, earning the Medal ofHonor, or achieving success instate or federal service.

I f you desire to participate in thisvoluntary effort, make check payable to TUSAOCAA, Inc., WigleHall Fund. Send donations toSecretary (ATTN: Mr. Chester F.Alderfer), TUSAOCAA, Inc., PostOffice Box 2192, Fort Benning,GA 31905-2192.The association also is seekingnew members. Regular membership is open to graduates of anyArmy OCS. Associate membership is open to graduates of otherservices' OCS and other personswho support the OCS program. Formore information about membership and dues write to the addressabove, or call commercial 404-322-4622.


Oops! In the May/June 1992issue, the article "Comanche, Restructuring to Meet the Requirement," figure 3, Force modernization, page 40, erroneouslyshows 25 Comanches fielded intoth e Attack Battalion (HeavyDivision/Corps). The correct number should be 10 Comanches.

Editor:WANTED: Invalid addressesof deactivation units.REWARD: Big money savings.The U.S. Army PublicationsDistribution Center (USAPDC)needs to know your deactivatedunit's old address.Deactivated units need to writedown their invalid former addresses and mail this information toUSAPDC, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220-2896.The mailings of the U.S. ArmyAviation Digest to invalid unit addresses, mostly from OperationDesert Storm, have resulted in a bigwaste of time to mail and a bigwaste of money to return.Deactivation units-let's save alotof time and money. Please writeto USAPDC so they can immediately delete those old addresses andadd any new addresses for mailingthe Aviation Digest.For more information, pleasewrite or call the USAPDC, DSN584-3775 or commercial 410-671-3975.

Aviation Digest Staff

Readers can obtain copies of thematerial printed in this issue bywriting to the Editor, U.S. ArmyAviation Digest, ATZO-PAD-AD,Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5042.

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FM

FM 100-5is thecenterpieceof the doctrinal assessment anddevelopmentprocess.

100-5, OperationsA Paradigm For Adaptation

Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. RampySchool of Advanced Military StudiesFort Leavenworth, KS

~ ~ ~ V a\\\1

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The key i s doctr ine andthe keystone i s FM 100-5,Operat ions. The Ar.my re -l i e s on i t s doctr ine toprovide i n t e l l e c tua l fo -cus and prec is ion foreverything it does.

For more than 45 years, our nation and ourArmy focused on the defense of WesternEurope and the containment of communism.

The Soviet Union-the major concern of our defenseefforts for over 4 decades-no longer comprises asignificant threat. A national military strategy of containment, strengthened with forward-deployed forcesand a credible nuclear deterrent, proved its relevance.We succeeded.As flexible response and forward deployment inWestern Europe fade, we must confront the complexities of a new strategic environment, one that ismultipolar, interdependent, and regionally oriented.

Adapting to a world that has changed more broadlyand more fundamentally in the last 2 years than at anyother time since the end of World War (WW) II imparts a uniq ue se t of challenges for our Army.Now-more than ever before-we serve as a strategicArmy, a land force America and its allies count on tomeet our global responsibilities in peace, crisis, andwar.

The StrategicEnvironmentIn his National Security ofthe United States strategy document (August 1991), President

George Bush posed the four fundamental demands ofthe new strategic era: "... to ensure strategic deterrence, to exercise forward presence in key areas, torespond effectively to crises, and to retain the nationalcapacity to reconstitute forces should this ever beneeded. II I This new national military strategy, the mostprominent shift since the mid-1950s, focuses onregional threats whose capabilities and intents are notreadily discernible.


The threat covers the spectrum from illicit drugs andterrorism to the proliferation of technology andweapons of mass destruction. Simultaneously, astrategy of power projection means we will respond tocrises primarily with forces based in the continentalUnited States.

At home, resources previously committed todefense are now going to other national priorities. Partof the change in strategy is a diminishing resourcebase. Moreover, these fundamental changes to ourstrategic environment predicate we divest ourselves ofnonessential assets and acti vities.

This entails identifying and maintaining our corecapabilities-then eliminating the rest. Our guide tohow we do this, and how we apply the resources thatremain, is doctrine.

Role o f DoctrineFortunately, we find ourselve s in an era of doctrinalrenaissance. The Army today ismore aware of the critical role of

doctrine than at any other time in our nation's history.Furthermore, there are few times when the military hashad such a unique opportunity to shape its ownfuture.

In this regard, we approach the new era from aposition of strength, a strength based on a highlyprofessional force. Trained, proven, confident, anddedicated, our officers, noncommissioned officers,and soldiers stand ready to focus their energies on thechallenges ahead. The lens that will allow them thatfocus is doctrine.

America's Army has always been a reflection of oursociety. Doctrine must complement the nationalmilitary strategy and reflect the uniqueness of ourArmy and the American way of war. We have alwaysbeen, as we are today, a unique combination of activeduty professionals, volunteer militia, and citizen-soldiers serving as volunteers or conscripts.

Purpose o f DoctrineDoctrine is not a peripheralconcern; it is the heart of ourArmy. Doctrine is the essentialfirst step in developing a plan of

action designed to accomplish near-term objectivesand to confront future exigencies.

D.W. Knox, in his excellent treatise on the natureand role of doctrine, asserts "[a] sound, comprehensive, all-pervading doctrine . . . is as important to anarmy as its organization."2 [Doctrine] is the vital link

9


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between organizational thought patterns and reality, acommon frame of reference for our Army. It lies in thecontinuum between theory and application; it mustcomprehend both, yet favor neither.

The Joint Staff defines military doctrine as a set of"fundamental principles by which military forcesguide their actions in support of national objectives.Doctrine is authoritative, but requires judgment inapplication. ,3

Effective doctrine is like a mirror: hold it up and itreflects our image, our nature, our purpose. Sometimeswe agree with what we see; other times we do not.

The salient point is the mirror-doctrine-shouldalways reflect the image of our Army. If the imagelacks clarity or is not consistent with our perceptions,it requires revision.

While doctrine articulates how we do our business,it is only a guide to action. not a prescriptive checkliston "how to fight." Professor I. B. Holley contends"military doctrine is an officially approved teaching,precept. guide to action. a suggested method for solving problems or attaining desired results . . . doctrinesare not hard-and-fast rules to be slavishly applied; they. ,,4are suggestIve.

Doctrine is the means by which we convey concepts,information, and terminology to our Army. One ofdoctrine's principal purposes is to facilitate discussionand communication-both inside and outside-of theprofession of arms. Its evolution clearly indicates the". . . great value of doctrine is less the final answers itprovides than the impetus it creates toward developinginnovative and creative solutions . . . . IS

The Army relies on its doctrine to provide intellectual focus and precision for everything it does. One of

10

We serve as a strategic Army, a landforce America and its allies count onto meet our global responsibilities inpeace, crisis, and war.

its principal purposes is to allow us to think as acorporate body and, thereby, have consistent expectations in the conduct of our business.

This intellectual process strengthens our organization; identifies the essence of the army, stimulatesdialogue among professionals, engenders writing, bothprofessional and personal, and codifies our thoughts.Consequently, doctrine is the mechanism that bondsthe Army to its sister services and its alliance andcoalition partners.

Fac to rs o f Doct r ineExternal and internal factorscombine to shape the development of doctrine and have farreaching implications on its

ability to adapt. We can exert a measure of control oversome factors; others we cannot. The issue of controlling these significant factors is less important thanunderstanding what they are and how they affectdoctrinal development.External. Throughout the evolution of our doctrine.the most significant external influences have been thethreat, national security policy, technology, budgetaryconstraints, public support, and national values. Thesefactors in varying proportions have had, and will continue to have, a significant impact on how our doctrinedevelops.

National security policy is fundamental to therevision of doctrine. Colonel Bob Doughty, the authorof the insightful book The Seeds of Disaster, detailsthe failed French doctrine of WWII. He contends that,for us, "no single factor [drives] the development ofArmy doctrine, but changes in national security policylay at the basis" of any sweeping changes. When national security policy and national military strategyshift, "profound changes [occur] in the Army'sdoctrine, organization, and equipment. ,6

With the recent significant change in our strategy,we can expect, if history is any indication, "profoundchanges" will soon occur. We must plan for andmanage those changes with great foresight.

The relationship between technology and doctrine iscomplex. This is due, in part, to the differences between the dynamic nature of technological advancesand the seemingly laborious pace of doctrinal development.

Before World War II, Ferdinand Miksche, an earlyproponent of maneuver warfare and an advocate ofthe integration of technology and doctrine, assertedtechnology has a dramatic influence on the nature ofwar.

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War undergoes continual evolution. New arms giveever new forms to combat. To foresee this technicalevolution before it occurs, to judge well the influenceof these new arms on battle, to employ them beforeothers is an essential condition for success.7

Public support and national values determine na-tional security that, in turn , determines the nature andscope of doctrine. Therefore, doctrine must reflect thissynthesis of national security policy, potential, andcapabilities, public support, and a firm foundation inour national values.Internal. Internal factors, many that we can in-fluence directly, include institutional tensions andexperience. The internal tension created by serviceparochialism and the seemingly endless fight overroles and missions have a direct impact on doctrinaldevelopment.

As a result, doctrine is frequently a contentiousissue, because the services often cannot agree on thebest way to prepare for the next war. Creating astrategy to contend with a new global environmentmust be the result of a logical thought process basedon the needs of the nation.

Experience affects doctrine. History is replete withexamples of armies that learn only in defeat; good


The Army today is more aware of thecritical role of doctrine than at anyother time in our nation's history.

armies also learn in victory. Ours is a good Army. Wemust learn in victory and thereby never suffer adefeat.

Quest ions AboutDoctr ineWhile the best measure of adoctrine is its application, wemust be able to assess its prob-

able effectiveness short of conflict; to wait until con-flict occurs may be too late.

We should continuously ask four questions of ourdoctrine: Is it relevant (does it address the threat)? Isit achievable (will it work given current resources,both physical and political)? Is it acceptable (will theArmy and the American public accept it)? Is it adapt-able (can it adapt to changes in a dynamic strategicenvironment)?

The more affirmatively we can answer these ques-tions, the more likely we have the correc t doctrine. Thefollowing statements help us maintain correctdoctrine.Relevance is a perceived relationship between ad-versaries; a doctrine based on the wrong perception ofthe threat is not relevant and in danger of failure.

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Achievability comprehends the availability and application of resources. Doctrine must take a conceptand translate it into a more assured appreciation of theconstraints, both physical and political, of the present.Acceptability is essential to the American way ofwar in terms of the least expenditure of friendly casualties and national wealth, and strong adherence to ournational values. Not only must the Army accept andimplement the doctrine, but also the public must acceptdoctrine as the accurate translation of national valuesand democratic ideals into military application. Toviolate this rule is to risk rejection.Adaptability is a pivotal factor in assessing doctrine.In the void between organizational preference andoperational requirements lurks the potential for disaster.

A His to r i ca lPerspect iveof DoctrineAny review of the Army'soperational doctrine must begin

with its keystone manual, Field Manual (FM) 100-5,Operations; from it, all other Army doctrine derives.FM 100-5 traces its roots back to the beginning of theArmy.

From the Revolutionary War through the wars of the19th Century, our doctrine appeared in differentguises, much of it imported from Europe. From the

manual's inception in the early 20th Century, when itfirst took on its modern name (although then stilllabeled a field service regulation), through the turbulence of two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam,Grenada, Panama, and Saudi Arabia, FM 100-5 hasserved us to varying degrees.. A high point was the 1941 version of the manual. Inthat year, ours was a nation on the eve of conflict: wefaced the specter of war on a scale we could not haveimagined only a few years before.

The historical challenge was clear: develop the appropriate doctrine for the appropriate time, or sufferthe consequences. We focused our energies and got itright, although not without updating the manual atbetter than a once-a-year rate throughout the war.

The years following WWII witnessed a decline indoctrine. We entered Korea unprepared for the type ofwar we fought; our doctrine was neither relevant noradaptable. A decade later, we entered our longest war,Southeast Asia, never incorporating its realities intoour keystone doctrine. Doctrine seemed to have lost itsrelevance and adaptability .

The renaissance of doctrinal awareness in moderntimes began in 1972 with Operation Steadfast, thedissolution of the Continental Army Command intotwo distinct, specified commands: U.S. Army ForcesCommand, Fort McPherson, GA, and U.S . ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), FortMonroe, VA. TRADOC's primary mission was to

... we must confront the complexities of a new strategic environment, one that is multipolar,interdependent, and regionally oriented.12 u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1992


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focus on updating the Army's training and doctrineprograms.This resulted in the 1976 version of FM 100-5, theActive Defense and the "How to Fight" series ofmanuals. The 1976 version of FM 100-5 engenderedacrimonious debate, yet served one important purpose-it reminded our Army of the purpose and importanceof doctrine.The 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 broughtus out of the attrition-based active defense and into themaneuver warfare of AirLand Battle. We embracedthe offensive spirit again and recognized the jointnature of operations.

The Keystone ofDoctr ine: FM 100-5FM 100-5 is the instrumentfor managing and implementingadaptation and change. The

criticality of changing doctrine is evident. It isnoteworthy that in ". . . few spheres of human activityare change and progress so constant and the need foraccommodation and adjustment so unremitting as inthe military."S

FM 100-5, our keystone doctrine, should be anall-encompassing expression of how the strategic,total Army intends to fulfill its obligations across thecontinuum of military operations. The manual mustexpand both: vertically, to address in more detail thestrategic-operational linkage; and, horizontally, to encompass operations across the continuum of militaryoperations in peace, crisis, and war.

We need a doctrine-based approach to managingchange in our Army as we make a disciplined transition into the future. I emphasize ours is an intellectualand a pragmatic doctrine, a means to focus our effortsin these turbulent times. The caution, as Colonel[Professor] Bob Doughty has so aptly pointed out, is". . . intellectual changes can sometimes be moredifficult to achieve than material changes." 9

Doctrine, of course, is not an end in itself, but themeans to an end in the larger context of nationalsecurity policy. It must comprehend the lessons of thepast, grasp the realities of the present, and function asa paradigm for adaptation in the future.

FM 100-5 is the centerpiece of the doctrinal assessment and development process. This manual must bean all-encompassing expression of how the Army intends to fulfill it s strategic an d operationalcommitments around the world. Clearly, we must capture the traditional and nontraditional aspects of ourglobal operations. As we expand the scope of FM

u.s. ArmyAviation Digest July/August 1992

100-5, however, we must not dilute the Army's fundamental purpose: to fight and win our nation's battles.

Our doctrine must avoid any uncertainty betweenthe Army and the American people, if it is to pass thecritical test of acceptability. To have meaning in thecontemporary strategic environment, our doctrine cannot afford to focus solely on the business ofwarfighting; it must account for our other missions aswell.

The result of any revision must reflect the uniqueness of the American view of war. To be useful, thismanual must comprehend and support the fabric ofnational policy and strategy. It must be specific enoughto provide a guide for operations, yet flexible enoughto adapt to a constantly changing strategic environment.We are maintaining the edge while bringing our sizedown, reshaping and adapting at the same time; in sodoing we must keep the current situation in perspective. Ours is an Army in the finest condition we haveever seen. Having faced such challenges before, wewill avoid the historical pitfalls of a victorious Armyin reduction.

The key is doctrine; the keystone is FM 100-5,Operations, our paradigm for adaptation. 0

ENDNOTES1. White House, National Security Strategy of the UnitedStates (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, August 1991), p. 25.2. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History ofUnited States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 511.3. DOD Pub 1: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms(Washington, D.C.: JCS, June 1987), p. 118.4. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Emerging Doctrines and Technoloqies: Implications fo r Global and RegionalPolitical-Military Balances (Lexington: Lexington Books,1988), p. 14.5. MAJ Robert A. Doughty, Leavenworth Paper Number 1: TheEvolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976 (Leavenworth: USACGSC, Combat Studies Institute, August 1979), p. 2.6. Ibid ., p. 47.7. Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 7.8. John P. Campbell, "Marines, Aviators, and the Battleship Mentality, 1923-33," The Royal United Service Journal, February1964, p. 49.9. Ibid., p. 47.

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Organic Army Aviation in Worl

14

Army Ground Forcesflew first in Piper L-4s(below) and later in StinsonL-5s (right) .



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ar II Part 21944-1946 Dr. John W. KitchensAviation Branch Command HistorianU.S. Army Aviation Center

T he Field Artillery Branchof the Army Ground Forces (AGF) tested aerialobservation and fire adjustmentfrom lightweight organic aircraftfrom 1940 to 1942. The tests led tothe establishment of organic ArmyAviation on 6 June 1942. Part 1 inthe last issue related the details.Rivalry between the AGF andthe Army Air Forces (AAF), laterthe U.S. Air Force, over the roleand mission of organic Army Aviation began with the initial testingof the concept and continued forover 30 years. The AAF viewedorganic aviation with wariness,when not with outright hostility.

The air forces failed to furnishthe ground forces with the type andquality of aerial support beingprovided by organic aviation. Inspite of this, leaders blocked theexpansion of the tiny new air armof the AGF and, on occasion, attempted to absorb or abolish it.Conversely, the AGF sought to expand the size, mission, andauthority of organic Army Aviation. Disputes between the twoArmy commands were allayedtemporarily through compromiseor War Department edict, only toresurface later.1

The principal aircraft used byorganic aviation during World WarII (WWII) was the Piper L-4. Itwas an excellent plane for daytimeartillery fire adjustment, as well asfor several other types of missions.From the time the L-4 first enteredcombat in North Africa in 1942,however, several shortcomings became apparent: limited range andspeed, inability to operate at high

Fort Rucker, AL

altitudes, and problems involved innighttime flying.The liaison plane most widely

used by the AAF was the L-5,manufactured by the StinsonAircraft Division of ConsolidatedVultee Aircraft Corporation. Compared to the L-4, the I85-horsepower L-5 was faster, couldoperate at higher altitudes andcarry more weight, had a longerrange, and was easier to operate atnight.As early as the North Africancampaign, some ground unitsbegan to request the larger Stinsonaircraft for use in mountainousareas. Although the ground forcesmanaged to acquire a few L-5s fortesting in 1942 and 1943, no otherswere authorized for the AGF until1944.

One reason why the AGF did notrequest more L-5s was ground forces leaders believed the acquisition of higher performance aircraftwould intensify the AAF opposition to organic Army Aviation.2

The L-5 aircraft generally werenot needed for artillery fire adjustment. Moreover, the War Department, as well as the AGF, tendedto be cautious with regard to anysuggestion of officially expandingthe mission of organic Army A viation. For, example, it was widelyknown portable cameras were usedin L-4s for aerial photography. InFebruary 1944, however, the WarDepartment disapproved aproposal to upgrade this aircraft bymounting cameras because of AAF.. 3opposItIOn.In mid-I943, the AGF in Italyacquired a few L-5s intended for

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16

Army Ground Forces in ItalyTOP: Oxen teams and aircraft share arunway in Orbetello, Italy.LEFT: M.J. Strok (right) and R.W. Blakeleave on a night flight.ABOVE: An L-4 pilot on patrol looks overa house in Ita/y.



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the AAF but mistakenly sent to aField Artillery unit. According toseveral sources, the ground forcesfirst used L-5s in combat followingthe allied breakthrough at Anzio inearly 1944.4

It seems, however, the AGF mayhave sent a couple of the L-5s acquired for testing to North Africain 1943.5

Air Forces-GroundForces Rivalry in 1944In January 1944, the AAF madeanother concentrated effort toabolish organic Army Aviation.Air forces leaders were alarmed bythe attempts of some ground commanders to obtain higher performance aircraft. They were alsoconcerned about the rapidly expanding use of the L-4s for variousmissions that had been assigned tothe AAF. This concern precipitated the air forces' attemptedtakeover of January 1944.

In a memorandum for the chiefof staff of the Army, General(GEN) Henry H. Arnold, the commanding general of the AAF,charged that organic aviation wasoverextended, wasteful of resources, and unsound in principle. Furthermore, he claimed, it was beingused primarily for unauthorizedand unintended purposes.

He then repeated (but morevigorously than on prior occasions) the air forces' recommendation to discontinue organicArmy Aviation and resume allliaison and artillery fire adjustmentfunctions by the recently organizedAAF liaison squadrons.6

GEN Arnold was correct incharging that the de facto role andmission of organic Army Aviationhad expanded considerablybeyond what had originally beenauthorized. He ignored the fact,however, that the expansion hadresulted from the exigencies of

combat and from the failure of theAAF to provide the AGF with adequate liaison-type aerial support.

Also, some of Arnold's allegations (for example, his charge thatonly 5 percent of organicaviation's missions were "for thepurpose of adjustment of artilleryfire") were gross exaggerations.When organic aviation wasauthorized in 1942, it was intendednot to replace but "to supplementthe AAF's responsibility for aerialadjustment of artillery fire" fromhigh-performance aircraft?

Since few of the AAF squadronsthat were to have provided thissupport were actually organized,however, organic aircraft of theAGF provided almost all fireadjustment as well as manyother liaison functions duringWWII.

In May of 1943, the AAF obtained authorization to organizeliaison flights or squadrons, in lieuof the discredited air forces observation squadrons, to support theground forces. These flights wereonly beginning to be organized inearly 1944.8 GEN Arnold wantedto hasten the process by having theAAF flights absorb organic ArmyAviation and take over its assetsand functions. Apparently none ofthe new AAF liaison flights arrivedin the European Theater until mid-1944. Between then and January1945, the AAF assigned a total ofeight liaison squadrons of 32planes each to the AGF operating. E 910 urope.

In response to GEN Arnold'smemorandum of January 1944,Lieutenant General (LTG) LesleyJ. McNair, the commander of theAGF, took issue with some ofArnold's exaggerated chargesabout the use and cost of organicArmy Aviation. The thrust of hisrejoinder, however, was to observethe main issue was satisfactory air


observation for Field Artillery. Heasserted artillery air observationby the AAF had never been satisfactory, but that organic aviationwas performing this mission in anoutstanding manner.

As to wasting resources, LTGMcNair observed the cost of organic aviation was "microscopically small as compared with the costof the air forces as a whole," andwas hardly even a factor in thediscussion. He, therefore, stronglyobjected to GEN Arnold'sproposed change-especially ath . . I f h 10t at cntlca tlme 0 t e war.

The War Department acceptedLTG McNair's recommendationthat no change be made in organicaviation. To avert a renewal of thecontroversy, however, the WarDepartment spokesman warnedthat, should the mission of theground forces aviation arm be expanded in the future, GEN Arnoldcould renew his demand that organic aviation be transferred to theAAF.ll

The War Department also expressed the hope the new AAFliaison squadrons would providethe requisite courier and otherliaison service so organic ArmyAviation would no longer bediverted from its primary mis-. 12S1On.

While GEN Arnold doubtlesslywould have desired the total abolition of organic Army Aviation, hisdemand for such an action maywell have been intended, as a practical matter, to prevent its furthergrowth. At any rate, his demandand the War Department's threat toreconsider it appears to have contributed to increased caution on thepart of the ground forces leaders.For a few months, they were somewhat quieter with regard to acquiring higher performance aircraft,making modifications on the L-4,and obtaining official recognition

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of the de facto expanded role oforganic aviation.

Few, if any, of the AAF liaisonsquadrons being organized to support the AGF reached Europebefore the beginning of the Normandy invasion; therefore, it wasnecessary for the ground forces toacquire a few high performanceliaison planes to carry out theiroperations.

By mid-1944, several army,corps, and division headquarterspreparing for Operation Overlordhad obtained one L-5 each for"special missions." The overwhelming majority of the L-5sused by the AGF during WWII,however, were not received untillate 1944 and early 194513

Organic Army Aviation beganits third year with the 6 June 1944major assault against the Germanforces in France.Combat: The Europeanand Pacific Theaters ofOperationsDuring the Normandy invasion,some L-4s were dismantled andshipped across the English Channel to Normandy on LSTs (landingship, tanks); others were flownacross with auxiliary fuel tanks inthe rear seats.14

Major (MAJ) J. Elmore Swenson flew his L-4 across the channelon D Day and conducted one of thefirst fire missions on OmahaBeach.1S He subsequentlypioneered in attaching rifles to thelift struts of the L-4. Other innovative Army pilots successfullylaunched rockets from theirplanes.16

As the Allied Armies movedacross France and Germany, organic Army Aviation continued toperform the various missions conducted in North Africa and Italy aswell as several new ones. In northern Europe, L-4s also were used to

18

direct tank columns and supplytrains, to deliver blood plasma andmedical supplies, and to rescuedowned fighter and bomber pilots.

On Christmas Eve of 1944,during the Battle of the Bulge,Lieutenant (L T) Kenneth B.Schley, a 28th Infantry Divisionobservation pilot, flew a supply ofpenicillin to the besieged garrisonat Bastogne. On some occasions,observation planes were equippedwith skis so as to be able to landand take of f in deep snow. 17

The "Horsefly" technique wasmuch more widely used in theEuropean Theater than in Italy.The L-4 did not have adequaterange and speed for this mission,but after mid-1944, the AGF hadenough L-5s to perform it on aregular basis. These aircraft, withAG F observers, were used inHorsefly missions principally byunits of the XII and XIX TacticalAir Commands in cooperationrespectively with the Seventh andThird Armies.

The Brodie DeviceL-4s successfully landedand took off by means of 300feet of cabel stretched frombooms on LSTs and cargo ships(illustration at right).

This cooperative effort wasstudied by a mixed AAF-AGFboard in late 1945. Representativesof the two commands came up withopposing recommendations for future close air support (CAS), aswas the case with so many otherissues involving organic aviation.Ground forces analysts favoredthe expanded use of light aircraftwith ground forces observers,while air forces analysts favoredthe use of AAF aircraft to leadfighter-bombers on Horsefly mis-. 18Slons.

The AGF concern for ensuringproper and adequate CAS by beinginvolved in it would continue toinfluence relations between theArmy and the Air Force for years.

In the island-by-island waragainst the Japanese in the Pacific,organic Army Aviation performedessentially the same missions as inother theaters. Adjustment of navalbombardment and bombing theenemy with hand grenades wereapparently more common in the



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Pacific than elsewhere. In thePacific, as in North Africa andEurope, Army observation pilotscaptured enemy prisoners on a few. 19occasIOns.In the Pacific campaigns, L-4shad to be disassembled andtransported by sea; they then tookoff from the decks of LSTs andother type ships and flew to theislands being invaded to adjust fireand perform other missions. Whencarriers were not involved in aninvasion force, the L-4s usuallyhad to land on the beaches. In someinstances, wooden floats were attached to L-4s so they could landand take off from water.20

It became possible for the L-4sto return to an LST after thedevelopment and deployment of arig called the "Brodie Device"-

named for its inventor, L T JamesH. Brodie. L T Brodie obtained a$10,000 appropriation in 1943 todevelop a portable rig for landingand launching small planes in atightly confined space.He built a device consisting ofcables stretched between masts,which could bring a small planeequipped with a specially designedhook to a slow stop. The planecould then take off from the cable,or it could be lowered to the groundor a deck for refueling or otherpurposes and then raised again fortake off. LTG McNair witnessed ademonstration of the device inFebruary 1944 and ordered it betested for Field Artillery observation planes. One of the rigs wasinstalled on an LST and was usedeffectively by the 77th Infantry


Division during the invasion ofOk ' 21Inawa.The missions performed by organic Army Aviation in the U.S.Third Army during the latter partof the war in Europe representthose conducted throughoutWWII. A total of 22,972 hourswere flown for fire adjustment;26,260 hours for reconnaissance;and 19,034 hours for administrative and patrol purposes between 1August 1944 and 8 May 1945.The artillery observation planesin the Third Army were used forspecific purposes: courier services; transportation of personnel;liaison between units; aerial terrainstudies; photography; tracking services for friendly antiaircraft artillery; and control of moving motorunits. Other specific purposes were

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20

for locating friendly units, intel-ligence information, Horsefly ac-tivities, command and staff recon-naissance, column control, radiorelay, wire laying, emergencyresupply, evacuation, andcamouflage checks.22

The AGF observation planeswere used for many purposes otherthan artillery fire adjustmentthroughout WWII. Although thiswas true, ground commanderswere generally unable to acquireaircraft properly equipped for themissions until near the end of thewar. The two reasons for this prob-lem were as follows: the AAF con-trolled the procurement and issueof aircraft and aviation equipment;and air forces leaders strongly op-posed providing the AGF withplanes equipped to compete suc-cessfully with the AAF in the per-formance of liaison missions.Ground forces leaders, on theother hand, were reluctant to pressfor higher performance planes orfor recognition of many of the mis-sions being performed by organicaviation. They feared raising such

Pacific TheaterTOP: Unloading an L-4 from an LST in NewGuinea.ABOVE: An L-5 from the 5th Liaison Squadronflying over Burma.LEFT: L-4s at Sandburg Field in the NewHebrides.



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issues would lead to the disestablishment of organic Army Aviation.AGF Organic AviationThe War Department G3responded to the overwhelmingevidence from the field that largerand better equipped aircraft wererequired by the AGF. In May 1944,the Department ordered the AGFto initiate procedures to procure aplane better suited to its purposesthan the L-4. This was a period ofthe search fo r and testing ofvarious planes to replace the L-4.During this period, the long-standing AAF position that AGF planesbe used only for artillery fire adjustment suddenly changed.

In a declaration of long-termpolicy, dated 10 October 1944, thedeputy commander of the AAFsubscribed to the principle of organic aviation. Not only did he dothis, but he also observed that thenew plane being selected by theAGF would possess capabilitiesfar beyond those required for artillery fire adjustment. Furthermore,he observed, the AGF should "beencouraged to make maximumuse" of those capabilities.23

The AG F selected the PiperCorporation's L-14 as its newstandard Field Artillery liaisonplane. This versatile aircraft wasnot produced in significant numbers before the war ended. Theground forces acquired only fivebefore the contract was terminated.Consequently, L-5s as well as L-4swere used as ground forces replacement aircraft from late 1944unti I the end of the war.24

Reversal of the AAF pol icy onmultiple missions and the acquisition of higher performance aircraftfor organic aviation encouragedthe AGF to attempt to expand thetheoretical role of organic aviation.This policy change would make

the theoretical role more closelycorrespond to the de facto role.

The first efforts were modestand solidly based on requests fromtheater commanders. On 5 January1945, the AGF requested the assignment of L-5 liaison planes tocavalry reconnaissance squadrons.This would mean two additionalplanes would be assigned to armored divisions so as to improvetheir reconnaissance capabilities.

The War Department G-3promptly rejected this request,however, because of the shortageof L-5s and the need to conductfurther study of the performance ofAAF high-performance tacticalreconnaissance aircraft in ground. . . 25reconnaIssance mIssIOns.To comply with the WarDepartment's recommendation forfurther study of the air forces' useof it s tactical reconnaissanceaircraft, the AAF sent two ob-

COLWilliam W. Ford establishedthe Flight Training School anddeveloped its courses at Fort Sill,OK, from 1942 to 1944. The success of these graduating "LiaisonPilots" in World War II, a directoutcome of COL Ford's vision,paved the way for later development of Army Aviation as we knowit today. COL Ford was inducted inthe Army Aviation Hall of Fame in1975.

CPT John W. Oswalt stands with the L-5 Stinson that he used for"Horsefly" missions, later called forward air control missions. CPT Oswalt,who later became a colonel, flew these missions north of Rome, Italy, in1944. He was inducted into the Army Aviation Hall of Fame in 1976 forthe period 1942-1949. COL Oswalt, one of the first L-Pilots sent to a WWIIcombat zone, landed in Morocco with General Patton's Western TaskForce in 1942 (notice his cap tilted "tanker-style").u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1992 21


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theater commanders and amass of testimony fromthe front regarding theneed for these aircraft.27

In spite of the earlier indication that such organicaviation missions mightbe acceptable, the newdeputy commander of theAAF, LTG Ira C. Eaker,renewed the claim air forces liaison squadronsshould perform all liaisonmissions except for FieldArtillery.28

An L-4 is temporarily grounded by a floodin Rambervillers, France, in 1944.

The new commander ofthe AGF, GEN Jacob L.Devers, strongly supported the proposal to expand organic aviation, asdid also the chief of staff

servers to Europe and othertheaters in early 1945. These twoobservers were Colonel (COL)John C. Bennet, a former WWIpursuit pilot, an d LieutenantColonel Robert R. Williams, whoserved in both AGF and the AAFduring WWII.

They recognized and reportedthat the enlisted AAF liaison pilotslacked sufficient knowledge aboutthe requirements of the AGF toperform their assigned missionsadequately.26 Their reports wereforwarded to AGF headquarters inApril. These reports coincidedwith the ground forces' point ofview in every respect. The AGFused them to justify their new request for the expansion of organicaviation.

of the Army, GEN George C. Marshall.29 In a memorandum to thecommanding general of the AAF,GEN Marshall observed he hadstudied the matter and stronglysuggested the AAF "go along withthis wholeheartedly and not reluctantly.,,30

GEN Devers then met with thedeputy commander of the AAF.They emerged from the meeting

with an agreement for an evengreater expansion of organic aviation than originally requested.

In the agreement approved bythe War Department on 9 August1945, six (instead of five) lightplanes were to be assigned to eachinfantry, airborne, and mountaindivision; nine to each armoreddivision; seven to each cavalrydivision; two to each cavalrysquadron and separate tank battalion; one to each separate engineer battalion; and two to eachcavalry group and tank destroyergroup. Since more appropriateaircraft had not been produced, the31planes were to be L-4s and L-5s.

The war came to an end on 14August 1945, a few days after theexpansion of organic Army Aviation was authorized. In the meantime, the AGF had proceeded togather evidence from the field tosupport requests for the extensionof organic aviation to includeground reconnaissance as well asother uses which had been andcould be made of light planes.

Convincing evidence was collected and tests were conductedsupporting the use of L-5s for

Accordingly in May 1945, theacting commanding general of theground forces proposed that fivelight planes be provided to eachinfantry, airborne, armored, cavalry, and mountain division; he alsoproposed two planes be provided toeach cavalry reconnaissancesquadron. The request was accompanied by endorsements from The L-4 uses a German Autobahn for an airstrip in 1945.22 u.s. Army Aviation Digest July/August 1992


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Corporal Beahan, the first WAC instructor in the Department of AirTraining's Maintenance Divis ion, explains carburetors to a class ofstudents.close-in bombing and reconnaissance at night; as a moving platform for rocket launchers and forthe new recoilless gun; and fordropping supplies and evacuatingwounded. The war ended beforethe results of most of these studiesand tests could be reviewed adequately or implemented in a sys-. f h' 32tematlc as Ion.

The maximum number of organic Army aircraft in serviceduring WWII is not easy to determine. Statistical records on equipment during the war were less complete than during later periods, andmany of the records collected hadsubsequently been lost. Accordingto a widely cited study by a U.S.Air Force historian, 750 air observation post sections had been activated by the end of January 1944;about "1,600 suitable liaisonaircraft were available."

was intended to replace those lostthrough attrition. For most of 1945and the early part of 1946, about175 aircraft per month (with theratio of six L-4s to one L-5) wereacquired by the AGF.33

I f the attrition rate averagedabout 100 per month during 1945and declined significantly during

early 1946, the maximum numberof organic Army aircraft may haveapproached 3,000. Of this number,as many as 300 were probably L-5s. The estimated total of about3,000 is supported by the artilleryair operations reports of the armiesoperating in Europe in 1945.These reports enabled TheGeneral Board, U.S. Forces,European Theater, to report "approximately 1,380 Field Artilleryaircraft were operating in theEuropean Theater as of 1 May1945.,,34

Also, according to Andrew TenEyck, writing in 1946, "organicField Artillery air observation . . .[came to have] more than 3,000assorted Piper L-4s and Stinson L-5s in 1945.,,35

In early 1946, through disposition of aircraft by the SurplusProperty Board and otherwise, thenumber of aircraft in the inventoryof organic Army Aviation rapidlydeclined. The inventory apparentlyfell below 300 before the Armybegan purchasing L-16s and L-17 sin late 1947.36

Army Aviation Training,1943-1945COL William W. Ford con-tinued as director of the Depart-

During the following year, theacquisition of 100 aircraft per year L-4s line up at Fort Sill, OK.u.s.Army Aviation Digest July/August 1992 23


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The Brodie device connects anL-5 used for aerial observationto a ship in the Pacific.ment of Air Training at Fort Sill,OK, until January 1944, when hewas given a field command. MAJWolf was executive officer untilCOL Ford's departure, when, withthe rank of lieutenant colonel, heb d 37ecame lfector.

Private contractors under theauspices of the AAF continued toconduct primary fl ight training forAGF pilots. However, this trainingwas discontinued at Denton, TX, inNovember 1943 and conductedonly at Pittsburg, KS, until the endof 1944.

The AAF then terminated itscontracts with the civilian flyingschools. Beginning in January1945, the AAF used its instructorsto conduct primary flight trainingfor AGF pilots at Sheppard Field,TX.38

Relations between the AAF andAGF concerning the training ofground forces personnel were lessstormy between 1943 and 1945than before or what occurred later.

From mid-1942 through 1945,flight classes generally beganevery 2 weeks; the class size usually ranged from around 20 to 40students-depending on the needfor pilots at a particular time. Theprimary phase of the training lasted

24

from 11 to 14 weeks, and the advanced phase, conducted by theAGF at Fort Sill, from 5 to 14weeks.

The length of the courses had tobe shortened from time to time because of serious shortages oftrained pilots at the front. According to one respectable study, 2,630pilots and 2,252 mechanics hadbeen trained by the end of WWII.39

There were two significant additions to the training conducted atFort Sill during the latter part of thewar. First, seaplane training wasinaugurated for pilots andmechanics in April 1944. Second,the Department of Air Trainingbegan conducting training on theuse of the Brodie device in Octoberof that year.40

On 7 December 1945, theDepartment of Air Training of theField Artillery School was redesignated as the AGF's Air TrainingSchool. The commandant of theField Artillery School, MajorGeneral Louis E. Hibbs, wasnamed commandant of the newtraining school. COL William W.Ford was named assistant commandant for air training. The AAFcontinued to provide the primaryflight training at Sheppard Fielduntil May 1946.

During the course of WWII, organic Army Aviation gained theacceptance and acclaim of almostall AGF leaders. From 1943 untilthe end of the war, field commanders incessantly requestedmore organic aircraft. Even theAAF came to accept the validity ofthe fundamental concept of organic aviation.

In the last major wartime air forces attempt to takeover in January1944, for example, GEN Arnoldproposed to leave the liaisonaircraft under the field control ofthe ground forces units to whichthey were assigned, while establishing AAF ownership of planesand personnel.

The very survival of organicArmy Aviation, throughout thewar and the subsequent period ofdemobilization, was itself a significant achievement, as well as atribute to the WWII era pioneers.This was especially true in the faceof the initial skepticism of manyground leaders and the determinedopposition of the AAF.

The successes of these pioneerson the battlefield, on planningboards, and in the Pentagon ensured Army Aviation would live onand be afforded more opportunitiesto prove itself. 0

An L-4 on floats conducts sea plane training in 1944.



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Endnotes1. Part I of this study, covering 1940 to 1943 , was published inU.S. Army Aviation Digest, May-June 1992.2. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the AirGround Battle Team, Including Organic Light Aviation (StudyNo 35, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948), pp. 64-65.3. MG Ray E. Porter, assistant chief of staff , G-3, for deputychief of staff, Memo WDGCT 452.1 , 7 February 1944, subj:liaison aircraft in AGF, copy in Aviation Branch Command Historian Office (ABCHO).4. Ken Wakefield and Wesley Kyle , The Fighting Grasshoppers: U.S. Liaison Aircraft Operations in Europe, 1942-1945(Leicester, England: Midland Counties Publications, c. 1990) , pp.45 and 75, passim; Richard Tierney and Fred Montgomery, TheArmy A vlatlon Story (Northport, AL , c. 1963), p. 224.5. CWO Delmont Scott (ret) , who served as an aircraft mechanicin 4th Depot Army Unit during WWII , reported to the author thatthe AGF were using two L-5s in North Africa in 1943 (interview,Enterprise, AL, 5 June 1992), ABCHO.6. GEN H. H. Arnold for CSofA, memo, 29 January 1944, subj :liaison aircraft in AGF, ABCHO ; Greenfield, loc. cit.7. BG I. H. Edwards for commanding generals of AAF and AGF ,Memo, WDGCT 320.2 (2-5-42), 6 June 1942, subj: organic airobservation fo r Field Artillery, ABCHO.8. Greenfield, op. cit., p. 60; Robert F. Futrell, "Control of Observation Aviation: A Study of Tact ical Air Power," (unpublishedmanuscript , U.S. Air Force Historical Study No. 24, Air University) pp . 49, 65-67, passim; transcript of interview with LTGRobert R. Williams (ret) by COL Ralph J . Powell and LTC PhilipE. Courts (Carlisle Barracks, PA , 1978), pp. 7 and 9.9. The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater,"Liaison Aircraft with Ground Force Units ," (unpublished study,1945), ABCHO; Andrew Ten Eyck, Jeeps in the Sky: The Storyof the Light Plane (New York: Commonwealth Books, Inc.,1946), pp. 63-64. Reports stated some AAF liaison flights weresent to China-Burma-India Theater in 1943, but these wereprobably some previously authorized AAF observationsquadrons already organized and deployed.1o. LTG Lesley J. McNair for CSofA, memo, 16 February 1944,subj : liaison aircraft in AGF, ABCHO.11. Porter, op. cit. , 28 March 1944.12. Greenfield , op. cit. , pp. 66-67.13. Wakefield and Kyle, loc. cit.14. Ten Eyck, op. cit. , p. 44. According to Ten Eyck, about 1,000L-4s were flown across the channel with auxiliary fuel tanksduring the invasion.15. Wakefield and Kyle , op. cit. , pp . 65-71 ; Tierney andMontgomery, op. cit. , pp. 153-54.16. COL Delbert Bristol (ret) , transcript of interview conducted byCOL Ralph J. Powell and Ronald K. Anderson , 1978, p. 12;Greenfield, op. cit. , pp. 101-02.17. Ten Eyck, op. cit. , pp. 49-50, passim ; Wakefield and Kyle,op. cit. , pp. 77-98.18. General Board, op. cit. , pp. 14-22.19. Ten Eyck, op. cit. , pp. 47-53, passim ; Devon Francis, Mr.Piper and His Cubs (Ames, IA : Iowa State University Press,1973), pp. 111-15; Tierney and Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 157-64,167-73; Herbert P. LePore, "Eyes in the Sky: A History of Liaison


Aircraft and Their Use in World War II ," Army History, No. 17(Winter 1990-91), pp. 35-37.20. Ten Eyck, op. cit. , pp. 44, 59-60.21. "Brodie System ," a USAAVNC Technical Library boundmanuscript with copies of documents about developing, testing ,and using the Brodie device, authorship unknown.22. General Board, op. cit. , pp. 3-4.23. Greenfield, op. cit., p. 106. No entirely satisfactory explanation could be found for this about-face on the part of the AAF.One suggestion is the deputy commander , LTG Barney Giles,was expressing his opinion and not that of GEN Arnold. Whilethis theory may have an element of truth , it also seems probablethe AAF's posit ion in October 1944 was partly influenced by overriding concern to most air forces leaders- the separation of theAAF from the Army. A more conciliatory position on the role andmission of organic Army Aviation may well have been perceived ,at that particular time , as a means of achieving this AAF goal.24. Ibid. , pp. 104-08; Tierney and Montgomery, op. cit. , pp. 225and 238.25. Greenfield , op. cit. , pp. 109-110.26. Ibid., p. 110; Note from LTG Williams to Dr. John Kitchens,April 1992, "Williams File," ABCHO. Headquarters, Tactical AirCommand, "Study of Liaison Aircraft Activities" (unpublishedmanuscript , 19 March 1948), pp. 4-5, ABCHO.27. MG J. G. Christiansen , Memo 353/140 (FA Air Obsn) (S) 24May 1945) GNGCT-15, for CSofA, subj: liaison type aircraft ,ABCHO; General Board, op. cit., p. 6.28. LTG Ira C. Eaker, Comment No. 2, OF WDGCT 452.1 to G-3, op. cit. , 27 June 1945; Greenfield, op. cit., p. 112.29. LTG McNair was killed by American bombs dropped short ofthe line while he observed the battlefield in France, July 1944.30. "Williams Interview," op. cit. , pp. 26-27; MG I. H. Edwardsand MG C. C. Chauncey, Memo WDGCT 452.1 , op. cit. , 12 July1945.31 . Greenf ield , op. cit. , p. 113; Tierney and Montgomery, op. cit. ,p. 77.32. Greenfield, op. cit. , pp. 111 -12.33 . R. Earl McClendon, Army Aviation, 1947-1953: Ai r University Documentary Research Study (Maxwell Air Force Base,AL: Air University, 1954) , p. 5; Greenfield, op. cit. , p. 108.34. General Board, op. cit. , p. 1.35. Andrew Ten Eyck, op. cit. , p. 60.36 . McClendon, op. cit. , p. 2. McClendon'S estimate is too low of"something less than 200 individual aircraft" during NationalSecurity Act of 1947; MG E. E. Partridge to CG , Air University, 5January 1948, subj : liaison aircraft, ABCHO; "Inventory of Armyand National Guard Aircraft," Office of Chief of Transportation, 1April 1958, ABCHO.37. COL Ford, Wagon Soldier, pp. 127-27; Biographical sketchof COL Wolfe , ABCHO.38. Tierney and Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 75-76.39. Tierney and Montgomery, op. cit. , pp. 76-78; Richard P.Weinert , Jr., A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962 (Ft. Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command , 1991), pp.9-10.40. Ibid., Weinert , p. 9; Tierney and Montgomery, op. cit., p. 76;COL Ford, op. cit., pp . 148-50.

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Capabilitiesand

ExpectationsCaptain Pete VozzoDirectorate of Combat Developments

U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

T he Cold War is over . . .no longer does the EastEuropean communistthreat exist. The United States is inthe process of demobilizing itsmilitary forces as does any victorwhen his ends have been attained.Besides demobilization, ourmilitary forces are being reducedbecause of Congressional budgetcuts. These cuts spell the loss ofmany of the capabilities themilitary services are used tohaving. With this loss in capability,the entire U.S. military estab-lishment needs a new vision thatcan mean a larger, more importantrole for Army Aviation.

The principal tools the UnitedStates used to fight the Cold War -technology and force readiness-gave us an edge we maintained forover 40 years. For this long period,the Cold War shaped principal U.S.military investments, costly but

necessary, as we prepared to fightmassive, European battles.

With communism now disappearing as a form of governmentworldwide, the threat of largescale battles is dissipating. It is notlikely, however, that this changewill eliminate the risk of war. It ismore likely that the hidden riskssuch as nationalism, religiousfanaticism, and minority conflictswill continue to appear as headlinenews.

Development of these less-familiar risks can easily createsecurity risks for the United Statesand its allies. In the past, expectations of carnage, which normallywould occur with massive battlesbetween two super powers, actedas a deterrent to war. With the endof the Cold War, however, thesimple, bipolar system of securitythat the world had become familiarwith died. Thankfully, no blood-

letting battles came about as aresult of the Cold War.

As military planners envisionedbattles, they would have takenplace primarily with forward-stationed equipment, ranging fromarmored battalions to tacticalnuclear weapons. Most of theequipment that would have beenused for the first set of battles wasalready pre-positioned in Europe.

The future battles our militaryforces face are obviously no longerthe same as they were only a fewshort years ago. Today the threat isspread around the world and, inmost cases, far less defined. TheUnited States must be ready to dealwith these threats anywhere in theworld on short notice. It is notfeasible to pre-position and maintain contingency forces andequipment over the face of theglobe.Further, the new threat is armedwith some of America's own latesttechnology. Through the worldwide proliferation of weapons ofall types and quantities, many ofour potential enemies are equippedequally as well as our closest allies;however, we do not know for surewho our enemies or our allies willbe in 5 years.This unknown threat is what wemust now measure: We must specialize our approach to deterrence.The future threat is potentially toodangerous for us simply to assumethat it will never do us harm. Indeed, the investments we maketoday will affect our warfightingability tomorrow.Force projection response to thethreat is not new to the Army. TheArmy has numerous weapon systems that give it the capability ofprojecting U.S. power for quick,decisive victories. Many of thesesystems are strategically deployable, operationally mobile, andtactically lethal.

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An excellent example of theArmy's integrated use of these systems for responsive forceprojection is Operation Just Cause.During this operation, U.S.military units, overnight, silentlymoved Infantry and Special Forcesunits thousands of miles for an assault against the country ofPanama.

More impressively, units alsomoved AH-64 Apache helicoptersinto position. The latter positioning enabled attack helicopters to bein combined arms action with theInfantry from start to finish.

The U.S. military cannot affordto be less responsive to the newthreat than it was to communistEurope. We must be able to rapidlydeploy a lethal and versatile forceat the strategic level: force projection.

The public's expectations ofU.S. military capabilities will notdiminish proportional to budgetcuts. Nor do we do want it said oneday that the military effectivenessof the United States peaked inFebruary 1991. We must look fornew, more efficient ways ofprojecting our military forceacross the globe. We must spreadour capability across the entiresmaller force that remains af ter themilitary drawdown.

Joint operations, using the bestof each military service, is one wayto effect synergy and be militarilysuccessful in the future withoutoverspending th e budget. TheDepartment of Defense (DOD)should emphasize the Army's tactical, operational, and strategiceffectiveness as a part of the jointservices with the use of attack,utility, cargo, and reconnaissancehelicopters.

time