Army Aviation Digest - Mar 1990

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UNITED STATES ARMY

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AVIATIONPROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

1-90-2 MARCH/APRIL 1990

1 Aviation Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,MG Rudolph Ostovich III2 Moral Disruption by Maneuver, CPT Kevin B. Smith11 Arctic JAAT, CPT Walter M. Golden Jr. and CPT ChrisLusk14 Avoiding the Zig-Zag Monster, CW3 Ron Toth18 A Cockpit We Can Live With, Mr. Kent F. Smith21 Views From Readers24 PEARL'S26 Aviation Medicine Report: Modular Medicine-HealthServices Support in the AirLand Battle, CPT James R. Boen28 Army Engineering Test Pilots, MAJ Thomas C. Wallace32 Seven and Growing, CPT T. Cowart34 AVSCOM: Focus on TASN-A, Mr. Tomas A. Berrio36 Aviation Logistics: Division Aviation Support Battalion, Mr.James Curtin40 All That We Could Be, Mr. Charles D. Rhodes46 DES Report to the Field: DES Evaluation Focus, CW4Mike Wheeler48 Aviat ion Personnel Notes: Aviat ion Career Incent ive Pay;

Army Aviation Engineering Test Pilot Program; WarrantOfficer Flight Training Program Information Booklet;Noncommissioned Officer Logistics Program

52 ATC Focus: Flight Data Input-Output System, MSG KeithA. Ellefson54 Flying Air Cavalry Missions in the Low-Intensity Conflict,CPT Allen L. Peterson62 Eaglestrike: A Korean/U.S. Combined Aviation ForceOperation, Mr. Rick Fulton65 USAASO Sez: Important Changes to FLIP Termina l, Mr.

Forrest H. HelfenbergerBack Cover: A Crash Recipe

COVER: Army Aviation has been andremains a relevant force of thecombined arms team. More than everour modernized doctrine, tactics,techniques and procedures make theAviation Branch an indispensablemember of the air and land forces.Cover depicts aerial and groundforces working in unison to meet thechallenges presented by the AirLandBattle. Illustration by SSG BobRosenburgh.

-"R.VI ~ " ' A T ' O I Ipage 32

Major General Rudolph Ostovlch IIICommander, US, Army AViation CenterPatricia S KitchellEditor

By order of the Secretary of the Army:Carl E, VuonoGeneral, U S. ArmyChief of StaffOffiCial.William J Meehan IIBrigadier General, U.S ArmyThe Adjutant General

The mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Digest professional bulletin (ISSN0004-2471) is to provide information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accident prevention, air traffic control, training and doctrine,maintenance, operations, research and development, aviation mediCine and otherrelated data. Information contained in this bulletin does not change or supersedeany information presented in other offiCial Army publications

Articles, photos and items of Interest on Army Aviation are inVited. Directcommunication is authorized by writing Editor, U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Box699, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5042, or by calling either AUTOVON 558-3178 orCommercial 205-255-3178. Manuscripts returned only upon request

The Digest is an official Department of the Army professional bulletin publishedbimonthly under the supervision of the commander, U.S. Army AViation Center.Views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Armynor the U.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwisespecified. Use of the masculine pronoun is intended to include both gendersunless otherwise stated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to theAviation Digest and to the author unless otherwise Indicated.

Second class postage paid at DaleVille, AL, and additional mailing offices.Active Army, Army National Guard and U S. Army Reserve units receive distribu

tion as outlined in DA Pamphlet 25-33. To complete DA Form 12-99-R, enter formnumber 12-05-E, block number 0014 and quantity. Also use DA Form 12-99-R for anychange in distribution requirements. Submit to your publications control officer.

Personal copies of the Digest can be ordered from the Superintendent ofDocuments, U.S Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Superintendent of Documents, U.S.Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.


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Major General Rudolph Ostovich IIIChief, Army Aviation Branch

A viation Doctrine, Tactics,Techniques and Procedures

A RMY A VIA TION remains a capable force tha t,by its very nature, is sufficiently versatile toaddress changing national security requirements.Our branch has been and will continue to be a keymember of our land forces. As a relevant and indispensable member of the combined arms team, there is a needto document our growth and include it in our publications that discuss our doctrine, tactics, techniques andprocedures.During the past 7 years, we have published severalmanuals that establish the doctrinal foundation forconducting a wide variety of aviation-related missions.Doctrine states the fundamental principles by which themilitary fights its forces. AirLand Battle doctrine (FM

1 0 0 - 5 ~ Operations) certifies our existing Army doctrineand describes how we intend to employ our militaryforces. Army Aviation applies the tenets of AirLandBattle doctrine in its capstone manual, FM 1-100, Doctri-nal Principles for Army A viation in Combat Operations.

Tactics are the means by which commanders translatecombat power into victory. They analyze mission, enemy, terra in, troops and time available (METT -T) todetermine which methods will accomplish the mission.Many Army Aviation manuals begin with doctrinalemployment information and then establish guidelinesand checklists to help commanders and planners makethe right tactical choices. Several current and futuremanuals follow this format: FM 1-111, A viation Bri-gades; FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Battalion; FM 1-114, Regimental A viation Squadron; FM 1-116, AirCavalry/Reconnaissance Troop; and FM 1-118, Com-mand A viation Battalion/Company.To select the appropriate technique, commanders mustfurther apply METT-T and emphasize their specificunits' combat capabilities, limitations and equipment.

The choice between a continuous attack as opposed to aphased attack is a technical one. The manuals previously

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

listed contain generic information and checklists to helpcommanders and planners select techniques. Other manuals give more technical information and guidance: FM1-101, A viation Battlefield Survivability; FM 1-102,Army A viation in an NBC Environment; FM 1-104,Forward Arming and Refueling Points; and FM 1-107,Air Combat Operations.The exact action performed during a target handoffbetween a scout and an attack aircraft is a procedure.Procedures further define the "how to do " process. Youwill find them in manuals and in tactical standingoperating procedures. All Army Aviation manuals areexpanding to include more procedures.This brings us to our new generation of literature. Wehave recently published white papers that combine doctrine, tactics and some techniques specific to an assignedmission. They include "Air Assault Security"; "Em-ployment of the Target Acquisition Reconnaissance Platoon/Company"; "Diving Fire for Attack HelicopterOperations During Low Intensity Conflict"; and "TheAH-64 and OH-58C Warfighting Tactics, Techniquesand Procedures." We are also developing new literatureto coincide with our changes in missions, equipment andforce structure. These include documents on the armedOH-58D Kiowa Warrior and Army Aviation in counterdrug operations.

As you can see, Army Aviation is growing. As ourbranch matures, we gain experience, integrate new technology and adapt to new situations. We update existingdocuments and create new ones. We realize the importance of up-to-date field publications that havethe practical touch of common sense and actual fieldexperience.When you have corrections or suggestions, please passthem to us. In turn, you can help us produce a betterproduct. Make changes or recommendations on DAForm 2028. To request information or make comments,write to the Commander, USAAVNC, ATZQ-CAT-DD,Ft. Rucker, AL 36362, or call AUTOVON 558-488213947. Our continuous growth will ensure that weremain a relevant force for the future. . . - - - -"

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MoralDisruptionby ManeuverCaptain Kevin B. SmithDirectorate of Combat DevelopmentsU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

Can the "moral" force described byColonel Ardant du Picq and GeneralKarl von Clausewitz be an operatingsystem?l Is the moral force a theoretical"black box" into which we can placemeasured input data and expect to gaina measured ''psychological/moral''response?

Few models contend with the known,but impossible to quantify, fact that a

U.S. combat teams in action-their mission: Attack the enemy from the rear, disrupt their communications,seize strategically important roads and bridges and cause as much disruption, havoc and confusion as possible.

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unit's true fighting power is a constantlychanging combination of both apsychological/moral force (a la' duPicq) and the purely mathematicalpossibilities of weapons effects. Yet,despite the lack of supporting hardnumbers, the moral force has alwaysbeen, and remains, one of the mostpowerful forces on the battlefield-ifnot the most powerful.

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST

To COVER THE entire impact of psychologi-calor morale factors on the fighting power of anarmy is virtually impossible. The field is much toobroad. This article is, instead, a brief survey thatsupports and defines the phenomenon of moraldisruption by maneuver. "Quoting the record"will, hopefully, keep us treading on the terra firmaof the historian instead of slipping into the theoret-ical quicksands of the psychologist.2 Regardless ofthe source, though, there is a legitimate need toknow how, when or where to maneuver and shootin order to generate confusion, panic and disrup-tion on the modern battlefield far beyond thephysical effects of our own weapons.Tactical Styles of Warfighting

In a broad sense, two pure tactical styles ofwarfighting are generally recognized-attrition andmaneuver. The attritionist measures victory ordefeat by relative casualties suffered. This style iseasy to simulate mathematically. Thus it drivesmany wargames by the application of such thingsas "Lanchester" equations.3 The maneuver style,on the other hand, measures victory by relativedisruption-prisoners of war (paWs), abandonedpositions and psychological impact. These particu-lar phenomena are seen as impossible to duplicatemathematically-so we don't.COL John Boyd observed that " ... We do nothave any models today that measure how youcapture prisoners. They are all Pk or body countmodels or expected values, which are nothing morethan an accumulation oj body count. So i f theycannot measure that phenomenon that generates

1. " Moral force" is the term used by both du Picq and Clausewitz to describethe courage, daring and combativeness of a body of troops . The use of theword moral, in this article, has nothing to do with the concept of "right" or" wrong" as measured by religious or ethical standards.

2. Richard Holmes, Acts Of War : The Behavior of Men in Battle (New York: TheFree Press, 1985), p. 15 .

3. Lanchester equations attempt to predict battle outcomes by comparingrelative strengths and resulting casualty rates .

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MoralDisruptionby Maneuver

prisoners .. (then) any model we have .. is attritionwarfare. , ,4The first problem, therefore, is to determinewhich tactical style corresponds the closest withreality. Unfortunately, we cannot arrange a debatebetween the "king of ORSA" and General vonManstein. 5 ,6 As an alternative, however, the ORSA

community recently revealed that "No matter howcasualties are measured, battles have been given upfor lost when casualties ranged from insignificantto overwhelming ... Just as for troop casualties, nodominant pattern emerges from a study of equipment losses .. the principle condition associated withdefeat appears to have been the use of maneuverby an enemy (64% of 80 cases studied-auth).,,7While realizing that the absolutely pure style israrely found, and that actual combat is always amixture of maneuver and firepower, the historicalfacts appear to support the maneuver style ofwarfighting.Impact of ManeuverWhat is it about maneuver that causes the defeatof a force? The impact of maneuver has more todo with the mental apprehension of what mighthappen next than with the facts of what is physically happening now. In practice, this involves twoparticularly important components of operationsunit orientation and lines of communication(LOC).

It is generally recognized that a combat unitneeds to point a majority of its weapons in thedirection of the enemy. An enemy unit on the flankmeans that the linear defender cannot bring amajority of its weapons to bear. The "what mighthappen next" question creates a nearly unbearablemental pressure to reposition or reorient (or run).Max Hastings noted that "An uncertain andunhappy .. infantry unit would be hustled into adefensive position.... The North Korean tankswould come forward until they met (the Amer-

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icans).... Then they halted to allow infantry toswarm past them, infiltrating the .. positions andworking around their flanks. The (defenders) thenwithdrew, often in undignified haste ... ,, g

Lines of CommunicationLOC are the delicate umbilicals from frontline torear area. Always important, they are even more sonow in mechanized armies that lack any greatcapacity to live off the land. "Every westernsoldier is linked somehow or another with hisrearward services; they bring him sustenance andcomforts which make his life bearable.,,9 The"what might happen next" question creates thereal fear that a soldier will be denied propermedical care or sufficient food-not to mention thepossibility of being captured, killed or tortured.

History is filled with countless examples of unitsfalling apart after their LOC were only briefly cut:" .. . he flimsiest rumor of the men in quiltedjackets being observed on a main supply routebehind the front was enough to spark fears ofencirclement, and often outright panic." 10Unit BehaviorNonlinear defense. On a nonlinear battlefield,however, there are examples of units who areorganized in an all-around defense. These unitsmay have been overwhelmed but, by definition,were impossible to outflank. In some of the successful cases, the LOC were kept open by airresupply. In other nonlinear cases, the unit mayhave realized that a severed LOC was an extremelytransient event that would resolve itself within anestimatable (and therefore tolerable) period. Aprevious quote by Hastings described units that,initially, were failing to hold a linear defense. Aftera year of nonlinear fighting, these same unitsfound that "The key to tactical success .. was tocreate all-around defensive perimeters, and notallow panic to set in when it was discovered, as itso frequently was, that the Communists had turneda unit's flank. ,,11

Linear defense. Therefore, a subtle, but ex-tremely significant, difference exists between linearand nonlinear unit behavior after the enemy hasflanked or turned it. I t may well be that units in alinear defense assume a sort of "unwritten mentalcontract." They will bring fire to bear to the front,and they expect the friendly units on each flank todo the same. An enemy on the flank or rear is

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obvious proof that someone has not kept up hispart of the bargain. S.L.A. Marshall commentedthat, if soldiers "see a default (in support) any-where, they feel this gives them a moral [ethical]excuse to default in their position." 12Sensitive unit boundary. We can draw dozens ofsimilar examples from the pages of history, but thepoint is made. It leaves us with the notion that acombat unit in a linear battle has a peculiarsensitive boundary around it. 13 I f an enemy approaches the unit from the front, this boundaryshould not be too sensitive since the enemy isusually expected from that direction. I f approachedfrom the flank, however, the unit is much moresensitive (usually) not only to the enemy, but to theactions of adjacent units as well.

At the La Fiere Bridgehead, Normandy, 9 June1944, "An infantry company commander gave anorder for a limited withdrawal. But he was with theleft flank platoon and the order didn't carry to hisright flank (platoon). He then began an orderly butrapid withdrawal of the left flank (which) remainedunder control and stopped at the line designated.The right flank, seeing the movement but notunderstanding .. promptly took to its heels. ,,14"Unit Moral Envelope"

Physical dimensions and size. The exact physicaldimensions of this boundary, the unit moral envelope (UME), cannot be fixed since the impact of ahost of variables will cause it to shrink or grow.The unit's morale and its physical state-the number of days without sleep, quality of the food,weather, results of recent battles, etc.-have asignificant impact, causing a unit to hold on longeror break and run sooner. Thus, the size of anindividual unit's UME fluctuates over time. Adjacent units holding the same position might havedifferent UME dimensions. Consider the case oftwo German divisions, side-by-side, receiving identical attacks on the Eastern front:

" .. . on our left was a division from the Moselleregion. The chief of staff was a good friend ofmine from staff school. In this division, as soon asa hundred Russians had appeared over the horizon,the first soldiers would already be fleeing. I askedmy friend, 'What in blazes is wrong over there?Our men can see i t-a hundred Russians doesn'tmean you have to run!' (He replied) 'I am indespair because I can't change it; my commander isequally desperate. These people simply won' t


hold-they have some kind of fright in theirbones.' ,,15Another case, during the Bulge, finds the flank

guard battalion of a German division coming intofleeting contact with the remnants of an Americaninfantry company. "LTG Herman Fritz Bayerlein... concludes that the heavy fire comes from Ameri-can forces entering the village. Certain that he hasbeen outflanked, he prepares to withdraw hiscenter and recommends to the corps commanderthat the attack on Bastogne be suspended until he

4. Colonel John R. Boyd, " Patterns of Conflict ," presented during USAFSeminar "WARP XII," 18 May 1978, p . 32 .

5. ORSA- Operations research and system analysis is a form of battleanalysis that concentrates mainly on pure weapons performance and lossrates-it is a tool to study the attrition style of war.

6. General Erich von Manstein is regarded by many to be the best maneuvercommander in the German Army of World War II.

7. Robert McQuie, "Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates as a Measure ofDefeat," Army Magazine, November 1987, p. 33 .

8. Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1987),p. 78 .

9. Major General F. W. von Mellinthin, Panzer Battles (New York: BallentineBooks, 1971), p. 363.

10. Hastings, p. 171 .

11 . Ibid., p. 171 .

12. S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in FutureWar (Gloucester, MA, Peter Smith, 1947), p. 191 .

13. The concept of a unit being sensitive about its flanks or rear is nothing new.I have chosen to refer to a combination of both flanks and rear as a"sensitive area," or UME, to facilitate a more difficult discussion later in thearticle.

14 . Marshall, pp. 146-147.

15. Lieutenant General Heinze Gaedke, translation of taped conversation byBattelle Columbus Laboratories, Columbus, OH, November 1979, pp. 32-33.

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can extricate his division from an impossibleposition. ,,16These two examples illuminate another key

idea-that the UME surrounds small units as wellas large, thus having impact on the tactical as wellas the operational level. An examination of Jackson's rout of Banks from Strasburg, the Egyptianpanic after the 1973 Israeli counterattack across theSuez Canal (to name two), or any of a hundredcounterattacks or counterstrokes on the Easternfront will confirm this idea. It is an idea as old asmankind itself-bad things happen when your enemy gets behind you.An incursion, or predicted incursion, of anenemy inside the UME (or the unexpected retreatof a friendly adjacent unit) will cause a unit to dosomething. What this unit will usually do is tomove away from the enemy and toward a moreThe unit moral envelope.

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secure location in an effort to restore its UME. Inmany cases the unit LOC is seen as the most securearea. A majority of disrupted units will tend tomove toward this area. In cases of severely disrupted units, " .. .the survivors usually clusteraround the field kitchen or baggage train to seekrefuge and solace." 17The figure below puts shape to the UME. Acompany-sized unit is depicted occupying a battleposition in a linear defense. To the flanks are itsadjacent units. Each unit has a sector of fire tocover. For the center company, a bell-shapedsensitive boundary starts immediately in front ofthe battle position. The boundary usually restsbetween the unit itself and the effective range of itsweapons since "To fight from a distance is instinc-tive in man. From the first day he has worked tothis end, and he continues to do so. It was thoughtthat with long range weapons close combat wouldreturn. On the contrary, troops keep getting furtheroff before its effects. ,,18 The envelope gets wider(more sensitive) at the flanks where the adjacentunits are required to defend. Finally, the envelopeextends rearward to include the company's LOCwith its parent unit.Creating Moral Disruption

As the flanked unit begins to move away fromthe enemy and toward the LOC, several unpleasantthings normally happen: a retrograde, a retreatunder pressure, panic-stricken flight or even surrender. For the attacker (or counterattacker), theacquisition of a position on the flanks or rear isonly the means to the end for which we arestriving-disruption of our opponent's morale. Theworst thing to do, it seems, is to stop or becomepassive upon reaching this positional advantage,and allow the opponent to retreat with somesemblance of order. One should continue just onemore step and push him. The reaction of theflanked unit will then correspond to its perceptionof the enemy (and what the enemy might do next).As we have seen, a unit could be so apprehensivethat the mere rumor of an enemy on the flank orrear was enough to send men into flight. Theenemy could have been a two-man detachmenttrying to surrender, but misperception throughrumor, poor reporting or visceral fear caused theenemy on the flank to enlarge exponentially.The probable root of this misperception is acombination of several factors. First, not only are

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the weapons of a linear defense oriented to thefront but also a considerable portion of the unit's"eyes" as well. Even with eyes to the front, a unitmay still have a hard time defining the size of itsenemy. As S.L.A. Marshall puts it- "The natureof the terrain over which maneuver forces proceedtoward engagement, the nature of protection, andthe physical reaction to hostile fire all determinethat (opposing) forces .. .remain largely invisible ... . " 19 I f one cannot identify the size of anenemy to the front, one surely cannot do it whenthe enemy is on the flank.Second, the first reports of an unexpected andmobile enemy to the flanks and rear have a verypoor "signal to noise ratio." The unit commandermust correctly sort through what is accurate andwhat is not if he is to avoid a " .. .potential grosserror in 'reading' the battle. , , 20 This causes acommand and control "lock up" for a finiteperiod of time, which can have an extremelydetrimental effect on soldiers' desperately waitingfor someone to decide (and then tell them) what todo. It often becomes impossible to distinguishbetween an enemy platoon and a brigade beforeone's men disintegrate into a mob.Understanding the UME, and the notion that itspenetration by an enemy will cause the unit to "dosomething, " our next step is to see how thepreviously mentioned misperception of the enemyhas to work its obtuse psychology on the minds ofonly one or two soldiers to cause a wholesalepanic:" .. .it can be laid down as a rule that nothing ismore likely to collapse a line ... n combat than thesight of a few of its number in full and unexplained flight to the rear. Precipitate motion in thewrong direction is an open invitation to disaster.That was how each of . .seven incidents got itsstart. One or two men made a sudden run to therear which others in the vicinity did not understand. For in every case the testimony of allwitnesses clearly developed the fact that those whostarted (to) run ...started the panic. , ,2 1

We now, finally and completely, depart theattritionist's world of force ratio calculations. Littleeffort is needed to conclude that the result of abattle depends on the fearful imagination of theindividual soldier under fire. Precisely at this point,the attacker must push the defender-just enoughto cause the first soldiers to break and run.Magnify the misperception, or in the words of du


Picq: " .. .i f I can frighten them, they will runaway. I can shoot them and bayonet in the back.Let us make a try at it. , ,22 Make noise-makesmoke. Bluff him. Strive to appear many timeslarger than the strength with which you arrived.Push him with that final ounce of synchronizationthat brings in that last bit of artillery as youappear.Now is the time to jam the enemy's commandnet-lock up his command and control for thosefew critical moments when his soldiers need controlthe most. "Make the enemy believe that support islacking; . .. cut off; flank, turn, in a thousand waysmake his men believe themselves isolated.... Theinstinct of self-preservation which at the last moment dominates them utterly is not opposed bydiscipline. , , 23 The intent is not to kill, but to" .. .shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bringabout adversary collapse by generating confusion,disorder, panic and chaos. , ,24

This is the essence of maneuver. It is not a newidea.Generating a MobInstead of merely forcing the flanked unit tomove away in good order toward his LOC, maneuver into an enemy's UME has the excellent poten-

16. Marshall, p. 92.

17. von Mellinthin , p. 353.

18. Colonel Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle (asrepublished in Roots of Strategy, Book 2, Harrisburg , PA: Stackpole Books,198?), p. 138.

19. Marshall , p. 89.

20. Edward N. Luttwak, " The Operational Level of War ," International Security ,Winter 1980, p. 76.

21 . Marshall, pp. 145-146.

22. du Picq, p. 172.

23. Ibid ., p. 147.

24. Boyd, p. 35.

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tial for generating a panic-stricken mob in flight.This idea of generating, and then "pushing," amob must be addressed, since it represents theculmination of the maneuverist's art.

Mobs, or crowds, " . ..are implicit in armies.Inside every army is a crowd struggling to get out,and the strongest fear with which every commanderlives-stronger than his fear of defeat or even ofmutiny-is that of his army reverting to a crowdthrough some error of his making ..."25 The truthis that mobs have often formed in every army inhistory-even recent history, and even in the American Army.The Flight Crowd

The maneuverist does not seek to generate justany crowd or mob in general, but the "flightcrowd" in particular:

"The flight crowd is created by a threat. Everyone flees; everyone is drawn along. The dangerwhich threatens is the same for all .. they feel thesame excitement, and the excitement of someincreases the energy of others .. so long as theykeep together they feel that the danger is distributed ... No one is going to assume that he, out ofso many, will be the victim and, since the solemovement of the whole flight is towards salvation,each is convinced that he personally will attain it.Everyone who falls by the wqy acts as a spur to theothers. Fate has overtaken him and exempted them... the natural end of the flight is the attainment ofthe goal; once the crowd is in safety it dissolves. ,,26"Safety" to a flight crowd has meant differentthings at different times. In the 18oos, safety wasprobably sensed as the line of sight Qr direct firewas broken. In Korea, shattered defenders oftenmoved until they could no longer hear the sound ofmachinegun fire. It follows, then, that to achievethe complete "moral" disintegration of the enemy,one must not only generate the initial panic-butalso have some facility remaining for the pursuit,

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which prevents the flight crowd from reaching andthen "dissoiving in safety," and reestablishing adefense. Again, the concept of the UME rearsits wobbly head since the pursuer must violatethis safety boundary of the pursued to continuepushing.Effective Pursuit

Effective pursuit not only prevents the establishment of a new defense but also inflicts casualties(physical and mental) far beyond simple weaponseffects: " .. .it was during the flight of those whobroke that heavy casualties were inflicted, as thepursuers ran down their victims with a pitilessblood-lust that seems to overtake soldiers whenthey themselves are suddenly released from thedanger of death ... the vanquished who survived thisphysical experience, and the attendant 'paniqueterreur' as French professional soldiers would latercharacterize the emotional shock, were usuallyquite incapacitated from further action for a considerable time afterwards. ,, 27Attitude of the Flight Crowd

Personal accounts of pursued soldiers are understandably few in number but so graphic that theycannot help but convey the attitude of the "flightcrowd":

"Never before, despite my capacity for fear, hadI felt myself for so long in the grip of a terror soabsolute. Al l around us was the continuing threatof instant death. Yet I saw no one fall .. thecompany that night was in the grip of a sort ofcommunal terror, a hundred men running likerabbits.,,28"All day for nine hours we ran. It was thecontagion of bewilderment and fear and ignorance.

Rumor spread at every halt, no man had orders.Everyone had some theory and no plan beyond thefrantic desire to reach his unit.... In ourselves, wedid not know what to do. ,, 29The proponents of attrition would be hardpressed to explain how a handful of soldiers could

drive thousands of the enemy before them like somany cattle. Yet the evidence is there:"Up the Veronica Causeway toward the SanCosme gate to the city they raced . .driving thepanicky Mexicans ahead of them by sheer audacity.(The future Confederate General Daniel Harvey)Hill experienced what he called 'a sublime andexalted feeling ... chasing some five thousand men

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with little more than a dozen' . .for more than amile he and his men pursued alone.,,3oPursuit

Pursuit is the final component in this process ofdisruption by maneuver. I f force ratios mean littlein a maneuver contest, they have absolutely nomeaning in the pursuit. Pursuit, however, can be atwo-edged sword. Commanders often have madethe error of chasing a routed enemy too far. Therecomes, as with all things, a culminating point,however brief. Horses become "blown," tanks runou t of gas and men reach their limit of endurance.The pursuit must stop before the pursuer, himself,reaches this culmination point, or he will run therisk of becoming the pursued.

The charge of the Union Brigade against d'Erlon's corps at Waterloo is a classic case of pursuitgone way too far. d'Erlon's corps was routed, butthe Union Brigade continued to pursue for lessthan a kilometer across muddy fields until, exhausted, they found themselves directly in front ofthe French lines-and the canister rounds of thegrand battery.Summary

Moral disruption through maneuver is a processhaving much more to do with doubt, or fear, orcrowd psychology than with the effects of anyparticular weapon or arm. To summarize, theprocess usually flows through these steps:

An undisclosed movement to the flank or rearof an enemy.

The unexpected appearance of a poorly definedenemy within the UME. The application of force (or bluff) sufficient tocause the first soldiers to break and run. Artillery,smoke, jamming, multiple routes, or a rapid surge

of direct fires can help to make the attacker appearmany times larger.

The detection of the initial disintegration andthe quick "push" to cause a precipitous failure ofmorale local to the initial disruption.

The beginning of a pursuit that manages tocontinually violate the pursued unit's UME. The successful sustainment of the pursuit, orthe decision to end pursuit before the "culminating

point. "Having defined the chronological sequence of

events in a 'moral disruption by maneuver,' Ishould remind the reader that this is a process of


the human mind and, therefore, cannot carry theforce of a physical law.CaveatsFirst. "The unexpectedness oj an event accentu-ates it, be it pleasant or terrible. This is nowhereseen better than in war, where surprise terrorizeseven the strongest. ,,3) It is always necessary topossess some degree of surprise to disrupt bymaneuver. I f the maneuver into the flank or rearproceeds too slowly and is detected, the enemy hasthe opportunity to change unit orientation, thusreorienting the UME as well. Speed and relativesurprise go hand in hand.Second. The cases where units have broken andrun occur most frequently in new units or duringthe first battles of a war-green soldiers and greenleaders. Something in a combat unit's learningcurve makes it harder to disrupt over time.Third. During meeting engagements, two opposing units often may end up violating each other'sUMEs simultaneously. In these cases, the unit withthe weaker will (or larger UME) will usually breakfirst. This point is critical in any discussion of deepbattle. A unit that is striking across the forwardline of own troops32 must accept the fact that itsown UME will be violated continually an d steelitself to make the enemy break and run first.This "power of the stronger will,,33 was probably a key ingredient of countless German small-unit

25. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), p. 173.

26 . Elias Canetti , Crowds and Power (Gollancz, 1962).

27. John Keegan and Richard Holmes, Soldiers : A History of Men in Battle(London : Hamish Hamilton, 1985), p. 24.

28. Holmes, p. 226.

29. Keegan and Holmes, p. 42 .

30 . Hal Bridges, Lee's Maverick General (New York: McGraw-Hili Book Co.,Inc.), p. 21.

31 . Xenophon .

32 . FLOT forward line of own troops.

33. Also referred to as the " longer breath" by Lieutenant General LothanRendulic.

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counterattacks, especially on the Eastern Front.Although heavily outnumbered, recalls LTG vonMellinthin, "we always felt superior to them-wewere not afraid of them.,,34Small groups of well-trained, offensive-mindedsoldiers who possessed the "power of the strongerwill" could win battles merely by reputation:"Wherever Stuart rides he carries terror with

him. His victories are half won before he strikes ablow. Our soldiers feel that he may pounce uponthem at any minute .. Stuart wanted his men tobelieve in themselves; he wanted his enemies tobecome accustomed to defeat at his hands and getused to running from his horsemen. ,,35Fourth. Armies trained on linear tactics almostalways fare poorly against an enemy that usesbreakthrough or infiltration. Linear tactics, attrition through firepower and terrain-oriented missions are all terms that are guilty by association.Nonlinear tactics, moral disruption, and forceoriented missions are the palette of the "maneuverist. "Fifth. Disruptive maneuver into an enemy UMEcan generate outright passivity (as well as panic) . Inthese cases, the enemy prisoner count can exceedthe casualty count by whole orders of magnitude.The disruptive maneuver of Wehrmacht 'blitzkrieg'elements, slicing through Polish, Czech or FrenchUMEs, generated 2,000,000 prisoners and 300,000casualties (a ratio of about 7 to 1). Whole brigadessimply gave up. The excessive casualties of theeffectively pursued, and the masses in the POWcages, have absolutely nothing to do with theattritionist's Lanchester equations. Since maneuveris the predominant cause of a unit's defeat, wemust create some means of realistically duplicatingmaneuver's effects. Only then can we institutionalize the concept of 'morally disruptive' maneuver inour doctrine and training.Sixth. Many (if not most) military operationshover dangerously on the brink of disruptionwithout any enemy interference whatsoever:

10

" ...disruption has historically not been necessarilythe result of hostile threats or action alone ...dis-ruption within a military force can be created byactions-or inactions-of individuals or groupswithin that force, resulting from incompetence,oversight, misunderstanding, or even treachery. ,,36We do not have to scratch the surface of historydeeply to discover many, many examples of unitsthat have simply disrupted themselves. Disruptioncan be made to work for you-or you may be theunfortunate victim. It is a moral sword that mostcertainly cuts both ways.The notion of violating a UME through maneuver-and then disrupting the enemy's moraleapplies throughout the entire warfighting spectrum.We must keep in mind that it can happen to us aseasily as to the enemy. It can be used to helpunderstand the dynamics of defensive unit disintegration after forced or "soft spot" breakthroughs,or infiltration. Within FM 100-5, Operations, andits emphasis on the offensive-defense, the conceptof the UME can help guide the counterattacker tothe place where he can do the most harm to alarger enemy.ConclusionMoral disruption through maneuver is clearly arepetitive phenomenon, occurring in each war andwithin each army. It should, therefore, lend itselfto some model or theory; however, no usabletheory exists. It should be taught, in depth, tojunior officers of the combat arms. Yet, the younglieutenant today learns more of disruption ofmorale in one evening of television than he does inhis entire service schooling.Moral disruption through maneuver did not vanish with the fielding of the Ml tank or the AH-64Apache. It will remain a decisive element ofcombat until computers, which are void of emotion, replace man as the decision maker. f

34 . 80M Corporation, Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics:Implications for NATO Military Doctrine . Unpublished report for the Off ice ofthe Secretary of Defense, dated 19 December 1980, p. 16 .

35 . Emory M. Thomas, Bold Dragoon, The Life of J.E.B. Stuart (New York:Harper and Row, 1986), p. 172.

36. Historic Evaluation and Research Organization, Disruption in Combat.Unpublished Report for U.S. Air Force, dated 15 February 1970, p. 226.

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Captain Walter M. Golden Jr. and Captain Chris LuskHeadquarters, 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment

6th Infantry Division (Light)Fort Wainwright, AK

illustration by Paul Fretts

ARCTIC JAATVICTORY ON the modern battlefield will

be won by air and land forces fighting together. InAlaska (AK), frequent joint air attack team(JAAT) training facilitates this objective. JAATtraining provides the ground commander with ahighly mobile, extremely lethal, tank killing forcecapable of engaging enemy forces beyond the rangeof other antitank weapons. The 4th Squadron, 9thCavalry Regiment, 6th Infantry Division (Light),Ft. Wainwright, AK; and the 18th Tactical FighterSquadron, Eielson Air Force Base, AK, share aunique training relationship. Aided by 28 miles ofgeographic separation between units and largetraining areas unequalled in continental UnitedStates or much of the world, JAAT training is


conducted on a regular basis (see figure, page 12).Ground force commanders marshal Army and

Air Force assets and the following available mocktraining resources are used to destroy high-priority,lucrative targets: An airfield, tank and military vehicle bodies.

Plywood armor, air defense, and communication jamming equipment.Arctic considerations. The harsh arctic environ

ment can have an adverse impact on aviationoperations unless planned for in detail. It is common to conduct missions in temperatures around-20 degrees centigrade (C). At least once perseason, the thermometer will register -40 degrees C.

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ARMYUNIT ASSETS FUNCTION ORDNANCE/WEAPON DESCRIPTION4-9 Cavalry Squadron AH-1S Provide aerial firepower TOW missiles/2 .75-inch rockets; 40 mmgrenadesl7 .62 mm minigun

OH-58A Air mission commander None4-11 and 5-11 Field Artillery 105 mm howitzers Provide indirect firepower High explosive/variable time smoke , illumination

Ground located laser designator Provides aiming cue on heads Class IV laserup display for the A-10 aircraft

AIR FORCEUNIT ASSETS FUNCTION ORDNANCE/WEAPON DESCRIPTION18th Tactical Fighter Squadron A-10 Provides aerial firepower 30 mm Gatling gun with armor piercing incendiary

high explosive incendiary; MK-84 (2,000 poundgeneral purpose bomb) ; cluster bomb units withMK -20 Rockeye , shaped charge , or MK-58 , frag-mentation/incendiary AGM -65 Maverick missile withtelevision seeker or infrared seeker

343d Tactical Air Support Squadron OV-10 Forward air controller 2.75-inch rockets

JAAT participants in Alaska.

Factor in wind chill, and at times the name of thegame rapidly becomes survival. In extreme coldtemperatures, the following tips are helpful: It takes two to three times as long to do thesimplest of tasks.

Aircraft batteries should be kept in a warmarea when temperatures are below -20 degrees C.This prevents voltage drain and the resulting possibility of insufficient power for start or worse, a hotstart. Aircraft require 15 minutes or more to warmup. During this time, flight control movementmust be minimized and avionics should not bechannelized. Maintenance problems will increase dramatically. The stabilization control amplification systemon the AH-l Cobra and avionics across the board(but particularly the ANIARC-114 series field manuals) are adversely affected. Lubricant, arcticweight or break-free lubricants are required tosolve the M-28 turret system problems on themodernized AH-IS Cobra. Static electricity is intensified and results in therequirement to cold refuel below -18 degrees C.Forward arming and refueling point personnel must

12

heighten their safety awareness. Safety precautionsare required during rearming operations especiallywhen handling 2.75-inch rockets. Wind chill fromrotor wash, and the associated frost bite danger,mandate cold rearming.

Snow. Blowing-snow operations are conductedfrom October through April in Alaska. We havediscovered that ANIA VS-6 night vision gogglesintensify light so much that blowing snow causeswhite-out conditions. At these times, the landinglight or AN/PVS-5s are. better for these approaches. Another snow-related consideration isthat hovering AH 1 aircraft near snow cause asignificant signature that can be seen for severalkilometers. Depending on the situation, it maybe better to conduct running fire to reduce thesignature.

Ice fog. Ice fog occurs when cold air can't holdthe water vapor caused by aircraft exhaust andother sources. Compounded by a surface inversion,the cold air and accompanying fog stay from thesurface to about 200 feet above the ground. Ice fog

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causes instrument flight rules conditions and maygive attacking ground forces the advantage. Ice fogwas created with the aircraft during JAAT trainingand running fire was used to maintain visualcontact with the targets.Survival gear. Aircrews must wear arctic issueflight gear in the cockpit. Also mittens and muklucks must be worn in temperatures below -30degrees C in the OH-58 Kiowa and some AH-Ihelicopters. In addition, each crewmember mustcarry 35 pounds of individual survival gear. AH-Ipilots must depend on scouts for this equipmentwhen the aircraft are armed. A downed crew isalways in a survival situation in Alaska, whether it

is summer or winter.Training scenario. At least quarterly, more often

as ammunition allows, joint live fire exercises areconducted. These exercises reinforce and add realism to JAAT training. A typical scenario involvesan infantry battalion conducting a night offenseand day defense against a mechanized battalion orregimental sized threat. The ground commander isresponsible for overall coordination of the operation. The air mission commander (AMC) executesthe JAAT mission. Conditions include blowingsnow, extreme subzero temperatures and ruggedmountainous terrain. The standard is the synchronization of available artillery, attack helicopter andA-IO Warthog fires by the AMC.Mission execution. The mission is initiated withthe identification of the enemy armor or mechanized force. Once identified, the artillery with theTOW missile and/or 2.75-inch folding fin aerialrocket fire from attack helicopters, suppression ofenemy air defense (SEAD) is accomplished. TheAMC briefs the A-IO flight lead or airborneforward air controller on the following: Target location and description. Heading and distance from initial point totarget. Air defense artillery air threat and method ofsuppression. Position and activity of attack helicopters andartillery. Friendly locations. Restrictions such as the artillery gun targetline. Any additional information inbound callsrequire.


Immediately upon execution of the SEAD mission, the A-lOs are sequenced into the attack withimmediate reattacks. Doing this ensures that continuous pressure on the enemy is maintained.Attack helicopters cover the ingress and egress ofthe A-lOs with organic fires. Coupled with 105 mmartillery fire, which the aeroscouts adjust, theJAAT offers the ground commander a high volumeof lethal firepower. Firepower reinforces theground commander's defense, negates enemyattacks and supports his offensive scheme ofmaneuver.

Sustainment. Sustained operations require continuous pressure on the enemy. A-lOs and attackhelicopters departing the target area update inbound flights and teams through the AMC. TheAMC remains in the target area as long as possibleto facilitate target hand-over to inbound flights andteams. The JAAT operation is sustained as long asassets are available or until the mission is accomplished. The AMC then effects battle hand-over tothe ground commander.

Debriefing. At the completion of the exercise, adetailed debriefing is conducted with Army groundforces, artillery, aviation and the Air Force. Thescenario, sequence of events and target effects arediscussed and analyzed. Strengths and weaknessesof coordination and fire control are identified, andmethods of improvement are suggested. In the finalanalysis all players agree, whether preplanned orspontaneous, JAAT training offers practical, realistic and coordinated training for Army and AirForce players.

Future operations. JAAT operations in Alaskaare highly refined in the low- to mid-intensityopposing force (OPFOR) environment. Frequenttraining with Air Force elements has resulted in ourAMCs being trained in controlling all aspects ofthe fight. Also, AMCs are intimately familiar withthe A-IO pilots' language and their capabilities andlimitations. Currently, communications jammingon all frequencies and static tactical radar threatgenerators (TRTGs) are used for training. A mobilethreat array, mobile TRTGs and multiple integrated laser engagement systems will be used tocontinue improving tactics. Only with a realisticOPFOR will we really be able to measure ourabilities. JAAT in Alaska is alive and well and willonly get better in the future. Arctic light. --,=ll

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Computing heading and distance betweentwo sets of grid coordinates is easy when youapply the methods described by the author .

AVOIDING THE ZIGZAG AfONST

THE OTHER DAY, whileflying around area of operations Vanguard, something that one of my students didreally caught my attention. Thescenario was as follows: It waslate in the afternoon, near dark.We had been practicing terrainflight navigation using a 1 50,000map with an Australian fold. Inthe vicinity of landing zoneGlenda (EK 2395) I issued a mission change-' Climb to 800 feetand take me to Battens Crossroads, AL" (around EK 9457).For the next 20 minutes, Iwatched and listened as the student zigzagged us back to BattensCrossroads. We started of f on a170 heading and finally arrivedon a 080 heading.The reason we did not fly adirect route was because of thelimitations placed upon the student by the size of the map. Hehad no way of computing heading and distance between the twopoints because they were not onthe same map page. Then it oc-

14

curred to me that this was typicalof almost every Army aviator Ihad ever flown with no matterwhat the experience level.

For example, let us say thatyou are flying in support of ageneral officer and your missionis to visit several tactical operations centers (TOCs) today. Lastnight you had the coordinates ofeach TOC and planned your mission well. I f you have an Australian fold map, you probablyspent some time in flight operations in front of the big mapposted on the wall to get yourheadings and distances. I f youhave separate map sheets, youprobably laid them out on yourliving room floor, lining them upever so diligently. Then youfound the longest straightedgeyou could find to draw yourcourse lines and found yourdistances and headings for thismission.Now, during the execution ofthe mission, the general's aideapproaches your aircraft at the

first TOC and informs you thatthere was a night move last night.Then he hands you a piece ofpaper with the new coordinates towhich you will fly. The generalthen jumps on board and, unlessyou have Doppler or inertial navigation systems, you proceed tozigzag to the new coordinates. Inmy opinion, this gives an unprofessional appearance. Your passenger is not fooled. He knowsthat you are "swagging" yourcourse. Also, he soon learns thatyou swagged your estimated timeen route (ETE) when you arrive 5to 10 minutes earlier or later thanscheduled. Of course, you couldalways blame the winds. Right?Here is an easy way to compute,from the cockpit, the distanceand heading between two sets ofgrid coordinates. After you'vepracticed it a time or two, youwill be able to complete the figures in less than 1 minute. In thescenario I described earlier, youwanted to fly from EK 2395 toEK 9457. The first step is to draw

MARCH/APRIL 1990


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a course line. You should be ableto tell from the coordinates thatyour destination is somewhere tothe southeast of your position.Draw the course line accordingly,as in figure 1.Next, fill in the sides of animaginary right triangle as illustrated. After you have drawnyour right triangle, fill in thelength of each side by subtractingthe appropriate numbers in yourgrid coordinates. In this case, theeast/west difference between yourposition and Battens Crossroadsis 71 kilometers (km) (EK 23**and EK 94**). The north/southdifference is 38 km (EK **95 andEK **57). Now you can easilycompute the distance between ouraircraft and Battens Crossroadsby using a2 + b2 = c2 or 38(2) +71 (2 ) = 6,485. Push your scientific calculator's square root button and you find that the distanceis about 80.53 km. I f you aretravelling at about 90 knots (kt),you simply divide 80.53 by 2.78(the number of km travelled in 1


CW3 Ron TothCompany 0, 1-212th Aviation Regiment

U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

minute at 90 kt) to find our ETE.In this case, it will take us almostexactly 29 minutes.Next, you want to computeyour heading. Because side b runseast/west or 090 and 270, if youcompute how many degrees anglea has you can determine yourtrue heading by adding that angle

to 090. The formula to use is:side a/side b = tan angle a.It is simpler than it looks. Youtake side a (38 km), divide it byside b (71 km). The result is.5352112. Next, hit the "INV"

button on your calculator followed by the "tan" (tangent) but-

FIGURE 1: Use of grid coordinates to compute heading and distance.

~ 11.............. . 1 . . ! . f . m .. 01I01 . . . . 1 __~ ."9}. side b fA E To . a : ~ 3 8 kll1O ~ .,,- CD:1& 0'. Q):e ~ . e- :, , ~ :""e E--Battens

Crossroads

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AIfOID'NO THE ZIGZAG _ . T ~

ton. The result is angle a- in thiscase, about 28 degrees. Our heading from EK 2395 to EK 9457 is118 degrees true (090 degrees +28 degrees). Last, add or subtractyour magnetic variation and youare on your way!

I f you are passing between several grid zone identifiers, let's sayfrom grid EK to EL, it may beeasier to use latitude and longitude in your computations as described below. I used this methodin Europe on a daily basis, and itis a better method for the longerhaul.Here is another scenario-whatwould you do? You are waitingto pick up a civilian dignitary in

Wurzburg, Germany, and takehim and his party to Garmischfor the evening. Five minutes before takeoff one of the civilian'saides gives you a note that saysthey must get to Brussels, Belgium, as soon as possible. Two ofthe first questions in your mind,other than clearances, etc., mightbe, "What is the heading?" and"D o I have enough fuel to getthere?"

I f you have no way of findingthese answers from the cockpit,you may be forced to stop enroute somewhere that is not ex-actly on the way to ensure, inyour own mind, that you cancomplete the mission. I f this

FIGURE 2: Lati tude is an imaginary angle from the center of the earth.

earth

16

means cold refuel, it may meanan unnecessary delay for yourpassengers. You must have themeans to compute these thingsfrom the cockpit before youleave.

To use latitude and longitudeeffectively, you must know a littlebit about them. Let us say thatyou are starting a cross-countryflight from Lowe Army Heliport(AHP), AL. You can look in theinstrument flight rules supplementto find that Lowe is at 31 degrees, 21.4 minutes north latitude, and 85 degrees, 44.9minutes west longitude. Let meexplain what these coordinatesmean. First, both latitude andlongitude refer to angles measured at the center of the earth.For latitude, if I were standingat the center of the earth, and myleft arm, extended, were pointingat the equator, and my right armwere pointing to Lowe AHP, theangle measured at my torso between my arms would be 31 degrees, 21.4 minutes (figure 2).Keep in mind that 60 minutesmake up 1 degree. Therefore, if Iwere to move north of Loweexactly 38.6 minutes, I would beat 32 degrees north latitude("north" merely refers to whathemisphere you are in). The nicething about latitude is that nomatter where you are on earth, 1minute of latitude is equal to 1nautical mile (nm). So again, ifwe were to move exactly 38.6minutes north of Lowe, we would

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ANSWER RobinsAFB 3238.4'N= 8335.S'WI)

.....Q..CD: 77nm.:side b :oweAHP.3121.4'N8S044.S'W 129.4 minutes or 110nm

Figure 3: Use of latitude and longitude to compute heading and distance.

be exactly 38.6 nautical milesnorth of Lowe.Longitude is measured the

same way. I f I were at the centerof the earth, and my left arm,extended, were pointing to theprime meridian (not the equator),my right arm, extended, pointingto Lowe AHP, the angle formedbetween my arms at my torsowould be 85 degrees, 44.9 minutes. The distance between 1minute of longitude varies from 1nm at the equator, to zero at theNorth or South Pole.Now that we know more aboutlatitude and longitude, we canplan a cross-country flight. Let usplan on going from Lowe AH Pto Robins Air Force Base, GA.The coordinates for Robins are32 degrees, 38.4 minutes northlatitude, and 83 degrees, 35.5minutes west longitude. Weshould be able to see from look-


ing at the coordinates that Robinsis north and east of Lowe. Drawour course line as in figure 3.Again, fill in the sides of yourright triangle as shown, and postthe length of each side in minutes. That would be 32 degrees,38.4 minutes north, minus 31 degrees, 21.4 minutes north, whichwould equal 77 minutes. Also, 85degrees, 44.9 minutes west, minus83 degrees, 35.5 minutes westwould equal 129.4 minutes. Allwe are doing is taking the smallercoordinate from the larger coordinate, keeping in mind that 60minutes comprise 1 degree.Before we use the formulas forcomputing headings and distance,we must first convert 129.4 minutes of longitude to nauticalmiles. Again, the distance between minutes of longitude depends on your position on theearth. To do the conversion, you

take your minutes of longitudeand multiply them by the cosineof your line of latitude. Huh? I tis simple. Punch in 31 degrees,21.4 minutes to your calculator(31.214) and push the "cos" button. Then mUltiply that numberby 129.4. Your answer is 110.67nm. Now you may use the sameformulas mentioned at the beginning of the article to find yourdistance and heading.It all looks complicated at firstglance, but if you work throughit just twice, you will see howeasy it is. Whether you are usinggrid coordinates or latitude andlongitude, you can accuratelycompute headings and distancesbetween any two points from

your cockpit in less than 1minute. I t just takes the use of ascientific calculator (less than $15in most stores) and a little practice. ~

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A Cockpit We Can Live WithThis is the second in a series of articles on human factors considerations that

will appear in the Aviation Digest in 1990. The inflatable body and headrestraint system is yet another development in the man-machine interface of cockpit

design to further reduce aviator injuries.

SINCE THE introduction ofrotorcraft in the 1950s, the U.S.Army has made great strides inhelicopter crashworthiness. TheUH-60A Black Hawk and theAH-64 Apache have achieved unprecedented levels of crash safetythrough use of energy absorbinglanding gear, crushable fuselagestructure, crashworthy seats andmany other design features.These improved energy absorbers help to control peak loads anddissipate the huge amounts ofcrash energy involved. However,the energy absorbers do little toprevent movement of aviatorswithin their restraints. This movement is substantial in highenergy, survivable crashes andresults in secondary impacts toobjects within the cockpit thatmay be serious or fatal. The AH-64's optical relay tube (ORT),located in the forward cockpit,incorporates a load link designedto collapse the ORT at about 300pounds of load. In spite of this,injuries occur because of its closeproximity to the aviator's headand the impact loads involved inaccelerating the significant massof the ORT once contact is made.Statistically, about two-thirdsof the major and fatal cockpit

18

5POINT ROTARY BUCKLE(MILR58095)

NORMAL

FIGURE 1: Inflatable body and head restraint system.

injuries in survivable mishaps aredue to secondary impacts to thehead and upper torso.The Aviation Applied Technology Directorate (AATD), Ft.

Eustis, YA, a part of the U.S.Army Aviation Systems Command (A YSCOM), has conductedseveral research efforts to improve this situation for Army avi-

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FIGURE 2: The flailedposition of a humancadaver seated In aUH60A crewseat whensubjected to a severe,but survivable, crashImpact.

ators. The inflatable body andhead restraint system (lBAHRS)was codeveloped by the Armyand the Navy. This device is anairbag system sewn into a conven-


Mr. Kent F. SmithAerospace Engineer

Aviation Applied Technology DirectorateU.S. Army Aviation Research

and Technology Activity (AVSCOM)Fort Eustis, VA

FIGURE 3: A cyclic stick,designed to UH60Ageometric requirements,that will collapse whenstruck vertically In a crash.

tional five-point restraint andtriggered to inflate by a remotecrash acceleration sensor duringthe initial milliseconds of a severecrash (figure 1). This action in-

stantly removes any slack in therestraint, distributes the crashloads more evenly about the upper torso and greatly reduces thereactive distance of the head andupper torso (strike envelope). TheIBAHRS, now in engineering development, is scheduled for fielding in the AH-l Cobra fleetstarting September 1993.Apparently, the cyclic controlstick is a cockpit strike hazardthat has lethal potential. In fact,the Army's first female aviatorfatality was due to a cyclic stickstrike to the head in an otherwisesurvivable UH-l Huey mishap.Figure 2 shows the flailed position of a human cadaver seated ina UH-60A crewseat when subjected to a severe, but survivable,crash impact. The inertia reel waslocked before the test. The headposition confirms that, had a cyclic stick been present, a facialstrike would have been inevitable.AATD initiated a program to design and fabricate a cyclic stickassembly that collapses whenstruck vertically in a crash. Figure3 shows such a stick designed toUH-60A geometric requirements.The grip has a high-density foampad bonded on top to distributeloads. The base of the stick is a

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A Cockpit We Can Live With

dovetail assembly with needlebearings and a small -wire-benderenergy absorber. The stick beginsto yield under a lOO-pound vertical impact load and will separatefrom its base near the floor after2 inches of travel. Full-scale dynamic tests showed the designreduced dynamic impact loads by78 percent compared to the production UH-60A design, placing it into the nonlethal loadcategory.

Prototypes also offer a + /-2-inch grip height adjustment viaa cam/pin mechanism. This design will soon undergo flight evaluation by the Army and the Navyto determine pilot acceptance andlong-term durability.As the Army looks to the future, cockpits appear to be shrinking in size with more and moreequipment mounted on thehelmet because of various re

quirements; e.g., night vision,chemical or biological protection,and helmet sights. This loadingup of the helmet effectivelymakes the head a large pendulumcantilevering from the upperspine and, coupled with a shrinking cockpit, it is not a brightpicture for reducing cockpit secondary strikes. Consequently,

20

FIGURE 4: Airbag application to attack helicopter cockpit.

AATD recently initiated a contract effort to devise innovationsto further delethalize the futureArmy cockpit.

The program will examine passive measures, such as improvedpadding and unique frangiblemounts, as well as active measures like automotive airbags inthe cockpit. Figure 4 is a sketchof a cockpit that has three airbags-one within the main instru-

ment panel and one on eacharmored wing panel of the crewseat. The idea is to totally encapsulate the aviator's head andupper torso before and during asevere crash pulse.

Where cockpit designs areheaded is open to debate. Irrespective of the outcome, one ofthe AATD's missions will remainto maximize the Army aviator'schances for crash survival.

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VIEWS FROM READERS

Editor:Request the following notice berun in the A viation Digest:Attention UH-60 Black Hawkpilots! The U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory is inneed of aviator subjects to participate in ongoing research. Currently, we need aviators betweenthe ages of 21 and 40 with 20/20vision, on flight status with acurrent flight physical. I f 10 UH-60 simulator flight hours in 2weeks would interest you, contact

the USAARL aviator representative at AUTOVON 558-6864.

Editor:

CPT Michael H. HulseyAdjutantU .S. Army AeromedicalResearch LaboratoryFt. Rucker, AL

The September-October 1989issue of the U.S. Army AviationDigest arrived this afternoon.I do have a special reason forwriting you. The article "Eagles,Wings and Other Things," page30, has what many of us, whowere early in Army Aviation,would consider a major flaw.The date 6 June 1942 is supposed to be the birthday of modern day Army Aviation. On that


date, the then equivalent of Department of the Army (War Department) authorized creation ofOrganic (integrated) Army A viation for the combat arms, Engineers and Signal Corps (asdifferentiated from the Army AirCorps/Forces). Officers and enlisted men with private pilot licenses were asked to join this newprogram.I volunteered and was acceptedinto the 2d Liaison Pilot Class(P-2) in mid-August 1942, at Ft.Sill, OK. My class graduated on 2October 1942. A major part ofthe class with a few from P- l andP-3 went almost immediately tothe landings in North Africa. Isailed from New York harbor on15 October 1942, along with nineothers; four more flew of f theU .S.S. Ranger in the landings atFedala and Casablanca with General Patton's Western TaskForce. We landed across treadway bridging over sunken shipsand picked up our aircraft atCasas Airport later.The point is, none of us hadbeen authorized to wear wings atall. After I got to Sidi-bel-Abbes,Algeria (home of the French Foreign Legion), in December 1942,some of the newcomers showedus their new ' 'L Pilot' , wings.I had some British silver coinsI' d accidentally brought back

from Gibraltar. We went to aFrench jeweler in Sidi-bel-Abbes,who melted the silver and cast usour first wings! COL Mike Strok(Retired), P-3, will rememberthis.In January 1943, several of usgot a very nice surprise. TheArmy paymaster paid us backflying pay for the period 2 October 1942 to 31 January 1943.Apparently, someone couldn'tstand for us to be flying and notdrawing flying pay-although wehad never been promised or evenconsidered being paid to fly.We had about 4,000 Army aviators in World War II and stillhad about 800 when the war inKorea started. Our next buildupstarted from there. I was at Ft.Monroe, VA, in research and development, 1950 to 1953, and gotmy first present day Senior ArmyAviator badge about 1951. So,there were quite a bunch of uswho wore "L Pilot" wings for anumber of years. I don't find thebadge or mention of it in yourarticle!Don't feel bad. LieutenantGeneral Bob Williams (Retired)lives a block down the street fromus. He recently let me read acopy of CONARC History ofArmy Aviation, 1950-1960. It hadnothing in it about the switchfrom L wings, nothing on Army

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Aviation research and development efforts, almost nothing onOrdnance Corps maintenance andsupply support or aviation funding for Army Aviation after theAir Force split separately. (Transportation Corps got into the actwith the cargo helicopter in 1951.When th e Ordnance Corpswanted to get rid of its problemswith Army Aviation funding,maintenance and supply, etc.,Transportation Corps gladlypicked them up in 1952.)Whoever wrote the CONARChistory took almost all of hisinformation from a search of letters and studies in the G3 archives. So far as real ArmyAviation history was concerned,it had very little. There was nothing about the ordnance maintenance teams we organized,trained and sent to Korea; northe MASH helicopter detachments; nor the provisional division Army Aviation companieswe organized in Korea patternedafter our AFF Board No. 1study. There was very little on theinitial arming of light, fixed-wingaircraft, which later developedinto armed helicopters to dodgeAir Force objections, etc., etc.Oh well, as General Williamssays (in jest), "History is a bunchof stories, tales and lies agreedupon by the writers," or something like that.Check out the L Pilot wingssubject with your own museum.Also, Army Aviation is about90 percent helicopters and 10 percent fixed wing. How did wemanage to get stuck with an old,secondhand branch insignia ofthe wings and propeller? The insignia implies or hints that wegrew out of the Air Corps IForces! Why not a hot air balloon insignia? Just an idea!Another subject-From theback cover of your magazine, Inote that the helicopter championship team is still using thepatch I came up with for the

22

Poland 1981 competition; thatwas the first competition we won.I was team manager.COL John W. OswaltU.S. Army (Retired)Ft. Worth, TX

CW 4 Harry W. Sweezy, authorof "Eagles, Wings and OtherThings," reviewed the commentsof COL Oswalt and provided thefollowing information:The article was not written as ahistory of Army Aviation. I t waswritten to show the roots of thecurrent aviator wings and collarinsignia worn by warrant officers.

The evolution of the aviatorbadge was summarized and didnot include all other variationssuch as balloon pilot, airship pilot, glider pilot or liaison pilot.The evolution showed only themajor changes to the commonstyle pilot badge.COL Oswalt is correct withwhat he states; however, he appears concerned with the fact thathe also read the CONARC History of Army Aviation, 1950-1960, and it did not containinformation that he thought itshould.COL Oswalt also appears concerned that Army Aviationadopted the Army Air Corps insignia when, in fact, it did not.The article "Eagles, Wings andOther Things" shows that thecurrent design of the AviationBranch insignia predates theArmy Air Corps. As a result theA viation Branch insignia hasroots that truly belong to theArmy and the Aviation Branch.

Editor:Hurray to CPT John G. Kershaw and his article "III/V Platoon Leader's Lessons Learned"[November/December AviationDigest] . I found that a positive

attitude and aggressiveness arethe keys to successful supportplatoon leadership. Contrary topopular belief, it is a challengingand rewarding position.

Editor:

CPT Paul M. SteeleFt. Belvoir, VA

These comments are in regardsto the article "Mobility Differential" by Major Lloyd W. Carr, inthe NovemberIDecember 1989 is-sue of Aviation Digest. AlthoughI agreed with a majority of thisarticle's content and enjoyed thereading, there were two specificitems mentioned that rubbed methe wrong way.The first item was calling ArmyAviation the founder of a thirddimension of the battlefield. Thisis the last thing that we shouldwant our own branch or anyother branch to think true! Theonly members of Army Aviationin the third dimension should bespecial electronic mission aircraft(SEMA) and nontactical fixedwing aircraft well to the rear ofoperations.The best chance for our tacticalaircraft to survive in a medium orhigh threat environment is tothink in only two dimensions. WeMUST use the terrain in order tolive and fight again another day.An attack helicopter should bethought of as an armor killingmachine that is unrestricted bynatural obstacles such as riversand dense forests while at thesame time confined to that verysame terrain in order to survive.As soon as we leave the coverand concealment of the earth andventure into the third dimension,our vulnerability increases dramatically. The same can be saidfor assault helicopter operations.Although they do vastly increasemobility and decrease reaction

MARCH/APRIL 1990


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time, they are still confined to theterrain for survival.Army Aviation does not add athird dimension to the battlefield,but it most certainly expands theexisting dimensions of the Army'sbattlefield in both width and particularly depth. We add, for theARFOR [Army forces] commander, the capability of strikingthe enemy from one lateralboundary to the other and deepin his rear faster than everbefore.The second point mentioned inthis article that I disagree withwas the statement ". . . hat mostofficers do not have the 'foggiestidea' what tactics are." WhatMajor Carr might have meant tosay was that most aviation officers do not know tactics. Eventhen, I would tend to somewhatdisagree. Whose fault is that,anyway? Tactics are taught in theclassroom right there at Ft.Rucker in the officer basic andadvanced courses. Applying thesebasic tactical fundamentals, refining them and reinforcing whatwas taught in the classroom is theresponsibility of battalion commanders and battalion S3s infield units. These field grade officers should be the real experts.Having attended the Armor Advanced Course as an aviator, Iknow that Ft. Knox graduates aretaught offensive, defensive andcavalry tactics extensively. As aformer DCAT instructor in attackhelicopter and cavalry operationsat Ft. Rucker, I can also say thatmaybe the Army Aviation Schoolshould increase not only the number of hours spent on teachingtactics but also the complexity ofthe subject matter, particularly atthe advanced course level. I amvery proud of being a member ofthe Aviation Branch and wantnothing less than its officers to be

as tactically capable and proficient as those of the other combatarms.CPT Steven M. GreenbergPlans Officer1 t Battlefield Coordinat ion Det.Ft. Bragg, NC

Editor:The Army ROTC Departmentat the University of Cincinnati isestablishing an alumni association. Our alumni association willseek to support the corps of cadets through affiliation with previous members and recognition oftheir deeds and accomplishments.Alumni of the University ofCincinnati Army ROTC programare invited to send their name,address and telephone number to:Army ROTC, ML-44, Universityof Cincinnati, OH 45221-0044 orcall Cadet Captain TerrenceBrandt or me at 513-556-3660.

Editor:

CPT Daniel D. GraffAssistant Professorof Military ScienceUniversity of Cincinnati

Any year group 81 officer whohas not yet completed the 9-weekPhase I I of the Combined Armsand Services Staff School (CAS3)at Ft. Leavenworth must do so bythe end of fiscal year (FY) 1990.Failure to attend may jeopardizepromotion and staff college selection. FY 1990 classes also areopen to captains in year groups82 and later who have completedthe advanced course and Phase Iof CAS3 For report dates referto the Army Training Require-

ment and Resource System computer network, or call the CAS3Operations Office at AUTOVON552-2113 or 2602.Captains must report to the Ft.Leavenworth billeting office inHoge Barracks by 1200 on theirreport date, 1 day before the classstart date. Captains must bring acopy of their CAS3 Phase I completion certificate. The School ofCorresponding Studies no longeraccepts hand-delivered Phase Imaterial for scoring. Captainsreporting for Phase I I without aPhase I completion certificate intheir possession will not beenrolled.The Combined Arms Centercommander and Command andGeneral Staff College (CGSOC)commandant have initiated twochanges that impact on yourplanning for CAS3 completion.First, enrollment in Phase I isnow automatic upon graduationfrom the advanced course. Captains have 2 years following advanced course graduation tocomplete Phase I, the nonresidentphase. Second, CAS3 graduationis a prerequisite to enrolling inthe CGSOC nonresident course.Watch for these and otherchanges in DA Pam 600-3, Com-missioned Officer ProfessionalDevelopment and Utilization, asmandatory CAS3 attendance becomes institutionalized in the officer professional developmentand selection policies.Questions can be directed tothe senior aviation representative on the CAS3 faculty, COLRonnie Gipson, at AUTOVON552-2639/5257, extension 20.

LTC John E. McNettOperations OfficerU.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff CollegeFt. Leavenworth, KSReaders can obtain copies of material printed In any Issue by writing to: Editor,

U.S. Army Aviation Digest, P.O. Box 699, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5042.

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST 23


26/68

PEARL!SPersonal Equipment And Rescue/survival Lowdown

Fire by FrictionWhen was the last time anyone started a firewith the friction method called "fire thong"?Unless one has a pile of rattan in the survivalkit, one is probably out of luck. However,there is another method.Stories have been written about the Japanesewho spent years in the jungles refusing tobelieve World War II had ended. They lit firesevery day without matches. I f the sun wereshining, they used the bottom of a bottle as amagnifying glass. During rain, however, theyfound an even simpler way of managing. Theyopened rifle cartridges and mixed the powderwith paper, dry leaves and wood shavings.Then someone could rub a wire along a pieceof hardwood until the wood was hot enoughfor tinder.Aircrews may also use these same materials.If they do, they should wear gloves becausewires get too hot. They may wish to experiment with different gauged wires, such aspiano wire or 14-gauge wire hangers. However, snare wire is too soft even when doubledor tripled.Aircrews without a weapon or ammunitioncan experiment with other tinders. A wire thatworks for this purpose could also have otheruses in a survival situation. Such a wire wouldmake an excellent addition to a soldier's survival kit.These items in a survival vest and kit makefire starting easier: fire starter, spark lite,24

national stock number (NSN) 1680-01-233-0061; fire starter, aviation survival, magnesium, NSN 1680-01-160-5618; or matches,nonsafety in round plastic container, NSN1680-01-154-7199.

Ration CansWhoever uses the aluminum general purposeration can for cooking probably notices thatthe white lining comes off and floats in thesoup. The can was tested at an aerospacemedical research laboratory. Here are the results and safety recommendations of that test.The coating that flakes inside normally represents more of an aesthetic than a healthproblem. A health hazard may occur, however, when a soldier heats the can excessively.To prevent thermal degradation of the interiorcoating and possible formation of toxins, noindividual should expose the can directly toopen flame. Instead, one should heat the canonly while warming food or water to limittemperatures under 100 degrees centigrade.Heating or using an empty can for frying mayelevate temperature more than 230 degreescentigrade. Such temperatures degrade the lining and produce toxins.New survival ration cans will soon incorporate a tin-plate coating to eliminate the flaking. Until that time, field personnel should notexcessively heat presently used survival cans.

MARCHIAPRIL 1990


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cov.,/ 'stove - - .

Pocket StoveThe pocket stove, NSN 7310-00-234-3524, isin the supply system with a 2-hour trioxanefuel reserve. This stainless steel stove has acover that doubles as a wind screen. The baseunit has a grid that a soldier can pull out andlock in the up position to hold a canteen cupor other cooking utensil.

I f necessary, a soldier can place sand or dirtin the bottom container and then add aircraftfuel to burn when the trioxane is depleted. Aswith any other flammable liquid, soldiersshould be cautious when they use aircraft fuel.They should make sure they do not overfuel.They should add just enough fuel to moistenbut not flood the sand or dirt. "Mud pies" inthis case are dangerous. ~

If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival e ~ / , write PEARL 5 AMC Product Management Office, ATTN:AMCPM-ALSE, 4300 Goodfe llow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693-3573 or Commercial 314-263-3573.

u.s. Army Class A Aviation Flight MishapsArmy Total CostNumber Flying Hours Rate Fatalities (in millions)

FY 89 (through 31 March) 14 749,482 1.87 11 $42.7FY 90 (through 31 March) 18 775,248* 2.32 23 $60.0

"estimated



28/68

Modular MedicineHealth Services Support in the AirLand BattleCaptain James R. BoenMedical Service Corpsu.s. Anny Aviation Officer Advanced CourseU.S. Anny Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AL

THE MODERN battlefield will be an areaof mass confusion. The lethality of today'sweaponry has reached tremendous proportions.Only teams of highly trained professionals will beable to function, survive and help others survive.However, th is is how modular medicine will help.The modular medical system is the base forheal th services support in medical force 2000. Thissystem evolved because Army medical department(AMEDD) personnel saw a need to standardize allmedical units below corps level. The modulardesign enables the medical planner to quicklytailor, augment, reinforce or reconstitute thebattlefield where critically needed.The system is built around six basic modules.These modules are oriented toward casualtyassessment/collection, evacuation, treatment andinitial emergency surgery. They exist from themaneuver battalion to the communications zone(COMMZ).The combat medic module consists of the combatmedical specialists and their prescribed load ofsupplies and equipment. This module, normallyunder the operational control of individualmaneuver companies, is sometimes under themedical platoon/section of a combat battalion.These soldiers give initial emergency medical carealong with the combat-lifesaver and individualsoldier.

The ambulance squad module comprises twomedical noncommissioned officers (NCOs) , twomedical specialists and two ambulances. Theyevacuate patients and assure them of continual26

care en route. Ambulance squads, located at everylevel of the corps and COMMZ, are organic tomaneuver battalions. These squads operate inwheeled or tracked vehicles.The treatment squad module consists of aphysician, physician's assistant, two medicalNCOs and four medical specialists. This squad istrained and equipped to provide advanced traumatreatment to the battlefield casualty. This is thefirst place in the medical chain where one findsa physician. These squads, organic to maneuverbattalions, exist throughout the entire theater ofoperation.The area support squad module consists of adental officer, dental specialist, X-ray specialistandlaboratory specialist. The dental officer providesemergency and routine dental care. This person,trained in advanced trauma medicine, can provideadditional capabilities during peak patient loads.These squads are organic to medical companies

of separate brigades, divisions and echelons abovedivision units.Thepatient-holding squad module comprises twopractical nurses and two medical specialists. Thismodule can hold and provide minimal care for as

many as 40 patients who will return to duty. Thesesquads are organic to the medical companies ofseparate brigades, divisions and corps.The final module is the medical detachment,surgical. It consists of a general surgeon, anorthopedic surgeon, two nurse anesthetists, twooperating room specialists, a medical/surgicalnurse and two practical nurses. This squad

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55052550047545 042540 037 5350B 325

E 300D 275S 250

22520017 515012 510 0

7550250 CombatSupport

o

General

HOSPITAL TYPES

MODULES ;

Field

olding MedlCII Surgic i l BI.eperfonns early resuscitative surgery on seriouslywounded soldiers. Surgical detachments arenonnally employed in the division support area,but may be employed in the brigade support areaduring brigade operations. Corps-level surgicaldetachments augment divisions and corpshospitals.These modular squads make up the health careunits of the division and corps. Matching thesesquads with the unit missions fonn functionalmedical units. For instance, a treatment squad,combat medic module an d two ambulance squadsmake up a medical platoon found in the maneuverbattalions.

All of the squads carry their required equipmentand personnel in organic vehicles. Additionally,each squad can divide into two fully equippedteams. The teams provide the maneuver commander with highly mobile and responsive medicalsupport.Forming squads into modules facilitates reconstitution. For example, i f a squad is rende,red

combat ineffective, the next higher level isresponsible for replacements. This type of responsibility furnishes combat units with continualmedical care.Hospitalization also falls into a modular system.The corps and COMMZ area comprise fourhospitals: Combat Support, Field, General andMobile Anny Surgical Hospital (MASH). TheMASH is the only one without a module.

The hospitals include combinations of the base,surgical, medical and holding hospital unitmodules. Each hospital starts with a base hospitalunit. Depending on the type of hospital, other unitsare added. These units quickly augment existinghospitals or rapidly regenerate ineffective hospitals(see figure at left).The MASH furnishes lifesaving surgical andmedical care. The MASH may augment existingsurgical facilities bu t will likely be employedforward to support a certain area of operation. Thistype of hospital is lOO-percent mobile and canairdrop to support airborne/air assault operations.Because of its specific mission, only a MASH canreconstitute another MASH; therefore, it does no tfollow the modular system.

Patient evacuation is key to the success of allmedical support. The AMEDD uses the evacuationbattalion to help with patient evacuation. Theevacuation battalion's mission is to providecommand and control of air and ground evacuationassets within an area of operation. Assigned tothe evacuation battalion are medical companiesconsisting of either air or ground ambulances orboth. These companies offer additional evacuationsupport to the organic division and corps medicalunits. These assets pre-position forward to facilitatemore timely evacuation of battlefield casualties.

The modular medical system is approved forfielding, and some units have been fielded incertain commands. The system provides variousfunctions: more responsive care to the battlefieldcasualty; quicker evacuation; an d a superior meansof reinforcing and reconstituting medical unitsfrom the COMMZ to the forward line of own troops.The system also helps to tailor medical assets tosupport the tactical commanders' operations.

The Aviation Medicine Report is a bimonthly repori from the Aviation Medicine Consultant of TSG. Please forward subject matter of cunentaeromedical importance for editorial consideration to U.S. Anny Aeromedical Center, ATTN: HSXY-ADJ, Fori Rucker, AL 36362-5333.



30/68

THE PERSONNEL bulletin, floats' , across your desk. Younotice the announcement of theclosing date for application tothe Army Aviation EngineeringTest Pilot Program. A nervetwitches-the one that you alwaysknew was there-the one thatsays, "I want to be challenged, todo something grand, somethingglorious. ' ,During the next few days, youask around to find out what others know about experimental!

28

ArmyEngineeringTest Pilots

Major Thomas C. WallaceEngineering Test Pilot

U.S. Army Aviation Engineering Flight ActivityEdwards Air Force Base, CA

engineering test pilots; i.e., whoare they, what do they really doand what does it take to becomeone? To your dismay, answersrange from some "golden arm"pilot to an aviator with a sliderule for a brain (neither of whichis true). So who really are thesemen and women and what is theirmission in this Army of ours?Army Engineering Test PilotsCurrently, 65 engineering testpilots are on active duty in the

Army. They range in rank fromchief warrant officer, CW4, tobrigadier general. All are graduates of the United States NavalTest Pilot School (USNTPS).Twenty-seven are in positions thatare coded to require an experimental test pilot (skill id