Army Aviation Digest - May 1990

7/28/2019 Army Aviation Digest - May 1990

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MAY/JUNE 1990

GRANDOPENING

26 MAY 1990

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Professional Bulletin 1-90-3Distribution restriction: This publication approved fo r public release. Distribution is unlimited.


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Distinguished guests take part in ribboncutting ceremonies during the grand openingof the U.S. Army Aviation Museum. From leftare Mr. Billy J. Blackmon, mayor of Ozark;Mr. Gene Hughes, mayor of Daleville; Mr.Steven Maxham, museum director; Mr. JamesR. Balkcom Jr . , civilian aide to the Secretaryof the Army fo r the state of Alabama; Ms.Jacquelyn Thompson, mayor of Enterprise;Alabama Congressman William L. Dickinson;Lieutenant General John J. Tolson III (U.S.Army, Retired), chairman of the ArmyAviation Museum Foundation; and MajorGeneral Rudolph Ostovich III, commander ofthe U.S. Army Aviation Center and Ft.Rucker.

Alabama Congressman William l . Dickinsonduring grand opening ceremonies praisesArmy Aviation fo r it s role in keeping peace inAmerica. He said, " Army aviators pioneeredmilitary flight in this nation , and Armyaviators have repeatedly accomplishedstaggering feats, often at the cost of theirlives, in serving America . " Seated from leftare Mr. Steven Maxham, museum director;Major General Rudolph Ostovich III,commander of the U.S. Army Aviation Centerand Ft. Rucker; Lieutenant General John J.Tolson III (U.S. Army , Retired), chairman ofthe Army Aviation Museum Foundation ; andChaplain Lou Shirey , acting Aviation Centerchaplain.


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GRAND OPENINGcJ1\r11}Y AviatioTL

A LL ROADS IN the Wiregrass and Ft. Rucker, AL,area lead to the fabulous andexhilarating new U.S. Army Aviation Museum. Distinctive andcolorful billboards along Alabama and Florida roadways andbrochures attract visitors to oneof the largest helicopter collections in the world.The museum is open to thepublic daily 0900 to 1600 andclosed Christmas Eve and Day,New Year's Eve and Day, Thanksgiving and Easter. The $5 millionfacility, building 6000, is locatedat the corner of Andrews andNovosel Avenues.This new museum building,Dickinson Hall, is named for Alabama Congressman William L.Dickinson in recognition for hisleadership in obtaining the federalfunds to match locally generated

u.s. Army Aviation Digest

USEUMStory and Photos byMr. Ted Walls

Writer-Editor

donations for its construction.The naming of this building alsorecognizes his continual supportof Ft. Rucker as a strong militaryinstallation. Congressman Dickinson is highly supportive of themuseum effort and proudly viewsit as a monument to aviation ofthe past and a new industry forthe future.

Major General Rudolph Ostovich III, commander of the U.S.Army Aviation Center and Ft.Rucker, comments, "The newmuseum is a first-rate operationalong the lines of the NationalAir and Space Museum in Washington, DC. I t pays tribute to theroots of Army Aviation and givesspecial recognition to the VietnamWar era, when Army Aviationfirst really came into its own.

"The name Dickinson Hall isone way to recognize the tremen-

dous support Army Aviation hasreceived from Congressman Dickinson during his extensive servicein the U .S. Congress," adds MGOstovich.FacilitiesThe realization of a 20-yeardream results in a 87,000 squarefoot, three-story facility. The firstfloor is devoted to the main aircraft gallery, administrative offices, theater and gift shop. Thegift shop, open 0900 to 1600,offers aviation-related books, Tshirts, models and other paraphernalia, as well as numerousdistinctive gift items.

The interpretive exhibit gallery,on the second floor, displays thestory line of Army Aviation. Additionally, several hands-on exhibits of fixed- and rotary-wingsimulators, numerous experimen-

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verfly. The L-4B was the firstfixed-wing aircraft purchased bythe Army in 1942. I t was anobservation and reconnaissanceaircraft made by the Piper Aircraft Corporation. First acceptedin September 1941, it was theprincipal airplane used by ArmyAviation throughout W orId WarII. The R-4B, the first productionrotary-wing aircraft also dating to1942, was an observation, reconnaissance and medical evacuationaircraft produced by the SikorskyAircraft Company.The most recent aircraft in themuseum is the AH-64A Apache,dating to 1984. Also in the aircraft gallery is the Bell 207 SiouxScout manufactured by the BellHelicopter Company. This modelillustrates the first attempt to design an "attack" helicopter forthe Army.The UH-IB Iroquois (betterknown as Huey) armed withTOW missile system, also in themuseum, illustrates the first useof an aerial-launched antitankmissile.What determines the aircraftchosen for the museum? According to Mr. Maxham, he checksthree criteria: aircraft flown in avalid mission, in the course ofassigned duties and those flownover a sustained period.

CenterpieceA Vietnam-era diorama createsthe central focus of the gallery.As the centerpiece for the museum, it graphically depicts atroop insertion during a Vietnamconflict.Cost

Half of the $5 million cost ofthe museum came from privatedonations. Lieutenant GeneralJohn J. Tolson III (U.S. Army,Retired), chairman of the Boardof Directors, U.S. Army AviationMuseum Foundation, presented a$2.5 million check to ColonelLarry S. Bonine, commander,Mobile District, Corps of Engineers, on 1 February 1988 forconstruction of the museum. TheCorps of Engineers, in turn, received a like sum in matchingfunds from the Military Construction Appropriations Act.Phase I ConstructionThe Ft. Rucker Area Office,U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,reviewed plans and contract documents for the new museum andsupervised the project. Mr. Ronald A. "Bo" Carter, civil engineer, comments that this office isproud to have had an active partin the museum's construction."This facility will further pro-

Trainer Aircraft

mote the history of and serve as afocal point for Army Aviation,"he says.Groundbreaking took place 28March 1988. Construction of themuseum began 29 March 1988and was completed 7 November1989. W. M. Marable, Inc., wasthe contractor for the museum."Erecting the Army AviationMuseum is my most memorableexperience," comments Mr. Richard Laframboise, Marable's superintendent of construction."Although many of us havenever been involved with aviation, it is a thrilling experience tobe a part of the preservation ofArmy Aviation history," he adds.The building, erected on concrete slab, has a prefabricatedbaked-steel frame supporting atubular-truss roof framing. Aluminum frame windows, exteriorsteel doors, metal wall panels andurethane insulation complementthe museum's side construction.Army Aviation MuseumFoundation

According to Ms. ShelleyBlack, director of administrationfor the Army Aviation MuseumFoundation, Inc., five phases areplanned for the total constructionof the new Army Aviation museum. "The new museum just

LC-126A; OH-23B Raven;T 41 B Mescalero; TH-13TSioux; TH-SSA Osage; UH-1HIroquois; and two link trainersimulators.

L-S Sentinel;

RU-SO Seminole;XH26A Jet Jeep (left)and YHO3BR UH1

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The second floor interpretative exhibits(above) portray the story line of ArmyAviation.The configuration of the DH-1 A Whirlymite was tested as a presolo trainer toevaluate the pilot's training time. Thestudent pilot was able to train in completesafety since the platform would not allowthe helicopter to tip over.

constructed is phase one," shesays. "Plans for the next fourphases include construction of additional buildings near the newmuseum that will house more display areas, warehouses, workshops or whatever is needed forthe future growth of the museum," she adds.

"Retired Army personnel andlocal civilians established the museum foundation in 1970 to enhance the growth and interest ofArmy Aviation," Ms. Black continues. "The foundation hasabout 30 members from industry,30 distinguished members and 100charter members. The patron

member is His Royal HighnessPrince General Faisal M. AI-Saudof Saudi Arabia. He is a majorcontributor who attended flightschool at Ft. Rucker in the 1970s.Ms. Black says the foundationwill sponsor future fund drivesfor the additional museum construction. She hopes when contributors see how the $5 milliondream became a reality, the public will be willing to donate again.Annual attendance in the old museum averaged 100,000 visitors,she states. Military officials believe the new museum will be oneof the most rewarding attractionsin the Wiregrass and the entiresoutheastern United States. Theyhope attendance will increasesteadily."Completion of the Army Aviation Museum is the realizationof a 20-year dream," says Command Sergeant Major Roger Putnam (U.S. Army, Retired),museum foundation board member.The foundation is still takingdonations from individuals whowant to witness and participate inthe continual growth of the newmuseum. Tax deductible contributions may be mailed to theArmy Aviation Museum Foundation, P.O. Box 610, Ft. Rucker.AL36362. ~

Utility Aircraft Aircraft hung from ceilingL-5G Sentinel (MEDEVAC);OH-13E Sioux (MEDEVAC);OH-23A Raven (MEDEVAC);

R-4B Hoverfly; U-1A Otter;UH-1D Iroquois (Air Assault);UH-1H Iroquois (MEDEVAC);and U-6A Beaver.

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Training aircraft (foreground)

AH-1G Cobra; L-16AChampion; L-19A Bird Dog;OH-6A Cayuse; OH-13E Sioux;U-1A Otter; U-6A Beaver; andUH-1 H Iroquois (MEDEVAC).

U-6

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Left to right: R-5, R-6 and R-4 Sikorsky helicopters were used by the Army Ground Forces during World War II.

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The Army Ground Forcesand the Helicopter1941 to 1945This article is the first in a series on Army Aviation logistics history.

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Dr. Howard K. ButlerHistorical DivisionU.S. Army Aviation Systems Command

St. Louis, MO


T HANKS TO A NUMBER of pseudohistorical products that primarily rest upon suspectsecondary sources, the lay reader could easily gaina number of misconceptions about the relationshipof the helicopter to the Army Ground Forces(AGF) and its successor organizations. The mostimportant of these misconstructions are all terminalin nature, characterized by such examples as:

The French . n Algeria were the first to mountand fire rockets from helicopters.

American armed helicopter experiments beganat the close of the Korean War.

Attack and antitank helicopter theory began totake form in the late 1950s.

Actually, the AGF took everyone of these stepsnot later than during or just after the end of WorldWar II. The AGF's rotorcraft speculations wereinclusive of, and often beyond, all of that equipment that began appearing 20 to 40 years later.Past the piston-engined, unarmed L-4 Cubs, theAGF foresaw an Army air arm consisting offixed-wing and rotary-wing ambulances, televisionrelaying reconnaissance aircraft and elevated weapons platforms-its term-that could operate anytime in any weather and that carried enoughautomatically loaded rockets, cannon and recoillessrifles to make either a T-72 tank or a Mi-24 Hindhelicopter head for cover. The AGF saw this force,moreover, as one firmly under its control-theground commander was its commander.The Helicopter Enlists

Though the Kellett Autogiro donned Army bluein 1935, the first "true" helicopter to come aboardwas one Sikorsky XR-4 Hoverfly in November1941. The Army, that was the Army Air Forces(AAF) bought 131 more R-4s during World WarII, as well as 67 R-5s and 225 R-6s, for a total of424 helicopters. l Compared to the total AAFwartime procurement of nearly 300,000 aircraft,that number seems small. The AAF, moreover,transferred 98 of these helicopters to the Navy. 2, (1) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Study, December 1975, subject:

Army Helicopter Facts, Acceptances and Flyaway Costs, From 1942 through1948. (2) A signified rotorcraft, Y prototype and X experimental.

2 Richard Tierney, The Army Aviation Story, Colonial Press, Northport , AL, 1963,pp. 253-255.

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UseThe helicopter saw little action in the war. A

YR-4 did, however, effect what was apparently thefirst American heliborne rescue of the conflict, on23 and 24 April 1944. A light aircraft with fourmen onboard had engine trouble and landed behindNipponese lines in Burma. On the first day, theYR-4 picked up two of the four, then it overheated. After an overnight cooldown, the YR-4picked up the other two the next day. 3Test Bodies

The AGF kept abreast of developments in helicopter and other air matters via two bodies:

The first was the Airborne Board, activated inDecember 1944 at Camp Mackall, NC. The rootsof this board were the Testing and DevelopingSection of the Airborne Command, organized in1942 at Camp Mackall, and the Parachute TestPlatoon, activated at Ft. Benning, GA, in June1940 .

The second was the A ir Support Service TestSection of the AGF. Activated on 1 October 1945at the AAF Center in Orlando, FL, it absorbed the12-man AGF Liaison Detachment station at EglinAir Force Base (AFB), FL.

The Airborne Board was the more extensive andimportant of the two. Inheriting airborne detachments in Europe, the board dispatched anothersuch section to the Pacific. It also had liaisonofficers at the AAF's Air Transport Service Command, at the AAF Center in Orlando and in theRequirements Section of the headquarters ofAGF.4

The board's main interests lay in parachutes andgliders, but it did, in October 1944, borrow anXR-6A from the AAF for tests at Camp Mackall.These tests persisted. In December 1945, the sectionmounted, then fired, rockets on the R-6. On 1October 1945, the board became the AirborneService Test Section of the AGF.

The Air Support Service Test Section had evenmore potential as an experimenter in aircraft development. Its concerns included " ... ockets andaircraft guns used to attach ground targets; aerialreconnaissance and aerial photography; helicopters;parachutes; and gliders." The section dissolved in

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..Above and right: The R-4 Hoverflyis historically significant. It was thefirst helicopter produced for any ofthe U.S. military forces in otherthan experimental quantities.

s

April 1946 when the AAF organized the AirUniversity at Maxwell AFB, AL.5Rotorcraft Applications and The Cook Board6

A large party within the AGF saw the 1942authorization for liaison aircraft as a wedge for acomplete air arm. Their opportunity to expand itcame in August 1944, when the War Departmentdirected the AGF to determine what equipment thepostwar Army should have. 7 In December 1944,the AGF set up this board under the chairmanshipof Major General Gilbert R. Cook.8

On 20 June 1945, the board published its report.In aviation, it presented the AGF with its owntactical air force, an air force with applications ascomplete, or more so, as in the Army of today. 9The thorough treatise began so:Role and Missions

"a . There is a need for organic ground supportaviation within the ground forces. This aviationwould be operated by ground force personnel andwould be employed for close fire support, tacticalreconnaissance, photography, control and liaison,

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limited transportation, and emergency supply andevacuation.

"b. The organic ground support aviation shouldhave as its sole mission the close support of groundtroops in combat."

At this point, the board inserted what is nowknown as a "disclaimer," which conceded both theexistence of the AAF and its possible helpfulness:

"The provision of this special aviation within theground forces need not effect materially the presentor future organization of the AAF nor the presentmissions of its Strategical or Tactical AirForces. . . [which are,] in the order of prioritylisted in our present doctrine, namely

(1) To gain the necessary degree of air superior-ity.(2) To present the movement of hostile troops

and supplies into the theater of operations orwithin the theater.

(3) To participate in a combined effort of the airand ground forces, in the battle area, to gainobjectives on the immediate front of the groundforces. "

U.S. Army Aviation Digest

This standing operating procedure aside, theboard proceeded to describe a world in which " ...aircraft, like automobiles, will become so common-place and will present advantages which are sodesirable to ground units that certain types andnumbers of these vehicles must be decentralized to,make [sic] organic to, and thus placed undercommand of ground formations."Aircraft Requirements

The board next systematically discussed the fivetypes of aircraft needed: photographic; tacticalreconnaissance; light, either liaison or helicopter;fire support; transportation (and what special

3 Joint Intelligence Collection Agency , China Burma India [report] . 3 May 1944.subject: BURMA- First Combat use of Helicopter In .

4 History, Army Ground Forces (AGF) Board No. I. FI. Monroe, VA , 1948. pp . 10-12. 16-17.

S Ibid , p. 20 .6 Author's designation.7 Memorandum , WDGDS. MG R. L. Maxwell. ACofS. G4. to CG , AGF, 19 August

1944, subject: Equipment for the Post War Army.8 Memorandum , No . 40, MG E.F. Olsen, GAG , HQ, AGF. to MG Gilbert R. Cook.

S December 1944, subject: Equ ipment Review Board .9 , 987 .

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equipment was necessary for them); an integratedground-air radio communication system; the latestnavigation fire control and identification and interrogation equipment; and equipment to permit nightoperation.

The board was either astonishingly foresighted,or, more likely, it reflected widely held currentAGF interests in organic air arm potentialities.Hence, its discussion of the particulars of typesincluded such entries as:

"6 . Tactical reconnaissance aircraft . . . b. Photographic means, direct observation by personnel,and television equipment are required in this organic reconnaissance aviation. TV will provide anindirect visual means that could transmit a view toreceivers located at a command post on theground, then extended [sic] the 'eyes' of thecommander to distant points... via] horizontallyand vertically stabilizing the TV lens.... "8 . Fire support aircraft. a. Types. Fire sup-port aircraft of the following types are required:

(1) Flying artillery.(2) Flying tanks or tank destroyers.b. Mission . . . hese aircraft would have the ex-

clusive mission of furnishing close fire support tothe ground troops... They would fly] from theantiaircraft artillery fire zone of friendly groundtroops as a base, normally without fighter cover.They should be armored, and carry armament topermit the delivery of heavy and accurate fire,from elevated platforms, in close support of theground troops.. . [These] missions...would becomparable, respectively, to the missions of groundartillery, and ground tanks or tank destroyers.

"[Using] low flying speeds... and possessing an]Endurance of at least four hours,... these craft]should be sufficiently armored to be able to withstand small arms fire and shell fragments... Their]armament carried would depend upon the mission...Machine Guns, rockets, recoilless weapons,bombs, and smoke or chemical spraying equipmentshall be utilized. . . .

"and 9. Transport Aircraft. [These shouldbe]. . .low speed aircraft, or aircraft of the helicopter type, which can carry sufficient payload for thetransport of emergency supplies and personnelwithin the combat zone for evacuation. . . Thesetransport aircraft will be used in a manner similar

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to the...2Y2-ton truck in tactical units and QMTruck Companies and the Ambulance in the Am-bulance Collecting companies.Tactical Air Support "

The board was not at all happy with currenttactical air support, either as expressed in FM100-20 (now obsolete), in which it was a thirdpriority, or in practice:

"There is an urgent requirement for close support aircraft, organic to and operated by theground forces, which would be available at alltimes and which would have the exclusive missionof furnishing that close support to the groundforces."

Present practice was poor in every aspect:"c . Aircraft thus far assigned in support of

ground troops have not been designed specificallyfor that purpose...."d . [Cooperation between AAF air controllersand AGF ground commanders was in disarray, forthe] ...problems, tactics, and techniques of onemust be understood by the other. This cannot bedone in a few hours or a few days of workingtogether. These men must live and work togetherdaily in training and in battle. There is no place inthis set-up for two teams or for co-equality; it mustbe one team with one commander. Only by havingthe personnel organic to the ground forces can therequired cooperation be assured."e . The low priority given training and equipment of air force units for close ground supporthas constituted a serious obstacle to effective combined air-ground operations during the presentwar. ...

"f. The present policy of centralized control ofThe R-5 helicopter saw limited use by Army Ground Forces

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tactical reconnaissance aviation under the air forceshas resulted, on numerous occasions, in failure toget highly important information to front line unitsin time to be of great value. There is a distinctneed for tactical reconnaissance aircraft, on thecorps or division level, organic to the groundforces... and] in addition to the tactical andstrategic reconnaissance aviation in the AAF."An AGF Tactical Air Arm

The report was thus careful not to advocateeither the dismantling of the AAF, or the detailingof segments from it, but its recommendations, ifcarried out, would certainly obviate and duplicatemuch of the prospective junior service. To underscore any doubts that such were its aims, the reportcontinued with this entry:

"11. Aircraft weapons for use against groundtargets. The development of weapons for use onaircraft of both [author's underscore] the Air Forceand the organic ground support aviation againstground targets should include the following:

a. Guided bombs.b. Guided power-driven missiles....c. Directional flame throwing bombs and projec

tiles.d. High explosive rockets capable of penetrating

armor.e. Shaped charge bombs with stand off fuse [sic]

to take advantage of the shaped charge principle inpenetrating armor or reinforced concrete.f. High velocity armor-piercing antitank weapons

for the direct attack of armor.g. VT lO fuses for providing airburst of bombs

and other missiles.h. Developments to increase the chemical carry-

The R-6, another early vintage helicopter.


ing capacity of aircraft and to increase the lengthand duration of smoke screens."Military Characteristics

The aircraft portions of the report closed with alengthy list of aircraft and their desired militarycharacteristics. The aircraft included a 10-ton payload assault aircraft, for cargo and glider towing; a50-ton cargo aircraft; various mapping and tacticalreconnaissance aircraft; fire support aircraft, eitherfixed or rotary wing, for the close support ofground troops; medical ambulance aircraft, alsoeither fixed or rotary wing; and large cargo aircraft. The aircraft specifics matched or exceededanything in operation 40 years later. For example,the fire support aircraft, either fixed or rotary wingand single or multiengined, were to carry one tofour cannons and rocket launchers or recoillessguns not to exceed 105 millimeter (mm) in caliber;remote control automatic loaders; a crew flaksuited to stop flak and .50 caliber rounds; and acapability of operation in day or night and in alltypes of weather while flying at speeds up to 100 to150 knots per hour. The flying tank or tankdestroyer had to have the same characteristics,except that its guns were not to exceed 90 mm incaliber, or enough firepower to penetrate 6 inchesof homogeneous armor at 500 yards. To remedythis deficiency the flying tank could carry a 500-pound payload of bombs.Perspective

The board's other general officers included Major General Floyd E. Jones and Brigadier GeneralsBenjamin G. Ferris and Rupert E. Starr. ll Fourgeneral officers certainly imply some weight and, ifthe war had continued onward as supposed foranother 2 years, perhaps some of their ambitiousprogram might have come forth. The sudden endof the war and concomitant fiscal austerity, theatomic bomb, and a furious Army-Navy postwarroles and missions war all served, however, topostpone fulfillment of the board's air powerobjectives for nearly 40 years. To preserve whatever it had, the Army's top leadership muffledinternal aggressiveness and imposed, in its stead,unification as the watchword. ~10 Variable time.11 AGF, pp. 114-147.

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IN RELATIVEOBSCURITY

Mr. Edward J. BavaroThreat Support Office

U.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker. AL

"A LOST BATTLE IS A BATTLE ONE THINKS ONE HAS LOST"

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Ferdinand Foch(1851-1929)Principes de Guerre

A UNIQUE organizationunobtrusively stole onto thescene very early in Vietnam towin the admiration and affection of the troops it supported.All too soon it quietly fadedfrom the rolls. Later it emergedgrander and more complex,continuing to discover andperfect other roles fo r thatconflict as well as for futurebattlefields.

This article heralds- this organization and an aircraft thatdid yeoman service throughout the entire Vietnam conflict. Like a venerable, proudold workhorse that refuses tobe put out to pasture, the OV-1 Mohawk continues to pull itsweight today, while seekingother chores to perform. Another aircraft, the UH-1 Huey,deserves all the attention itreceives fo r its service in Vietnam. However, the literati, intheir monographs on that war,too often assessed the UH-1as "Army Aviation's contribution in Vietnam."

Other aircraft-some of themof the fixed-wing varietywere important players in thateffort as well. The OV-1 Mohawk was one of those aircraft,an aircraft that performed nobly, without fanfare, in relativeobscurity. When the news media realized their camera crewsdid not have room to get inthe cockpit with them, theylost interest in the Mohawk!

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T e first Army Aviation unitsto serve in Vietnam arrived at apier in downtown Saigon in December 1961. Offloading fromthe aircraft carrying ship, theU.S. Navy Ship Core, were 32CH-21 Shawnees and 400 men.The equipment and men belongedto the 57th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) from Ft.Lewis, W A, and the 8th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) from Ft. Bragg, NC.Thus began what was to becomea long, arduous adventure andthe opportunity for Army Aviation that has led to its currentposition as a key member of theArmy's combined arms team.

In those early days of September 1962, an unusual, one-of-akind, unit arrived on the scene inVietnam. It was designated the23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment (SWAD). This unit wascomposed solely of JOV-IA Mohawks. The SWAD was in Vietna m to perform operationaltesting and its weapons were, ostensibly, for self-protection.

The JOV-IA was the armedversion of the Grumman OV-1.Its armament consisted of General Electric SUU-12 gun podscarrying the Army standard .50-caliber machinegun. The universalpylons were capable of carrying avariety of other weapons. In thecockpit the pilot had a selectorpanel for the six pylons and aMark 20 gunsight. These weaponswere a "big bone" of contentionwith the U.S. Air Force. Moreabout this later.Mekong Delta-IV Corps

The 23d moved around Vietnam for a while until it finally"rooted in " at Vung Tau. Theunit continued to provide supportall over the country as directed by


Naval vessels transported Mohawks to Subic Bay, Philippine Islands. Aircraftwere hoisted over the main gate at Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, after theywere transported by truck on a lowboy from the pier.

OV-Is equipped with oversized 300-gallon drop tanks were ferried to Vietnam.An Air Force search and rescue version of the KC-97 from Clark Air ForceBase, Philippine Islands, served as lead ship fo r the ferry flight.

the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV); however, it was committed to dailysupport of the Army of Vietnam(ARVN) IV Corps headquarteredat Can Tho. Can Tho was locateddead center in the Mekong Delta.IV Corps consisted of the 7th,9th and 21st ARVN Divisions,

arrayed roughly north to south,respectively, in the Delta.

That daily commitment required that the SWAD providetwo aircraft in the morning(wheels in the well at 0600 hours)and two aircraft in the afternoon(airborne at 1300 hours). Theseaircraft flew surveillance of en-

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emy sightings compiled daily byeach division G2 from intelligencereports and plotted nightly on thecorps G2 situation board. Eachnight our corps liaison officercalled in these coordinates, andthe estimated unit size, to theSWAD. These sightings wereplotted similarly on the SW ADmission board from which thenext day's missions were drawn.Our pilots all pulled corps liaisonofficer duty rotating in 2-weekshifts.The morning flight would coverone whole division's (e.g., the7th) reported sightings and asmuch of a second division's asthey could. The morning flightteam had to be back at base notlater than 1200 hours so that theycould consult with the afternoonteam. The afternoon team wouldfly the balance of the sightings.

Both teams would contact theAmerican advisers at the divisiontactical operations centers on FMradio when they approached thatdivision's area of operations (AO)and check on immediates and/orupdates to that division's plots.These missions produced agreat deal of action. Invariably,the Mohawks would be shot atwhile checking out these manysightings. I f artillery were available, the crew would initiate andadjust a fire mission against thetarget. More often than not, theMohawks would engage the targets themselves. The rules of engagement (Le., you could returnground fire) allowed for that. Wefollowed the rules of engagementlike religious zealots. On occasion, however, muzzle flashesturned out to be sun glint orsome other anomaly. By this

time, the Mohawks carried rockets and/or machineguns and weremore than adequately equipped,not to mention eager, to handlethe situation.I f the target appeared to be

lucrative enough, the divisionwould try to mount a heliborneassault. Occasionally, such aforce would be standing by already. The 21st ARVN Divisionwas the SWAD's favorite becauseits senior American adviser, callsign "Bull Moose," was extremely aggressive. His divisionmounted more operations thanthe other divisions in IV Corpscombined. In those days whenbody counts were the big yardstick for measuring success, BullMoose consistently achieved themost success. Of course, the factthat Bull Moose was a big believer in the armed Mohawk had

Wingman's view as flight leader leads team down to begin mission. Letdown generally was done 10 to 20 kilometersfrom initial target. Object at right is the Mark 20 gunsight.

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no bearing on our esteem forhim; he was simply a very brightfellow. He had been known tocancel operations if the Mohawkscouldn't play.Coordinating with the Vietnamese Air Force could be, and oftenwas, a protracted affair. BullMoose preferred contacting theSW AD on one day for operational support missions the next.Although our firepower was useful, it was not the main reason hewanted us. He came to appreciatethe Mohawk's superiority in surveillance and the SWAD crew'sability to ferret out the mostlucrative targets. On his operations, the Mohawks would go outand "beat the bushes" in themission area, while his assaultforce stood by their helicopters ata nearby staging area waiting forthe word to come.Silent Death-I and II CorpsThe other commitments, assigned by MACV, that the 23dserviced ranged all over the country. Another corps or an intelligence officer of a district headquarters would request, throughMACV, assistance for surveillance and photography. A teamof two or more OV-IAs would bedispatched with appropriate support personnel for whatever timewas required. (OV-IAs were sodesignated to appease the AirForce. The Air Force assumed thedesignation meant we were nolonger armed-well you knowwhat happens when you assumesomething. )We also had a U-6A Beaver(dubbed "Casper the Ghost" forits white paint job) in the SWADto facilitate these moves. Plus, wealways received help from the U-IOtters and the CV-2 Caribous(when they still belonged to us).


This was in the days before theSignal Corps came in (after thebuild-up of U.S. forces in mid-1965) and established a flight following service and added numerous navigational aids.Flying in areas like I and IICorps could be interesting. Ourinfrequent appearances in the skyover these large expanses did notinstill the fear and respect thatthe Vietcong (VC) accorded usdown in IV Corps where we were"beating up the sky" every day.

More importantly, these upcountry VC, and soon the NorthVietnamese Army (NVA), had tolearn the hazards of "SilentDeath" or "Whispering Death,"as we were known down south.The Mohawk, with the turboprops pulled back to I 050 to 1100revolutions per minute, was extremely quiet with practically noforward projection of sound.Only when passing overhead wasthe quiet, distinct whistling of theturbines audible. No otherturbine-equipped Army aircraft,even today, has such a pleasingaphonic quality. Operating overthe treetops reduced visual detection until close-in. Better yet, itrestricted the enemy's engagementwindow to get a shot at us. Devoid of the flapping of rotors, orof the whine of reciprocating engines and their props or of theroar of the pure jet aircraft, theMohawk operated silently in virtual stealth. That feature, morethan any other factor, gave ussome of our most productive andrewarding results.A good example of this waswhen a detachment of eight AirForce A-IE Skyraiders joinedwith my four OV-IAs in QuiNhon to provide aerial supportfor II Corps. The district G2briefed us that captured docu-

ments indicated a regimentalforce was advancing out of Laosnear the Dak Pek area. The regiment's objective was to overrunthe district headquarters in PhuCat.

A few days later, we were returning from a search of the DakPek-Dak To Corridor, skimming along treetops headingsoutheasterly back to Qui Nhon.About 35 nautical miles out ofQui Nhon, we broke over a bendin a large river and, 10 and behold, below us was the largestconcentration of VC/NVA troopsI had ever seen. We later determined that the unit exceeded1,200 men. Most of the troopswere lying on their rucksacks resting, while others were washing inthe river. Their mouths literallydropped when we appeared directly over them. They jumpedup, scurrying for the trees. Perfect! That would make our rockets, equipped with delay fuzesdesigned for bursting in junglecanopies, all the more effective.As lead aircraft, I immediatelystood my bird on its tail (toobtain some altitude for highangle dive runs). Simultaneously,I contacted our operations tent atQui Nhon with the information.The Mohawks and Skyraidersshared the ramp located on themountain side of the Qui Nhonairfield. The Air Force had aflight of four A-IEs scheduled torelieve us on the area search mission so those aircraft should beready to go. We would stay onstation rationing our rockets untilthe A-IEs arrived to take over.We proceeded to initiate ourdaisy chain attack, attempting toherd the VC together.Soon, within 15 minutes, theA-IEs, led by their forward aircontroller (F AC) in an 0-1 Bird

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OV1 returning to base at Vung Tau from over Mekong Delta in the vicinity of Soc Trang.

Dog, appeared. After a quick orientation, the FAC took over.This allowed us to rearm andrefuel. Over the next hour and ahalf, we returned three times tothe area, as did the A-IEs. Thelatter added two more aircraft(recently returning from anothermission) and formed two flightsof three aircraft. Finally, an assault force was lifted out to thearea and "cleaned up" what wasleft. The body count was morethan 300 with many wounded leftbehind.A SAM Kill

The SWAD had become quiteproficient at aerial photography.Our photo-mosaics were in greatdemand; they were perfect foroperational planning, perimeterdefenses, etc., because many ofour maps were of World War IIvintage. Some commanders likedto have a mosaic of their AOhanging on the wall. Flyingphoto-mosaic missions was a dan-

18

gerous business under any circumstance. These missions wereparticularly dangerous whenweather conditions forced us tofly lower and closer to the groundfire. Because the area being photographed usually was intendedfor planning an operation, wedefinitely were going to be firedon. I t wasn't the flying low thatwe hated so much as the need tofly straight and level for numerous photo runs. This would ensure coverage of the entire areawith the overlap needed to construct an acceptable mosaic. Agood wingman, protecting yourrear quarter, was absolutelyindispensable.We became involved with theAir Force, through our photomosaics, in the first applicationsof Agent Orange and the defoliation program. (Working withAgent Orange is something I havesince come to regret.) We serviceda request for mosaics to assist theAir Force's mission planning to

defoliate the biggest VC encampment area in the Mekong Deltathe U Minh Forest. We personally delivered the mosaics to theC-123 Provider squadron at TanSon Nhut. After discussing theenemy concentration areas wherewe had experienced the mostground fire, they asked if wecould accompany them duringtheir mission. Cleared by MAC Vthe mission required several daysto complete. We covered themwith fire when required. The mission went so well that, a fewmonths later, they requested us toassist them again.

This mission was the defoliation of portions of the Ho ChiMinh Trail-north where it proceeds into Laos from North Vietnam and continues down towardCambodia. The idea was to makethe trail easier to interdict bythinning out the jungle canopy.We deployed six Mohawks to DaNang to begin photographing thearea along the trail. These mis-

May/June 1990


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sions required our flying into thesouthern portion of North Vietnam down into Laos. The basicroute of the trail was determinedwith side looking airborne radar(SLAR) monitoring vehicle trafficand then further defined by infrared (lR) imagery. These missionswere flown mainly at night. Wethen followed up with photo-runsto complete the necessary footagefor the mosaic.

As good luck would have it, Iwas able to work the mission foronly a few days. I had to departthe operation and get back toVung Tau to catch a C-130 Hercules and travel to the CubiPoint, Naval Air Station, SubicBay, Philippine Islands. The C-130 would carry a large teamfrom the 73d to Cubi Point topickup and process several replacement Mohawks. New Mohawks generally were deliveredthere by small Navy carriers.Then, after processing, the aircraft were ferried across to SouthVietnam. These trips to the Philippine Islands were avidly soughtby our pilots. I t was my turn. Sowith pilots, maintenance crews,tech-reps and other support personnel, we were off for a treasured respite.While in the Philippine Islands,we had to contact unit operationsin Vung Tau to request that areplacement engine be dispatchedto us; one caught fire during atest flight. Operations informedus that four of our six aircraft atDa Nang had been shot down.Three were attributed to enemyantiaircraft artillery. The fourthwas the first Army aircraft shotdown by a Soviet surface-to-airmissile (SAM). We had had otheraircraft shot down but not somany so close together. This wasdevastating news. Operations


could not tell us any details overthe phone. What they did tell uswas cryptic in the interest of operational security. Although acouple of the crews survived byejecting, they were captured butwere not part of the repatriatedcontingent released later at theend of the war.Air-Conditioned Mohawks

Besides the visual and photographic surveillance and the firepower capability of the Mohawk,the SWAD and its Mohawks often supported field tests of newdevelopments. The 23d tested a"people sniffer" that sampled theair while flying low over the jun-gle and detected Cs H4 N4 0 3-uric acid. On the "assumption"that uric acid meant people, apositive detection on the snifferwould result in an artillery orairstrike to interdict the area. Thesystem worked quite well.

But, finally, the developers realized that animals do numberone also. Certain that the Societyfor the Prevention of Cruelty toAnimals would "raise the roof"about killing harmless animals,the developers went back to thedrawing board. They later returned with a new detector designed to respond to amino acidscents associated with perspiration. No one enjoyed flying thesemissions because the sniffer unithad to be strapped in the observers seat with the sensing probestuck down 'the message droptube. No one wanted to give uphis observer. Fortunately, theSW AD had to conduct the testand not fly the sensors operationally.

We also tested several versionsof the Starlight scope. Anothernew piece of equipment added tothe Mohawk surveillance suite

was the KS-61 panoramic cameramounted in the nose near the ramair chin-scoop. This camera tookexcellent pictures. I t featured afilm coated with a new emulsioncomposition that allowed the pictures to be enlarged greatly before they became grainy. Thisincreased the ability to resolvetargets that would have been obscured when enlarged as much onfilm of our other camera, thebelly-mounted KS-30.

The problem we found with theKS-61 was it obstructed the ramair feed from the chin-scoop leading into the cockpit, making thecockpit stifling. It wasn't unusualfor a member of a flight team toradio ... "Going Up" .. . and suddenly zoom up more than 10,000feet to cool down and stave of fdizziness.

The flight surgeon, notingsome crews were suffering fromdehydration upon their returnfrom missions, made us weigh-inbefore and after every mission.He found that the crew's averageweight loss was in excess of 6pounds. Having flown with usseveral times on missions, heknew that, during each mission,the crews landed at least twice torearm and refuel at various fieldsabout the Delta. He knew, also,that the crews would consumesoft drinks (nobody could drinkthe water*) each time while waiting for the aircraft to be serviced.Despite that, they still sustainedthe excessive fluid loss.Acting immediately, the doctorpushed to get rid of the flak vests

The drinking water was so heavily treated withpurifying chemicals that it tasted, looked andsmelled terrible. But, worst of all, most peoplegot a bladder infection from the caustic effect ofthose chemicals .

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22/68

we wore. We also had on MaeWests, survival vests and ejectionseat harnesses we had been tryingto get rid of from the start. Wewere unable to get rid of therubberized Mae Wests because weflew "feet wet." This problemwas reported back Stateside immediately. As a result, later Mohawks were fitted with ai rconditioning units. These unitslater became known by theirmore acceptable and less wimpishname-environmental controlunit-when installed on the AH-lCobra. For our gun pilots, theworst part of losing so much ramair was being blinded by the excessive sweat rolling down thebrow into the eyes, while makingthe standard 4-G (gravity) pull upafter a gun-run. The aircraftcould be moving between 300 and400 knots during the steep attacksand terminating fairly close to theground. Thus, any distraction,such as sweat in your eyes, couldbe catastrophic.

SWAD Pilot TrainingThe SW AD pilots were all

graduates of the Aerial GunnerySchool at Naval Air Station(NAS), Jacksonville (lAX), FL.There we spent several weeksqualifying in the assorted weapons systems we would be using inVietnam. We perfected dive angles and speeds, trimming controls (important for rockets) andpickle altitudes in dry runs. Thistraining was followed, after acouple of days, by live fire drills.In between takeoff/kiss-offs, welearned about formation flying.We thought we were good beforewe got to NAS JAX, but therewas plenty of room for improvement. We learned not to be vocalwhile flying formation. After

20

takeoff, when number four called"four's up," no t a word wouldbe said by lead. He continuallychanged the formation like a choreographer with simple wingwaggles. Before you knew it, hegave you a kiss-off and youpeeled of f over the gunnery rangeor airfield.

Altogether, flying at NAS JA Xmay have been some of best flying and fun we ever had. Mystickmate through transition an dgunnery school and I were thefirst Hawk-Jocks to go to NASJAX and then directly to the newsurveillance school at the Electronic Warfare Center, Ft. Huachuca, AZ. At the surveillanceschool, we qualified in the various surveillance systems of theOV-IB SLAR and the OV-IC IRand their photographic systems.

An important aspect of thetraining was the Doppler navigation system that was necessaryparticularly for IR missions. Thebiggest problem of all was fighting the monotony of flying "longlegs" on SLAR missions. SLARhas to be flown on autopilot topreclude causing breaks in theimagery. Since most tech-observers don't want your help, thepilot did not have much to do.Years later when we installed thedata-link capability in the aircraft, monotony on SLAR missions no longer applied.

Finally, after completing ou rtraining in Arizona, my stickmateand I were ready to proceed toTravis Air Force Base, CA, tocatch our flight into Tan SonNhut. As foolish as it sounds,

Vung Tau. From there thingshappened fas t-meet ing oldfriends, making new ones andgetting into the flow of the dayto-day activities. After a quicktrip or two around the pattern fora few touchdowns and emergencyprocedures, we broke out of thetraffic pattern. We joined up withanother Mohawk, an d headedwest over the bay toward theMekong Delta.

The gravity of what my tour inVietnam would be like becameevident on that very first mission.After arriving in the 9th Division's AO, we got into "a heckof a shoot out" with someground forces; the lead aircrafttook several hits in the process.We had to get use to the idea thatpeople were trying to kill us. Butflying the armed Mohawk turnedout to be all that I had expectedand then some!

Shortly after arriving at VungTau, Chief of Staff, Army (CSA)General Harold K. Johnson, accompanied by General William C.Westmoreland, commander,MACV , visited our unit. The pilots stood by their birds as theentourage crossed the parkingramp to "troop the line." General Johnson looked up as theywalked along and did a doubletake. It just dawned on him thatthose were guns an d rocketshanging under the wings of ouraircraft. He turned to GeneralWestmoreland sputtering, "Whatare those guns doing on thoseaircraft-I want those guns offthose planes!" As CSA he hadendured much of the Air Force

considering our later long in- invective-the Air Force's hacklesvolvement in Vietnam, we were were really up about the armedanxious to begin our tours. After Mohawk. We almost died, espea day or two of orientation at cially the newbies like me whoMACV Headquarters (HQ) in had been on orders for this asSaigon, we hopped a flight to _ signment for well over a year and

May/June 1990


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had finished 5 months of specialized training. General Westmoreland, unflappable and withoutmissing a step, continued walking, telling General Johnson thatthey would talk about it later.NO!! TALK TO HIM NOW!(I'm thinking).

For days after that visit, wemaintained a very low profile,waiting for the word that we weregoing to be flying slicked-downHawks. Finally our commanderreturned from a staff meeting atMACV HQ, assembled us andgave the blessed word "all wasright with the world" and theguns would stay.The 23d Is No More

In late 1964, an aerial surveillance and target acquisition(ASTA) detachment from Ft.Bragg deployed to Vung Tau.The AST A detachment consistedof OV-1Bs and OV-1Cs and support personnel. Included were alarge contingent of imagery interpreters (lIs) and their speciallyequipped expansion vans. Thetwo organizations merged andwere designated the 73d Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC).

The flight platoons naturallyretained the integrity of their previous units so that the old SWADbecame simply the "GunPlatoon," while the ASTA detachment was referred to as the"Exotic Platoon." Absolutely nofactionalism or cliquishness wasexhibited as both groups quicklyhit it off. The previous esprit andcamaraderie of the old 23d nowwere amplified by virtue of theexpanded organization now calledthe 73d SAC.

A good-natured rivalry betweenthe two platoons fed our unit'sconviviality. The "Exotics" referred to us as the "Glory Boys"


or "Murder, Inc." as well asmany unprintables, but they envied our having the gunship tofly. Because th e OV -1 A isequipped with dual controls, theywould jump at the chance to flywith us. We were glad to havethem (having another pilot beatflying with the nonrated ARVNofficers). On the other hand, weragged the Exotics because theycould spend their days on thebeautiful beaches at Vung Tau,working on their tans, and thenfly their missions in the relativecool of the evenings. But we hada deep respect for those guys andtheir technical observers becauseof the tough job they had to doflying those IR and SLAR missions night after night in goodweather and bad. Moreover, weknew they contributed the mostto the future of Army intelligenceand surveillance. Breaking newground in the Army, they weredeveloping, as they went, how theArmy could best use these neweyes and ears of the ground commanders. The whole process wasso new that even our I Is had tolearn "on-the-fly" as it were.They were writing the book.

Designated a company, ou runit was, in fact, a small battalion. We had our own machineshops; upper echelon aircraft andautomotive maintenance and supply; a liquid nitrogen plant toproduce coolant for the IR systems; a big ordnance section; apetroleum section; an II section;a detachment of ARVN officerswho flew as observers in the gunships; a complete commo/avionics maintenance and supplycrew; enough personnel to runthe consolidated messes at theairfield and at Vung Tau; andother groups, the largest of whichwas the civilian tech-reps, who

were often indispensable. Theyrepresented, among others, Grumman, Lycoming, Hamilton, Collins, Martin-Baker, General Electric, Singer, Motorola, Marconiand Ryne.

This has been a brief background of the 23d SWAD/73dSAC that merits being told forposterity's sake. Practically noone from that period is aroundthese days. It's probably true thatyou'll never see any stories titledArmy Aviation's Fixed Wing Ex-ploits in the Republic o f SouthVietnam or How The Bird DogMade the World Safe fo r Man-kind. On the other hand, try toremember, when's the last timeyou saw a Cobra do a Cubaneight? 9q ,

At the Aerial Gunnery School, NavalAir Station, Jacksonville, FL, a viewfrom number two aircraft as flightstarts turn to final fo r 360-degreeoverhead break fo r landing.

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AVIATION MEDICINE REPORTOffice of the Aviation Medicine Consultant

AVIATORS AND ALCOHOL: A Personal Experienceby an Anonymous Army Aviator with a history of alcoholism andMajor Kevin T. Mason, M.D., M.P.H.Director, U.S. Army Aeromedical ActivityU.S. Army Aeromedical CenterFort Rucker, AL

Sharing personal experiences is educational and, at the same time, disturbing to one's ego. We seereflections of ourselves in the errors in judgments of others. We struggle with the reality that we can becaught up in the whirlpool of life's more unpleasant aspects without warning or as a result of our owndenial. Sometimes when a friend needs our help, we look the other way, hoping the same fate will notafflict us. This interview is an insightful look back at how consumption of alcohol, an addicting drug,changed a man's life. This person is an Army aviator, perhaps even a friend of yours or just like a friendof yours. This interview is with an open and honest man.

Dr. Mason: When did you begin to understandthat alcohol consumption was becoming a problemfor you?

Aviator K.: A couple of years ago, I wentthrough an alcohol rehabilitation program. Justbefore that, probably for 2 years, I realized my useof alcohol was becoming a problem at home aswell as on the job. My wife and I were fightingmore and more about my late night happy hours

22

and weekend hangovers. I lost interest in familyevents. My children and wife turned away fromme. On the job, I started to have problemsworking with my peers, and I knew my perfor-mance level was dropping.

Even though my boss did not detect it, my use ofalcohol was becoming a problem. After a very lateevening of drinking and getting into a fight withone of my coworkers, I realized I just could not

May/June 1990


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continue drinking the way I had been for the lastfew years. That night, with blood on my face fromthe fight and arriving home to an upset wife, Idecided the time had come. The next day I referredmyself to the treatment center.

Dr. Mason: How did you feel when you firstreferred yourself for treatment of your alcoholrelated disorder?

Aviator K.: The next day as I was going throughthe paperwork, the phone calls and the logistics ofgetting into the program, I felt relieved I hadfinally made the decision to correct my problem. Iwas ready to learn how to drink socially. Once Igot into the program, they told me I would neverbe able to drink again. I was disturbed for probably the first 2 or 3 days. I just couldn't believe thatwould ever happen. But after going through a28-day program, being introduced to AlcoholicsAnonymous (AA) and learning some things aboutmyself-I slowly realized and understood the problem of alcoholism. That is, the only drink I havethe power to say no to is the first drink.

After the first drink, I have no control over mydrinking. The change was hard to accept. I knew itwould be a challenge, but that's what AA is allabout.Dr. Mason: What were your thoughts when you

first completed the alcohol treatment program?Aviator K.: During those 28 days, I achieved the

first 28 days of sobriety I probably had since I was16 years old. I was excited. When I walked out ofthe treatment center to go home though, I wasscared. I no longer was in the safe bounds of thetreatment center and now maintaining my sobrietywas totally up to me. The first steps I made wereto get into a local AA support group and to get asponsor. Then I talked with my wife about myfeelings. She was very supportive because, believeme, she wanted my sobriety as much as, if notmore than, I.

Dr. Mason: Did you ever feel you could go backto controlled or limited drinking of alcohol?

Aviator K.: When I got out of the treatmentcenter, I felt fairly confident in the new sobriety I


had gained-along with what I had learned in thetreatment center about myself, the disease of alcoholism and AA. However, in the back of my mind,I had this nagging little question: Could I really gofor the rest of my life without drinking again? Wasthis all really just the result of irresponsibility orwas I truly diseased like I had learned? About 4months after I got out of the center, I startedtapering of f from my AA meetings. Instead ofgoing 4 or 5 times a week, I dropped of f to 2 or 3and eventually 1 night a week. Then I didn't go forabout a month, which led into the Christmasholidays and all those reasons to celebrate.

Yes, I started drinking again and desperatelyhoped I could control myself. It took me about 6weeks to realize everything I had learned aboutalcohol abuse and the disease was all true. I wastruly an alcoholic. I decided to quit again. I gotback into AA. I now have more than a year andone-half of sobriety. I fully understand just howpowerful the disease is and I cannot drink again.

Dr. Mason: How long do you feel an aircrewmember should be grounded during the initialphase of alcohol rehabilitation?

Aviator K.: Well, I think that is a tough questionthat has to be handled on an individual basis.Alcoholism is such a powerful disease in the way itworks on the subconscious. However, after goingthrough my ordeal and learning how it affectedme, I think there needs to be some trial period ofgrounding. For individuals who voluntarily enteredthe program, the periods of grounding should bebrief times during the initial phases of their treatment programs. For individuals who are referredinto the program or who tend to deny they arealcoholics, the periods of grounding should belonger. Depending on their recovery and circumstances, different timeframes should be developedfor different individuals.

Dr. Mason: What is the importance of continuing in an active sobriety program such as AA?

Aviator K.: In my opinion, the only wayanalcoholic maintains abstinence or sobriety isthrough the lifelong continuance in a sobriety

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AVIATORS AND ALCOHOL, continued

"For individualswho voluntarilyenter the [alcoholtreatment]program, ...periods ofgrounding shouldbe brief . . . . [Forthose who] denythey arealcoholics, . . .periods ofgrounding shouldbe longer."

program; a 12-step program such as AA; orperhaps a church that has a similar program. Thedisease of alcoholism is ever present subconsciously. People who get away from the supportgroup of AA or a similar program tend to forgetthe reasons why they entered the program in thefirst place. They fall into the trap that I did,thinking maybe they really aren't diseased. So tomaintain sobriety, I feel that alcoholics staying in aprogram is important.

Dr. Mason: What do you see as the key toprevention of alcohol-related disorders?Aviator K.: Considering what I learned in the

program and what I have seen in myself, I stronglybelieve I was born an alcoholic. I remember when Iwas a child of 5, 6, 8 years old, my parents andrelatives got together and drank beer. I stoodaround and asked my father or anyone for a tasteof beer. I loved the taste. I loved the feeling I got,

24

even at that young age. I was 14 the first time I gotdrunk, really drunk. I drank until I could not standup. I could barely crawl. I got sick. I continued todrink afterward just because I liked the feeling, thebuzz that was going through me.

I would say individuals who question whether ornot they are alcoholics should practice abstinence.They may be able to abstain on their own. But ifnot, they may need to consider getting into aprogram. Abstinence is the only way to preventalcohol abuse.

Dr. Mason: Why do people drink to the point ofbecoming dependent on alcohol-that is, why areyou an alcoholic and others are not?

Aviator K.: First, I am not a doctor, but what Iam saying is very basic and accurate as I understand it.

The reason why some people are alcoholic andothers not has been an issue studied by universitiesand medical agencies. These medical people attribute alcoholism to a chemical imbalance ofhormones, called endorphins and enkephalins. Thisimbalance is present at birth or can be brought onby long-term heavy drinking or prolonged stress.They can diagnose alcoholism with 100 percentaccuracy on any dead person by cutting open thebrain and looking for TIQ, a by-product of ethanol. During a drinking session, a person's liverturns alcohol into something similar to vinegar,which is dissipated through the sweat glands, urineand breath until that person sobers up. When analcoholic drinks, the body goes through the sameprocess, except for TIQ. TIQ attaches itself to thebrain receptors where endorphins and enkephalinsare normally found, and TIQ stays there. Over theyears, TIQ builds up into larger quantities. Themore the chemical is on the brain, the more of acompulsion one has to keep drinking once thatperson starts a drinking session. It controls theamount one consumes. This is why alcoholicsprogressively get worse with their drinking habitsover time, usually a period of years.

Genealogical studies have identified that alcoholism clusters in families, but alcoholism does notoccur in every generation. In my case, I am the

May/June 1990


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oldest of nine children and I am the only one ofmy brothers, sisters and parents who is alcoholdependent. But I do have other relatives on mymother and father's side who were alcohol dependent. I pray my children won't be, but there is nodefinite pattern as to who will get it in a familywhere it has been identified.

Dr. Mason: In summary, do you have anyclosing comments to fellow aircrewmembers?

Aviator K.: Yes, and this applies to anyone, notjust aircrewmembers. I suspected I had a problemand finally, after much hardship, had to take careof my problem. Now that I have been in theprogram for a while, been sober and the fear ofnot taking a drink again is gone, there has been a

100 percent improvement in my lifestyle. I am notafraid of going places anymore where there is nobooze. The people I have met in my support groupare the best friends I have ever had. They all havethe same problems I have had. There is a commonbond among the people who are helping themselvesrecover from this disease. I don't miss alcohol atall. It just takes acknowledging you have a problemand the desire to stop, to beat it. Once you do beatit, you will fall in love with yourself again. Youwill get back your self-esteem. Your family andsocial life improves almost daily. I suggest anybodywho is thinking or has that little question "Do Ihave a drinking problem?" in the back of theirmind, probably do. Help comes very easy-youjust have to make a decision to ask for it.

The U.S. Army Aeromedical Center, Ft. Rucker, AL, and the waiver authorities at the U.S. TotalArmy Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA, and the National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC, activelysupport the return of aviators with a history of successful alcoholism rehabilitation to full-flying duties.The period of grounding is individually tailored to the progress of each aviator and ranges from 3 to 18months. Those who voluntarily present themselves for care are usually returned to full-flying duties in lessthan 6 months.

Our guest aviator in this article was grounded for 5 months and is currently flying Army aircraft without restrictions. The U.S. Army Aeromedical Center is working with the waiver authorities to reducesome of the administrative requirements that prolong the current period of grounding. The goal is to de-velop an effective treatment program for aviators with a minimum period of grounding.

The current policy is as follows: A via tors with a medical diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence aredisqualified and require a waiver to return to full-flying duties. A waiver will be recommended when theaviator does the following: initiates successful participation in a drug and alcohol treatment program; ab-stains from the use of alcohol; makes a commitment to an active, ongoing sobriety program, such as AA;and submits letters of support from the treating program director, local flight surgeon and the chain ofcommand. A majority of aviators disqualified for alcohol abuse or dependence have met these require-ments and are currently flying, maybe even in the seat next to you.

The Aviation Medicine Reporlls a bimonthly reporl from the Aviation Medicine Consultant of TSG. Please fOfW8rd sub/ect matter of currentaeromedical importance for editorial consideration to U.S. Army Aeromedical Center, ATTN: HSXY-ADJ, Forl Rucker, AL 36362-5333.

u.s. Army Aviation Digest 25


28/68

Microburst-A deadly weather phenomenonHowever, the high cost of this radar systemmakes it an unlikely candidate for implementationat a large number of airfields in the near future.Most Doppler radars currently in use, and thosethat will be fielded in the 1990s, are used forsevere storm surveillance and have only asecondary capability to spot microbursts.

A few short years ago, the term "microburst"was not a part of most people's vocabulary. On 9July 1982, that changed dramatically when aBoeing 727 crashed at New Orleans InternationalAirport, killing 145 people on the airliner and 8others on the ground. Then on 2 August 1985, aLockheed L1011 on approach to DallaslFt. WorthInternational with 163 people on board entered aquickly developing thunderstorm, attempted a goaround, struck a hill and crashed onto a state

A high percentage of microburst relatedmishaps and incidents have occurred duringJune, July and August, between the hours ofhighway, claiming 134 lives, including 1 person on 1400 and 1900. In every case, thunderstorms orthe ground. Investigation revealed both these

aircraft were victims of microburst induced windshear.

Primarily because of these accidents,microbursts have become a part of our nationalweather consciousness, taking their placealongside other such violent weather phenomenaas tornadoes and hurricanes.

Although, as its name suggests, a microburstis small-1 to 3 miles laterally-and of shortduration-5 minutes or less-it can be lethal,particularly to aircraft during the landing andtakeoff phases of flight. The lateral wind shearproduced by a microburst can result in a switchfrom a headwind to a tailwind of as much as 50knots.

Microbursts are extremely difficult to detect,and conventional weather radars cannot be reliedon as a means to detect and avoid them. A 1982Joint Airport Weather Study of the FederalAviation Administration's low-level wind shearalert system in use at some major U.S. airportsindicated the system was not effective indetecting microburst wind shear (MBWS). Thiswas true primarily because the surface sensorswere spaced too far apart, allowing the small,highly transient microburst to pass undetectedbetween the sensors. Terminal Doppler radars,which are built and operated for the primarypurpose of wind shear detection, have thecapability to detect developing microbursts.

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intense convective activity were in the area. Andalmost without exception, there existed someknown precursor event or warning of impendingdanger. For example, a Learjet that immediatelypreceded the L1011 at DallaslFt. Worthencountered wind shear on approach. The pilottold investigators that he did not report theapparent wind shear because he had his handsfull trying to recover from a 25 knot loss inairspeed and a rapid loss of altitude duringapproach. His plane had not completely clearedthe runway before the L1011 crashed. If the pilotof the Learjet had been able to report hisencounter with wind shear to air traffic controlpersonnel, there is a possibility that the crash ofthe L1011 might have been averted.

Although much has been written in the pastfew years about microbursts and their effect onflight, most of the information has been directedtoward fixed-wing aircraft, particularly largecommercial aircraft. However, while attending theAir Force Command and Staff College, MajorEugene E. Mace, * an Army aviator, prepared areport on microburst induced wind shear that, inaddition to exploring the history of MBWSdetection, also includes special considerations ofhelicopter operations in relation to microburstinduced wind shear. The following information hasbeen extracted from that report.LTC Eugene E. Mace retired from the Army in January of this year.He is presently flying for Northwest Airlines.

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Helicopter Operationsin aMicroburst EnvironmentM I C R O B U R S T WIND wind shear is hazard

ous to helicopters for basically the same reasonsit's hazardous to fixed-wing aircraft. It affects bothtypes of aircraft by a systematic loss of lift thatoccurs following downdrafts and tailwind conditions, which are undetected by the crew until theaircraft has penetrated the wind shear. The major-ity of MBWS could be handled by most aircraft ataltitude (above 1,000 feet); however, encountersbelow 500 feet above ground level (AGL) can posea significant hazard to any kind of aircraft, including helicopters.

Admittedly, no documented research has beenconducted dealing specifically with helicopters andMBWS; however, a report by the Committee onLow Altitude Wind Shear and Its Hazard toAviation stated, "Wind shear represents a hazardto all aircraft, ranging from small general aviationaircraft to swept wing jet transports."

In one incident, a helicopter was in cruise flightat 1,200 feet when it encountered a localized heavyrainshower. The aircraft rapidly lost 600 feet ofaltitude even though the crew held maximum continuous power. The loss of altitude was attributedto the rapidly flowing column of air of a descending micro burst . Although this crew had sufficientaltitude in which to arrest the helicopter's descent,that may not have been true if it had been engagedin terrain flight.

Although the effects of microbursts on helicopters would not be identical to those on fixed-wingaircraft, they should be similar since both moveairfoils through the atmosphere to create lift andboth have the same three axes of motion (pitch,roll and yaw). The most critical aspect of loss oflift situations involving fixed-wing aircraft is asudden degradation of airspeed that corresponds toa drastic loss of lift and altitude. Any decrease inairspeed, such as that experienced in a sudden


tailwind condition, results in a corresponding lossof lift if all other values remain constant. Helicopters similarly are affected by tailwinds, especially ifthey are at or near their power limits. In additionto the loss of lift that accompanies the tailwindcondition, the downflow in the center of themicro burst also contr ibutes to the overall loss oflift. This occurs because as the aircraft enters thedownflow, it pitches over, which decreases theangle of attack.Effects on :Fixed-Wing Aircraft

The following step-by-step discussion of an airplane penetrating a microburst while on finalapproach and immediately after takeoff will help inunderstanding exactly what happens and why ithappens. It will also provide a basis for understanding how the same principles apply to a helicopter under the same conditions:Encounter on final approach (figure 1). As theairplane approaches the initial outflow of themicroburst, an uncommanded increase in airspeedand angle of attack initially causes the plane topitch up and climb (a). In response, the pilotreduces power and angle of attack to remain on hisapproach path. Those descent rates are now aggravated as the airplane encounters the downdraftportion of the microburst, which further reducesthe angle of attack and increases the descent rate(b). The aircraft now encounters the tailwind out-flow segment, which again decreases the angle ofattack and effectively reduces the indicated airspeed(lAS), causing a further reduction in lift (c). Atthis point, depending on the altitude, the only hopefor recovery is to add maximum power and increase the angle of attack to the maximum liftcondition. Unfortunately, a common mistake madeby pilots at (c) is to lower the nose of the aircraftto regain the reference airspeed, which may, de-

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FIGURE 1: Microburst encounter by fixed-wing aircraft during final approach.

FIGURE 2: Microburst encounter by fixed-wing aircraft immediately after takeoff.

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pending on the aircraft's altitude, make recoveryimpossible.Encounter immediately after takeoff (figure 2).Immediately after takeoff, an airplane's power andangle of attack are much closer to the maximumlimits than in the previous situation. For thisreason, a severe micro burst may be more than theairplane can overcome, as was the case of the 727in New Orleans in 1982. In the following situation,the airplane has just taken of f and encounters thedownburst segment of the micro burst (a). As in theprevious example, the airplane will lose lift becauseof a decreased angle of attack followed by afurther reduction of lift due to a loss of airspeed asthe aircraft passes through the center of the microburst into the tailwind outflow segment (b). Depending on the actual altitude at which the airplaneencounters the microburst and the height of theterrain and obstacles, the pilot's only chance forrecovery rests with an immediate recognition of theproblem at or before (a). This was portrayedgraphically in the New Orleans accident when the727 encountered the shear at 163 feet about 6seconds after takeoff. In a matter of seconds, the727 lost 110 feet of altitude and airspeed decreasedfrom a maximum of 162 knots 47 seconds aftertakeoff down to 144 knots 54 seconds after takeoff. Even though the 727 was climbing at approximately 361 feet per minute when it first impacted a52-foot tree, it was descending more than 1,200feet per minute just 5 seconds before the firstimpact. In his investigation of the accident, Dr. T.Fujita, Department of the Geophysical Sciences,University of Chicago, determined that "the loss ofaltitude inside the micro burst was attributed twothirds to the tailwind and one third to thedownflow.' ,Effects on Rotary-Wing AircraftIn either of the two previous conditions, ahelicopter would be affected in a similar mannerbecause the same basic aerodynamic principlesapply. What is not known is to what degree thesame micro burst would have affected a helicopter.When comparing the effects of micro burs t windshear on the two different categories of aircraft,the following factors, as a minimum, should beconsidered:Stability. In the case of nonstability equippedairplanes and helicopters, the airplane would tendto be affected the least by micro burst conditions

U.S. Army Aviation Digest

due to inherent stability. However, many modernhelicopters are equipped with stability augmentedsystems capable of providing artificial dynamicstability. These systems, along with built-in designfactors, reduce helicopter crew workloads to aboutthe same as those experienced by airplane pilots.For this reason, micro burst conditions would havealmost the same effect on both categories ofaircraft.Power application response time. Some airplanes, particularly those powered by jet engines,have a very apparent lag time from throttle movement to engine response. In the case of a microburst encounter at traffic pattern altitudes, this lagtime may be critical. Helicopters, on the otherhand, are operated at full throttle (governor controlled) throughout the normal flight envelope withpower linked directly to the rotor blades (angle ofattack). In other words, when a helicopter pilotadds or decreases collective pitch to change therotor blades' angle of attack, the engine power(torque) is reset at the same time. In most situations, power applications up to maximum limitscause no perceivable engine droop, and response isalmost instantaneous with collective movement. Asa result, the helicopter, with all other conditionsequal, would seem to have an advantage overfixed-wing aircraft.Stall characteristics. The helicopter, by virtue ofits whirling rotor blades (which are maintained at aconstant velocity by a governor), is capable ofreducing its forward speed to zero without stalling.This ability to vary airspeed across a much widerspectrum enables a helicopter to convert airspeed toaltitude to a larger degree than an airplane withoutrisking a stall. This capability gives the helicopterpilot greater flexibility when faced with an inadvertent micro burst encounter.Typical mission profiles. A unique characteristicof a helicopter is its ability to hover, and the hovermission serves as the mainstay of helicopter operations. Typical hover missions include terrain flight(including nap of the earth (NOE, pinnacle andconfined-area operations, sling loads and variousrescue missions. Since most of these missions occurat relatively low altitudes (below 200 feet AGL)and in close proximity to terrain and obstacles,micro burst encounters are extremely critical. Inaddition to reduced reaction times because of thelow altitude, available engine power is also aproblem. A helicopter operating at a hover or

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FIGURE 3: Microburst encounter by helicopter during final approach.

FIGURE 4: Microburst encounter by helicopter during takeoff.

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below effective translational lift (ETL) is operatingmuch closer to its maximum allowable powerlimits. Therefore, it has less of a margin of powerto allow it to fly out of critical conditions.

One other factor that could impact on helicoptermissions to a greater degree than many airplanemissions is the remote areas from which helicopterstypically operate. These areas usually are devoid ofmodern pilot aids such as radar, wind shear indicators or even weather observations.

Following are recommended pilot response actions for three types of microburst encounter:Situation i-Encounter on final approach (figure3). This situation involves a helicopter on finalapproach. The microburst is located Y2 mile fromthe approach end of the runway and is centeredalong the approach path. As the helicopter proceeds on final, the initial phases of the approachare normal. The first indication of impendingproblems occurs when the helicopter enters heavyrain at about 400 feet. The initial outburst winds of24 to 30 knots will cause the nose to pitch up,along with a corresponding increase in lAS. Theestablished descent rate for holding the glide pathwill either lessen or the helicopter will actuallybegin climbing (a). At this point, without priorwarning that micro bursts were in the area, orwithout a Doppler radar warning from the ground,it would be highly improbable that any pilot wouldbe able to correctly determine that the initial stagesof micro burst penetration were beginning. Normalpilot responses would consist of a power reductionand a reestablished pitch attitude to regain theapproach airspeed and glide path. As the helicopterapproaches 300 feet, it passes through the initialoutburst and enters the core of the downflowingmicroburst (b), which would be perceived by thepilot as a noticeable sinking sensation, with acorresponding descent indication on the verticalspeed indicator (VSI). A very apparent pitch-overwould also probably occur as the helicopter entersthe down flow segment. Once the helicopter passesthrough the core of the microburst and into thetailwind outflow (c), a drop in lAS would occur,further aggravating the descent and making recovery exceedingly difficult. The combined negativelift effects produced by the down flow and thetailwinds are sometimes too much to overcome.For example, in a real-life case, a 727 was unableto overcome a sudden headwind to tailwind condition that reduced its lAS by 16 knots in 7 seconds,


combined with a 22-foot-per-minute downdraft,which caused it to crash 2,400 feet short of therunway. In another instance, an L I 0 II initiated amissed approach at 400 feet because of the samemicroburst conditions. The LIOII descended towithin 60 feet of the ground before it beganclimbing. For these reasons, it is imperative thatthe microburst conditions (sudden increases ordecreases in airspeed with corresponding changes inperformance) be recognized as early in the approach as possible so that a timely recovery (missedapproach) can be conducted. The recovery shouldconsist of maximum power at best rate-of-climbattitude until clear of the downburst conditions.Situation 2-Encounter immediately after takeoff(figure 4). This situation involves a helicopterengaged in a slingload mission. The takeoff (a) ismade in visual flight rules conditions. At about 100feet, the helicopter encounters rain, which necessitates the use of the windshield wipers (b), but doesnot enter instrument meteorological conditions. Atapproximately the same moment, the lAS suddenlydrops from 80 to 40 knots in about 5 seconds alongwith a noticeable sinking sensation with a corresponding descent on the VSI (c). Concerned withthe loss of airspeed, the normal pilot response is tolower the nose to regain the lost airspeed. As in thefirst situation, the recommended pilot response isto apply maximum power and set the pitch attitudeon maximum climb attitude regardless of lAS. Inthe case of flight-director-equipped helicopters, thego-around mode would be invaluable since it couldbe selected for immediate pitch attitude reference.I f the descent cannot be arrested, the load shouldbe jettisoned without hesitation. In this situation,the normal headwind, and to some degree thedownburst portion of the microburst, was not afactor because the microburst occurred adjacent tothe takeoff point rather than directly in line withthe flight path.Situation 3-Encounter during NOE flight. Thissituation involves a helicopter engaged in NOEflight. As stated previously, the effects of a microburst on a hovering helicopter are probably moresevere than if the helicopter were in forward flightabove ETL. The first indication of the impendingmicroburst is a dust cloud about I mile to thefront, followed immediately by a gusty disturbancein the trees surrounding the helicopter. During theinitial outburst portion of the microbust, the helicopter will derive increased lift because of the

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greater efficiency of the rotor system interactingwith the outburst winds. The hovering helicopter'slAS will increase in response to the outflow and,depending on the magnitude of the microburst,may pass through ETL while at a hover. This willnecessitate a substantial power reduction to main-tain a constant altitude and may not be a problemunless the helicopter's flight path continues throughthe remainder of the micro burst. Probably thesafest maneuver at this point of the penetration isto land and remain at operating rpm until thedisturbance ceases. I f a landing cannot be madebecause of the terrain, an abrupt course changemay be best to avoid the core of the micro burst.Care should be taken not to expose the helicopterto critical wind azimuths, especially below ETL.The least desirable action would be to attempt toclimb out through or along a path parallel to themicro burst . This action would expose the helicopterto the full intensity of the wind shear.

Although the preceding is highly speculative, itattempts to describe probable sequences of events

Do microbursts present a danger to Army Aviation operations, or do Army pilots simply "stayon the ground" when conditions exist that mightproduce this kind of weather phenomena?Although there has been progress in detection,microburst encounters can still happen.In April 1986, an Army U-21 Ute was approaching Atlanta International Airport. The tower reported wind shear, but the aircraft was already onshort final and committed to touchdown. It encountered severe wind shear, causing it to touchdown left-wing low, allowing the propeller blades

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with different micro burst encounters. In all threeencounter situations, early detection of the micro-burst is important for successful penetration oravoidance to be possible. Aircrews should be espe-cially alert for any danger signal that may provideclues that a micro burst encounter is likely . Oncemicro burst contact is suspected (whether on finalor during takeoff), maximum power should beapplied along with a pitch attitude that providesbest rate of climb. In the hover situation, flightthrough or near the center of a microburst would,in all likelihood, be extremely difficult to cope withbecause of the relatively close proximity of theterrain. As in the other two situations, earlyrecognition of micro burst danger signals increasesthe pilot's odds of coping with the wind shear orsuccessfully avoiding it. I f a microburst is con-tacted during a hover, every effort should be madeto land. I f a landing is not possible, the center ofthe microburst should be identified and avoided.No attempt should be made to climb out throughthe center of the micro burst.

of the left engine to hit the ground. Fortunately,the only damage was to the propeller blades.Last year's wind damage to Army aircraft at Ft.

Hood, TX, Ft. Polk, LA and Eastover, SC, and thisyear in Germany makes it clear that nature stillholds the winning hand even when aircraft are onthe ground and presumably safe. Being preparedfor severe weather, particularly during the springand summer months, is the best way to avoidbeing caught in situations that can destroy aircraft and possibly take the lives of crews as well.

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AH-64 Apaches at Hood Army Airfield.

ON 13 MAY 1989, a severeweather phenomenon known as aMesoscale convective complex occurred at Ft. Hood, TX. Twohundred and forty-five unhangared aircraft were exposed tonearly 100 miles per hour (mph)winds.The post's aviation communityinitially estimated damage to 200aircraft. Eyewitnesses describedCH-47D Chinooks and AH-64Apaches turned upside-down, andmain rotor blades snapped orbent like toothpicks. This stormwas the most catastrophic peacetime event in Army Aviation history. It hit so suddenly that oneAH-64A crew was rolled onto the


side in their helicopter while attempting to shut down, and hadto be rescued by ground crews.U.S. Army Aviation SystemsCommand (AVSCOM) personnelquickly determined that damageexceeded the capability of Ft.Hood to evaluate, and requesteddepot assistance. Officials at Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD),TX, reacted immediately. An advance party arrived 14 May toprovide an initial assessment. Theremainder of the team arrivedand began work on 15 May.

The team was comprised of 15civilian pre-shop analysis technical inspectors (WG-l1), officerin-charge Captain Thomas J.

O'Brien and III Corps/CCAD li-aison officer CW2 Larry Simone.The inspectors had an averageexperience level of 20 years inaircraft maintenance.Planting the CCAD Flag

The advance party arrived byautomobile around 1600 hours,15 May. They confirmed initialestimates of the damage. U.S.Army Materiel Command (AMC)personnel tasked the team (asmembers of an A VSCOM taskforce) to provide any assistancerequired to reconstitute IIICorps/Ft. Hood's aviation assets.The AVSCOM task force wascomprised of the CCAD team,

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AVSCOM logistics assistance representatives (LARs), engineersfrom A VSCOM Directorate ofEngineering, and techniciansfrom A VSCOM Directorate ofMaintenance-a total of 50personnel.The Task at Hand

All exposed aircraft had experienced a catastrophic event andrequired safety-of-flight inspections . In addition, AVSCOM required an accurate estimate of thedamage and a projected repaircost as soon as possible.

To accomplish this, A VSCOMapproved combining an estimatedcost of damages (EC

Documents

Army Aviation Digest - May 1990