ASEM: Looking Back, Looking Forward

ASEM: Looking Back, Looking ForwardAuthor(s): YEO LAY HWEESource: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2000), pp. 113-144Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798481 .

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Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 22, Number 1, April 2000

ASEM: Looking Back,

Looking Forward

YEOLAYHWEE

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is a forum and a process

involving the fifteen EU member states and the Commission, and ten East Asian countries. It is a product of the emergence

of East Asia as an economic powerhouse in the 1990s, and the commercial embrace of Asia by many European countries.

However, with the advent of the Asian economic crisis, the economic motivations underlying ASEM could not but be

questioned. ASEM has seemingly survived the worst of the Asian economic crisis. But what lies ahead? Can ASEM continue

without a fundamental reassessment of its basic rationale? This article is an attempt to chronicle the genesis and development of ASEM, and examine the challenges that lie ahead.

Introduction

ASEM is the acronym for the Asia-Europe Meeting, a co-operative framework established in March 1996 between Europeans as represented

by the fifteen European Union (EU) member states plus the European Commission, and Asians as represented by ten East and Southeast Asian

states comprising China, Japan, South Korea, Brunei, Indonesia,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEM was to be a symbol of Asia's and Europe's rediscovery of each other

after a long period of relative neglect. It was first conceived to be the

bridge between Asians and Europeans. The declared aim of ASEM was

to reinforce the weak link in the triangle of relations between East

Asia, North America, and Western Europe. These three regions were

then depicted as the growth engines driving the world economy. While

113



114 Yeo Lay Hwee

transatlantic and transpacific ties were well-established, strong ties between Europe and Asia were missing. To fill this gap, the idea of an Asia-Europe Meeting was initiated by Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in October 1994.

There were many reasons behind the alacrity with which the idea of ASEM was taken up. Among them were the development of East Asia into an economic powerhouse, the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, the fears of a fortress Europe, and mutual interest in maintaining an open and multilateral trading system and countering American unilateralism. It was further argued that a balanced relationship among these regions would promote and ensure greater stability and prosperity in the world.

The inaugural Summit Meeting of ASEM in Bangkok in March 1996

got off to a good start. The range of initiatives and activities that followed

engendered an ongoing process involving summit meetings, ministerial and senior officials meetings, and also expert meetings in various functional areas of co-operation. All these are now collectively referred to as the ASEM process. The plethora of activities in the wake of the

Bangkok Summit reflected the initial enthusiasm and optimism of the

parties involved. However, scepticism with regard to the long-term sustainability of the process, and criticisms about ASEM being more

form than substance, have also been commonplace. Below is an attempt to re-examine the underlying rationale of ASEM

and explain its genesis and development thus far. It has been four years since the first Asia-Europe Summit was launched in Bangkok. What has been ASEM's achievements and what are the challenges that lie ahead in view of the various changes now taking place in Europe and Asia?

An Idea Whose Time Has Come?

Was ASEM a product of the post-Cold War world? Hans Maull and Akihito Tanaka believe that the realities of the changing power structure in the post-Cold War environment provide the backdrop for ASEM.

More specifically, they offer the following reasons behind the genesis of ASEM:

The growing complexity of power relations in a post-Cold War world where military power has lost its old dominance, and economic power and other forms of "soft power" have grown in importance.

The rise of new actors such as China, leading to a general diffusion and dissipation of power in world politics.



ASEM: Looking Back, Looking Forward 115

The growing interdependence of foreign policy and domestic affairs.

The emergence of Pacific Asia as one of the three centres of the world economy and world politics.

A change in the geopolitical agenda where the management of adversarial great power rivalry is giving way to the prevention and management of serious internal disorder.

The rise of new regional groupings and transborder regions such as APEC, NAFTA (North American Free TYade Agreement), and their growing importance.1

While not disputing Maull and Tanaka's overall thrust for the rationale behind ASEM, one is inclined to narrow down the specifics to the

increasing economic dynamism of East Asia in the 1980s through to the 1990s, the trend towards regionalism in the world political economy, and the commercial race into Asian markets by Western countries.

The emergence of East Asia as one of the centres of the world

economy seemed to be on track in the early 1990s. In 1992, East Asia accounted for 24 per cent of global production compared to 35 per cent for the EU, and 28 per cent for North America. The East Asian economies had been enjoying dynamic growth since the mid-1980s

following a surge in Japanese investments because of the massive revaluation of the yen after the 1985 Plaza Accord. According to World Bank figures, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in East Asia from 1991 to 1993 was 8.7 per cent on average. On the basis of growth rates recorded during 1978-91, many economists, including those from the World Bank, projected that East Asia's GDP would overtake that of North America in the year 2003, and that of Western Europe in 2011.2

While East Asia was growing at a dizzying pace, both the United States and the countries of Europe were experiencing a general slowdown. This led to the emergence of what Francois Godement, in his book The Asian Renaissance, called "the new age of mercantilism". To try and revive their own economies and gain a foothold in the Asian economies, most Western countries embarked on a "frantic commercial race towards Asia" and "mutual competition for contracts".3 The European Union, stimulated by this competition and concerned with

Europe's relatively weak response to the emerging economic prospects in Asia, began a process of re-assessing its relations with and roles in Asia. This culminated in the July 1994 communications on "Towards a New Asia Strategy", calling for greater engagement in Asia. Several



116 Yeo Lay Hwee

European member states were also in the process of redefining their outlooks on Asia. In particular, "Britain's impending withdrawal from

Hongkong pushed the government to rethink its Asia policy, just as the wearing out of the Indochinese rationale of French policy stimulated France's new Asian strategy...".4 Germany was also reassessing its relations with Asia with its own paper, "Concept on Asia", in late 1993.

The emergence of APEC was another important catalytic factor. APEC was an immediate response from the East Asian economies (in this case, including Australia and New Zealand) to the growing regionalism in the world economy. It was seen as a logical response to meet the challenges of EC92 and NAFTA. When APEC was first launched in 1989, it was ignored by the Europeans. Europe only woke

up to the APEC challenge when the first APEC Summit was held in Seattle in 1993. For the first time in post-war history, a major inter national meeting took place without any European presence. The

European Commission sought to have the European Union (EU) join APEC in some form, but was refused. The idea therefore of an Asia

Europe summit became attractive as it offered a sort of conduit to the APEC process, as then, nine out of the ten Asian ASEM members were also APEC members.

On the side of the Asians, attracting more European investments and tapping European expertise and technology to sustain the economic boom in East Asia was one of the key practical calculations. Trade between the two regions had increased over the years, but the same could not be said of investments. Figures from the Report by the

European Commission and the UNCTAD Division on Transnational

Corporations and Investments showed that while EU investments in some parts of Asia have been growing, on aggregate, European invest

ments in Asia dropped from 5.1 per cent of the EU's total foreign direct investment (FDI) in 1990 to 2.8 per cent in 1993. This drop in investments from the EU was a major concern for many East Asian economies.

In addition, because much of the dynamism of the East Asian economies is based on an export-oriented, trade-led development strategy, the continued access to European markets is therefore an

important consideration. Lingering fears of a "fortress Europe" shutting out Asian exports from its single market; and uncertainties about a

Europe consumed with its internal affairs such as enlargement, and the implications of a single currency, also provided strong impetus for the East Asian countries to court the Europeans.

Concern was also growing among the Asians and Europeans about American unilateralism. As the Cold War era of military conflicts and

ideological rivalry faded, economic issues gained precedence. Economic




competitiveness is increasingly viewed as the essential foundation of national interests and security. This was especially prominent in the

foreign policy debates of the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In focusing on the pursuit of specific economic interests, the United States is less willing to provide unconditional support for the liberal international economic order. This is, in part, because it believes it can no longer afford to do so, and in part because the anti-communist

geopolitical rationale for doing so no longer exists. The signals that the management of the U.S. economy and polity have sent to other

players in the international economy have caused a questioning of continued U.S. commitment to multilateralism. Having each other as active partners was seen as one possible way of countering this

unhealthy tendency. Being major traders in the global economy, Asia and Europe both have an interest in maintaining an open and multilateral trading system.

These broad factors ? a wavering U.S. commitment to a multilateral

framework, the dynamism of the East Asian economies, and the potential regionalization of the global economy

? interacted with the individual concerns and calculations of the EU and the countries of East Asia,

leading to Europe and Asia rediscovering each other.

ASEM's Development and Achievements

Against this background of the growing self-confidence of the East Asian economies and coinciding mutual interests of key Asian and EU players, the EU was sold on the idea of a meeting to bring Asia-Europe relations on par with transatlantic and transpacific relations. Europe and Asia had in the past lacked a proper framework for exchanging views on

issues of common concern and addressing matters of co-operation. Much of the Asia-Europe dialogue (with the exception of the ASEAN-EU dialogue) had occurred in other multilateral fora, and had tended to be overshadowed by their respective dialogues with the United States.

Thus, the idea of an exclusive Asia-Europe meeting which would allow the Europeans to deepen their relationship with Asia and to complement other inter-regional dialogues the EU had with other partners, was

welcomed. Once this idea was endorsed, preparations proceeded in

earnest, and within a year, the inaugural Asia-Europe Meeting took

place in Bangkok. That meeting was hailed a success. For the Asians, the political symbolism of having sixteen European leaders journey to

Bangkok was in and of itself important. It was to be a symbol of Asia's new status on the world stage, and Europe's recognition of that status. It was also to be a statement of faith that the two regions could find new ways of working together to set the stage for a new framework



118 Yeo Lay Hwee

for the post-Cold War order.5 For the Europeans, the summit was seen as a success as it concluded with a whole list of initiatives and follow

up actions. Concrete decisions on some recommendations were taken,

giving the European leaders enough to assure the public at home that it was all worthwhile. A process was established when the following commitments were taken:

to hold a meeting of ASEM Foreign Ministers in February 1997

(Singapore) and a meeting of ASEM Economic Ministers in November 1997 (Japan);

to hold the second ASEM summit in London in 1998, and the third in Seoul in 2000;

to form a Government and Private Sector Working Group to

prepare an Investment Promotion Action Plan;

to inaugurate the Asia-Europe Business Forum in France in October 1996 and to hold the next forum in Thailand in 1997;

to create an Asia-Europe Foundation to promote cultural and intellectual exchanges;

to create an Asia-Europe University Programme to foster an

exchange of students and academics;

to create an Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre

(AEETC) in Thailand; and

to prepare an Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework to establish the long-term principles of co-operation.6

Apart from the above specific commitments, several other generic proposals were also included in the Chairman's Statement:

to strengthen political dialogue;

to enhance existing dialogues on general security issues through the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference;

to promote the effective reform and greater democratization of the United Nations;

to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear

weapons globally;

to generate greater trade and investment flows between Asia and Europe;




to strike an economic partnership that is based on common commitments to the market economy, an open multilateral

trading system, non-discriminatory liberalization, and open regionalism;

to work towards a common WTO (World Tirade Organization) agenda at its first Ministerial Meeting in Singapore;

to intensify science and technology exchanges, particularly in

agriculture, information technology, energy and transport and to strengthen co-operation in education and training;

to improve development co-operation, with priority given to

alleviating poverty, promoting the role of women, and combating AIDS; and

to co-operate in combating drug trafficking, money laundering, and illegal immigration.

Assessments of the achievements of ASEM are varied and contrast

ing. Going by face value, the achievements of ASEM might appear considerable as almost all the specific commitments undertaken during the first Summit meeting in Bangkok have been realized or even

surpassed. Two ASEM Foreign Ministers Meetings and two Economic Ministers Meetings have taken place so far. In addition, ASEM Finance Ministers have met twice during this short period of four years. The second Summit was held in London amidst the Asian economic crisis. There were initial fears that the Asian crisis might derail the nascent ASEM process. This, however, did not happen. The London Summit reaffirmed the commitment to make ASEM a success. An ASEM Trust Fund was set up to help the crisis-hit countries in the restructuring and reform of their financial sectors. Commitments were also undertaken to keep the European markets open for Asian exports. During this Summit, several other important decisions were also taken. The Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP), the Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP), and the AEETC were officially launched. A draft Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework was adopted, and to show that the partners were serious about the long-term relationship, an Asia-Europe Vision

Group was commissioned to provide ideas for the development of the ASEM process into the next century.

Another concrete achievement of the ASEM process was the establishment of the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) in February 1997. ASEF was launched in Singapore with the objective of promoting better mutual understanding between Asia and Europe through greater intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges. ASEM partners



120 Yeo Lay Hwee

pledged a total of some US$22 million for the operations of the Foundation. Since its launch, ASEF has organized or supported various activities. These range from its own flagship Asia-Europe Lecture series

? public lectures by high-profile speakers from Asia or Europe

? to an ASEF Summer School for undergraduates, and the co-organizing of many other seminars or conferences with topics ranging from economic issues, to labour relations, cultural issues and human rights. (See Appendix 1 for the full list of ASEF activities.)

The annual Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF), which com

menced in Paris in October 1996, brings together prominent business men from all ASEM countries. It serves as a platform for networking and discussion of issues affecting trade, investment, and business collaboration between Asia and Europe. Despite talk that it has been

losing steam, and is already showing signs of fatigue, a commitment has been made by Austria to host the fifth AEBF in Vienna in 2000.

Beyond these regular summits, ministerial and senior officials'

meetings, business fora, experts' meetings on trade facilitation and investment promotion, many other ad hoc initiatives have also been taken up. (For a complete listing of ASEM and ASEM-related activities, see Appendix 2.) The range of initiatives and follow-up actions

engendered an ongoing process that seem to confound the harshest critics that ASEM is like passionate love ? a spur of the moment and a "feel good" thing that cannot be sustained. The seemingly healthy functioning of ASEF, which is by far the most concrete manifestation of the ASEM process, further reinforces the perception that ASEM is here to stay.

However, a more comprehensive and deeper analysis of the results of the various meetings would reveal a different picture. While sup porters of ASEM would point to follow-up meetings and activities

generated in the past few years and give ASEM the thumbs up, ASEM's detractors are not far from the truth when they say that from all these

many meetings, fora and activities, no concrete results have been

produced beyond public declarations extolling confidence in ASEM. Where then does the reality lie? The assessments made by supporters

and detractors alike are both valid. What really divides these two camps are their different expectations of ASEM, of what ASEM can deliver, because of their different interpretations of what ASEM is and should be.

Supporters of ASEM tend to take a long-term view. They look at ASEM as a process designed to bring about greater understanding and effect a rapprochement between Asia and Europe in the long run. They point to the dearth of knowledge each region has of the other, and the lack of robustness in the cultural and intellectual foundations of




the relationship after decades of mutual neglect. To them, ASEM is an overarching, all-purpose forum for dialogue and exchange of views to rebuild the foundations for a long-lasting relationship. The process of getting acquainted with each other again will be slow and long drawn out. No quick-fix and instantaneous results can be expected. In addition, the results of ASEM would likely be more intangible and hence difficult to measure. In the words of Sir Leon Brittan, "the tools of the ASEM process may be technical ones ? the creation of pro grammes for improving trade and investment, for securing business

internships, or for cultural exchanges ? but their goal will ultimately

be a psychological one ? to whittle away the barriers of misunder

standing that have made our two cultures, traditions and political and economic systems seem further than they really are".7

ASEM's detractors, on the other hand, tend to look for short-term concrete results. While not totally denying the value of the ASEM

process, their belief is that the process cannot be sustained without concrete results. They want to look beyond process and towards results.

They question the value of meetings which produce nothing but rhetoric. Shada Islam, a Brussels-based journalist, has captured exactly the mood of ASEM's detractors by saying that "if ASEM is to survive into the new millennium, it must be more than a forum for debate and exchange of views".8

An objective assessment of ASEM's achievements should start with a realistic appraisal of the explicit and implicit goals of ASEM. From the impetus behind ASEM, one can safely assume that the overarching objective of ASEM is to open a channel for dialogue between Asia and Europe and to strengthen the relationship in the hope that this would result in:

more trade and investments between the two regions;

greater co-operation on WTO matters to ensure the maintenance of an open, multilateral trading system; and,

balancing the influence of the United States.

ASEM's achievements must be evaluated against this backdrop. For the past four years, efforts have been concentrated on these areas.

Measures were taken to try and achieve concrete results in the more

specific goals of increasing trade and investments and of reaching some sort of agreement on WTO matters as a counterweight against any unilateral U.S. moves. The Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) and the investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP) are examples of the former. There have also been important milestones, such as the launch in 1997



122 Yeo Lay Hwee

of ASEMConnect, an Internet-based tool to facilitate co-operation in the business sector; and then in 1999, the launch of the Virtual Information Exchange (VIE), an important tool to foster transparency of investment regimes in all ASEM countries.

With regard to the WTO and the multilateral trading system, extensive consultations were carried out before the first WTO Ministerial

Meeting in Singapore in December 1996. However, results of the WTO consultations have been limited because of genuine differences. This is beginning to show more clearly especially after the Asian crisis. While both regions are generally committed to the multilateral order, differ ences have emerged on many specifics, such as labour standards and the need for a new comprehensive round of trade talks. Critics of the

ASEM process are sceptical about how far co-operation between Asia and Europe can extend without common values and binding institu tions.

On the need to balance U.S. influence and counter increasing U.S.

unilateralism, the stark reality is that both the EU and more so the Asian ASEM members are unable to act in concert. The EU is still

sorting out a common foreign and security policy, and the Asians are

still hesitant about institutionalizing their inter-state co-operation. This lack of common position, and the inability to act in unison has meant that neither Europe nor Asia can really temper America's increasingly unilateral behaviour. If trying to get the EU alone or the ten Asian ASEM members to act in unity is already a considerable chore, what more can one expect of Asia-Europe co-operation in countering U.S. influence? Until such time when an Asia-Europe rapprochement is

achieved, and common values established, ASEM will remain the weak link in the triangle of relations governing East Asia, North America, and Europe.

Another reality about ASEM, often forgotten in the midst of all the frantic activities that followed the Bangkok Summit, is that it was never really meant to be a forum for negotiations and the conclusion of binding agreements. At the outset, ASEM was only intended to be a forum for leaders and officials to get to know one another and exchange views. The fact that there are now expectations for ASEM to produce concrete results, to conclude and implement agreements, is in some

ways a testimony of the initial success of ASEM. "Success" breeds

expectations. The high profile nature of summitry triggered a sense of euphoria and generated expectations beyond what ASEM was

initially intended to be. Jacques Santer, then President of the European Commission, put ASEM in perspective when delivering an Asia-Europe Lecture organized by ASEF. He said: "... the ASEM process cannot

replace or substitute for the other bilateral, regional or multilateral fora




in which Asia and Europe interact. It would rather complement and stimulate these other fora, with a special added value based on ASEM's

unique comparative advantage and reflecting in particular its multi

dimensionality, its informality and its high political profile." Percy Westerlund put this even more bluntly by pointing to the fact that the informal nature of ASEM meant that it is "an excellent forum for

sending political signals and for the concerting of efforts, but the end results of ASEM will often depend on implementation at the bilateral level".9

ASEM is entering its fifth year and will be holding its third Summit meeting in the new millennium. Enough expectations have been

generated with regard to the ASEM process. People are now looking for benchmarks along the way to see how far ASEM has travelled, and if it is heading in any clear direction. Many challenges lie ahead for

ASEM. The conditions under which ASEM was first broached and

ultimately launched in 1996 have changed significantly with the advent of the Asian economic crisis. There were calls for Europe to readjust its ties with Asia in the midst of this crisis. Though ASEM managed to survive the Asian crisis, will it survive into the new millennium

by continuing with what it has been doing so far? The Director of European Affairs at the Thai Foreign Ministry, in

a speech to a conference on "Asia-Europe at the Eve of the 21st Century", held in Bangkok in August 1999, acknowledged that there was a rising trend of disinterest and declining enthusiasm with regard to ASEM at the political level, brought about in part by the Asian economic crisis and the European preoccupation with deepening the EU's financial and economic integration. Most recently, Germany's Deputy Foreign

Minister, Dr Ludger Volmer, called for a re-examination of Europe's relationship with Asia "from one anchored mainly on economics to that emphasising human rights, democratisation and values".10 Is there therefore a need to re-orientate ASEM? And if so, what are the significant changes that ASEM must undertake to remain relevant and retain the interest and commitment of its various members? In short, what does the future hold for ASEM?

The Future of ASEM: Problems and Challenges

For the last four years, the focus of ASEM has been on process and not results. Critics would say it is more symbolism than substance.

However, the symbolism itself has been of significant value in the initial

years of ASEM. Of course, the expectation now is that ASEM should move beyond symbolism to the substance of Asia-Europe relations. This is one of the real challenges facing ASEM. But even before ASEM



124 Yeo Lay Hwee

takes up this challenge, there are more immediate dangers that ASEM members must address if interest in the ASEM process is to be sustained. These are the dangers of a haphazard proliferation of ASEM activities,

resulting in forum fatigue and waste of resources; and the need to address the criticism that ASEM has been too top-down in its approach, too officious, and too elitist in its orientation.

Haphazard Proliferation of Activities: Forum Fatigue, Declining Interest and Waste of Resources As illustrated earlier and captured in detail in Appendix 2, in a short

span of about four years since the first meeting in Bangkok, many activities have been generated under the ambit of ASEM. However, it is also precisely this proliferation of activities that is now cause for concern. As pointed out by Percy Westerlund, Director-General of DG 1 of the European Commission, a proliferation of follow-up meetings

without any sense of focus or direction would only lead to wasteful

duplication, and dissipation of energies and precious resources. The

danger of having all sorts of follow-up activities simply for the sake of "showing progress" but without any specific orientation or direction is not only a waste of resources but might also result in "forum fatigue", and in the long-run, general disinterest. Compounding this problem is the fact that the goals of some of these activities are either vague or remote so that no one feels the pressure to take any specific action

immediately.11 Such mushrooming of activities, however, is a reflection of a

more fundamental problem: that is, while ASEM's broad objective of

strengthening Asia?Europe co-operation is clear, the reality is that the

specifics of the objective are still evolving. If one looks at the whole

gamut of activities that has been carried out, some can be clearly seen as steps taken to fulfill the economic objective, such as the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP), Investment Promotion Action Plan

(IPAP), and the regular Business Forum. Others, such as the Conference on Traditional and Modern Medicine, are, however, rather dubious.

The need to review priorities is all the more urgent at this juncture when both the EU and the Asia-Pacific states are so caught up in their own domestic and regional affairs ? the EU with the issue of enlarge

ment, and the reconstruction of southeastern Europe, particularly the

Balkans; and the Asians with managing the recovery of their economies and coping with the political and social fall-out of the Asian economic crisis.




The Top-down Approach: Too Officious and Elitist Some scholars and observers have criticized ASEM for being too elitist and top-down in its approach, with not enough participation and input from civil society. These criticisms are not unfounded, and the challenge is for ASEM to address them in the years to come. The danger of a

top-down approach is that government changes within the ASEM countries might affect policy continuity. The reality is that there are different levels of interest among the Europeans concerning Asia.

Compounding this, the frequent changes in governments, particularly in the European countries, often result in the pursuit of different

priorities. One case in point is the change in leadership in France to a socialist government under Lionel Jospin, who seems to have little or no interest in Asia. Fortunately, the President of France, Jacques Chirac, has shown great enthusiasm in engaging Asia, and still has a major influence on France's foreign policy orientation. Similarly, when the German Social Democrats under Gerhard Schroeder replaced the Kohl government, there were fears about the implications of a Red Green coalition government on Germany's Asia policy.

There are indications that the Asian economic crisis and the

European preoccupation with deepening Europe's financial and eco nomic integration have resulted in a rising trend of disinterest and

declining enthusiasm in ASEM at the political level.12 While such

political inertia has to be countered at the political level, what would ensure the long-term continuity of ASEM is the building of linkages at all levels of society. Asia-Europe relations should not just be a project for governments. It is about building ties and networks between interest

groups, businesses, professionals, and young people. Hence, borrowing the words of the late Derek Fatchett, then Minister of State of the British

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "we must establish contacts at all

levels, from grey-suited government officials to back-packing young

people, from business people with lap-tops to designers with sketch books".13

The need for ASEM to respond to an approach that is not too officious and an agenda that is less elitist also comes from the increasing trend in domestic politics in even the Asian countries - a desire for

greater participation, the need for accountability, and the call to focus on human development rather than just economic development. ASEM, as a process, will have to continue to evolve and to adapt in order not to be "out of sync" with what is happening in Asia and Europe.



126 Yeo Lay Hwee

The Challenge of Enlargement The issue of membership expansion has surfaced a few times in the

past four years but has now been side-stepped. This is primarily because of the inability to agree on the specifics and the criteria for membership. ASEM leaders and officials are, of course, fully aware that Europe and Asia are larger entities than the sum total of ASEM. The official rhetoric is that ASEM should be "an open and evolutionary process". Beyond agreeing that "discussions would continue on the timing and modalities

concerning expansion of membership" and reiterating the simple principle that "enlargement should be based on consensus by the Heads of State and Government",14 nothing more has been decided. There is as yet no agreement on procedures and pace for enlargement, though there are already some ten or more applicants, among these, Australia,

New Zealand, India, and Pakistan. There are several potential points of contention regarding mem

bership expansion. Should membership in the EU or ASEAN automati

cally qualify a country for membership in ASEM? This issue spawned a debate back in 1997 when Myanmar and Laos joined ASEAN. There was no agreement even among the Asian members. While Malaysia was keen to support the idea of including Myanmar and Laos in ASEM, Indonesia and some other Asian members came out to refute the idea of automatic inclusion. The latter course was taken in order not to derail the nascent ASEM process in view of the EU's strong objections to Myanmar's participation because of its domestic human rights situation. As it is, Myanmar's membership of ASEAN has already stalled the much older ASEAN-EU dialogue.

On the other hand, the differences in the legal position and constitution of the EU, compared to ASEAN, would mean that new EU members would have to be automatically included in all its dialogue relationships. Therefore, in the case of the EU, new members would

automatically become part of the ASEM process. While this is not likely to happen until 2003 or beyond, the prospects of having an expanded ASEM seemingly weighted in favour of the Europeans (at least nu

merically) has to be dealt with. Precisely because of such a prospect, there has been a sort of initial in-principle agreement that the first round of expansion should be on the Asian side. However, still no

specific criteria have been arrived at, though initial discussions broached criteria such as the applicant's "degree of engagement with Asia and

Europe". For example, one could use trade and investment figures to assess the extent of economic engagement and the intensity of dip lomatic relations. Interestingly, when discussions were held in 1995 to decide on the potential participants of ASEM, for Asia the most




important consideration then was to include dynamic economies which had contributed to the region's prosperity and growth.15

Of late, the emerging consensus, however, seems to be to impose a sort of moratorium on membership. The general feeling is that it

might not be desirable to admit new members as ASEM is still at an

embryonic stage. As it stands, the current ASEM comprising twenty six countries is an extremely diverse group with plenty of scope for

disagreement. It is therefore more important now to consolidate its co

operation than to look at expansion.

The Limits to Asia-Europe Co-operation: The Lack of Common Values and Common Institutions A fundamental issue for ASEM to resolve in the coming years is the decision with regard to the degree of "formalization" and "institution alization". Should ASEM remain an informal entity with as little institutions as possible? Is it enough for ASEM to be merely a process?

Without the necessary common values and institutions, can ASEM move

beyond merely a forum for discussions and debates to produce concrete results on the issues discussed?

The institutionalization of the ASEM process is an issue which

may be taboo at this juncture. Most ASEM members have maintained that they want to keep ASEM as an informal process with as little institutionalization as possible. For instance, the idea of having a "lean but effective" ASEM Secretariat, one of the many recommendations made by the Asia-Europe Vision Group, has been almost unanimously rejected for now.

However, the reality is that if the ASEM process is to continue to make progress, it will only become more, not less complex. Insti tutionalization may be unavoidable in the long-run if only to

manage the myriad activities and meetings at all levels. The proliferation of activities in the last few years has already created the need for at

least some sort of mechanism to guide and manage the process.

Currently, in line with the expressed desire to keep institutionalization to a minimum, a rudimentary structure of the ASEM process has

evolved, as reflected in Figure 1, that relies on "co-ordinators" from the Foreign Affairs departments of ASEM member states and the External Relations/Trade Directorate of the Commission. But how far can this structure support or constrain the evolution of the ASEM process is an issue that requires serious examination. In a way, it brings us back to the fundamental question of what member states want ASEM to

be, and the vision they have with regard to the future of ASEM.



128 Yeo Lay Hwee

FIGURE 1 The ASEM Structure

SUMMITS

AEVG

Foreign Ministers

Economic

Ministers

SOMTI

AEBF

ASEF

Finance

Ministers

SOM

Economic

Co-ordinators

6 Working Groups

S&T Ministers

Deputies

Co-ordinators

EU: Commission,

Presidency Asia: Thailand,

Korea

Preparatory

Groups

Core

Groups

IPAP

Shepherds IEG

2 Task Force: - TFAP - EPAP

TFAP Facilitators 6 Working Groups

Customs Gps: - Procedures - Enforcement

Dir-Gen Mtgs

LEGEND AEVG : Asia-Europe "vision Group ASEF : Asia-Europe Foundation

S&T : Science & Technology SOMTI: Senior Officials Meeting

Trade & Investment

SOM : Senior Officials Meetings AEBF : Asia-Europe Business

Forum

IPAP : Investment Promotion

Action Plan

TFAP : Trade Facilitation

Action Plan

SOURCE: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg01/euasem.htm




The struggle to find common values and a common cause to bind members together in the ASEM process is another challenge that has to be met. As noted earlier, ASEM started with a very practical underpinning

? to enhance trade and investment opportunities; and to co-operate in the economic arena to ensure an open, multilateral

trading system, and keep U.S. unilateralism in abeyance. However, the economic motivation behind the ASEM venture has been called into

question in the midst of the Asian economic crisis. While most Asian ASEM members have preferred the Asia-Europe relationship to be anchored mainly in economics, some European members are beginning to question such an approach. The political and social fall-out of the Asian economic crisis has given Europe the impetus to review its ties with Asia. To the Europeans, it is simply not possible to get involved in Asia on purely economic grounds. The signal to emphasize human

rights, democratization and values in Europe's relationship with Asia was sent out by one of the key European players, Germany, through its Deputy Foreign Minister in a recent speech at the World Economic

Forum.

The emphasis on political dialogue on human rights and democ ratization is a particularly sensitive matter. Positions on these issues are still well apart between some European and Asian ASEM members.

Putting the focus on political dialogue in the ASEM process now might only generate more friction and constrain ASEM's future development. The fear is that ASEM might become another case of the current ASEAN EU relationship which has been marred in recent years by a sense of

political inertia and intense irritation over the human rights agenda in general, and the Myanmar issue in particular.

Another interesting academic question that has surfaced in exam

ining ASEM is whether it should be viewed and treated as an inter

regional dialogue, or should it be seen as a dialogue among twenty six actors. The great institutional gap between a well-defined regional entity like the EU and a loose coalition of ten East Asian countries

just seems too wide to treat ASEM as an inter-regional dialogue. Scholars have tried to get around this academic question by calling ASEM a

trans-regional dialogue. By this, it is meant that a more diffuse

membership, not necessarily coinciding with regional organizations, make up the two groups engaged in the dialogue. While the question over whether ASEM is an inter-regional dialogue or a multilateral forum of twenty-six individual actors may be academic, it does have practical implications on the limits of Asia-Europe co-operation.

Hans Maull, Gerald Segal, and Jusuf Wanandi have argued in the

preface to the book, Europe and the Asia Pacific, that ASEM be best seen as a cluster of relationships rather than a neat relationship between



130 Yeo Lay Hwee

two coherent units in view of the "ASEMmetries" both within and between the two regions. It is therefore more fruitful to think in terms of "variable geometry"

? "the notion that different states will work

together on specific issues. There is no need for everyone to cooperate on all issues".16 In this scheme, "ASEM then should not be judged on whether it can reach coherent agreement among 26 actors on specific policy issues, but rather whether on aggregate, it is conducive to the creation of a series of closer Euro-Asian relations".

Conclusion

ASEM got off to a splendid start with more fanfare than did APEC. It began with a summit of twenty-six European and Asian leaders.

Though it was very much a feel-good summit with emphasis on

informality and a loose agenda, it prompted a plethora of activities,

follow-up meetings, and initiated a process of dialogue between Europe and Asia. There is now a host of ministerial meetings, senior officials

meetings, and working groups, and even an Asia-Europe Foundation and an Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre, that together have set the basis and network for a greater Asia-Europe partnership.

Notwithstanding this positive start, ASEM remains a loosely organized process, which is an easy target for sceptics who often point to its non-focused nature. The sceptics are of the opinion that only the creation of a more formal body can secure the momentum of ASEM. Given the different levels of interest among the Europeans about Asia and governmental changes, there are fears whether there will be follow

up action and policy continuity with regard to ASEM if there is no formal set-up to bind members together. However, this view has been

opposed by many ASEM members who prefer to keep ASEM as an informal process rather than engage in premature institutionalization. The preference is for inclusive informal networks rather than exclusive

institution-building. After a long period of mutual neglect, it does seem sensible to treat

ASEM as a long-term process of getting both Asia and Europe re

acquainted. As Brian Bridges has put it, "it is difficult to move quickly from a tradition of mutual neglect to one of mutual interest, under

standing and benefit. Commitment and education are required". And this has to involve not only politicians, policy-makers and bureaucrats, but also businesses, communities and individuals. "Although inter

regional initiatives such as the ASEM process can undoubtedly help cast a more favourable and positive framework and environment, much will continue to be done ? and indeed needs to be done ? at the level of bilateralism, between individual European and Asian countries




or between their companies and peoples".17 This pertinent point is shared and reiterated by several European and Asian leaders alike, that ASEM should not and will not replace or overshadow the various bilateral relationships that exist between individual European and Asian

countries, or between the EU and its key Asian partners. It is also

acknowledged, particularly after the Asian economic crisis, that closer

engagement in the ASEM process must include a wide variety of social, economic, cultural, and educational interest groups. Economic motivations alone cannot sustain the process.

Asia and Europe still have a long way to go in building a stronger, more varied, and long-lasting relationship based on equality and

honesty. ASEM was the first step taken towards this ultimate goal. The members are now content to focus on process. However, the nagging question of whether it is enough for ASEM to travel well than to finally arrive will continue to be a point of endless debate. What more can

ASEM do to ensure the momentum towards a common destination? Is there even a common destination? And if there is indeed one, are

there any landmarks along this long and winding path that would lead it in the right direction towards that common destiny?



132 Yeo Lay Hwee

APPENDIX 1

Activities Organized or Co-sponsored by ASEF

I. FLAGSHIP EVENTS

The Asia-Europe Lecture

Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, "Asia and

Europe: The Road from Bangkok to London and Beyond", Singapore, 13 January 1998.

Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand, "Economic

Management and Good Governance", Bangkok, 17 February 1998.

Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, "A Vision of

Europe in the 21st Century", Singapore, 1 June 1998.

Colloquiums

Colloquium with Mr Patrick Imhaus, "Satellite TV: A Bridge between Asia and Europe", Singapore, 7 April 1997.

Colloquium with Professor Wolf Lepenies, "The End of the Cultural Westernisation of the World?", Singapore, 4 March 1998.

ASEF Colloquium for Journalists, "How can Europe Help Asia Without

Provoking a Backlash", Singapore, 12 October 1998.

Colloquium on Human Rights and Human Responsibility, Hamburg, 20-21 November 1998.

ASEF Colloquium for Journalists, "A Preview of the Indonesian

Elections", Jakarta, 12-14 May 1999.

Europe-Asia Forum

"Two Views, One Vision", Singapore, 20-21 February 1998.

30 April-1 May 1999, Munich (Germany).

II. INTELLECTUAL EXCHANGE

ASEF Meeting of Editors, "Building Bridges With Images", Luxembourg, 25 October 1997.

Meeting of Deans of Business Schools, Madrid, 15-17 January 1998.




Conference on "Societies in Transition: Asia and Europe at a Moment of Change", London, 3-4 April 1998.

Asian Financial Crisis Meeting, Paris, 11-12 May 1998.

EMU Roadshows, Hongkong, 10 July 1998; and Singapore, 1 March 1999.

Inaugural Workshop with the Programme for Europe-Asia Research

Linkage (PEARL) Network, Seoul, 7-9 October 1998.

Conference on Trade, "A New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: An Asia-Europe Perspective", Brussels, 5-7 July 1999.

III. CULTURAL EXCHANGE

Asia-Europe Cultural Forum, Paris, 5-6 February 1998.

Conference on "Touring East and Southeast Asian Arts in Europe: Exploring Cooperation", London, 1-4 April 1998.

Seminar on Conservation of the Built Heritage, London, 11-12 May 1998.

ASEM II Cultural Events, London, March-July 1998.

ASEF Meeting of Publishers, "How to Promote Understanding Between Asia and Europe Through Publications", Frankfurt, 6 October 1998.

ASEM Experts Meeting on Protection and Promotion of Cultural Heritage, Hanoi, 20-22 January 1999.

Asian Film Festival, Deauville, 5-7 March 1999.

Cultural Managers Training Seminar, Barcelona, 25 March-1 April 1999.

Meeting of Cultural and Educational TV Channels, Cannes, 13-14 April 1999.

Conference on Cultural Industries and Cultural Development, Beijing, 19-21 May 1999.

Asia-Europe Young Entrepreneurs Forum, Berlin, 8-9 October 1999.

Symposium on Images of Asia in Europe and Europe in Asia, Copen hagen, 27 October 1999.

IV. PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGE

ASEF Young Parliamentarians, Meeting, Cebu (Philippines), 13-16 November 1996.



134 Yeo Lay Hwee

Seminar on Website Twinning of High Schools, Copenhagen, 15-17 May 1998.

Launch of Asia-Europe Classroom Website, Singapore, 2 December 1998.

Summer School for Undergraduates, Reutlingen (Germany), 12-24 July 1998; and Beijing (China), 22 August-5 September 1999.

Asia-Europe Classroom Exhibition, Berlin, 30 March-11 April 1999.

Workshop on Sustainable Forest Management, Joensuu, 5-6 July 1999.

Cities on the Move, Bangkok, 9-30 October 1999.

Meeting on the Formation of Education Hubs in ASEM, Fontainebleau, 25-28 November 1999.

APPENDIX 2

ASEM Activities/Initiatives

I. CORE MEETINGS

Asia-Europe Leaders Summit

1st ASEM Summit, Bangkok, 1-2 March 1996.

2nd ASEM Summit, London, 3-4 April 1998.

3rd ASEM Summit, Seoul, 20-21 October 2000.

Foreign Ministers' Meeting

1st ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting (FMM), Singapore, 15 February 1997.

2nd ASEM FMM, Berlin, 28-29 March 1999.

Senior Officials' Meeting (Foreign Ministry)

1st Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM), Dublin, 20 December 1996.

Preparatory Meeting for 1st FMM, 14 February 1997.

2nd SOM, Luxembourg, 30-31 October 1997.

3rd SOM, London, 19-20 February 1998.




Preparatory Meeting for London Summit, 2 April 1998.

4th SOM, Bangkok, 27-28 October 1998.

Preparatory Meeting for 2nd FMM, Berlin, 27-28 March 1999.

5th SOM, Rovianensi, 2-3 November 1999.

ASEM Co-ordinators' Meeting

In 1996, ASEM Co-ordinators' Meetings were held in:

Rome, 15 June.

Jakarta, 22 July.

Tokyo, 24 October.


Kuala Lumpur, 26 July.

Makuhari, 28 September.


Tokyo, 13 January.

Bangkok, 16-17 March.

London, 1 April.

Manila, 26 July.


Berlin, 29 January.

Singapore, 26 July.

Economic Ministers' Meeting

1st ASEM Economic Ministers' Meeting (EMM), Makuhari, 27-28

September 1997.

2nd ASEM EMM, Berlin, 9-10 September 1999.

Senior Officials' Meeting Cfrade and Investment)

1st ASEM SOMTI, Brussels, 25 July 1996.



136 Yeo Lay Hwee

2nd SOMTI, Tokyo, 5-6 June 1997.

Preparatory Meeting for 1st EMM, Tokyo, 26-27 September 1997.

3rd SOMTI, Brussels, 5-6 February 1998.

4th SOMTI, Singapore, 11-13 February 1999.

5th SOMTI, Brussels, 7-8 July 1999.

Preparatory Meeting for 2nd EMM, Berlin, 7-8 October 1999.

SOMTI Co-ordinators' Meeting

To prepare for the 1st EMM, four SOMTI Co-ordinators' Meetings were

held:

Tokyo, 30 January 1997.

The Hague, 25 April 1997.

Tokyo, 7 June 1997.

Luxembourg, 21 July 1997.

To prepare for the 2nd EMM, four SOMTI Co-ordinators' Meetings were held:

Bangkok, 24 July 1998.

Geneva, 27 November 1998.

Brussels, 20 September 1999.

Berlin, 7 October 1999.

Finance Ministers' Meeting

1st ASEM Finance Ministers' Meeting (FinMM), Bangkok, 19 September 1996.

2nd ASEM FinMM, Frankfurt, 15-16 January 1999.

Financial Deputies' (Senior Officials) Meeting

1st Financial Deputies' Meeting, London, 5 February 1998.

2nd Financial Deputies' Meeting, Vienna, 18 December 1998.




Financial Core Group Meeting

The Core Group meetings bring together officials from ten Asian ASEM partners and the EU Troika plus the Commission. Such meetings have

generally been held in Washington on the margins of regular IMF/IBRD Meetings. So far, five such meetings have taken place: on 1 October

1996, 30 April 1997, 5-6 October 1998, 26 April 1999 and 27 September 1999.

ASEM Customs Director-Generals and Commissioners' Meeting

1st Customs DGs and Commissioners' Meeting, Shenzhen, 21 June 1996.

2nd Meeting, Vienna, 20 June 1997.

3rd Meeting, Brussels, 23 June 1999.

ASEM Customs Working Group on Enforcement

1st Meeting, Brussels, 7-8 February 1997.

2nd Meeting, Brussels, 6-7 February 1998.

3rd Meeting, Brussels, 5-6 February 1999.

ASEM Customs Working Group on Procedures

1st Meeting, Brussels, 21-22 March 1997.

2nd Meeting, Brussels, 16-17 March 1998.

3rd Meeting, Manila, 26 February 1999.

II. BUSINESS SECTOR MEETINGS / CONFERENCES / PROGRAMMES

Asia-Europe Business Forum

1st Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF), Paris, 14-15 October 1996.

2nd AEBF, Bangkok, 13-14 November 1997.

3rd AEBF, London, 2-3 April 1998.

4th AEBF, Seoul, 29 September-1 October 1999.

Symposium on Economic Synergy

Tokyo, 4 June 1997.



138 Yeo Lay Hwee

Asia-Europe Business Conference

Jakarta, 8-10 July 1997.

Symposium on Infrastructure Financing

Frankfurt, 3 September 1997.

Asia-Europe Small and Medium Enterprises Conference

Naples, 28-30 May 1998.

ASEMConnect

ASEMConnect was proposed at the 2nd AEBF and officially launched

during the London Summit. It is an electronic resource network to

provide the business community, particularly the SMEs (small and medium enterprises), with easy access to information on trade oppor tunities, consultancy and business-matching services.

III. INVESTMENT AND TRADE PROMOTION PROGRAMMES

Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP)

During the Bangkok Summit, the Chairman's Statement noted that a

joint government and private-sector working group would be convened to draw up an Asia-Europe Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP) to promote greater cross-flows of investment.

The IPAP was prepared through Working Group meetings held in:

Bangkok, 7-9 July 1996.

Luxembourg, 28-29 July 1997.

The 1st EMM in Makuhari (27-28 September 1997) endorsed the IPAP, and agreed on the setting up of an Investment Experts' Group (IEG) to assist SOMTI in following up on IPAP initiatives. The IPAP was

fully adopted at the London Summit in April 1998.

Preparatory work continued during this period through meetings of IEG Shepherds in:

Brussels, 5 February 1998.




Bangkok, 24 July 1998.

Investment Experts Group (IEG) Meeting: 1st IEG Meeting, Evian, 23-24 November 1998.

2nd IEG Meeting, Singapore, 11-12 February 1999.

3rd IEG Meeting, Brussels, 5-6 July 1999.

Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) The feasibility of establishing a Trade Facilitation Action Plan was first discussed during the 1st SOMTI Meeting in July 1996. SOMTI requested Shepherds to elaborate on a TFAP proposal including principles, objectives, priority areas, concrete goals, and implementation mecha nisms.

The TFAP Shepherds met on the following occasions to produce a final draft that was finally adopted by the London Summit:

Singapore, 15 February 1997.

Tokyo, 4 June 1997.

Makuhari, 25 September 1997.

Manila, 19 December 1997.

Tokyo, 14 January 1998.

Tokyo, 3-4 February 1998.

Singapore, 11-13 February 1999 (to review progress in each area).

With the adoption of the TFAP at the London Summit, working groups were formed around various priority areas, and the following meetings and seminars were held:

TFAP Thematic Meeting on Standards, Accreditation, Certification,

Testing and Technical Regulations, Brussels, 30 September - 2 October

1998.

TFAP Seminar on Quarantine and SPS Procedures, Chiang Mai, 3-5

February 1999.

TFAP Seminar on Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs

Procedures, Manila, 23-25 February 1999.

TFAP Thematic Meeting on Standards, Seoul, 10-12 March 1999.



140 Yeo Lay Hwee

TFAP Thematic Meeting on Intellectual Property Rights, Paris, 24-25

June 1999. TFAP Thematic Meeting on Government Procurement, Berlin, 14-15

September 1999. TFAP Meeting on Standards, Brussels, 4-6 October 1999. TFAP Seminar on Industrial Districts and Technology Transfer, Bari, 5-6 October 1999. TFAP Seminar on SPS, Beijing, 23-25 November 1999.

IV. ASEM'S ENVIRONMENTAL, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION

Asia-Europe Expert Meeting on Technological Co-operation

Beijing, 24-25 April 1997.

ASEM Science and Technology Ministerial Conference

1st Preparatory Meeting, Beijing, 25-26 November 1998.

2nd Preparatory Meeting, Brussels, 17-19 March 1999.

ASEM Science and Technology Ministerial Conference, Beijing, 14-15 October 1999.

Meeting of Environment Officials and Technology Transfer Centres

Dusseldorf, 3-4 March 1998.

Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre (AEETC)

During the ASEM Bangkok Summit, Thailand proposed the set-up of an Asia-Europe Environmental Technology Centre (AEETC) to facilitate

exchange of knowledge and technology between existing environmental

technology centres in the two continents. A series of meetings were held to fine-tune this proposal:

1st Pre-meeting of Experts, Bangkok, 27 May 1997.

2nd Pre-meeting of Experts, Bangkok, 27 October 1997.

Special Meeting among Asian ASEM Experts, Bangkok, 19 December 1997.

Senior Experts Meeting on AEETC, The Hague, 27-28 January 1998.




Following these meetings, the final proposal was presented to the

London Summit for endorsement. The proposal for an AEETC was

accepted at the London Summit and launched in Thailand. The AEETC was officially opened in Bangkok on 29 March 1999.

V. ASEM INITIATIVES IN THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE SECTOR

Symposium on Multimedia and the Future of Electronic Media

Mainz, 2-6 June 1997.

ASEM Action on Child Welfare

The ASEM Action on Child Welfare evolved from the Framework of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Plan of Action agreed upon at the Stockholm World Congress against the Commercial and Sexual Exploitation of Children. The primary aims

of the ASEM Action on Child Welfare are to enhance exchange of

information and experiences on child welfare and encourage greater

co-operation among ASEM countries in this area. To achieve these

objectives, two meetings bringing together governmental and non

governmental experts from Asia and Europe were held to discuss the various issues:

Manila, 15-16 June 1998.

London, 6-8 October 1998.

ASEM Seminar on Labour Relations

The Hague, 26-27 October 1998.

ASEM Conference on States and Markets

Copenhagen, 8-9 March 1999.

ASEM Seminar on Traditional and Modern Medicine

Hanoi, 18-19 March 1999.



142 Yeo Lay Hwee

VI. ASEM INITIATIVES IN THE CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL FIELDS

Asia-Europe Young Leaders' Symposium

1st ASEM Young Leaders' Symposium (YLS), Miyazaki and Tokyo, 10-14 March 1997.

2nd ASEM YLS, Baden and Vienna, 25-29 May 1998.

3rd ASEM YLS, Kangwon and Seoul, 24-28 May 1999.

Asia-Europe University Relations

1st Roundtable Discussion on Asia-Europe University Relations, Brussels, 25-26 November 1996.

2nd Roundtable Discussion on Asia-Europe University Relations, Kuala Lumpur, 19-20 December 1996.

Europe-Asia Forum on University Relations, Naples and Rome, 16 18 January 1997.

Asia-Europe University Forum and Fair, Kuala Lumpur, 17-19 March 1998.

ASEM Symposium on Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Lund, 11-13 December 1997.

Conference on "Societies in Transition: Asia and Europe at a Moment of Change"

London, 19-22 March 1998.

ASEM Experts' Meeting on Protection and Promotion of Cultural

Heritage

Hanoi, 20-22 January 1999.

ASEM Informal Seminar on Human Rights

Beijing, 28-29 June 1999.




VII. ASEM INITIATIVES IN RESPONSE TO THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

ASEM TVust Fund

During the London Summit, the leaders announced the creation of an ASEM Trust Fund at the World Bank to help finance technical assistance and provide advice on restructuring the financial sector, and finding effective ways to redress poverty. Four ASEM Trust Fund Donors and

World Bank meetings were held in:

Brussels, 8 July 1998;

Bangkok, 20 January 1999.

London, 22 July 1999.

Jakarta, 3-4 February 2000.

Further such meetings are held every six months, alternating between venues in Europe and in Asia.

European Financial Expertise (EFEX) Network

Another initiative in response to the Asian financial crisis was proposed during the London Summit. The EFEX Network set up by the European Commission facilitates access by donors or governments to a wide range of specialized expertise on the reform of the financial sector. The EFEX Network commenced activities in September 1998 and is now fully operational.

NOTES 1. Hans Maull and Akihito Tanaka, "The Geopolitical Dimension", in The Rationale

and Common Agenda for Asia-Europe Cooperation - CAEC Task Force Reports

(Tokyo and London: Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation 1997), pp. 31-32.

2. Figures from The East Asian Miracle, A World Bank Policy Research Report (World

Bank, 1993) 3. Francois Godement, The New Asian Renaissance (London & New York: Routledge,

1997), p. 278.

4. Christian Lechervy, "Overcoming the Obstacles to Europe-Asia Political Dialogue", Asia limes, 19 September 1996.

5. Katsuyuki Nagagawachi, "Mutual Respects, Benefits", Look Japan, July 1996, pp. 8-10.

6. This list is contained in the Chairman's Statement on the Asia-Europe Meeting,

Bangkok, 2 March 1996.



144 Yeo Lay Hwee

7. Leon Brittan, "Europe and Asia Can Be Closer", Far Eastern Economic Review

[FEER), 20 February 1997.

8. Shada Islam, "ASEM Struggles to find a Common Cause", Business Times (Singa pore), 20 October 1999.

9. Percy Westerlund, "Strengthening Euro-Asian Relations: ASEM as a Catalyst", in ASEM: The Asia-Europe Meeting

- A Window of Opportunity", edited by Wim Stokhof and Paul van der Velde (London & New York: Kegan Paul International and

HAS, Leiden, 1999), p. 25.

10. Straits Times (Singapore), 19 October 1999.

11. Westerlund, op. cit., p. 19.

12. A point made by Mr Apinan Pavaranit, Director-General, Department of European Affairs, Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during a speech to the Conference on

"Asia-Europe at the Eve of the 21st Century", organized by the Centre of European Studies, Chulalongkorn University, and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

(ISEAS), 19-20 August 1999.

13. Straits Times (Singapore), 5 February 1998.

14. Indicated in the Chairman's Statement of the Second Asia-Europe Meeting, London, 4 April 1998, and also in the draft Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework.

15. Reflected in the Concept Paper on the Asia-Europe Meeting, prepared by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. 16. Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal, and Jusuf Wanandi, eds., Europe and the Asia-Pacific

(London & New York: Routledge, 1998), Preface, p. xv.

17. Brian Bridges, Europe and the Challenge of Asia-Pacific: Change, Continuity and Crisis (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999), pp. 202-3.

Yeo Lay Hwee is a Research Fellow at the Singapore Institute for International Affairs.



Documents

ASEM: Looking Back, Looking Forward