99J. Kang (ed.), Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6019-6_8, © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

1 Introduction

In the late 1950s, with the help of Western nations, Iran began to develop a civilian nuclear program for electricity production. However, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran shut that program. During the Iran-Iraq war, it restarted nuclear research and began a clandestine uranium enrichment program with the assistance of the Khan Network. In August 2002, as Iran was preparing to open a large-scale enrich-ment facility, a dissident Iranian group revealed Iran’s clandestine activities to the world and since then Iran’s ambitious nuclear program has become one of the most important issues facing the international community (Kerr 2009 ) .

The international community has expended considerable energy on diplomatic efforts designed to halt Iran’s nuclear program, yet the two sides remain far apart. Iran argues that under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), it has an “inalien-able right” to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including uranium enrichment for its nuclear reactors. 1 Israel, the United States, and most nations of the EU consider Iran’s nuclear program (especially its enrichment program) illegal and express anxiety about possible military dimensions to the program.

This report provides a historical overview of the Iranian nuclear issue and examines its nuclear material inventories and production capacity.

The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programs

Jung-Hyun Lee

J.-H. Lee (*) Researcher, Nonproliferation Research Division, Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control , 573 Expo-ro , Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-348 , Republic of Korea e-mail: leejh@kinac.re.kr

1 Statement of H.E. Dr. Zarif, Permanent Representative of Iran, before the Security Council on December 23, 2006.

100 J.-H. Lee

2 The History of Iran’s Nuclear Program 2

2.1 1950s–1979: Iran Seeks a Nuclear Power Plant for Peaceful Purposes

In the late 1950s the Iranian nuclear program was initiated under the Pahlevi dynasty with Western technical assistance. It was not until November of 1967, when the 5 MWe Tehran University research reactor (TRR) commenced operations, that Iran fi rst began nuclear R&D. It is noteworthy that in this early stage the United States supported Iran’s nuclear efforts. At that time, the Pahlevi dynasty was staunchly pro-American, and the United States reasoned that surplus crude oil generated by the introduction of nuclear energy in Iran could be used for the U.S. petrochemical industry. 3

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war accelerated Iran’s nuclear program. After the fi rst oil shock in 1974, the second generation of the Pahlevi dynasty, led by Mohammed Shah, established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and announced plans to build 23 nuclear power plants by 2000 to prepare for eventual depletion of crude oil reserves. Iran thus entered into a contract with Kraft-Werke Union A.G. (a Siemens subsidiary) to build two Soviet-style LWRs. Construction of the LWRs at the Bushehr site began in 1974, with 1981 set as the target year for commencing operations at the plant. In 1975, a Nuclear Technology Center at Esfahan was established with French support in order to train the engineers who would eventually staff the reactor complex.

At the time, Iran wanted to fabricate nuclear fuel for its reactors indigenously and began to show an interest in enrichment technology. Iran therefore invested several billions of dollars in the EURODIF uranium-enrichment consortium head-quartered in France, and purchased a U.S.-provided laser enrichment research project. Iran also showed interest in reprocessing technology, ostensibly in order to deal with the problem of spent fuel. The U.S. Government, however, opposed deployment of a reprocessing plant in Iran. Instead the United States suggested that Iran use multinational reprocessing facilities or return its spent fuel to the United States for storage.

2.2 1979–2002: Iran Revives Nuclear Power Plant Construction and Begins a Clandestine Enrichment Program

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, cooperation between Iran and the West ended. The new revolutionary government cancelled contracts for nuclear reactor construction, including the Bushehr NPP, causing Germany to withdraw completely from the Bushehr

2 Framework is mainly based on ISIS literature ( http://www.isisnucleariran.org/nuclear-history/ ), which divided Iran’s nuclear development history into fi ve sections. In this report, we divide it into four sections. 3 Kerr ( 2009 , p. 1).

101The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programs

project. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), many of Iran’s nuclear-related facilities were destroyed.

During the war, the Iranian leadership decided to resume the nuclear program. However, due to changes in the international political environment and economic sanctions on Iran, it was impossible to gain support from Western nations for a resumption of Iran’s nuclear activities. Instead, Iran turned to China, Russia and the black market for assistance. In 1985, Iran signed a secret nuclear cooperation agree-ment with China for the provision of fuel-cycle facilities, and in 1995 with Russia for re-construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP).

Initially, Russia agreed not only to build the NPP but also enrichment facilities. However, due to U.S. objections, Russia revoked its offer of an enrichment plant and insisted that the Bushehr NPP should be constructed and operated under IAEA safe-guards, and that the discharged spent fuel must be returned to Russia. From 1995 to 1998, Iranian plans to construct heavy-water production facilities and a uranium-conversion plant (built by Argentina and China, respectively) also collapsed under U.S. pressure.

Meanwhile, the experience of the Iran-Iraq War left Iranian leaders with a power-ful reminder of the necessity of a credible deterrent force. At this time (the mid-1980s), Iran began to secretly develop a uranium-enrichment program based on gas centrifuge technology.

According to an IAEA report, in the early stages, Iran based its research and development efforts on open-source literature. However, a member of the Khan Network soon approached Iran with an offer of assistance, and in 1987 Iran pur-chased a set of P-1 centrifuge technical drawings and related components from the network. Research and development on the P-1 centrifuge was initially unsuc-cessful, but after 1994, it negotiated to receive further assistance from the net-work, probably with Pakistan’s approval. From 1994 to 1996, Iran imported a second set of design drawings and components for 500 P-1 centrifuges, as well as design drawings for a more advanced P-2 centrifuge. In 1999 and 2002, with a 1-ton supply of undeclared UF

6 secretly provided by China in 1991, Iran tested

several pilot centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company, an AEOI-af fi liated orga-nization. Finally, construction of a full-scale enrichment plant at Natanz (located approximately 200 km south of Tehran) was started in 2001.

2.3 2002–2004: Iranian Nuclear Program Becomes an International Issue

On August 14, 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a dissident group opposed to the revolutionary government, held a press conference and revealed that Iran had been conducting clandestine nuclear activities in Arak and Natanz. Western nations criticized Iran for its covert nuclear program, which they claimed had undercut international nuclear nonproliferation norms and, by its

102 J.-H. Lee

secrecy, implied a possible military motive. Iran countered by explaining that it was left with no choice but to initiate a clandestine nuclear program due to the hostile American posture towards Iran’s nuclear program.

On February 2003, Iran accepted IAEA inspections at the newly revealed nuclear facilities, and in May of that year the IAEA conducted several on-site inspections. The IAEA later concluded that there were two commercial enrichment facilities (together, the FEP) and a pilot uranium enrichment plant (PFEP) at Natanz. At the Arak site, inspectors found a heavy-water reactor under construc-tion. In June of same year, the IAEA Director General delivered a report to the Board of Governors regarding Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities of the preceding 10 years. In September, the IAEA Board unanimously passed a resolution calling on Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment and related activities.

Negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 nations (Britain, France, and Germany) produced the October 2003 “Saad Abad Agreement” and the November 2004 “Tehran Joint Statement.” With these agreements Iran agreed (1) to cooperate with IAEA inspections, and (2) to take part in voluntary con fi dence-building measures, including the suspension of centrifuge-fabrication activities “to the extent possi-ble”. Iran was also required to report to the IAEA all undeclared nuclear activities undertaken during the previous 18 years. In addition, Iran signed and provisionally implemented the IAEA Additional Protocol in December 2003.

2.4 After 2004: Rising Tensions

The scope and duration of the 2003 suspension were not clearly speci fi ed and a dispute over interpretation of the agreement between Iran and the EU occurred in the early part of 2004. In June 2004, the IAEA board censured Iran for noncompli-ance, and in retaliation Iran removed the IAEA seal from its centrifuges and resumed centrifuge manufacturing for the Natanz enrichment facility. In November 2004, the EU-3 negotiated the “Paris Agreement,” under which Iran again agreed to suspend enrichment-related activities, but this time with more speci fi city. After this new agreement, ongoing talks between the EU-3 and Iran began in an effort to reach a fi nal resolution of the nuclear fi le.

The EU-3, under intense pressure from the United States, began to pressure Iran to dismantle its enrichment program altogether, implicitly requesting that Iran give up its right to enrich under the NPT. In mid-2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former Tehran mayor, was elected president of Iran. Taking a harder line on Iran’s rights, Ahmadinejad rejected the EU3- proposal to abandon enrichment. On August 8, 2005, Iran restarted uranium conversion activities and in January 2006 revived R&D on centrifuge technology at the Natanz facility. In February 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to refer Iran’s case to the UN Security Council. In protest, Iran announced that it would cease voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol. In the subsequent period, the UN Security Council has adopted several resolutions

103The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programs

imposing sanctions against Iranian entities connected to the nuclear program. The broader international community, including the United States and the European Union, has imposed several rounds of unilateral economic and fi nancial sanctions.

During the standoff over its nuclear program, Iran has steadily strengthened its nuclear capabilities. In February 2007, the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) began par-tial operation and centrifuge installation and enrichment is ongoing. In February 2010, Iran began to enrich uranium to 20% (from approximately 3.5%) at the Pilot Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in order to produce fuel for the TRR. In 2009, a new clan-destine enrichment plant (FFEP) was discovered to have been built underground near the Iranian city of Qom. In December 2011, the FFEP also started production of 20% enriched uranium. 4

In November 2011, the IAEA reported on past activities 5 that indicate that Iran had carried out tests “relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.” This was used by the United States and European Union as a basis for passing an “unprecedented” oil embargo against Iran over its nuclear program, banning all new oil contracts with the country (BBC News 2012 ) . In doing so, the United States and European Union began to attack Iran’s most economically productive industry. In an attempt to demonstrate that it would be unfazed by the new sanctions, Iran announced on February 15, 2012, I two major advances in its nuclear program: Installation of fourth generation centrifuges made of carbon fi ber at the Natanz facility, and the loading of the fi rst batch of domestically-produced nuclear fuel into Tehran’s research reactor (VOA News 2012 ) . These steps threaten to increase signi fi cantly Iran’s capability to produce weapons-grade uranium quickly by the installation of better performing centrifuges, and to close off prospects for using the Tehran Research Reactor as an opening for negotiations.

3 Status of Nuclear Facilities and Materials

3.1 Status of Nuclear Facilities

1. All facilities (Table 1 ; Fig. 1 ) 2. Main facilities – Uranium enrichment plants (IAEA 2012 )

4 NTI homepage, country pro fi le of Iran, nuclear facilities, http://www.nti.org/facilities/172/ 5 In the report (GOV/2011/65), IAEA stated that “The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency fi nds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.” IAEA ( 2011 ) .

104 J.-H. Lee

Tabl

e 1

Key

fea

ture

s of

Ira

n’s

know

n nu

clea

r fa

cilit

ies

No.

Ty

pe

Faci

lity

nam

e, S

ite

nam

e C

onst

ruct

ion/

oper

atio

n ye

ar

Safe

guar

ds s

tatu

s (a

s of

Nov

. 201

1)

Ope

ratio

nal s

tatu

s

1 M

ine/

Mill

ing

Sagh

and

Min

e, S

agha

nd

1995

/-

N/A

a U

nder

con

stru

ctio

n 2

Ard

akan

Yel

low

cake

Pro

duct

ion

Plan

t, Ya

rd

2004

/-

N/A

U

nder

con

stru

ctio

n 3

Gch

in M

ine,

Mill

, Ban

dar

Abb

as

N.R

. b /20

06

N/A

O

pera

tiona

l 4

Con

vers

ion

Ura

nium

Con

vers

ion

Faci

lity

(UC

F), E

sfah

an

1999

/200

5 Y

es

Ope

ratio

nal c

5 Fu

el f

abri

catio

n Fu

el M

anuf

actu

ring

Pla

nt (

FMP)

, Esf

ahan

20

04/2

008

Yes

O

pera

tiona

l 6

Zir

coni

um P

rodu

ctio

n Pl

ant (

ZPP

), E

sfah

an

N.R

./N.R

. Y

es

N.R

. 7

Ura

nium

enr

ichm

ent

Fuel

Enr

ichm

ent P

lant

(FE

P), N

atan

z 20

01/2

007

Yes

O

pera

tiona

l 8

Pilo

t Fue

l Enr

ichm

ent P

lant

(PF

EP)

, Nat

anz

2001

/200

3 Y

es

Ope

ratio

nal

9 Fo

rdow

Fue

l Enr

ichm

ent P

lant

(FF

EP)

, For

dow

20

07/2

011

Yes

O

pera

tiona

l 10

Pi

lot U

rani

um L

aser

Enr

ichm

ent P

lant

, Las

hkar

ab’

ad

N.R

./200

2 Y

es

Dis

man

tled

11

Res

earc

h re

acto

r G

raph

ite S

ub-C

ritic

al R

eact

or (

GSC

R),

Esf

ahan

19

91/1

992

Yes

D

ism

antle

d 12

M

inia

ture

Neu

tron

Sou

rce

Rea

ctor

(M

NSR

), E

sfah

an

1991

/199

4 Y

es

Ope

ratio

nal

13

Lig

ht W

ater

Sub

-Cri

tical

Rea

ctor

(LW

SCR

), E

sfah

an

1988

/199

2 Y

es

Ope

ratio

nal

14

Hea

vy W

ater

Zer

o Po

wer

Rea

ctor

(H

WZ

PR),

Esf

ahan

19

91/1

995

Yes

O

pera

tiona

l 15

Te

hran

Res

earc

h R

eact

or (

TR

R),

Teh

ran

1960

/196

7 Y

es

Ope

ratio

nal

16

Iran

Nuc

lear

Res

earc

h R

eact

or (

IR-4

0 R

eact

or),

Ara

k 20

04/(

2013

) Y

es

Und

er c

onst

ruct

ion

17

Nuc

lear

Pow

er P

lant

B

ushe

hr N

ucle

ar P

ower

Pla

nt (

BN

PP),

Bus

hehr

19

75/–

1995

/201

1 Y

es

Ope

ratio

nal

18

360

MW

Nuc

lear

Pow

er P

lant

, Dar

khov

in

2011

/(20

16)

N/A

Pl

anne

d 19

N

ucle

ar W

aste

Sto

rage

K

araj

Was

te S

tora

ge, K

araj

N

.R.

Yes

Pa

rtia

lly o

pera

ting

20

Was

te H

andl

ing

Faci

lity

(WH

F), T

ehra

n N

.R.

No

Ope

ratio

nal

21

R&

D F

acili

ties

Jabr

Ibn

Hay

an M

ultip

urpo

se L

abor

ator

ies

(JH

L),

Teh

ran

N.R

. Y

es

Ope

ratio

nal

22

Fuel

Fab

rica

tion

Lab

orat

ory

(FFL

), E

sfah

an

N.R

. Y

es

Ope

ratio

nal

23

Ura

nium

Che

mis

try

Lab

orat

ory

(UC

L),

Esf

ahan

N

.R.

N/A

C

lose

d do

wn

105The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programs N

o.

Type

Fa

cilit

y na

me,

Sit

e na

me

Con

stru

ctio

n/op

erat

ion

year

Sa

fegu

ards

sta

tus

(as

of N

ov. 2

011)

O

pera

tiona

l sta

tus

24

Isot

ope

Prod

uctio

n M

olyb

denu

m, I

odin

e an

d X

enon

Rad

iois

otop

e Pr

oduc

tion

Faci

lity

(MIX

Fac

ility

), T

ehra

n 19

95/2

005

Yes

C

onst

ruct

ed, b

ut

not o

pera

ting

25

Hot

cel

l fac

ility

for

pro

duct

ion

of r

adio

isot

opes

, Ara

k N

.R.

N/A

Pl

anne

d, b

ut

canc

elle

d 26

R

elat

ed in

dust

rial

fa

cilit

ies

Kal

aye

Ele

ctri

c C

ompa

ny, T

ehra

n N

.R.

N/A

O

pera

tiona

l 27

H

eavy

Wat

er P

rodu

ctio

n Pl

ant (

HW

PP),

Ara

k N

.R.

N/A

O

pera

tiona

l

Tabl

e 1

com

bine

s th

e co

nten

ts o

f th

e fo

llow

ing;

[1]

IAE

A,

“Im

plem

enta

tion

of t

he N

PT S

afeg

uard

s A

gree

men

t an

d re

leva

nt p

rovi

sion

s of

Sec

urity

Cou

ncil

reso

lutio

ns i

n th

e Is

lam

ic R

epub

lic o

f Ir

an,”

G

OV

/200

3/40

, 6 J

une

2003

, Ann

ex p

. 1. “

Lis

t of

nucl

ear

faci

litie

s un

der

IAE

A s

afeg

uard

s.”

[2

] IA

EA

, “I

mpl

emen

tatio

n of

the

NPT

Saf

egua

rds

Agr

eem

ent

and

rele

vant

pro

visi

ons

of S

ecur

ity C

ounc

il re

solu

tions

in

the

Isla

mic

Rep

ublic

of

Iran

,”

GO

V/2

004/

83, 1

5 N

ovem

ber

2004

, Ann

ex p

.1. “

Lis

t of

Loc

atio

ns R

elev

ant t

o th

e im

plem

enta

tion

of s

afeg

uard

s in

Ira

n.”

[3

] IA

EA

, “I

mpl

emen

tatio

n of

the

NPT

Saf

egua

rds

Agr

eem

ent

and

rele

vant

pro

visi

ons

of S

ecur

ity C

ounc

il re

solu

tions

in

the

Isla

mic

Rep

ublic

of

Iran

,”

GO

V/2

011/

7, 2

5 Fe

brua

ry 2

011,

p.1

1, A

ttach

men

t, “F

acili

ties

whi

ch I

ran

has

decl

ared

und

er i

ts S

afeg

uard

s A

gree

men

t an

d w

here

the

Age

ncy

cont

inue

s to

ve

rify

the

non-

dive

rsio

n of

dec

lare

d nu

clea

r m

ater

ial.”

[4]

NT

I ho

mep

age,

cou

ntry

pro

fi le

of I

ran,

nuc

lear

fac

ilitie

s, h

ttp://

ww

w.n

ti.or

g/fa

cilit

ies/

[5]

ISIS

; Nuc

lear

Ira

n, N

ucle

ar S

ites,

http

://w

ww

.isis

nucl

eari

ran.

org/

site

s/al

pha/

[6]

Iran

Wat

ch, I

ran’

s Su

spec

t Ent

ities

, http

://w

ww

.iran

wat

ch.o

rg/s

uspe

ct/

a Ura

nium

min

es a

re n

ot s

ubje

ct to

IA

EA

saf

egua

rds.

b N

.R. i

ndic

ates

the

data

is n

ot r

epor

ted

by th

e IA

EA

. c S

ince

Aug

ust 2

009,

fac

ility

has

not

pro

duce

d an

y ad

ditio

nal U

F 6 . T

he to

tal a

mou

nt o

f U

F 6 pro

duce

d at

the

plan

t is

371

t.

106 J.-H. Lee

6 30 cascades consist of 174 centrifuges each, and 24 cascades contain 164 centrifuges each. 7 The IAEA noted that “not all of the centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UF

6 may

have been working.”

(a) FEP (Fuel Enrichment Plant) Located in Natanz, the Natanz FEP has two cascade halls (Hall A, Hall B). Hall B is empty and Hall A has eight units. Operation of centrifuges began at FEP in February 2007. Each unit consists of 18 cascades. As of February 19, 2012, 54 cascades (9,156 centrifuges) 6 have been installed in these three units. Since August 2011, installation work has begun at the other fi ve units, where until now no centrifuges have been operated. However, Iran has completed prepara-tory installation work, including placement of 6,177 reportedly empty casings for IR-1 centrifuges in two of the units, with installation ongoing in the other three units. All centrifuges in the FEP currently are of the IR-1 type. Among 54 cascades, 52 of them (8,808 centrifuges) are being fed with UF

6 to produce low

enriched uranium below 5% uranium-235. 7 (b) PFEP (Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant)

Also located at Natanz, the PFEP began operations in October 2003. The PFEP is used for centrifuge R&D and LEU production. PFEP has one cascade hall that consists of six cascades. This hall is divided into two areas: A production

Fig. 1 Location of Iranian nuclear facilities

107The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programs

area (cascades 1 and 6) and an R&D area (cascades 2–5). Cascades 1 and 6 feature 164 IR-1-type centrifuges each. Cascades 2 and 3 consist of small test setups of several tens of IR-1, IR-2 m, and IR-4-type centrifuges and three new types of single centrifuges: the IR-5, IR-6 and IR-6s. 8 Cascade 4 consists of 58 IR-4 centrifuges and Cascade 5 consists of 164 IR-2 m centrifuges (as of Feb. 2012). Since February 2010, Iran has been using cascade 1 to produce 19.75% LEU from 3.5% enriched uranium for use in the manufacture of fuel for the TRR. In July 2010, Iran began producing 19.75% LEU using an interconnected cascade arrangement comprising cascades 1 and 6 operating together.

(c) FFEP (Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant) This facility is located near the holy city of Qom. It is constructed underneath a mountain and is therefore highly resistant to aerial attack. It began operation on December 14, 2011. In the most recently revised Design Information Questionnaire, Iran stated that the FFEP will be used for the production of 5 and 20% enriched LEU. 9 When complete, the FFEP can accommodate approxi-mately 3,000 centrifuges in 16 cascades, equally divided between two units (unit 1 and unit 2). Beginning in the summer of 2011, cylinders containing ~3.5% LEU and Depleted Uranium (DU) were transferred from the FEP to the FFEP. Iran explained that LEU would be used as feed material (for producing 20% enriched uranium), and the DU would be used for chemical passivation of the lines. Iran informed the IAEA that initially it would produce 20% LEU within two sets of two interconnected cascades (a total of four cascades) in unit 2, with each of these cascades consisting of 174 centrifuges. As of February 15, 2012, the four remaining cascades of unit 2 and the eight cascades of unit 1, contain 2,088 reportedly empty IR-1 centrifuge casings, installed along with the piping needed for operation.

3.2 Iranian Fissile Material Inventories and Production Capacity

3.2.1 Plutonium Production Capacity

At the TNRC, during the period from 1988 to 1993, Iran extracted approximately 100 mg of plutonium in bench-scale experiments. However, after 1993 all activities related to reprocessing were halted. In addition, these activities came under the supervision of the IAEA and Iran lacks a larger-scale plutonium extraction capability. Thus, in the short term, it seems unlikely that Iran would attempt to develop a plutonium-based nuclear weapon through reprocessing.

8 The IAEA noted that in a letter dated Feb. 1, 2012, that Iran informed the IAEA of its intention to install these three new centrifuge models. 9 The IAEA noted that in a letter dated Feb. 16, 2012, the IAEA requested that Iran provide details on how it intends to operate the FFEP (i.e., whether it will produce UF

6 up to 5 or 20%, or a

combination of both).

108 J.-H. Lee

Currently four research/training reactors and one nuclear-power reactor are operational in Iran. These facilities are not optimized for plutonium production, as shown in Table 2 .

Although the quantity of plutonium extracted from LWR spent fuel is relatively large, it contains isotopes that make it undesirable for weapons use. Fuel for the Bushehr NPP was provided by Russia, and spent fuel would be returned to Russia. As long as Iran seeks to maintain its cooperation with Russia on the Bushehr reactor, it will be dif fi cult for Iran to divert spent fuel discharged from the Bushehr NPP to a reprocessing program. Iran would be able to maintain independence if it could fabricate its own fuel for the Bushehr reactor. However, to produce the 3.5% enriched LEU required for one fuel load in the 1,000 MWe LWR, Iran requires approxi-mately 100,000 kg-SWU of enrichment work—more than ten times current levels. With the same amount of enrichment work, it is also possible for Iran to produce HEU suf fi cient for 20 nuclear weapons per year, therefore the Bushehr reactor does not meaningfully increase Iran’s proliferation potential.

IR-40 is a heavy-water reactor suitable for plutonium production. However, this facility is still under construction and Iran will not be able to produce plutonium from the IR-40 complex until it is complete and has been operating for about 1 year. It is likely to take Iran at least 2–3 years to complete the reactor, although Iran recently announced that it had loaded the reactor with non-nuclear fuel for testing the cooling system. 10 While not yet an immediate proliferation problem, the IR-40 reactor is nonetheless a proliferation-relevant part of Iran’s nuclear program and must be considered alongside its enrichment program.

10 http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/95546-arak-reactor-will-undergo-initial-test-by-sept

Table 2 Iranian plutonium production capacity

Reactor type Uranium enrichment of nuclear fuel

Nuclear fuel loaded

Annual plutonium production

MNSR LWR 90% N.R. Negligible LWSCR Sub-critical 90% N.R. Negligible HWZPR Critical

Assembly Natural Uranium N.R. Negligible

TRR Pool MTR a 19.75% (in form of U 3 O

8 ) 32 kg 0.6 kg

IR-40 HWR Natural Uranium (in form of UO

2 )

10 t Max. 14 kg (8–10 kg)

BNPP LWR 3.5% (in form of UO 2 ) 80 t Several hundred kg

– Research reactor type based on the IAEA research reactor database ( http://nucleus.iaea.org/RRDB/RR/ReactorSearch.aspx ). – Other parts of Table 2 : IISS, “Iran’s strategic weapons programmes: a net assessment”, Nuclear research and power reactors, Sept. 6, 2005. a MTR Material Test Reactor

109The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programs

3.2.2 Uranium Enrichment Capacity (Albright et al. 2012 )

The three known enrichment facilities have produced only LEU below 20%. As of February 2012, Iran has produced 5,451 kg of 3.5% UF

6 in total, with some 985 kg

of this total being used as feedstock for the PFEP and FFEP. Therefore, Iran’s stock-pile of 3.5% UF

6 is 4,466 kg. Iran has produced about 110 kg of 19.75% UF

6 in

total, with around 8 kg of this having been utilized to produce test fuel the TRR. Therefore Iran’s stockpile of 19.75% UF

6 stands at 102 kg. This quantity of 19.75%

LEU is suf fi cient for one TRR fuel load, but is not enough to make one uranium bomb. 11

Enrichment capacities of Iran’s enrichment plants are shown in Table 3 . In February 2012, monthly production at the FFEP is about two times greater than that at the PFEP. Beginning operation of the FFEP, Iran achieves a near threefold increase in production rate of 19.75% LEU. The number of centrifuges enriching at the FEP has increased by about 50%, but centrifuge performance worse than during the pre-vious year. Iran installed approximately 8,300 additional IR-1 centrifuge casings at the FEP and FFEP, but does not install rotor assemblies. It is unknown whether Iran can obtain enough raw materials to actually install this number of centrifuge rotor assemblies into the outer casings.

Iran is also focusing its efforts on building advanced centrifuges. But Iran seems to be experiencing problems in testing of production-scale cascades of advanced centrifuge at the PFEP. And Iran’s efforts to manufacture these advanced centri-fuges appear to face shortages of vital raw materials. Iran has deployed only IR-1 centrifuges but no advanced centrifuges at the FFEP.

4 Closing Remarks

Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the international community and the IAEA have serious concerns regarding possi-ble military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program. Despite possible past military dimensions, the consensus of the U.S. national intelligence community is that Iran has not yet decided to build nuclear weapons, and this appears to be somewhat re fl ected in the organization of Iran’s nuclear activities. At present, Iran has a growing nuclear-weapon capability, however such a capability is not technically prohibited under the NPT, making a negotiated resolution of the matter dif fi cult.

Neither negotiations nor sanctions have been able to stop Iran from pursing its nuclear ambitions. Sanctions might have delayed Iran’s nuclear program somewhat, although it is not possible to determine if that delay has been signi fi cant. As the data shows, Iran has steadily and dramatically strengthened its nuclear capabilities in

11 R. Scott Kemp estimated that 303 kg of 19.75% UF 6 is needed for breakout sprint. Scott Kemp

( 2012 ) .

110 J.-H. Lee

Table 3 Enrichment capacities of Iran’s enrichment plants

Facility name FEP PFEP a FFEP

Concentration of Stream (T: Tails, F: Feed, P: Product)

T: ~0.4% T: 0.7% T: N.A. F: 0.71% F: 3.3% F: 3.3% P: 3.3% P: 19.6% P: ~19.75%

Reference Date Feb. 2011 Feb. 2012 Feb. 2011 Feb. 2012 Feb. 2012

Monthly output (kg-UF

6 /

month)

133 170 3.8 4.3 6.5

Accumulated feed (kg-UF

6 )

39,683 + N/A b 487.2 885.7 99.3

Accumulated product (kg-UF

6 )

3,606 5,451 43.6 95.4 13.8

Annual Enrichment Capacity (kg-SWU/year)

3,878 + 4,732 + 272 + 298 + N/A

Centrifuge Separation Capacity (kg-SWU/year/centrifuge)

0.78 0.65 0.83 0.96 N/A

No. of operating centrifuges

~5,084 ~8,808 328 328 ~696

No. of installed centrifuges

~8,812 9,156 + (6,177) ++ 328 IR-1s 328 IR-1s 696 + (2,088) ++

David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond, ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report, February 25, 2011 David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond, ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report, February 24, 2012 a The fi rst cascade enriched from 3.5% LEU to 19.75%, the second cascade takes the tails from the fi rst one and produces about 10% LEU, which is fed into the fi rst cascade in addition to 3.5% LEU. b Since the start of operations in February 2007, as of 17 October 2010, 34,737 kg of natural UF

6 ,

as of 16 October 2011, 55,683 kg of natural UF 6 , had been fed into the cascades.

+ Values in parentheses are author’s estimates. ++ These are empty IR-1 outer casings without rotor assemblies.

spite of sanctions. It is not clear that further sanctions are possible. If Iran’s progress continues at current levels, Iran will have a rapid weapon-making capability in the near future. This suggests that a priority should now be placed on negotiations at an alternative route to a resolution.

Despite its steady progress, Iran is not yet on the verge of making a nuclear weapon so quickly that it could not be stopped by military force. Iran’s stockpile of near-20% enriched UF

6 is not yet enough to make one uranium bomb, and given its current

capacity, it would need considerable time to convert that material to weapon-grade levels. Iran’s stockpile of 3.5% UF

6 is enough to make over three nuclear bombs if

further enriched to weapons grade, but the time required is signi fi cantly greater. This suggests that a preemptive military strike cannot be justi fi ed at this time.

In the short term, it seems unlikely that Iran would attempt to develop a pluto-nium-based nuclear weapon through reprocessing of plutonium-bearing spent fuel.

111The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programs

Therefore, halting Iran’s ongoing enrichment of uranium remains the fi rst priority for negotiators. However, Iran’s plutonium program is progressing more rapidly than previously anticipated and should be included as an early agenda item in any upcoming negotiations.

References

Albright D, Stricker A, Walrond C, Wood H (2012) Preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons: constraining its future nuclear options, p 10, 5 March 2012

BBC News (2012) EU Iran sanctions: ministers adopt Iran oil imports ban, 23 January 2012 IAEA (2011) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of security

council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, 8 November 2011 IAEA (2012) Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of security

council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2012/9, 24 February 2012 Kemp RS (2012) 2012 PBNC presentation, HEU Production Potential of Iran and North Korea, 20

March 2012 Kerr PK (2009) Iran’s nuclear program: status, CRS report, 11 August 2009, pp 1–4 VOA news (2012) Iran claims nuclear advances, US downplays Iranian ‘Hype’ ( http://blogs.voanews.

com/breaking-news/2012/02/15/iran-claims-nuclear-advances-us-downplays-iranian-hype/ ), 15 February 2012