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Land Use Planning Risk Assessment for La Collette Fuel Depot and Jersey Gas Facility States of Jersey Report No: 5052526 R2 Issue 01 Issue Date: 24 October 2007

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Page 1: Atkins Report

Land Use Planning Risk Assessment for La

Collette Fuel Depot and Jersey Gas Facility

States of Jersey

Report No: 5052526 R2 Issue 01

Issue Date: 24 October 2007

p

Page 2: Atkins Report

Land Use Planning Risk Assessment for La Collette Fuel Depot and Jersey Gas Facility

Report No: 5052526 R2 Issue 01 Page ii Issue Date: 24 October 2007

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Land Use Planning Risk Assessment for La Collette Fuel Depot and Jersey Gas Facility

A Report Prepared by

Atkins Ltd

On Behalf of

States of Jersey

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

Author:.............................. Checked:........................ I.G. Lines D.M. Deaves Approved:........................ P. Gallagher Atkins Ltd States of Jersey WS Atkins House Chief Minister’s Department Birchwood Boulevard Cyril Le Marquand House Birchwood St Helier Warrington JE4 8QT WA3 7WA Tel.: +44 (0)1925 828 987 Fax.: +44 (0)1925 828 153 [email protected]

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DOCUMENT ISSUE CONTROL SHEET

States of Jersey Land Use Planning Risk Assessment for La Collette Fuel Depot and Jersey Gas

Facility

Issue Date Purpose Rev Prepared Checked Approved

01 24 October 2007 IGL DMD PG

NOTE:

This document has been specifically produced for the purposes of a study relating to a Land Use Planning Risk Assessment for La Collette Fuel Depot and Jersey Gas Facility and is only suitable for use in connection therewith. Any liability arising out of use of this document by the States of Jersey or a third party for purposes not wholly connected with the above project shall be the responsibility of the States of Jersey, who shall indemnify Atkins Ltd against all claims, costs, damages and losses arising from such use.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary Abbreviations and Acronyms

1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 1.1 Background ..................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Objectives and Scope of Work........................................................................ 2 1.3 Structure of Report.......................................................................................... 3 2 THE MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATIONS...................................................... 4 2.1 The Fuel Storage Depot.................................................................................. 4 2.2 The LPG Storage Site ..................................................................................... 4 2.3 The LPG and Fuel Transfer Operations.......................................................... 5 2.4 Nature of Risks................................................................................................ 5 3 BASIS OF RISK ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS ....................................... 7 3.1 Fuel Storage Depot ......................................................................................... 8 3.2 LPG Storage Facility ....................................................................................... 9 3.3 LPG and Fuel Transfer Operations ............................................................... 11 4 RISK ASSESSMENT .................................................................................... 13 4.1 Methodology.................................................................................................. 13 4.2 Hazard Based Results .................................................................................. 13 4.3 Individual Risk Results .................................................................................. 13 4.4 Societal Risk Results .................................................................................... 14 5 MITIGATION OF RISK.................................................................................. 16 5.1 On-site Plant and Procedures ....................................................................... 16 5.2 Off-site Measures and Procedures ............................................................... 17 6 RECOMMENDED POLICY FOR LAND USE PLANNING AT LA COLLETTE18 6.1 New Developments ....................................................................................... 18 6.2 Modifications to Existing Developments........................................................ 18 6.3 Large Developments ..................................................................................... 19 6.4 Modifications to Major Hazard Installations................................................... 19 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS................................................................ 20

8 REFERENCES.............................................................................................. 21

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Figures Figure 1.1 The Existing HSE Land Use Planning Zones Calculated in 1999

Figure 2.1 Site Plan for the Fuel Storage Depot (Showing Hazardous Area Classification)

Figure 4.1 Illustration of Current HSE ‘Cautionary’ 400m Consultation Distance

Figure 4.2 DPZ (150m), Inner (250m), Middle (300m) and Outer (400m) HSE Land Use Planning Zones for Fuel Depot Based on Possible Post-Buncefield Approach (Option 4)

Figure 4.3 Individual Risk of Receiving a Dangerous Dose or Worse Contours for a Residential Population (100% Occupancy) for All Events

Figure 4.4 Individual Risk of Receiving a Dangerous Dose or Worse Contours for a Residential Population (100% Occupancy) for LPG Installation and Ship Transfer Operations Only

Figure 4.5 Recommended Combined Land Use Planning Zones

Figure 4.6 Individual Risk of Fatality for a Residential Population (100% Occupancy) for All Events

Figure 4.7 Individual Risk of Fatality for an Industrial Population (25% Occupancy) for All Events

Figure 4.8 Societal Risk FN Curves for All People at La Collette for All Events

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Executive Summary

This Phase 2 study builds on a previous Phase 1 assessment of the Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) risks associated with the La Collette fuel depot to other existing facilities and developments at La Collette. These concerns were raised following the Buncefield event and publication of UK HSE’s Consultative Document CD211, which raised the possibility that developments close to large fuel depots may be more strictly controlled in future.

This Phase 2 study now considers all the major hazard risks associated with all the major hazard installations at La Collette and assesses the levels of risk to those in the vicinity. Recommendations are also made in terms of how these results should be used in terms of practical land use planning decisions.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms AA Advise Against ACMH Advisory Committee on Major Hazards AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable ARI Approximate Risk Integral CD Consultation Distance CIA Chemical Industries Association COMAH Control of Major Accident Hazards cpm Chances per million (years) DAA Don’t Advise Against DD Dangerous Dose (or worse) DDW Dangerous Dose or Worse DETR Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions DPZ Development Proximity Zone DT Development Type DTL Dangerous Toxic Load EV Expectation Value HID Hazardous Installations Directorate (of HSE) HRG Hazard Review Group HSA Hazardous Substances Authority HSE Health and Safety Executive IZ Inner Zone LD Land Division (of HSE) LPA Local Planning Authority LUP Land Use Planning MAOP Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure MSDU Methodology and Standards Development Unit (of HID in HSE) MZ Middle Zone Nmax Maximum number of people affected OZ Outer Zone PA Planning Authority PADHI Planning Advice for Developments near Hazardous Installations PCAG Planning Case Assessment Guide (HSE internal documents) PLL Potential Loss of Life PRAM Pipeline Risk Assessment Model (an HSE model) QRA Quantified Risk Assessment R2P2 Reducing Risks, Protecting People (HSE publication, 2001) RI Risk Integral RoD Risk of Death SL Sensitivity Level SLOD Significant Likelihood of Death SRI Scaled Risk Integral SUKOP Shell UK Oil Products tdu thermal dose units (kW/m2)4/3.seconds TOR Tolerability of Risk UKMO United Kingdom Meteorological Office VCE Vapour Cloud Explosion

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

There are several major hazard installations at La Collette which store and handle a range of flammable substances. The Jersey Gas Company operates an LPG storage facility, and there is also a fuel storage depot operated by Shell and Esso together, although also used by Total.

It has long been established that developments in the vicinity of such major hazard sites need to be controlled in order to ensure that people are not exposed to unacceptable levels of risk. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has in the past provided advice (HSE, 1995 and 1999) relating to the risks associated with the LPG storage and ship transfer operations at La Collette, leading to the production of an HSE 3 zone map (see Figure 1.1) which defined the zones within which certain types of development may be inadvisable from a safety point of view.

However, following the incident at Buncefield in December 2005, it has become apparent that the risks associated with fuel storage depots may have been underestimated, and the HSE has been undertaking a process of consultation which may lead to more stringent zoning advice for such sites in the UK. In particular, one option that is being considered is that the HSE may in future adopt larger land use planning zones and may normally advise against any occupied buildings within about 150 m of such fuel depots.

Therefore, in order to address the specific issues relating to potential Buncefield type events at the fuel farm, the States of Jersey commissioned Atkins in 2007 to undertake an initial Phase 1 assessment of the risks associated with such large vapour cloud explosion events, and the implications for nearby developments. The results were presented in a report ‘Initial Assessment of Vapour Cloud Explosion Risks Associated with the La Collette Fuel Depot’, 5052526 R1 Issue 03, 18 June 2007. This Phase 1 report was presented to the Jersey Hazard Review Group (HRG), which includes representatives from all the key stakeholders, including: the current fuel farm operators, Jersey Gas, the Jersey Electricity Company, Police, Fire, Planning, Harbours, Public Health, Health and Safety Inspectorate of Social Security, Property Holdings, Waterfront Enterprise Board and the Emergency Planning Officer.

However, the Phase 1 study did not consider other potential major hazard risks associated with the fuel depot or LPG storage facility, all of which may impact on existing and future developments at La Collette. Therefore, in order to address these issues, the States of Jersey commissioned Atkins to undertake this Phase 2 study which considers all the major accident hazard risks which need to be assessed in terms of land use planning at La Collette.

It is noted that this Phase 2 report draws on the work undertaken in Phase 1, and that the Phase 1 report includes a great deal of useful general information on land use planning which is not repeated here.

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1.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF WORK

The main objective of this project is to provide advice to the States of Jersey and to the HRG in relation to the consideration of future land use planning issues at La Collette.

It is noted that this study has been undertaken in two phases. The first phase concentrated on the VCE risks from the fuel depot and the impact on the proposed Energy from Waste facility, and the second phase now considers the wider range of potential events at all the major hazard installations, and the implications for land use planning for the entire La Collette area.

The results of Phase 1 were presented in a report ‘Initial Assessment of Vapour Cloud Explosion Risks Associated with the La Collette Fuel Depot’, 5052526 R1 Issue 03, 18 June 2007. It is noted that the Phase 1 report included some background information on the basis of the UK land use planning system which is not repeated in this Phase 2 report.

The detailed scope of work for Phase 2 was defined by the States of Jersey as follows:

1. Carry out a site specific assessment of risks associated with La Collette major hazards (including those relating to a Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) initiated by a release of petroleum spirits from the La Collette Fuel Farm), taking into account:

(a) Existing neighbourhood populations and hours of occupation.

(b) Potential neighbourhood populations and hours of occupation of development options for La Collette 2 as envisaged in the Jersey Island Plan 2002.

(c) Breakdown of maximum Jersey Gas, Fuel Farm and Jersey Electricity inventories in terms of levels of flammability and tonnages.

(d) History of tanker unloading operations, and associated Jersey Gas, Fuel Farm and Jersey Electricity filling operations, inclusive of tonnages, pumping rates, duration of filling operations, and times of day that filling operations are undertaken.

(e) Any risks associated with the interfaces between adjacent major hazards.

2. Assess the total annualised societal risk associated with major hazards risk (including those relating to a VCE initiated by a release of petroleum spirits from the La Collette Fuel Farm).

3. Consider how these risks might be mitigated by onsite plant and procedures, and by offsite measures and procedures.

4. Report assumptions made as regards the risks associated with a VCE or other major accident.

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1.3 STRUCTURE OF REPORT

Section 2 of this report begins by providing some details of the major hazard installations at La Collette, and the general nature of the of the types of major accident which lead to the risk. Section 3 describes the basis of the risk assessment calculations in terms of the potential major accident scenarios which have been considered, and Section 4 describes the risk assessment methodology and results. Section 5 provides a discussion of the potential for risk mitigation measures, and Section 6 provides a summary of how the results in this report should be used for the purposes of land use planning at La Collette. The overall summary and conclusions are presented in Section 7.

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2 THE MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATIONS There are 3 principal major hazards which may lead to risks at current and future developments at La Collette, namely:

• the fuel storage depot;

• the LPG storage site; and,

• the LPG and fuel transfer operations from ships, including pipelines to the above sites.

Each of these is considered in the following subsections.

2.1 THE FUEL STORAGE DEPOT

The fuel farm at La Collette is operated by Esso Petroleum Limited, Shell (U.K.) Limited and Total Oil, and would be classified as a Lower Tier site under the UK COMAH Regulations. The fuel farm itself is operated by Esso and Shell together under a joint-venture arrangement, known as the Jersey Consortium Agreement. Esso and Shell have separate office facilities, loading racks and tanker parking areas. Total Oil has an office and tanker parking area and uses the Esso loading racks to fill tankers.

Shell UK Oil Products have produced a safety case for the Jersey Depot, which has been provided to Atkins. The site would not be classed as a top-tier COMAH installation, and so the safety case does not contain any quantitative risk analysis calculations.

A site layout diagram is presented in Figure 2.1, which includes the hazardous area classification and the dimensions and contents of each of the main storage tanks.

It is noted that, concurrently with this risk assessment study, Atkins has also been conducting a review of the fuel depot in terms of how it complies with current standards such as HS(G)176 and HS(G)186.

2.2 THE LPG STORAGE SITE

The LPG storage site at La Collette is operated by the Jersey Gas Company Ltd, and would be classified as a Top Tier Site under the UK COMAH Regulations (as it stores more than 200 tonnes of LPG).

The installation consists of 9 mounded LPG storage vessels (2x85 te, 2x100 te, and 5x200 te). The installation is supplied by ship at the nearby jetty from which the LPG is transported to the site by pipeline. The LPG is vaporised for mixing with a small volume of air for transmission off-site, and 13 te, 8 te and 5 te road tankers are also filled on site for distribution.

The Jersey Gas Company Ltd has produced a detailed COMAH Safety Report (April 2004) which has been provided to Atkins. The report includes some quantified risk assessment calculations involving a variety of major accident scenarios.

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2.3 THE LPG AND FUEL TRANSFER OPERATIONS

LPG and other fuels are delivered to Jersey by ships, which berth at the jetty on the west side of La Collette. A number of pipelines carry the LPG and other fuels to the LPG storage site and to the fuel depot.

Some details of these operations are provided in the installation safety cases.

The most significant hazard is associated with the LPG, for which the following information has been obtained:

• Ship discharges occur approximately 24 times per year.

• Deliveries occur approximately once every 10 days during the winter months, reducing to once a month during the summer months.

• The maximum ship capacity is 1100 tonnes, but this is shared with Guernsey.

• Ships discharge between 400 - 700 tonnes depending on stock levels in both Islands, but normally discharge about 550 tonnes in Jersey.

2.4 NATURE OF RISKS

Whilst the likelihood of a leak of gas/flammable liquid is relatively low, there is always a chance that corrosion, structural failure, human error or third party activity could lead to an accidental release. The severity of the incident will depend on the size of the breach, which could be anything from a tiny pinhole to catastrophic rupture. The main types of major accident event which could occur at the major hazard sites at La Collette would result from the ignition of a flammable release and are:

Fireball – If a large release of gas (LPG) is ignited within a few seconds then a large fireball lasting 10 to 15 seconds may be produced, with very high levels of thermal radiation in all directions. The initial large fireball would probably be followed by a jet fire (see below).

BLEVE – Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion. A BLEVE is a sudden catastrophic vessel failure, usually due to fire impingement on an LPG vessel, leading to a major fireball and some blast overpressure. The likelihood of such events for fully mounded LPG tanks is generally considered to be negligible, although it could still occur for LPG road tankers.

Jet Fire – Any ignition of gas or pressurised liquid will burn back to the point of release and may form a jet fire. Depending on the nature of the failure, the jet fire may be directed horizontally or vertically. Jet fires continue to burn for as long as the release of gas is not isolated, and the prolonged thermal radiation (or flame impingement) can lead to significant risks, although the impact tends to be relatively local.

Flash Fire – If a release of gas (LPG or petroleum vapours) is not ignited within a few seconds of the release, then a cloud of gas will disperse downwind some distance from the point of release. If this cloud then finds a source of ignition, the area covered by the vapour cloud will burn rapidly as a flash fire, with significant risks to all those within the flash fire envelope. The flash fire would probably be followed by a jet fire.

Vapour Cloud Explosion – This is similar to a flash fire, except that if the vapour cloud is in a partially confined area, then the ignition of the cloud could also lead to a vapour cloud explosion (VCE), generating significant levels of

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blast overpressure, which would present a risk to people beyond the flash fire envelope.

Pool fire – Any release of fuel may form a liquid pool on the ground. If the release finds a source of ignition then a pool fire will be formed.

For the fuel farm, the major concern is a VCE, such as occurred at Buncefield, although there may also be risks from flash fires and pool fires.

For the LPG storage site, the worst case events would be major fireballs following catastrophic vessel/road tanker failure, but lesser events, such as flash fires and VCEs could also have significant off-site impact. Jet fires tend to be more local in their effects.

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3 BASIS OF RISK ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS A quantified risk assessment involves 4 main stages:

1. Identification of representative scenarios

2. Assessment of the consequences

3. Assessment of the likelihood

4. Calculation of the risk

Each of these is discussed below.

Identification of representative scenarios This involves a consideration of all of the potential major accident events that could occur in order to derive a list of scenarios. It is noted that it is not feasible in any risk assessment to consider explicitly every possible event, and therefore it is necessary to identify ‘representative’ events which ‘bound’ a wider group of events. For example, the wide variety of events involving leaks from pipework and associated equipment could be characterised by simply considering partial and catastrophic failures of pipework.

The approach that has been adopted in this study is to consider the type of representative events that are typically considered for the purposes of land use planning. It is emphasised that these tend to concentrate on those events with the potential for off-site impact, and that a detailed quantified risk assessment for the purposes of a safety case would also need to consider lesser events which may only have on-site impact.

Assessment of the consequences The consequences of the various potential major accident events, in terms of the levels of blast overpressure and thermal radiation, have been calculated using standard models and assumptions, which are typical of those generally used by the UK HSE.

Assessment of the likelihood The likelihood of each representative scenario has generally been based on the approach typically adopted by the UK HSE, as described in their Planning Case Assessment Guide. For some representative scenarios, it has been necessary to derive the frequency of the event using other published sources of data.

Calculation of the risk The calculation of risk involves the combination of the scenario consequences and likelihood, together with assumptions regarding the vulnerability of the people exposed (i.e. the probability of harm given a particular level of consequence).

The following subsections summarise the key details of the assessment for each of the following:

• the fuel storage depot;

• the LPG storage site; and,

• the LPG and fuel transfer operations from ships, including pipelines to the above sites.

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3.1 FUEL STORAGE DEPOT

The major off-site risk associated with the fuel depot is a large vapour cloud explosion similar to that which occurred at Buncefield. The consequences, likelihood and risks associated with such an event were considered in detail in the Phase 1 report. A similar, but much lesser event would be a vapour cloud explosion in the semi-confined areas of the depot, such as the fuel tanker loading areas.

There is also a risk that any spillage of flammable liquid could lead to a pool fire. In general, small leaks are much less likely to be ignited than large releases, and small releases are also much less likely to have any off-site impact. Therefore, for the purposes of this land use planning risk assessment, it is only considered necessary to consider severe events such as a major fire within the bunded area, following a major loss of containment, and a similar larger scenario in which the bund wall is assumed to have failed.

The table below summarises the representative events and their likelihood.

Table 3.1 Representative Events for Fuel Storage Depot Scenario Description of Scenario Likelihood Notes

A1 Major vapour cloud explosion Volume = 50,000 m3 Ignition strength = 7 Location = Anywhere around tank farm area Consequences modelled using TNO Multi-Energy Model

1.0E-04/year Event consequences and frequency based on HSE RR512, as described in Phase 1 report.

A2 Minor vapour cloud explosion Volume = Taken as 20 x 15 x 3 m = 900 m3 Ignition strength = 7 Location = Road tanker loading areas Consequences modelled using TNO Multi-Energy Model

1.0E-04/year (for each of two)

Similar to event A1 but much smaller. Likelihood considered to be a conservative estimate.

A3 Major fire in tank farm bund Consequences modelled using POOLFIRE6

1.0E-03/year Likelihood considered to be a conservative estimate.

A4 Major fire which extends beyond tank farm bund Consequences modelled using POOLFIRE6

1.0E-04/year Event based on HSE PCAG Chapter 2C. Likelihood considered to be a conservative estimate.

It is noted that the likelihoods for several of the events have been conservatively estimated, based on a review of all available information and a consideration of published sources of data for such events. Whilst there may be significant conservatism in some of these estimates, there is little benefit in refining these estimates unless they turn out to be the dominant contributors to the risk.

Similarly, in some cases it has been necessary to make estimates relating to the consequences of some events (such as likely VCE volumes) based on expert judgement, but in general such factors do not affect the overall results significantly.

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3.2 LPG STORAGE FACILITY

The main types of major accident which may occur involving LPG are:

• BLEVE/fireball

• Vapour cloud explosion

• Flash fire

• Jet fire

All of the main storage vessels are fully mounded, and so the likelihood of a BLEVE is considered to be sufficiently low that it can be neglected for the purposes of land use planning. The most significant potential BLEVE that needs to be considered is one involving road tankers, for which Jersey Gas have indicated that there were the following number of loading operations in a typical year (2006).

13 tonne slip trailer 50

8 tonne MBT4 160

5 tonne MBT5 30

There is also the possibility of a smaller BLEVE/fireball involving the inventory in the vapourisers.

The most likely locations for a vapour cloud explosion (i.e. semi confined regions) are probably in the mixing shed and in the area of the road tanker filling operations (and nearby main pipework manifold). The mixing shed has an approximate volume of 245 m3. It is noted that the shed is clad in Ventair manufactured by European Profiles Ltd., and its design is such that it would be very unlikely to fill and remain full of LPG vapour.

The ignition of any release from pipework or equipment could also lead to a flash fire or jet fire. The extent of the area affected by a flash fire is generally based on the area covered by the LFL, and is calculated in typical D5 and worst case F2 weather conditions.

The areas at risk from a jet fire will depend on its orientation, and so both vertical and horizontal jet fires are considered.

The table below summarises the representative events and their likelihood.

Table 3.2 Representative Events for LPG Storage Facility Scenario Description of Scenario Likelihood Notes

B1 BLEVE of road tanker Mass a) 13 tonnes b) 8 tonnes c) 5 tonnes Location = road tanker loading bay Consequences modelled using standard Roberts fireball model (AIChE,1994)

a) 6.0E-06/year b) 1.9E-05/year c) 3.6E-06/year

Likelihood based on 1.2E-07/year/operation, based on hose rupture frequency of 4.0E-06/operation (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K) and 3% probability of failure of protection systems (taking account of deluge and remote isolation systems).

B2 BLEVE/fireball of vapouriser Mass = 400 kg Location = vaporisers Consequences modelled using standard Roberts fireball model (AIChE, 1994)

1.0E-05/year (for each of two)

Likelihood based on Crossthwaite, Fitzpatrick and Hurst (1988).

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B3 Vapour cloud explosion in mixing shed Volume = 245 m3 Ignition strength = 7 Location = mixing shed Consequences modelled using TNO Multi-Energy Model

1.0E-04/year Likelihood considered to be a conservative estimate.

B4 Vapour cloud explosion the open Volume = taken as 20 x 20 x 3m = 1200 m3 Ignition Strength = 7 Location = liquid pipework areas Consequences modelled using TNO Multi-Energy Model

1.0E-04/year Likelihood considered to be a conservative estimate.

B5 Jet fire following hose/coupling failure Release rate = 10 kg/s Ranges to 1000 tdu = 5/35m for vert/horz Location = road tanker loading bay

9.6E-04/year Likelihood based on hose rupture frequency of 4.0E-06/operation (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K), and a total of 240 loading operations per year.

B6 Flash fire following hose/coupling failure Release rate = 10 kg/s Ranges to LFL = 60/160m in D5/F2 Location = road tanker loading bay

9.6E-04/year Likelihood based on hose rupture frequency of 4.0E-06/operation (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K), and a total of 240 loading operations per year.

B7 Jet fire following major liquid line failure Release rate = 40 kg/s Ranges to 1000 tdu = 15/60m for vert/horz Location = liquid pipework areas

1.0E-04/year Likelihood based on guillotine failure frequency of 5.0E-07/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K) and the length of large diameter liquid pipework (~200m).

B8 Jet fire following minor liquid line failure Release rate = 7.4 kg/s Ranges to 1000 tdu = 5/30m for vert/horz Location = liquid pipework areas

6.0E-04/year Likelihood based on 25mm failure frequency of 1.0E-06/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K), and the length of liquid pipework (~600m).

B9 Flash fire following major liquid line failure Release rate = 40 kg/s Ranges to LFL = 120/320m in D5/F2 Location = liquid pipework areas

1.0E-04/year Likelihood based on guillotine failure frequency of 5.0E-07/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K) and the length of large diameter liquid pipework (~200m).

B10 Flash fire following minor liquid line failure Release rate = 7.4 kg/s Ranges to LFL = 50/140m in D5/F2 Location = liquid pipework areas

6.0E-04/year Likelihood based on 25mm failure frequency of 1.0E-06/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K), and the length of liquid pipework (~600m).

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3.3 LPG AND FUEL TRANSFER OPERATIONS

The main types of major accident which may occur involving LPG delivery and pipeline transfer operations are:

• BLEVE/fireball

• Flash fire

• Jet fire

For the other fuel pipelines, the only significant events are likely to be leaks, ignition of which could lead to pool fires.

The table below summarises the representative events and their likelihood.

Table 3.3 Representative Events for LPG and Fuel Transfer Operations Scenario Description of Scenario Likelihood Notes

C1 LPG ship BLEVE Mass a) 1100 tonnes

b) 550 tonnes Location = jetty Consequences modelled using standard Roberts fireball model (AIChE, 1994) with SEP of 200 kW/m2

a) 2.4E-07/year b) 2.4E-07/year

Likelihood taken as 2.0E-08/year per ship delivery based on previous HSE assessment, and 24 deliveries per year (split equally between major and minor cases).

C2 LPG hose/coupling failure flash fire Release rate = 100 kg/s Ranges to LFL = 200/500m in D5/F2 Location = jetty

9.6E-06/year Likelihood based on failure frequency of 4.0E-06/delivery (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K), with a 10% flash fire probability, and 24 deliveries per year.

C3 LPG hose/coupling failure jet fire Release rate = 100 kg/s Ranges to 1000 tdu = 30/90m for vert/horz Location = jetty

9.6E-05/year Likelihood based on failure frequency of 4.0E-06/delivery (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K), and 24 deliveries per year.

C4 LPG pipeline fireball Based on 1320 kg Location = anywhere along LPG pipeline Consequences modelled using standard Roberts fireball model (AIChE, 1994) with SEP of 270 kW/m2

2.0E-07/m/year Likelihood based on rupture frequency of 2.0E-07/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K).

C5 LPG Jet fire following major pipeline failure Release rate = 100 kg/s Ranges to 1000 tdu = 30/90m for vert/horz Location = anywhere along LPG pipeline

2.0E-07/m/year Likelihood based on rupture frequency of 2.0E-07/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K).

C6 LPG Jet fire following minor pipeline failure Release rate = 20 kg/s Ranges to 1000 tdu = 10/45m for vert/horz Location = anywhere along LPG pipeline

2.8E-07/m/year Likelihood based on significant failure frequency of 1.1E-06/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K) and an ignition probability of 25%.

C7 LPG Flash fire following major pipeline failure Release rate = 100 kg/s Ranges to LFL = 200/500m in D5/F2 Location = anywhere along LPG pipeline

2.0E-08/m/year Likelihood based on rupture frequency of 2.0E-07/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K), with a 10% flash fire probability.

C8 LPG Flash fire following minor pipeline failure Release rate 20 kg/s Ranges to LFL = 85/250m in D5/F2 Location = anywhere along LPG pipeline

2.8E-07/m/year Likelihood based on significant failure frequency of 1.1E-06/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K) and an ignition probability of 25%.

C9 Major fuel leak and pool fire Release rate 100 kg/s Range to 1000 tdu = 40 m Location = anywhere along fuel pipelines Consequences modelled using POOLFIRE6

2.0E-07/m/year (for each pipeline)

Likelihood based on guillotine failure frequency of 2.0E-07/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K).

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C10 Minor fuel leak and pool fire Release rate = 20 kg/s Range to 1000 tdu = 20 m Location = anywhere along fuel pipelines Consequences modelled using POOLFIRE6

2.8E-07/m/year (per pipeline)

Likelihood based on significant failure frequency of 1.1E-06/m/year (from HSE PCAG Chapter 6K) and an ignition probability of 25%.

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4 RISK ASSESSMENT

4.1 METHODOLOGY

There are two main types of risk assessment:

• Hazard based – where the results are based on the consequences of a representative worst case event.

• Risk based – where the results are based on a consideration of the likelihood and consequences of a range of representative events.

In the past, the UK HSE has generally provided advice using both approaches, generally preferring hazard based approaches for fuel farms and simple LPG installations, and a risk based approach for toxics and more complex LPG installations.

It is noted that the previous HSE analyses for the LPG installation at La Collette were based on a risk based approach.

Each approach has its merits in particular circumstances, and so the approach adopted in this study has been to consider both.

The risk based analyses have been based on the scenarios, consequences and frequencies described in Section 3. The calculations take into account the probability of the wind blowing in various directions (for gas dispersion leading to flash fires), and the detailed distribution of population at La Collette (for the societal risk calculations). The complex risk integration calculations required to produce the risk contours has been undertaken using the Atkins RiskTool software.

4.2 HAZARD BASED RESULTS

Following the incident at Buncefield, the approach currently being adopted by the UK HSE for large scale petroleum storage sites is simply to issue Local Planning Authorities with maps showing a ‘cautionary’ 400 m Consultation Distance, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Local Planning Authorities in the UK are currently required to consult the HSE for all developments within this area. However, the 400 m zone for the La Collette fuel depot covers the entire La Collette area, so this is not particularly helpful for the purposes of land use planning in this particular study.

However, as noted in the Phase 1 report, the HSE is currently considering 4 land use planning options for such sites. Atkins, and other groups such as the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Borard, currently believes that Option 4 represents the best pragmatic advice amongst these options, i.e. a Development Proximity Zone (DPZ) of 150 m and Inner, Middle and Outer zones of 250, 300 and 400 m respectively, as shown in Figure 4.2. It is understood that HSE will make their views on all 4 options known in early 2008, and that there is a good chance that Option 4 will be the approach preferred by HSE.

4.3 INDIVIDUAL RISK RESULTS

The standard approach in the UK for setting risk based zones is to determine the risks of receiving a dangerous dose or worse to a hypothetical member of a residential population present for 100% of the time.

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Figure 4.3 shows these results in terms of risk contours at 1.0E-05, 1.0E-06 and 3.0E-07/year (i.e. 10-5, 10-6 and 3x10-7/year, or 10, 1 and 0.3 cpm respectively), which correspond to the standard definitions of the Inner, Middle and Outer Zones respectively.

In practice, the estimates of the risks of dangerous dose for the fuel farm (based on a large VCE as described in the Phase 1 report) in Figure 4.3 are not considered to be a particularly useful basis for land use planning for such sites (as all the zones occur at approximately the same distance). Therefore, Atkins recommends that land use planning should be rather based on a combination of the Figure 4.2 (Option 4) approach for the fuel depot, and the risk of dangerous dose results for the LPG installation and ship transfer operations alone. The risk of dangerous dose contours for the LPG installation and ship transfer operations only (i.e. not including the fuel depot) are illustrated in Figure 4.4. Figure 4.5 combines Figures 4.2 and 4.4, to show all the relevant recommended land use planning zones on a single plot. It is believed that this is the type of approach that HSE is likely to take in the future in the UK.

Whilst the use of dangerous dose is the standard approach currently adopted in the UK for individual risk, other countries often consider the risk of fatality, which will be somewhat lower. Figure 4.6 is identical to Figure 4.3 except that it is based on the risk of fatality.

Figure 4.7 also relates to the risk of fatality, but is based on an occupancy of 25% (10% outdoor), which provides a better estimate of the risk to a worker who spends around 40 hours per week at that location.

In summary, Figure 4.5 should be used as the main basis for providing zone based advice, but Figure 4.7 may also be useful in terms of providing an assessment of the individual risk of fatality.

4.4 SOCIETAL RISK RESULTS

The societal risk of fatality associated with all potential major accident events is illustrated in Figure 4.8 in terms of an FN curve. This shows the cumulative frequency of events leading to N or more fatalities. It is noted that the maximum number of predicted fatalities is about 395, for the largest LPG ship BLEVE scenario (an extremely unlikely event).

The top line in Figure 4.8 shows the overall total FN results, and the contributions from each of three groups of scenarios are also shown, indicating that the fuel depot (major VCE) is the dominant contributor.

Figure 4.8 also shows the upper and lower comparison lines used by the HSE (Hirst and Carter, 2002 and HSE SPC 12). This shows that the risks are above the broadly acceptable (negligible) level, but are below the upper comparison line (where risks may be considered intolerable). A large number of major hazard sites in the UK would have FN curves at similar levels.

The Expectation value (EV) or Potential Loss of Life (PLL) for this FN curve is about 0.0035 fatalities per year (or 3500 in units of cpm). This can be thought of as the average number of fatalities that would be expected per year over the long term, i.e. the result corresponds to 1 fatality every 286 years, or to incidents involving 10 fatalities every 2,860 years.

There are no generally accepted criteria for the EV, although the total EV for top tier COMAH establishments is often of the order of 0.01 fatalities/year. However, it is interesting to note that the upper and lower FN comparison lines quoted by Hirst and

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Carter (2002) correspond to EVs of 0.00046 and 0.069, implying that the societal risk calculated here is above the level that would be considered broadly acceptable (i.e. not significant), but still well below intolerable levels. It is also worth noting that RR512 (Table 10 in HSE, 2007) considered a number of hypothetical sites whose total EVs ranged from 0.007 to 0.062.

These levels of societal risk are broadly consistent with what would be expected for a typical major hazard site, and are at least an order of magnitude less severe than for some major hazard sites in the UK.

Clearly, any additional development at La Collette will lead to an increase in the societal risk, which may then need to be considered carefully if it is likely to be significant.

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5 MITIGATION OF RISK The risk assessment calculations in Section 4 follow the type of standard approach adopted by the UK HSE, where it is assumed that the major hazard sites are well operated and that the likelihood of accidents is no higher than it would be at any site in the UK which complies with all the requirements of the Health and Safety at Work Act, and which has implemented all reasonably practicable measures to reduce the risk.

The types of accident which dominate the off-site risk tend to be relatively severe events, for which the best mitigation is to ensure that they never occur in the first place. Due to the paucity of accident frequency data for such major events, it is generally difficult to assess the extent to which any particular mitigation measure (such as an improved procedure) may reduce the accident likelihood.

However, it is worth making some more specific points regarding mitigation measures in terms of on-site plant and procedures and off-site measures and procedures.

5.1 ON-SITE PLANT AND PROCEDURES

One of the most significant risks identified in this assessment is that of a major Buncefield type VCE at the fuel depot. The most effective way of mitigating this risk is to ensure that the installation has taken into account all the recommendations arising from the Buncefield Investigation, and complies as far as possible with the latest standards and guidance. Atkins has been commissioned by the States of Jersey to review these issues for the fuel depot, particularly in terms of compliance with:

• The Safety Alert issued by HSE in February 2006 (Reference http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/insproforma.pdf)

• The 5th report issued by the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board in March 2007

• HS(G)176 The Storage of Flammable Liquids in Tanks

• HS(G)186 The Bulk Transfer of Dangerous Liquids between Ship and Shore

• Energy Institute Model Code of Safe Practice 19

This work will be reported separately, and is anticipated to provide the best basis for identifying any further significant on-site mitigation measures at the fuel depot, both in terms of plant and procedures. Some of the results may also be relevant to the LPG installation and ship off-loading operations.

In terms of the LPG installation, the existing mounding of the major LPG storage vessels already reduces the risks very significantly. Having viewed the site, and the site Safety Report, Atkins is of the view that further significant quantifiable off-site risk reduction would be difficult to achieve.

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5.2 OFF-SITE MEASURES AND PROCEDURES

As noted above, the most effective mitigation is to reduce the likelihood of major accidents. Many of the most severe events considered in this assessment may occur rapidly, with little opportunity for escape and evacuation, and so there is only a limited amount which can be achieved.

However, the MIIB has recently published ‘Recommendations on the emergency preparedness for, response to and recovery from incidents’. The 32 recommendations in the MIIB report should be reviewed by all those involved in Emergency Planning at La Collette to determine the extent to which they are relevant in Jersey and whether anything further can be done.

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6 RECOMMENDED POLICY FOR LAND USE PLANNING AT LA COLLETTE

6.1 NEW DEVELOPMENTS

The UK HSE’s PADHI system provides a robust and transparent basis for providing land use planning advice. Atkins would therefore recommend that new developments should be assessed in terms of their Sensitivity Level and zone location (using Figure 4.5 as a basis), using the standard PADHI decision matrix, as shown below.

Table 6.1 HSE Decision Matrix for Land Use Planning

Level of Sensitivity

Inner Zone Middle Zone Outer Zone

Level 1 Don’t Advise Against Don’t Advise Against Don’t Advise Against

Level 2 Advise Against Don’t Advise Against Don’t Advise Against

Level 3 Advise Against Advise Against Don’t Advise Against

Level 4 Advise Against Advise Against Advise Against

Note that within the Development Proximity Zone (150 m) the advice would be to Advise Against all normally occupied buildings.

If the above approach leads to an ‘Advise Against’, then more detailed site/location specific assessment of the risk is required, and the planning authority would have to take a view as to whether the socioeconomic and other planning benefits associated with the development were sufficient to outweigh the levels of residual risk. Factors such as the risk of fatality and the societal risk associated with the development would be key issues to consider.

For example, in the Phase 1 report, the EfW facility was a Sensitivity Level 1 in the DPZ and so could only be permitted after detailed assessment of the risk.

In some cases, typically where the PADHI matrix is ‘exceeded’ by more than one cell, it is likely that the risks are so high that the development should be refused no matter what the benefits.

6.2 MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING DEVELOPMENTS

The general approach adopted under PADHI is that, provided the Sensitivity Level of the development does not increase, then it is reasonable not to advise against. However, there may be exceptions to this general approach if the development involves large numbers or is towards the inner edge of a risk zone (or if there are no clear benefits).

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6.3 LARGE DEVELOPMENTS

It is likely that any large scale development at La Collette will require a detailed assessment of the risk, taking into account the likely number and distribution of people at the development.

6.4 MODIFICATIONS TO MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATIONS

Any significant modification to the major hazard installations at La Collette should be carefully reviewed in order to ensure that it does not lead to an unacceptable increase in the level of off-site risk.

The first step would be to consider whether the modification increases the likelihood of any of the representative major accident scenarios identified in Section 3, or introduces any significant new scenarios.

In many cases, modifications will have little or no effect on the overall risk, but where this is not the case, careful consideration will need to be given to the overall increase in off-site individual and societal risk.

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7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS This Phase 2 report provides an assessment of the health and safety land use planning risks associated with all potential major accidents associated with the fuel depot, LPG installation and ship-offloading facility at La Collette.

The existing risks are shown to be significant but not intolerable, in terms of the criteria generally adopted.

The UK HSE PADHI approach, using Figure 4.5 to define the zones, provides a reasonably robust and transparent basis for providing initial land use planning advice. It is noted that Figure 4.5 is based on a combination of Option 4 approach in HSE CD211 for the fuel depot, and a risk based assessment for the LPG installation and ship off-loading operations.

In cases where this approach leads to developments being initially advised against on the grounds of safety, it is recommended that more detailed site/location specific analysis of the individual and societal risks should be undertaken, so that decision makers can balance these risks against the socioeconomic and other planning benefits associated with the development.

The information in this report provides some initial data which may be helpful for such assessments, but it is likely that more detailed consideration of the likely numbers and distribution of people at the proposed development would also be required.

In summary, this report provides a sound framework to take account of major hazard risks for the purposes of land use planning at La Collette, both in terms of general development plans and the assessment of specific development proposals.

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8 REFERENCES Documents Supplied as Part of this Project ‘Fuels Supplies (C.I.) Ltd Emergency Management Plan’, Issue 1, Revision 0, April 2005.

‘Fuels Supplies (C.I.) Ltd - La Collette Terminal - Jersey - Oil Spill Emergency Plan’, Revision 0, 18/04/05.

‘Shell UK Oil Products Limited - Jersey Depot HSE Case’, March 2002.

‘Shell UK Oil Products Limited - Jersey Depot HSE Case - Appendix 1 - Activity Catalogue and Hemp Register’, Revision 2, 2004.

‘La Collette Consortium - Shipping receipts, cargo & flow rates’.

La Collette Hazard Review Group Response Item 2 30-03-07.doc, ‘La Collette - Hazard review group - Hazard Consultant – Information requirements - Item 2 Regulation activities and procedures - Health and Safety’, Colin Myers.

La Collette Regs.doc, ‘La Collette – Hazard review group - Hazard Consultant – Information requirements - Item 2 Regulatory Activities and Procedures - Fire and Rescue Service’

MHAU 1995 report risk assessment of an alternative LPG installation.pdf

MHAU 1999 report proposed development of reclaimed land.pdf

Drawings Supplied as Part of this Project Jetty - Hazardous area classification.pdf

Office - Hazardous area classification.pdf

Tank compound - hazardous area classification.pdf

La Collette - Hazard Review Group Area.pdf

La Collette 2006 new.jpg

Figure 02 - Island Plan Zoning for La Collette Area - Extract from Town Proposals Map.pdf

E 201 P1 - Planning Application Site Extent.pdf

E 203 P1_Facility plan.pdf

cl2mry45okgsbay5mmfhnt55_1.pdf

871-014-A1.pdf

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General References AIChE, ‘Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires, and BLEVEs’, Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1994.

Buncefield Task Group, ‘Recommendations on the Design and Operation of Fuel Storage Sites’, 5th Report, 29 March 2007.

Carter, D.A., ‘Aspects of Risk Assessment for Hazardous Pipelines Containing Flammable Substances’, J. Loss Prev. Process Ind., Vol. 4, January 1991.

Carter, D.A., ‘The Scaled Risk Integral - A Simple Numerical Representation of Case Societal Risk for Land Use Planning in the Vicinity of Major Accident Hazards’, Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries, Volume II, Elsevier, 1995.

Carter, D.A., Hirst, I.L., Madison, T.E. and Porter, S.R., ‘Appropriate Risk Assessment Methods for Major Accident Establishments’, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Transactions of the Institution of Chemical Engineers, Vol. 81, Part B, pp12-18, January 2003.

Carter, D.A., Hirst, I.L., Porter, S.R. and Turner, R.L., ‘Numerical Risk Assessment and Land Use Planning’, Hazards XVI, IChemE Symposium Series No. 148, pp365-378, 2001.

Chemical Industries Association, ‘Guidance for the Location and Design of Occupied Buildings on Chemical Manufacturing Sites’, Second Edition, 2003.

Clay, G.A., Fitzpatrick, R.D., Hurst, N.W., Carter, D.A. and Crossthwaite, P.J., ‘Risk Assessment for Installations Where Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) is Stored in Bulk Vessels Above Ground’, Conference Paper, New Brunswick, Canada, 1987.

Considine, M., Grint, G.C. and Holden, P.L., ‘Bulk Storage of LPG - Factors Affecting Offsite Risk’, IChemE Symposium Series No. 71.

Consultancy Solutions for the Oil Industry, ‘Fuel Farm, La Collette, St Helier, Jersey - Review of the Current Arrangements for the Importation, Storage and Supply of Petroleum Products to the Distribution and Retail System in Jersey – Final Report’.

DETR, ‘Planning Controls for Hazardous Substances’, DETR Circular 04/2000, 8th May 2000.

Energy Institute, ‘Model Code of Safe Practice Part 19: Fire Precautions at Petroleum Refineries and Bulk Storage Installations’, ISBN 9780471943280, April 1998.

Goose, M., ‘Risk Assessment for LPG Using LPG RISKAT’, Conference on the Major Hazard Aspects of Land-Use Planning, 26-29 October, 1992.

Health and Safety Commission, Advisory Committee on Major Hazards:

First Report, HMSO, ISBN 0 11 880884 2, 1976.

Second Report, HMSO, ISBN 0 11 883299 9, 1979.

Third Report, HMSO, ISBN 0 11 883753 2, 1984.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘Quantified Risk Assessment: Its Input to Decision Making’, HMSO, 1989.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘Risk Criteria for Land-Use Planning in the Vicinity of Major Industrial Hazards’, HMSO, 1989.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘Reducing Risks, Protecting People – HSE’s Decision Making Process’, HMSO, 2001.

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Health and Safety Executive, ‘Guidance on ‘As Low as Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP Decisions in Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) – (SPC/Permissioning/12)’, Hazardous Installations Directorate, 2002.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘PADHI – HSE’s Land Use Planning Methodology’, http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/padhi.pdf.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘HSE’s Current Approach to Land Use Planning’, http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/lupcurrent.pdf.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘Chapter 1E: Consultation Distances for Generic Classes of Consented Quantities’, Version 6, Extract from HSE PCAG, David Carter, 5/12/2005.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘Chapter 2C: Assessment of the Thermal Hazards from Pool Fires’, HSE PCAG, Version 13, 14/8/2001.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘Safety Report Assessment Guide: LPG’, http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sraglpg/images/lpgcriteria.pdf.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘Proposals for Revised Policies for HSE Advice on Development Control Around Large-Scale Petrol Storage Sites’, CD211, February 2007.

Health and Safety Executive ‘Revised Land Use Planning Arrangements Around Large Scale Petroleum Depots’, HSE Research Report, RR511, 2007.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘Review of Significance of Societal Risk for Proposed Revision to Land Use Planning Arrangements for Large Scale Petroleum Storage Sites', HSE Research Report, RR512, 2007.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘The Bulk Transfer of Dangerous Liquids and Gases Between Ship and Shore’, HSG 186, ISBN 0 7176 1644 4, HMSO, 1999.

Health and Safety Executive, ‘The Storage of Flammable Liquids in Tanks’, HSG 176, ISBN 0 7176 1470 0, HMSO, 1998.

Hirst, I.L. and Carter, D.A., ‘A “Worst Case” Methodology for Risk Assessment of Major Accident Installations’, Process Safety Progress, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2000.

HMSO, ‘Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) Regulations’, 1999.

Hurst, N.W., Nussey, C. and Pape, R.P., ‘Development and Application of a Risk Assessment Tool (RISKAT) in the Health and Safety Executive’, Chem. Eng. Res. Des., Vol. 67, July 1989.

LP Gas Association, ‘A Guide to the Writing of LPG Safety Reports’, GN1, 1993.

Reeves, A.B., ‘The Determination of BLEVE Frequency for a LPG Road Tanker’, 1992.

Rew, P.J. and Hulbert, W.G., ‘Development of Pool Fire Thermal Radiation Model’, HSE Contract Research Report No. 96/1996, HMSO, 1996.

Van den Berg, A.C., ‘The Multi-Energy Method - A Framework for Vapour Cloud Explosion Blast Prediction’, Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 12, pp 1-10, 1985.

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Figure 1.1 The Existing HSE Land UsePlanning Zones Calculated in 1999

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Consulting Engineers Design & Project Management Quantity Surveyors Cost Control & Analysis

TRIDENT ENGINEERING CONSULTANTSShell Distributor

THIS DRAWING IS CONFIDENTIAL AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS A CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURE. IT IS SHOWN ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS NOT TO BE REVEALED TO OTHERS OR USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE

WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF TRIDENT ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS.

Fuel Supplies (C.I.) LimitedPO Box 409La Collete,

St Helier,Jersey,

Channel Islands,JE1 OFS

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Figure 2.1 Site Plan for the Fuel Storage Depot (Showing Hazardous Area Classification)

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41200 41300 41400 41500 41600 41700 41800 41900 42000 42100 42200 42300 42400

Figure 4.1 Illustration of Current HSE 'Cautionary' 400m Consultation Distance

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41200 41300 41400 41500 41600 41700 41800 41900 42000 42100 42200 42300 42400

Figure 4.2 DPZ (150m), Inner (250m), Middle (300m) and Outer (400m) HSE Land UsePlanning Zones for Fuel Depot Based on Possible Post-Buncefield Approach (Option 4)

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40800 40900 41000 41100 41200 41300 41400 41500 41600 41700 41800 41900 42000 42100 42200 42300 42400

Figure 4.3 Individual Risk of Receiving a Dangerous Dose or Worse Contoursfor a Residential Population (100% Occupancy) for All Events

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40800 40900 41000 41100 41200 41300 41400 41500 41600 41700 41800 41900 42000 42100 42200 42300 42400

Figure 4.4 Individual Risk of Receiving a Dangerous Dose or Worse Contours for a Residential Population (100% Occupancy) for LPG Installation and Ship Transfer Operations Only

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Figure 4.5 Recommended Combined Land Use Planning Zones

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Figure 4.6 Individual Risk of Fatality for a Residential Population (100% Occupancy) for All Events

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Figure 4.7 Individual Risk of Fatality for an Industrial Population (25% Occupancy) for All Events

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Figure 4.8 Societal Risk FN Curves for All People at La Collette for All Events

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Atkins is one of the world’s leading providers of professional, technology based consultancy and support services. In recent years, it has expanded from its historical base in traditional engineering, management consultancy and property services into related technological consultancy and the management of outsourced facilities. With over 14,000 staff worldwide, Atkins has enormous expertise, providing both breadth and depth of knowledge in an extremely diverse range of disciplines. Our clients are varied and include governments, local and regional authorities, funding agencies and commercial and industrial enterprises. We help our clients to realise their objectives by developing and delivering practical solutions, adding value to their businesses through the application of our experience, innovative thinking and state-of-the-art technology.

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