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Attempts to "Radicalize" the Labor Movement Author(s): Philip Taft Source: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Jul., 1948), pp. 580-592 Published by: Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2518468 . Accessed: 25/06/2014 11:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Industrial and Labor Relations Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 91.229.229.210 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 11:00:13 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Page 1: Attempts to "Radicalize" the Labor Movement

Attempts to "Radicalize" the Labor MovementAuthor(s): Philip TaftSource: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Jul., 1948), pp. 580-592Published by: Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2518468 .

Accessed: 25/06/2014 11:00

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserveand extend access to Industrial and Labor Relations Review.

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Page 2: Attempts to "Radicalize" the Labor Movement

ATTEMPTS TO "RADICALIZE"

THE LABOR MOVEMENT

PHILIP TAFT *

pL ANS for infiltrating into labor unions and converting them to radical organizations are based upon a belief that labor unions can serve as effective instruments for producting social change, or upon the assumption that they are political organizations. The

fraternal and political activities of labor unions are offered as proof that they are more than economic institutions for improving the position of their members. Fraternal and political activities are, however, often de- signed to weld the members more closely together or to facilitate other activities of the union. Moreover, a union may find that it can perform economic and social services which do not impinge upon its relations with the employer. These may be educational, recreational, and even economic activities, such as operating a co-operative store or credit union. Yet the raison d'etre of the union is its protection of the wages and working conditions of its members. Failure to recognize this simple truth has fre- quently led to much mischief and has sometimes compelled the trade unions to resist the efforts of their "friends" to impose upon them func- tions and activities that are alien to their nature.

The argument that trade unions are political organizations is based largely upon Marxist analysis or some variant of that creed. The character of the trade union has never been adequately appreciated by Marxist writers, and the attack upon the integrity of unions has come from this source in many countries. The nascent trade union movement in France in the 1870's faced an attack from the Marxist Jules Guesde and his fol- lowers.' German Social Democracy sought for a time to subordinate the economic movement of German labor to the needs of the political party.

* Professor of Economics, Brown University; co-author of History of Labor in the United States, 1896-1932 (1935).

This article was prepared with the aid of a grant from the American Philosophical Society. 1 Leon de Seilhac, Les Ouvriers en France (Paris: Armand Colin & Cie, 1899).

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It was the anti-Marxist Revisionists who recognized the autonomy of the trade unions most unequivocally.

The Marxist attitude toward unions is the outcome of Marxist socio- logical and economic theories. Marxism assumes that there is an inherent tendency for the position of the worker in a capitalist society to deterio- rate. Trade unions are therefore unable to -solve the problems of industrial labor, and at best they can only improve conditions temporarily. Never- theless, the majority of Marxist parties have supported and even inspired trade union movements in their countries. While accepting the theoretical position that trade unions were mere palliatives and that they could not serve as instruments for permanent improvement in the conditions of labor, the Marxist parties in Western Europe recognized in practice the importance of labor organizations as organs of self-defense and offense against the employer. Moreover, the trade unions were able as a result of their growing influence to force the political parties of Socialism to recognize their autonomy and independence. The latter acceded to this demand, partly because of their inability to oppose it and partly because of the growing influence of non-Marxist views in the Socialist and po- litical movements.

Western European Marxists sought a loose type of intellectual domi- nation over the trade unions. In Russia, Lenin developed the view that the unions were to serve as fields of agitation and feeders for the revo- lutionary party, and the latter was to dominate the former.2 In answer to the economists who maintained that the labor movement ought to concen- trate its efforts upon day-by-day improvements, economic benefits rather than distant ideals, and avoid political activity, Lenin argued that the

history of all countries shows the workingclass, exclusively of its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e., it may itself realize the necessity for combining in unions to fight against the employers and to strive to compel the government to pass necessary labor legislation, etc.

The theory of Socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. The founders of modern scientific Socialism, Marx and Engels themselves, belonged to the bourgeois intelli- gentsia. Similarly, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social Democracy arose quite independently of the labor movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of ideas among the revolutionary Socialist intelli- gentsia.3

Lenin argued that workers were only capable of reaching by them- selves the trade union level, which he held was inferior and should be

2 Nicolai Lenin, What Is to Be Done? (New York: International Publishers, 1929). 3 Ibid., p. 33.

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subordinated to the needs of the revolutionary party. The conception of a political party Lenin had in mind was later revealed in the controversy at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, when he demanded that the party be "the vanguard, the leader of the vast masses of the workingclass, the whole (or nearly the whole) of which works 'under the control and guidance' of the Party, but which does not and should not, as a whole, join the party."4

In discussing the relations of the trade unions to the Communist Party, it is necessary to underline the difference between Bolshevism or Commu- nism, and the Marxist movement as it developed in Western Europe and the United States prior to World War I. The latter sought to dominate the entire labor movement intellectually and gain the support of the trade unions for independent political action. On the continent in Europe, Socialist political organizations and trade unions arose, as in Germany, out of common roots, and both branches of the labor movement faced the same opposition. At the Congress of the German Social Democratic Party in 1893, a demand for the dominance of the trade unions by the Party was made. The increase in trade union influence and power led the unions to reject the superior position of the party. Finally, the parity of the trade unions and the party was recognized at the Mannheim Congress in 1906.5 The German trade unions never denied the value of political action, but such recognition did not necessitate, in their view, domination by a po- litical party. Consequently, political action is a means for improving the position of the worker and is not a means whereby the immediate or long- run interests of the labor union are subordinated to a political party. In Germany and in other European countries the trade union movements were able to loosen themselves from the "tight" hold of the Socialist parties because the labor organizations increased in size and were in a position to enforce their independence. However, with the Communist victory in Russia, the views of Lenin on the relations between the trade unions and the party became accepted dogmas in all of the Communist parties of the world. Not only do the Communist parties espouse a totali- tarian view, but they seek to gain dominance over all labor organizations, political, cultural, and economic.

Dealing with the question of the structure of fractions and their co-relationship, the Second Organization Conference of the Communist International adopted a resolution giving the basis for this work in all capitalist countries.

It goes without saying that it is in the trade unions that we in the United States must show our greatest activity. This must be done through organized

4 Lenin, Selected Works, II. 360. 6 Richard Seidel, Die Gewerkschaf ten nach derm Kriege (Berlin: Dietz, 1925), p. 17.

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and well disciplined fractions. Without any exceptions whatever all Commu- nist fractions must work under the immediate leadership and control of the Party Committees... doing all possible to carry out the Party policy in all organizations wherein they function. The party's instructions and decisions are obligatory in fraction work, and no member of the fraction, once a decision is made and a policy laid down can in any way take a stand against such a decision or policy, no matter what his opinion may be regarding the correctness of the policy.6

Communist attempts to subordinate the trade union movement flow from Marxist conceptions on the nature of society and the course of his- tory, and are reinforced by a totalitarian view of the labor movement and society.

BORING-FROM-WITHIN IN THE UNITED STATES

The attempt by radicals to "capture" the trade unions and bend them to their will began in the United States during the 1890's. American unionism was at the time becoming increasingly pragmatic and job con- scious, and under the influence of Gompers and his associates it was turn- ing its back upon Socialism, producer's co-operation and political action. In the 1880's and 1890's both socialists and anarchists followed two poli- cies: (1) organizing competing or dual unions, and (2) boring-from-within the old established unions with a view of winning them over to more militant action. Socialists occupied leading positions in many unions, and in 1893 they submitted to the convention of the AFL a political program of eleven planks; one, plank 10, endorsed "the collective ownership by the people of all the means and production and distribution." The next convention (1894) failed to endorse this plank, and as a consequence the Socialists helped to defeat Gompers for re-election.7 "This was the second defeat of the Socialists. In 1890 the convention of the A. F. of L. upheld Gompers in his refusal to charter the New York Central Labor Federation because the latter had allowed a section of the Socialist Labor Party to affiliate with it. Gompers insisted that a political organization would not affiliate with the A. F. of L. and in this view he was upheld."8

At this time, Daniel DeLeon became the leader of the People, the official organ of the Socialist Labor Party. DeLeon was a university teacher, a man of wide, although not very deep, learning, and a convinced and

6 M. Jenkins, The Communist Nucleus (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1928), pp. 55-56.

7 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.), I, 391-394.

8Selig Perlman and Philip Taft, History of Labor in the United States, 1896-1932 (New York: Macmillan, 1935), pp. 219-220.

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dogmatic Marxist. He neither sympathized with nor understood the trade unions, whose efforts to correct the inequities of capitalism he regarded as close to ignorance and their failure to endorse Socialism as treason to labor. Under DeLeon's leadership the Socialist Labor Party failed in its attempt to capture either the AFL or the fading Knights of Labor. His virulence created a widening gulf between the Socialists and the trade unions. Many Socialist unionists refused to go along with these attacks and seceded. It did not deter DeLeon from launching a dual labor center, which was never of much significance. Later DeLeon and others launched the Industrial Workers of the World, which never succeeded in organiz- ing large numbers of workers, although it did lead some dramatic strikes.

Socialists who opposed DeLeon's trade union views and rigid Marxism gradually withdrew from his organization and were instrumental in set- ting up the Socialist Party. The latter was hospitable to trade unionism, while opposing the views of Gompers on Socialism and political action. Within the unions of the American Federation of Labor, many Socialists were active, and between 1900 and World War I the Socialist influence was on the increase within the trade union movement. A number of unions were either completely dominated by Socialists or elected Social- ists to high office within the organization. In the general labor movement the Socialists supported the endorsement of resolutions approving their positions on politics and economics. While not altogether a clear indi- cation of the division of sentiment, a Socialist candidate for president of the American Federation of Labor was able to poll 5,073 votes against 11,974 cast for Gompers.9 A few unions, bakery workers, brewery workers, needle trades, and mine, mill and smelter workers, supported the Socialist cause, while Socialists were influential in the mine workers, machinists, printers, painters, and carpenters.10

Socialist boring from within the AFL was never centrally directed. So- cialists held common views on some political and economic issues, but the Socialist Party could not direct or govern their views of trade union mat- ters. Intervention by the Socialist Party in trade union affairs was never attempted nor would Socialist trade unionists have allowed it. Any attempt of a Socialist political party to direct such leading Socialist unionists as William Johnston of the machinists, Frank Hayes of the miners, or Ben- jamin Schlesinger of the ladies' garment workers would have met with a stern rebuff. At no time did the Socialists operate as a solid phalanx within

9 American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1912, pp. 354-355. 10 David J. Saposs, Left Wing Unionism (New York: International Publishers, 1926), pp.

33-37.

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the labor movement, and their objectives were largely to gain endorsement for certain policies but not to turn over the trade union movement to the control of a political party. It was not a disciplined, centrally directed, militarylike formation which sought to capture the unions by conspira- torial means, but a loose, informal group, openly professing a general objective.

SYNDICALIST BORING-FROM-WITHIN

Boring-from-within was also tried by syndicalists influenced by the experience of the French Confed6ration du Travail. This tendency in the United States is largely associated with the early activities of William Z. Foster. Originally a member of the Socialist Party and the Industrial Workers of the World, he came to the conclusion that dual unionism was harmful to the workers of the United States and that a policy of boring- from-within was the most desirable. This policy was followed by the French militants, who were able, despite their inferior numbers, to capture the CGT. Foster launched the Syndicalist League of North America in 1912. It lasted only a short time and it was succeeded by the International Trade Union League, which did not fare any better. While his boring- from-within did not make much of an impression," Foster succeeded in leading successful organizing drives in the meat-packing and steel indus- tries, but neither led to the establishment of permanent organizations. The prestige he gained enabled him to launch, in 1920, the Trade Union Educational League, which soon came under Communist control.

"The working theory of the Trade Union Educational League is the establishment of a left bloc of all the revolutionary and progressive ele- ments in the trade union.'"12 The League sought to infiltrate into different unions to advance its policy, and the growing militancy of part of the members of organized labor furnished a fertile field for its operations. At the beginning the Trade Union Educational League advocated amal- gamation of craft into industrial unions. This issue aroused enthusiasm among progressive and radical unionists who believed that progress could best be made by working within the standard labor organizations. How- ever, the League was, from the outset, under Communist control and it advocated that American trade unions affiliate with the Red International of Labor Unions, the trade union arm of the Communist International.13

"Communists together with sympathizing elements must organize Communist fractions within the trade unions which must be completely

" William Z. Foster The Bankruptcy of the American Labor Movement (Chicago: Trade Union Educational League, [n.d.]), p. 54; Perlman and Taft, op. cit., pp. 538-539.

"2Foster, op. cit., p. 55. 13 Ibid., p. 59.

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under the control of the Communist Party."'14 Discussing the situation in the United States, the Communist International argued that Communists "should get into the old trade unions in order to revolutionize them."'15 The same document decried "the belief in the absolute value of collective agreements.... The revolutionary trade unions, without rejecting as a rule the collective agreement, must realize its relative value and clearly define the methods to abolish those agreements when it proves profitable to the workingclass."'16

Losovsky, the head of the Red International of Labor Unions, de- scribed the "trade unions as the national link between the Party and the workingclass." It is only by this device that the Party is able to penetrate into the labor movement. Consequently, the Communist International has always given great attention to the trade union movement.17 The Communist International urged the winning of immediate demands but maintained that "every economic struggle is also a political, i.e. a general class struggle.''18

As the real character of the Trade Union Educational League was revealed, progressive unionists disassociated themselves from it.19 The League then became an outright instrument of the Communists. It set up National Industrial Sections of the League, and these were to direct the campaigns of infiltration in various industries. The first objects of attack were the needle trades, which have a long Socialist tradition; and the followers of the Trade Union Educational League succeeded in 1922 in making sharp inroads in the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. Followers of the Trade Union Educational League were elected to office in a number of locals, which led to changes in the top adminis- tration. Followers of the Trade Union Educational League captured the New York Joint Board, and the efforts of the union heads to debar those receiving directions from outside the union office met with failure. In 1926 the left wing precipitated a general strike in the New York market which almost wrecked the union, but it put an end to the moral and organi- zational influence of the Communists in the ladies' garment industry.20

In the men's sector of the garment trades, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America was at first on friendly terms with the Trade Union

14 Theses and Resolutions Adopted at the Third World Congress of the Communist Inter- national (New York: The Contemporary Publishing Co., 1921), p. 136.

5Ibid., p. 139. 1 Ibid., p. 146. 17 Le Congr&s de l'Internationale Communiste (Paris: Librairie de l'Humanite, 1924), p. 268. 18 Ibid., p. 149. 19 William Z. Foster, "Railway Employee's Convention," Labor Herald, June 1922, p. 19. 20 Perlman and Taft, op. cit., pp. 544-553; Joel Seidman, The Needle Trades (New York:

Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), pp. 155-164.

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Educational League. After a break over an endorsement of a candidate for President of the United States, the Amalgamated was subjected to the same type of attacks. The left wing never gained as much influence nor did it do as much damage as in the ladies' garment trades. The cap and millinery union was also subjected to an assault, but it managed to repel it.21 Only one needle trades organization - the fur workers' union - was captured by the Communist-dominated left wing.

The Trade Union Educational League also launched a campaign to capture the coal miners' union and formed an International Committee to direct the campaign. Foster announced that "in the Miners' Union the League is particularly effective. At present it is putting up progressive tickets, with excellent chances for victory, in many districts and sub- districts."22 The Communists were, however, not able to make much head- way in the coal miners' union, despite the serious problems facing the organization in the 1920's. At every turn they were stopped, and in 1928 they symbolized their defeat by organizing a dual miners' organization, the National Miners' Union. This policy was similar to the one followed by the Communists in the garment trades, where they launched the Needle Trades Industrial Union in 1928. The Trade Union Educational League was a failure, and the only organization it succeeded in capturing was the International Fur Workers Union. The inability of the Communists to win the labor movement to its policies was explicitly recognized in Sep- tember 1929 when the Trade Union Unity League was launched as the American section of the Red International of Labor Unions.

"The Trade Union Unity League is the continuation, expansion, and reorganization of the Trade Union Educational League."23 The new or- ganization launched unions in the coal mining, textile, needle trades, automobile, shoe, and marine transportation industries.24 Aside from a few industrial skirmishes in the coal-mining and textile industries, the Trade Union Unity League did not play an important role. Its philosophy and propaganda did not attract the American worker, nor were conditions propitious for extensive organizing drives.

THE NEW DEAL

The labor laws enacted in the early years of the Roosevelt adminis- tration drastically altered the labor union picture. Not only was there a revival of old unions, but organizations arose in industries where none

21 Donald Robinson, Spotlight on a Union (Dial, 1948), pp. 184-197. 22Foster, op. cit., p. 59. 23 The Trade Union Unity League (New York: Trade Union Unity League, [n.d.]). 24 Ibid., p. 25.

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had ever functioned. The latter naturally lacked leaders, administrators, or clear-cut policies. The Trade Union Unity League correctly evaluated the situation, and its leaders reverted to the old policy of boring from with- in rather than dualism. Skill, energy, willingness to work hard, as well as absence of alternative leadership, enabled the Communists and those close to them to win a dominant position, or at least become an influential minority, in a number of the "new" unions. A number of CIO unions, the most notable the United Steelworkers of America, were not in the least affected. With help from Philip Murray of the Mine Workers Union, the steelworkers received able and experienced administration and there was little opportunity for dissidents to win a place. The rubber workers' union is another organization that has been singularly free of left-wing domi- nation, and this is due largely to the fact that there rose up from the ranks an able group of leaders and administrators interested only in trade unionism.

In contrast, the auto workers' union faced a long-drawn struggle be- tween those in sympathy, completely or partially, with Communist trade union policy and those opposed to outside dictation. The struggle in the automobile workers' union was complicated initially by the opposition of many progressive trade unionists to the policies of Homer Martin, the first president of the union. After the ousting of Martin, two broad di- visions developed within the union, with the Communists participating, but not entirely dominating, the group that controlled most of the top offices. A struggle developed between the two groups. In the fall of 1947 Walter Reuther sharply attacked the intrusion of the Communists in the affairs of the union and demanded an end to bickering based upon outside loyalties.25 In 1947 the anti-Communist progressives succeeded in winning a large majority of offices. The victory of this group led to the ousting of many individuals suspected of having their first loyalties to groups out- side the union.26

In the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' Union, the outcome of the struggle between Communists and anti-Communists took a different turn. In this union the so-called left wing dominated the organization, but grad- ually opposition to the union's following the zigzag of the Party line arose. Charges that elections of International officers were procured by fraud were made, and a sizable group seceded. President Philip Murray, in an effort to heal the breach, appointed a committee to investigate, and it was found that an organizer for the Communist Party was giving direct orders to officers of that union, and that the person chosen as president of the

28 United Automobile Worker, Sept. 1947. 20 Wage Earner, January 9, 16, 23, and 30, 1948.

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union had been expelled from the United Steelworkers of America be- cause he was working for forces outside the union.27 The head of the union refused to agree to suggested concessions, and about 25,000 workers with- drew and joined the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Work- ers, a CIO affiliate.28

A comparison of the attitude of this union toward World War II be- fore and after Hitler's invasion of Soviet soil may throw some light on the issues in dispute. In 1940 the convention of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers announced that with "the European war for conquest and ex- ploitation raging and destroying the lives, unity and living standards of the workers and the ever growing agitation for preparedness in America clouding the main issue and delaying ultimate realization of our ultimate aim, and social justice for the American people," the convention de- manded that the government "maintain strict neutrality in the present European conflict."29

The next convention was held in August 1941, after Hitler had in- vaded Soviet territory. The preceding year "strict neutrality" was de- manded. Now we are told: Each day brings the war abroad closer to us.... With this attack [upon Soviet Russia], the only remaining major world power besides the United States that was still at peace was drawn into the war. Victory for Hitler over the Soviet Union would give fascism in one bite control of one-sixth of the earth's surface. ... It is therefore our considered judgement that there can be no lasting peace and democracy even for our nation, without a smashing defeat for fascism.30

Disputes also took place over Communist interference in union affairs in other CIO unions. The chief executives of the shoe workers' and furni- ture workers' unions found their positions intolerable, denounced outside interference in union affairs, and resigned.

In the National Maritime Union, the struggle between Communist and non-Communist forces is continuing at a high pitch. Leading the anti- Communist side is President Joseph Curran, supported by two other top officers. His chief opponent is the national secretary, Ferdinand Smith, supported by an equal number of top officers. A Committee for Maritime Unity had been formed. It was made up of CIO unions in the industry and one unaffiliated group. In the latter part of 1946 Curran withdrew from the Committee for Maritime Union, a step attacked by his oppo-

27Report to President Murray, Congress of Industrial Organizations, by Committee Ap- pointed to Investigate Breach within the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, May 16-17, 1947, pp. 8-12.

28 New York Times, Feb. 13, 1948. `9 International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Proceedings, 1940, pp. 186, 244. 30 Ibid., 1941, p. 502.

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nents and the Communist Party. Curran charged: "It is quite clear there- fore, that when the Daily Worker took it upon themselves to interfere in the internal affairs of our Union, it took sides on this question of our relationship with the C.M.U., it was giving orders in our Union, particu- larly the leading ones, such as McKenzie and Stack, who as I have said before have officially spoken for the Party.''31 Moreover, he pointed out that just "as two years ago when Myers was Vice President, McKenzie, Myers and Smith attempted to promote the idea that the shipowner was our friend and that we should not worry about wage increases - the ship- owners would give them to us out of the goodness of their hearts. That was the time the Communist Party promoted collaboration with the em- ployer and it had to be pushed into our Union."32

Curran carried his fight to his opponents. He charged that "the Com- munists and their machine in the Union seek to control this Union and intend to fight against it."33 In another statement Curran declared: "I have been convinced for a long time that the Communist Party as it is today is a menace to the labor movement and particularly to our Union."34 Curran claimed that the Communists had over one hundred people on the union's payroll. Commenting on the tactics of the Communists at the convention of 1947, Curran charged that the Communists "intend to bankrupt the union before they allow the rank and file to control their destiny."35

Curran brought charges against Vice-President Joseph Stack for mis- handling of funds, malfeasance and neglect of duty, and misuse of organ- izers. According to the minority of the trial committee elected by the National Council of the Union "the great majority of organizers appointed or employed during Joseph Stack's term as Vice President were members of the Communist Party."36 Curran's charges were upheld at a convention of the union by a small majority. The fight is still undetermined; and while the Communists may be the better-organized group, Curran's ability and his large personal following may be sufficient to bring victory to his forces.

The Committee for Maritime Unity is not the first attempt to bring the maritime unions close together. In the 1930's the Maritime Federation of the Pacific, with which the major maritime unions affiliated, was formed. It soon became Communist-dominated. At the convention of 1940 Walter J. Stack, representing the oilers and firemen's union, demanded that the American people... fight each and every action, large and small, subtle and significant, which ignores our stated policy of absolute neutrality in the present

" The Pilot, Jan. 3, 1947, p. 2. s Ibid., Oct. 10, 1947, p. 2. 82 Ibid., p. 12. 33 Ibid., May 9, 1947, p. 2. e Ibid., April 4, 1947, p. 11. 3' Ibid., July 11, 1947, p. 2.

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conflict, whether by sending munitions to one side or the other, or attempting to drum up public sympathy for either side; and that the organizations rep- resented here at this conference continue to cooperate on issues of common interest tending to spread the message to all the world that The Yanks Are Not Coming.37

A similar note was struck by the head of the International Longshore- men's and Warehousemen's Union, Harry Bridges. Reporting to the con- vention of his union in 1940, President Bridges declared that it is generally recognized that the present administration's policies in regard to the international situation, its pro-Allies sympathies, the endorsement of millions of dollars being sent abroad while millions of Americans suffer un- employment and poverty can result in the embroiling of America into a foreign war in which she can have no concern except the protection of investments of the large bankers and industrial interests of the country.38

His views were approved. The convention held in April 1941 was informed that the people are

rapidly being conditioned for war.

The nation is rapidly being put on a war footing....Legislation is being pro- posed and passed with almost miraculous speed under... hysterical pressure, and organized propaganda that would have been laughed at or vigorously opposed by the people a few short months ago, is now becoming effective.... The individuals and forces who wrap themselves in the flag and condemn any- one who raises a voice in opposition to foreign war as an appeaser are the same who cry out for appeasement on the industrial front."39

The largest union that clearly follows the course laid down by the Communist Party is the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. At its convention of 1940 a telegram was read from the State, County and Municipal Workers of America urging "passage of a Reso- lution condemning politicians who are bringing us closer to European war and are advocating conscription."40 As defense measures the needs of the people and extension of the social services were given first place in a resolution on the subject. The resolution did not explicitly condemn national defense, but advocated only the extension of social services and civil rights as means by which "we can have real national defense.'"41

In September 1941 the resolution on foreign policy was listed under the title "Security and Defense of the United States." The opening state- ment was that "Hitlerism directly threatens our country and its democratic institutions." The resolution approved "the policy of the Government in

37 Maritime Federation of the Pacific, Proceedings, 1940, p. 185. 38 International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Proceedings, 1940, pp. 82, 63. 89 Ibid., 1941, pp. 83-85. 40 United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Proceedings, 1940, p. 182. "Ibid., p. 183.

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declaring that the defense of this country requires that all possible aid be given to Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union and other nations resist- ing Hitlerism, and urges the Government to put this policy into effect with all possible speed and energy."42 The only significant change was that now Hitler's legions were racing across Soviet soil.

In 1942 the union offered its advice to the joint chiefs of staff, and approved a resolution demanding the opening of a "second front." The union's military experts announced that our "national security is at stake in the present military situation," and "that we urge immediate opening of a western front so that the war can be brought to a more speedy con- clusion." The resolution condemned "vigorously and without compromise the pro-Nazi appeasers, fifth columnists, enemy agents and those who speak for them wittingly or unwittingly, delaying the opening of the western front by spreading rumors against the power of the armed forces of the United Nations."43 The union that was lukewarm to the Nazi threat while German troops were overrunning France and the Low Countries, unblushingly denounced as appeasers those who refused to use pressure upon those charged with running the war.

After the Soviet Government and the United States entered the war, the Communist-line unions had interests no different from other CIO unions. With the split between the Eastern and Western nations on the making of peace, the divisions in the ranks of the CIO have reappeared. Moreover, as the differences between the unions within the CIO are not based upon trade union issues, but reflect a political conflict between nations, a solution to the differences cannot come within the CIO with- out (1) the overturning of the Communist-line administrations within the unions; or (2) a surrender by the non-Communist unions within the CIO. The first condition may be realized, but in several of the unions an uphill fight against those in control would be necessary. It is not likely that the non-Communist elements would be ready to accept every change in Party policy, for many of those changes are not based upon a desire to pursue a policy beneficial to the workers of the United States, but are devised in the interests of a political party. For the Communists, political aims are cardinal and the trade union is of subsidiary importance. In contrast, the trade unionist regards politics as a weapon, an instrument, with which he can more easily achieve his trade union aims: the improvement of the living standards of the workers. The basic conflict in attitude can be resolved temporarily, but in a world of political tensions the two views inevitably clash.

42 Ibid., 1941, p. 70. 43Ibid., 1942, pp. 120-121.

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