Judaism and PluralismAuthor(s): Reuven KimelmanSource: Modern Judaism, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, 1987), pp. 131-150Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1396236Accessed: 05/08/2010 17:08

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Reuven Kimelman

JUDAISM AND PLURALISM

The unmistakable characteristic of contemporary Jewish life is its di-

versity. For some such diversity is not only a social threat, but also a

theological scandal.' The peculiar problematic of Jewish unity is that both social and theological factors are involved.. Varying combinations of these factors both highlight the need for unity as well as exacerbate the tensions which trigger divisiveness.

This inquiry ponders whether there exist sufficient unifying factors to counterbalance the divisive ones and whether there can be unity without some degree of uniformity. It also asks whether the effort to establish unity on the basis of conformity might not be misguided at best, and wrongheaded at worst, if diversity of practice is a given of modern

Jewish life. After all, it is possible that such uniformity is not only no

longer attainable, but not even desirable. How has the Jewish tradition previously mediated between the ideal

of unity and the reality of diversity? In the past, when the price of unity was uniformity, the stronger

group excommunicated the nonconforming weaker group. As people despaired of saving the whole body of Israel, they became willing to entertain suggestions for amputation. When the love for clal Yisrael became more an abstraction than a reality, the loss of fellow Jews was borne with equanimity. Evidently, it is easier to love the idea of the universal

community of Jewry-clal Yisrael- than to love the people of Israel-am Yisrael.

A poignant example of the danger involved in resorting to amputa- tion as the antidote to religious nonconformity is the banning of the

emergent Hasidic movement in eighteenth Poland. The writ of ex- communication of 1781 against the Hasidim stated:

They must leave our communities with their wives and children ... and they should not be given a night's lodging; their ritual slaughter is forbidden; it is forbidden to do business with them, to intermarry with them, or to assist at their burial.2

As could be expected, the Hasidim countered with their own ban. Not infrequently, both Hasidim and their opponents denounced each other to the secular authorities. Tension between the two did not abate

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until both were endangered by an even greater threat-the rise of Jewish modernity. Indeed, it took the Holocaust to finally resolve, in practice, the conflict between the two. Without an outside threat and left to their own machinations, the Hasidic controversy could have gone the way of the Karaite split eight hundred years earlier. When one realizes that within a generation of the writ of excommunication, the Hasidic move- ment had already spread to a sizable proportion of Eastern European Jewry, it is surprising that the Jewish people remained intact. Even if this

controversy has been basically resolved, the method of handling conflict

through exclusion still characterizes Hasidic life. Internecine ideological struggles are still resolved by violence or through political power plays.3

The basis of these types of conflicts is the popular religious under-

standing of the monistic nature of truth. The Hasidim and their oppo- nents believed there is only one truth. As the God of Israel is one, so should there be one truth for all Jews. Two opposing sides cannot both be in possession of the truth. If I have the truth, then what you have is false. If I am right, then you are wrong. And, since falsehood has no rights, I, in service of the truth, am duty-bound to work for your conversion or, failing that, your destruction. Such an attitude seeks to absolutize a par- ticular configuration of the tradition into universal validity.

What are the alternative Jewish ways of resolving differences which maintain the truth of the one God and the centrality of Torah in Jew- ish life?

A significant precedent is the resolution of different Sefardic and Ashkenazic practices. Two of the most famous deal with dietary practices on Passover and naming children after living grandparents. In both communities, the differences of practices are so pronounced that the

contrary practice is popularly judged to be un-Jewish, if not anti-Jewish. It is literally a common binding that has resolved Sefardic-Ashkenazic

differences. When Joseph Karo published an abridgement of his full

commentary on Jewish law which he called the Shulkhan Aruch, Moses Isserles, the dean of Polish Talmudists of the day, instead of publishing his alternative manual of Jewish law, decided to append glosses to Karo's work to have it include Polish custom and mode of legal decision. By spreading his Mappah ("tablecloth"), as he called his work, over Karo's Shulkhan Aruch ("prepared table"), he made the work acceptable to Ashkenazim as well as Sefardim. If Isserles had followed through with his original plan, there would have been no single reference book of

Jewish law. Due to his conciliatory spirit, Judaism, for the time being, was at least held together by a common binding.

This approach for maintaining Jewish unity-in-theory despite di-

versity-in-practice worked so well because of the distance between the centers of Ashkenazic and Sefardic Jewry. Plural options stir minimal dissonance when there is little contact between them. Generally, local

uniformity is sufficient for the appearance of Jewish unity.

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THE MODEL OF HILLEL AND SHAMMAI

There is, however, a more pertinent model for us which allows competing claims of truth to coexist. According to Mishnah Avot, the disputes between Hillel and Shammai are deemed examples par excellence of "contro- versies for the sake of Heaven." That means, according to Rambam, Meiri, and Bertinoro, that both parties sought truth, not victory.5

When parties struggle for the truth, the Mishnah continues, their

disagreements "are destined to endure." Why is this so? Why can't the

quest for truth lead to harmony? Because, as indicated by Rabbenu Yonah, the pursuit of truth is an ongoing process which constantly leads to a clash of opinions. The more intense the quest, the less the likelihood of unanimity. Such controversies endure beyond their original advo- cates.6 This is not the case with self-serving controversies such as those of Korach and his gang. Their disputes are easily resolvable by victory or death of one of the parties. Since the issue was personal gain, personal gain or loss decides the conflict.

The school of Hillel, called Beit Hillel, and the school of Shammai, called Beit Shammai, argued over the full range of Jewish issues from halakhic details to overall world-views. The more than 300 recorded controversies between them deal with issues of personal life, blessings and prayers, the separation of priestly dues and tithes, marriage and divorce, levitical purity and abstinence, sacrifices and the priestly service, as well as civil and capital cases, not to mention the metaphysical debates over the order of creation and the worthwhileness of life.

How did the controversies affect the relationship between the two schools? Talmudic sources record two disparate pictures of their relation-

ship. One source presents a picture of violent conflict, the other of re-

spectful disagreement. The violent picture is based on the Mishnah.7 On the day Beit

Shammai outvoted Beit Hillel, they also issued eighteen prohibitions against Jewish-Gentile interaction. Since normally Beit Hillel outnum- bered Beit Shammai, the Talmud asks how Beit Shammai succeeded in

outvoting Beit Hillel. The answer given is that Beit Shammai ambushed Beit Hillel. Most were slain. The six who escaped to the academy to have their votes counted were insufficient. Beit Shammai carried the day. A similar coercive picture is recorded elsewhere.9 Both sources conclude that the day Beit Shammai achieved victory was as calamitous to the

Jewish people as the day the golden calf was made. This picture of Beit Shammai is an example of how frequently sincerity of motive and expres- sions of violence become congenial bedfellows.

Many historians consider these events to have taken place in the violent years preceding the devastation of Jerusalem and the destruction of the temple by the Romans some nineteen hundred years ago. The historian, Josephus,10 repeatedly testified to the ideological conflicts which

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led to bloodshed. He described graphically how once positions were rejected their advocates were delegitimized and ultimately done away with. The afterword to the ancient chronicle, Megillat Ta'anit," records that a fast day was decreed to lament the conflict between the Hillelites and Shammaites, apparently alluding to those slain as a result of these disputes. It is not surprising that the Talmud12 attributes the destruction of the Temple to the rampant hatred of the day.

Confirming this conclusion, Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin (The Natsiv) linked up the sense of self-righteousness with baseless hatred and bloodshed. He says:

The people of the second temple period were religious, pious, and students of the Torah, but they were not honest in their general conduct. Because of the baseless hatred lodged in their heart, whomever they saw deviating from their opinion or religion was suspected as an apikorus (heretic). Accordingly, they came to bloodshed and all other evils of the world until the Temple was destroyed. Being that God is honest, how- ever, he does not tolerate such religious people unless they walk honestly and not crookedly even if their motive is for the sake of heaven.'3

According to the Natsiv, religious motives alone are insufficient

safeguards for preventing conflicts from erupting into violence. On the

contrary, the belief that one is acting for the sake of heaven may goad one on to violence for the greater glory of God. Such was the way of Beit Shammai.

Were the Hillelites any different? The same Mishnah Avotl4 describes Hillel's way as that of loving peace, pursuing peace, loving humanity and bringing them nigh to the Torah. It is therefore no wonder that the Talmud15 describes Hillel's patience with abrasive gentiles as succeeding in bringing them nigh to Torah. Indeed, one story relates that the convert named his children after Hillel.16

In contrast to this negative picture of the relationships between the two schools is the positive one found in the Tosefta. It states:

Although Beit Shammai differed from Beit Hillel in regard to co- wives, sisters, a woman whose marriage is in doubt, an old bill of divorce, one who marries a woman with an item worth a peruta, and a man who divorces his wife but spends the night with her at the (same) inn, never- theless Shammaites did not refrain from marrying women from Hillelite families, nor did Hillelites refrain from marrying women from Sham- maite families. Truth and peace prevailed between them, as it is said: 'Therefore love truth and peace.'17 Although these prohibited and the others permitted, they did not refrain from preparing levitically pure food with one another (i.e., using one another's utensils).18

This version of Beit Hillel-Beit Shammai relations rejects the as-

sumption that wide-ranging disagreements about the fundamental laws

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of marriage and food need provoke exclusionary policies. Rather, the

Tosefta holds that the conjunction of truth and peace can prevail over the

tendency toward factionalism resulting from disagreements. Another source19 attributes the unity to the love and friendship they showered upon each other. At any rate, the cited version believes that factionalism can be prevented if the pursuit of truth is accompanied by a correspond- ing love for peace.

According to the Tosefta, by maintaining table fellowship, the Hil- lelites and Shammaites fulfilled the verse, "Every way of man is right in his own eyes, but the Lord weighs the hearts."20 According to Rashi,21 this verse shows that God judges a man by his intentions. Since only God is capable of doing so, humans are to be satisfied knowing that a man's way is right in his own eyes.22 As long as neither party confuses their commitment to truth with God's knowledge of truth, amity can reign. It is possible to view one's opponent, however wrong, as equally concerned with the truth. In other words, mutual regard can be main- tained even in the face of the most fundamental disagreements as long as both parties entertain the possibility of the other acting for the sake of Heaven.

UNITY DESPITE DIVERSITY

Still, we must ask whether it is credible to believe that mutually exclusive

policies are bridgeable by respect alone. How, for example, can Hillelites and Shammaites intermarry in the light of disparate marriage laws? Different marriage laws yield different categories of mamzerim. Would either group marry those they deemed mamzerim? Wrestling with this issue, the Talmud suggests three possibilities: 1) the Shammaites accepted Hillelite authority in practice while remaining opposed in theory; 2) di- vine providence prevented any prohibited cases from occurring;23 3) since both parties kept the other informed of problematic cases, intermarriage was allowed to continue.24

The upshot is that there are three ways of maintaining the marriage- ability of Jews despite disparate positions on marriage laws. The first solution holds that pluralism stops with thought; practice demands

uniformity. It stresses the principle of majority rule. Accordingly, Beit Shammai are to be complimented for risking marrying mamzerim for the sake of Jewish unity. Freedom of conscience can be sustained without freedom of action. The demands of social co-existence limit those acts which threaten group cohesion.

The second solution holds that autonomy in thought entails autonomy in action. It seeks to balance the demands of community with those of conscience. With regard to the inevitable conflict there are two pos-

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sibilities. Either human responsibility stops with adherence to the truth, leaving for God the responsibility for Jewish unity. Or, it can be argued, in order to minimize communal dissension on an issue of low probability,25 there is justification for being less than zealous in ferreting out the facts to prevent embarrassment and ignominy.26

The third solution assumes that the parties involved have sufficient esteem for one another to inform each other of problematic cases. Under- pinnings of trust can sustain surface disagreement when both sides keep the lines of communication open. Difficult cases can be dealt with indi- vidually before they become causes celebres. Conflicting practices will not necessarily split the community as long as bonds of trust allow for the

exchange of information. Respect for the principled position of the other means that neither party will do to the other that which is hateful to itself. For this to work, there need be a concern for truth and harmony. Where both are present the different sides will not only be informed of the other's problem, but also feel obliged to help the other adhere to its

principles. In sum, the Talmud presents three strategies for maintaining unity

despite diversity. They involve trusting the majority, trusting Provi- dence, and trusting each other. According to the Talmud, all three were effective in resolving the Beit Hillel-Beit Shammai controversy. It states:

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel argued for three years. One side said: 'The halakha is in accordance with us,' and the other side said, 'The halakha is in accordance with us.' Finally there was a divine pronounce- ment (bat kol) saying, 'These and those are the words of the living God, but the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel'27

There is no mention that both parties considered the other's words to be of the living God. That was left to the determination of the bat kol. But how can the bat kol claim that conflicting positions reflect God's word? One answer claims that different positions are true for different ages.28 Another claims that different positions are valid for different contin-

gencies.29 The alternative is the realization that both perspectives are equally

inspired, neither being spun out of ulterior motives, but both addressed to the same problem. The validity of both confirms the existence of alternative ways of grasping the divine word.30 Since the fullness of the divine word cannot be contained in a single human perspective, a

plurality of understandings is needed to fill out the human grasp of divine truth. Even revelation, remarks the Midrash, was appropriated according to the capacity of the recipient.

The recognition of plural solutions need not lead to paralysis. For one, they may be applicable to different times or circumstances; for another, they may reflect that the totality of a problem requires more

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than one solution, indeed, even what appears at times to be conflicting solutions.

PLURALISM AND TRUTH

The awareness of the pluralism of truth is also a safeguard against exag- gerated claims. The message of the bat kol is to exclude the possibility of

laying claim to an exclusive on the words of the living God. Once one can claim to tell the truth, there is even the possibility of telling nothing but the truth, but it is humanly impossible to tell the whole truth. As the medieval philosopher Joseph Albo said about God, "If I knew Him, I would be Him."31 The whole truth is only an object of divine cognition; it exceeds the human grasp. Since any human perspective is limited to

part of the truth, the whole truth may not be graspable without con- tradiction.

This may be what the physicist Niels Bohr meant when he said, "The

opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. But the opposite of a

profound truth may be another profound truth." An understanding of the limited nature of human truth as opposed

to divine truth is poignantly expressed by the author of K'sot HaHoshen32 in his introduction to the fourth part of the Shulkhan Aruch, Hoshen Ha- Mishpat:

One trembles at the thought that one might say about the Torah things that are not true, i.e. that the human mind is too weak to grasp the truth . . . The Torah was not given to ministering angels. It was given to man with a human mind. He gave us the Torah in conformity with the ability of the human mind to decide, even though it may not be the Truth ... only it be true according to the conclusions of the human mind.

Since the Talmud says that Truth is the seal of the Holy One, praised be He, we must concur with Solomon Schechter who, in describing the life of the Gaon of Vilna, wrote:

Neither men nor angels are trusted with the great Seal. They are only allowed to catch a glimpse of it, or rather to long after this glimpse. However, even the longing and effort for this glimpse will bring man into communion with God, and make his life divine.33

It is this commitment to the fullness of truth which enables Judaism to navigate between the Scylla of relativism and the Charybdis of abso- lutism. For one extreme, anything goes; for the other, everything but itself is condemned. the Jewish commitment to a pluralism of viewpoints sprouts not from the soil of indifference nor from an erosion of religious

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conviction, but results from the heterogeneity of knowledge and the richness of the talmudic method.

The logic of talmudic method itself accounts for the halakha being according to Beit Hillel. According to the Talmud, Beit Hillel did not

prevail because of the bat kol, rather the bat kol sided with them because, "They were congenial and modest, that is, they studied their rulings and those of Beit Shammai. Indeed they taught the Shammaite position before

advancing their own."34 The Hillelite policy conformed to that confirmed by the bat kol,

namely, the assumption that conflicting views can be equally committed to the truth. They, however, did not mistake their passion for truth with its exclusive possession. Instead, they felt it their responsibility to Torah to ensure that their disciples hear the Shammaite view. That did not mean that they were any less right in their own eyes, only that they sundered the nexus between right and legitimacy. While only one may be right, both are legitimate.

The story of the bat kol likewise explains the Shammaite defeat.

Apparently, the Shammaites not only did not teach the Hillelite position first, they refused it a hearing at all. After all, since they were toiling for the sake of Heaven, were they not entitled to protect God's truth? Error. has no rights. It is probably not a coincidence that the same school which refused to give the Hillelites a hearing was the very school which was quick to slay the Hillelites in order to secure ideological victory. Once deligitimation sets in, it knows no bounds.

By initially laying claim to no more than fifty-one percent of the truth, commitment can be maintained without feeling obliged to negate alternatives. Total commitment to a vision of truth need not necessitate the belief that the truth is exhausted by the vision. On the contrary, as the Hillelite method attests, by attending to the truth in other views, one's own truth grows. By teaching the Shammaite position in their academy, the Hillelites had to wrestle with the alternative.35 In order to retain the loyalty of their students, the Hillelites had to upgrade their arguments. By sifting out the chaff from the wheat their final stances were all the

stronger. The result was transformative. The Mishnah reports quite a few instances in which Beit Hillel reversed their position in favor of Beit Shammai.36 There is only one instance,37 ambiguous at that,38 in which Beit Shammai acted accordingly.

For Beit Shammai truth is a closed system. It speaks with a brittle

univocity. But truth unchallenged, not revitalized by argument, tends to lose its cogency. Unable to bend, it breaks. In the end, they lost.

The Shammaite position illustrates that when differences lead to mistrust, diversity threatens unity. The Hillelite position, on the other hand, demonstrates that a pluralistic mentality can sustain collegiality in the face of diversity.

It is not easy to hold that pluralistic understandings of Torah are

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consonant with its divine origin. The Talmud and Midrash relish stories

portraying students protesting their loyalty to their master by not trans-

mitting the teachings of other masters, only to be rebuked for not up- holding the Torah in all its diversity.

One case in point has a student so overwhelmed by the variety of opinions that he despairs of learning Torah. To him Scripture declares, "They are given from one shepherd," about which the Talmud comments:

One God created them, one leader gave them, the Master of all things uttered them. You too, therefore, make your ear like a hopper and take in the words of those who forbid and the words of those who permit, the words of those who declare unclean and the words of those who declare clean, the words of those who pronounce unfit and the words of those who pronounce fit.39

The divine origin of the Torah does not guarantee singleness of

meaning. The student of Torah must develop a receptivity to the various manifestations of truth. As Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik noted in The Halakhic Mind, "Pluralism asserts only that the object reveals itself in manifold ways to the subject, and that a certain telos corresponds to each of these ontical manifestations."40 This demands a high tolerance for

,ambiguity. When people, however, are educated to believe that truth claims are exclusive, their tolerance for ambiguity diminishes. But without such tolerance, the above Talmudic source notes, Torah study in all its dialectical fullness will overwhelm the prospective student.

As the insecure cannot live without certainty, so the pedestrian mind cannot bear contradiction. But the Torah is not a device to drug our

thinking. On the contrary, it is an elixir of life (sam hahayim) TO THOSE WHO HOLD FAST TO IT. But hold fast one must, for "the word is like fire and like a hammer which breaks the rock in pieces." As Soloveitchik

remarks, "The white light of divinity is always refracted through reality's 'dome of many-coloured glass'."41

Either repose or truth. A polyvalent Torah is not embraceable by the one-dimensional minded. Neither does the way of Torah favor certitude over the search for certainty. As the Maharal of Prague wrote in deline-

ating "the path of Torah":

It is more fitting and more correct that one should determine the law for himself directly on the basis of the Talmud, even though there is a danger that he will not follow the true path and not decide the law as it should be in truth. Notwithstanding, the sage has only to consider what his intellect apprehends and understands from the Talmud and if his

understanding and wisdom misleads him, he is nevertheless believed

by the Lord when he decides in accordance with his mind's dictates ... and he is superior to one who rules from a later prepared code without

knowing the reasons which are the ground of the decision. Such a one walks like a blind man on the way."42

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Since not all positions promote individual search as much as the Maharal, not all are as tolerant of diversity as his position implies. Basically, there are three positions on the subject of the conflict of opinion. Rabbi Yosi, in the Tosefta,43 holds that controversy reflects a defect in the transmission of the tradition due to disciples who were deficient in

attending to their masters. Rambam, in the preface to his Commentary on the Mishnah,44 holds that controversy is inevitable due to variegated tem-

peraments and intellectual capabilities. Accordingly, no one should be held accountable for honestly arriving at a different conclusion. Both

positions, nonetheless, hold that ideally the tradition should be free of

controversy. The third position, championed by Meiri, in his Commentary to

Mishnah Avot,45 sees the dialectic resulting from disagreement as integral to the establishment of truth. For him, without challenge there is no intel- lectual ferment and thus no refinement of position. Intellectual pluralism is not tolerated because of human weakness, rather it is exalted as a

necessary ingredient in the human quest for truth. Even a positive posture towards pluralism has its limits. Rashi at-

tributes the Talmud's receptivity to opposing views to the fact that "Neither side of the conflict cites an argument from the Torah of another

god, rather only from the Torah of our God.46 In the first part of the twentieth century, the two great theoreticians

of Jewish religious pluralism were Rabbis Solomon Schechter and Ab- raham Kook. Schechter's position was formulated vis-a-vis the Reform movement. Kook's position was formulated vis-a-vis the "secular" zionists. Both positions were enunciated before the Holocaust and the establish- ment of the State of Israel.

Schechter, in discussing Jewish diversity, uses the model of His Majesty's Government and His Majesty's Opposition from the British

parliamentary system. He writes:

This sounds like a paradox, yet it contains a deep truth, implying as it does that both His Majesty's Government as well as His Majesty's Op- position form one large community, working for the welfare of the country and the prosperity of the nation. The same principle may also be applied to theology, there being, under Providence, room also for the opposition party, which has its purpose and mission assigned to it by history. Of course, there are exceptions, but generally there is hardly any phenomenon in Judaism in the way of sect or movement which has not served a certain purpose in the divine economy of history. For opposition there must be, owing to the difference of temper and tempera- ment, the difference of training, the difference of surroundings which no process of schooling can entirely obliterate, and the difference of opportunity . . . For reduce your differences as much as you want, and, indeed, I hope and pray that the difference of aims is not as deep as we sometimes think, the fact remains that we are unfortunately divided

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both in questions of doctrines-at least certain doctrines-and even more in practice. But, thank God, there are still a great many things and aims for which both parties can work in harmony and peace, and unite us.47

Differences become tolerable, according to Schechter, if room for them can be found in the divine economy. Coordinated action is possible to the degree that there are common aims.

Kook expounds his theory of complementarity in a reflection on why scholars, in the Talmud, are designated as builders. He says:

For the building is constructed from various parts, and the truth of the light of the world will be built from various dimensions, from various approaches, for these and those are the words of the living God ... It is

precisely the multiplicity of opinions which derive from variegated souls and backgrounds which enriches wisdom and brings about its enlargement. In the end all matters will be properly understood and it will be recognized that it was impossible for the structure of peace to be built without those trends which appeared to be in conflict.48

Diversity of perspective is a function of diversity of role. Again, differences become tolerable, indeed desirable, to the degree in which

they can be subsumed under an overarching purpose.

PLURALISM AND PRACTICE

All of this is well and good for ideological pluralism. What about plural- ism in practice? For many, pluralism comes to a screeching halt at

practice. After all, disagreement in thought is an intellectual problem. Disagreement in practice is a social problem. The popular mind associates truth with unanimity or uniformity. The absence of the latter implies for them the absence of the former. Can this issue be contained?

The Talmud does not assume that pluralism in practice necessarily undermines Jewish unity. In fact, it presents three different views on the

subject. Rabbi Yohanan rules against pluralism in practice in those situations in which the rulings of both the Hillelites and the Shammaites are implemented.49 For him, any diversity in the practice of mitsvot-as

opposed to custom-threatens the unity of Israel. Uniformity in the

practice of mitsvot is a safeguard against anarchy. Others are more permissive. Abayye rules against pluralism in

practice only where there are two courts in one town, and the one decides

according to the Shammaites and the other according to the Hillelites. But there is no objection to two courts in two towns ruling differently. Abayye limits the demand for uniformity to a single locale.

His colleague Rava goes further: He prohibits pluralism in practice only in the case of one court in one town, half of which decide according

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to the Shammaites and half according to the Hillelites. But there is no objection to two courts in one town ruling differently.50

Both Rabbi Yohanan and Abayye understand the need for communal unity and insist that the basis of unity is uniformity. Rava, however, refuses to allow the appeal for unity to impose uniformity as long as it does not undermine the fulfillment of an institution's function. If con- sensus cannot be reached, an alternative institution may be required. In an ambience of mutual regard, competing institutions will not necessarily fracture the unity of the people.

Is Rava's position realistic? Is it really possible to have unity without a consensus on authority? This problem will be taken up in the next part of this study, which focuses on Jewish religious pluralism in the context of denominationalism.

DENOMINATIONALISM AND PLURALISM

The Problem

It is popularly held that denominationalism in Jewish life is due to dif- ferent understandings of God, revelation, and Torah. Knowledge of the various denominations shows that while these factors are significant, just as significant are the differing understandings of the past and varying analyses of what to do in the present.

Disagreements on the present-day application of Judaism are fre- quently anchored in disagreements about the nature of past applications. The more we disagree about what happened in the past, the less likely we are to come to an agreement about the present.

The two extremes of grasping the past may, for convenience, be designated The Way of Metaphysics and The Way of History. The meta- physical approach underscores the essential unity of the past. All signifi- cant diversity is swept under the rug of a harmonistic exegesis of the historical record. The result is that the past speaks to the present in a monotone. The belief that all past voices spoke in unison leads to the hope that all present voices will speak in unison. Finding uniformity in the past spurs the desire to impose uniformity on the present.

The historical approach revels in the diversity of the past. It under- scores variety over continuity. Relishing every difference, it skips the constant. Finding little that is normative in the past, it provides little

guidance for the present. By denying any essence to Judaism, it wallows in relativism. Its tolerance is an expression of indifference. Anything goes because everything has gone.

Exclusive emphasis on the metaphysical approach can lead to re-

jecting Jewish pluralism as inauthentic. Exclusive emphasis on the his- torical approach can result in rejecting any truth claim.

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A proper analysis of the relationship between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai shows how pluralistic and exclusive claims to truth can dwell

together. That is, those whose study of Jewish law is ahistorical frequently find the metaphysical absolutist perspective congenial to their way of

thinking. On the other hand, those whose study of Jewish history is divorced from a study of Jewish law frequently find the historical rela- tivist position most congenial.

Many, if forced to choose between a Procrustean absolutism and a

protean relativism, will opt for the former. Any guidance, it is believed, is preferable to being left rudderless in a sea of doubt.

Nonetheless, imposing on the past a single mold not only ignores the

complexity of past Jewish experience but facilitates denial of the spiritual fragmentation which characterizes modernity. A nostalgic yearning for a uniform past that never was leads to a disinclination to face the multiform

expressions that exist today. Modernity has cracked the facade of uni-

formity. The way to narrow the gap between exclusive claims to truth and

pluralistic ones is methodological pluralism. Metaphysical and historical claims can take each other into account, thereby qualifying each other's extremes. An awareness of the historically-grounded dimensions of past expressions can lead to an appreciation of the historically-grounded di- mensions of present affirmations. Universalizing a specific picture of the

past will make it more difficult to deal with the vicissitudes of the present. Loyalty to the past need not mandate its reproduction in the present. As Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits writes in "Authentic Judaism and Halakhah": "No Jewry is imitable or repeatable, because each authentic Jewry repre- sents a single application of Torah to a specific constellation of conditions in which Jews find themselves at one time in their history."51

It is one thing, for example, to affirm that Hasidism was a revelation of transcendence. It is another to affirm the ongoing validity of all the historic garbs of that revelation in eighteenth century Poland. Precisely because the Baal Shem Tov spoke the historical word of God to the moment was it so pertinent. But, to believe that it was absolutely true for the moment is not equivalent to affirming its universality for all times. God's will is only partly disclosed in each historical tradition or personal revelation. As we learned from the story of the bat kol, just because God certifies particular human utterances as referring to His will does not

guarantee that they hold a monopoly on divine truth or that they are

universally valid. As heirs to the totality of Jewish expression, we are obliged to take

seriously both the theology of the first Lubavitcher Rebbe, Schneur Zalman of Liadi, and that of the Vilna Gaon on the equipoise between divine immanence and transcendence in formulating contemporary theology, despite the fact that both cannot be affirmed simultaneously. To say that both are the words of the living God, is to say that even if we

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cannot determine which is right, we can affirm that both are authentic understandings of the relationship between the divine and the human.

To argue that mutually exclusive positions are both authentic is not a rudderless relativism but a loyalty to the Talmudic understanding of controversies for the sake of Heaven.

It is one thing to argue that a specific understanding of transcendence and immanence should be made available to all. It is quite another matter to hold one understanding to be universally valid for all human experience, and therefore to seek to impose it. Loyalty to a vision of truth does not have to lead to ideological imperialism any more than the belief in the ultimate unity of truth has to exclude methodological pluralism.

Toward a Solution

Even if there were a common appreciation of the diversity of the past and its usefulness for the present, it would still be inadequate on its own to create a basis for Jewish unity. Three other elements must be present: an understanding of what we hold in common, a belief that our diversity plays a role in the divine economy, and a commitment to continuing communication with open regard to our disagreements, along with a willingness to help each other solve our respective problems.52

Commonality

What do we hold in common? We all share the search for retaining Jewish authenticity within contemporary civilization. Our commitment to Jewish survival also means a commitment to the spiritual destiny of the Jewish people and a belief that our share in holiness is acquired by living as part of the Jewish community. We are all participants in the discovery of the grandeur of our tradition, as we are all committed to the premise that living as a Jew will raise us to a plane which cannot otherwise be reached.

We share cultural heroes. We all agree that to be a Jew means being inspired by Isaiah as well as being instructed by Akiba. We readily concede that Maimonides has contributed to our mind as much as the Baal Shem Tov has provided language for our soul. Our hearts are quickened by the vision of Herzl as our breath is abated by the expansive- ness of Kook. All of us can deepen our understanding of what it means to be a Jew in the twentieth century through the examples and writings of Buber, Heschel, and Soloveitchik. And finally, we know that "separation from the people of Israel is detachment from the Covenant with the God of Israel."53

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Diversity

Can not all this be achieved without denominationalism? Are not denomi- nations the institutionalization of divisiveness? It all depends on whether the denomination is Ptolemaic or Copernican. Those denominations that see themselves as the center of the Jewish solar system with all else

revolving around them cannot but prove to be divisive. It takes a Copernican shift to realize that God, Torah, the Jewish

people, and the land of Israel constitute the hub of the Jewish solar

system. As long as denominations judge themselves by their capacity to mediate the hub to their constituencies, then praised be such denomina- tionalism.

When our solidarity precedes our particularity, the result is clal Yisrael denominationalism. Clal Yisrael denominationalism enables us to be loyal to the insights of our community without being burdened by the onus of negating the insights of others.

Clal Yisrael is composed of overlapping faith communities. While the

overlap makes for cohesiveness, the remainder makes for that diversity which so often serves as the cocoon of creativity.

Let us not allow our pursuit for unity to suppress our diversity, nor allow our appreciation of diversity to squelch our impulse to work for common goals.

Has denominationalism been a blessing in disguise? Multi-expres- sions of Judaism have, in all probability, allowed Judaism to reach more Jews. In the pre-modern situation, Jews were Jews by the fact of their birth, something that was reinforced by all of social reality. In such a situation, one movement could believe that another's success is at their

expense. Thus, excommunication of the deviant could be institutionally self-serving.

In modernity, the social-political situation is so constructed that Jews are such by choice. They share in the various plausibility structures of

modernity. They vote with their feet.54 Any single dimension of Judaism cannot possibly have the range of appeal to the variety of Jews that a multi-dimensional approach will have. Synagogue-affiliated Jewry hardly exceeds 50% of American Jewry.55 Reduce synagogue options and affilia- tion rates will fall accordingly. Awareness of this characteristic of mo- dernity itself will enhance appreciation for the need of diversity in

Judaism. Moreover, the fragmentation of the modern Jewish experience militates against any movement with an internally coherent ideology speaking authentically to all the different places which Jews occupy on the ideological map. The Jewish world may be so complex as to demand

many interpreting spheres of reality. Indeed, it may only be grasped in alternatives by using different attitudes. As such Jewish heterogeneity mandates a pluralism of viewpoints.

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American Judaism is assuredly the richer for the mutual fructification which has taken placed among the denominations. Historically speaking, the Reform were in the forefront in founding both synagogue movements and synagogue-centered youth movements. The Conservative movement was the first to place religiously-centered camping and teen-age pilgri- mages to Israel at the cutting edge of its educational enterprise. And the Orthodox have single-handedly made day-school education the option it is in Jewish life.

All three now have flourishing synagogue movements, youth groups, religious camping, pilgrimages and day schools. Are we not all the better for it?

Note also that while the commitment to personal observance has

generally flowed from the Orthodox to the Reform through the Conserva- tive and Reconstructionist movements, liturgical contributions, especially in English, whether it be the Siddur, the Haggadah, or contemporary musical renditions, have almost all moved from the Reform in the direc- tion of the Orthodox.

Finally, while historically a party in Orthodoxy was the first to join the Zionist movement, and Solomon Schechter was the first denomina- tional head to acknowledge Zionism "as the great bulwark against assimi- lation,"56 the Reform were the first to express their commitment to clal Yisrael by requiring student rabbis and cantors to spend a year in Israel.

Honesty

As we have said, Jewish unity under the conditions of modernity needs to underscore the overarching commonality, the appreciation of diverse roles in the divine economy, and finally honesty in communicating our differences.

According to Samuel, Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai solved the

problem of mamzerim by informing each other of problematic cases as defined by each approach.57 A similar honesty and flow of information

through ongoing communication would prove beneficial to the American rabbinate. If rabbis would keep each other apprised of their policies and also keep their congregants abreast of the implications of their policies for the other movements, we would be on the way to making American

Judaism safe for diversity within the context of unity. Too few rabbis, in actuality, inform their own congregants of the clal

Yisrael implications of certain divorce and conversion procedures. Those not committed to disclosing the truth to their own congregants are even less likely to do so to other rabbis. Without trusting cross-denominational rabbinic support systems, it is unlikely that an honest flow of information can take place. Why refuse to be on speaking terms and hope for one

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another's failure when we can pray for each other's health and help one another in preserving our communal legacy.

An analysis of the interlocking network of American Jewry will show that no denomination is an island. Still, too many continue to act as

though they were extended peninsulas. Denominational loyalty within a clal Yisrael context would allow for mutual fertilization based on a col- laborative pluralism. The outcome will not be a homogenization of the movements, but the mutual deepening of Jewish experience which will contribute to an overarching unity of aspirations. Moreover, it will allow for the type of criticism which fosters growth.

Such criticism, to be constructive, must be tolerant and undergirded by a moral compassion toward the other. In such an atmosphere, plural- ism provides the opportunity for spiritual self-judgment and growth. It

suggests, as Yitz Greenberg points out, that all denominational theorizing about the meaning of Jewish existence should be overheard by theorists of the other denominations.58 The result would be a more honest and humble understanding of our role in the life of the spirit. This, of course, cannot be accomplished without the interaction between information and exposure to the other.

Epilogue

According to the Talmud,59 a blessing is to be offered upon seeing a multitude of Jews. The blessing praises God for plumbing the secrets

despite the diversity of the crowd. Diversity of mind is one more reason to praise God, thank God.

It was Rabbi Kook in his essay, "Fragments of Light: A View as to the Reason for the Commandments," who so exquisitely summed up the nature of pluralism:

On reaching full maturity, the human spirit aspires to rise above conflict and opposition. It will recognize all expression of the spiritual life as an organic whole, in which differences in states will not be erased, in which there will remain a distinction between the primary and the

peripheral, high and low, more holy and less holy, and between these two and the secular. But this will not be in a grievous form that inspires discord and hostility. It will be in a form similar to the divisions of

organs in the body, and to the distinctive impulses in the fully developed spiritual life, each of which recognizes its place as well as that of its

neighbor, whether it be below or above it.

The symphony of Jewish religious life results when each denomina- tion plays its own instrument well. To create the orchestra, each denomi- nation has to realize that the quality of the richness of the music together will exceed anything they can produce separately. Harmony results from

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differences coordinated not suppressed. While we may play different instruments, we must be committed to the goals of the orchestra to

produce a symphony. As soon as one part starts to do his own thing or to believe that his music will be superior by withdrawing from the whole,

everybody loses. BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY/CLAL

NOTES

1. Sifre Deuteronomy 346 (ed. Louis Finkelstein), p. 403, maintains that "when Israel is of one mind below, God's great name is exalted above, as it says, 'He became King in Jeshurun when the heads of the people assembled, the tribes of Israel together' (Deuteronomy 33:5).

2. As cited in Encyclopaedia Judaica (Jerusalem, 1972), Vol. 7, p. 1395. 3. The conflict has undergone a recrudescence as witnessed by the break-up of

the right-wing religious party Agudat Israel along these lines. 4. M. Avot 5:17. 5. Ad Mishnah Avot 5:17. 6. Rabbenu Yonah ad Mishnah Avot 5:17. 7. M. Shabbat 1:4. 8. J. Shabbat 1:4 (1, 3c). 9. B. Shabbat 17a. 10. Josephus, The Jewish War, Book IV, passim. 11. See Ben-Zion Lurie, Megillath Ta'anith with Introduction and Notes (Jerusalem,

1964), p. 201. 12. B. Yoma 9b. 13. N. Berlin, Ha'amek Davar, Genesis, Introduction (Jerusalem, 5735), p. 1. 14. M. Avot 1:12. 15. B. Shabbat 81a. 16. Avot D'Rabbi Natan 15 (ed. Solomon Schechter), p. 62. 17. Zechariah 8:17. 18. B. Yevamot 1:10-11. 19. B. Yevamot 14b. 20. Proverbs 21:2. 21. Rashi ad Proverbs 21:2. 22. I am indebted for this interpretation, as well as several others in this study,

to David Dishon, Tarbut HaMahloket BeYisrael (Tel Aviv, 1984), p. 46. 23. J. Yevamot 14a-b. 24. B. Yevamot 14a-b. 25. See Tosafot ad B. Yevamot 47a s.v. be-muhzak. 26. For contemporary illustrations of this approach, see Dishon, op. cit. (n. 22),

p. 55; and Louis Jacobs, A Tree of Life: Diversity, Flexibility, and Creativity in Jewish Law (New York, 1984), pp. 269 and 275.

27. B. Eruvin 13b.

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28. See sources in David Halivni, Mekorot UMesorot, Eruvin, Pesahim, (Jerusa- lem, 5742), p. 31, n. 1.

29. B. Ketubot 57a, last line of Rashi before the Mishnah. 30. See Hatam Sofer ad Pesahim 3b, cited by Halivni, op. cit. 31. Joseph Albo, Sefer Halkkarim, Part 2, chapter 31 (Jerusalem, n.d.), p. 306.

According to Judah Halevi, "If we could grasp Him it would show up a deficiency in Him" Sefer HaKuzari, part 5, chapter 22 (ed. Even-Shmuel), p. 232.

32. By Aryeh Leib Heller, originally published in two parts, Lemberg 1788- 1796. Although his contemporary Jacob Lorbeerbaum critiqued this book in a comparable work, Netivot HaMishpat (Zolkiew, 1809-1816), he also included a similar disclaimer in his introduction to the effect that the composite nature of Man's God-given mind "prevents him from grasping matters according to the truth, for absolute truth can only be ascribed to God whose seal is truth."

33. Solomon Schechter, Studies in Judaism, First Series (Philadelphia, 1945), pp. 74-75.

34. B. Eruvin 13b understanding the vav of veshonin as explicative as it fre-

quently is in early strata of Talmudic literature, see M. Lehman, "Iyunnim Be Vam HaPerush (Explicativum)," Sinai, Vol. 85 (1970), pp. 200-215.

35. See Rashi ad B. Eruvin 13b, s.v. veshonin. 36. M. Yevamot 15:3, Gittin 4:5, Kelim 9:2, Ohalot 5:3 and summation in M.

Eduyot 1:12-13. 37. M. Terumot 4:4. 38. See Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta, Vol. I (New York, 1955), pp. 382-383. 39. B .Hagigah 3b. 40. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Halakhic Mind (New York, 1986), p. 16. 41. Ibid., p. 46. 42. Netivot Olam, Netiv HaTorah, end of chapter 15, cited by Menahem Elon,

Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles, Vol. III (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 1150, who dis- cusses the different approaches to the issue of independent Talmudic investiga- tion versus dependency on codes. I am indebted to Dr. Bezalel Safran for this reference.

43. T. Hagigah 2:9. 44. Rambam, Mishnah Im Perush Rabbenu Moshe ben Maimon, Vol. I (ed.

Kafah), pp. 11-12. 45. AdM.Avot 5:17. 46. Rashi ad B. Hagigah 3b, s.v. kulan. 47. Solomon Schechter, "His Majesty's Opposition," in his Seminary Addresses

and Other Papers (New York, 1959), pp. 240-241. 48. Abraham Isaac Kook, Olat HaRayah, Vol. I (Jerusalem, 1939), p. 330. 49. J. Pesahim 4:1, 30d. 50. B. Yevamot 14a. 51. Eliezer Berkovits, "Authentic Judaism and Halakhah," Judaism, Vol. 19

(1970), p. 76. 52. This analysis is limited to the theory of pluralism. An illuminating applica-

tion with regard to such issues as Jews for Jesus, Who is a Jew?, and Jewish divorce appears in Irving Greenberg, "Toward a Principled Pluralism," CLAL

Perspectives (March, 1986) pp. 9-10.

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150 Reuven Kimelman

53. This quotation and much of the language in the above paragraph derives from Abraham J. Heschel, "The Individual Jew and His Obligations," in his The

Insecurity of Freedom (New York, 1967), pp. 187-211. 54. See Calvin Goldscheider, Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in

America (Bloomington, 1986), esp. chapter 11, "Social Change and Jewish Con-

tinuity," pp. 170-184. 55. See Steven M. Cohen, American Modernity and Jewish Identity (New York,

1983). 56. Seminary Addresses, op. cit. (n. 47) p. 93. 57. Op. cit., n. 24. 58. Irving Greenberg, "Will There Be One Jewish People by the Year 2000?,"

CLAL Perspectives (June, 1985). 59. B. Berakhot 58a with Rashi. 60. Translation by Ben Zion Bokser, Abraham Isaac Kook (New York, 1978),

p. 311.