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Auto-Epistemic Logic • Proposed by Moore (1985) • Contemplates reflection on self knowledge (auto-epistemic) • Allows for representing knowledge not just about the external world, but also about the knowledge I have of it

Auto-Epistemic Logic

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Auto-Epistemic Logic. Proposed by Moore (1985) Contemplates reflection on self knowledge (auto-epistemic) Allows for representing knowledge not just about the external world, but also about the knowledge I have of it. Syntax of AEL. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Auto-Epistemic Logic

• Proposed by Moore (1985)

• Contemplates reflection on self knowledge (auto-epistemic)

• Allows for representing knowledge not just about the external world, but also about the knowledge I have of it

Page 2: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Syntax of AEL

• 1st Order Logic, plus the operator L (applied to formulas)

• L means “I know ”• Examples:

MScOnSW → L MScSW

(or L MScOnSW → MScOnSW)

young (X) L studies (X) → studies (X)

Page 3: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Meaning of AEL

• What do I know?– What I can derive (in all models)

• And what do I not know?– What I cannot derive

• But what can be derived depends on what I know– Add knowledge, then test

Page 4: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Semantics of AEL

• T* is an expansion of theory T iff

T* = Th(T{L : T* |= } {L : T* |≠ })

• Assuming the inference rule /L :

T* = CnAEL(T {L : T* |≠ })

• An AEL theory is always two-valued in L, that is, for every expansion:

| L T* L T*

Page 5: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Knowledge vs. Belief

• Belief is a weaker concept– For every formula, I know it or know it not– There may be formulas I do not believe in,

neither their contrary

• The Auto-Epistemic Logic of knowledge and belief (AELB), introduces also operator B – I believe in

Page 6: Auto-Epistemic Logic

AELB Example

• I rent a film if I believe I’m neither going to baseball nor football games

Bbaseball Bfootball → rent_filme• I don’t buy tickets if I don’t know I’m going to

baseball nor know I’m going to football L baseball L football → buy_tickets

• I’m going to football or baseballbaseball football

• I should not conclude that I rent a film, but do conclude I should not buy tickets

Page 7: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Axioms about beliefs

• Consistency Axiom

B• Normality Axiom

B(F → G) → (B F → B G)

• Necessitation rule

F

B F

Page 8: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Minimal models

• In what do I believe?– In that which belongs to all preferred models

• Which are the preferred models?– Those that, for one same set of beliefs, have a minimal

number of true things

• A model M is minimal iff there does not exist a smaller model N, coincident with M on B e Latoms

• When is true in all minimal models of T, we write T |=min

Page 9: Auto-Epistemic Logic

AELB expansions

• T* is a static expansion of T iff

T* = CnAELB(T {L : T* |≠ }

{B : T* |=min })

where CnAELB denotes closure using the

axioms of AELB plus necessitation for L

Page 10: Auto-Epistemic Logic

The special case of AEB

• Because of its properties, the case of theories without the knowledge operator is especially interesting

• Then, the definition of expansion becomes:

T* = (T*)

where (T*) = CnAEB(T {B : T* |=min })

and CnAEB denotes closure using the axioms of AEB

Page 11: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Least expansion

• Theorem: Operator is monotonic, i.e.

T T1 T2 → (T1) (T2)• Hence, there always exists a minimal

expansion of T, obtainable by transfinite induction:– T0 = Cn(T)

– Ti+1 = (Ti)

– T = U T (for limit ordinals )

Page 12: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Consequences

• Every AEB theory has at least one expansion

• If a theory is affirmative (i.e. all clauses have at least a positive literal) then it has at least a consistent expansion

• There is a procedure to compute the semantics

Page 13: Auto-Epistemic Logic

LP forKnowledge Representation

• Due to its declarative nature, LP has become a prime candidate for Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

• This has been more noticeable since its relations to other NMR formalisms were established

• For this usage of LP, a precise declarative semantics was in order

Page 14: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Language• A Normal Logic Programs P is a set of rules:

H A1, …, An, not B1, … not Bm (n,m 0)

where H, Ai and Bj are atoms

• Literal not Bj are called default literals

• When no rule in P has default literal, P is called definite

• The Herbrand base HP is the set of all instantiated atoms from program P.

• We will consider programs as possibly infinite sets of instantiated rules.

Page 15: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Declarative Programming

• A logic program can be an executable specification of a problem

member(X,[X|Y]).

member(X,[Y|L]) member(X,L).

• Easier to program, compact code• Adequate for building prototypes• Given efficient implementations, why not use it to

“program” directly?

Page 16: Auto-Epistemic Logic

LP and Deductive Databases

• In a database, tables are viewed as sets of facts:

• Other relations are represented with rules:

),(

).,(

londonlisbonflight

adamlisbonflight

LondonLisbon

AdamLisbon

tofromflight

).,(),(

).,(),,(),(

).,(),(

BAconnectionnotBAherchooseAnot

BCconnectionCAflightBAconnection

BAflightBAconnection

Page 17: Auto-Epistemic Logic

LP and Deductive DBs (cont)

• LP allows to store, besides relations, rules for deducing other relations

• Note that default negation cannot be classical negation in:

• A form of Closed World Assumption (CWA) is needed for inferring non-availability of connections

).,(),(

).,(),,(),(

).,(),(

BAconnectionnotBAherchooseAnot

BCconnectionCAflightBAconnection

BAflightBAconnection

Page 18: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Default Rules

• The representation of default rules, such as

“All birds fly”can be done via the non-monotonic operator not

).(

).(

).()(

).()(

.)(),()(

ppenguin

abird

PpenguinPabnormal

PpenguinPbird

AabnormalnotAbirdAflies

Page 19: Auto-Epistemic Logic

The need for a semantics

• In all the previous examples, classical logic is not an appropriate semantics– In the 1st, it does not derive not member(3,[1,2])

– In the 2nd, it never concludes choosing another company

– In the 3rd, all abnormalities must be expressed

• The precise definition of a declarative semantics for LPs is recognized as an important issue for its use in KRR.

Page 20: Auto-Epistemic Logic

2-valued Interpretations

• A 2-valued interpretation I of P is a subset of HP

– A is true in I (ie. I(A) = 1) iff A I– Otherwise, A is false in I (ie. I(A) = 0)

• Interpretations can be viewed as representing possible states of knowledge.

• If knowledge is incomplete, there might be in some states atoms that are neither true nor false

Page 21: Auto-Epistemic Logic

3-valued Interpretations

• A 3-valued interpretation I of P is a set

I = T U not F

where T and F are disjoint subsets of HP

– A is true in I iff A T– A is false in I iff A F– Otherwise, A is undefined (I(A) = 1/2)

• 2-valued interpretations are a special case, where:

HP = T U F

Page 22: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Models

• Models can be defined via an evaluation function Î:– For an atom A, Î(A) = I(A)– For a formula F, Î(not F) = 1 - Î(F)– For formulas F and G:

• Î((F,G)) = min(Î(F), Î(G))• Î(F G)= 1 if Î(F) Î(G), and = 0 otherwise

• I is a model of P iff, for all rule H B of P:

Î(H B) = 1

Page 23: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Minimal Models Semantics• The idea of this semantics is to minimize positive

information. What is implied as true by the program is true; everything else is false.

• {pr(c),pr(e),ph(s),ph(e),aM(c),aM(e)} is a model• Lack of information that cavaco is a physicist, should indicate that he isn’t• The minimal model is: {pr(c),ph(e),aM(e)}

)(

)(

)()(

cavacopresident

einsteinphysicist

XphysicistXaticianableMathem

Page 24: Auto-Epistemic Logic

Minimal Models Semantics

D[Truth ordering] For interpretations I and J, I J iff for all atom A, I(A) I(J), i.e.

TI TJ and FI FJ

T Every definite logic program has a least (truth ordering) model.

D[minimal models semantics] An atom A is true in (definite) P iff A belongs to its least model. Otherwise, A is false in P.

Page 25: Auto-Epistemic Logic

TP operator• The minimal models of a definite P can be

computed (bottom-up) via operator TP

D [TP] Let I be an interpretation of definite P.

TP(I) = {H: (H Body) P and Body I}

T If P is definite, TP is monotone and continuous. Its minimal fixpoint can be built by:

I0 = {} and In = TP(In-1)

T The least model of definite P is TP({})

Page 26: Auto-Epistemic Logic

On Minimal Models

• SLD can be used as a proof procedure for the minimal models semantics:– If the is a SLD-derivation for A, then A is true– Otherwise, A is false

• The semantics does not apply to normal programs:– p not q has two minimal models:

{p} and {q}

There is no least model !