University of Bristol Department of Historical Studies Best undergraduate dissertations of 2015 Myfanwy James The Refugees of Eastern Zaire: the Forgotten Chapter of the Great Lakes Conflict Winner of the 'Best History dissertation of 2015' prize The Department of Historical Studies at the University of Bristol is com-mitted to the advancement of historical knowledge and understanding, and to research of the highest order. Our undergraduates are part of that en-deavour. Since 2009, the Departmenthas published the best of the annual disserta-tions produced by our final year undergraduates in recognition of the ex-cellent research work being undertaken by our students. This was one of the best of this years final year undergraduate disserta-tions. Please note: this dissertation is published in the state it was submitted for examination. Thus the author has not been able to correct errors and/or departures from departmental guidelines for the presentation of dissertations (e.g. in the formatting of its footnotes and bibliography). The author, 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the prior permission in writing of the author, or as expressly permitted by law. All citations of this work must be properly acknowledged. 58932 1 The Refugees of Eastern Zaire: the Forgotten Chapter of the Great Lakes Conflict (1994-1998) Image 1: Mugunga refugee camp, 16/11/96, (Stringer-Reuters/Corbis/PBEAHUMYCDX). Words: 9,896 58932 2 CONTENTS Introduction...4 Chapter 1: The Kivu Crisis and UN Vacillation........8 Chapter 2: Invasion, Massacres and International Inaction........12 Chapter 3: Perpetrators and Victims: Hiding behind Oversimplification.....25 Conclusions..32 Appendices....34 Bibliography.65 58932 3 Forastorytoreachthemostpowerfullevelofcompulsionyouneedaclean-cutstory lineagoodguyandabadguythatswhytheRwandanstoryhasworkedsowellwe shouldallbesuspiciousofstorieswithlinesthatcleanThestoryoftheCongoisastory that doesnt seem to have any lines at all. You have to really take some time to invest your attention in understanding this very complicated tangle of situations in a really big country withconflictinterspersedandinterlacedatmanylevels,localities,regionsPeoplejust conclude its another one of these African messesits not going to make a blip of different in the history of mankind, so you turn the page. Howard French1 1 H. French Interview: Story-line: Congo vs. Rwanda, (2011). 58932 4 INTRODUCTION TheCongoleseconflict,orAfricasworldwar,ledtothehighestdeathtollsincethe Second World War. By 2004, almost 4 million people had died,2 approximately 200,000 in massacresofHuturefugeesin1996/7.3However,theconflictremainsneglectedinthe historical record. Unlike the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Congolese conflict is not a house-hold name, and remains air-brushed out of history.4 The two Congo wars (1996-1997, and 1998-2004) are difficult to follow: with their multiple, shifting factions and acronyms, they havefailedtoattracttheinternationalandhistoricalattentiontheydeserve.Toaidthe reader, a timeline, lists of acronyms and geographical locations, and a dramatis personae can be found at Appendices 1-4. SummaryofEvents IntheaftermathoftheRwandangenocideofTutsisbyHutusin1994,1.1millionHutu refugeesfledtotheKivuprovincesoftheCongo(easternZaire),inresponsetoviolent reprisals.Thecivilianrefugeeswereaccompaniedbytheperpetratorsofthegenocide,the formerRwandanarmy(ex-FAR)andtheInterahamwemilitia,whichthenestablished controlovertheHuturefugeecamps.5HumanitarianagenciesandtheRwandan governmenturgedtheUNtoseparatetheciviliansfromthemilitia,whichhadbegunre-organisingandattackingRwanda.Followinginactiononthepartoftheinternational community,in1996theTutsi-basedRwandanarmy(RPA)invadedZaire,foundingthe rebelgroup,theAllianceForces(AFDL).TheAFDL/RPAthendismantledtheHutu camps, systematically massacring refugees. InMay1997,theAFDLoverthrewPresidentMobutuofZaire,andLaurentKabila,the head of the AFDL, became the President of the country, renamed the Democratic Republic ofCongo(DRC).ThreeUN-sponsoredteamsinvestigatedeventsintheDRC,and concluded that mass human rights abuses had taken place. However, in 1998, Kabila blocked anyfurtherinvestigations,presentinghimselfasaliberatorwhohadoustedthecorrupt MobutuwiththehelpoftheRwandanTutsis,thevictimsofthe1994genocide.The AFDL/RPAmassacresof1996/7wereforgotten,aninconvenientfootnote.Subsequently, 2 International Crisis Group, Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report no. 104 (2006), 1. 3 E. Kisangani, The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: a case of UN peacekeeping failure and international law, The Journal of Modern African Studies, (2000). 4 R. Lemarchand, Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, Memory, (Philadelphia, 2011), 1. 5 UNHCR, The State of the Worlds Refugees, (Oxford, 2010), 268. 58932 5 inJuly1998,KabilaorderedRwandantroopstoleaveCongo,startingthe2ndCongolese war. Nonewinvestigationsintothe1996-7massacresfolloweduntil2005,whentheUN discoveredmassgravesintheKivus.6Thispromptedrenewedinvestigationsthat culminatedintheUNMappingReportin2010.Thereportconcludedthatthe RPA/AFDLskillingsofHuturefugeesintheCongoweresystematic,andacourtcould consider them genocide.7 The reports publication was delayed by almost a year as President Kagame of Rwanda attempted to get the term genocide withdrawn by threatening to pull RwandaoutofUNpeacekeepingmissions.However,thereportwasleakedinLeMonde. TheRwandangovernmentdenouncedthereport,callingitaninsulttohistory.8Yet,no significant historical research has followed. Historiographical Outl ine Ratherthanhistorians,ithasbeenpoliticalscientistsandjournalists,manywhowerein Zaireatthetime,whohavewrittenmostoftheaccountsofthemassacresduringthe RPA/AFDLinvasionofZaire.Prunier,anAfricanspecialistandformeradvisortothe Frenchgovernment,arguesthattheinternationalcommunitywascaughtinawebofits owntangledguiltfornotaidingtheTutsisduringthe1994genocide.TheRwandan regime mobilised this guilt, and the US government overlooked RPA human rights abuses intheCongo.ConflictintheCongoremainedseenthroughtheprismoftheRwandese genocide.9Politicalscientists,suchasSmis,Oyatambwe,Kisangani,OkosunandKibiswa expoundsimilarviews:AmericansympathyfortheRwandansafter1994ensuredsilence over the massacre of refugees.10 Both Lemarchand and Reyntjens have explored the limitations of genocide as a framework fortheGreatLakesconflicts.Lemarchandagreesthatgenocidewasinstrumentalisedto allow the Kagame government to commit crimes with impunity.11 But, viewed through the 6 UN investigates DRC graves, BBC News, 01/10/10. 7UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, DRC 1993-2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise, (August, 2010), 13. (http://www.friendsofthecongo.org/pdf/mapping_report_en.pdf) [Accessed 11/04/15]. 8 C. McGreal, Delayed UN report links Rwanda to Congo genocide, The Guardian, 01/10/10. 9 G. Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War, (London, 2009), 332; 352. 10S.SmisandW.Oyatambwe,ComplexPoliticalEmergencies,theInternationalCommunity&theCongo Conflict,ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy,(2002),422;Kisangani,MassacreofRefugees,183;T.Okosun and N. Kibiswa, Human Rights Violations and Genocide in the DRC, Contemporary Justice Review, (2013), 492; T. Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality, (NY, 2007), 10. 11 R. Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, (Philadelphia, 2009), 106. 58932 6 prism of history, the roles of victims and perpetrators become blurred.12 Rwanda played on a logic dear to the Americans: the Tutsis were a victim of genocide and therefore, in the Congo,theRPAwerethegoodguys.13Theworkofjournalistsconstitutesafurther source,inparticularHowardFrenchoftheNewYorkTimes,whoinvestigatedtheHutu massacresintheCongoatthetime.HearguesWashingtonpretendednottoknowthe extentofmurder,Americansbeingoverlyfondofgoodguy/badguydichotomiesthat paralyze debate over central Africa.14 Methodol ogy Thecontemporaryperiodmustbeanalysedbyhistorianswiththesamemethodological rigourappliedtothedistantpastinordertofillinthegapsincurrentunderstanding. Otherwise,theanalysisofthecontemporarywillbelefttojournalists.15Thisdissertation examines the first Congolese War of 1996-1997. It draws on the ideas of political scientists abouttheconflict,andsearchesforhistoricalevidenceandnewsourcematerial.This dissertation is multi-archival, threading together evidence from a variety of online archives inamannerthathasnotpreviouslybeenundertaken.ItfocusesonneglectedUN documentsandreports,SecurityCouncilminutesfromtheUNarchive,reportsfromthe archives of NGOs, and contemporary journalistic investigations. Hitherto, the degree of US military and political support for the Rwandan regime in the face of human rights violations has not been adequately explored due to a lack of source material. However, in March 2014, topsecretNationalSecurityCouncilfileswerequietlydeclassified,coveringAmerican strategy to Rwanda and Zaire at the time. This new source has yet to be incorporated into publishedhistoricalaccounts,butisexaminedhereforevidenceastoUSpositionsand actions. Outl ine This dissertation argues that the massacres of Hutu refugees by the AFDL and RPA reveal amisunderstandingandsimplificationofthemulti-facetedconflictintheGreatLakes region on the part of the international community. After the Rwandan genocide, Tutsi and Hutubecamesynonymouswithvictimandperpetrator.Consequently,theTutsihuman rights violations committed against Hutu in the Congo were not readily understood by the 12 Lemarchand, Forgotten Genocides, 6. 13 F. Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996-2006, (Cambridge, 2009), 100. 14 H. French, A Continent for the Taking, (NY, 2004), 143. 15 P. Catterall, What (if anything) is distinctive about contemporary history? Journal of Contemporary History, (1997), 450. 58932 7 internationalcommunity,andhavebeenoverlookedbythehistoricalrecord.Speculative debates about whether the 1996-7 massacres constituted genocide will not be explored: for, genocide with its legal implications risks distracting from the historical focus. This account describeshowtheRwandangovernmentactivelyemployedthevictim/perpetrator dichotomy in the Great Lakes crisis to legitimise the invasion and atrocities in Congo/Zaire andgaininternationalsupport.Theinternationalcommunity,inparticulartheUS, remained blinded by their sympathy for the Rwandan regime and guilt about their inaction in1994.Historically,the1994RwandangenocidehashadanAuschwitzeffect.16Justas theatrocitiesatAuschwitzovershadowedthecrimesinoccupiedPoland,theatrocitiesin Rwanda overshadowed the massacres in the Congo. ChapterOneexaminesthechallengeoftherefugeecrisisineasternZairebetween1994-1996, using archival evidence to demonstrate international inaction at the crisis, leading to the Rwandan invasion and creation of the AFDL. Chapter Two examines the massacres of Hutu refugees, mapping the atrocities from a range of sources, and demonstrating the way in which a victim/perpetrator dichotomy was deployed by the RDA/AFDL. It explores UN inaction and US support for the Rwandan denials of atrocities. Chapter Three will explore thenewly-declassifiedNationalSecurityCouncilsourcesthatrevealanarrow understandingoftheconflictbytheUS,ignoringhumanitarianissuesintheinterestsof political expediency. 16 T. Snyder, Holocaust: the Ignored Reality, New York Review of Books, 16/07/09. 58932 8 CHAPTER 1: THE KIVU CRISIS AND UN VACILLATION Pre-existingTensionsintheKivus ThereweremajortensionsintheKivuprovincesofeasternCongobeforetheinfluxof refugeesfromRwandain1994.Relationswerealreadyfraughtbetweenboththe Kinyarwanda-speaking Banyamulenge of South Kivu and Banyarwanda of North Kivu, and other groups in the provinces. The Banyamulenge were descendants of Rwanda Tutsis; the Banyarwanda were a mix of Hutu and Tutsi. Tensions centred on competition for land and the question of nationality. The influx of Rwandan Hutus heightened tensions and broke the Tutsi-HutuallianceamongtheBanywarwanda.Theex-FARandInterahamwestartedto launchattacksonlocalTutsiCongolesewiththehelpoflocalethnicgroups,whosawan opportunity to settle scores with the Tutsi.17

TheviolencewasexacerbatedbyinterventionsbytheZairianauthorities.On28thApril 1995,theZairianparliamentofficiallyrejectedallBanyamulengeclaimstoZairian citizenship.18InNovember1995,GeneralEluki,headoftheForcesArmesZaroises(FAZ), declaredthelocalpopulationhadtherighttofightforthelandoftheirancestorsandto chasetheforeignersaway.19AmnestyreportedmassacresofBanyamulengeand Banyarwandaintheprovince,includingextrajudicialkillingsbyFAZsoldiers. On8th October1996,theGovernorofSouthKivudemandedthatallBanyamulengeleaveZaire within a week: thousands of Zairian Tutsi fled to Rwanda. 20

Refugeecrisis1994-1996 Againstthisbackdrop,theUNSecurityCouncilfailedtoseparatetheex-FARand Interahamwefromciviliansinthecamps,despiterepeatedthreatsfromRwandathatit would take military action if the international community did not do so. There could be no effectiverepatriationofHutuswhilstthemilitiacontrolledthecampsandprevented refugeesfromleaving.Thus,therefugeesremainedinZaire,thecross-borderattacksinto Rwanda continued, and Rwanda concluded that the only way to dismantle the Hutu refugee campswastoallywiththeBanyamulengeandinvade.AnexplorationoftheSecurity Councilminutesrevealswaninginternationalinterestinthecomplexitiesofthesituation, which was allowed to spin out of control. 17 Kisangani, Massacre of Refugees, 165. 18 UN, Mapping, 72. 19 Reyntjens, African War, 18. 20 AI, Zaire: Lawlessness and Insecurity in North and South Kivu, AFR 62/14/96, 01/11/96, 14-15. 58932 9 Specifically, from 1994, the Secretary-General concluded that repatriation of Hutu refugees toRwandawasnotpossibleuntiltherefugeeswereseparatedfromtheex-FARand Interahamwemilitia.21TheSecretary-Generalofferedseveraloptionstoachievethis.He recommendeddeployingaUNpeacekeepingoperationtomaintainsecurity,although admittingthatitdidnotprovidetheseparationofformerRwandesegovernmentforces troops, due to logistical difficulties.22 By January 1995, international reluctance to commit resourceswasevident.Whenconsideringtheoptionofapeacekeepingoperation,the Secretary-General contacted 60 available troop-contributing countries. However, only one country offered a unit.23 In the event, in February 1995, an agreement was signed with the Zairiangovernmenttosend1,500militarypersonnelfromtheZairianarmytomaintain order in the camps.24

Thisprovedinsufficient.Boutroue,headoftheUNHCRinNorthKivuatthetime, explained that the Zairian military were more interested in making deals with the refugees than in controlling them.25 The militia was not separated from the civilian refugees: reports ofcross-borderincursionsintoRwandacontinued.InFebruary1995,theSecurityCouncil acknowledgedthatthiswasdestabilisingforthesub-regionasawhole,26andinJune, expressedconcern.Butnodecisiveactionwastaken,theSecurityCouncilsimply reaffirming the need for a long-term solution.27

InJune1995,theSecurityCouncilplacedanarmsembargoforbiddingthesaleofarmsto thestatesneighbouringRwandatopreventthere-armingofex-FARandInterahamwein thecamps.However,byApril1996,anInternationalCommissionofInquiryreportedthat thesupplyofarmstoformerRwandangovernmentforcescontinued.TheSecurity Councilresponsewasaresolutionthaturgedstatestointensifytheireffortstoprevent militarytrainingandthesaleofweaponstomilitiagroups.28TheRwandangovernment thoughtthisinadequate,theirrepresentativeremindingtheCouncilthatweaponswere beingsoldtothosewhocarriedoutthegenocide.Hecondemnedthesystematiclackof 21 S/1994/1133, Progress Report of the Secretary General, 06/10/94, 10. 22 S/1994/1308, Report of the Secretary General on Rwandese Refugee Camps, 18/11/94, 8. 23 S/1995/65, Second Report of the Secretary General on Rwandese Refugee Camps, 25/02/95, 6-8. 24 S/1995/127, Letter from the Secretary General to the Security Council President, 09/02/95, 1. 25 J. Boutroue, Missed Opportunities: The Role of the International Community in the Return of the Rwandan Refugees from Eastern Zaire July 1994 December 1996, (UNHCR, 1998), 60.26 S/PV.3500, 3500th Security Council Meeting, 10/02/95, 2. 27 S/RES/997, Resolution from Security Council, 09/06/95, 2. 28 S/1996/298, Security Council Draft Resolution, 18/04/96, 2.58932 10 desiretogiveadequatesupporttotheRwandangovernment.29TheSecretary-General admittedinalettertotheZairianPrimeMinisterthattherehadbeeninternational reluctancetodevotethenecessaryresourcestosolvingtheissueofarmedmilitiainthe camps.Hestated:IbelievethatthebestwayfortheUNtohelpimprovesecurityinthe campsisfortheUNHCRtoaddressthisissue.30Thereafter,attemptstoaddressthe political situation were abandoned, and the crisis was left to the UNHCR, being treated as a purely humanitarian matter. TheSecretary-Generalstatedthatthecrisisrepresentedanunprecedentedchallenge.31 However,ZaireremaineddistantfromtheprioritiesofSecurityCouncilmembers.In November 1996, Nsanze of Burundi criticised the Security Council for not neutralising the ex-FAR.Cabral,representativeforGuinea-Bissau,askedtheSecurityCouncil:Isrespect forhumanrightsandhumanitarianlawinZaire,somewhereoverthereinAfrica,notas important?32 Howard French concluded that, within 2 years of the genocide, the world had largely forgotten Rwandas Hutu exiles, as this was central Africawhere life had always been regarded as cheap, not Bosnia or Kosovowhere European lives and interests were at stake.33 TheUSremainedreluctanttoleadonanysolutiontothecrisis.Thisisevidentfromthe NationalSecurityCouncilfilesdocumentingdeliberationsinWashington.OnAugust2nd 1995, a memorandum to Wirth, under-secretary for State Global Affairs, from Bogosian, co-ordinatorforRwandaandBurundiintheUSStateDepartment,statedtherefugeecrisis requiredtheinternationalcommunitytoagreeonanover-archingstrategy.34However, itwasnotuntilayearlater,inJuly1996,thataplanwasformulated.Amemorandumto Lake,NationalSecurityAdvisor,fromRagan,DirectorofHumanitarianAffairsinthe NationalSecurityCouncil,acknowledgedthatthecampsposeagrowingthreatto regionalpeace.Theyagreedtophaseoutassistancetothecampstostimulatevoluntary return.35 Yet this did not address the problem of the threat from the militia controlling the camps. On August 2nd 1996, it was simply concluded that we can expect vigorous efforts by ex-FARandInterahamwetothwarttheplanand,ifthereisnoefforttoneutralisethis 29 S/PV.3656, 3656th Security Council Meeting, 23/04/96, 3. 30 Letter dated 17/01/95, in Boutroue, Missed Opportunities, 53. 31 S/1995/65, Report of the Secretary General, 9. 32 S/PV.3713, 3713th Security Council Meeting, 15/11/96, 18. 33 French, Continent for Taking, 126. 34 NSC: Memorandum for Wirth from Bogosian, Rwanda/Burundi priorities, 02/08/95, 50.35 NSC: Memorandum for Lake from Ragan, Rwanda Refugee Strategy, 26/07/96, 50.58932 11 threat,theplanwillfail.36TheUSwasunwillingtoleadaninternationaleffortto separate the militia from civil refugees. Inpart,thiscanbeexplainedbytheremotenessoftheZairianconflicttoAmerican interests.AttheCommitteeonInternationalRelationsinDecember1996,Rosenblatt, PresidentofRefugeesInternational,referredtoareverseformoftheCNNfactor:Zaire was peripheral to US interests and thus many feel that politically they can afford to ignore it.37TherewasalsotheeffectoftheSomaliasyndrome:thedeathofUSrangersin Somalia created an American backlash against peacekeeping.38 No doubt Somalia was fresh in the minds of officials such as Bogosian, who had been the Co-ordinator at the US Liaison Office in Mogadishu at the time. Inaction can also be explained by a rivalry between France and the US. The French saw increasing American support for Rwanda after the genocide as the beginning of Anglo-Saxon domination of central Africa, which could only be halted by thesurvivalofMobutuinZaire.AsoneFrenchofficialtoldPrunier,wecannotlet Anglophone countries decide on the future of a Francophone onewe want Mobutu back.39 InthecontextofincreasingtensionsbetweenZaireandRwanda,FranceandtheUS blockedeachothersefforts.AstheNationalSecurityCouncilconcludedinOctober1995, effortstodealwiththeconflictwerehamperedbytheperceptionthatthemajorpowers weresupportingoppositesidesintheconflict.Thisledtoapoorshowingofthe international community as the flow of arms to ex-FAR increased and few refugees were repatriated.40 The Rwandan UN representative concluded that the refugee crisis had never received satisfactory attention.41

36 NSC: Interagency Meeting, Rwandan refugee camps in Eastern Zaire, 02/08/96, 39.37 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations hearing, 04/12/96, 101. (https://archive.org/stream/refugeesineaster00unit#page/n5/mode/2up) [Accessed 11/04/15]. 38 M. MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping under Clinton, (London, 2000), xviii. 39 Prunier, From Genocide, 279. 40 NSC: Memorandum for Sens, Request for a meeting between Lake and Rwandan President Bizimungu, 11/10/95, 18.41 S/PV.3640, 3640th Security Council Meeting, 08/03/96, 3. 58932 12 CHAPTER 2: INVASION, MASSACRES AND INTERNATIONAL INACTION ThischapterwillexploretheRPA/AFDLinvasionandmassacresofHuturefugees,and demonstratethewayinwhichavictim/perpetratordichotomywasdeployedbythe Government of Rwanda to legitimise its actions. It will map existing numerical information onthemassacres,presentingtheextracteddataintheformofbarcharts.Finally,itwill examine the US and UN inaction in responding to the massacres, and American support for the Rwandan denials of atrocities or missing refugees. TheInvasion InOctober1996,RwandantroopsinvadedtheCongoundertheguiseofaBanyamulenge rebellion, and set up a new rebel organisation, the AFDL. The Rwandan government at first denied any involvement in the rebellion, saying it was led by Kabila, a nativeof Zaire.42 However,inaninterviewfortheWashingtonPostinJuly1997,Kagameadmittedthatthe Rwandangovernmentdirectedtherebellion.KagameexplainedthattheRwandanarmy trainedCongoleseTutsis,formingtheAFDL.Kagamearguedthattheinvasionwas spurred on because of a plan by Hutus in Congo to attack the Banyamulenge. The goals to the invasion were: to dismantle the camps, to destroy Hutu militia and to topple Mobutu. He acknowledged that the senior commanders of the AFDL were Rwandan officers.43

Beforelaunchingtheinvasion,theRwandangovernmenthadsucceededinliftingaUN armsembargoonthecountry.InJuly1995,theRwandandelegateremindedtheSecurity Council that Rwanda had been decimated by genocide and that the arms embargo imposed onthecurrentRwandesegovernmenthelpsthecriminalsoftheformergovernment:in thefaceofcross-borderattacksfromthecamps,thegovernmentwasweakened.44Zaire urged the Security Council not to lift the embargo on Rwanda when it is barely concealing itswar-likeintentions,threateningtoattackrefugeecamps.45However,thispleawas ignored.TheUSputpressureontheUN:inaNationalSecurityCouncilmeetingon February 8th 1995, it was concluded that the US will initiate consultations in New York to buildthecasetolifttheembargo.46Thescenarioofvictimsagainstperpetratorswas instrumentalised to win international support. 42 S/1997/109, Letter from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to UN, 05/02/97, 3. 43 J. Pomfret, Rwandans led revolt in Congo, The Washington Post, 09/07/97. 44 S/PV.3542, 3542nd Security Council Meeting, 09/07/95, 16. 45 S/PV.3566, 3566th Security Council Meeting, 15/08/95, 2. 46 NSC: Conclusions of Meeting on Rwanda, 08/02/95, 26.58932 13 RPA/AFDLMassacres: 1996-1997 BetweenOctober1996andSeptember1997,theAFDL/RPApursuedandmassacred refugees,dismantlingthecamps.Kisangani,inapainstakingexaminationofsources, estimated the number of refugees killed during the massacres, by using UNHCR population figures for each camp to calculate those unaccounted for, as huge groups fled west over vast distances (see Image 2). His meticulous calculations arrive at an estimation of total refugees killed of 232,000.47

Image 2: Flight of Refugees (1996-7)48 47 Kisangani, Massacre of Refugees, 172-180, see Appendix 5. 48 UN, Mapping, 79. 58932 14 ContemporaryReports Apartfromthis,therehasbeenlittleacademicresearchintothenumberofrefugees massacred.Contemporaryreportsarefragmented:thelackofharddataisstriking. Amnesty,MdecinsSansFrontires(MSF),HumanRightsWatch(HRW)andjournalists investigatedintheregionandpublishedreportsbasedoneyewitnesstestimony. Additionally,therearethreekeyreportsconductedbyUNinvestigators:thereportofa preliminary investigation by Garretn in April 1997,49 the Report of the UN Joint Mission in July 1997,50 and the Report of the Secretary-Generals Investigative Team in June 1998.51 Garretn visited Goma and North Kivu for four days, interviewing humanitarian agencies, NGOs,doctors,refugeesandeyewitnesses.52TheJointMissionreportdescribedonlythe situationasitappearsontheground,throughthecollectionofreportsofalleged massacres.53TheSecretary-GeneralTeamsreportfindingswerebasedonfewerthan200 testimonies: its forensic team made only a preliminary investigation of one site. However, thereportalsoexamineddocuments,photographsandnotesofinterviewsprovidedby Congolese organisations.54 Thecontemporaryreportshavesixmainfindingsincommon.Firstly,theAFDL/RPA systematicallyandindiscriminatelymassacredrefugees:noeffortwasmadetoseparate women,childrenorciviliansfromarmedmilitia.55Forexample,Campbell,fromHRW, visitedvillagesalongaroutefollowedbyrefugeeswhofledcampsinOctober1996, interviewing villagers, who described killings of women and children by Rwandan soldiers. HRWphotographedbonesandskullsthatwereidentifiableaswomenandchildren.56 FrenchandMcKinleydescribedhowtherebelsattackedtheHutustentcitiesagainand again, driving them deeper intoCongos interior. A survivor of the attack at Tingi-Tingi, explained how shells were fired into the camp. 57 Block, from The Wall Street Journal, visited Mbandaka in June 1997, interviewing a Red Cross worker, who described how the soldiers 49 E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2, Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire, by Special Rapporteur Garretn, 02/04/97. 50 A/51/942, Report of the Joint Mission charged with Investigating Allegations of Massacres in Eastern Zaire, 02/07/97. 51 S/1998/581, Report of the Secretary-Generals Investigative Team charged with investigating serious violations of HR in DRC, 29/06/98. 52 E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2, Garretn, 4. 53 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 6. 54 S/1998/581, Secretary-Generals Team, 20-22. 55 AI, DRC: Deadly Alliances in Congolese Forests, AFR 62/33/97, 03/12/97, 8. 56 S. Campbell, DRC: What Kabila is Hiding, Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo, HRW, (October, 1997), 2. 57 J. McKinley and H. French, Hidden Horrors: A Special Report, Uncovering the Guilty Footprints along Zaires long trail of death, The New York Times, 14/04/97. 58932 15 had someone shout in the local language Zairians get down. The Zairians dropped to the ground while the Rwandans remained standing and were shot.58

Secondly,clean-upoperationstookplacetohidetheevidenceofthekillings.Campbell explainedthatbodiesofrefugeesweredumpedinanearbyriver.59Amnestydescribed AFDL/RPAsburningbodiesanddumpingtheminriverstoconcealevidence.60The ReportoftheJointMissiondescribedattemptstoremovealltraceofmassgravesby setting fire to them.61 Thirdly,refugeeswereluredtocongregateinoneplace,andthenkilled.Arefugee interviewed by Amnesty described an attack in Uvira: the troops told refugees to gather in a particular place in the camp for a meeting, but then shelled the area where they had told peopletogather.62TheJointMissiondescribedtroopssummoninginhabitantsto meetingssoastomassacrethem.63MSFdescribedhowtheAFDL/RPAused humanitarianagenciestoeitherlocaterefugeesorlurethemoutofhidinginorderto eliminate them.64

Fourthly,starvationwasusedasawayofinflictingmassdeath.InNovember1996,MSF was not permitted to go within 30km of Bukavu. This was seen as a deliberate strategy by the AFDL, aimed at the elimination of all remaining Rwandan refugees by preventing food andmedicalassistance.65TheJointMissionreportedthatinMay1997theUNHCRwas preventedfromtravellingbeyondkm-42southofKisanganiwherethousandsofrefugees wereawaitingassistance.Subsequently,themortalityrateroseto89.5deathsadayper 10,000 refugees: nearly half of the victims were under the age of 5. The mission considered this a tactic aimed at eliminating the refugees.66

58 R. Block, Blood Stains: Kabilas government is tainted by reports of Refugee Slaughter, The Wall Street Journal, 06/06/97.59 Campbell, Kabila is Hiding, 30.60 AI, Deadly Alliances, 8.61 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 23. 62 AI, Rwanda: Human rights overlooked, AF 47/02/97, 1997, 5. 63 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 23. 64 MSF, Forced flight, 12. 65 MSF, Forced flight, 12. 66 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 15. 58932 16 Image 3: Refugee Dying in Makeshift Clinic in Ubilo for those unable to continue walking after fleeing Tingi-Tingi, 28/03/97, (Reuters/Corbis/42-70446019). Fifthly,itwasdifficulttoobtainaccurateinformationduetoobstructionby Rwandan/AFDLforces.Garretnwaspreventedfromvisitingmanymassacresites.67In July1997,thefollow-upteam,theUNJointMission,haddifficultyinvestigating.The AFDLobjectedtoGarretnsparticipation,consideringhimpartial.Theteamreported intimidation: a member of the team had tried to go to Masisi, but a soldier fired five shots in his direction at a distance of less than 10m. The patrol leader explained that the AFDL did not require the UN to come and make sure the soldiers arent hurting anyone.68 In January 1998, the team was refused entry into the DRC, and suspended its activities.69

The UN gave into the Kabila governments objections: the investigative team was changed. TheSecretary-GeneralsInvestigativeTeamwassentasareplacement.Theirreport concludedthatthekillingsbytheAFDL/RPAconstitutecrimesagainsthumanityand mayconstitutegenocidedependingontheirintent.Itdescribedaviciouscycleof violationsofhumanrightsandrevengefuelledbyimpunity,andurgedtheUNto 67 E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2, Garretn, 4. 68 A/51/942, Joint Mission, 8. 69 E/CN.4/1998/64, Report on the allegations of massacres in eastern Zaire, Roberto Garretn, 23/01/98, 4. 58932 17 investigatetheextentofparticipationbyRwanda.However,betweenitsdeploymentin August1997andwithdrawalinApril1998,duetoobstaclescreatedbyKabilas government,itwasimpossibletoconfirmmostoftheallegations.TheKabila government staged demonstrations against the teams presence in Kinshasa in August 1997 withbannersreadingnototheUN.InNovember1997,theteamtriedtoinvestigate massacresitesinthewestofthecountry:MbandakaandWendji.However,theywere forcedtowithdrawduetodemonstrationsthatappearedstaged,involvingthesame bannersseeninKinshasa.TheteamtriedtoreturninMarch1998,butwitnesseswere arrested, bodies had been moved, and the team were confronted by a crowd with spears and machetes.Relationsworsened:on29thMarch,aninvestigatorwasheldinRwandaon ordersfromthePresidentsOfficeinKinshasa.Gunsweredrawnand documentscontaininghighlysensitiveinformationincludingwitnessstatementswere confiscated.70Thegovernmenthadgonetogreatlengthstopreventinvestigationsin Mbandaka and Wendji on the opposite side of the vast country, to which Hutu refugees had been tracked down and killed. Finally,asaconsequenceoftheseobstructions,thenumericaldatathatthereportswere abletogatherwaslimited.Thegraphsconstructedforthisdissertationfromallavailable data in the reports (see Appendices 6-8) show the following. No data as to number of deaths isavailableformanysites.Forothers,onlyestimatesofhundredsorthousandsare available.Forexample,thenumericalevidenceofmassacresGarretnwasabletogather was visibly patchy,71 (see Figure 1). Similarly, by mapping the Secretary Generals teams collection of accusations by province, it is evident that obstacles restricted the amount of evidence the team obtained.72 There is a wide range in the numbers killed at different sites. There are differences between reports in estimatesofnumberskilledatsomeparticularsites.Betterdataisavailablefortheearlier massacres(seeFigure2):thedataavailablebythetimetherefugeesreachedthemore distantManiema,OrientaleandEquateurprovincesbecameincreasinglysparse.The Secretary-GeneralsteamexplainedthatdetailedinformationabouttheattacksonTingi-Tingi, Kasese, Biaro was scarce because the AFDL blocked access before attacking them 70 S/1998/581, Secretary-Generals Team, 21. 71 See Appendix 7. 72 See Appendix 8. 58932 18 andconductedmopping-upoperations.73Ineffect,contemporaryinvestigationsweremore qualitative than quantitative. Figure 1: Estimates of numbers killed in North Kivu from Garretn Report74 The Rwandan government wrote to the Secretary-General denying that Rwandan soldiers committed any human rights violations.75 The DRC government considered his report an attempt to falsify history and trivialise the word genocide. It argued that the AFDL had no intention of massacring anyone, but rather of liberating the country fromMobutu.76 In September 1997, the UNHCR withdrew in protest.77 Significantly, no further investigations followed. HRW called on the international community to ensure that accountabilityis not sacrificedforeconomicorpoliticalexpediency.78However,insteadofcontinuing investigations,inJuly1998theSecurityCouncilcalledonthegovernmentsofDRCand Rwandatoinvestigatetheallegationscontainedinthereportandbringtojusticeany persons found to have been involved inmassacres.79 Amnesty stated: It is extraordinary 73 S/1998/581, Secretary-Generals Team, 50. 74 See Appendix 7. 75 S/1998/583, Letter from Rwandan Representative to Secretary-General, 25/06/98, 2. 76 S/1998/582, Letter from DRC Representative to Secretary-General, 29/06/98, 30. 77 UNHDA: IRIN Update 246, 9/11/97.78 HRW, Uncertain Discourse: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo, (December 1997), 11. 79 S/PRST/1998/20, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 13/07/98, 1. u 1uuu 2uuu Suuu 4uuu Suuu 6uuu 7uuu }omba Rutshuiu 1196 Kasuga Nasisi 121996 Bukombo S11296 Biiambizo Nasisi u197 Bitonga Chibumbi Nasisi Chanzu Rutshuiu uoma Kahinuo Rutshuiu iegion Kahiia Kapanzi camp Kaioba Nasisi u197 Katale Kibabi Kibumba Kimbumba paic Kibumba village Kilimanyoka Kiiumba Lumbishi Natanua Nasisi Nunigi Nugunga 141196 Nushabwabwe Ngungu Nasisi 191196 Nyakaiiba Nasisi 221296 Nyamitaba Bashali Nasisi Ruhegeii Nasisi 1296 Sake Shinua }anuaiy 1997 Tongo 19u197 !"#$%& ()*#$+), #,- !#$" . /%" #0&",*" )1 ",$2+"& 1)2 &)3" &+$"& +,-+*#$"& 3+&&+,4 -#$# 5#22"$6, 78 9":)2$; "&$+3#$"& )1 ,>"4#$+),& )1 3#&*2"& #$ &+$"& +, C)>"4#$+),& )1 3#&*2"& #$ &+$"& +, C)>"4#$+),& )13#&*2"& #$ &+$"& +, J#,+"3#L R2+",$#>" #,- OX". Massacre and Date: Orientale Deaths Njale Ubundu 06/03/97 Hundreds Wanie Rukula camps Ubundu 14/03/97470 Kisangani prison 15/03/9730 Kisangani-Lubutu road April 199711 Obilo 26/03/9780 Kasese I and II 22/04/97200 Biaro camp 22/04/97100 Ubundu road km 52 22/04/97- Yalikaka Kisangani-Opala road 28/04/97- Makako in Opala territory 04/97300 Yaoleka and Anziroad, Opala, 04/9761 Bengamisa locality 05/97- Alibuku 06/97 onwards- Lula camp 09/97- Kisangani Hospital 11/9733 58932 62 5) Equateur province Data on Equateur province extracted from UN Mapping Report and used in chart above u Su 1uu 1Su 2uu 2Su Boenue 22u497 Lifomi neai Boenue 24u497 Lolengi neai Boenue u497 Lofonua junction 9uS97 Bjoa u7uS97 BekonuiBuya u7uS97 Wele u8uS97 Bjoa anu Ruki iivei u7uS97 Lomposo anu Kalamba 12uS97 Wenuji 1SuS97 Bolenge 1SuS97 Nbanuaka 1SuS97 0NATRA poit 1SuS97 !"#$%& ()*#$+), #,- !#$" ./%" #0&",*" )1 ",$2+"& 1)2 &)3" &+$"& +,-+*#$"& 3+&&+,4 -#$#A 78 J#::+,4 9":)2$ IKGK; "&$+3#$"& )1 ,