BACKWATERS RUN DEEP: Locating New Zealand Social Anthropology || PAKEHA ETHNICITY AND INDIGENEITY

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PAKEHA ETHNICITY AND INDIGENEITYAuthor(s): Keith BarberSource: Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice, Vol. 43, No.2, BACKWATERS RUN DEEP: Locating New Zealand Social Anthropology (July 1999), pp. 33-40Published by: Berghahn BooksStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23166519 .

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SOCIAL ANALYSIS ISSUE 43 (2) July 1999

PAKEHA ETHNICITY AND INDIGENEITY

Keith Barber

In a recent article in The Australian Journal of Anthropology, Jonathan Friedman

describes the world as pervaded by cultural politics, a politics of cultural difference

that transforms differences of culture into claims upon the state for recognition, funds

or land (Friedman 1999:6). Among the forms of cultural politics evident in the world

today are claims to indigeneity. These are claims to territory based on opposition to a

territorial state which is perceived as usurper and conqueror and as not representative of the people involved (Friedman 1999:7). This form of cultural politics is evident in

New Zealand in claims upon the state by formally constituted tribal authorities for the

return of, and monetary compensation for, land which had been illegally appropriated

since 1840. The parties in this process are referred to as 'Iwi' and the 'Crown', terms

expressing a sense of unresolved opposition dating from the colonisation of New

Zealand in the nineteenth century. But there is another claim to indigeneity that is

current in New Zealand. This is the claim by some sections of the Pakeha (non

Maori) population to indigenous status. This is a claim that is clearly different from that made by iwi. It is related to territory but it does not entail a claim against the

state. It is related to the process of colonisation but does not have its origin there.

Instead its origin can be found in contemporary transformations of class relations

brought about by the process of economic globalisation.

Globalisation is described by Friedman as a process of local transformation, and

not least in terms of identity (Friedman 1999:5). It has generated, he says, identities

that are cosmopolitan and others that are indigenous, but all of which are local. "A

cosmopolitan", he says, "is not primarily one who constantly travels the world, but

one who identifies with it in opposition to his or her own locality" (Freidman

1999:5). "Cosmopolitan" is also a class identity. "The true cosmopolitans are mem

bers of a privileged elite" (Friedman 1999:5). They are those who have been "sucked

into the global process and who are the producers of globalising representations of

the world, understandings that challenge the very existence of the nation state and

proclaim a new post-national era" (Friedman 1999:13). It is in opposition to this

globalising local elite that other local elites are producing indigenized identities.

Friedman discusses the process of indigenization as a "Fourth World" struggle

based on claims of aboriginally. In New Zealand indigenization has these charac

teristics with respect to Maori, but not with respect to Pakeha. The Pakeha claim to

indigeneity is something else. But what it is, is not entirely clear. As yet it is evident

in the writings of only one individual (see King 1985,1991,1999). But these writings have been influential. They have stimulated a body of literature on Pakeha identity

33



that has given expression to feelings of uncertainty and discomfort caused by disrup tions to the idea of national unity brought about by Maori assertions of indigeneity. In what follows I will review what has been written about Pakeha identity since 1985

and examine its various constructions in relation to local transformations in ethnic

and class relations.

Pakeha Ethnicity

The term 'pakeha' is a Maori word that came into use in the 19th century to refer to

the non-Maori people who, at the time, were arriving and settling in New Zealand in

large numbers. Its use has endured and it has become part of everyday New Zealand

language, where it is used to refer to those people who are not Maori. There is some

variation however in the way it is used, both among and between Maori and Pakeha.

Some Maori use the term to refer to all non-Maori, including populations resident

outside New Zealand. Other Maori, or the same Maori in different situations, use the

term to refer only to 'white' New Zealanders. Most Pakeha, I believe, use the term in

the latter categorical sense, but others have recently tried to give it a more political construction. In the last decade 'Pakeha' has been promoted as a form of self-identi

fication with the characteristics of a politicised ethnic identity. Questions now

abound as to whether Pakeha really do constitute an ethnic group. And if they do,

what is the nature of their ethnicity? To answer these questions we can begin with a recent anthropological definition

of an 'ethnic group'. Eric Wolf (1994:6) has defined an ethnic group as a social en

tity that arises and defines itself as against other social entities also engaged in the

process of development and self-definition. This definition alerts us to the fact that

ethnic groups are historical constructs and that they have an existence relative only to

other similar historical constructs. In the case of Pakeha, the identity is relative only to that of Maori and the construction of Pakeha as an ethnic identity has been

dependent upon the corresponding ethnification of Maori. The latter has been occur

ring since the 1970s, and has been fairly well documented (see Greenland 1984, Walker 1990). It is this development that most discussions of Pakeha ethnicity have

taken as their point of departure. But several constructions of Pakeha ethnicity have

emerged — as 'cultural identity', 'nationalism', 'class interest', and 'indigeneity' —

each derived from a different conception of ethnic group as 'culture', 'nation', 'class'

or 'people'.

Pakeha Ethnicity as Cultural Identity

Michael King (1985) defines 'pakeha' as "an indigenous New Zealand expression that denotes things that belong to New Zealand via one major stream of its heritage:

people, manners, values and customs that are not exclusively Polynesian", but also

"no longer European" (King 1991:16). For King (1991:19), an essential ingredient of Pakeha-ness "is contact with and being affected by Maori things: Maori concepts,

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Maori values, Maori language and Maori relationships" —

experiences, he says, that

he could not have had access to in any other part of the world. Pakeha is thus an

indigenous identity as it could arise only in New Zealand.

The same value is attributed to Pakeha culture. Pakeha culture is seen as some

thing "that could only accrete in New Zealand from the Maori, European and wider

human ingredients that history has cast up on these shores". As such "it is not

something foreign: it is a second indigenous New Zealand culture"(King 1991:19).

But it is not one that will "displace or supplant" Maori culture. Rather, it is in a

"symbiotic relationship" with it (King 1991:20), a "vital component in the process of

Maori Pakeha accommodation". This last statement is made in obvious deference to

the politicization of Maori cultural identity and the perceived threat that it entails for

Pakeha. Because Pakeha culture will enable Pakeha people to feel that they "truly

belong in this part of the world" King says, "Pakeha people will cease to feel threat

ened by the enlarged Maori presence" (King 1991:20).

Pakeha Ethnicity as Nationalism

The idea of Pakeha as a group who have had their identity threatened by an assertive

Maori ethnicity is also present in the construction of Pakeha ethnicity as a form of

nationalism. This construction is represented by David Pearson in his book A Dream

Deferred (1990) (see also Pearson 1989). Pearson (1990:17) adopts a definition of

ethnicity as the study of "ethnic myths, symbols, memories, and values" as the endur

ing cultural core of an ethnic community, and the basis for national sentiments.

It is in these terms that Pearson discusses Maori ethnification of the 1980s, and

the Pakeha response to it. "Any conception of Pakeha ethnicity", he says, "cannot be

separated from conceptions of the nation and the state, because majority groups are

the 'nation' in their own terms, and the state is the major vehicle through which their

dominance is expressed" (Pearson 1990:217). From this perspective, Maori ethnicity is portrayed as a threat to Pakeha hegemony, and Pakeha ethnicity is seen as a potent ial nationalist reaction to that threat (Pearson 1990:223).

A similar perspective is taken by Paul Spoonley in his book Racism and Ethnicity

(1993). Spoonley (1993:40) likens the newly politicized Maori identity to "black

nationalism" and worries that Pakeha might react to it with a neo-racist nationalism

of their own — unless they can be encouraged to reflect upon their own cultural

identity in a way that will give them the confidence to relate to others more equally

(1993:62; cf. King 1985). It is the latter response that Spoonley wished to promote in

order to obviate the need for a reactive and divisive Pakeha nationalism. Elsewhere

Spoonley takes a different approach and defines Pakeha identity as a positive

response to biculturalism.

Pakeha Ethnicity and Biculturalism

In New Zealand, biculturalism was an ideological response to the politicization of

35



Maori identity in the 1970s. During the 1970s, an aggressive stance was taken by

several groups of young urbanized and tertiary educated Maori in protest against the

inequalities that characterized Maori-Pakeha relations (Greenland 1984). The rhetor

ic of this protest movement involved mutually defined caricatures of Maori and

Pakeha culture. Maori culture was defined as sublime, and Pakeha culture as de

based. And Pakeha, as a group, was accused of cultural domination. Many liberal

minded Pakeha were stung by this criticism and responded by advocating a more

equitable sharing of power between Maori and Pakeha. Other Pakeha rejected this

solution, but these two positions came to define the debate about 'biculturalism' in

New Zealand and, in turn, set the context for the political construction of Pakeha

identity. Nominally, the idea of 'biculturalism' assumes the existence of two cultures, and

in New Zealand these are described as Maori and Pakeha. The existence of a Maori

culture is usually taken for granted, but the existence of Pakeha culture raises difficult

questions (see Nash 1990). Spoonley's position is that 'Pakeha' is not cultural

identity at all but, rather, a political identity symbolizing a commitment to

biculturalism and the equitable sharing of power with Maori (Spoonley 1991). Those

Pakeha who support the notion of a bicultural partnership and recognize the rights of

Maori as tangata whenua are said to employ the label 'Pakeha' for themselves as a

way of expressing their commitment to such an arrangement (Spoonley 1991:167).

The label 'Pakeha', Spoonley says, has been adopted to symbolize acceptance of a set

of political views and social obligations that involve the sharing or, in effect, the

conceding of power to Maori. This is an unusually self-effacing political position. It is said to have grown out

of the anti-racism movement associated with certain Church groups and other liberal

organizations (Spoonley 1991:160) and to be restricted to a relatively small number

of people (Spoonley 1991:167). It "has largely been confined", Spoonley writes

(1995:107-108), "to the middle class", whose "relatively privileged position ....

allows the luxury of such self-reflection". "There is little to suggest", he says, "that

working class 'Pakeha' share an interest in Pakeha as a cultural or political identity".

"It is a label that represents the politics of a fraction of the middle class" (Spoonley

1995:111). Two questions are raised by this description of Pakeha identity. How

many people are there who identify with it? And what interest do they have in doing

so?

How Many 'Pakeha'?

Some indication of the number of people self-identifying as Pakeha has been provided

by Pearson and Sissons (1997). They set out to answer the question "how many

'potential Pakeha', namely New Zealanders of primarily European ancestry, used the

term Pakeha to name themselves" (Pearson and Sissons 1997:65). In addition, they

sought to discover whether the avowal of the term Pakeha implies support for

biculturalism, as suggested by Spoonley. From their sample of 849 respondents they

36



found that just less than ten per cent (9.5%) "always" described themselves as

Pakeha. A smaller group (7%) "often" used this self-identifier, and nearly a third

(31%) only used Pakeha "sometimes" (Pearson and Sissons 1997:66). In all, 47.8%

of their sample said that they described themselves as Pakeha at least "sometimes".

When asked why they chose this identity, most (62%) of this group said they

chose the term because of its "relational value" — that is, because 'it best described a

New Zealander who is a non-Maori'. Just over a third (36%) preferred the name

Pakeha because the term 'New Zealand European didn't suit them' and "only a

quarter related their self-naming as Pakeha to the Treaty of Waitangi and 'the idea of

partnership with Maori'. Indeed, with reference to this last reason, a significantly

higher number (43%) explicitly rejected the link with partnership issues" (Pearson

and Sissons 1997:70).

These figures indicate that the number of people identifying as Pakeha are rela

tively few and, furthermore, that the number identifying as Pakeha for the reasons

proposed by Spoonley are fewer still. The authors conclude that "the link between

being Pakeha and being bicultural is surprisingly weak". The majority of people in

the sample, whether they always identified as Pakeha or never identified as Pakeha

were "distinctly unsupportive of biculturalism" (Pearson and Sissons 1997:79).

Clearly, then, not everyone who identifies as Pakeha is supportive of bicultural

ism. But some are and, according to Spoonley (1995), those that are constitute a

fraction of the middle class. But what are the characteristics of this class fraction?

What is the basis of their support for biculturalism? The clearest answer to these

questions has been provided by Elizabeth Rata (1996).

Pakeha Ethnicity and Class Transformation

Rata (1996:224) describes the supporters of biculturalism as that section of the mid

dle class trained in the humanities and social sciences and working in the welfare and

creative professions. There, she says, they found a "sanctuary" from direct involve

ment in capitalist enterprises, and the freedom to develop their humanistic idealism

(1996:227). In the 1980s, that idealism found its expression in a commitment to

biculturalism, defined as a newly negotiated sense of nationhood predicated on an

equal partnership between Maori and Pakeha. But biculturalism entailed its partici pants defining themselves in terms of their particularistic ethnicities. So in response

to the ethnicity of Maori participants, the non-Maori participants defined themselves

as ethnically 'Pakeha' (Rata 1996:227).

But the bicultural project was short lived. According to Rata it fell victim in the

1990s to changing jural and economic conditions. For their part, the Maori partici

pants in biculturalism rejected it favour of an independent course of retribalization

(Rata 1996:227) and tribal capitalism, made viable by the newly instituted Waitangi

Treaty settlement process (Rata 1996:240). Meanwhile, with the decline of Fordist

conditions of production, the humanist fraction of the Pakeha middle class lost status

to the neo-liberal fraction engaged in the world of business and commerce (Rata

37



1996:228). With the decline in middle class support for biculturalism, enthusiasm

for the development of a Pakeha ethnicity faltered and died. Pakeha, as a political

identity, it seems has failed to survive in the 'post-bicultural' context of New Zealand

ethnic politics.

Another reason for the decline of Pakeha ethnicity has been given by Janet Bedg

good (1997). Bedggood (1997) explores the dilemmas that a Pakeha ethnicity invol

ves in the context of emerging class divisions within Maoridom. A Pakeha identity

constructed in relation to a united Maori, she says, is no longer sustainable. Pakeha

will have to choose which class of Maori they will construct their ethnicity in relation

to — the neotraditional elite or the detribalized urban masses (Bedggood 1997:97).

But as Pearson and Sissons (1997) have demonstrated, self-identification as

Pakeha may not necessarily involve support for Maori of any class. Pakeha may be

chosen simply for its "relational value" — because it best describes a New Zealander

who is non-Maori, or because other alternatives are not suitable. But there is one

other meaning of Pakeha that might be more self-serving — this is Pakeha as indig

eneity.

Avril Bell (1996:151) examines this construction when she asks what 'Pakeha' as

an identity might offer "white New Zealanders". She argues that self-identifying as

Pakeha "is as much about asserting 'our' right to be here as expressing pro-Maori

sympathies". This is a view that was first expressed by Michael King in Being Pake

ha (1985) and recently reiterated in Being Pakeha Now: Reflections and Recollect

ions of a White Native (1999). Here King writes, "people who live in New Zealand

by choice .... and who are committed to this land and its people .... are no less

'indigenous' than Maori" (King 1999:235). "To be Pakeha", King says, "is to be a non-Maori New Zealander .... who identifies with this land, as intensively and as

strongly, as anybody Maori. It is to be .... another kind of indigenous New Zealand

ers" (King 1999:239). As Bell points out, this is a problematic claim "given the

political significance of the term 'indigenous' for the world's first peoples, of which

Maori are one. For Pakeha to claim indigeneity is to deny the specificity of Maori in

this sense and to claim an equivalent status in their own interests". It works to deny

for Pakeha "any historical complicity with colonisation"(Bell 1996:155-6).

Conclusion

In this review of writings about Pakeha identity, I have traced the development of

'Pakeha' as an ethnic identity — one that has been generated and defined as against

another such identity also in the process of generation and definition. The identity

that 'Pakeha' has been defined as against is 'Maori', and as Maori identity has

changed, Pakeha identity has also changed. 'Pakeha' as an ethnic identity was gener

ated by the politics of biculturalism, which was itself an ideological response to the

ethnification of Maori. With the demise of biculturalism as a national project, brought about largely by the indigenization and retribalization of Maori, 'Pakeha'

declined as an ethnic identity also, to re-emerge as a comparable claim to indigeneity.

38



It would be possible to interpret this last incarnation of Pakeha identity as a

counter-claim to that being made by Maori — an assertion of 'a right to be here also',

to have no lesser rights than Maori — and it may be interpreted in this way by some.

But 'Pakeha' is not being claimed as an ethnic or indigenous identity by all who are

eligible to claim it. As Pearson and Sissons (1997) demonstrate, for the majority it is

simply a convenient categorical identity meaning 'non-Maori'. Those who claim it as

something more than this — as an 'ethnic' or as an 'indigenous' identity — are not

representative of the general 'non-Maori' population. They are a class fraction of the

middle class (Spoonley 1995). Rata (1996) describes them as a "humanistic" fraction

engaged in a struggle with a "neo-liberal" fraction. In Friedman's terms they are

"locals" engaged in a cultural struggle with "cosmopolitans". The "cosmopolitans"

are those who have been "sucked into the global process and who are the producers

of globalizing representations of the world". The 'locals' are those who are trying to

retain some semblance of national autonomy, at least in terms of identity, in a global

capitalist economy.

Bedggood, J.

1997 "Pakeha Ethnicity?", Sites, 35:81-100.

Bell, A. 1996

" 'We're Just New Zealanders': Pakeha Identity Politics" in P. Spoonley,

D. Pearson and C. Macpherson (eds) Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnic

Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

Friedman, J.

1999 "Indigenous Struggles and The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie", The Australian Journal of Anthropology 10(1): 1-14.

King, M. 1985 Being Pakeha, Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton,

1999 Being Pakeha Now, Auckland: Penguin.

King, M. (ed.) 1991 Pakeha, Auckland: Penguin.

Nash, R.

1990 "Society and Culture in New Zealand: An Outburst for the End of 1990",

New Zealand Sociology 5(2):99-121.

Pearson, D.

1989 "Pakeha Ethnicity: Concept or Conundrum",Sites 18:61-72.

1990 A Dream Deferred, Wellington: Allen and Unwin.

Pearson, D. and J. Sissons

1997 "Pakeha and Never Pakeha", Sites 35: 64-80.

Rata, E.

1996 "'Goodness and Power': The Sociology of Liberal Guilt", New Zealand

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Sociology 11 (2): 233-274.

Spoonley, P.

1991 "Pakeha Ethnicity: A Response to Maori Sovereignty" in P. Spoonley, D.

Pearson and C. Macpherson (eds) Nga Take: Ethnic Relations and

Racism in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

1993 Racism and Ethnicity, Auckland: Oxford University Press.

1995 "Constructing Ourselves: The Post-Colonial Politics of Pakeha" in M.

Wilson and A. Yeatman (eds) Justice and Identity: Antipodean Practices,

Wellington: Bridget Williams Books.

Walker, R.

1990 Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End, Auckland: Penguin.

Wolf, E.R. 1994 "Perilous Ideas: Race, Culture, People", Current Anthropology 35 (1):1

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BACKWATERS RUN DEEP: Locating New Zealand Social Anthropology || PAKEHA ETHNICITY AND INDIGENEITY