perceived by both as covering the world as a whole.The smallest power advantage obtained by the onehad to be compensated by the other.

In the post Cold War world regional balancesbecame more important. In South East Asia, forexample, the members of ASEAN had transformedtheir economic cooperation in a security alliancedirected to what they saw as the hegemonic ambitionsof Vietnam, demonstrated by Vietnam’s interventionand occupation of Cambodia. Recently Vietnamjoined ASEAN because of an unspoken commoninterest in balancing China’s possible bid for he-gemony in the region. American foreign policy hasbeen constantly concerned with regional balances ofpower, in Europe, but also in East Asia and the MiddleEast.

6. Conclusion: A Permanent Feature ofInternational Politics?

Since the Congress of Vienna all attempts to create aninternational order were based on an extension ofbalance of power policy. The exception was theLeagueof Nations. But its impotence can be explained by theneglect of balance of power considerations and over-estimation of the effectiveness of the all against onerequirement of punishing an aggressor, especially ifthat were a Great Power.

After 1991, the United States was the only globalGreat Power left. It is not likely that it will remain soindefinitely. Potential challengers, such as China orthe European Union, are already there, even thoughstill much too weak. Will balance of power policybecome relevant again in the future? As long as amonopoly of violence at the international level doesnot come into being, balance of power policy maywell remain relevant.

See also: First World War, The; International Lawand Treaties; International Organization; Interna-tional Relations, History of; Military History; Peace-making in History; Second World War, The; Warfarein History

Bibliography

Carr E H 1946 The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939. Macmillan,London

Elias N 1982 The Ci�ilising Process, Vol. II: State Formation andCi�ilization. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Gulick E V 1955 Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A CaseHistory of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft.Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY

Kant I 1957 Perpetual Peace. Bobbs Merril, New YorkKautilya 1992 The Arthasastra. Rangarajan L N (ed.) Penguin

Books, New Delhi, IndiaKissinger H A 1957 A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh

and the Problems of Peace. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA

Meinecke F 1929 Die Idee der Staatsraison in der neuerenGeschichte. Oldenbourg, Munich, Germany

Nicholson H 1947 The Congress of Vienna. Phoenix Publishing,Bern, Switzerland

van Benthem van den Bergh G 1992 The Nuclear Re�olution andthe End of the Cold War: Forced Restraint. Macmillan,Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK

Vincent R J, Wright M (eds.) Special issue on the balance ofpower. Re�iew of International Studies 15(2)

Watson A 1992 The E�olution of International Society: AComparati�e Historical Analysis. Routledge, London

Wedgwood C V 1963 The Thirty Years War. Routledge,London

G. van Benthem van den Bergh

Balance of Power: Political

As Kenneth Waltz has noted, ‘If there is any dis-tinctively political theory of international politics,balance-of-power theory is it. And yet one cannot finda statement of the theory that is generally accepted’(Waltz 1979, p. 117; for surveys of the meaning ofbalance of power see Claude 1962, Haas 1953, Wight1968, 1973). But cutting through the welter of possiblemeanings and making a few simple and undemandingassumptions leads to a conception that explains anumber of outcomes which, while familiar, cannototherwise be readily explained: no state has come todominate the international system; few wars are total;losers rarely are divided up at the end of the war andindeed are reintegrated into the international system;small states, who do not have the resources to protectthemselves, usually survive. There is then a form ofstability in international politics. Although the fates ofindividual units rise and fall, states and much of thepattern of their interaction remain. The system isnever transformed from an anarchical into a hier-archical one. (Note that this says nothing aboutwhether wars are more likely when power is evenlydistributed among the units or whether one state,although not dominant, is clearly stonger than theothers (Kugler and Lemke 1996). Although thoseengaged in this debate often frame it in terms ofbalance of power, in fact the question is quite aseparate one.)

The outcomes will follow if four assumptions hold.First, there must be several independent units. Second,the units must want to survive. They can seek toexpand and indeed many usually will, but at minimumthey must want to maintain their independence. Third,any unit must be willing to ally with any other on thebasis of calculations of interest, which means thatideology and hatreds must not be strong enough toprevent actors from working together when it isnecessary for them to do so. Fourth, war must be aviable tool of statecraft. Under these conditions, the

1039

Balance of Power: Political

system will be preserved even as states press everyadvantage, pay no attention to the common good,adopt ruthless tactics, and expect others to behave thesame way. Put differently, states do not strive forbalance; the restraints are not internal in the sense ofeach state believing that it should be restrained.Rather, restraint and stability arise as ambition checksambition and self-interest counteracts self-interest.

The basic argument about how this happens is wellknown, if contested. For any state to survive, none ofthe others can be permitted to amass so much powerthat it can dominate.Although states do not invariablyjoin the weaker side, if they are to safeguard their ownindependence and security they must balance againstany actor that becomes excessively menacing. In a wayanalogous to the operation of Adam Smith’s invisiblehand, the maintenance of the system is an unintendedconsequence of states seeking to advance themselves,not the product of their desire to protect the in-ternational community or a preference for balance.Balance is then maintained by negative feedback:movement toward dominance calls up forces that putdominance out of reach.

The theory obviously passes one important test inthat no state has been able to dominate the inter-national system. But this is not definitive. Few havetried: Napoleon, Hitler, perhaps the Kaiser and LouisXIV. Although others may not have made the effortbecause they anticipated that they would be blocked,the small number of challenges must undermine ourconfidence that the system could have been maintainedhad there been more of them. Furthermore, althoughthe overall balance of power system has never failed,local ones have. Not only have some countries come todominate their regions (this can perhaps be accom-modated within the theory), but isolated systems havefallen under the sway of one actor. While we considerit natural for China to be unified, in fact for centuriesit consisted of independent states. Rome’s neighborsdid not unite to check its power, and the Britishconquest of India was also made possible by the failureof a local balance. But these cases were still geo-graphically limited and did not produce a worldempire and bring international politics to an end.

The other restraints and puzzlesmentioned earlier—the fact that few wars become total and that losers andsmall states are not divided up—also follow from thedictates of self-interest within the constraints imposedby the anarchical system. Since any state can ally withany other, states do not have permanent friends andenemies. Because today’s adversary may be tomor-row’s ally, crippling it would be foolish. Furthermore,while the state would gain territory and wealth fromdividing up the loser, others might gain even more,thus putting the state at a disadvantage in subsequentconflicts.

The knowledge that allies and enemies are notpermanent and the expectation that losers will betreated relatively generously reinforce one another.

Because the members of the winning coalition knowthat it is not likely to remain together after the war,each has to fear accretions to the power of its allies.Because winners know that they are not likely to beable to dismember the loser, why should they prolongthe war? Each state’s knowledge that its allies havereason to contemplate a separate peace provides itwith further incentives to move quickly. The result,then, is a relatively moderate outcome not despite butbecause of the fear and greed of the individual states.This is one reason why international wars are muchmore likely to end in negotiated settlements than civilwars (Licklider 1993).

There is something wrong with this picture, how-ever. Wars against hegemons can become total, loserssometimes are divided up, and the postwar relationsamong states are often very different from thoseprevailing previously (Jervis 1985). The reason is thata long and bitter war against the hegemon underminesthe assumptions necessary for the operation of thebalance. States are likely to come to believe that warsare so destructive that they cannot be a normalinstrument of statecraft and to see the hegemon asinherently evil and aggressive, which means that it isnot a fit alliance partner and the winning coalitionmust stay together. As a result, wartime allies are notregarded as being as much of a potential threat asbalance of power reasoning would lead us to expect.Postwar politics may then be unusually moderate anda concert system may evolve in which the statespositively value the system, develop longer-run con-ceptions of their self-interests, and forego competitivegains in the expectation that others will reciprocate.Ironically, then, a war against a would-be hegemonthat epitomizes the operation of the balance of poweris likely to produce a system in which the actorsconsciously moderate their behavior and restrainthemselves.

1. An Alternati�e View

The model of the balance of power presented here isclearly a version of systems theory in that it sees aradical separation between intentions and outcomes.An alternative view of the balance of power that seesmore congruence is summarized by Edward Gulickwhen he says that ‘balance-of-power theory demandedrestraint, abnegation, and the denial of immediate self-interest’ (Gulick 1955, p. 33). Morton Kaplan’sconception of the balance of power similarly positsinternalized moderation as two of his six rules call forself-restraint: ‘stop fighting rather than eliminate anessential national actor,’ and ‘permit defeated orconstrained essential national actors to re-enter thesystem as acceptable role partners’ (Kaplan 1957, p.23). For Kaplan, these rules not only describe howstates behave, they consciously guide statesmen’sactions. In contrast to the version of balancing

1040

Balance of Power: Political

discussed earlier, Kaplan points out that in hiscomputer model, ‘if actors do not take system stabilityrequirements into account, a ‘‘balance of power’’system will be stable only if some extra systemic factor…prevents a roll-up of the system’ (Kaplan 1979, p.136). In other words, stability and restraint are notlikely unless the actors seek stability.

Here the system is preserved because states want topreserve it and there is little conflict between a state’sshort-run and long-run interest. The two are harmon-ized because the norms have been internalized throughsocialization as the actors watch and interact withtheir peers. Indeed, Paul Schroeder’s important studyof the transformation of European international poli-tics caused by the Napoleonic wars stresses that stablepeace and the concert were produced not only by thedefeat of the aggressor, but also by the painful learningthat led the victors to understand that others’ interestshad to be respected, that smaller states could play avaluable role, and that the eighteenth century practiceof compensation and indemnities led to endless cyclesof warfare (Schroeder 1994; also see Schroeder 1992and Jervis 1992). But this view cannot readily explainhow the system can be maintained in the face of actorswho have interests in exploiting others’ moderation.

Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that states feelinternal restraints and that, if they do not, the systemwill be torn apart by high levels of warfare. If theproponents of the version of balance of power set forthhere draw on the analogy of Smith’s invisible hand,critics can respond that unalloyed capitalism, like anengine out of control, will produce so much un-constrained energy that it will soon destroy itself. Justas economic liberalism must be embedded in broadersocietal norms if capitalism is to be compatible with awell-functioning society (Polanyi 1944), perhaps thepursuit of narrow self-interest can yield stability and amodicum of productive peace only if it is bounded bynormative conceptions that limit predatory behavior.

2. Anticipation of the Operation of Balance ofPower

States may be restrained by the expectation that if theyare not, they will be faced with intense opposition.These cases fall in between the two models discussedabove. Indeed, if the view of the balance as automaticis correct it would be surprising if decision-makersheedlessly sought to expand; awareness of the likelyfeedbackwould lead them tobe restrained even thoughthis impulse does not flow from internalized normsand the desire to preserve the international order.Much has been written about self-defeating expansion,but we should not neglect the fact that leaders may beinhibited by the anticipation of these processes. Thesecases are literally countless—that is, they cannot becounted because they do not leave traces in thehistorical record. But perceptive leaders realize that

the balance of power makes it dangerous for theircountries to be too powerful. Edmund Burke made thepoint eloquently at the end of the eighteenth century:

Among precautions against ambition, it may not be amiss totake one precaution against our own. I must fairly say, Idread our own power and our own ambition; I dread ourbeing too much dreaded. It is ridiculous to say we are notmen, and that, as men, we shall never wish to aggrandizeourselves in some way or other. Can we say that even at thishour we are not invidiously aggrandized? We are already inpossession of almost all the commerce of the world. Ourempire in India is an awful thing. If we should come to be ina condition not only to have all this ascendant in commerce,but to be absolutely able, without the least control, to holdthe commerce of all other nations totally dependent upon ourgood pleasure, we may say that we shall not abuse thisastonishing and hitherto unheard-of power. But every othernation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that,sooner or later, this stage of things must produce a com-bination against us which may end in our ruin (quoted inMorgenthau 1978, pp. 169–70).

Finally, if we think of balance of power in thebroadest sense of power checking power, these dy-namics are built into the basic forms of domesticpolitics. The American Constitution was built on theconcept of checks and balances because the foundersbelieved that potentially dangerous power could bestbe tamed by countervailing power, to use the term thatGalbraith later applied to many aspects of Americanpolitical and economic life (Galbraith 1952). Otheraspects of domestic politics illustrate negative feed-back as the unintended consequences of the pursuit ofnarrower self-interest in a way even more analogous tothe automatic balance. Most obviously, it is hard forany political party to gain a monopoly of powerbecause the competition can mount matching orcompeting claims. If the political pendulum swings inone direction, those losing influence usually willincrease their unity and activity.

See also: Alliances: Political; Diplomacy; First WorldWar, The; International Relations, History of; In-ternational Relations: Theories; National SecurityStudies and War Potential of Nations; Nations andNation-states in History; Peacemaking in History;Realism�Neorealism; War: Causes and Patterns; War,Sociology of; Warfare in History

Bibliography

Claude I 1962 Power and International Relations. RandomHouse, New York

Galbraith J K 1952 American Capitalism: The Concept ofCounter�ailing Power. Houghton Mifflin, Boston

Gulick E V 1955 Europe’s Classical Balance of Power. CornellUniversity Press, Ithaca, NY

Haas E B 1953 The balance of power: prescription, concept orpropaganda. World Politics 5: 442–77

1041

Balance of Power: Political

Jervis R 1985 From balance to concert. World Politics 38: 58–79Jervis R 1992 A political science perspective on the balance of

power and the concert. American Historical Re�iew 97: 716–24Kaplan M A 1957 System and Process in International Politics.

Wiley, New YorkKaplan M A 1979 Towards Professionalism in International

Theory. Free Press, New YorkKugler J, Lemke D (eds.) 1996 Parity and War. University of

Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MILicklider R (ed.) 1993 Stopping the Killing: How Ci�il Wars

End. New York University Press, New YorkMorgenthau H J 1978 Politics Among Nations, 5th edn. Rev.

Knopf, New YorkPolanyi K 1944 The Great Transformation. Farrar & Rinehart,

New YorkSchroeder P W 1992 Did the Vienna settlement rest on a balance

of power. American Historical Re�iew 97: 683–706Schroeder P W 1994 The Transformation of European Politics,

1787–1848. Oxford University Press, New YorkWaltz K N 1979 Theory of International Politics. Addison-

Wesley, Boston, MAWaltz K N 1991 America as a model for the world? A foreign

policy perspective. PS: Political Science and Politics 24: 669Waltz K N 1993 The emerging structure of international

politics. International Security 18: 44–79Wight M 1968 The balance of power. In: Butterfield H (ed.)

Diplomatic In�estigations. Harvard University Press, Cam-bridge, MA

Wight M 1973 The balance of power and international order. In:James A (ed.) The Bases of International Order. OxfordUniversity Press, London

R. Jervis

Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy procedures are intended to provide anefficient and fair mechanism for the reorganization orliquidation of the assets of insolvent debtors. Debtorsinclude both individuals and business entities. Asecond important objective of some bankruptcy pro-cedures is the financial rehabilitation of overindebtedindividuals. Rehabilitation sometimes includes dis-charge of indebtedness.

1. Fair and Efficient Administration of Insol�entEstates

1.1 The Need for Bankruptcy

Reliance on the usual legal procedures to collect debtsfrom non-paying debtors can lead to inefficient andunfair results when applied to an insolvent debtor.When there are not enough assets to pay all creditors,non-bankruptcy law commonly favors the creditorwho seizes and sells assets before other creditors do.The resulting race to seize the debtor’s assets can lead

to inefficient dispositions of debtor’s assets. Forexample, if a business is making a profit even whileinsolvent, it may be more efficient to allow it tocontinue to operate and pay debts from future profits,yet competition between creditors can lead to sale ofassets that makes continued operation of the businessimpossible (Jackson 1985). Competition between cred-itors also leads to unnecessarily duplicative collectionactivities. Many people also believe it is unfair to givepriority in the distribution of the limited assets of aninsolvent estate to the creditors who are the first toinitiate formal collection actions.

Bankruptcy procedures address each of these diffi-culties. Once a bankruptcy proceeding is initiated,unsecured creditors are automatically enjoined fromusing non-bankruptcy collection procedures. In somecountries, secured creditors are similarly enjoined.These injunctions eliminate duplicative collection ef-forts and permit an orderly disposition of the debtor’sassets. In bankruptcy, the debtor’s assets constitute abankruptcy estate, to be managed in the interests ofthe estate’s beneficiaries, the creditors. When thebankruptcy estate makes distributions, creditors withsimilar contractual priorities are usually paid pro rataaccording to the amount they are owed. Contractualpromises to subordinate or to privilege particularcreditors in the distribution of debtor’s assets (in-cluding security agreements) are normally respected,and a few creditors (e.g., tax creditors) receive prioritypayments by statutory mandate. However, prioritiesare not usually given to creditors who have initiatedcollection activities before the bankruptcy filing.

1.2 Liquidation �s. Reorganization in BusinessBankruptcy

The assets of an insolvent business estate may be sold,either as a unit or in separate parts, to the highestbidder(s), which is called a liquidation. Alternatively,the assets may be retained by an entity and operated asa continuing business, which is called a reorganization.In a liquidation, creditors are paid the proceeds of thesale(s). In a reorganization, creditors are given secur-ities (debt instruments and�or shares) in the newreorganized entity, which represent rights in the futureincome of the continuing business. Bankruptcy cred-itors often have conflicting interests in the decisionwhether to liquidate or reorganize an insolvent busi-ness estate.

Creditors with contractual priority over other cred-itors (including, most importantly, secured creditors)usually prefer rapid liquidation if the anticipatedproceeds will pay them in full. Reorganization bothdelays repayment and introduces an element of risk,because the continuing business might lose money,thus depriving these senior creditors of full payment.This preference for liquidation exists even whenreorganization seems the better option from the

1042

Balance of Power: Political

Copyright � 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.

All rights reserved.

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences ISBN: 0-08-043076-7