Rev.Roum.Philosophie,56,1,p.147160,Bucureti,2012

THOMASAQUINASONBRIDGINGTHEGAPBETWEENMINDANDREALITY*

ELENABLTU

Abstract:TheaimofthisarticleistofollowThomasAquinasinhisattempttoprovethatthegapbetweenmindandrealityisbridgeable.Thiswholeepistemologicalpuzzleis by nomeans a newone, but unlike his predecessorswhowere unable to solve it,AquinasmanagedtobridgetheepistemologicalgapbyapplyingtheAristotelianrecipeof agent intellect and its act of abstraction, improved by adding the illuminationingredient.Thearticle followsa tripartiteconfiguration:At firstAquinassargumentsforthesourcesofhumancognitionandfortheimpossibilityofcognizingparticularsarepresented,atsecondthedifferencesbetweenspecificobjectsofcognitionaregivenandatthirdAquinasssolutionisstated.Key words:ThomasAquinas;universals;particulars;agentintellect;abstraction;illumination.

Aquinas repeatedly states that senses are concerned with particular things,intellectwith universals, and that senses arematerial and intellect is immaterial.Theproblemwiththistwo-layeredaccountisthatitcanleadtoanepistemologicalgapbetweenhumancognitiondependenton senseperceptionofmaterial particularsand immaterial cognition of universals. The puzzle is by no means a new one;Aquinasinheriteditfromtheancients,but,unlikethem,hebelievedthatbyfollowingand improving the Aristotelian recipe of abstraction, he was able to bridge theepistemologicalgap.

Let us begin, without further delay, by stating the epistemological puzzle.Insteadofofferingadescription,Ishallofferareconstructionofthreearguments:(1)sensationisofparticulars,(2)intellectualcognitionisofuniversals,and(3)intellectcannothavecognitionofparticulars,butallcognitionstartsfromthesenses.ElenaBltu RomanianSocietyforPhenomenology,Bd.M.Koglniceanu,no.49,ap.45,Bucharest,Romania,050104;email:elena_baltuta@yahoo.com

*This paper was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for ScientificResearch,CNCS-UEFISCDI,projectnumberPN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0661.

ElenaBltu 2

148

(1)Sensationisofparticulars:(a)cognitiontakesplacewhenthecognizedisinthecognizer(throughitssimilitude1)inaccordancewiththemodeofthecognizer(Sent. de Anim.lib.2,lect.12,n.52);(b)allcognitionarisesfromthesenses(S.Th. I,q.78,a.4,ad.4;q.84,a.8,ad.1;q.86,a.4,ad.2);(c)allcognitionarisesfromsenses,whichhaveabodilyorgan(S.Th. I,q.78,a.3);(d)Sensationtakesplacewhen the sensedobject is in the sense in accordancewith themodeof the sense(from1.a);(e)allcognitionarisesfromsensation,whichisafunctionofabodilyorgan that takes place when the sensed object is in the sense in a bodily andmaterialway(from1.a,1.cand1.d);(f)thecognizerinactisthecognizedinact(S.Th.I,q.14,a.2,co.);(g)senseinactissensible(thingwhichhasabodilyandmaterialexistence,whichisaparticular)inact(S.Th.I,q.14,a.2,co.);(h)sensationrepresentsthingsasparticulars(Sent. de Anim, lib.2,lect.12,n.5);therefore(i)allcognitionarisesfromsensationwhichrepresentsthethingsasparticulars.

(2)Intellectualcognitionisofuniversals:(a)cognitiontakesplacewhenthecognizedisinthecognizer(throughitssimilitude)inaccordancewiththemodeofthe cognizer (Sent. de Anim., lib. 2, lect. 12, n. 5); (b) intellection, which is animmaterialpowerwithnobodilyorgan,takesplacewhenthecognizedobjectisinthe intellect in accordancewith themode of the intellect (Sent. de Anim., lib. 2,lect.12,n.5);(c)intellection,whichisanimmaterialpowerwithnobodilyorgan,takes place when the cognized object is in the intellect in an incorporeal andimmaterialway(from2.b);(d)thecognizerinactisthecognizedinact(S.Th.I,q.14, a.2, co.); (e) intellect in act is the intelligible (whichhasan incorporealandimmaterialwayofexistence,whichisauniversal)inact(S.c.G. lib.I,cap.51,n.6);therefore(f)intellectrepresentsthethingasuniversal.

(3)Intellectcannothavecognitionofparticularsbutallcognitionstartsfromthe senses: (a) all cognition arises from sensationwhich represents the things asparticulars (1.i); (b) cognition of universals arises from senses (1.e); (c) intellectrepresents the things as universals, intellect has cognition of universals (2.f);(d)thatwhichisimmaterialcannothavecognitionofthatwhichismaterial(Sent.

1See, for example Dominik Perler, Theorien der Intentionalitaet im Mittelalter, (VittorioKlostermann Verlag, Frankfurt amMain, 2002), n. 90, p. 73: Bercksichtigt man allerdings dieTatsache, dass Thomas similitudo als Terminus technicus verwendet, muss man nicht von einemHinbergleiten von einer strkeren zu einer schwcheren These sprechen: Die Rede von einersimilitudo ist nichts anderes als die Rede von einer Identitt, denn similitudo besteht in nichtsanderemals imgemeinsamenHabeneinundderselbenForm.The treatmentof thesimilitude asatechnical termmeaning sharing or agreement of a form is also present in theMiddleAges in theworksofBonaventura,Boethius,AugustineandAlbertusMagnus.

2InthisarticleIwillusethefollowingLatineditions:De ente et essentia(Deenteetessentia)ed.H.F.Dondaine,Operaomnia(ed.Leonina)XLIII,Roma:CommisioLeonina,1976; Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia(De.Pot.)P.M.Pession,Torino&Roma:Marietti1965;Sentencia libri de Anima(Sent.deAn.)ed.R.-A.Gauthier,Operaomnia(ed.Leonina)XLV, Roma&Paris:CommissioLeonina&Vrin1984;Summa contra Gentiles(S.c.G.)C.Pera,Torino&Roma:Marietti1961;Summa Theologiae(S.Th.)P.Caramello,Torino&Roma:Marietti1952;andthefollowingEnglishtranslationsDe. Pot.EnglishDominicanFathers,TheNewmanPress,1952;S.c.G. JosephRickaby,LondonBurnsandOates,1905;S.Th. FathersoftheEnglishDominicanProvince,BenzigerBros.edition,1947.

3 ThomasAquinasonBridgingtheGapbetweenMindandReality

149de Anim.,lib.2,lect.12,n.6);(e)nothingcorporealcanmakeanimpressiononthecorporeal (S.Th. q. 84, a. 6, co.); therefore (f) intellect cannot have cognition ofparticulars,butcognitionarisesfromsensationwhichcognizestheparticulars.

Thequestionwhicharisesafterreaching(3.f)is:Howcomecognition,whicharises fromsenseswhich represent thingsasparticulars,hasaccess touniversals,when nothing corporeal can make an impression on something incorporeal? Inorder to be able to solve this puzzle,wemust first shedmore light onwhat thedifferencebetweenparticularanduniversalis.Designatedmatter,unlikecommonmatter, is matter considered under specific dimensions, under specific time andspacecoordinates,hereandnow.Everyobjectfromtheworldwelivein,trees,houses,animals etc. is formedofdesignatedmatter and substantial form.Thedesignatedmatter is the so called principle of individuation3; it is that specific componentwhich makes this piece of wood this piece of wood and not that one. Sensibleparticular things are in act in the extramentalworld, hence there is no need, inordertohaveadirectcontactwiththem,foroursensestobeactive.4Theyexistassuchinanaturalandmaterialmannerintheextramentalworldandtheyactonoursenses,which in turn trigger theprocessof cognition.Unlike theparticulars, theuniversalsarecomposedofcommon,notdesignatedmatter,andsubstantialform.If designated matter was to be understood like this bone, this flesh and so on,commonmatter shouldbeunderstood like flesh,bonesandso forth,withoutanyspecific determinations. The universals as such exist only in the mind of thecognizer, and in the extramental world, where they can fall upon the universalintentions,theyexistinthings:universalia,secundumquodsuntuniversalia,nonsuntnisi in anima. Ipsae autemnaturae, quibus accidit intentio universalitatis, sunt inrebus. (Sent. de Anim., lib. 2, lect.12, n. 8). In otherwords, universals exist inparticularobjectsnotassuch,butonlyinasforastheyareuniversallyconceivable.Inthemindofacognizertheuniversalshaveanimmaterialandintentionalwayofexistence, in accordance with intellects way of being, which means they existapart from any material or individuating conditions, which in turn makes themintelligible. Following Aristotle, Aquinas says that existing matter, apart fromwhichaparticular thingcannotexist, isnotactually intelligible (Aristotelesnonposuit formas rerumnaturaliumsubsistere sinemateria; formae autem inmateriaexistentesnon sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebaturquodnaturae seu formae rerumsensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu.5). But universals,which exist apart from any material and individuating conditions in a perfectlyimmaterialmanner,haveanintelligiblestructure:sicutressuntseparabilesamateria,siccircaintellectumsunt(S.Th.,q.85,a.1,s.c.).

Duetothefactthatoursensescomeintocontactonlywithparticularmaterialobjects which are non-intelligible, universals need to be rendered intelligible bybeingseparatedfrommatter.Inotherwords,universalsastheyexist inparticular

3SeeDe ente et essentia(cap.II,75).4S.Th.(I,q.79,a.3,ad.1).5S.Th.(I,q.79,a.3,co).

ElenaBltu 4

150

objects are only potentially and not actually intelligible. Is this also the case ofparticulars? No, sense objects, particular objects composed of designated matterand substantial form, are already to be found in a state of actuality in nature,thereforepositinganactivesensepowertoactualizethemwouldbenothingbutafutile extension. One thingmust be kept inmind, namely that sense objects areactive, therefore senses do not need to be active, in turn are passive, and theintellectualobjectsarepassive,thereforetheremustbeanactiveintellectualpower.BeforediscussingabouttheagentintellectandAquinassbridgingsolutiontotheepistemological gap, allow me to resume the differences between sensorial andintellectivelevelsbymeansofatable.

Sensorial level Intellective level Particulars UniversalsMaterialexistence ImmaterialexistenceComposed of designated matter andsubstantialform

Composedofcommonmatterandsubstantialform

Inthenaturetheyareinanactivestate Innaturetheyareinapassivestate

Specific objects

Non-intelligible IntelligibleSenses(externalandinternalsenses) Intellectualpowers(agentandpossibleintellect)Are passive relative to their specificobjects

Musthaveatleastanactivepowerrelativetoitsspecificobjects

Specific powers

Haveabodilyorgan Doesnothaveabodilyorgan

Maybe the easiest way to understand the differences between senses andintellect is by shortly describing their activities. Whenever Thomas Aquinasexamines the objects of human mental states, he does it by putting at work alayeredstructure:Thesensible species6 (species sensibilis)or the sensorial formswhich transmit the properties of extra mental objects7 are received by thecognizersexternalsenses.Startingfromthedataprovidedby theexternalsensesthe internalsenses8 forman image (phantasma9)of theextramentalobject.Untilthismomentthedatacomesfromtheexternalobjecttowardsthesenseswhichin

6Thesensible species arethefirstcausalintermediaryentitieswecomeintocontactwith,astherealistswouldsay.Theyarenumericallydifferentindifferentcognizers,andaretheid quo ofourcognition, themeans by whichwe know; based on their similitude with the object, they work ascausalmediatorsforourcognition.Aquinas,likeothermedievalthinkers,alsospeaksaboutspecies in medio, whoseexistenceismadepossiblebytheactionofthecelestialbodies,butforthepurposeofthisarticleIshallnottakethemintoaccount.7Theobjectsofsensationcanbe theproperobjects,namelycolour,smell,etc., thecommonobjects,likemovement,size,etc.,andtheaccidentalobjects,liketrees,people,etc.,whichexceedthepowerofasinglesense.8Theinternalsensesarecommonsense,whichactsliketherootofallexternalsenses,thecogitativepower,whichpreparestheimagesandcomparesdifferentindividualintentions,thememory,whichstorestheimagesandrecognizespastexperiences,andimagination,whichretainsandcombinestheimages.9Thoughit iscalledphantasmaimage,thisisnotproperlyavisualimage,butmorelikeacomprehensiveimageformedoutofalltheinformationreceivedfromalltheexternalsenses,asumofallthesensiblespeciesreceived.

5 ThomasAquinasonBridgingtheGapbetweenMindandReality

151turngiverisetocertainmodificationswhoseeffectwastheformingofimages.Allcognitivepowersinvolvedinthesestagesofcognitionplayamorepassive,thenanactive role: theexternal sensesare informedby the sensible species emanatedbythe extra mental object, the internal senses process the data gathered from theexternalsenses,butdonotchangetheextramentalobjectsinput.Itcanbesaidthat,atleastuntiltheformationoftheimages,themovementisanascendingone,fromtheobject towards thecognitivepowers;as farassensescangothedata isgathered,transformedandgeneralized.Butsincetheknowableobjectmustbeproportionatewith its specific cognitive power, and the images are still associated with theparticularobjectbecausetheyareconstitutedfromtheaccidentalformsoftheextramental hylomorphic object placed under specific space and time coordinates, itfollows they cannot be fitted for the immaterial intellect. The mark of theindividuality present in the images must be removed and, at the same time, theobjectsuniversalessence,theinformationalcoreoftheextramentalobject,mustbekept.Thisisperformedbytheactionoftheagent intellect10whichilluminatesandabstractstheintelligible species11 fromtheimages.

Allowmenowtoreturntothepuzzlewhichtriggeredthiswholeinvestigation.Theissueatstakehereistheepistemologicalgapbetweenmindandreality:Humancognizerscanonlyhavecognitionofuniversals,butallofcognitionissensedependentandsensescanonlyhaveaccesstomaterialparticularobjects.Thispuzzleisbynomeansanewone.Infact,AquinasthoughtthatunlikehispredecessorshehadthenecessaryargumentsforbridgingthisgapbyfollowingAristotlesrecipe.Fromhispredecessors,AquinasmentionsPlatoand theNeo-Platonistpositiononone sideandDemocritusontheother,butinhisopiniontheyallhaveembracedthepuzzlewithout trying to solve it.First of all,Democritusheldup that all cognitionwascaused by images issuing from the bodies we thought of and entering into oursouls.Basically,AquinasresumesDemocrituspositiononcognitionasaprocessofdischargeofimages,andholdsresponsibleforthisviewhislackofdistinctionbetweenintellectandsenses.Secondofall,Platodistinguishedbetweensensesandintellect,butstillwasunabletobridgetheepistemologicalgap,becauseintellectualcognitionhaditssourcenot inthesenses,but inseparateintelligibleformsbeingparticipatedbytheintellect.IfinthecaseofDemocritus,intellectualcognitionwasextrinsic to thesoul, in thecaseofPlato, thesourcewas intrinsically to thesoul.Aristotle,andAquinaswithit,tookthemiddleway;cognitionwasneitherwhollyextrinsic,norwhollyintrinsictothesoul.LikePlatohebelievedintellectandsenseweredifferent,butlikeDemocritushethoughtcognitionstartsfromthesenses.The

10Forahistoricalapproachoftheagentintellectsee:RuthReyna,OntheSoul:APhilosophicalExplorationoftheActiveIntellectinAverroes,Aristotle,andAquinas,Thomist: a Speculative Quarterly Review, vol. 36, 1972; Herbert Davidson,Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, OxfordUniversityPress,1992.ItmustbesaidthatThomasAquinastalksabouttwointellects,anagentandapossibleone,butthisdoesnotconcernthetopicofthisarticle.

11Theintelligiblespeciesarecognitiveintermediaryentitieswhichreplicatetheessentialformofacognizedobject,andare the idquoofcognition,namely themeansbywhichwecognize,notthosewecognize.

ElenaBltu 6

152

gistoftheproblemliesinthefactthatnothingcorporealcanmakeanimpressionon the corporeal and so the simple sensible impression will not suffice forintellectualcognition:

Ianswerthat,Onthispointthephilosophersheldthreeopinions.ForDemocritusheldthatallknowledgeiscausedbyimagesissuingfromthebodieswethinkofandenteringintooursouls,asAugustinesaysinhislettertoDioscorus(cxviii,4).AndAristotlesays(DeSomn.etVigil.)thatDemocritusheldthatknowledgeiscausebyadischargeofimages.AndthereasonforthisopinionwasthatbothDemocritusandtheotherearlyphilosophersdidnotdistinguishbetweenintellectandsense,asAristotlerelates(DeAnimaiii,3).Consequently,sincethe sense is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowledge isaffected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. WhichimpressionDemocritusheldtobecausedbyadischargeofimages.Plato,ontheotherhand,heldthattheintellectisdistinctfromthesenses:andthatitisan immaterialpowernotmakinguseofacorporealorganfor itsaction.Andsince the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held thatintellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting theintellect,butbyseparate intelligibleformsbeingparticipatedbytheintellect,aswehavesaidabove(Articles4,5).Moreoverheheldthatsenseisapoweroperatingofitself.Consequentlyneitherissense,sinceitisaspiritualpower,affectedby the sensible:but the sensibleorgansareaffected by the sensible,theresultbeingthatthesoulisinawayrousedtoformwithinitselfthespeciesofthesensible.Augustineseemstotouchonthisopinion(Gen.adlit.xii,24)wherehesaysthatthebodyfeelsnot,butthesoulthroughthebody,whichitmakes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what isannounced fromwithout. Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectualknowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledgeexclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to thesentient act,while the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding.Aristotle chose amiddle course. Forwith Plato he agreed that intellect andsense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operationwithout the cooperationof thebody; so that to feel is not an act of the soulalone, but of the composite. And he held the same in regard to all theoperationsofthesensitivepart.Since,therefore,itisnotunreasonablethatthesensibleobjectswhichareoutsidethesoulshouldproducesomeeffectinthecomposite,Aristotle agreedwithDemocritus in this, that theoperationsofthesensitivepartarecausedbytheimpressionofthesensibleonthesense:notby a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. ForDemocritusmaintainedthateveryoperationisbywayofadischargeofatoms,aswegatherfromDeGener. i,8.ButAristotleheld that the intellecthasanoperation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothingcorporealcanmakeanimpressionontheincorporeal.Andthereforeinordertocause the intellectualoperationaccording toAristotle, the impressioncaused

7 ThomasAquinasonBridgingtheGapbetweenMindandReality

153bythesensibledoesnotsuffice,butsomethingmorenobleisrequired,fortheagentismorenoblethanthepatient,ashesays(DeGener.i,5).12ForAquinasformsdonotexistinrealityseparatedfrommatterasPlatosaid,

but always as a part of a hylomorphic compound.As soon aswe state this, ourproblembecomesmoreobvious:bybeingjoinedwithmatterformsdonothaveanintelligiblecharacter.Tobespecific,theydonothaveanactualintelligiblecharacter,butapotentialone.Itisforthisreasontheintelligiblecharacterofforms,of images,needstobeactualized.Atthesametime,forAquinas,nothingisactualizedexceptbysomethingactual13,asforexamplehappensatthesensoriallevelwherethepassiveexternalsensesareactualizedwhenanactualsensibleobjectactsonthemthroughitssensible species.At the intellective level theagent intellect14 is theonepoweralwaysinactandwhichrendersactualtheintelligiblecharacteroftheimagesbyitsdoublefunctionofilluminatingandabstractingoftheintelligible species: 12 Respondeo dicendum quod circa istam quaestionem triplex fuit philosophorum opinio.Democritus enim posuit quod nulla est alia causa cuiuslibet nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab hiscorporibusquaecogitamus,veniuntatqueintrant imaginesinanimasnostras;utAugustinusdicit inepistolasuaadDioscorum.EtAristotelesetiamdicit, in librodeSomn.etVigil.,quodDemocritusposuit cognitionem fieri per idola et defluxiones. Et huius positionis ratio fuit, quia tam ipseDemocritusquamaliiantiquinaturalesnonponebantintellectumdifferreasensu,utAristotelesdicitin librodeanima.Et ideo,quiasensusimmutaturasensibili,arbitrabanturomnemnostramcognitionemfieripersolamimmutationemasensibilibus.QuamquidemimmutationemDemocritusasserebatfieriper imaginumdefluxiones.Platoveroecontrarioposuit intellectumdifferreasensu;et intellectumquidemessevirtutemimmaterialemorganocorporeononutenteminsuoactu.Etquia incorporeumnon potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio intellectualis non fit per immutationemintellectusasensibilibus,sedperparticipationemformarumintelligibiliumseparatarum,utdictumest.Sensumetiamposuitvirtutemquandamperseoperantem.Undenecipsesensus,cumsitquaedamvisspiritualis, immutaturasensibilibus,sedorganasensuumasensibilibusimmutantur,exquaimmutationeanimaquodammodoexcitaturutinsespeciessensibiliumformet.EthancopinionemtangerevideturAugustinus,XIIsuperGen.adLitt.,ubidicitquodcorpusnonsentit,sedanimapercorpus,quovelutnuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod extrinsecus nuntiatur. Sic igitur secundum Platonisopinionem, neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilis totaliter asensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant animam sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensusexcitantanimamintellectivamad intelligendum.Aristotelesautemmediaviaprocessit.PosuitenimcumPlatoneintellectumdifferreasensu.Sedsensumposuitpropriamoperationemnonhaberesinecommunicatione corporis; ita quod sentire non sit actus animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et similiterposuit deomnibusoperationibus sensitivaepartis.Quia igitur non est inconveniensquod sensibiliaquae sunt extra animam, causent aliquid in coniunctum, in hoc Aristoteles cum Democritoconcordavit, quod operationes sensitivae partis causentur per impressionem sensibilium in sensum,nonpermodumdefluxionis,utDemocritusposuit,sedperquandamoperationem.NametDemocritusomnemactionem fieriposuitper influxionematomorum,utpatet in IdeGenerat. Intellectumveroposuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corporeumimprimerepotest inremincorpoream.Et ideoadcausandamintellectualemoperationem,secundumAristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quiaagensesthonorabiliuspatiente,utipsedicit(S.Th. q.84,a.6,co.).13SeeforexampleS.Th. I,q.2,a.3,co.:Movereenimnihilaliudestquameducerealiquiddepotentiainactum,depotentiaautemnonpotestaliquidreduciinactum,nisiperaliquodensinactu.

14SeeGyulaKlima,AquinasontheMaterialityoftheHumanSoulandtheImmaterialityoftheHumanIntellect,Philosophical Investigations,vol.32,nr.2,2009andidemMANBODY+SOUL:Aquinas'sArithmeticofHumanNature,http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/BODYSOUL.HTM.

ElenaBltu 8

154

ButsinceAristotledidnotallowthatformsofnaturalthingsexistapartfrommatter,andasformsexistinginmatterarenotactuallyintelligible;itfollowsthat thenaturesof formsof the sensible thingswhichweunderstandarenotactuallyintelligible.Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesensesasmadeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.Wemust thereforeassignon thepartof the intellect somepower tomake thingsactually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.15Abit further in the same 79thQuaestio, article 3, fromSumma Theologiae

Aquinas says the agent intellect is essential in the process of human cognitionwhereitactslikelightactsonsensiblesight.ForAquinaslightrendersthetransparent,themedium of sight, actual and, this way, it enables its passing through by thesensiblespecies.Inasimilarmannertheagent intellectrendersactualtheimagesintelligibility,makingitpossibleforthepossibleintellecttocognizethem:

There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light isrequired forsight, inorder tomakecolorsactuallyvisible.Andaccording tothistheactiveintellectisrequiredforunderstanding,inlikemannerandforthesamereasonaslightisrequiredforseeing.Butintheopinionofothers,lightisrequired for sight;not for thecolors tobecomeactuallyvisible;but inorderthatthemediummaybecomeactuallyluminous,astheCommentatorsaysonDeAnimaii.Andaccordingtothis,Aristotle'scomparisonoftheactiveintellecttolight is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is lightrequiredforseeing;butnotforthesamereason.16Nowtheintelligibleinactisnotsomethingexistinginnature;ifweconsiderthe nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. Andtherefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passiveintellectwould not suffice but for the presence of the active intellectwhichmakesthingsactuallyintelligiblebywayofabstraction.17

15SedquiaAristoteles nonposuit formas rerumnaturalium subsistere sinemateria; formae

autem inmateria existentesnon sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quodnaturae seu formae rerumsensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia inactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicutsensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem(S.Th.I,q.79,a.3,co.).

16Ad secundum dicendum quod circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enimdicunt quod lumen requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu visibiles.Et secundumhoc, similiterrequiritur, et propter idem, intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum.Secundumaliosvero,lumenrequirituradvidendum,nonproptercolores,utfiantactuvisibiles;sedutmedium fiat actu lucidum, utCommentator dicit in II de anima. Et secundumhoc, similitudo quaAristoteles assimilat intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod sicut hoc estnecessariumadvidendum,itailludadintelligendum;sednonpropteridem(S.Th. I,q.79,a.3,ad.2).

17 Intelligibile autem in actunon est aliquidexistens in rerumnatura, quantumadnaturamrerum sensibilium, quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeretimmaterialitasintellectuspossibilis,nisiadessetintellectusagens,quifaceretintelligibiliainactupermodumabstractionis(S. Th. I,q.79,a.3,ad.3).

9 ThomasAquinasonBridgingtheGapbetweenMindandReality

155Theagent intellect abstracts and, at the same time, illuminates the images.

Buthowexactlycanbeunderstoodthisabstractionoftheintelligible speciesfromtheimages?EleonoreStump18describestheprocessasoneofstrippingawayoftheindividualandmaterialcharacteristicswhicharebeingconservedwithintheimage, andconcentratingonobjectsquiddityoressence.Theagentintellectremovestheindividualandmaterialcharacteristicsoftheobjectfromitsessence.Buthowcanthe agent intellect tell the difference betweenwhat is particular (individual) andwhatisuniversalinan image?Forexample,ifwehaveasubject, letsnamehimJohn,who looks at a painting. In order for John to distinguish the red from theothercoloursofthepainting,hemustfirstperceivethewholepainting,namelyallofitscolours.Ifweapplythistothecaseofagent intellect,wouldwebeentitledtobelievethat,sinceithasthepowerofdiscriminatingandremovingindividualelementsfrom universal ones, it has access to both particular and universal features? Thesimplestanswerwouldbeanaffirmativeone,buttheproblemisAquinasdoesnotallowit.Hesaysthatasaconsequenceofintellectsimmaterialityisthefactthatithasaccessonlytouniversalessencesofthings.Evenmore,inS.Th. (I,q.84,a.6,co.) hesaysthatnothingcorporealcanaffectsomethingcorporeal:Nihilautemcorporeumimprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualemoperationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibiliumcorporum, sed requiritur aliquidnobilius, quia agens est honorabiliuspatiente, utipsedicit.But images are theproductsofcorporealorganscorresponding to theinternalsenses,sotheyare,atleastatsomeextent,corporeal.Whatisthesolutiontothisproblem?Intheextramentalworldmaterialobjectshaveanatural,materialandnon-intelligibleexistence,buttheagent intellect hasthepowertorenderthemintelligibleinordertomakethemfitthepossibleintellect:

Not,indeed,inthesensethattheintellectualoperationiseffectedinusbythemere intellectualoperation is effected inusby themere impressionof somesuperiorbeings,asPlatoheld;butthatthehigherandmorenobleagentwhichhe calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (Question 79,Articles 3,4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actuallyintelligible,byaprocessofabstraction.Accordingtothisopinion,then,onthepart of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. Butsince the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, andrequiretobemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect.19Howexactlythisrenderingintelligibletakesplace?Ibelieveonehintcanbe

gainedby looking atagent intellects functionof illumination.Byunderstanding

18EleonoreStump,Aquinas,Routledge,LondonandNewYork,2003,p.175.19Nontamenitaquodintellectualisoperatiocauseturinnobisexsolaimpressionealiquarumrerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius et nobilius agens quod vocat intellectumagentem,dequo iam supradiximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu,permodumabstractioniscuiusdam.Secundumhocergo,expartephantasmatumintellectualisoperatioasensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportetquodfiantintelligibiliaactuperintellectumagentem(S.Th. I,q.84,a.6,co.).

ElenaBltu 10

156

howilluminationworks,wewillbeabletounderstandandcomeupwithasolutionfor the above problem (the abstraction on the intelligible from sensible and thepossibility of discrimination between two types of objects, sensible andintelligible).

Firstofall itmustbe said thatour intellectparticipates,by likeness, to theuncreateddivinelight:

Fortheintellectuallightitselfwhichisinus,isnothingelsethanaparticipatedlikeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types.Whence it iswritten (Ps.4:6,7), Many say:Whoshowethusgood things?whichquestionthePsalmistanswers,ThelightofThycountenance,OLord,issigneduponus,asthoughheweretosay:BythesealoftheDivinelightinus,allthingsaremadeknowntous.20Our agent intellect has, by participation21, something in common with the

divine light,somethingwhichenables it to illuminate the images. Ineachhumanbeing exists a source of cognition, namely the light of the agent intellect whichenables us to know and to have access, without appeal to any inductive ordeductiveinferences,totheuniversalprinciplesofcognition(theprincipleofnon-contradiction,theprincipleoftheexcludedmiddleetc.).Buthowcanilluminationbeunderstoodinthespecificframeworkofhumancognitionand,evenmore,howcanitsolvetheintelligibilityproblem?

AsIseethingsilluminationcanbeunderstoodasfollowing:the images arepotentiallyintelligiblefromthebeginning,asithappenswitheverythingcreatedbyGodinconformitywithhumanpowers,but,atthesametime,theyarenotaware,so to speak, of their intelligibility. I do not intend to say that images have aconscienceof theirown,butonly that, though theyhaveapotentially intelligiblecharacter,thecognitivepowersuntiltheleveloftheagentintellectdonothavetheability to notice this specific feature, intelligibility. In the sameway inwhich inorderforathingtobeseen,thetransparentneedstoberenderedactualbythelight,the images intelligibilityneeds tobeactualized.Theoperationof illumination isanalogue to switching the lights into a darkened room in order to make visiblethingswhichotherwisewouldhaveremainedinvisibletothehumaneye.22Perhapsanotherexamplewouldmakethingsevenmoreclear.Supposeourcognizer,John,hadahandballaccidentandneedstotakeradiography.AtfirstJohnsbonesarenotvisiblewith the naked eye, though they are a part of his body.They are not yet

20Ipsumenimlumenintellectualequodestinnobis,nihilestaliudquamquaedamparticipatasimilitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae.Unde inPsalmo IV,dicitur,multidicunt,quisostenditnobisbona?CuiquaestioniPsalmistarespondet,dicens,signatumestsupernoslumenvultus tui,domine.Quasidicat,per ipsamsigillationemdivini luminis innobis,omnianobisdemonstrantur(S.Th. I,q.84,a.5,co.).

21 SeeHuston Smith, AquinassAbstractionism,Medieval Philosophy and Theology, vol. 10,2001.

22ThisexamplewassuggestedtomebyDominikPerler.

11 ThomasAquinasonBridgingtheGapbetweenMindandReality

157

visiblebecausearehiddenbehindtissues,blood,ligamentsetc.Itisonlyaftertheunit of radiation exposure transmits the short frequency ionized electromagneticradiationwhichpassesthroughthesofttissuesofhisbody,thatthebonesbecomevisible.Whatwasfirstvisibleonlyinpotency,hiddenbehindindividualpiecesof matter, becomes visible in act and, at the same time, the skin, its color andtexture,alongwithallothervisibleindividualdeterminationsoftheobjectwhichisphotographed, become invisible. Acting just like such an apparatus the agent intellectdoesnotneedtheabilitytoseebothsensibleparticularsandimmaterialuniversalsforbeingabletoabstractthelatteronesfromtheimages.Therefore,wecould say, that illumination is the intellects operation or function whichmakesmanifesttheintelligiblecharacterofextramentalobjects,theirconceptualskeleton,inordertomakepossibletheabstractionofintelligible speciesfromimages.

Theresultsofthisoperationorfunctionistheintelligible species which,justliketheimages andthesensible species,arethe means by whichpossibleintellectcognizestheextramentalobjectsessences,thequoofintellectivecognition.Throughthis double function, abstraction and illumination, the agent intellect offers thepossibleintellectitsmaterialcapitalbecausetheintelligible species arelaterdepositedinthepossibleintellect,andtheyaretheoneswhichwillinformthepossibleintellect:

Notonlydoestheactiveintellectthrowlightonthephantasm:itdoesmore;byitsownpoweritabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm.Itthrowslight on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greaterpowerbyitsconjunctionwiththeintellectualpart,sobythepoweroftheactiveintellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom ofintelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm,forasmuchasbythepoweroftheactiveintellectweareabletodisregardtheconditionsofindividuality,andtotakeintoourconsiderationthespecificnature,theimageofwhichinformsthepassiveintellect.23Afterbeingdepositedinthepossibleintellect,itassimilatesthembyforming

aconcept24(intention intellecta, verbum mentis or conceptus).Byformingthisconceptthepossibleintellectunderstandstheessenceofextramentalobject:

23Adquartumdicendumquodphantasmataetilluminanturabintellectuagente;etiterumabeis, per virtutem intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur. Illuminantur quidem, quia,sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita phantasmata ex virtuteintellectusagentis reddunturhabiliautabeis intentiones intelligibilesabstrahantur.Abstrahitautemintellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantumper virtutem intellectus agentisaccipere possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus,secundumquarumsimilitudinesintellectuspossibilisinformatur(S.Th. I,q.85,a.1,ad.4).

24Further readingsabout theconcept: JoshuaP.Hochschild, "DoesMentalLanguage ImplyMentalRepresentationalism?TheCaseofAquinassVerbumMentis,"Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, Volume 4, 2004, http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/PSMLM4/PSMLM4.pdf; Uwe Meixner, Abstraktion und Universalie bei Thomas vonAquin,inPhilosophisches Jahrbuch der Grres-Gesellschaft,AlberVerlag,Freiburg,1994;MarcEugeneOzon,The emergence of theories of mental language in early fourteenth-century

ElenaBltu 12

158

Theactionofunderstandingisnotexercisedwithoutsomethingbeingconceivedinthemindoftheonewhounderstands,andthisiscalledtheword:sincebeforeaconceptofsomekindisfixedinthemindwearenotsaidtounderstandbuttothinkaboutathinginordertounderstandit.25As it canbe noticed, thepossible intellect, just like the agent intellect, has

twooperationsorfunctions,apassiveandanactiveone.Thefirstimpliesreceivingtheintelligible species,theabilityofbeinginformedbythem,andthelatterconsistin the formationof aconcept, amentalwordwhichwill be later expressedby aspoken word, in and by which the possible intellect is able to cognize thehylomorphicextramentalobjectsessence:

Forinthefirstplacethereisthepassionofthepassiveintellectasinformedbythe intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms adefinition,oradivision,oracomposition,expressedbyaword.Whereforetheconcept conveyed by aword is its definition; and a proposition conveys theintellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify theintelligiblespeciesthemselves;butthatwhichtheintellectformsforitselfforthepurposeofjudgingofexternalthings.26We must further consider that the intellect, having been informed by the

species of the thing, by an act of understanding forms within itself a certainintention of the thing understood, that is to say, its notion, which the definitionsignifies.Thisisanecessarypoint,becausetheintellectunderstandsapresentandphilosophy as explanations of complex cognition,A thesis submitted in conformitywith therequirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of Philosophy,University of Toronto, 2005; Henri Paissac, Theologie du Verbe: Saint Augustin et SaintThomas,EditiondeCerf,Paris,1951;GiorgioPini,Species,ConceptandtheThing:TheoriesofSignificationintheSecondHalfoftheThirteenthCentury,Philosophy and Theology,vol.8,nr.1,1999; Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in Latter Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1997;Claude Panaccio, Aquinas on IntellectualRepresentation,Chaiers dpistmologie,nr.265,PublicationduGroupeenpistmologieCompare,Quebec,2002;ClaudePanaccio, Lediscours interior dePlaton aGuillaumed'Ockham,LeSeuil, Paris, 1999;ClaudePanaccio,FromMentalWordtoMentalLanguage,Philosophical Topics,vol.20,nr.2,1992;ClaudePanaccio,Mentalrepresentation,inTheCambridge History of Medieval Philosophy,vol.1,eds. Robert Pasnau and Christina van Dyke, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 346356;Olivier-ThomasVenard, ThomasdAquinpoticien,Revue roumaine de philosophie, tome55,2,2011,pp.303333.

25 Ipsumenim intelligerenonperficiturnisi aliquid inmente intelligentisconcipiatur,quoddicitur verbum; non enim dicimur intelligere, sed cogitare ad intelligendum, antequam conceptioaliquainmentenostrastabiliatur(De Anim. q.9,a.9,co.).

26 Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informaturspecie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem velcompositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; etenuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsasspeciesintelligibiles;sedeaquaeintellectussibiformatadiudicandumderebusexterioribus(S.Th.I,q.85,a.2,ad.3).

13 ThomasAquinasonBridgingtheGapbetweenMindandReality

159

anabsentthingindifferently.Inthistheimaginationagreeswiththeintellect.Buttheintellecthasthischaracteristicinaddition,namely,thatitunderstandsathingasseparatedfrommaterialconditions,withoutwhichathingdoesnotexistinreality.But this could not take place unless the intellect formed the abovementionedintentionforitself.27

Allowmetoofferanexampleforwhathasbeensaiduntilnow, inordertomakethingsclearer.WhenJohn,islookingatapieceofcitrine28,hisfiveexternalsensesreceivethesensible speciesoftheobject,theformsofthepropertiesoftheexternal object, and the means by which (id quo) our senses actually sense theobject,andnotwhat issensed.AtthisparticularmomentJohncanseetheyellowcolourofthesemipreciousstone,ifhetouchesit,hecansensethetexture,andhecanobserveitssizeandshape,orwhatwecancalltheproperandcommon sensible.29After theexternal sensesare informed, the internal sensesgatherall the informationand form aphantasm, an image of the external object.Now John can see thisparticularstonewiththisparticularshadeofyellow,withaspecifictexturalstructure,placed in this particular moment in time and under specific spatial coordinates.Fromthephantasms,towhichtheintellectwillalwaysneedtoreturn,inordertoget a glimpse of the particular and because human thinking revolves aroundimages,theagentintellectabstractstheintelligible species.Theintelligiblespeciescanbebestunderstoodascitrinesthechemicalformula:SiO2Fe3.Johnisnowabletoapprehendinwhatsize, inwhatshapeandinwhatgenusthisthingconsists.Dueto thefact that intelligible speciesare the thingsby means of which (id quo)we cognize (in virtue of their similarity relation with the essential form of theobject)andnot those that arecognized,at theendof thisprocessJohnisable toknow the quiddity or the essence of the object30. The final step of this firstoperationendswiththeintellectsactiveformationofaconcept,whichwilllaterbesignifiedbyaspokenword,andwillhelpJohntoactuallyunderstandtheexternalobject.Returningoncemoretoourcitrineexample,theconcept canbeunderstoodas the chemical formulaSiO2Fe(x),wherex stands fordifferentquantitiesof ironwhichcanproducedifferentvarietiesofquartz,amongwhichcitrine.

27Ulteriusautemconsiderandumestquodintellectus,perspeciemreiformatus,intelligendoformatinseipsoquandamintentionemreiintellectae,quaeest ratioipsius,quamsignificatdefinitio.Et hoc quidem necessarium est: eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem etpraesentem,inquocumintellectuimaginatioconvenit;sedintellectushocampliushabet,quodetiamintelligitremutseparatamaconditionibusmaterialibus,sinequibusinrerumnaturanonexistit;ethocnonpossetessenisiintellectussibiintentionempraedictamformaret(S.c.G. lib.1,cap.53,n.3).

28Citrineisasemipreciousyellowquartzresemblingtopaz.ItschemicalformulaisSiO2Fe3.29Theobjectsofsensationcanbe theproperobjects,namelycolor,smell,etc., thecommonobjects,likemovement,size,etc.,andtheaccidentalobjects,liketrees,people,etc.,whichexceedthepowerofasinglesense.

30Thequiddityor theessenceofanobjectsignifieswhat iscommon toallnatures, throughwhich the various beings are placed in various genera and species. In the case of human beings,humanityistheessencethatcanbesignifiedbyadefinition,whichincludesboththecommonmatterandthesubstantialform.

ElenaBltu 14

160

Now that we have seen how Aquinas thinks that, by positing an agentintellectendowedwiththepowertoabstractandilluminate,hewasabletobridgethe epistemological gap, instead of taking one last survey on the argumentsemployedinthisarticle,allowmetoreturnoncemoretohisownwords.Letusseein a nutshellAquinass improvedAristotelian recipe for solving the epistemologicalpuzzlewhichtriggeredthiswholeinvestigation:

ButsinceAristotledidnotallowthatformsofnaturalthingsexistapartfrommatter,andasformsexistinginmatterarenotactuallyintelligible;itfollowsthat thenaturesof formsof the sensible thingswhichweunderstandarenotactuallyintelligible.Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesensesasmadeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.Wemust thereforeassignon thepartof the intellect somepower tomake thingsactually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.31

31 SedquiaAristotelesnonposuit formas rerumnaturaliumsubsistere sinemateria; formae

autem inmateria existentesnon sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quodnaturae seu formae rerumsensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia inactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicutsensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem(S.Th.I,q.79,a.3,co.).